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AMY R. LEVINE, State Bar No. 160743
MATTHEW J. TAMEL, State Bar No. 229378
KASMIRA M. BROUGH, State Bar No. 308791
Dannis Woliver Kelley
275 Battery Street, Suite 1150
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: 415.543.4111
Facsimile: 415.543.4384
Attorneys for Defendant
LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
GIRL DOE, a minor, by her Guardian ad Case No. 17CV307094
Litem, Father Doe
LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT’S
ELLEY
Plaintiff MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
UITE
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OLIVER
ATTERY TREET
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
AN RANCISCO
LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT, and SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
DOES 1 through 50
ANNIS
ate September 13, 2018
Defendants
Dept
Judge Hon. Peter H. Kirwan
Trial: October 15, 2018
Complaint Filed: March 8, 2017
Exempt from filing fees pursuant to Gov.
Code, §
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR
DWK DMS 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
4 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS .................................................. 1
5 III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .................................................................. 2
6 IV. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 3
7 A. District is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Negligence Per Se Cause
of Action Because Plaintiff Cannot Prove All Required Elements ........................ 3
8
1. Plaintiff’s Negligence Per Se Claim is Duplicative of Her
9 Negligence Claim and Not a Valid Separate Cause of Action .................... 3
10 2. The Statutes Plaintiff Relies Upon Do Not Provide a Standard on
Which Negligence Per Se Can be Based ..................................................... 4
11
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a. Education Code Sections 220 and 233.5 Do Not Create a
12 Mandatory Duty of Care for the District ......................................... 5
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY
13 b. Education Code Section 44807 Does Not Create a Standard
of Care ............................................................................................. 7
14
3. The Complaint Doesn’t Allege Separate Causes of Action, Nor is
15 There a Basis for Liability Under Sections 220, 233.5, or 44807 .............. 7
16 a. There is No Evidence the District Intentionally
Discriminated Against Girl Doe...................................................... 8
17
i. The District Had No Notice of Alleged
18 Discrimination or an Opportunity to Correct ...................... 8
19 ii. The District Was Not Deliberately Indifferent .................... 9
20 b. There Was No Failure to Provide Moral Instruction or Any
Causal Link ................................................................................... 10
21
4. Plaintiff Failed to Comply with Government Tort Claim
22 Presentation Requirements ........................................................................ 11
23 B. Plaintiff’s Negligence and Negligence Per Se Claims Fail Because the
Incidents at Issue Were Not Reasonably Foreseeable .......................................... 13
24
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3 State Cases
4 Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist.
5 (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 492 ........................................................................................................ 14
6 Clausing v. San Francisco Unif. Sch. Dist.
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224 ...................................................................................................... 5
7
Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.
8 (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244....................................................................................................... 10, 11
9 Dailey v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist.
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 741 .................................................................................................................. 14
10
11 Das v. Bank of America, N.A.
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727 ................................................................................................... 3, 4
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Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta
13 (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 899 ..................................................................................................... 13
14 Donohue v. State of California
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795 ...................................................................................................... 13
15
Donovan v. Poway Unif. Sch. Dist.
16
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567 ............................................................................................... 6, 8, 9
17
Fall River Joint Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct.
18 (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431 ................................................................................................ 12, 13
19 Gong v. City of Rosemead
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363 ..................................................................................................... 12
20
Guzman v. Cty. Of Monterey
21
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 887................................................................................................................. 5
22
Haggis v. City of Los Angeles
23 (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490............................................................................................................. 5, 6
24 Hoff v. Vacaville Unif. Sch. Dist.
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 925........................................................................................................ passim
25
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist.
26 (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508 ................................................................................................................ 14
27
J.L. v. Children’s Inst., Inc.
28 (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388 ............................................................................................... 13, 14
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1 Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist.
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320 ................................................................................................... 16
2
Leger v. Stockton Unif. Sch. Dist.
3 (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448 ................................................................................................ 5, 14
4
Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs.
5 (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472 ................................................................................................. 10, 11
6 M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist.
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508 ............................................................................................... 14, 17
7
Margaret W. v. Kelley R.
8 (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 141 ............................................................................................... 14, 15
9 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
10 (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465..................................................................................................... 2, 10, 11
11 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783 ....................................................................................................... 4
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Nunn v. State of Calif.
13 (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616 ................................................................................................................ 11
14 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unif. Sch. Dist.
(1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814 .................................................................................................... 6, 11
15
16 Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr.
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256 ............................................................................................... 3, 10
17
Rodrigues v. San Jose Unif. Sch. Dist.
18 (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 842 ........................................................................................................ 7
19 S.M. v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist.
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 ..................................................................................................... 12
20
21 Shoemaker v. Myers
(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407 ....................................................................................................... 12
22
Woodsmall v. Mt. Diablo Unif. Sch. Dist.
