Wells Fargo Trade Capital Services Inc Vs The Core Apparel G

Case Number: 22STCV11951 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B HEARING DATE : Tues., July 9, 2024 JUDGE /DEPT : Moskowitz/Dept. B CASE NAME : Byron Walker v. Sebastian Huesca, et al.

Case Number: 24TRCP00007 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling ¿ HEARING DATE: July 9, 2024 ¿ CASE NUMBER: 24TRCP00007 ¿¿¿ CASE NAME: G. Joseph Buck v. City of Torrance ¿ ¿¿ MOVING PARTY: (1) Plaintiff, G. Joseph Buck, in Pro Per ¿¿¿ RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Defendant, City of Torrance ¿¿¿ TRIAL DATE: Not Set. ¿¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts April 22, 2024 Ruling on Petitioners Petition for Injunctive Relief Ordering Compliance with California Public Records Act ,Cal. Govt Code § 7920.000 et seq., and Cal. Constitution, Art. 1, § 3 Tentative Rulings: (1) DENIED. I. BACKGROUND ¿ ¿ A. Factual ¿ ¿¿ On January 5, 2024, Petitioner, G. Joseph Buck filed a Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief order Compliance with the California Public Records Act, Cal. Gov Code §§ 7020.000 et seq., and California Constitution Art. 1, § 3(b). In Petitioners Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Order for Compliance with the Public Records Act, Petitioner argued that Responded uses the label PRE23-00013 to identify a recent request for approval of a Precise Plan of Development for property located at 22209 Susana Ave., Torrance, CA. (Petition, ¶ 17.) The Petition indicated that Respondents planning department holds and retains documents pertaining to Precise Plan PRE23-00013 in a file identified in the same manner. (Petition, ¶ 18.) On December 18, 2023, at Petitioners request, Petitioner notes that Respondent permitted Petitioner to examine the contents of the file, maintained in Respondents Planning Department, that contained documents filed by the Applicant for approval of Precise Plan PRE23-00013. (Petition, ¶ 19.) Later that day, Petitioner notes that he then delivered to Respondent, Petitioners Public Records Act request identified as Public Records Act Request re: PRE23-00013, which request Respondent then further identified as Public Records Act Request:: W011717-121823. (Petition, ¶ 20.) The Petition further contended that in his Public Records Act Request, he asked for Respondents permission to use [his] own equipment to photograph, and obtain for [him] a copy of each of the documents that [he] examined in the City of Torrance Planning Department on December 18, 2023, and that [he] described above, i.e., large-sized sheets of paper that bear the labels: A1 Site Plan, A2 First Floor Plan, A3 Second Floor Plan, Aa5 Elevations, A7 Roof Plan, and TS Boundary/Topography Survey. (Petition, ¶ 21.) Petitioner noted that with the exception of the Document labeled A1-Site Plan Respondent refused to permit Petitioner to photograph any of the Documents. (Petition, ¶ 23.) Petitioner asserted that Respondents refusal to allow Petitioner to use Petitioners own equipment, to make and retain a copy of each of the Defendants (with the exception of the Document identified as A1-Site Plan), violates the provisions of the CPRA as set forth by Government Code section 7922.530(b). (Petition, ¶ 29.) On April 22, 2024, this Court, after hearing oral argument from both parties, DENIED the Petition. Now, Plaintiff has moved for Reconsideration. B. Procedural On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On June 24, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition. To date, no reply brief has been filed. II. ANALYSIS ¿ ¿ A. Legal Standard When a court granted or denied a prior application for an order in whole or in part, the original party making the application may make an additional application for the same order when it based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(b).) If a party fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure § 1008(b), the court may revoke or set aside on ex parte motion any order following the application. ( Id. ) If a change in law warrants reconsideration of a prior order entered, the court may make a motion on its own and enter a new order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(c).) An application that fails to comply with CCP § 1008 cannot be considered. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(e).) Section 1008 is the clear legislative intent to restrict motions to reconsider to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or authority that was not previously considered by it and could not have been considered by it.¿ ( Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)¿ Section 1008 is the exclusive means for modifying, amending or revoking an order.¿ That limitation is expressly jurisdictional.¿ ( Id . at p. 1499.)¿¿¿ ¿ ¿ ¿¿¿¿ The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial.¿ ( New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-13.)¿ There is a strict requirement or diligence on the moving party; the moving party must present a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence or different facts earlier.¿ ( Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.)¿ Evidence obtained after a is not ground for reconsideration where there was no showing why evidence could not have been obtained earlier.¿ ( Jones v. P.S. Develop. Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 725, overruled on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 530 [discussing evidence discovered after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment].)¿ B. Discussion Two hearings were held on this petition, one on April 11 and a second on April 22. By this motion Plaintiff seeks the Courts reconsideration of its April 22, 2024 ruling on the grounds that, as he argues, neither Petitioner nor Respondent were able to address the Courts identified factual and legal issues in its tentative ruling during the hearing (Motion, ¶ 1), and that Petitioner specifically was unable to comply because he had not received notice of the Courts detailed and multiple requests set forth in the written tentative ruling prior to a few minutes before the hearing started when this Courts assistant delivered him a copy of the Tentative Ruling. (Motion, ¶ 1.) As an alleged consequence of this lack of notice, Petitioner contends that there is substantial evidence and legal argument that exists, and that was not submitted to the Court on or prior to the April 22, 2024 motion by either Petitioner nor Respondent. (Motion, ¶ 3.) The motion indicates that the Court delayed the April 22 hearing that morning to allow both sides the opportunity to review a printed copy of the tentative ruling