Santos Eligio Say Velasquez Vs A C M Fashion Inc., A California Corporation

Case Number: 23SMCV03493 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Southern California Injured Workers LLC, v. Amigo Management CASE NO.: 23SMCV03493 MOTION: OSC Re: Preliminary Injunction HEARING DATE: 7/26/2024 Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526(a), a preliminary injunction may be issued in the following cases: 1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. 3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. 5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. 6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. 7) Where the obligation arises from a trust. In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: 1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)); and 2) a balancing of the irreparable harm that the moving party is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied compared to the harm that the non-moving party is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowners Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402.) A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits. ( MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.) [A] cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted. ( Id . (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168).) The courts ruling on a preliminary injunction is not an adjudication of the merits, is not a trial, and does not require a statement of decision. ( Cohen v. Board of Supervisors , (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.) The judge is not required to state her reasons for granting or denying a preliminary injunction; a cursory statement is sufficient. ( City of Los Altos v. Barnes , (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198.) A proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with any required undertaking, within one day after the preliminary injunction is granted, or other time ordered by the judge. (CRC 3.1150(f).) EVIDENTIARY ISSUES Cross-Defendants objections to the Marchant declaration are GRANTED as to nos. 17-24 (foundation, personal knowledge and legal conclusion). The remainder of objections are OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants objections to the Tantuwaya declaration are ruled on as follows: Sustained as to objections nos. 1 and 43. Sustained in part as to no. 3, as to the portion starting with who I later . . .. Sustained in part as to no. 12, as to the portion starting with In February of 2022 and in without my knowledge and/or authority. Sustained in part as to no. 44, as to the portion starting with Also, a total of . . . and ending in December 31, 2022. All other objections are OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants objections to the supplemental Winthrop declaration are OVERRULED. The Court agrees that the attached documents should have been part of a supplemental request for judicial notice. The Court also agrees that while the Court may take judicial notice of the documents existence, it cannot take judicial notice of any factual assertions therein. Cross-Complainants objections to the supplemental Marchant declaration are OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) Cross-Defendants request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) Analysis Cross-Complainant Funding4Doctors LLC ("Funding") moves for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Cross-Defendants Injured Worker Medical Group, LLC ("IWMG") and Dr. Vrijesh S. Tantuwaya from disbursing and/or otherwise dissipating funds collected and being collected on behalf of Funding pursuant to 30 Masters Receivables Advance Agreements ("Agreements 1-30"). Specifically, they request the following order: (1) Cross-Defendants are ENJOINED from taking any action whatsoever that will dissipate the funds collected on account of the thirty (30) Masters Receivables Advance Agreements (Agreements 1-30) as set for in the Verified Cross-Complaint filed by Funding, as well as the Cross-Complaint filed by IWMG, including, but not limited to, paying, disbursing, distributing, or otherwise dissipating funds collected and being collected by IWMG; (2) Cross-Defendants are ORDERED to provide Funding with an accounting of all funds collected on account of Agreements 1-30 within fourteen (14) days of this Order, and to identify all banks and/or financial institutions at which such funds are being held; and (3) Cross-Defendants are ORDERED to provide a copy of this Order by Certified Mail to any and all banks and financial institutions at which such funds are being held. Funding reasons that it will succeed on the merits of their contract claims because the Agreements are admitted by IWMG and personally guaranteed by Dr. Tantuwaya. Further, Funding will suffer great and irreparable injury because Cross-Defendants may use and/or distribute the amounts that are due under the Agreements, and by the time the case is over, there may be no money left. (See Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Svcs., Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414 [an injunction may be granted when a party to the action is doing or threatens an act in violation of another party's rights and tending to render the judgment ineffectual].) Funding does not meet its burden to show its irreparable harm, such that the balance of equities favors an injunction. Funding cites no substantive evidence that IWMG or Dr. Tantuwaya are dissipating the disputed funds rendering ineffectual any resulting judgment. Funding merely asserts in conclusory terms that the funds are at risk of dissipation by Cross-Defendants IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya as they are attempting to use the funds due to Funding for their own benefit to pay restitution to IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya's victims in the open and ongoing criminal investigation against Dr. Tantuwaya. (Marchant Decl., ¶ 18.) Cross-Defendants deny this assertion. (Krieger Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) Indeed, restitution could not be owed in an open and ongoing criminal investigation. IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya also present evidence that they continue to generate funds and receivables through their ongoing medical practices. (Tantuwaya Decl., ¶ 122.) Any judgment against them would therefore not be ineffectual. Funding therefore fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Case Number: 23CHCV01662 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/26/24 Case #23CHCV01662 DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE TO THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT Demurrer & Motion to Strike filed on 5/8/24. MOVING PARTY: Defendant Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) erroneously sued as the California Fire Department and the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs Emilio Valdovinos and Jaime Madrigal NOTICE: ok Demurrer is to the 1 st 5 th causes of action: 1. Dangerous Condition of Public Property 2. Negligent Hiring/Training/Supervision/Retention 3. Failure to Protect From Harm, Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Violation (42 U.S.C. §1983) 4. Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Policies and Customs (42 U.S.C. §1983) 5. Supervisory Liability for Unconstitutional Policies, Procedures, Practices and Customs (42 U.S.C. §1983) 6. Negligence ( not alleged against Moving Parties ) RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE : An order striking portions of the complaint. RULING : The demurrer and motion to strike are placed off calendar as moot. On 6/8/23, Plaintiffs Emilio Valdovinos and Jaime Madrigal filed this action against Los Angeles County Fire Department; California Fire Department; State of California California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection and Does 1-50 for: (1) Dangerous Condition of Public Property; (2) Negligent Hiring/ Training/ Supervision/Retention; (3) Failure to Protect From Harm, Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Violation (42 U.S.C. §1983); (4) Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Policies and Customs (42 U.S.C. §1983); (5) Supervisory Liability for Unconstitutional Policies, Procedures, Practices and Customs (42 U.S.C. §1983) and (6) Negligence. On 5/8/24, Defendant Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) erroneously sued as the California Fire Department and the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection filed and served the instant demurrer as to all causes of action alleged against these defendants (1 st 5 th causes of action) and the instant motion to strike seeking an order striking portions of the complaint. Plaintiffs have not opposed he demurrer or motion to strike. Rather, on 6/28/24, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Dismissal of the entire complaint with prejudice as to Defendant State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection which was entered that same day and on 7/17/24, Plaintiffs filed another Request for Dismissal of the complaint without prejudice as to Defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Department of Forestry and Fire Protection which was entered that same day. Based on the above-mentioned dismissals, the demurrer and motion to strike are moot.

