Defamation in California

CV-24-008707 – ROSSBERG, JAMIE MARIE vs TUBACH, KAREN – Defendant Karen Tubach’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Marie Rossberg’s Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel Including Points & Authorities – DENIED without prejudice. Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel is DENIED without prejudice for failure to provide sufficient notice of the motion per Code of Civil Procedure 1005(b).

Jimenez, M.D.’s Demurrer to and Motion to Strike Portions of Second Amended Complaint Tentative Ruling: To sustain defendant’s general demurrer to the cause of action for defamation (slander), with leave to amend. To overrule defendant’s demurrer to the cause of action for defamation (libel).

The Motion (ROA # 20, 30) of Defendant John Petersen ("Defendant"), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, for an order striking the Complaint, and each cause of action pled therein, including the causes of action for: (1) defamation - slander per se; (2) defamation - libel per se; and (3) defamation - libel per quod, of Plaintiff Robert Godinez ("Plaintiff"), will be HEARD. The Joinder (ROA # 24, 27) of Defendant Gustavo Rojo Flores ("Flores"), will be HEARD.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes Plaintiff has failed to identify whether this defamation cause of action is based on slander or libel. Given there are different requirements for slander and libel, Plaintiff must clarify whether this defamation claim is based on libel or slander. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for defamation against Defendant.

The statute of limitations on a defamation or slander claim starts at the time of publication. California Code of Civil Procedure section 340 requires that actions, involving “libel [and/or] slander,” must be brought “within one year.” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §340(c).) The demurrer is unopposed. As a result, defendant’s demurrers to both causes of action in the action are sustained without leave to amend, and the case is dismissed.

Case Number: 24VECV02362 Hearing Date: January 14, 2025 Dept: T 24VECV02362 ANHARI V ALAMIRAD [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Cross-Defendant Hanna Anharis Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint filed 11/4/2024 is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the causes of action for defamation, libel, slander per se, emotional distress, and mal-practice and OVERRULED as to the request for damages.

Slander/Libel/Defamation The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) The rules of pleading only require ultimate facts to be alleged; evidentiary facts supporting the allegation of ultimate fact need not be pleaded. (McKelly v.

Defamation is a false, unprivileged and defamatory statement about an individual and may consist of either libel (written) or slander (spoken). The essence of the tort is injury to reputation. (Civil Code § 44, 45, 46; Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242.) Under Civil Code § 46, slander is “a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means” that causes the person damage.

Conclusion CDC Defendants’ demurrer to slander (4th) and libel (5th) causes of action in Plaintiff’s complaint is sustained with leave to amend.

Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for defamation, in the form of libel or slander, for the same reasons stated above as to Global Win. The demurrer to the sixth and seventh causes of action is SUSTAINED. III.

Per Se ClaimsMinor Plaintiffs Defendants argue The Minor Childrens claims for defamation per se (Second and Third Causes of Action for Libel and Slander, respectively) are not per se defamatory. Civ. Code § 45a provides, A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face.

The caption page of the Complaint states that it is a "Civil Suit of $10,000 for Defamation, Slander & Libel of Character. Harrassment." It is unclear whether Plaintiff's "defamation" claim sounds in libel (i.e., based on the publication of written statements), slander (i.e., based on the publication of oral statements), or both. Although the pleading requirements for libel and slander are similar, they are not identical.

Libel and libel per se (1st and 2nd causes of action) Defamation is a false, unprivileged and defamatory statement about an individual and may consist of either libel or slander. The essence of the tort is injury to reputation. (Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1243.)

To grant with leave to amend the fourth cause of action for defamation only. The First Amended Complaint is to be filed and served upon the Defendants via hand delivery or by electronic means (if an agreement exists to do so) within 5 calendar days. The motion for summary judgment will be continued to Tuesday, April 24, 2018 at 3:30 p.m. in Dept. 402. Explanation: Defamation Defamation is a false, unprivileged and defamatory statement about an individual and may consist of either libel or slander.

First Cause of Action for Libel Defamation The elements of a defamation claims are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (See Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.)