before oral argument; the opposition papers and the Guerrero Declaration indicated that the Court gave both sides at least half an hour to review the printed copy of the tentative ruling after the courtroom staff provided each side with a copy. The Court typically inquires of the parties at the outset of hearings on noticed motions and petitions to ensure a fair and fruitful hearing, and the Court regularly delays the conduct of a hearing to enable the parties or their counsel the time and opportunity to review and consider the Courts thoughts on the noticed matter if they had not previously seen the posted basis for the intended ruling. Petitioner cites to the Courts March 11, 2024 minute order where it stated that: The Court, counsel, and plaintiff briefly discuss[ed] the possibility of an evidentiary hearing in this case. On the Courts own motion, a hearing [was] set as follows: Evidentiary Hearing 402 EC is scheduled for 04/22/2024 at 09:30 AM in Department 8 at Inglewood Courthouse. The Court order[ed] a declaration and documents for an in-camera review be submitted by 4/8/24. (Motion, ¶ 5.) Petitioner argues that the minute order did not include a statement of a briefing schedule for the parties to follow in their preparation and presentation of evidence to argue for the Courts consideration, and that Petitioner made repeated inquiries to the Courts assistant and Respondents attorney as to the briefing schedules and briefing content for use with respect to the hearing, but was not able to understand prior to the hearing what was to be submitted to the Court prior to the evidentiary hearing. (Motion, ¶¶ 5-7.) But there does not appear to have been any prejudicial effect of the purported lack of a briefing schedule, as Petitioner did file a brief in support of his petition on April 5 and filed a Reply Brief on April 22 that the Court considered in deciding the merits of the Petition despite its late submission. Petitioner contends that when the Courts assistant handed him the tentative ruling for the April 22 hearing, he did not have time to understand, or comprehend the breadth and importance of the Courts concern until he was able to return home after the April 22, 2024 hearing. (Motion, ¶ 15.) As such, he wishes to submit this application for reconsideration so that he can respond to the Courts concerns as to the use he intended to make of the copies he obtained, pursuant to the CPRA, and documents held by Respondent. (Motion, ¶ 15.) This is not sufficient grounds for Section 1008 reconsideration. A Courts indication of its question for the parties is a substitute for the Court asking questions orally during the hearing; the fact that a party may not have her or his best answer to the Courts question does not warrant reconsideration of a ruling after a hearing on the merits. The Citys April 8, 2024 opposition brief had raised the issue of Petitioners intended use of the subject records so Petitioner should not have been surprised that the Court would like to hear from Petitioner about his intended use of the records as bearing on whether they were protected by federal copyright law. Petitioners own brief in support of his petition noted that he desired to use his own equipment to obtain copies of the documents for Petitioners use with a footnote 3 reference to paragraphs 19-24 of the Petition itself. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subsection (b), when a court granted or denied a prior application for an order in whole or in part, the original party making the application may make an additional application for the same order when it based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(b).) Here, Petitioners motion for reconsideration does not appear to have any new or different facts, circumstances, or law that could not have been presented earlier. In amending section 1008(b), the Legislature did not dispense with the need for the moving party to show a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier. ( Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690 [denying reconsideration when the purportedly new or different evidence consisted of the moving partys own declared knowledge].) Here, Petitioner bases his new or different facts argument on the fact that he lacked advance notice of the Courts tentative ruling, that he now possesses substantial evidence and legal argument that he failed to submit prior to the April 22, 2024 ruling because he was not give a briefing schedule and because he did not know to look for a tentative ruling in advance. This Court understands that Petitioner is representing himself in pro per and that he may not have understood the Los Angeles Superior Courts procedures for the on-line posting of written tentative rulings before the hearing date. However, California Courts have found that pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. ( Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543, citing Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [A doctrine requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.].) As such, the onus is on Petitioner, who brought this case to the trial court, to understand the County courts system for tentative rulings before a hearing. As for the time to review the tentative ruling, per California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(e), Courts are not required to provide the parties with tentative rulings. This Court typically does provide them, as a courtesy, to help guide the parties oral arguments as well as inform the parties of this Courts analysis in making its decision. Tentative rulings are provided prior to the hearing on lacourt.org, and for self-represented or attorney-represented parties the Courts assistant will (and here did) provide a hard copy to litigants in the Court room who have not reviewed the tentative ruling on their own. Further, the Petitioners Declaration in support of this reconsideration motion indicates that he is retired former member of the State Bar of California. Judges in Los Angeles County have been posting tentative rulings on the doors outside their courtrooms on the day of a hearing, and later on the court website up to a day or two before the hearing, for decades. Petitioners motion for reconsideration contains his declaration on intended use of the subject records, facts that were not presented at the April 11 or April 22 hearings but were facts that were available to him at or before the April 22 hearing. Petitioners motion asks this Court to consider his April 22 reply brief, however, this Court already previously considered it over the Respondents objection. Petitioner also contends that he was unable to present evidence of his