Interest Rates and Usury Laws in California

Instead, under Hardwick , a settlement agreement cannot waive usury if it is an extension of a usurious transaction or itself violate[s] the usury law. ( Hardwick, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.) 2. Application to this Case In this case, the parties did not have a bona fide dispute over usury, and the Settlement Agreement was not a resolution of a preexisting usury dispute. Instead, the facts suggest that the Agreement itself violated the usury law.

'[T]he intent sufficient to support the judgment [of usury] does not require a conscious attempt, with knowledge of the law, to evade it.

The decisions have pointed out that subsequent extensions or modifications may be unambiguously good for the interests of the borrower, and it is contrary to the borrower-protection purposes of usury law to effectively shut the parties off from extensions or modifications by applying usury limits for the first time to the later transactions.

Sokol, in contrast, argues that Californias fundamental public policy is to bar usury, which would include usurious interest rates under California law even if legal elsewhere. California does have a general fundamental public policy barring usury. It is set forth in Californias Constitution as well as statute. And while some courts have perhaps suggested that the bar against usury is not a fundamental public policy, the court believes that the case law does not so hold.

[T]he intent sufficient to support the judgment [of usury] does not require a conscious attempt, with knowledge of the law, to evade it. The conscious and voluntary taking of more than the legal rate of interest constitutes usury and the only intent necessary on the part of the lender is to take the amount of interest which he receives; if that amount is more than the law allows, the offense is complete.

In particular, Wimer argues that the court erred by finding that Beserra did not intend to violate the usury laws. Wimer argues that there was ample evidence that Wimer intended to charge 12%, which was a usurious rate of interest, and that it was not necessary for Wimer to show that Beserra intended to violate the usury law, only that he intended to charge 12% interest, even though he did not realize that it violated the usury laws.

ANALYSIS: Cross-defendants argue that the pleading fails to sufficiently allege a cause of action for usury, as it is not alleged that cross-complainant actually made any payments to cross-defendants under the promissory note, when in order to establish a claim for usury, there must be an actual payment of usurious interest.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown that there is any exception to the statutory usury provision, a breach of which still satisfies the elements of an usury claim. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Kevin J. Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Defendant to give notice.

Rather, Plaintiff wrongly equates "waiver" with a decision not to object to the non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property "based on usury." (FAC, ¶ 43.) The distinction is especially important in the usury context, as courts have held that "the protections of our usury law cannot be waived." (G Companies Management, LLC v. LREP Arizona LLC (2023) 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 658; see also WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v.

Pursuant to LA SC rule 3.206 , [i]f interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1 , proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.

Under the California Constitution, this interest rate constitutes usury. Cal. Const. Art. 15, §1. Plaintiff must explain why this interest rate is lawful before obtaining default judgment. DENIED, with leave to file an OSC re: usury.

Plaintiff is required to explain in their declaration their exemption from anti-usury laws. If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. (Rule 3.206 new and effective July 1, 2011).

Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule, rule 3.206 provides, “If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiff’s exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.” The complaint does not plead an exemption from the usury limitations. Plaintiff iHeartMedia did not submit proof of exemption.

In opposition, defendant argues that the proposed amended complaint is a futile sham pleading because plaintiffs cannot strip defendant of usury remedies by reducing the interest rate after he asserted a usury defense in his answer. Defendant asserts that the 2020 Notes are usurious because the interest rate is 12%, and that the California Constitution prohibits charging interest in excess of 10%.

Essentially, usury will only apply to un-matured contracts with a fixed obligation. (Southwest, supra,51 Cal.3d at 714.) This means that a usury defense can only arise from an interest term that accrues before the loan matures. “Even if these charges are measured by or characterized as “interest,” they do not make the transaction usurious: ‘Usury law applies only to unmatured contracts with a fixed obligation.