CV-24-008707 – ROSSBERG, JAMIE MARIE vs TUBACH, KAREN – Defendant Karen Tubach’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Marie Rossberg’s First Amended Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel – CONTINUED to June 24, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. This matter is CONTINUED on the Court’s own motion to June 24, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22 for further review and consideration.

Hashemiyoon) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this defamation action against Diana Lee (Defendant) on August 23, 2022. Plaintiffs allege three causes of action for (1) defamation (Civ. Code, § 46), (2) libel per se, and (3) slander. Defendant moves the court for an order sustaining the demurrer to each cause of action alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint.

Defamation involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. [Citation.] ( Price v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 962, 970.) Defamation & may occur by means of libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) ( Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242.)

Nevertheless, plaintiff’s sixth and seventh causes of action (i.e., for defamation per quod and defamation per se, respectively) fail as against Mt. SAC, because they have not been adequately pled against the individual defendants. “Defamation is effected by either of the following: (a) Libel. (b) Slander.” Civil Code § 44.

Defamation Plaintiff Raschiatore’s first cause of action is for defamation. As an initial matter, defendants assert that while the cause of action is labeled defamation, it is unclear whether Raschiatore alleges causes of action for libel, slander or both. Raschiatore argues that both are stated because the allegations are that the defamatory statements were both “authored” and “uttered” and that they were “read” and “heard.” (Opposition, at p. 5.) Libel and slander are two different forms of defamation.

CV-24-008707 – ROSSBERG, JAMIE MARIE vs TUBACH, KAREN – Defendant Karen Tubach’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Marie Rossberg’s Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel – DENIED as MOOT. The original complaint is superseded by the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) that was filed on January 3, 2025. The demurrer to the FAC was filed on April 22, 2025, and is set for hearing on May 22, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. Consequently, the demurrer to the original complaint is DENIED as MOOT.

Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for libel per se. Slander in Violation of Cal.

Here, in support of a cause of action for defamation, plaintiff alleges only that Artiaga “would continue to lie to keep the case open,” and that she “gave false information to continue the case and verbally torture me.” However, as stated above, defamation requires that the words constituting an alleged libel be specifically identified, or that the substance of an alleged slander be stated. Plaintiff’s allegations are therefore insufficient to meet the pleading standards for either libel or slander.

Sol Del Cielo’s cross-complaint alleges: (1) Real property trespass; (2) Intentional interference with contractual relations; (3) Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) Negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (5) Contribution pursuant to C.C.P. 841; maintenance of boundaries; (6) Abatement & enjoinment of nuisance; (7) Defamation-slander; (8) Defamation-libel; and (9) Trade libel Defendant Sandoval’s cross-complaint alleges: (1) Defamation-slander per

The remaining claims would be consolidated into a single cause of action for defamation, with the following proposed counts: (a) slander per se against Townsend, (b) slander per se against Silverman and Mokayef, (c) libel against Ryan, (d) conspiracy to qualify defamation against Silverman, Mokayef, Cotter, Martindale and Ryan, (e) public entity liability against the County of Los Angeles and Gascon, and (f) Government Claims Act waiver against the County and Gascon.

Plaintiff has adequately alleged a cause of action for defamation against VCOE. That the cause of action may include additional unspecified acts of defamation does not make it uncertain. Plaintiff has alleged (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. She was not required to state whether the defamation was by libel or slander.

CV-24-008707- ROSSBERG, JAMIE MARIE vs TUBACH, KAREN – Defendant Karen Tubach’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Marie Rossberg’s First Amended Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel – SUSTAINED without leave to amend. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is based on a statement that was made in a court filing as part of litigating a motion for change of venue in Case No. CV-23-005948.

CV-24-008707 – ROSSBERG, JAMIE MARIE vs TUBACH, KAREN – Defendant Karen Tubach’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Jamie Marie Rossberg’s Complaint for Defamation, Slander and Libel – CONTINUED to May 8, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. An opposition to the demurrer was late-filed on March 26, 2025. This matter is therefore CONTINUED to May 8, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. If she wishes, Moving Defendant may serve and file a reply five court days before the continued hearing date.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Successor Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for libel per se or slander per se against Defendant.