23 (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 262 ...................................................................................................... 14
24 Federal Cases
25 Garcia v. Clovis Unif. Sch. Dist.
(2009) 627 F.Supp.2d 1187 ........................................................................................................ 9
26
27 Garedakis v. Brentwood Union Sch. Dist.
(N.D. Cal. 2016) 183 F.Supp.3d 1032 ..................................................................................... 12
28
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1 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.
(1998) 524 U.S. 274 ................................................................................................................... 8
2
Moore v. City of Vallejo
3 (E.D.Cal. 2014) 73 F.Supp.3d 1253 ......................................................................................... 13
4
Ortiz v. Lopez
5 (E.D.Cal. 2010) 688 F.Supp.2d 1072 ....................................................................................... 13
6 Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ.
(C.D.Cal. 2015) 100 F.Supp.3d 927 ........................................................................................... 8
7
Wills v. Brown Univ.
8 (1st Cir. 1999) 184 F.3d 20 ........................................................................................................ 9
9 State Statutes
10
California Education Code sections 220, 233.5 ...................................................................... passim
11
Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. ................................................................................................ 2
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Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. (a) .......................................................................................... 2
13
Code of Civ. Proc. section 437c, subd. (f)(1) ................................................................................... 2
14
Code Civ. Proc. section 437c, subd. (o) ........................................................................................... 2
15
Educ. Code section 200 .................................................................................................................... 6
16
Educ. Code section 201(g) ............................................................................................................... 8
17
18 Educ. Code, section 233.5, subd. (a) and (b) ................................................................................... 6
19 Education Code section 220 .................................................................................................... passim
20 Education Code sections 220, 233.5, and 44807.................................................................. 1, 3, 5, 7
21 Education Code section 233.5 ................................................................................................ 6, 8, 10
22 Education Code section 44807 ......................................................................................................... 7
23 Evidence Code section 669 ...................................................................................................... 3, 5, 7
24
Gov. Code, section 815.6 ..................................................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7
25
Gov. Code, section 910 .................................................................................................................. 12
26
Gov. Code, sections 911.2, 945.4 ................................................................................................... 12
27
Government Code sections 815.2 and 815.6 .................................................................................. 11
28
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1 Under the Tort Claims Act ............................................................................................................. 12
2 Constitutional Provisions
3 California Constitution article I........................................................................................................ 5
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1
2 I. INTRODUCTION
3 Plaintiff Girl Doe, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Father Doe, filed this action on
4 March 8, 2017, asserting two causes of action against the Los Altos School District: a First Cause
5 of Action for negligence, based on an alleged breach of “an affirmative duty under statutory law,
6 including but not limited to, Education Code §§220, 233.5, and 44807,” and a Second Cause of
7 Action for negligence per se, based on “a violation of statutes including, but not limited to,
8 California Education Code §§220, 233.5, [and] 44807.” Because there is no triable issue of
9 material fact with regard to either of these causes of action and the District is entitled to judgment
10 as a matter of law, the Court should grant summary judgment in the District’s favor.
11 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
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12 Girl Doe was seven years old at the time of the events giving rise to this Complaint.
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DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY
13 (Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts “SS”) 4.) She attended Loyola Elementary School
14 (“Loyola”) in the District for kindergarten, and then again for second grade during the 2015-2016
15 school year. (SS 3, 6.) In February 2016, Girl Doe’s mother withdrew her from Loyola. (SS 33.)
16 On January 28, 2016, Plaintiff and another second grade student reported to yard duty aide
17 Nimmi Rao that two boys in Girl Doe’s class, J.R. and M.Z., had pulled down her pants and
18 poured water down her back in the playground area during lunch recess. (SS 5, 12, 13.) Ms. Rao
19 addressed the situation with the children, and then brought Girl Doe, J.R. and M.Z. to Loyola
20 principal Kimberly Attell. (SS 15, 16.) Ms. Attell interviewed the students, and additional
21 witnesses. (SS 17.) Girl Doe told Ms. Attell that J.R. and M.Z. had pulled down her pants and
22 pulled up her shirt behind the shed. (SS 18.) Girl Doe reported that J.R. and M.Z. had touched
23 her “bottom front and back.” (SS 18.) Girl Doe reported that a similar incident happened
24 recently, but was not sure when. (SS 19.) This was the first report that Ms. Attell or anyone
25 else in the District had of either incident, or of any issue between Girl Doe and J.R. or M.Z. (SS
26 10, 11, 27, 28.)
