Slander or Disparagement of Title in California

Here, plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Rothman in connection with its Third Cause of Action for slander of title and Fourth Cause of Action for aiding and abetting slander of title.

It is essential to an action for slander of title that the party claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged slanderous disparagement of title must plead and prove not only that the statements complained of were false, but that they were maliciously made with the intent to thereby disparage the title involved. (Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, at 263-264 and Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)

On 1/20/21, Plaintiff filed this action for disparagement of title related to the Ballinger Property against Nania and the attorneys that represented Nania in relation to the recording of and failure to withdraw the lis pendens against the Ballinger Property. On 2/25/21, Defendants Barbara Nania, Brett A. Berman and The Berman Law Group, APC (collectively, Defendants) filed the instant motion seeking an order, pursuant to CCP 425.16, striking Plaintiff’s Complaint for Disparagement of Title against them.

Therefore, the Cross-Complaint fails to state a cause of action for slander of title against Cross-Defendant PRC with respect to the recording of the mechanic’s lien. Conclusion Cross-Defendant Perez Reconstruction Contractors, Inc. dba PRC’s Demurrer to the third cause of action for slander of title in the First Amended Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Moving party to give notice.

(Complaint ¶ 78.) (6) Plaintiff was harmed in that it suffered disparagement of title (Complaint ¶ 80) and incurred legal expenses (Complaint ¶ 84). (7) Plaintiff’s harm was proximately caused by CCA’s slander. (Complaint ¶¶ 80 and 84). The parties dispute the question whether malice is a necessary element of a slander of title claim. But as Gudger v. Manton (1943) 21 Cal.2d 537 explained, a publication without privilege or justification constitutes express or implied malice (Id. at p. 264).

As discussed earlier in the analysis of the summary judgment motion, plaintiffs’ actions for slander of title and nuisance involve separate and distinct primary rights, one for harm to the property (slander of title) and the other for harm to the person (nuisance). For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Haddon B. Dillon to stay the proceedings is denied. Plaintiffs’ slander of title claim is not affected by defendant’s appeal in the nuisance action.

i) Cause of Action Disparagement of Title (Slander of Title) Slander of title is a tort claim brought for disparagement of title to either real or personal property, which affects its vendibility or salability. ( M .F. Farming, Co. v. Couch Distributing Co.

Slander of Title RSL argues that Osiks claim for slander of title fails because the a lleged statements by RSL were true and privileged and because Osik has failed to allege pecuniary harm . The Court agrees that there is no falsity and declines to consider other grounds raised for dismissing the slander of title claim .

“The gravamen of an action for ‘disparagement of title,’ also known as ‘slander of title,’ differs from that of an action for personal defamation. [Citation.] Disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes pecuniary loss. [Citation.] ‘The elements of the tort are (1) publication, (2) absence of justification, (3) falsity and (4) direct pecuniary loss.’ [Citation.]

Substantive Third Cause of Action—Slander of Title Defendant Jinkie argues that the only cause of action brought against her, the third cause of action for slander of title, fails to state a cause of action against her. The elements of a Slander of Title Cause of action are: 1) Plaintiff’s title; must allege ownership of real or personal property; 2) Defendant’s disparagement of title; e.g. false written or oral statement or false claim of interest; 3) Specific pecuniary damage as a result. Davis v.

Substantive Third Cause of Action—Slander of Title Defendant Jinkie argues that the only cause of action brought against her, the third cause of action for slander of title, fails to state a cause of action against her. The elements of a Slander of Title Cause of action are: 1) Plaintiff’s title; must allege ownership of real or personal property; 2) Defendant’s disparagement of title; e.g. false written or oral statement or false claim of interest; 3) Specific pecuniary damage as a result. Davis v.

Although older California cases dealing with slander of title refer to "malicious" disparagement and state that "malice" is an essential element of the cause of action, it was later held that actual malice or ill will is unnecessary. Id. All that is required is the "fictional malice" or "malice implied in law" from the unprivileged character of the act. Id. Disparagement of Title.