Analysis All three of plaintiff’s causes of action fall within the broad category of defamation. Defamation includes libel, which is written, and slander, which is verbal. (Civ. Code, §§ 44-46). Libel and slander both require a false and unprivileged statement of fact that is intentionally published to someone other than the plaintiff, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage. (Whelan v. Wolford (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 689, 693; Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Relihan, Clifford Schwenker, Hana Bruce, Kristina Keifer, Jazzmaine Francis, Susan Judson, Christ Catania, and Charlotte Ling for (1) defamation-libel, (2) defamation-libel per se, (3) defamation-slander, (4) defamation-slander per se, (5) defamation at common law and pursuant to Civil Code §46, (6) IIED, (7) trade libel, (8) violation of Bus. & Prof.

Only one cause of action is asserted against Defendants – defamation. “Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injury or which causes special damages.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) Defamation consists of two forms – libel and slander. (Burrill v. Nair (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 357, 382.)

Libel and slander are merely different forms of defamation, in that libel is written, while slander is spoken. (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883 [libel], 893 [slander].) The undisputed evidence shows that Defendant did not publish anything about Plaintiff. (Def.’s Sep. Stmt. of Undisp. Mtr. Facts [“UMF”], No. 3.) Defendant did not defame, libel, or slander Plaintiff. (UMF 5-7.) This is fatal to Plaintiff’s first three causes of action.

The relevant procedural history is as follows: On October 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) for (1) Defamation, (2) Libel, (3) Slander, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (5) Fraudulent Concealment, (6) Civil Extortion, and (7) Libel against Defendants Madeline Isabel Cordoba (Cordoba), Justin Daily (Daily), Reed Aljian (Aljian), and Daily Aljian LLP (Firm).1 The first five causes of action are asserted against Defendant Cordoba only.

Analysis Plaintiff, at ¶7 of her complaint, indicates she is suing for defamation, libel (sic), and slander. Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. It may be libel (written) or slander (spoken). The tort involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. (Civil Code §§45, 46; Rest.2d, Torts §§558, 559; see Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.A.4th 637, 645.)

On November 21, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint for (1) intentional misrepresentation, (2) negligent misrepresentation, (3) fraudulent misrepresentation, (4) fraudulent concealment, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (7) breach of fiduciary duties, (8) fraud, (9) constructive fraud, (10) libel, (11) libel per se, and (12) slander and defamation.

Page 3, paragraph 10(c); page 3, paragraph 10(e); page 3, from paragraph 10(f) the following: "Wrongful Eviction; Assault; Battery; False Arrest & Imprisonment; Fraud; Negligent Misrepresentation; Intentional & Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Declaratory Relief; Injunctive relief; Conspiracy; Violation of Civil rights; Abuse of Process; Malicious Prosecution; Trespas [sic] to Property, Defamation, Libel, Slander and Conversion"; page 3, paragraph 11(g); page 3, paragraph 14(a)(2); page 8, Exemplary

There are no other facts whatsoever pled as to what Defendant Noa did, or refrained from doing that constituted “fraud, record keeping violation, UCL, intention to harm, concealing/tampering with evidence, libel, slander, defamation, perjury, and civil rights violations.” The general demurrers are each SUSTAINED with leave to amend on the same grounds. Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint within ten days. Moving party to give notice.

However, Defendants argue the SAC adds “new and substantive allegations to the existing cause of action for Defamation Per Se.” (Mot. p. 11:17-18.) Defendants contend the SAC limits the defamation claim to two statements: (1) that a court “validated” plaintiff’s statements constituted libel and slander; and (2) plaintiff fabricated a court transcript, including the phrasing, “reach out to the California court and not the one this cyber stalker has written himself.”