27 After her initial investigation, Ms. Attell contacted District Superintendent Jeffrey Baier,
28 and then the Los Altos Police Department for further follow up. (SS 20, 23.) She also contacted
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1 the parents of Girl Doe, J.R. and M.Z. (SS 21.) J.R. and M.Z.’s parents were told what had been
2 reported, and they were advised that the students should not return to school. (SS 22.) Ms. Attell
3 also took steps to protect Girl Doe from any unwanted attention over the events and notified the
4 students’ teacher so she could redirect any conversation about it. (SS 25.) At Ms. Attell’s
5 direction, school psychologist Christine Anderson met with the students’ class as a whole to
6 discuss the importance of student privacy and reporting problems to a safe adult. (SS 31.) In
7 addition, Ms. Attell offered the services of the school psychologist to talk with the students
8 involved. (SS 26.) Girl Doe continued to attend Loyola until about February 12, 2016, at which
9 time her mother withdrew her and began homeschooling her. (SS 33.) There were no further
10 incidents between Girl Doe and J.R. or M.Z. after January 28, 2016, and in fact, neither J.R. nor
11 M.Z. ever returned to Loyola after that date. (SS 29, 30.)
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12 III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY
13 “A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact
14 exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
15 (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a cause of
16 action that has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) A cause of action has no merit
17 where one or more of its elements cannot be established or an affirmative defense to the cause of
18 action is established. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (o).) A defendant may obtain summary
19 adjudication as to “one or more causes of action within an action … one or more claims for
20 damages, or one or more issues of duty.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Once a
21 moving defendant has shown that a cause of action or issue of duty has no merit, “the burden
22 shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff
23 ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings … but, instead, shall set forth
24 the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action…’
25 (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. [(p)(2)]…” (Merrill, 26 Cal.4th at 476-77.)
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1 IV. ARGUMENT
2 A. District is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Negligence Per Se Cause of
Action Because Plaintiff Cannot Prove All Required Elements
3
1. Plaintiff’s Negligence Per Se Claim is Duplicative of Her Negligence
4 Claim and Not a Valid Separate Cause of Action
5 As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges two causes of action: negligence and
6 negligence per se. Plaintiff cites three Education Code sections: 220, 233.5, and 44807, as the
7 bases for both causes of action.
8 The doctrine of negligence per se, as codified in Evidence Code section 669, recognizes
9 that a duty of care, and the attendant reasonable standard of conduct, may be set by statute. (Hoff
10 v. Vacaville Unif. Sch. Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 938.) “Generally, ‘[t]he doctrine of
11 negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that
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12 affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. [Citation.] The doctrine of
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DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY
13 negligence per se does not provide a private right of action for violation of a statute. [Citation.]’.”
14 (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-38 [citations omitted]; see also
15 Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285-86 (“the doctrine of negligence
16 per se does not establish tort liability. Rather, it merely codifies the rule that a presumption of
17 negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of
18 which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered as a result of
19 the violation.”).) Moreover, a plaintiff is not entitled “to a presumption of negligence in the
20 absence of an underlying negligence action.” (Quiroz, 140 Cal.App.4th at 1285.) Thus, because
21 negligence per se is merely an evidentiary doctrine to be used in a negligence action, Plaintiff’s
22 only appropriately pled claim is for negligence, not negligence per se.
23 That Plaintiff does not have a separate cause of action for negligence per se is underscored
24 by the fact that she asserts the same three Education Code provisions in support of both her
25 negligence and negligence per se claims. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges no additional facts in
26 support of her negligence per se claim, save for the addition of seeking attorneys’ fees under
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1 Education Code section 220.1 To establish a violation of Education Code section 220, 233.5, or
2 44807 under a negligence per se theory (just as under a negligence theory), Plaintiff would have
3 to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. The only distinction is that when negligence per
4 se is available, Plaintiff can establish the breach of a duty by showing violation of a statute that
5 creates an applicable mandatory standard of care. Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is therefore
6 duplicative of her negligence claim, and is not a valid separate cause of action. Thus, Plaintiff’s
7 Second Cause of Action for negligence per se fails as a matter of law.
8 2. The Statutes Plaintiff Relies Upon Do Not Provide a Standard on
Which Negligence Per Se Can be Based
9
“Under the doctrine [of negligence per se], ‘the plaintiff ‘borrows’ statutes to prove duty
10
of care and standard of care.’” (Das, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 738 [citations omitted].) A
11
“presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a
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DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY
class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm which the plaintiff
13
suffered as a result of the violation of the statute.” (Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 938.)
14
A parallel construction applies in the arena of public entity liability, such as would be
15
applicable to the District. “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an
16
enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public
17
entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty
18
unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”
19
(Gov. Code, § 815.6.) The “standard for determining whether a mandatory duty exists [under
20
Gov. Code, § 815.6] is virtually identical to the test for an implied statutory duty of care.”...
21
[A]lthough there is a semantic distinction in the labels attached to each cause of action, there is no
22
legal difference in the analytic process to determine the existence of a duty of care.’” (Hoff,
23
supra, 19 Cal.4th at 939 & n.7.)