intended use for the architectural plans at the hearing, even after reading the Courts tentative ruling whose two-sentence headline simply states that Mr. Buck can explain his intended use of the copy he seeks to make at his own expense. Merely because Petitioner failed to do so in his prior briefs and in oral argument on April 22 does not qualify as new or different evidence that could not have been presented before or at the hearing. Further, were the Court to grant reconsideration, and to view as a new fact or facts the Petitioners statement of his intended uses of the requested copies, the Court would deny the motion on the merits. Petitioner asserts that he has no intention to build or duplicate the architects design plan, but rather his intent is to use the more detailed information in the architects plans to address overdevelopment and degradation of the hillside issues. The City did not prevent him from taking notes of such details during his inspection of the plans. His reconsideration motion also addresses the fair use exemption from copyright law but not the right of the architect to permit or restrict Petitioner from copying the architects plans. That avenue was apparently closed to Petitioner per Respondents evidence opposing the Petition, i.e., that upon inquiry to the architect he denied consent to allow Petitioner to copy his materials. For all these reasons, Petitioners motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subsection (b) is DENIED. Respondent is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 20STCV46605 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles ALANNA FOUTZ, an individual, JOHN BASSETT, an individual, MARIA KCKENNA, an individual, JOSH PETKER, an individual, LAUREN MINTZER, an individual, GREG CLARK, and EDWARD BARAN PIECHOCKI, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. AFTON PROPERTIES, INC., a California Corporation; HAROLD HERSKOWITZ, an individual; MY MANAGEMENT CO, INC., a California Corporation; and Does 1 through 80, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 20STCV46605 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 12/07/2020 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: 09/29/2022] Trial Date: 10/13/2025 Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: All Plaintiffs Responding Party: All Defendants Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Awarding Monetary and Terminating Sanctions The Court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply. Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Awarding Monetary and Terminating Sanctions is DENIED . The parties are ordered to meet and confer over the following: · The production of WhatsApp messages between Harold Herskowitz and Afton Properties, Inc. to determine whether these messages were produced. · The production of all internal emails from Afton Properties, Inc. concerning the subject property and the instant suit. Background This case was commenced on December 7, 2020 when a Complaint was filed by several plaintiffs against three defendants concerning the conditions of apartment units located at 360 N. Orange Grove, Ave., Los Angeles, Ca 90036 (the Premises). The plaintiffs subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on September 29, 2022 that alleged eight causes of action against three defendants: (a) Afton Properties, Inc. (Afton); (b) Harold Herskowitz (Herskowitz); and (c) My Management Co. Inc. (My Management). The FAC alleges that Afton and My Management, who managed the Premises at different points in time, and Herskowitz, who owned the Premises, failed to provide a habitable premises and failed to address critical repairs including a red tagged gas furnace. (FAC, ¶¶12-14.) The motion before the Court now concerns alleged discovery violations. Plaintiffs file a Motion for an Order Awarding Monetary and Terminating Sanctions (the Motion). All Defendants oppose the Motion, and Plaintiffs file a reply. Discussion Legal Standard Although CCP § 2023.030 provides the Court the power to dismiss an action as a sanction for misuse of the discovery process, The sanction of dismissal&against the disobedient party is ordinarily a drastic measure which should be employed with caution. ( Victory Valley Union High School District v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1158-1159.) Misuse of the discovery process includes the failure to respond to an authorized method of discovery or disobeying a court order to provide discovery. (CCP § 2023.010(d) and (g).) Dismissal is a proper sanction to punish the failure to comply with a rule or an order only if the court's authority cannot be vindicated through the imposition of a less severe alternative. ( Rail Services of America v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 323, 331.) Evidence or issue sanctions may be imposed only after parties violated discovery orders compelling further responses, except in exceptional circumstances, including where there was sufficiently egregious misconduct regarding a failure to respond to discovery, or a prior discovery order would be futile. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1426.) Terminating sanctions are authorized where the evidence shows that less severe sanctions will not be successful in compelling discovery responses. ( Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-80.) Analysis In their moving papers, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to provide certain documents during discovery destroyed certain documents in violation of discovery statutes. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to provide: · Emails from Afton concerning the Premises and the instant lawsuit; and · Any communications between Herskowitz and Afton. (Moving Papers, 2:25-28.) Further, Plaintiffs contend that after sending a notice of impending litigation and a Notice of Preservation of Evidence to Defendants in July of 2020, Defendants were on notice to preserve any preserve any evidence. (Moving Papers, 2:18-20.) Upon opposition Defendants counter, arguing that internal emails from Afton were produced. Defendants also argue that Herskowitzs WhatsApp messages were produced as well. Attached to the opposition papers, Defendants provide several email chains and WhatsApp messages. However, there are few internal Afton messages included, and it is unclear who the WhatsApp messages are between. One of the communicators is clearly Herskowitz, but it is unclear who the other party communicating is. (See Declaration of Gregory Kim, hereinafter, Kim Decl., Exh. 1, Bates Nos. 03323 03425.) Defendants argue that the Motion is meritless, the Court disagrees. Although it is clear that at least some of the documents alleged to have been destroyed are accessible and have been produced, after review, it appears that not all documents requested were produced. Attached to Defendants opposition papers there are five pages of internal emails (see Kim Decl., Bates Nos. 02153-02156) from within Ashton, however, the emails date back to 2017, and Plaintiffs point out that Ashton managed the Premises until August of 2020. Plaintiffs contend that they lodged several complaints regarding the habitability of the Premises, Defendants contention that all internal Ashton emails have been produced is unpersuasive. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the WhatsApp messages produced are not between Herskowitz and Afton as requested. At this time, it is unclear who one of the parties is in the WhatsApp communications, the documents provided only identify Herskowitz. Therefore, the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding (1) the production of WhatsApp messages between Harold Herskowitz and Afton Properties, Inc. to determine whether these messages were produced and (2) t he production of all internal emails from Afton Properties, Inc. concerning the subject property and the instant suit. Conclusion Plaintiffs Motion for an Order Awarding Monetary and Terminating Sanctions is DENIED . The parties are ordered to meet and confer over the following: · The production of WhatsApp messages between Harold Herskowitz and Afton Properties, Inc. to determine whether these messages were produced. · The production of all internal emails from Afton Properties, Inc. concerning the subject property and the instant suit. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV18797 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Monica Gonzalez Sanchez, Plaintiff, vs. Lidia Pacheco, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV18797 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 08/08/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: None Set Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lidia Pacheco Responding Party: Plaintiff Maria Sanchez Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition. Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. Background This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58 th Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. ( Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. ( Id . at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. ( Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. ( Id. at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. ( Id. ) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. ( Id. at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. ( Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. ( Id. ) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action: 1. Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 2. Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Nuisance 5. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 6. Negligence 7. Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation 8. Fraud Concealment 9. Landlord Harassment 10. Constructive Eviction 11. Retaliatory Eviction 12. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 13. Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer. Discussion Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend. A. The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer. B. The Complaint is Vague As to Defendants second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled Facts. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.) Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below). C. Statute of Limitations Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. ( Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP (2018) 22 Cal.App.5 th 508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained in its entirety. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV03072 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: P Demurrer to Complaint Broker Defendants Demurrer is placed off calendar in light of the Courts ruling on Seller Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration and the Courts order staying the entire action pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants. On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:& (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP §1281.2(c).) If the court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c), the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding. (CCP §1281.2, para. 4.) Seller Defendants are moving to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to ¶31 of the Purchase Agreement. Broker Defendants are not a party to ¶31 of the Purchase Agreement. (Petition to Compel Arbitration, Ex. 2, ¶31(D)(Agents shall not be obligated nor compelled to mediate or arbitrate unless they agree to do so in writing.) Broker Defendants and Seller Defendants are named as joint tortfeasors in Plaintiffs tort causes of action and as co-defendants in the UCL cause of action. The claims against both Broker and Seller Defendants arise out of the same transaction and events and have overlapping factual and legal issues. Based on these facts, CCP §1281.2(c) applies and the Court has the discretion to choose from several options, including denial of the petition to compel arbitration. Here, it appears every issue of law and fact between Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants overlaps those as to Broker Defendants. There is therefore a danger of conflicting rulings if the Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants in arbitration and Broker Defendants in litigation are allowed to proceed simultaneously. The bulk of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint is against Seller Defendants. For these reasons, the Court orders arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants and stays the entire action pending completion of the arbitration. As the court has GRANTED Seller Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration pursuant to CCP §1281.2, the entire action is stayed pursuant to CCP §1281.2(c), para. 4, pending completion of the arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants pursuant to ¶31 of the Purchase Agreement. As the entire action is stayed, the court takes the demurrer off calendar until such time as arbitration between the Plaintiffs and the Seller Defendants is completed. *** Motion for Monetary and Non-monetary Sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Counsel pursuant to CCP §128.7 The Court considered the moving papers, opposition and reply. RULING Defendants request for CCP §128.7 sanctions is DENIED. Defendants fail to establish compliance with the 21-day safe harbor requirement. Defendants also fail to establish any substantive violation of CCP §128.7. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Matthew Graham and Regan Cole purchased a single family home from Defendants Kerri and Richard Pomarolli (Seller Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants remodeled the property without proper permitting and without a general contractor. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants listed the property for sale on May 6, 2022 through Defendants Cory Jane Mishelevich-Birkett and Matilla Realty, Inc. d/b/a ERA Matilla Realty (Broker Defendants). Defendants falsely stated in the listing that the property contained a permitted family room addition. In June 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a residential purchase agreement with Seller Defendants for the property. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants made multiple misrepresentations regarding the property in the purchase agreement, as well as in the listing. After purchasing the property, Plaintiffs discovered multiple defects in the home and ultimately discovered that the remodel work was improperly performed and unpermitted. Plaintiffs allege Broker Defendants also made alleged misrepresentations regarding the property. On September 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Seller and Broker Defendants alleging (1) fraud; (2) constructive fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of Penal Code §496; (5) negligence; (6) negligence per se; (7) breach of contract; (8) violation of Bus. & Prof. C. §17200, et seq. LEGAL AUTHORITY By presenting to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following conditions are met: (1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. (2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. (3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. (CCP §128.7(b).) Under section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions if it concludes a pleading was filed for an improper purpose or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. [¶] A claim is factually frivolous if it is not well grounded in fact and is legally frivolous if it is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. A claim is objectively unreasonable if any reasonable attorney would agree that it is totally and completely without merit. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189 (CCP 128.7 sanctions properly imposed where it was obvious that plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata, judicial admissions and judicial estoppel).) An action that is not legally or factually frivolous cannot be presented for an improper purpose. Having concluded that the claims presented in the second amended complaint were nonfrivolous, we must also conclude that they were not presented for an improper purpose. (Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 253, 265.) DISCUSSION Seller Defendants ask that CCP §128.7 sanctions be imposed against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs counsel. Seller Defendants argue the complaint was filed for an improper purpose and to harass them. Seller Defendants argue parties entered into an arbitration agreement that clearly applies to this action. Seller Defendants argue Plaintiffs refused to withdraw their complaint despite knowledge of the applicable arbitration agreement. Seller Defendants ask that the Court impose $9,000 in monetary sanctions and that it strike Plaintiffs complaint and dismiss Seller Defendants from the action. In response, Plaintiffs filed a combined opposition to Seller Defendants Petition to Compel Arbitration and the instant Motion for 128.7 Sanctions. Plaintiffs argue the requested sanctions are excessive. Seller Defendants claim they satisfied the 21-day safe harbor requirement under CCP §128.7(c). However, based on the proof of service, Seller Defendants filed the motion on May 28, 2024, and served it on the same date. Seller Defendants were required to serve the motion at least 21 days before they filed it with the Court. (CCP § 128.7(c)(1) (Notice of motion shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion&the challenged paper&is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.) Seller Defendants motion must therefore be denied for failure to establish that the 21-day safe harbor requirement was satisfied. Seller Defendants motion also fails substantively. Seller Defendants claim Plaintiffs complaint is frivolous and brought solely to harass them, because there is a clearly applicable arbitration agreement. However, a complaint is not totally and completely without merit merely because the alleged dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement. Even if there is an applicable arbitration agreement, the complaint is not dismissed. If a party successfully compels arbitration, the action would be stayed pending completion of arbitration and upon completion of arbitration, judgment would be entered on the arbitration award. Thus, existence of an applicable arbitration agreement does not affect the meritoriousness of a complaint. In addition, an arbitration agreement can be deemed unenforceable even if it is applicable to the dispute alleged in a complaint. For example, if CCP §1281.2(c) applies, as it does here, a court may decline to enforce an applicable arbitration agreement and force all parties to litigate their claims. In fact, a plaintiff does not waive the right to arbitrate by merely filing a complaint. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 185.) Thus, arbitration and filing of a complaint are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, a plaintiff may file a complaint in hopes that a defendant chooses not to exercise the right to arbitration. Arbitration can also fail, leading parties to agree to withdraw the matter from arbitration and reinstate the litigation. (See e.g. Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 482, 487 (Absent an agreement to withdraw the controversy from arbitration, however, no judicial act is authorized.) For these reasons, Seller Defendants request for CCP §128.7 sanctions is DENIED. Defendants fail to establish compliance with the 21-day safe harbor requirement. Defendants also fail to establish any substantive violation of CCP §128.7. ORDER Seller Defendants request for CCP §128.7 sanctions is DENIED. Seller Defendants fail to establish compliance with the 21-day safe harbor requirement. Seller Defendants also fail to establish any substantive violation of CCP §128.7. *** (1) Petition to Compel Arbitration (2) Motion to Stay Legal Action Pending Arbitration In connection with the Petition to Compel Arbitration, the court considered the moving papers, opposition and reply. In connection with the Motion to Stay, the court considered the moving papers. No opposition or reply papers were filed. RULING Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED pursuant to CCP §1281.2. The entire action is stayed pursuant to CCP §1281.2(c), paragraph 4 pending arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants. Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Motion to Stay Legal Action Pending Arbitration is GRANTED. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Matthew Graham and Regan Cole purchased a single family home from Defendants Kerri and Richard Pomarolli (Seller Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants remodeled the property without proper permitting and without a general contractor. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants listed the property for sale on May 6, 2022 through Defendants Cory Jane Mishelevich-Birkett and Matilla Realty, Inc. d/b/a ERA Matilla Realty (Broker Defendants). Defendants falsely stated in the listing that the property contained a permitted family room addition. In June 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a residential purchase agreement with Seller Defendants for the property. Plaintiffs allege Seller Defendants made multiple misrepresentations regarding the property in the purchase agreement, as well as in the listing. After purchasing the property, Plaintiffs discovered multiple defects in the home and ultimately discovered that the remodel work was improperly performed and unpermitted. On September 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Seller and Broker Defendants alleging (1) fraud; (2) constructive fraud; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of Penal Code §496; (5) negligence; (6) negligence per se; (7) breach of contract; (8) violation of Bus. & Prof. C. §17200, et seq. LEGAL AUTHORITY On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for rescission of the agreement. (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (CCP §1281.2.) The trial court may resolve motions to compel arbitration in summary proceedings, in which the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination. The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability by a preponderance of the evidence. (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 776 (trial court properly decided plaintiffs challenge to arbitration agreement despite delegation clause where plaintiff attacked contract formation and very existence of agreement to arbitrate).) If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies. (CCP §1281.4 (para. 1).) DISCUSSION I. Petition to Compel Arbitration A. Seller Defendants Establish an Applicable Arbitration Agreement and Plaintiffs Fail to Raise any Defense Seller Defendants move to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the parties residential purchase agreement (Purchase Agreement). (Motion, Ex. 2.) Paragraph 31 of the Purchase Agreement states, [t]he Parties agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration&The arbitration shall be conduct through any arbitration provider or service mutually agreed to by the Parties&. (Motion, Ex. 2, ¶31.) Plaintiffs claims undoubtedly arise out of the Purchase Agreement, as the complaint is based entirely on the misrepresentations made in the Purchase Agreement itself and in connection with Defendants sale of the property. (FAC, ¶¶24-40.) Seller Defendants therefore establish the existence of an applicable arbitration agreement to Plaintiffs dispute. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the arbitration agreement applies to their dispute. In response, Plaintiffs argue Seller Defendants failed to satisfy the condition precedent of selecting an arbitrator mutually agreed to by Plaintiffs and Seller Defendants and have thus waived their right to arbitrate. B. The Contract Does Not Contain a Condition Precedent A condition is an event which must occur or be excused before performance on a contract becomes due. Conditions precedent are not favored and contractual provisions will not be so construed in the absence of language plainly requiring such a construction. (In re Marriage of Hasso (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1181.) There is no language in ¶31 that would make the obligation to arbitrate contingent upon first selecting an arbitrator, e.g. subject to or conditioned on. Plaintiffs fail to point to any such language. Absent plain language requiring that parties first appoint a mutually agreeable arbitrator prior to complying with their obligation to arbitrate, the Court will not construe paragraph 31 as imposing such a condition precedent on the parties obligation to arbitrate. The Court rejects Plaintiffs contention that their obligation to arbitrate was contingent upon selection of a mutually agreeable arbitrator. C. Defendants Have Not Waived Their Right to Arbitration In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue Seller Defendants have waived any right to compel arbitration by refusing to name an acceptable arbitrator. A party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 447, 453.) As the party asserting waiver, Plaintiff bears the heavy burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) While there is no single test for establishing waiver, the relevant factors include: (1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) whether important intervening steps (e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration) had taken place; and (5) whether the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party. (Saint Agnes Med. Ctr., supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1203.) The presence or absence of prejudice from the litigation is a determinative issue. (Id. at 12031204.) Any claim that the right to arbitration has been waived is reviewed with close judicial scrutiny. (Id. at 1195.) Although a court may deny a petition to compel arbitration on the ground of waiver (§ 1281.2, subd. (a)), waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof. (Id.) Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 320.) Plaintiffs fail to carry the heavy burden of establishing waiver. Seller Defendants were under no obligation to name an acceptable arbitrator prior to exercising their right to demand arbitration. Plaintiffs fail to articulate how the failure to name an arbitrator during the parties discussions qualifies as waiver of the right to arbitrate. Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to cite to specific evidence of Seller Defendants absolute refusal to participate in the process to select a mutually agreed upon arbitrator. Given Plaintiffs refusal to voluntarily participate in arbitration, Seller Defendants understandably chose to obtain an order compelling arbitration before attempting to select a mutually agreeable arbitrator. Plaintiffs raise no other arguments in opposition to the request to compel arbitration. Defendants have established an applicable arbitration agreement and Plaintiffs have failed to raise any defense to arbitration. Therefore, the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. II. Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration If a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in this State or not, has ordered arbitration of a controversy which is an issue involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court of this State, the court in which such action or proceeding is pending shall, upon motion of a party to such action or proceeding, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration is had in accordance with the order to arbitrate or until such earlier time as the court specifies&If the issue which is the controversy subject to arbitration is severable, the stay may be with respect to that issue only. Seller Defendants also filed a separate motion to stay the action against them pending completion of arbitration pursuant to 1281.4. In light of the Courts order granting the petition to compel arbitration and staying the action pursuant to CCP §1281.2(c), Seller Defendants request to stay this action pending arbitration is GRANTED for those reasons. III. Selection of Neutral Arbitrator Should parties reach an impasse in selecting a neutral arbitrator, they may petition the Court to appoint the arbitrator pursuant to CCP §1281.6. If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointing an arbitrator, that method shall be followed. If the arbitration agreement does not provide a method for appointing an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom arbitration is sought may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator and that method shall be followed. In the absence of an agreed method, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed fails to act and his or her successor has not been appointed, the court, on petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator. ORDER Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Petition to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED pursuant to CCP §1281.2. The entire action is stayed pending arbitration of Plaintiffs claims against Seller Defendants. Defendants Kerri Pomarolli and Richard S. Pomarollis Motion to Stay Legal Action Pending Arbitration is GRANTED.

Case Number: 22PSCV01925 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Michael Rosas, et al. v. OC Auto Exchange dba LA Auto Exchange, et al. Motion to be Relieved as Plaintiffs Counsel TENTATIVE RULING The Court GRANTS the motion. Plaintiffs Counsel must resubmit a correct and complete proposed order prior to the hearing, addressing the items discussed above, including the correct courthouse address in the caption and noting that the order is effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order (Item 5.a.). Counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five calendar days. BACKGROUND This is a fraud action. On November 21, 2022, plaintiffs Michael Rosas and Odalys Rosas (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against defendants OC Auto Exchange dba LA Auto Exchange, a California corporation, Western Surety Company, a South Dakota corporation, Capital One Auto Finance Inc., a Texas Corporation (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 10. On February 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint against Defendants and Does 1 through 10, alleging causes of action for fraud & deceit, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, action for rescission of sales contract for sale of goods pursuant to California [ sic ] Code section 1698, violation of California Civil Code section 1632, violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty [ sic ], Civil Code section 1790, et seq., violation of the Consumers [ sic ] Legal Remedies Act Equitable and Injunctive Relief, and violation of Vehicle Code section 11711. On September 5, 2023, Ben Roberts of Law Office of Ben Roberts moved to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not opposed the motion. On March 25, 2024, the Court denied the motion without prejudice. On June 13, 2024, Ben Roberts of Law Office of Ben Roberts moved to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not opposed the motion. LEGAL STANDARD The Court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted, provided that there is no prejudice to the client, and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. ( See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398, 403-407.) A motion to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Council Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion), MC-052 (Declaration), and MC-053 (Proposed Order). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362, subds. (a), (c), (e).) The requisite forms must be served on the client and on all parties that have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1362, subd. (d).) DISCUSSION Ben Roberts of Law Office of Ben Roberts (Counsel) seeks to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiffs Michael Rosas and Odalys Rosas. Counsel contends he and his firm have lost all contact with Plaintiffs. (Roberts Decls., ¶ 2.) Grounds for permitting an attorney to withdraw from representation include the clients conduct that renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively[.] (Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16, subd. (b)(4).) A breakdown in the attorney-client relationship is also grounds for allowing the attorney to withdraw. ( Estate of Falco (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014.) While the Court finds Plaintiffs lack of communication sufficient grounds for permitting withdrawal, the Court finds a few issues with Counsels motions that need to be fixed. First, each of the Judicial Council forms Counsel filed with the Court show that Counsel provided the wrong courthouse contact information in the caption of each document. Counsel provided the following contact information: 1427 West Covina Parkway, Compton, CA 90220. The correct courthouse address is 1427 West Covina Parkway, West Covina, CA 91790. Nevertheless, the proof of service filed on June 13, 2024, lists the correct courthouse address and the declaration provides the correct courthouse address for