Third Cause of Action: Disparagement of Title In the third cause of action, Cross-Complainants allege that Calvano published false statements on a website disparaging their lawful ownership of the Hope Street Properties. (FACC at ¶¶ 32-36.) “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof some special pecuniary loss or damage. [Citation.]

Here, plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Rothman in connection with its Third Cause of Action for slander of title and Fourth Cause of Action for aiding and abetting slander of title.

Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action for slander of title and attorney's fees are an element of damage in such actions. (Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 865 ["In an action for wrongful disparagement of title, a plaintiff may recover (1) the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement...".) Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees is in accordance with applicable law. The minute order is effective immediately.

Slander of Title (3rd Cause of Action) The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are (1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justi¿cation, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. (Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 664.) Slander of title is a tort claim brought for disparagement of title to either real or personal property, which affects its vendibility or salability. (M.F. Farming, Co. v.

The operative second amended complaint alleges two claims: (1) disparagement of title and (2) quiet title. The Court previously sustained a demurrer to the first amended complaint which contained the same two claims as the SAC , concluding that Topanga cannot show slander of title where Topanga intentionally and with authority executed and delivered the DOT.

Discussion 1) The third cause of action for slander of title is well stated. Slander or disparagement of title requires proof of (1) a publication, which is (2) without privilege or justification and thus with express or implied malice, (3) false, either knowingly made or made without regard to its truthfulness and (4) causes pecuniary loss. ( Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 527, fn. 7.)

Slander of Title Cannot Be Alleged on These Facts Slander of title, as its name implies, concerns title to property: Slander of title is a false and unprivileged disparagement, oral or written, of the title to real or personal property , resulting in actual pecuniary damage. . . . The statement is disparaging if it throws any doubt on the ownership of the property. 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11 th ed.) Torts, §747, bolding added.

(FAC, ¶ 20.) “ ‘ “Pecuniary loss” ’ is an essential element of a slander of title cause of action. [Citations.]

(C) Punitive Damages for Slander of Title “The gravamen of an action for ‘disparagement of title,’ also known as ‘slander of title,’ differs from that of an action for personal defamation. [Citation.] Disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes pecuniary loss. [Citation.] ‘The elements of the tort are (1) publication, (2) absence of justification, (3) falsity and (4) direct pecuniary loss.’ [Citation.]

As a general rule, the recording of an unfounded claim to the property of another is actionable has a disparagement of title, while a person who deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his risk of injury is liable for fraud. (See e.g. Wright v. Rogers (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 349, 365-366.)

Slander of Title: A slander or disparagement of title has been defined as “the publication of a false statement disparaging another’s property rights in land, chattels or intangible things that the publisher should recognize as likely to result in pecuniary harm to the other through the conduct of third persons in respect to the other’s interest in the property.” (Restatement of Torts § 624; Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858-859.)

Slander of Title: A slander or disparagement of title has been defined as “the publication of a false statement disparaging another’s property rights in land, chattels or intangible things that the publisher should recognize as likely to result in pecuniary harm to the other through the conduct of third persons in respect to the other’s interest in the property.” (Restatement of Torts § 624; Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858-859.)

Slander of Title: A slander or disparagement of title has been defined as “the publication of a false statement disparaging another’s property rights in land, chattels or intangible things that the publisher should recognize as likely to result in pecuniary harm to the other through the conduct of third persons in respect to the other’s interest in the property.” (Restatement of Torts § 624; Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858-859.)

On the scant showing made, the Court cannot find the designation of such an expert is warranted simply based on the Third Amended Complaint’s cause of action for disparagement of title. Indeed, it is hard to see how a new expert concerning title to property is suddenly needed for this cause of action when the cause of action for Quiet Title was already part of the case.

Plaintiff also contends it may recover attorneys’ fees as damages under its first cause of action for slander of title, citing Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1032, which holds: “While it is true that an essential element of a cause of action for slander of title is that the plaintiff suffered pecuniary damage as a result of the disparagement of title (Manhattan Loft, LLC v.

Slander of title is sufficiently pled “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof “ ‘some special pecuniary loss or damage. The elements of the tort are (1) a publication, (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss.