However, Defendants argue the SAC adds “new and substantive allegations to the existing cause of action for Defamation Per Se.” (Mot. p. 11:17-18.) Defendants contend the SAC limits the defamation claim to two statements: (1) that a court “validated” plaintiff’s statements constituted libel and slander; and (2) plaintiff fabricated a court transcript, including the phrasing, “reach out to the California court and not the one this cyber stalker has written himself.”

However, Defendants argue the SAC adds “new and substantive allegations to the existing cause of action for Defamation Per Se.” (Mot. p. 11:17-18.) Defendants contend the SAC limits the defamation claim to two statements: (1) that a court “validated” plaintiff’s statements constituted libel and slander; and (2) plaintiff fabricated a court transcript, including the phrasing, “reach out to the California court and not the one this cyber stalker has written himself.”

Fourth Cause of Action for Slander/Libel Finally, all Defendants demur to the fourth cause of action on the grounds that the allegedly defamatory statement is not set forth. The elements of slander are: (1) a false and unprivileged publication; (2) orally uttered to third persons; and (3) naturally tending directly to injure a person, in respect to office, profession, trade or business (slander per se), or special damages. (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 106.)

Plaintiffs allegations are also sufficient whether she is pleading libel or slander. Slander can be charged by alleging the substance of the defamatory statement ( Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458) and less particularity is needed for alleging libel where, as here, it appears that defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense. ( Id. at p. 458.)

As Plaintiff elected to bring only a defamation claim, the Court need not consider the elements unique to trade libel in ruling on the demurrer. B. Particularity Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to plead the specific words used, which constitute libel. Civil Code section 44 provides that defamation can be of two types, libel or slander. Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 470.

The Statute of Limitations for Libel or Slander is One Year An action for libel or slander must be brought within one year of discovery. (Code Civ. Pro., § 340 subd. (c).) The "rule of discovery," which can toll a statute of limitation, generally applies to action for libel or slander. (Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 725 731.)

The only true cause of action that plaintiff appears to allege is for defamation, based on either libel or slander. “Defamation constitutes an injury to reputation; the injury may occur by means of libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) In general, leaving aside certain qualifications that are not relevant in this case, a written communication that is false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries, constitutes libel.

Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, 235 [specific words or substance, in slander action]; Okun v. Superior Court v. Super. Ct. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458 [slander action, noting libel rule]].)

Plaintiff’s Defamation causes of action for Libel and Slander fail as a matter of law because undisputed material facts show that the allegedly defamatory statements were true. 2. Plaintiff’s Defamation causes of action for Libel and Slander fail as a matter of law because undisputed material facts show that the allegedly defamatory statements were conditionally privileged and not made with malice. 3.

On August 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC) for (1) Defamation, (2) Libel, (3) Slander, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (5) Civil Code § 1708.85, and (6) Negligence against Defendant Cordoba.

Cross-Complainant is not given leave to amend as his "fraud" theory, but is given leave to amend to attempt to state a claim for defamation (e.g., libel or slander) based on the same representation to County employees. As presently alleged, the second cause of action fails to state a claim for libel or slander due to the absence of allegations indicating that the alleged statement had any defamatory meaning, or caused any injury to Cross-Complainant's reputation. (See Shively v.

The demurrer to the first (slander) and second (libel and defamation) causes of action is sustained without leave to amend. Plaintiff Ahmed Elebyany (Plaintiff) failed to plead that Defendant made any false statement to a third party. (Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 486.) Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to plead Defendant's liability for defendant Melissa Grajek's (Grajek) alleged statements.

Relihan, Clifford Schwenker, Hana Bruce, Kristina Keifer, Jazzmaine Francis, Susan Judson, Christ Catania, and Charlotte Ling for (1) defamation-libel, (2) defamation-libel per se, (3) defamation-slander, (4) defamation-slander per se, (5) defamation at common law and pursuant to Civil Code §46, (6) IIED, (7) trade libel, (8) violation of Bus. & Prof.

Second Cause of Action for Libel Slander is a form of defamation. (Civ.Code, § 44.) The basic distinction between libel and slander is that the former is written while the latter is spoken. (Id. §§ 45, 46.) The only evidence before the Court is that Lauren made these statements orally on a podcast. Plaintiff contends that the subsequent republication of the statements on YouTube was foreseeable, but Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this contention.