Local Rule 3.206 provides: “If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiff’s exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.” The parties’ Forbearance Agreement provides for 7.5% regular interest plus, upon default, an additional 7.5%, totaling 15%. (Beretta Decl., Ex. 3, ¶ 6(a)-(b).)

If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiff’s exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. (LASCR Rule 3.206.) Plaintiff has not pled or offered proof that it is exempt from California’s usury laws to charge in excess of the legal rate. Plaintiff also fails to support its claim for attorneys’ fees.

When “ interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of . . . Article XV, Section 1,” LASC Local Rule 3.206 places the burden on the plaintiff to present “proof . . . of plaintiff’s exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.” No usury exemption is pleaded and admitted in the Complaint or elsewhere identified.

Plaintiff argues that usury laws do not apply, in that this contract for legal services is not a loan or forbearance. Tentative Rulingr OVERRULE. Defendant’s demurrer failed to attach a meet and confer declaration per CCP §430.41. This demurrer raises the same argument from the prior demurrer, in violation of CCP §430.41(b). In Jones v.

Pursuant to Los Angeles County Superior Court Rules, Rule 3.206, “If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiff's exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.” Plaintiff has not provided an explanation for his entitlement to any exemption from the usury laws.

Pursuant to LA ¿ SC rule 3.206 ¿ , [i]f interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of ¿ California Constitution Article XV, Section 1 ¿ , proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. The Complaint does not appear to plead any exemption from the usury limitations and Plaintiff has not provided an explanation for her entitlement to any exemption.

While the general principles of usury law are correctly stated in the Demurrer, the Court notes that none of the cases cited by Moving Defendant was based on determinations at the pleading stage. Because the determination of whether a particular transaction is a loan or sale subject to the aforementioned exceptions to usury laws is a question of fact, the Court declines to rule on whether the Agreement falls under an exception to usury law.

This is willful intent for purposes of usury. (WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 525, 533 (“ ‘[T]he intent sufficient to support the judgment [of usury] does not require a conscious attempt, with knowledge of the law, to evade it.

The Comment does not indicate that usury in an underlying loan transaction is a ground for vacating a sister state judgment under section 1710.40, and Judgment Debtors cite no California decision in support of the proposition that it is. On the other hand, in the opposition memorandum, Judgment Creditor cites California decisions persuasively demonstrating that section 1710.40 is construed narrowly, and that usury would not be a ground for vacating a sister state judgment under section 1710.40.

Pursuant to LA SC rule 3.206 , [i]f interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1 , proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. The Complaint does not appear to plead any exemption from the usury limitations and Plaintiff has not provided an explanation for its entitlement to any exemption.

Cross-Defendant Batson Enterprises, Inc. demurs, per CCP § 430.10(e)&(f), to the usury cause of action in Cross-Complainant Colleen Griffin, individually and dba C&M Custom Tackle’s cross-complaint, on the basis that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain.

If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiff’s exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. (LASCR Rule 3.206.) Plaintiff has not pled or offered proof that it is exempt from California’s usury laws to charge in excess of the legal rate. Plaintiff also fails to support its claim for attorneys’ fees.

“proof . . . of plaintiff’s exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.”

TY Investment also argues that Plaintiff’s causes of action for usury and violation of the Unfair Competition Law fail because the loan at issue is exempt from claims of usury because it was originated by a licensed California broker.

Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is unable to maintain a cause of action for usury as the statute of limitations bars her cause of action. Lastly, Defendants argue that the interest rate contemplated by the agreement was not a usury interest rate as it did not exceed the legal maximum permitted. Usury is defined as the charging of interest for a loan or forbearance on money in excess of the legal maximum. [Citation.] ( Junkin v. Golden West Foreclosure Service, Inc.

