The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) is set forth in Public Resources Code Section 21000 et seq. and is intended to implement a statewide policy of environmental protection. (California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa Clarita (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1225 discussing how the legislature intended CEQA to be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.)
The basic purposes of CEQA are to:
(Residents Against Specific Plan 380 v. County of Riverside (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 941, 959.)
The guidelines for implementing the CEQA requirements are contained in California Code of Regulations, Title 14, Section 15000 et seq.
Under CEQA, the “lead agency” (the local public agency responsible for granting approval of public and private development plans and projects within its jurisdiction) must analyze a project’s impact on various environmental resources, including natural, scenic, and historical resources. Pub. Res. Code Sec. 21001(b); Cal. Code Regs. Sec. 15002(k).
If the lead agency determines that the environmental impacts of the project are not significant, it prepares and makes available to the public a Negative Declaration. Cal. Code Regs. Sec. 15064(f)(3). Conversely, if the lead agency determines that the project will have significant impacts on the environment, it prepares and publishes for public review an Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”). Cal. Code Regs. Sec. 15064(a)(1). In the EIR, the lead agency must identify mitigation measures or alternatives that would avoid the significant effects of the project on the environment, or show that the unmitigated effects are outweighed by the project’s benefits. Cal. Code Regs. Sec. 15065(c).
Finally, once the lead agency decides whether and under what conditions to approve a development project, it issues a Notice of Determination. Cal. Code Regs. Sec. 15094.
An individual, business, or association directly impacted by a public agency’s approval of a project under CEQA may challenge the agency’s actions by a petition for writ of mandate. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085, subdivision (a), provides:
“A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.”
The petition for writ of mandate must be filed within 30 days of the Notice of Determination. (Cal. Code Regs. sec. 15112(c)(1).) In ruling on a petition for writ of mandate, the court’s task is to determine whether the respondent public agency abused its discretion by either failing to proceed in a manner required by law or by making a determination not supported by substantial evidence. Pub. Res. Code Sec. 21168.5. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of sufficient value to support the public agency’s findings and conclusions, even though other conclusions might also be reached. (Laurel Heights Improvement Association v. Regents of the University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392-393.) If the dispute is predominantly one of facts, the court must uphold the agency’s actions that are supported by substantial evidence. (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2001) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435.) However, the court determines de novo whether the agency failed to comply with the procedural requirements of CEQA, such as approving a project with significant environmental impacts without preparing an EIR. (Save Tara v. City of Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 131.)
In a mandate proceeding to review an agency's decision for compliance with CEQA, the court reviews the administrative record to determine whether the agency prejudicially abused its discretion. Abuse of discretion is shown if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, or the determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (Protect the Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1106.) Judicial review differs significantly depending on whether the claim is predominantly one of improper procedure or a dispute over the facts. (Ebbets Pass Forest Watch v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Prot. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 936, 945.)
Where the alleged defect is that the agency has failed to proceed in the manner required by law, the court's review is de novo. (Ibid.) Although CEQA does not mandate technical perfection, CEQA's information disclosure provisions are scrupulously enforced. (Id.)
A failure to comply with the requirements of CEQA that results in an omission of information necessary to informed decision-making and informed public participation constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion, regardless whether a different outcome would have resulted if the agency had complied with the disclosure requirements. (Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1198;
Section 21168.5 provides that a court's inquiry in an action to set aside an agency's decision under CEQA "shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence." fn. 5 [4] As a result of this standard, "The court does not pass upon the correctness of the EIR's environmental conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency as an informative document." (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 387, 392 citing County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 189.)
Where the alleged defect is that the agency's factual conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must accord deference to the agency's factual conclusions. Substantial evidence to support an agency’s decision means “enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support the agency’s conclusion, even if other conclusions might also be reached.” (Joy Road Area Forest & Watershed Ass’n v. Cal. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Prot. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 656, 677.)
The reviewing court may not weigh conflicting evidence to determine who has the better argument and must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative decision. The court may not set aside an agency's factual conclusions on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable. (Ebbets Pass, supra, at p.945; County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 946.) A court's task is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has the better argument. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 393.) "The purpose of CEQA is not to generate paper, but to compel government at all levels to make decisions with environmental consequences in mind. CEQA does not, indeed cannot, guarantee that these decisions will always be those which favor environmental considerations." (Id.)