To establish liability for slander of title, the owner of the property interest must have sustained some special pecuniary damage as the direct and natural result of the publication made in disparagement of title. (Burkett v. Griffith (1891) 90 Cal. 532, 537-538, overruled in part on other grounds by Gudger v. Manton (1943) 21 Cal.2d 537, 544.) “ ‘ “Pecuniary loss” ’ is an essential element of a slander of title cause of action.” [Citation.] (Sumner Hill, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030.)

Slander of Title Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state this cause of action against Ladera and Lordon. “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof some special pecuniary loss or damage. The elements of the tort are (1) a publication, (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss.

Slander of Title/Disparagement of Title (7th Cause of Action) In their remaining claim, Cross-Complainants assert that because Ramos’ claims regarding the Property are without merit, the lis pendens recorded by him operates as a slander of their title and they are entitled to actual and punitive damages as a result. (SACC, ¶¶ 69- 72.)

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION – SLANDER OF TITLE “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘“some special pecuniary loss or damage.”’ [Citation.] The elements of the tort are (1) a publication, (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss.” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1030.)

FIVE RIVER HOSPITALITY LLC HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT AND NOTICE OF RELATED CASE FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Plaintiff states no facts to support a cause of actions for slander per se, slander per se, false light, or infliction of emotional distress. As to slander per se Plaintiff alleges no facts to support this cause of action. As to slander Plaintiff alleges no damages to support a cause of action.

Rivera NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order, pursuant to CCP 425.16, striking Plaintiff’s Complaint for Disparagement of Title against Defendants Barbara Nania, Brett A. Berman and The Berman Law Group, APC. RULING : The hearing will be continued. Opposition papers must be filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing date. CCP 1005(b).

The complaint includes causes of action for violation of the Homeowners Bill of Rights, unfair business practices, disparagement of title, declaratory relief, breach of contract, and quiet title. Plaintiffs have owned the property since 1991 and the current promissory note is secured by a July 27, 2005 Deed of Trust.

As to Lepe, Defendants have alleged causes of action for quiet title, cancellation of instruments, disparagement of title, claim against notary bond and declaratory relief. Lepe has filed this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings claiming that Defendants do not have standing to bring the claims alleged as they have no title to the property based on judicially noticeable recorded documents.

Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1050—claim for slander of title arises from protected activity.) The FAXC also asserts a cause of action for malicious prosecution based upon BHI’s filing of the Prior Action against Defendants and subsequent dismissal of the Defendants from the Prior Action. (See FAXC, ¶¶10 and 16.)

The Cross-Complaint sets forth four causes of action: (1) declaratory relief (against Ginsburg); (2) slander/disparagement of title (against Ginsburg); (3) declaratory relief (against CIT Bank); and (4) abuse of process (against CIT Bank). * * * CIT Bank now demurs to the Cross-Complaint and argues: (1) the litigation privilege bars both causes of action against CIT Bank; (2) the Cross-Complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to support either cause of action against CIT Bank; and (3) the Cross-Complaint

A slander that falls within the first four subdivisions of section 46 is slander per se and requires no proof of actual damage. A slander that does not fit into those four subdivisions is slander per quod, and special damages are required for there to be any recovery for that slander. Here, the complaint alleges only one statement made by a previous bartender of the plaintiff business, who allegedly stated: “There goes the Stalker”. The statement does not fall within one of the four categories of slander.

As long as the other requirements for slander of title are met, the fees incurred in clearing title are properly awardable as damages, no matter the form of the original slander of title. As a result, whether or not the Turicchis have sustained any other damages arising from the slander of title, there is sufficient evidence before the court to establish a triable issue of material fact with respect to their suffering of pecuniary loss from the slander of title.

SLANDER OF TITLE: Although it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for Slander of Title. The elements of slander of title are: (1) publication; (2) absence of privilege or justification; (3) falsity; and (4) direct pecuniary loss. (Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 664; Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858.)

SLANDER OF TITLE: Although it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for Slander of Title. The elements of slander of title are: (1) publication; (2) absence of privilege or justification; (3) falsity; and (4) direct pecuniary loss. (Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 664; Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858.)