If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. (Rule 3.206 new and effective July 1, 2011)

(2) add the following Twenty-Sixth Affirmative Defense for Illegal Usury, at the Answer, page 6: Defendant alleges that the fee and interest rate on the face of the alleged loan at issue in on or more of Plaintiffs causes of action are illegal usury per se pursuant to California law, and are, therefore, unenforceable. (Cal. Const. Art. XV, Sec. 1; Civ. Code §§¿1912 to 1916.12; and Cal Uncod . Init. Measures & Stats Deerings 1919, 1919-1.)

"[T]he intent sufficient to support the judgment [of usury] does not require a conscious attempt, with knowledge of the law, to evade it. The conscious and voluntary taking of more than the legal rate of interest constitutes usury and the only intent necessary on the part of the lender is to take the amount of interest which he receives; if that amount is more than the law allows, the offense is complete." [Citation.] … A transaction is rebuttably presumed not to be usurious. [Citations.]

"[T]he intent sufficient to support the judgment [of usury] does not require a conscious attempt, with knowledge of the law, to evade it. The conscious and voluntary taking of more than the legal rate of interest constitutes usury and the only intent necessary on the part of the lender is to take the amount of interest which he receives; if that amount is more than the law allows, the offense is complete." [Citation.] … A transaction is rebuttably presumed not to be usurious. [Citations.]

Relying on Thomas , Defendants further contend that the only intent required under usury is the intent to take an interest rate higher than the legal maximum, regardless of the lenders intent to violate the law. (See ibid. [The conscious and voluntary taking of more than the legal rate of interest constitutes usury and the only intent necessary on the part of the lender is to take the amount of interest which he receives].)

App. 2d 613: "Though a contract is tainted with usury, the abandonment of the usurious agreement and the execution of a new obligation for the amount of the actual debt free from the usury and bearing only legal interest, purges the original usury and makes the second obligation valid and enforceable. Whittemore Homes, Inc. v. Fleishman, 190 Cal.App.2d 554, 560 [12 Cal. Rptr. 235]. See also Westman v. Dye, 214 Cal. 28, 38 [4 P.2d 134]; Lamb v.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Defendants are estopped from asserting the defense of usury because they defrauded Plaintiff by representing that they would make payments on the loan when they actually intended to assert a usury interest defense to avoid their obligations under the loan. (See Stock v.

[A] debtor cannot bring [their] creditor to the penalties of the usury law by [their] voluntary default in respect to the obligation involved, where no violation of law is present at the inception of the contract. ( Id. , at p. 291.) In this case, the alleged usurious interest rate of 18% only applies after Defendants default on the lease payments. (Complaint, Ex., ¶ 8.) Because the 18% interest rate is brought on by Defendants voluntary default, there is no violation of Californias usury laws.

They argue that the constitutional prohibition against usury clearly inures to the benefit of one who is a borrower within the meaning of the usury law. In this vein, they argue the bankruptcy trustee for Cota's estate is the property party to bring suit, not Plaintiff, and no usury claim is assignable. They also contend Plaintiff forged the Quitclaim Deed conveying Cota's interest in the encumbered property to Plaintiff, and thus comes to the court with unclean hands.

('RMI') has no affirmative defense to WLW's claim that the subject transactions were sales of goods not subject to the usury law"; and 2) "The undisputed facts demonstrate that there is no triable issue of fact as to RMI's cause of action as RMI cannot show that the subject transactions were subject to the usury law."

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing they have already paid the loans’ principal and that any remaining interest or fees owed are void under the California Constitution’s usury prohibition. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection OVERRULED. Defendants’ evidentiary objections OVERRULED.

Fifth Affirmative Defense: No Cause of Action as Defendant Exempt from Usury Laws Defendant/Cross-Complainant Raymond J. Pages (“Defendant”) asserts as his fifth affirmative defense in the First Amended Answer that he is exempt from usury laws, so no cause of action may be maintained against him. Defendant cites Corporations Code section 25118, subdivisions (b)(1), (f)(1), and (f)(2), and Civil Code section 1916.1, as the bases for his assertion.