Kettler’s First through Third Causes of Action assert claims for libel per se, slander per se, and defamation. While the initial showing on these claims requires proof that the Goulds failed to use reasonable care to determine the truth or falsity of their statements (CACI 1704), the parties appear to agree that the common interest privilege of Civil Code section 47(c) applies, so Kettler will actually be required to prove malice to succeed on his defamation claims, consistent with CACI 1723.

First and Third Causes of Action – Defamation (Slander) and Defamation (Trade Libel) Defendants argue the first cause of action for defamation (slander) and third cause of action for defamation (trade libel) fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants Dr. Hornsby, Lagares, and Pashko (CCP § 430.10 (e)).

First and Second Causes of Action – Slander, Libel, Defamation “Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of fact that is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.)

Although Plaintiff herein drafted his complaint using the Judicial Council form complaint for contract complaints, none of his causes of action involve any part of the lease agreement [the contract] Plaintiff entered into with Defendants; the complaint alleges only causes of action for wrongful eviction, defamation, slander, and libel. Tort actions are not an “action on the contract” within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717 authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in an action on a contract. (Stout v.

Seventh Cause of Action Defamation Defamatory statements can be either libel or slander. (Civ. Code, § 44.) Libel is written communication that is false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries. (Id., § 45.)

On December 12, 2023, Jamgotchian, ESPA, and Theta filed case no. 23STCV31285 against Coastal, Bruce Nye, and Sonja Nye for (1) slander of title, (2) quiet title, (3) defamation, (4) libel per se, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (6) negligent interference with contractual relations. On February 27, 2024, Jamgotchian, ESPA, and Theta filed the instant actioncase no. 24STCV05004against Done!

for (1) slander of title, (2) quiet title, (3) defamation, (4) libel per se, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (6) negligent interference with contractual relations. On June 14, 2024, the Court related case nos. BC674357, 23STCV31285, and 24STCV05004. On September 5, 2024, the Court granted an anti-SLAPP motion filed by Coastal and the Nyes as to the entirety of the Complaint herein.

The complaint alleges one cause of action for defamation based on a publication on defendant's website on the internet. Plaintiff has attached a copy of the posting to the complaint that shows it was posted on April 20, 2008. The statute of limitations for a defamation cause of action is one year from accrual of the cause of action. Civil Code section 3425.3 sets forth the single publication rule.

Eighth Cause of Action: Defamation The elements of a defamation claim, whether classed as slander (spoken) or libel (written), are (1) intentional (2) publication of (3) a statement of fact that (4) is false, (5) is not privileged, and (6) has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special damage. Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4 th 637, 645; see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4 th 683, 720.

When pleading defamation, the words constituting the alleged libel or slander must be specifically identified, if not pled verbatim, in the complaint. (Des Granges v. Crall (1915) 27 Cal.App. 303, 315.) Plaintiff fails to do so, nor does the complaint allege how any published statements were defamatory. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action of the first amended complaint is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the basis of failure to state a cause of action.

Accordingly, because plaintiffs requested discovery is not necessary to oppose the special motion to strike as to the libel, slander, and wrongful termination causes of action, the requested discovery is likewise unnecessary for the other causes of action. ( Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, 34 [causes of action based on failed defamation claim also fail].) The motion is DENIED.

Cross-Complainant is not given leave to amend as his "fraud" theory, but is given leave to amend to attempt to state a claim for defamation (e.g., libel or slander) based on the same representation to County employees. As presently alleged, the third cause of action fails to state a claim for libel or slander due to the absence of allegations indicating that the alleged statement had any defamatory meaning, or caused any injury to Cross-Complainant's reputation. (See Shively v.

Slander (4th cause of action) and Libel (5th cause of action) Civil Code, §44 states that defamation is effected by either libel or slander. “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1259.)