Regardless of what is alleged, the agency’s actions are presumed legally adequate, and the party challenging such actions has the burden of showing otherwise. (Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 149, 158.)
Plaintiffs’ CEQA claim is likewise deficient. Given the timing of the phasing out of STRs, there is no evidence that that there is any immediate risk of the environment being adversely affected by the Ordinances. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 376, 423-24. Stated simply, Plaintiffs’ claims at this time are speculative.
Orange County, CA
The Petition Petitioner Lucas commenced this proceeding on December 24, 2019, alleging a cause of action for violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) and seeking the remedy of injunctive relief. The verified Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows. On October 9, 2019, at a public hearing, the City’s Planning Commission considered a recommendation to City Council to approve the Ordinance.
Los Angeles County, CA
The Petition Petitioner Lucas commenced this proceeding on December 24, 2019, alleging a cause of action for violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) and seeking the remedy of injunctive relief. The verified Petition alleges in pertinent part as follows. On October 9, 2019, at a public hearing, the City’s Planning Commission considered a recommendation to City Council to approve the Ordinance.
Los Angeles County, CA
In reaching this conclusion, the court has relied on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in Los Angeles, including reasonable fees in CEQA and land use actions. The court has also considered the experience, skill, and reputation of Wallraff and Unger (including in prior CEQA actions), the difficulty of this action, and the declaration of Pearl.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
The TAC alleges that a judgment rendered by Judge Holmes on 2/22/11 is void because Judge Holmes was acting in an appellate capacity by denying Plaintiff’s motion for costs in the CEQA portion of the underlying action. The complaint by Plaintiff in the underlying action contained a writ claim against the County. A judgment granting a writ was entered on 6/18/07 and signed by Judge Cahraman. (Exhibit F to TAC.)
Riverside County, CA
The court disagrees CEQA requires more from the EIR as an informational document. Contrary to the Petitioner’s Opening Brief, the EIR is not required to calculate the likelihood of fire from specific human activities and, as noted by Tejon, “[t]he [CEQA] statute does not demand what is not realistically possible given the limitation of time, energy, and funds. ‘Crystal ball’ inquiry is not required.” (Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Com. v.
Los Angeles County, CA
Tejon argues this difference of opinion—supported by substantial evidence on the part of the County—does not violate CEQA.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
In this California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) petition, Petitioner contends that Respondents did not sufficiently analyze alleged cumulative parking impacts associated with a subway line extension near the Project. Petitioner’s Request to Augment Record In general, “a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceedings before the administrative agency.” (Toyota of Visalia, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 872, 881.)
Los Angeles County, CA
The tension between (or perhaps more appropriately, the uncertainty created by) sections 26202 and 26205.1 was raised tangentially in a recent CEQA decision, Golden Door v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 837 ("Golden Door"). In footnote 26 of Justice McConnell's careful opinion, she made clear this issue had not been developed in the trial court, and thus the Court declined to consider it. The court discusses this case further below.
Other
Intellectual Property
San Diego County, CA
The rate does not appear to be overly high for the market rates in the community, especially given petitioners' counsel's years of specialized experience in CEQA and land use matters. Smith Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 17, Exs. D & E (showing blended rate of $675 and $650 in CEQA action awarded to counsel from Latham and Watkins two years ago). Latham and Watkins is an internationally recognized firm with rates above average and the blended rates were set in 2018.
San Diego County, CA
(ii) The project either qualifies for a CEQA exemption or Negative Declaration/Mitigated Negative Declaration. (iii) Due to the site's location, the provision of water and wastewater disposal can be accommodated with no significant impact to the environment or surrounding properties. (iv) The project involves a minor expansion on a site that has no active enforcement action.
Gary Nadler via Zoom
Sonoma County, CA
The Petition asserts three causes of action for writ of mandate based on violations of CEQA and the Carpenter-Presley Act. Legal Standard Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding. (CCP § 1032(b).)
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
In particular, the County had made repeated assurances about entering into a new, binding lease option once CEQA requirements were met. (Compl., ¶ 177.) Plaintiffs allege that the County breached the contract “by failing and refusing to negotiate exclusively and in good faith with Plaintiffs over the terms of the new lease option agreement.” (Compl., ¶¶ 178, 189, 200.)
