Education Code section 201 states in pertinent part:
(Hector F. v. El Centro Elementary Sch. Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 331, 337-38 citing Ed. Code, Sec. 201.)
“As a means of implementing the right of students to be free of discrimination and harassment set forth in Education Code section 201, Education Code section 32281 subdivision (a) provides that each school district is responsible for the development of comprehensive school safety plans for each of its schools. Education Code section 32282, subdivision (a)(2)(E) provides that, among other matters, each comprehensive school safety plan shall include a discrimination and harassment policy consistent with the prohibition against discrimination contained in [Education Code section 201].” Education Code section 32282, subdivision (f) further provides that: “As comprehensive school safety plans are reviewed and updated, the Legislature encourages all plans, to the extent that resources are available, to include policies and procedures aimed at the prevention of bullying.” (Hector F. v. El Centro Elementary Sch. Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 331, 338.)
In Collins v. Thurmond (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 879 the court held that a taxpayer discrimination lawsuit brought under Education Code Sections 201 and 220 had to be dismissed because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under the UCP. The court stated:
“A taxpayer suit is designed to facilitate the resolution of legal issues that may not otherwise be justiciable due to standing issues. Thus, where the Legislature has provided an administrative remedy, a taxpayer action cannot be used in lieu of that remedy....The question raised in this case is whether the Uniform Complaint Procedure administrative remedy is available to those suffering from discriminatory practices at the local level and is a process that must be completed prior to bringing a taxpayer laws. [...] We conclude that it is.
“The Uniform Complaint Procedures (UCP) set forth administrative procedures for resolving grievances ‘regarding an alleged violation by a local agency of federal or state law or regulations governing educational programs, including allegations of unlawful discrimination . . . .’ (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, Sec. 4610(a).) The regulations apply to ‘the filing of complaints which allege unlawful discrimination . . . against any protected group as identified under Education Code section 200 and 220 . . . in any program or activity conducted by a local agency, which is funded directly by, or that receives or benefits from any state financial assistance.’ (Id., subd. (c).) The referenced complaints are typically filed with the local agency, which then has 60 days to conduct and complete an investigation. (See Id., Sec. 4631(a), (e).) The resulting conclusion can be appealed to CDE, which must again complete its review in 60 days. (Id., Secs. 4632, 4633.) The regulations do not appear to restrict who may file complaints and appellants have pointed to no reason why the taxpayer plaintiff could not have filed an administrative complaint in the first instance.
“These proceedings are specifically designed to administratively resolve allegations of discrimination under Education Code section 200, as well as similar complaints. (See Ed. Code, Sec. 221.1.) They would thus appear to bar any taxpayer action alleging discrimination in the first instance.”
Education Code section 220 provides that “[n]o person shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic that is contained in the definition of hate crime set forth in Section 422.55 of the Penal Code, including immigration status, in any program or activity conducted by an educational institution that receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance, or enrolls pupils who receive state student financial aid.”
To prevail on a claim under section 220 for peer sexual orientation harassment, a plaintiff must show:
(Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 579 (“[w]e further conclude that from the words of section 262.3(b), as well as from other markers of legislative intent, money damages are available in a private enforcement action under section 220.”).)
“We conclude the Legislature intended Title IX's elements to govern an action under section 220. We further conclude the Legislature intended money damages to be available in a private enforcement action. Although the trial court erred by applying the elements of liability from FEHA and not Title IX when it instructed the jury under section 220, we conclude that error is harmless. As the District notes, the elements of liability in connection with plaintiffs' equal protection claims against Fisher are the same elements that apply in a Title IX action for money damages, which we hold also govern a private suit for damages under section 220.” (Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 581.)
“[A] state funding recipient can be liable for peer sexual orientation harassment, even if a recipient does not itself engage in harassment directly, if its response was "clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances" (Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ. (1999) 526 U.S. 629, 648), and "subjected" a person to "discrimination" for purposes of section 220 (§ 220).” (Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567, 589.)
Specifically, under Davis:
“[F]unding recipients with notice that they may be liable for their failure to respond to nonagents' discriminatory acts. The common law has also put schools on notice that they may be held responsible under state law for failing to protect students from third parties' tortious acts. Of course, the harasser's identity is not irrelevant. Deliberate indifference makes sense as a direct liability theory only where the recipient has the authority to take remedial action, and Title IX's language itself narrowly circumscribes the circumstances giving rise to damages liability under the statute. If a recipient does not engage in harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference "subject[s]" its students to harassment, i.e., at a minimum, causes students to undergo harassment or makes them liable or vulnerable to it. Moreover, because the harassment must occur "under" "the operations of" a recipient, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), 1687, the harassment must take place in a context subject to the school district's control.These factors combine to limit a recipient's damages liability to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”
(Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.(1999) 526 U.S. 629, 630.)
Nature of Proceedings: Motion Judgment on PleadingsMotion for Judgment on the PleadingsATTORNEYS:Peter Scott for Plaintiff Fair Education Santa Barbara, Inc.Craig Price for Defendants Santa Barbara Unified School District, Cary MatsuokaSarah E. Piepmeier for Defendant Just Communities Central Coast, Inc.RULING: Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s second cause of action...
..ction for declaratory relief is denied.BACKGROUNDPlaintiff Fair Education Santa Barbara, Inc. (“FESB”) is a non-profit corporation composed of parents, taxpayers, and residents of Santa Barbara County that was...
Jan 14, 2020
Santa Barbara County, CA
Case Number: BC644226JANE CJD DOE ET AL VS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT ETFiling Date: 12/20/2016Case Type: Other PI/PD/WD (General Jurisdiction)11/09/2017Conference-Case ManagementBoth parties have demanded jury trial and posted jury fees. The matter will be set for trial at the earliest available date on the court’s calendar.CASE MANAGEMENT ORDERNote 1Jury Trial11/7/20189:30 a.m.Note 2Sel...
Nov 09, 2017
Los Angeles County, CA
The Court bases the Order After Hearing on this date upon the following Statement of Decision: 1. The present case arises out of the alleged series of abusive sexual acts committed against Plaintiff Jane Dn Doe (“Plaintiff”), a minor, by Defendant Marcus Williams (“Williams”) employee and agent of Defendant Antelope Valley Union High School District (“AVUHSD”). 2. Plaintiff filed the initial Com...
..uctive Fraud (Civ. Code § 1573). 3. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Williams, an adult teacher, coach, and employee of both AVUHSD and Palmdale High School, engaged in a series of abusive sexual acts with Plaintiff from December 2015 into January 2016. Plaintiff was approximately 14 years old when the alleged abuse began. Plaintiff alleges that staff at AVUHSD had prior notice of much of...
Apr 25, 2019
Personal Injury/ Tort
Los Angeles County, CA
MOVING PARTY: Defendants, City of PasadenaRESPONDING PARTY: NoneThe court considered the moving papers and the arguments of counsel.BACKGROUNDPlaintiff Inri Coba (“Plaintiff”), a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem Karla Cabrera, filed a complaint on September 25, 2017, alleging breaches of mandatory duties under direct and vicarious liability theories. On April 20, 2018, Defendant City of...
..mandatory duties set forth in various education codes to protect Plaintiff from bullying. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-27.)Defendant’s Demurrer to the ComplaintDefendant demurs to the entire complaint on the basis that Defendant ha...
May 17, 2018
Los Angeles County, CA
1-8 of 8 results
Feb 20, 2019
San Francisco County, CA
Dec 12, 2018
Tharpe, D Tyler
Fresno County, CA
Jul 10, 2018
Santa Clara County, CA
May 03, 2016
San Francisco County, CA
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