Motion for Directed Verdict in Texas

What Is a Motion for Directed Verdict?

Background

Tex. R. Civ. P. 268 governs motions for a directed verdict. (Thunder Rose Enters., Inc. v. Kirk (2017) No. 13-15-00431-CV, at *15 n.8 ) Further, it is well established that Rule 268 “does not require a formal written motion for instructed verdict” and that “[t]he requirement of specificity may be met with an oral motion.” (Id.)

Purpose of Instructed Verdict

An instructed verdict is proper when a defense to a plaintiff's cause of action is conclusively proved. (See, Villegas v. Griffin Indus (1998) 975 S.W.2d 745.)

Concerning baseless claims, however, it is well established that a trial court cannot rely on the granting of an instructed verdict to find that a claim is groundless. (Monroe v. Grider (1994) 884 S.W.2d 811.)

Employing Instructed Verdict as Procedural Device

A motion for instructed verdict is the proper device to preserve challenges for appeal. (See, In re C.E.M (2000) 64 S.W.3d 425, 427 [stating, “[t]here are four ways to preserve legal sufficiency challenges. A party may include the complaint in (1) a motion for instructed verdict, (2) an objection to the submission of a jury question, (3) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or (4) a motion for new trial.”].)

How to Structure the Motion

The granting of a motion for instructed verdict is proper if:

a specifically indicated defect in the opponent's pleading makes it insufficient to support a judgment;
the evidence proves conclusively the truth of fact propositions that, under the substantive law, establish the right of the movant, or negate the right of his opponent, to judgment; or
the evidence is insufficient to raise a fact issue as to one or more fact propositions that must be established for the opponent to be entitled to judgment.

(Edlund v. Bounds (1992) 842 S.W.2d 719, 723 citing Fort Worth State School v. Jones (1988) 756 S.W.2d 445, 446.)

Instructed Verdicts and Evidence Arguments

In deciding whether to grant an instructed verdict, “[a court] must determine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on the material questions presented.” (Szczepanik v. First Southern Trust Co. (1994) 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 citing Collora v. Navarro (1978) 574 S.W.2d 65, 68.)

An appellate court affirming the propriety of an instructed verdict, “must find that there was no evidence presented which could have raised a fact issue concerning a fact proposition essential for the plaintiff's recovery.” (Duff v. Yelin (1988) 751 S.W.2d 175, 176 citing Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc. (1983) 662 S.W.2d 55, 59.)

Further, “[i]f the record contains any probative evidence on proximate cause, the question is one for the jury to decide and the instructed verdict cannot stand. (White v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1982) 651 S.W.2d 260, 262]; Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Page (1977) 553 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. 1977).”

The Court’s Decision

In reviewing the granting of an instructed verdict the reviewing court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the trial court instructed the verdict.

The reviewing court will disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. (Collora v. Navarro (1978) 574 S.W.2d 65, 68.) If any conflicting evidence of probative value on any theory of recovery exists, an instructed verdict is improper. (White v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. Inc. (1983) 651 S.W.2d 260, 262.)

In determining when an instructed verdict is warranted, it is well established that “[a]n instructed verdict is warranted when the evidence is such that no other verdict can be rendered and the moving party is entitled, as a matter of law, to judgment.” (Edlund v. Bounds (1982) 842 S.W.2d 719, 724 citing CC Partners v. Sun Explor (1990) 783 S.W.2d 707, 712.) Moreover, “[i]t is error for the trial court to instruct a verdict when a material issue is raised by the evidence. (Edlund, supra, citing Graziadei v. D.D.R. Mach. Co. (1987) 740 S.W.2d 52, 55-56.)

Concerning the standard of specificity necessary, it is well established that “a motion for instructed verdict [predicated] "on all grounds," cannot preserve error for appeal [where the] motion for instructed verdict is too general, to require consideration, or to constitute a basis on which to predicate reversal.” (In re C.E.M (2000) 64 S.W.3d 425, 427 citing Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Jansen (1962) 357 S.W.2d 770, 771.) Importantly, “[t]his requirement is designed to compel a frank disclosure of the basis of the motion so that the trial judge may rule on it with informed directness, and to prevent a termination of the trial in a judgment unjust upon the merits because of some technical oversight which could be supplied readily.” (In re C.E.M, supra, citing 4 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 21.50, at 131 [1992].)