24
25 1
Since Plaintiff has not pled or attempted to plead an Education Code section 220 claim, there is no basis for
26 attorneys’ fees. Fees are not recoverable in negligence or negligence per se causes of action. (See, e.g., Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783 (mother of arrestee who died after arresting officers applied Total
27 Appendage Restraint Procedure (TARP) was not entitled to attorney fees under private attorney general doctrine for
her successful wrongful death action against county, notwithstanding court's requiring county to preserve recordings
28 relating to similar claims, and notwithstanding changes to TARP procedure, since mother had substantial financial
stake in outcome of lawsuit).)
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1 Application of Government Code section 815.6 (or Evidence Code section 669) “requires
2 that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive in its
3 directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a
4 particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490,
5 498.) “Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of law. (Id. at 499.) Courts
6 have strictly construed what constitutes a mandatory duty, finding that one exists only where the
7 statute “affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.” (Guzman v. Cty.
8 Of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 898 (citations omitted); see also Clausing v. San Francisco
9 Unif. Sch. Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1240 [“the enactment relied upon must impose a
10 mandatory duty, not a discretionary duty; neither must the enactment simply set forth a
11 prohibition or a right, as opposed to an affirmative duty on the part of a government agencty to
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12 perform some act”] (emphasis original); Leger v. Stockton Unif. Sch. Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d
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13 1448, 1455 n.1 [“Because section 28(c) [of Article I of the California Constitution] does not
14 supply the necessary rule for its implementation, but is simply a declaration of rights, it imposes
15 no mandatory duty upon defendants to make Franklin High School safe”].)
16 Here, Plaintiff attempts to “borrow” Education Code sections 220, 233.5, and 44807 to
17 establish a standard of care and create a presumption of negligence. However, as set forth below,
18 none of these sections impose a mandatory duty with specific implementing guidelines that would
19 trigger a presumption of negligence if violated.
20 a. Education Code Sections 220 and 233.5 Do Not Create a
Mandatory Duty of Care for the District
21
Education Code section 220 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall be subjected
22
to discrimination on the basis of…gender…in any program or activity conducted by an
23
educational institution that receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance ….” This section
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creates no standard of care because it is prohibitory, not mandatory, and has no implementing
25
guidelines that were violated here. Indeed, what constitutes gender discrimination is a widely
26
debated matter of interpretation, not a bright line rule that could delimit a workable standard of
27
care for school districts. Further, section 220 was enacted to prevent gender discrimination in
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1 programs and activities, not to protect students from personal injury for an alleged sexual assault.
2 (Educ. Code § 200 [“It is the policy of the State of California to afford all persons in public
3 schools, regardless of their … gender, … equal rights, and opportunities in the educational
4 institutions of the state. The purpose of this chapter is to prohibit acts that are contrary to that
5 policy and to provide remedies therefor”]; Donovan v. Poway Unif. Sch. Dist. (2008) 167
6 Cal.App.4th 567, 590-91 [construing purpose of section 220 in conjunction with section 200].) If
7 the benefit that the statute confers on Plaintiff is only incidental to its purpose, it “cannot serve as
8 a predicate for liability” for negligence per se. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 499.)
9 Education Code section 233.5 provides, in relevant part, “[e]ach teacher shall endeavor to
10 impress upon the minds of the pupils the principals of morality, truth, justice, patriotism, and a
11 true comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship…” and further that
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12 “[e]ach teacher is also encouraged to create and foster an environment that is…free from
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DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY
13 discriminatory attitudes, practices, events, or activities, in order to prevent acts of hate
14 violence...” (Educ. Code, § 233.5, subd. (a) and (b).) Section 233.5 encourages teachers to foster
15 a nurturing learning environment, presumably to advance state curriculum goals, but provides no
16 rules or guidelines for doing so. This section does not appear to have ever been applied to impose
17 a mandatory standard of care owed by school districts to students. There is nothing in the
18 language of section 233.5 that remotely suggests it was designed to protect students from
19 misbehavior by other students leading to alleged personal injury, nor has it ever been construed
20 that way. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 499; see also Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 939-40.)
21 Moreover, it is well established that districts cannot be liable for personal injuries
22 allegedly caused by inappropriate instruction. (See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unif. Sch.
23 Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 826 [rejecting plaintiff’s claims on the basis that “the several
24 ‘enactments’ have been conceived as provisions directed to the attainment of optimum
25 educational results, but not as safeguards against ‘injury’ of any kind: i.e., as administrative but
26 not protective. Their violation accordingly imposes no liability under Government Code section
27 815.6.].) Because neither section 220 nor section 233.5 imposes an affirmative, mandatory duty,
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1 and neither was enacted to protect plaintiff from an alleged playground personal injury, neither
2 statute supports a negligence per se claim.