On August 25, 2022, the Court issued an Order on Plaintiffs request for default judgment, indicating, inter alia , that P laintiff seeks interest at an annual rate of 18% and that [t]he Complaint does not appear to plead any exemption from the usury limitations and Plaintiff has not provided an explanation for its entitlement to any exemption.

(LR 3.214(d)) [OK] Interest Computations: Declaration re Usury Exemption – Plaintiff, as a national bank is exempt from usury laws – Fin. Code § 1504(b).

As discussed below, Ybarra has failed to allege the subject loan violated California usury law. Therefore, Ybarra has failed to demonstrate an actual controversy related to whether the subject loan was usurious, and the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend as to the first cause of action.

Motion No. 2 : This motion seeks to exclude any reference to usury because the usury cause of action was dismissed. Plaintiff argues the fraud cause of action is based on the claim that Defendant made false promises to hide the fact that the rate of interest violated the usury laws.

Blair and Cristofo filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff for (1) fraudulent misrepresentation; (2) rescission; (3) declaratory relief; and (4) usury. ROA # 262. 1. Demurrer Fraud Plaintiff argues cross-complainants lack standing to pursue a derivative claim for fraud.

Plaintiff argued about usury but Defendant is not claiming usury. Plaintiff argued about late fees but Defendant is not complaining about those either. Plaintiff's case, Bank of America v Hirsch Mercantile Co 64 CA 2d 175, 181 was an action for declaratory relief regarding interpretation of agreements between parties. The complaint had documents attached and the answer had additional documents attached.

(LR 3.214(d)) [NO] Interest Computations: Must explain exemption from usury laws to charge 24.90% per annum.

Estoppel is a defense to usury. See Lakeview Meadows Ranch v. Bintliff (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 418. 424. Further, intent is an element of usury. Here, Defendant set the interest rates on the loans. See Declaration of Dipu Haque, Paragraph 5.

Counsel will confer with their clients regarding a waiver of right to a jury trial, assuming it exists, on issues of affirmative defense of usury and causes of action of usury. With respect to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine #1, the Court declines to rule at this time as it requires determinations of fact. The Court will treat the parties' papers as trial briefs.

If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. (Rule 3.206 new and effective July 1, 2011.) Plaintiff to submit a supplemental declaration justifying the interest rate charged.

Plaintiffs’ main argument is that the Promissory Note violates California usury laws but Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority that the interest rate of 5% per month is usurious, and Plaintiff failed to allege that this action does not fall within the many exceptions to the usury laws. Therefore, it is unclear if the contract is void or voidable. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED.

Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule, rule 3.206 provides, If interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default.

Pu rsuant to LA ¿ SC rule 3.206 ¿ , [i]f interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of California Constitution Article XV, Section 1, proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. The Complaint does not appear to plead any exemption from the usury limitations and Plaintiff has not provided an explanation for its entitlement to any exemption.

The Henleys instead argue that summary adjudication should be denied based on two affirmative defenses: (1) usury, and; (2) California’s anti-deficiency statutes. While the usury defense was not set forth in the Henleys’ answer, it appears to the Court that doing so was not required. (See, Yoo v. Robi (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1103 [“a defense of illegality based on public policy is not waived by the defendant's failure to include it as an affirmative defense in the answer to the complaint”].)

Patel does not argue, or present any evidence, that he is an exempt lender under the usury laws or that the transaction subject to the First Note and $450,000 Trust Deed is not subject to the usury limitations. 1. Usury Claim Patel admits the First Note provides for an interest rate of 18%.

TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT RE USURY NOTE ALLEGEDLY DRAFTED BY LEE SEE BUCK VS. DAHLGREN 23CALAPP3D 779. (LC(EX)

Prohibitions against usury are for the benefit of the borrower or a personal representative of the borrower and a junior lienholder in real property is not entitled to assert usury laws against senior lenders [12] . Id . Vista has not demonstrated a probability of success on its claim for usury. b. Material Variance Vista argues that there is a material variance in the amount AWBCO claims is owed under the FDT loan.