Personal Injury/ Tort
Fraud
Los Angeles County, CA
In order to assure consistent and adequate water deliveries, the District alleges that in 1984 it entered into two agreements with DFW in order to settle a CEQA lawsuit. It further alleges that those agreements irrevocably entitle it to divert 600 cfs from the Yuba River, and to perform excavation work in or around the Yuba River in order to maintain sufficient flow capacity to divert 600 cfs. 5 (See Compl., ¶¶ 4, 4.3, 16.1.)
Sacramento County, CA
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND This action involved the process by which respondent Marin County Open Space District (the “District”) evaluated and approved certain proposed improvements and the allowance of bicycle use on the Bob Middagh Trail in Mill Valley (the “Project”), Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the District’s approval of the Project based on a violation of the procedures contained in the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) (Pub. Res.
Marin County, CA
CITY OF PASADENA Case Number: BS164664 Hearing Date: October 30, 2020 [Tentative] ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD [Tentative] ORDER DENYING RELIEF PETITIONER’S CEQA CLAIMS
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
First, Petitioner claims that the City improperly found the project categorically exempt from preparation of an Environmental Impact Report under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Second, Petitioners claim that the City improperly applied the state housing statute and local ordinance allowing “density bonuses” for projects that provide units for low-income people. The project sits on three lots totaling 3.2 acres at the corner of High Street and Marsh Creek Road.
Contra Costa County, CA
Wagner Farms, Inc. v Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, at 777-778 (judge properly awarded prevailing defendant its photocopying costs of record of proceedings in CEQA action, which were supported by invoice from copy company, when plaintiffs failed to present any evidence showing that copying could have been done for less). Cal.
Orange County, CA
., it was not a CEQA case, patent law case, complex class action, etc. It was a clear liability lemon law case whose outcome was largely inevitable. Finally, Defendants did not object to Plaintiff's claimed costs of $6,673.23 via a motion to tax costs under California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b). The Court accepts the memorandum of costs as representing costs that were reasonable, necessary, and allowable.
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
., it was not a CEQA case, patent law case, complex class action, etc. It was a clear liability lemon law case whose outcome was largely inevitable. Finally, Defendants did not object to Plaintiff's claimed costs of $6,673.23 via a motion to tax costs under California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b). The Court accepts the memorandum of costs as representing costs that were reasonable, necessary, and allowable.
Contract
Breach
San Diego County, CA
Moreover, any future projects have been expressly made contingent upon CEQA compliance... An EIR is not required for an element of a master plan which has not been proposed for development. Where, as here, an EIR carmot provide meaningful information about a speculative future project, deferral of an environmental assessment does not violate CEQA. {Id. at 373)(citations omitted.)
Sacramento County, CA
Moreover, any future projects have been expressly made contingent upon CEQA compliance… An EIR is not required for an element of a master plan which has not been proposed for development. Where, as here, an EIR cannot provide meaningful information about a speculative future project, deferral of an environmental assessment does not violate CEQA. (Id. at 373)(citations omitted.)
Sacramento County, CA
A record is required for traditional mandamus review of quasi-legislative decisions where there are land use issues of zoning, CEQA, general plans, public contracts, or charter schools, or other issues of general application, depending on if the law requires a hearing at which evidence is presented and fact-findings made. See SN Sands Corp. v.
Administrative
Writ
Los Angeles County, CA
In addition, Wonderful filed a CEQA action to prevent or delay the construction of plaintiffs’ new pistachio processing facility. (Id. at ¶¶ 63 - 65.) Wonderful also tried to interfere with plaintiffs’ plans to purchase another pistachio processing facility in Terra Bella, California. (Id. at ¶ 67.) When plaintiffs launched their new brand, Touchstone, they succeeded in selling part of their crop in the Chinese market. (Id. at ¶ 69.) However, Wonderful zealously guards its position in the Chinese market.
Fresno County, CA
The City did not create an Environmental Impact Report because of its finding that the project qualified for a Class 32 Categorical Exemption from CEQA, the Infill Exemption, and that no exception applied to overcome that exemption.
Orange County, CA
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