SLANDER OF TITLE: Although it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for Slander of Title. The elements of slander of title are: (1) publication; (2) absence of privilege or justification; (3) falsity; and (4) direct pecuniary loss. (Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 656, 664; Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858.)

Here, the Church alleges defendants, including Balboa, breached a duty of care “not to slander the title to the real properties of the Plaintiff.” (FAC, ¶ 70.) Balboa argues that this claim fails for the same reasons the slander of title claim fails. As discussed above, however, the Church properly states a claim for slander of title.

The HOA claims, nevertheless, that it may still pursue its slander of title cause of action and that the demurrer to the 3rd cause of action (“c/a”) for slander of title as to Lot 42 should be overruled. For the following reasons, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. The HOA cannot state a slander of title claim against B of A. Slander of title may be either by words or an act that clouds title to the property. (See, e.g., Alpha & Omega Development, LP v.

The foregoing allegations are sufficient to state the 3 rd cause of action for Slander of Title. Defendants concede that because Plaintiff has not pled the exact wording of the Multiple Listing Service listing which he claims has slandered the title to his property, “the court cannot determine for purposes of demurrer if a slander of title has been committed.” ( See p.2:24-25).

Fifth Cause of Action Slander of Title Stater Brothers demurs to the fifth cause of action for Slander of Title on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The elements of slander of title are the following: (1) a publication; (2) without privilege or justification; (3) that is false; and (4) causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. ( M.F. Farming, Co. v. Couch Distributing Co. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180, 198-199.)

Slander of Title The elements of a Slander of Title Cause of action are: 1) Plaintiff’s title; must allege ownership of real or personal property; 2) Defendant’s disparagement of title; e.g. false written or oral statement or false claim of interest; 3) Specific pecuniary damage as a result. Davis v. Wood (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 788, Witkin § 749; Cf. Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375.

As to the 2nd cause of action for slander per se, Defendant contends this cause of action fails because “slander” is defined as an “oral publication” in Civil Code section 46 and the FAC alleges the statements were made on the Internet (see ¶18); that the alleged statements were too generic and generalized; and that Plaintiff must demonstrate injury in order to plead a claim for slander per se. None of these contentions have merit.

Defendant Farrell now demurs to plaintiffs’ second amended complaint on the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for slander. Farrell’s previous demurrer to the slander cause of action in plaintiffs’ first amended complaint was sustained with leave to amend.

The slander of title action is based on two actions, first that the Holt parties continued to list the properties they didn't own for sale and second, that the Holt parties recorded an assignment of the deed of trust on 6/25/10. The court agrees that the assignment was not a slander a slander of title. However, the res judicata argument fails for various reasons. The San Luis Obispo Co minute order does not mention Rutherford.

SustainedAs to the Demurrer, the claim of slander is not barred by the statute of limitations on its face. The Complaint states that the Defendant began to make the slanderous statements in January 2016.The Complaint states the basis for the slander claim.

Defendants California Highway Patrol and Officer Butler’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Eighth Cause of Action for Slander Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 Defendants’ special motion to strike the Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of action for slander is GRANTED, and unopposed.

Issue 5: Whether the sixth cause of action for slander of title against the Association fails because the recording of the relevant documents was proper. The sixth cause of action is for slander of title. Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” Sumner Hills Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v.

The statute of limitations on a defamation or slander claim starts at the time of publication. California Code of Civil Procedure section 340 requires that actions, involving “libel [and/or] slander,” must be brought “within one year.” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §340(c).) The demurrer is unopposed. As a result, defendant’s demurrers to both causes of action in the action are sustained without leave to amend, and the case is dismissed.

(Note: This motion addresses the action for slander. The action for slander (originally case number 1372630) was consolidated with the action for slander of title (case number 1337207). References herein to “this action” are to the action for slander only.) On November 18, 2009, Robert D. Zacky and Lillian D. Zacky, trustees of the Robert D. Zacky and Lillian D. Zacky Trust dated July 26, 1988, through their representative Scott Zacky (“Zacky”), presented an offer to the Welshes to purchase the Property.

Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged slander under three out of the above five categories, two of them being slander per se. The slander per se categories that plaintiffs believe are implicated here are the first(a statement charging plaintiff (Mrs.