This rate exceeds the usury laws of this state by 75.8 percentage points, which is objectively “grossly unreasonable” pursuant to Probate Code section 11604.5(h)(1). Probate Advance argues that the usury laws do not apply by citing creatively to authorities that do nothing to actually define what the advance of cash is to Chales Van Dyke. The gravamen of the agreement memorialized in the contract with Probate Advance is that $15,000 was given to Mr.

The parties dispute whether the agreements attached to the Complaint (entitled “Promissory Note”) are loans, which would be subject to the usury law, or part of joint ventures, which could exempt the agreements from usury laws. (See Junkin v.

The answer alleges affirmative defenses of usury and unfair debt collection practices.

Citing to the Comment g to Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws § 203, the Mencor court quoted, “‘[T]he forum will examine the general usury statutes of all states which have a substantial relationship to the contract and apply the statute which either sustains the contract in full or else imposes the lightest penalty for usury.’” (Mencor Enters. v. Hets Equities Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 432, 437. Here, Colorado law sustains the contract in full.

The demurring Defendants are not parties to the loan transaction and/or Promissory Note and thus are not proper parties to the causes of action for rescission, cancellation of instrument, usury and unjust enrichment. Further, because Plaintiff’s demands for injunctive and declaratory relief are based solely upon the loan transaction at issue, the claims are likewise not properly pleaded against the demurring Defendants.

Do the usury limits apply to this loan? Please be prepared to discuss this issue at the hearing. In the alternative, Plaintiff may request a continuance to supplementally brief this issue.

First, while Brown argues that the usury claim is premature because plaintiffs have yet to pay any usurious interest, a cause of action for usury accrues when the usury has been paid “either in money, or money’s equivalent.” Westman, supra, at 38.

Indeed, the Hardwick Court found, inter alia , that [t]urning to the second prong of the trial courts analysis, assuming that policy concerns could be overcome, the court found that the unilateral release did not constitute a knowing waiver of Hardwicks usury claim. This finding was relevant because Wilcox attempted to invoke the proposition that a usury claim can be released in a settlement agreement.

The opposition, however, does not identify any applicable law. 6th Affirmative Defense: Usury The answer fails to allege sufficient facts for usury. Usury does not apply to the subject contract. The law of usury in California is based upon California Constitution article XV, section 1, which limits the interest payable [f]or any loan or forbearance of any money. [Fn.]

Demurrer would be overruled as to usury which may be raised as an affirmative defense. =(302/CWW)

Plaintiff may be able to allege usury on the part of Defendant, but more substantive allegations are required. The Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Sufficiency COA 3: Usury Yang demurs to the usury claim arguing that usury laws do not apply to sophisticated borrowers, citing Corporations Code §25118(f)(2), and that the exemption applies to loans of at least $300,000, citing Corporations Code §25118(b)(2). Yang also cites various discovery responses in support of the demurrer to this cause of action.

In the FACC, Ramirez asserted that the first cause of action for usury against only Manuel and there were no allegations that the others directly committed the usury. While this arguably could create prejudice had Cross- Defendant already completed discovery based on the allegations that Cynthia and Lozardo were only co-conspirators in Manuel’s usury, Ramirez contends that Plaintiffs have not conducted any discovery to date.

The Court ruled as follows: "Respondents claim that the interest rate that was part of the arbitration award amounts to usury. However, a defense of usury is not applicable to the matter herein. The concept of usury applies to loans, which are typically paid at a fixed or variable rate over a term. The instant transaction, by contrast, is an ownership interest in proceeds for a claim, contingent on the actual existence of any proceeds.

Thus, plaintiff is exempt under the state's usury laws pursuant to California Financial Code section 22002. Judgment is entered against defendants in the principal amount of $369,437.55, plus $39,775.53 in prejudgment interest and $5,760.00 in attorneys' fees and costs, for a total judgment amount of $414,973.08.