3 b. Education Code Section 44807 Does Not Create a Standard of Care
4 Education Code section 44807 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very teacher in the
5 public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from
Preview
AMY R. LEVINE, State Bar No. 160743 MATTHEW J. TAMEL, State Bar No. 229378 KASMIRA M. BROUGH, State Bar No. 308791 Dannis Woliver Kelley 275 Battery Street, Suite 1150 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: 415.543.4111 Facsimile: 415.543.4384 Attorneys for Defendant LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA GIRL DOE, a minor, by her Guardian ad Case No. 17CV307094 Litem, Father Doe LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT’S ELLEY Plaintiff MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND UITE AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OLIVER ATTERY TREET IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN RANCISCO LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT, and SUMMARY ADJUDICATION DOES 1 through 50 ANNIS ate September 13, 2018 Defendants Dept Judge Hon. Peter H. Kirwan Trial: October 15, 2018 Complaint Filed: March 8, 2017 Exempt from filing fees pursuant to Gov. Code, § MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR DWK DMS 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Page 3 I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 4 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS .................................................. 1 5 III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .................................................................. 2 6 IV. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 3 7 A. District is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Negligence Per Se Cause of Action Because Plaintiff Cannot Prove All Required Elements ........................ 3 8 1. Plaintiff’s Negligence Per Se Claim is Duplicative of Her 9 Negligence Claim and Not a Valid Separate Cause of Action .................... 3 10 2. The Statutes Plaintiff Relies Upon Do Not Provide a Standard on Which Negligence Per Se Can be Based ..................................................... 4 11 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 a. Education Code Sections 220 and 233.5 Do Not Create a 12 Mandatory Duty of Care for the District ......................................... 5 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 b. Education Code Section 44807 Does Not Create a Standard of Care ............................................................................................. 7 14 3. The Complaint Doesn’t Allege Separate Causes of Action, Nor is 15 There a Basis for Liability Under Sections 220, 233.5, or 44807 .............. 7 16 a. There is No Evidence the District Intentionally Discriminated Against Girl Doe...................................................... 8 17 i. The District Had No Notice of Alleged 18 Discrimination or an Opportunity to Correct ...................... 8 19 ii. The District Was Not Deliberately Indifferent .................... 9 20 b. There Was No Failure to Provide Moral Instruction or Any Causal Link ................................................................................... 10 21 4. Plaintiff Failed to Comply with Government Tort Claim 22 Presentation Requirements ........................................................................ 11 23 B. Plaintiff’s Negligence and Negligence Per Se Claims Fail Because the Incidents at Issue Were Not Reasonably Foreseeable .......................................... 13 24 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17 25 26 27 28 i DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page(s) 3 State Cases 4 Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist. 5 (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 492 ........................................................................................................ 14 6 Clausing v. San Francisco Unif. Sch. Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224 ...................................................................................................... 5 7 Conroy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 8 (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244....................................................................................................... 10, 11 9 Dailey v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741 .................................................................................................................. 14 10 11 Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727 ................................................................................................... 3, 4 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY Doe 1 v. City of Murrieta 13 (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 899 ..................................................................................................... 13 14 Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795 ...................................................................................................... 13 15 Donovan v. Poway Unif. Sch. Dist. 16 (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567 ............................................................................................... 6, 8, 9 17 Fall River Joint Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct. 18 (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431 ................................................................................................ 12, 13 19 Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363 ..................................................................................................... 12 20 Guzman v. Cty. Of Monterey 21 (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887................................................................................................................. 5 22 Haggis v. City of Los Angeles 23 (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490............................................................................................................. 5, 6 24 Hoff v. Vacaville Unif. Sch. Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925........................................................................................................ passim 25 Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. 26 (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508 ................................................................................................................ 14 27 J.L. v. Children’s Inst., Inc. 28 (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388 ............................................................................................... 13, 14 ii DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1320 ................................................................................................... 16 2 Leger v. Stockton Unif. Sch. Dist. 3 (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448 ................................................................................................ 5, 14 4 Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs. 5 (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472 ................................................................................................. 