“A slander that falls within the first four subdivisions of Civil Code section 46 is slander per se and requires no proof of actual damages. [Citation.] A slander that does not fit into those four subdivisions is slander per quod, and special damages are required for there to be any recovery for that slander. [Citation.]” (Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 367.)

The judgment specifically states that Cross-complainants are the prevailing parties and are entitled costs and attorney’s fees as to the slander of title cause of action.  Initially, the Court notes that the appropriate measure for an attorney fee award in a slander of title case is “the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove the doubt cost by the disparagement…”  Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 865. 

It has been established in California that “[s]lander of title is the false and unprivileged disparagement of title to real property resulting in pecuniary damage[,] [and] [t]he recording of a deed which casts doubt upon the title is basis for an action in slander of title.” (Cavin Memorial Corp. v. Requa (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 345, 361 [internal citations omitted].)

Since Cross-Complainant cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the slander (defamation) claim, the derivative claim for IIED likewise fails as a matter of law.

First Cause of Action for Slander Per Se “‘Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means which: [¶] 1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; [¶] 2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease; [¶] 3.

In ruling on the demurrer to the second amended complaint, the Court took into account the argument put forth by the plaintiffs and gave them a chance to present causes of action for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This would enable the civil court proceedings to move forward. The permissibility of a civil court matter is no longer in question - it is confirmed.

DOWNEY Plaintiff/X-Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the 2nd c/a for slander and DENIED as to the 3rd c/a for defamation. ANALYSIS: X-Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings of the 2nd c/a for slander and the 3rd c/a for defamation. X-Defendant argues there is no slander alleged, because there is no oral statement pled. The only statements alleged against X-Defendant emails, which are writings.

Actions for slander of title are analogous to malicious prosecution suits. Both are torts based on conduct calculated to result in litigation.

Judgment: On May 14, 2018, the plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Slander Per Se and the Third Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress was tried before a jury. The Court granted the directed verdict in part, ruling against Condos on the Slander Per Se claim. On August 3, 2018, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Alladawi on the Third Cause of Action for IIED, and in favor of Ms. Hicks on the First Cause of Action for Slander Per Se, awarding her damages of $1.00.

Slander is a form of defamation, consisting of a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 46). To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Slander is a form of defamation, consisting of a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 46). To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Slander is a form of defamation, consisting of a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 46). To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Slander is a form of defamation, consisting of a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 46). To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Slander is a form of defamation, consisting of a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 46). To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Slander is a form of defamation, consisting of a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 46). To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Notice Of Motion And Motion For Leave To File Amended To First Amended Complaint For Damages For Slander Of Title SET FOR HEARING ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 2008 LINE 4. PLAINTIFF KATHLEEN JONES's Motion For Leave To File First Amended Complaint For Damages For Slander Of Title IS GRANTED. NO OPPOSITION FILED. =(302/PHA)

Plaintiff further argues that the slander case is closely related to the professional negligence claim and should follow the rules of venue governing that claim. Finally, plaintiff argues that the case should remain in Sacramento as the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice would be furthered by trial in Sacramento. The court finds that venue for the slander cause of action lies only in defendant's county of residence, Amador County. (See Carruth, infra.).

If Defendant Valentine R could not slander Plaintiff Holt's title by maintaining the deed of trust, he cannot be liable through the theory of conspiracy to do so either. The deed of trust cannot form the basis for the slander of title action and all references to it in that cause of action should be stricken.

Despite the fact that Plaintiff ROEM argues the permanent injunction is a final order, ROEM makes the erroneous argument that the final order resolved the competing quiet title claims “leaving only damages due on ROEM’s slander of title claim, since it has been adjudicated by stipulation through a final order that the cloud placed on Plaintiff’s title was improper.” Slander of title is a separate cause of action from a quiet title cause of action with different elements.