the Post-Arbitration Status Conference. The Court will not deny the motion on this ground but admonishes Counsel to carefully proofread documents to ensure they are accurate. Second, the proposed order does not include the Post-Arbitration Status Conference scheduled for July 30, 2024. On May 13, 2024, the Courts minute order provided the new date. The motions to be relieved as counsel were filed on June 13, 2024, therefore, counsel was aware of the new date but failed to include it in the proposed order. The proposed order is also incomplete in that items 3, 5, 6, 9 and as previously discussed, item 7, have not been completed. Notwithstanding, the Court GRANTS the motion. Plaintiff must resubmit a correct and complete proposed order prior to the hearing, addressing the items discussed above, including the correct courthouse address in the caption and noting that the order is effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order (Item 5.a.). CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS the motion. Plaintiffs Counsel must resubmit a correct and complete proposed order prior to the hearing, addressing the items discussed above, including the correct courthouse address in the caption and noting that the order is effective upon the filing of the proof of service of the signed order (Item 5.a.). Counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five calendar days.

Case Number: 20STCV17676 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On May 8, 2020, Plaintiff Henry Martinez (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Jill Renner (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On January 4, 2023, Defendant filed an answer. On January 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on February 22, 2024. On January 11, 2024, Defendant filed (1) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on February 23, 2024 and (2) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on February 22, 2024. On February 22, 2024, the Court placed the motions off calendar because the parties had not participated in an informal discovery conference. On February 28, 2024, Defendant scheduled an informal discovery conference for March 22, 2024 and filed an informal discovery conference form. On March 8, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to appear in person or remotely via LACourtConnect, or appear through counsel other than Randall Awad (who is not eligible to practice law), on March 13, 2024, and inform the Court whether Plaintiff intends to seek another attorney to represent him or whether Plaintiff will proceed without counsel. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff appeared and asked for additional time to find new counsel. The Court continued certain hearing dates. On March 22, 2024, the Court continued the informal discovery conference to April 17, 2024. On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff appeared and stated that he intended to find new counsel. The Court continued the informal discovery conference to May 17, 2024. On May 17, 2024, the Court conducted an informal discovery conference with Plaintiff and Defendants counsel. Defendants counsel agreed to re-send the discovery requests and motions to compel further responses and to give Plaintiff 20 days to respond without objections if Plaintiff would allow Defendant to file the motions after the 20 days. The Court suggested the parties discuss filing deadlines to see if the parties could stipulate to deadlines. On June 14, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on July 10, 2024. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. Trial is currently scheduled for August 16, 2024. PARTYS REQUESTS Defendant asks the Court to compel Plaintiff to provide further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and to impose sanctions on Plaintiff. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides in part: (a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following: (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (3) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. * * * (h) Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subds. (a), (b), (c), (h).) DISCUSSION On August 1, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motion to compel Plaintiffs responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and ordered Plaintiff to provide verified responses and to produce the documents, electronically stored information, and/or other things requested without objections by August 31, 2023. On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff served verified responses to the demand for production of documents. Considering the responses inadequate, Defendant filed a motion to compel further responses on January 11, 2024. The Court took the motion off calendar because Defendant had not scheduled or participated in an informal discovery conference. (In addition, the motion appears to have been untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c).) After participating in an informal discovery conference on May 17, 2024, Defendant filed another motion to compel further responses on June 14, 2024. The motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c), which provides: Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) Plaintiff served verified responses on September 25, 2023. Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff served supplemental responses or that the parties agreed in writing to allow Defendant to file a motion to compel further responses more than 45 days after service of the verified responses. Therefore, Defendant was required to file a motion to compel further responses within 45 days of September 25, 2023 that is, by November 9, 2023. On May 20, 2024, Defendant filed a notice stating that, at the May 17, 2024 informal discovery conference, the parties agreed that, if Plaintiff did not provide full and complete objection-free answers and documents within 20 days, Defendant will file Motions to Compel against Plaintiff . . . . Defendants notice does not constitute an agreement in writing for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c). At most, it memorializes Defendants understanding of Plaintiffs purported oral agreement. Defendant has waived her right to compel further responses. The Court denies the motion. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Defendant Jill Renners motion to compel Plaintiff Henry Martinezs further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling within five days.

Case Number: 19SMCV01265 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: I Please call the courtroom after 8 am to receive a copy of the courts tentative decision.