This violates the usury restrictions of California Constitution, article 15, which limits interest on loans for personal, family or household purposes to ten percent per year. Plaintiff must put forth evidence showing this loan falls outside those categories, or it is exempt. Plaintiff may choose to accept 10% interest or file additional papers. IN LIGHT OF THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC PARTIES AND COUNSEL ARE TO APPEAR REMOTELY VIA LA COURT CONNECT.

Usury Lawsuit A separate lawsuit (“Usury Lawsuit”) initiated by Renaissance 12 and SCI against Eurocom Finances also was waged in Reims District Court. Chol Decl. Ex. 2, ¶27, Ex. C.

A panoply of statutes creates further exemptions from the general usury law. [Citation.] “[T]he usury law ... is riddled with so many exceptions that the law's application itself seems to be the exception rather than the rule.” [Citation.] (Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1527, 1534-1535.)

Usury and Unconscionability A usurious loan is not revealed by the Complaint. Exhibit A to the Complaint, at page 1, states that Celtic Bank was the lender. Banks are exempt from usury law . Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1535 n.3. See also Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank (2003) 112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1535 ([T]he usury law & is riddled with so many exceptions that the laws application itself seems to be the exception rather than the rule.).

SUSTAIN the demurrer to the 8th cause of action for usury, without leave to amend; 2. SUSTAIN the demurrer to the 9th cause of action for rescission, without leave to amend; 3. OVERRULE the demurrer to the 4th through 7th causes of action for fraud; 4. SUSTAIN the demurrer to all causes of action based on lack of standing, with 30 days leave to amend (Plaintiff lacks standing if the trustee has not yet abandoned the property); 5.

In addition, "[t]he California Constitution, article XV, section 1, exempts certain institutions, such as banks, from the usury laws." Strike v. Trans-West Discount Corp. (1979) 92 Cal. App. 3d 735, 745. Leave to amend will not be permitted unless Plaintiff appears at the hearing and represents to the Court that it is possible to allege a viable cause of action against Defendant.

In reply, Cross-Defendants point out that Cross-Complainants rely on case law regarding usury claims, not conversion. Cross-Defendants acknowledge that consent may not be a defense to usury, but maintain their argument that consent is a defense to conversion. Neither side has provided authority on whether a conversion claim can be tacked on to a usury claim under Taylor under circumstances where the contracting parties agreed to certain monetary payments that might later be found unlawful.

This goes beyond California’s usury limits, however, and Plaintiff has not provided a justification as to whether any exception to the usury laws apply to this contract. (See Los Angeles County Court Rule, Rule 3.206.) Plaintiff must provide authority for an interest rate beyond 10%. Second, Plaintiff’s calculations do not appear to comply with the contract. Plaintiff calculates interest at a rate of 11.5%, based on a principal of $154,580.94, from April 7, 2015 to September 26, 2018.

Plaintiff argues (1) the subject loan is exempt from the California Constitution’s usury restrictions on the basis that it was arranged by a licensed real estate broker and is secured by real property (Civ. Code § 1916.1); (2) the subject loan is exempt from the California Constitution’s usury restrictions because the borrower and lender had a preexisting business relationship and the borrower had the resources to protect itself (Corp.

Usury The annual rate of interest on a loan or forbearance shall be 7%. Const. Art. XV §1.

They argue that the constitutional prohibition against usury clearly inures to the benefit of one who is a borrower within the meaning of the usury law. In this vein, they argue the bankruptcy trustee for Cota's estate is the property (sic) party to bring suit, not Plaintiff, and no usury claim is assignable. They also contend Plaintiff forged the Quitclaim Deed conveying Cota's interest in the encumbered property to Plaintiff, and thus comes to the court with unclean hands.

Further, usury law applies to loans of money from the res of a trust. (Hobbs v. Buck (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 176, 179-180.) As to the Fifth Cause of Action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, the The Chugh Firm is asserted to be a well-respected law firm in the Indian community. The allegations are thus adequate for purposes of a demurrer. The cross-complainants shall give notice.