Without any reference to evidence or record, the Court cannot conclude that the IIED claim and Libel/Slander claims were based on the same factual allegations, such that they are duplicative. E. Libel and Slander Damages Defendant argues that the award of damages for defamation for libel and slander was not supported by evidence. However, Defendants motion includes no analysis.

Defamation—Slander/Libel 2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 3. Fraud—Intentional Misrepresentation 4. Negligent Misrepresentation 5. Fraud—Concealment 6. Fraud—Promise Without Intent to Perform 7. Constructive Fraud 8. Breach of Contract 9. Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 10. Conversion 11. California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 12. Civil Conspiracy On 10/29/18, Liu’s and GSI’s defaults were entered.

The sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the existence of falsehood. Because the statement must contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability. Although statements of fact may be actionable as libel, statements of opinion are constitutionally protected. That does not mean that statements of opinion enjoy blanket protection.

Cross-Defendants also contend this claim is derivative of the defamation and trade-libel claims and thus fails because said underlying claims are not viable. The defamation claim is properly pled as discussed above. The argument therefore fails. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED. Seventh Cause of Action for Violations of Business and Professions Code Section 17200, et. seq.

The complaints allege both defamation and libel. "Defamation is effected by libel or slander (Civ. Code, § 44). ... "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (Civ. Code, § 45.)

The complaints allege both defamation and libel. "Defamation is effected by libel or slander (Civ. Code, § 44). ... "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation." (Civ. Code, § 45.)

Third Cause of Action for Slander Per Se The third cause of action for defamation per se is based on several oral statements allegedly made between March 1, 2024 and the filing of the action.

Libel: Exposing Plaintiffs to Contempt and Ridicule; (13) Slander: Accusation of Crime; (14) Slander: Tendency to Injure Occupation; and (15) Conversion.

Libel: Exposing Plaintiffs to Contempt and Ridicule; (13) Slander: Accusation of Crime; (14) Slander: Tendency to Injure Occupation; and (15) Conversion.

Libel: Exposing Plaintiffs to Contempt and Ridicule; (13) Slander: Accusation of Crime; (14) Slander: Tendency to Injure Occupation; and (15) Conversion.

Plaintiff argued that the Complaint alleged four causes of action (COA) against both Defendants: slander, libel, stalking/harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

Probability of Prevailing Plaintiffs’ Complaint, filed on 9/11/2025, pleads three causes of action: (1) Libel Per Se (2) Slander Per Se and (3) Negligence. The evidence presented demonstrates that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing a probability of prevailing on their claims for libel per se and defamation. (See the Declarations of Tiffanie Popp, Andre Ramirez, Jayson Moss and Brooke Moss.)

Therefore, Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to state libel. Demurrer to this claim is not well-taken. D. Slander Per Se Slander per se requires: (1) a false and unprivileged publication; (2) orally uttered to a third person; and (3) naturally tending directly to injure a person, in respect to office, profession, trade or business (slander per se), or special damages. (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 90, 106, disapproved on other grounds by Baral v.

Analysis Second Cause of Action (Defamation): Plaintiff is required to allege with greater specificity whether he is claiming slander or libel or both and to state the words or substance of the published defamatory statement. (Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, 234; (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.

Special Damages (Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action) Defamation per quod is inferred based on a knowledge of extrinsic facts. (Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 333, 351) To state a claim for defamation per quod, a plaintiff must plead special damages. (Civ. Code § 45a [libel]; Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 361, 367 [slander].) Special damages in defamation are those suffered “to property, business, trade, profession, or occupation.” (Civ. Code § 48a(d)(2).)

First Cause of Action for Slander/Defamation: Daneshnia contends that the first cause of action for slander/defamation is deficient on the grounds that (i) Plaintiff fails to allege the essential elements of this claim; (ii) the claim is barred by the 1-year statute of limitations for defamation claims; and (iii) the allegations in Plaintiff's 1st Amended Complaint are inconsistent with the allegations in her original Complaint. "Slander is a form of defamation (Civ.