10, 11 6 M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508 ............................................................................................... 14, 17 7 Margaret W. v. Kelley R. 8 (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 141 ............................................................................................... 14, 15 9 Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. 10 (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465..................................................................................................... 2, 10, 11 11 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783 ....................................................................................................... 4 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY Nunn v. State of Calif. 13 (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616 ................................................................................................................ 11 14 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unif. Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814 .................................................................................................... 6, 11 15 16 Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256 ............................................................................................... 3, 10 17 Rodrigues v. San Jose Unif. Sch. Dist. 18 (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 842 ........................................................................................................ 7 19 S.M. v. Los Angeles Unif. Sch. Dist. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712 ..................................................................................................... 12 20 21 Shoemaker v. Myers (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1407 ....................................................................................................... 12 22 Woodsmall v. Mt. Diablo Unif. Sch. Dist. 23 (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 262 ...................................................................................................... 14 24 Federal Cases 25 Garcia v. Clovis Unif. Sch. Dist. (2009) 627 F.Supp.2d 1187 ........................................................................................................ 9 26 27 Garedakis v. Brentwood Union Sch. Dist. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 183 F.Supp.3d 1032 ..................................................................................... 12 28 iii DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. (1998) 524 U.S. 274 ................................................................................................................... 8 2 Moore v. City of Vallejo 3 (E.D.Cal. 2014) 73 F.Supp.3d 1253 ......................................................................................... 13 4 Ortiz v. Lopez 5 (E.D.Cal. 2010) 688 F.Supp.2d 1072 ....................................................................................... 13 6 Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ. (C.D.Cal. 2015) 100 F.Supp.3d 927 ........................................................................................... 8 7 Wills v. Brown Univ. 8 (1st Cir. 1999) 184 F.3d 20 ........................................................................................................ 9 9 State Statutes 10 California Education Code sections 220, 233.5 ...................................................................... passim 11 Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. ................................................................................................ 2 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY Code Civ. Proc., section 437c, subd. (a) .......................................................................................... 2 13 Code of Civ. Proc. section 437c, subd. (f)(1) ................................................................................... 2 14 Code Civ. Proc. section 437c, subd. (o) ........................................................................................... 2 15 Educ. Code section 200 .................................................................................................................... 6 16 Educ. Code section 201(g) ............................................................................................................... 8 17 18 Educ. Code, section 233.5, subd. (a) and (b) ................................................................................... 6 19 Education Code section 220 .................................................................................................... passim 20 Education Code sections 220, 233.5, and 44807.................................................................. 1, 3, 5, 7 21 Education Code section 233.5 ................................................................................................ 6, 8, 10 22 Education Code section 44807 ......................................................................................................... 7 23 Evidence Code section 669 ...................................................................................................... 3, 5, 7 24 Gov. Code, section 815.6 ..................................................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7 25 Gov. Code, section 910 .................................................................................................................. 12 26 Gov. Code, sections 911.2, 945.4 ................................................................................................... 12 27 Government Code sections 815.2 and 815.6 .................................................................................. 11 28 iv DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Under the Tort Claims Act ............................................................................................................. 12 2 Constitutional Provisions 3 California Constitution article I........................................................................................................ 5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 2 I. INTRODUCTION 3 Plaintiff Girl Doe, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Father Doe, filed this action on 4 March 8, 2017, asserting two causes of action against the Los Altos School District: a First Cause 5 of Action for negligence, based on an alleged breach of “an affirmative duty under statutory law, 6 including but not limited to, Education Code §§220, 233.5, and 44807,” and a Second Cause of 7 Action for negligence per se, based on “a violation of statutes including, but not limited to, 8 California Education Code §§220, 233.5, [and] 44807.” Because there is no triable issue of 9 material fact with regard to either of these causes of action and the District is entitled to judgment 10 as a matter of law, the Court should grant summary judgment in the District’s favor. 11 II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 Girl Doe was seven years old at the time of the events giving rise to this Complaint. SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 (Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts “SS”) 4.) She attended Loyola Elementary School 14 (“Loyola”) in the District for kindergarten, and then again for second grade during the 2015-2016 15 school year. (SS 3, 6.) In February 2016, Girl Doe’s mother withdrew her from Loyola. (SS 33.) 