Libel And Slander Proof Of Servce SET FOR HEARING ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008 LINE 4. PLAINTIFF MALINKA MOYE'S Motion Of Opposition To Tentative Ruling.;Vacate Dismissal. Judgment. D.A. To File Charges. Libel And Slander Proof Of Service IS DENIED, IMPROPER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. =(302/PJM)

TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Stephanie Ann Martin-Gordon and Marjorie Gordon's demurrer to plaintiff Janis Carol Garrett's third amended complaint ("TAC") is overruled to the first and second causes of action for slander per se and slander pro quod. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support that there was a series of statements, which were allegedly made by defendant, that were false.

Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof some special pecuniary loss or damage. [Citation.] The elements of the tort are (1) a publication, (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss. [Citations.]

Demurrer to Seventh Cause of Action for Slander of Title and Eighth Cause of Action for Slander of Title Slander of title requires publication; without privilege or justification; which is false; and causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. “ ‘If the matter is reasonably understood to cast doubt upon the existence or extent of another's interest in land, it is disparaging to the latter's title where it is so understood by the recipient....’” (M.F. Farming, Co. v.

A slander that falls within the first four subdivisions of Civil Code section 46 is slander per se and require no proof of actual damages. ( Id. ) A [s]lander that does not fit into those four subdivisions is slander per quod, and special damages are required for there to be any recovery for that slander. ( Id. ) Here, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for slander per se because the FAC does not plead falsity with specificity, the FACs own allegations establish the truth of the

Cross-Defendants’ alleged recording of a lis pendens is a material fact supporting the slander of title cause of action that is now absent from the FACC. Given that there are no new material facts supporting a publication by Cross-Defendants, the slander of title cause of action fails to state a claim. In opposition, the Trust alleges that the slander of title cause of action in the FACC “states each required element for the cause of action alleged.” (Opp., p. 2, ll. 15-16.)

Moreover, as to the claim of slander of title, while there is no evidence, that defendant, directly or by conspiring with others, slandered the title to the plaintiffs' entities, the fourth claim alleges slander to the title of property owned by those entities, and there is a triable issue on that point.

Motion for summary adjudication by Homero Rochan as to the cause of action for slander is granted. Moving party shifted its burden and opposition failed to create a triable issue of fact. Motion is otherwise denied. Multiple triable issues of fact exist regarding slander of title, conspiracy and slander as to Andre. Triable issues of fact include 5, 9, 12, 13, 60, 61.

The alleged slander was recording the second correction grant deed in March 2004. ( Id., Ex. D.) There was no dispute over ownership then. To the contrary, the Pandazoses allege FATCs publication caused the dispute over ownership. FATC argues the correction deed does not constitute slander of title because [n]one of APN 35 is being removed from the legal description.

At a minimum triable issues remain as to the sixth cross-claim for Slander. Defamation is effected by libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Slander of Title “Slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof ‘ “some special pecuniary loss or damage.” (Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 379-380.)” (Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030.)

Notice Of Motion And Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings On Pltf'S First Amended Complaint For Damages (Libel And Slander); Memorandum Of P/A; Set for hearing on Thursday, September 10, 2009, line 10, DEFENDANT CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Damages (Libel And Slander). Granted, without leave to amend. No opposition filed.

Procedural History : Plaintiff filed the Complaint on December 19, 2024, alleging six causes of action: Slander of Title Civil Conspiracy to Slander Title Intentional Interference with Economic Advantage Negligent Interference with Economic Advantage Malicious Prosecution Abuse of Process Defendant Lorenzetti filed the present motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 4, 2025 Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 20, 2026. Defendant filed a reply on January 22, 2026.

“A slander that falls within the first four subdivisions of Civil Code section 46 is slander per se and requires no proof of actual damages. [Citation.] A slander that does not fit into those four subdivisions is slander per quod, and special damages are required for there to be any recovery for that slander. [Citation.]” (Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 367.)

CV-24-008707 – ROSSBERG, JAMIE MARIE vs TUBACH, KAREN – Defendant Karen Tubach’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Marie Rossberg’s Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel Including Points & Authorities – DENIED without prejudice. Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel is DENIED without prejudice for failure to provide sufficient notice of the motion per Code of Civil Procedure 1005(b).

To plead slander per se with required specificity, [t]he general rule is that the words constituting an alleged [libel/slander] must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint. ( Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017 n.3, quoting Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1612.) Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on its cause of action for slander per se.