The facts pled in the 2ndAC allege prima facie causes of action against defendant Madain for libel and slander. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a defamation cause of action must be pled with the level of specificity required to allege deceit. The actual defamatory words used by defendant are alleged and are adequate to place defendant on notice of the nature of the claims being asserted by plaintiff.

Overruled as to demurrer on 2nd COA. 1st COA (defamation) - Defamation consists of libel or slander, the former related to written defamatory statements and the latter concerning oral defamatory statements. (Civ. Code, § 45.)

Overruled as to demurrer on 2nd COA. 1st COA (defamation) - Defamation consists of libel or slander, the former related to written defamatory statements and the latter concerning oral defamatory statements. (Civ. Code, § 45.)

Overruled as to demurrer on 2nd COA. 1st COA (defamation) - Defamation consists of libel or slander, the former related to written defamatory statements and the latter concerning oral defamatory statements. (Civ. Code, § 45.)

Overruled as to demurrer on 2nd COA. 1st COA (defamation) - Defamation consists of libel or slander, the former related to written defamatory statements and the latter concerning oral defamatory statements. (Civ. Code, § 45.)

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND Pro per plaintiff Charles Bowen filed a complaint against his former wife, Julie Bell, on 10/6/23 alleging libel, slander and false light invasion of privacy. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to California Rule of Court 2.112 because it failed to specifically state each cause of action and its nature.

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND Pro per plaintiff Charles Bowen filed a complaint against his former wife, Julie Bell, on 10/6/23 alleging libel, slander and false light invasion of privacy. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to California Rule of Court 2.112 because it failed to specifically state each cause of action and its nature.

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND Pro per plaintiff Charles Bowen filed a complaint against his former wife, Julie Bell, on 10/6/23 alleging libel, slander and false light invasion of privacy. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to California Rule of Court 2.112 because it failed to specifically state each cause of action and its nature.

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND Pro per plaintiff Charles Bowen filed a complaint against his former wife, Julie Bell, on 10/6/23 alleging libel, slander and false light invasion of privacy. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to California Rule of Court 2.112 because it failed to specifically state each cause of action and its nature.

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND Pro per plaintiff Charles Bowen filed a complaint against his former wife, Julie Bell, on 10/6/23 alleging libel, slander and false light invasion of privacy. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to California Rule of Court 2.112 because it failed to specifically state each cause of action and its nature.

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND Pro per plaintiff Charles Bowen filed a complaint against his former wife, Julie Bell, on 10/6/23 alleging libel, slander and false light invasion of privacy. As an initial matter, plaintiff’s complaint failed to conform to California Rule of Court 2.112 because it failed to specifically state each cause of action and its nature.

Defamation—Libel; 2. Defamation—Libel Per Se; 3. Defamation—Slander Per Se. Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Anti-SLAPP Motion Cross-Defendant filed a special motion to strike the Second Amended Cross-Complaint and each cause of action of Cross-Complainant’s Second Amended Cross-Complaint under CCP § 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP (“strategic lawsuit against public participation”) statute.

Witkin describes the relationship of the two torts: The Restatement describes the relationship of false light invasion of privacy to defamation as follows: "In many cases to which the rule stated here applies, the publicity given to the plaintiff is defamatory, so that he would have an action for libel or slander. ...

Ultimately, that means that the defamation claim does not fail for lack of damages. See, e.g., McGarry v. Univ. Of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112 (statements that charge directly without a need for explanation are libelous per se, as to which pleading and proving special damages is not required). Libel-Proof Evidence Plaintiff states that California law does not recognize any libel proof doctrine.

Plaintiffs first amended complaint (FAC) alleges causes of action for: (1) defamation-libel; (2) defamation-slander; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) malicious prosecution; (6) abuse of process; and (7) injunctive relief. On 8/5/2024, Defendant noticed a hearing for a claim of exemption.

Plaintiffs first amended complaint (FAC) alleges causes of action for: (1) defamation-libel; (2) defamation-slander; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) malicious prosecution; (6) abuse of process; and (7) injunctive relief.