16 On January 28, 2016, Plaintiff and another second grade student reported to yard duty aide 17 Nimmi Rao that two boys in Girl Doe’s class, J.R. and M.Z., had pulled down her pants and 18 poured water down her back in the playground area during lunch recess. (SS 5, 12, 13.) Ms. Rao 19 addressed the situation with the children, and then brought Girl Doe, J.R. and M.Z. to Loyola 20 principal Kimberly Attell. (SS 15, 16.) Ms. Attell interviewed the students, and additional 21 witnesses. (SS 17.) Girl Doe told Ms. Attell that J.R. and M.Z. had pulled down her pants and 22 pulled up her shirt behind the shed. (SS 18.) Girl Doe reported that J.R. and M.Z. had touched 23 her “bottom front and back.” (SS 18.) Girl Doe reported that a similar incident happened 24 recently, but was not sure when. (SS 19.) This was the first report that Ms. Attell or anyone 25 else in the District had of either incident, or of any issue between Girl Doe and J.R. or M.Z. (SS 26 10, 11, 27, 28.) 27 After her initial investigation, Ms. Attell contacted District Superintendent Jeffrey Baier, 28 and then the Los Altos Police Department for further follow up. (SS 20, 23.) She also contacted 1 DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 the parents of Girl Doe, J.R. and M.Z. (SS 21.) J.R. and M.Z.’s parents were told what had been 2 reported, and they were advised that the students should not return to school. (SS 22.) Ms. Attell 3 also took steps to protect Girl Doe from any unwanted attention over the events and notified the 4 students’ teacher so she could redirect any conversation about it. (SS 25.) At Ms. Attell’s 5 direction, school psychologist Christine Anderson met with the students’ class as a whole to 6 discuss the importance of student privacy and reporting problems to a safe adult. (SS 31.) In 7 addition, Ms. Attell offered the services of the school psychologist to talk with the students 8 involved. (SS 26.) Girl Doe continued to attend Loyola until about February 12, 2016, at which 9 time her mother withdrew her and began homeschooling her. (SS 33.) There were no further 10 incidents between Girl Doe and J.R. or M.Z. after January 28, 2016, and in fact, neither J.R. nor 11 M.Z. ever returned to Loyola after that date. (SS 29, 30.) 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 “A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact 14 exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. 15 (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a cause of 16 action that has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) A cause of action has no merit 17 where one or more of its elements cannot be established or an affirmative defense to the cause of 18 action is established. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (o).) A defendant may obtain summary 19 adjudication as to “one or more causes of action within an action … one or more claims for 20 damages, or one or more issues of duty.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Once a 21 moving defendant has shown that a cause of action or issue of duty has no merit, “the burden 22 shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff 23 ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings … but, instead, shall set forth 24 the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action…’ 25 (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. [(p)(2)]…” (Merrill, 26 Cal.4th at 476-77.) 26 27 28 2 DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 IV. ARGUMENT 2 A. District is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Negligence Per Se Cause of Action Because Plaintiff Cannot Prove All Required Elements 3 1. Plaintiff’s Negligence Per Se Claim is Duplicative of Her Negligence 4 Claim and Not a Valid Separate Cause of Action 5 As set forth above, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges two causes of action: negligence and 6 negligence per se. Plaintiff cites three Education Code sections: 220, 233.5, and 44807, as the 7 bases for both causes of action. 8 The doctrine of negligence per se, as codified in Evidence Code section 669, recognizes 9 that a duty of care, and the attendant reasonable standard of conduct, may be set by statute. (Hoff 10 v. Vacaville Unif. Sch. Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 938.) “Generally, ‘[t]he doctrine of 11 negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. [Citation.] The doctrine of SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 negligence per se does not provide a private right of action for violation of a statute. [Citation.]’.” 14 (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 737-38 [citations omitted]; see also 15 Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1285-86 (“the doctrine of negligence 16 per se does not establish tort liability. Rather, it merely codifies the rule that a presumption of 17 negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of 18 which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm that the plaintiff suffered as a result of 19 the violation.”).) Moreover, a plaintiff is not entitled “to a presumption of negligence in the 20 absence of an underlying negligence action.” (Quiroz, 140 Cal.App.4th at 1285.) Thus, because 21 negligence per se is merely an evidentiary doctrine to be used in a negligence action, Plaintiff’s 22 only appropriately pled claim is for negligence, not negligence per se. 23 That Plaintiff does not have a separate cause of action for negligence per se is underscored 24 by the fact that she asserts the same three Education Code provisions in support of both her 25 negligence and negligence per se claims. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges no additional facts in 26 support of her negligence per se claim, save for the addition of seeking attorneys’ fees under 27 28 3 DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Education Code section 220.1 To establish a violation of Education Code section 220, 233.5, or 2 44807 under a negligence per se theory (just as under a negligence theory), Plaintiff would have 3 to prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. The only distinction is that when negligence per 4 se is available, Plaintiff can establish the breach of a duty by showing violation of a statute that 5 creates an applicable mandatory standard of care. Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is therefore 6 duplicative of her negligence claim, and is not a valid separate cause of action. Thus, Plaintiff’s 7 Second Cause of Action for negligence per se fails as a matter of law. 8 2. The Statutes Plaintiff Relies Upon Do Not Provide a Standard on Which Negligence Per Se Can be Based 9 “Under the doctrine [of negligence per se], ‘the plaintiff ‘borrows’ statutes to prove duty 10 of care and standard of care.’” (Das, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 738 [citations omitted].) A 11 “presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm which the plaintiff 13 suffered as a result of the violation of the statute.” (Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 938.) 