Therefore, the Court finds that Doumani is entitled to summary adjudication on the usury cause of action. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Doumani’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Doumani’s motion for summary adjudication is denied as to the breach of contract cause of action and granted as to the usury cause of action. Doumani is ordered to give notice of this ruling. DATED: March 12, 2019 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

This cross complaint for (1) usury, (2) fraudulent inducement, (3) intentional interference with economic advantage and (4) unfair business practices arises out of a contract entered into on 09/15/2105 between Defendant and Cross Complainant U.S. Oil Solutions and Plaintiff and Cross Defendant Imperial Western Production, Inc. (IWP), in which IWP sold a 2008 Ford F-650 pump truck valued at $35,000 and transferred $5,000 cash to U.S.

Cross-Defendants' motion to strike the prayer for general damages in connection with the first cause of action for usury and second cause of action for fraud is DENIED. General damages are plainly recoverable in an action for fraud. As for the usury claim, Cross-Defendants assume the claim for general damages is based on emotional distress. The pleading cannot be read so narrowly.

Lander claims the information he seeks will establish that USRECH is not entitled to a usury exemption because it was not licensed when the loan was made, and was required to be licensed. Notably, moving parties assert that the key evidence is whether USRECH was licensed at the time of the loan, which Lander acknowledges it was.

Usury Pascua alleges that the amount of money received by Merhi at the close of escrow represents a usurious transaction because Merhi received his loan principal and additional funds that exceed the statutory maximum for interest. (SAC, ¶¶ 180-181.) Merhi contends that the cause of action for usury must fail because the Agreement is exempt from usury laws.

Sixth Cause of Action – Usury The essential elements of usury are: (1) The transaction must be a loan or forbearance; (2) the interest to be paid must exceed the statutory maximum; (3) the loan and interest must be absolutely repayable by the borrower; and (4) the lender must have a willful intent to enter into a usurious transaction. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 798.) Here, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to maintain this cause of action.

As alleged, the loans do not violate the usury laws. Plaintiff’s additional allegation at ¶ 33 that Sampson’s failure to comply with B&P Code § 10240 somehow invalidates his exemption to the usury laws is without merit and unsupported by any legal authority.

Usury Assuming that defendants raised usury as an affirmative defense, plaintiff still establishes it is entitled to the damages they seek in this motion. Epstein v. Frank (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 111, 122-123 stated the law on usury: The attempt to exact the usurious rate of interest renders the interest provisions of a note void. The usurious provisions, however, do not affect the right of the payee to recover the principal amount of the note when due.

Under the California Constitution, this interest rate appears to constitute illegal usury. Cal. Const. Art. 15, §1. Plaintiff must explain why this rate is lawful. - Plaintiff seeks to recover for common counts from individual defendants Colin and Christel Maclean, but the only evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim is a contract between Keenan Williams and Saratoga Juice Bar LLC. The individual defendants are not parties to the contract.

Overrule Phenix's general demurrer to the second cause of action for unlicensed private investigative services, third cause of action for unauthorized practice of law, and fifth cause of action for usury law violations, on the ground that Phenix fails to identify any deficiencies in the pleading of these three causes of action.

Discussion Nguyen requests leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs for (1) Violation of Finance Code § 17200, § 17500 et seq., (2) Usury and/or Unconscionable Lending, (3) Unjust Enrichment and (4) Violation of California Finance Lenders Law. The proposed cross-complaint arises from the same transaction or occurrence as alleged in the underlying complaint and is a related cause of action.

In September 2007, Freeman and Boyd entered into a written settlement agreement, which was a good faith attempt by the parties to agree on a new set of obligations free from usury. In a statement of decision dated July 27, 2021, this Court held that while the original note contained a usurious interest rate, the subsequent settlement agreement purged the usury.