14 A parallel construction applies in the arena of public entity liability, such as would be 15 applicable to the District. “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an 16 enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public 17 entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty 18 unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” 19 (Gov. Code, § 815.6.) The “standard for determining whether a mandatory duty exists [under 20 Gov. Code, § 815.6] is virtually identical to the test for an implied statutory duty of care.”... 21 [A]lthough there is a semantic distinction in the labels attached to each cause of action, there is no 22 legal difference in the analytic process to determine the existence of a duty of care.’” (Hoff, 23 supra, 19 Cal.4th at 939 & n.7.) 24 25 1 Since Plaintiff has not pled or attempted to plead an Education Code section 220 claim, there is no basis for 26 attorneys’ fees. Fees are not recoverable in negligence or negligence per se causes of action. (See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783 (mother of arrestee who died after arresting officers applied Total 27 Appendage Restraint Procedure (TARP) was not entitled to attorney fees under private attorney general doctrine for her successful wrongful death action against county, notwithstanding court's requiring county to preserve recordings 28 relating to similar claims, and notwithstanding changes to TARP procedure, since mother had substantial financial stake in outcome of lawsuit).) 4 DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Application of Government Code section 815.6 (or Evidence Code section 669) “requires 2 that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive in its 3 directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a 4 particular action be taken or not taken.” (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 5 498.) “Whether an enactment creates a mandatory duty is a question of law. (Id. at 499.) Courts 6 have strictly construed what constitutes a mandatory duty, finding that one exists only where the 7 statute “affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.” (Guzman v. Cty. 8 Of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 898 (citations omitted); see also Clausing v. San Francisco 9 Unif. Sch. Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1240 [“the enactment relied upon must impose a 10 mandatory duty, not a discretionary duty; neither must the enactment simply set forth a 11 prohibition or a right, as opposed to an affirmative duty on the part of a government agencty to 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 perform some act”] (emphasis original); Leger v. Stockton Unif. Sch. Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 1448, 1455 n.1 [“Because section 28(c) [of Article I of the California Constitution] does not 14 supply the necessary rule for its implementation, but is simply a declaration of rights, it imposes 15 no mandatory duty upon defendants to make Franklin High School safe”].) 16 Here, Plaintiff attempts to “borrow” Education Code sections 220, 233.5, and 44807 to 17 establish a standard of care and create a presumption of negligence. However, as set forth below, 18 none of these sections impose a mandatory duty with specific implementing guidelines that would 19 trigger a presumption of negligence if violated. 20 a. Education Code Sections 220 and 233.5 Do Not Create a Mandatory Duty of Care for the District 21 Education Code section 220 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall be subjected 22 to discrimination on the basis of…gender…in any program or activity conducted by an 23 educational institution that receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance ….” This section 24 creates no standard of care because it is prohibitory, not mandatory, and has no implementing 25 guidelines that were violated here. Indeed, what constitutes gender discrimination is a widely 26 debated matter of interpretation, not a bright line rule that could delimit a workable standard of 27 care for school districts. Further, section 220 was enacted to prevent gender discrimination in 28 5 DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 programs and activities, not to protect students from personal injury for an alleged sexual assault. 2 (Educ. Code § 200 [“It is the policy of the State of California to afford all persons in public 3 schools, regardless of their … gender, … equal rights, and opportunities in the educational 4 institutions of the state. The purpose of this chapter is to prohibit acts that are contrary to that 5 policy and to provide remedies therefor”]; Donovan v. Poway Unif. Sch. Dist. (2008) 167 6 Cal.App.4th 567, 590-91 [construing purpose of section 220 in conjunction with section 200].) If 7 the benefit that the statute confers on Plaintiff is only incidental to its purpose, it “cannot serve as 8 a predicate for liability” for negligence per se. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 499.) 9 Education Code section 233.5 provides, in relevant part, “[e]ach teacher shall endeavor to 10 impress upon the minds of the pupils the principals of morality, truth, justice, patriotism, and a 11 true comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship…” and further that 275 BATTERY STREET, SUITE 1150 12 “[e]ach teacher is also encouraged to create and foster an environment that is…free from SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111 DANNIS WOLIVER KELLEY 13 discriminatory attitudes, practices, events, or activities, in order to prevent acts of hate 14 violence...” (Educ. Code, § 233.5, subd. (a) and (b).) Section 233.5 encourages teachers to foster 15 a nurturing learning environment, presumably to advance state curriculum goals, but provides no 16 rules or guidelines for doing so. This section does not appear to have ever been applied to impose 17 a mandatory standard of care owed by school districts to students. There is nothing in the 18 language of section 233.5 that remotely suggests it was designed to protect students from 19 misbehavior by other students leading to alleged personal injury, nor has it ever been construed 20 that way. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 499; see also Hoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 939-40.) 21 Moreover, it is well established that districts cannot be liable for personal injuries 22 allegedly caused by inappropriate instruction. (See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unif. Sch. 23 Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 826 [rejecting plaintiff’s claims on the basis that “the several 24 ‘enactments’ have been conceived as provisions directed to the attainment of optimum 25 educational results, but not as safeguards against ‘injury’ of any kind: i.e., as administrative but 26 not protective. Their violation accordingly imposes no liability under Government Code section 27 815.6.].) Because neither section 220 nor section 233.5 imposes an affirmative, mandatory duty, 28 6 DWK DMS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR 3253160v1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 and neither was enacted to protect plaintiff from an alleged playground personal injury, neither 2 statute supports a negligence per se claim. 3 b. Education Code Section 44807 Does Not Create a Standard of Care 4 Education Code section 44807 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very teacher in the 5 public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from