Case Number: 23SMCV04468 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 A&M ENGINEERING, INC. , Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER KLEIN, et al. , Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 SMCV0 4468 Hearing Date: June 28 , 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS APPLICATIONS FOR WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BACKGROUND This action arises from a breach of promissory notes . Plaintiff A&M Engineering Inc. made three short-term loans to two Defendants , Global Automotive Solutions LLC (GAS) and GASs successor - in - interest, Stelaro LLC ( Stelaro ) . The loans total $14 million, only $1 million of which Plaintiff claims has been repaid . The loans were purportedly used to buy cars in Mexico which were re-sold for a profit in other countries . Defendant Christopher Klein served as the CEO of GAS and Stelaro . Defendant Alondra Group, LLC is the sole shareholder of Stelaro . Plaintiff has sued other corporate defendants who it claims are the alter egos of Klein , including Christopher Klein Enterprises LLC (CKE), Executive Auto Rentals, LLC (EAR) , and Luxury Lift , LLC (L uxury ) (together with Alond r a, the Alter Ego Defendants) . Plaintiff has also sued Instant Infosystems, Inc. (Instant), an entity owned by Christopher Kleins father, which Plaintiff claims received a fraudulent transfer . Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging ten causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud-misrepresentation, (3) fraud-concealment, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) receiving stolen property Penal Code § 496(a), (c); (6) fraudulent transfer Civ. Code § 3439 et seq.; (7) breach of fiduciary duty, (8) unfair competition Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (9) constructive trust, and (10) unjust enrichment . Plaintiff filed applications for right to attach orders . On February 20, 2024, the Court denied the applications . Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate . On April 9, 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its order and alternative writ of mandate commanding the Court to either respond to an order to show cause or vacate your order of February 20, 2024 & and thereafter make a new and different order setting the petitions for a hearing to determine whether an attachment should issue based on the courts evaluation of the record and the probable outcome of the litigation. On May 1, 2024, the Court vacate d the February 20 order and set this hearing on the applications to consider the probable validity of Plaintiffs claims . LEGAL STANDARD Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this article for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment by filing an application for the order and writ with the court in which the action is brought.¿ (C ode C iv. P roc. § 484.010.) ¿¿ The application shall be executed under oath and must include: (1) a statement showing that the attachment is sought to secure the recovery on a claim upon which an attachment may be issued; (2) a statement of the amount to be secured by the attachment; (3) a statement that the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based; (4) a statement that the applicant has no information or belief that the claim is discharged or that the prosecution of the action is stayed in a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. section 101 et seq. ); and (5) a description of the property to be attached under the writ of attachment and a statement that the plaintiff is informed and believes that such property is subject to attachment.¿ (C ode C iv. P roc. § 484.020.)¿ ¿ The application [for a writ of attachment] shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based.¿ (C ode C iv. P roc. § 484.030.)¿¿ ¿ The Court shall issue a right to attach order if the Court finds all of the following: ¿ (1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued. ¿ (2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based. ¿ (3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based. ¿ (4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero. ¿ CCP § 484.090. ¿ A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.¿ (C ode C iv. P roc. § 481.190.) In determining the probable validity of a claim where the defendant makes an appearance, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of the probable outcome of the litigation.¿ (See Loeb & Loeb v. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1120.) ¿ This procedure is similar to a bench trial. ¿ (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4 th 76, 81.) At the times prescribed by C ode Civ. Proc. § 1005(b), the defendant must be served with summons and complaint, notice of application and hearing, and the application and supporting evidence.¿ (C ode C iv. P roc. § 484.040.)¿¿ ¿ Attachment is a drastic remedy in that it provides for the collection of a debt by seizure in advance of trial and judgment, as security for the eventual satisfaction of the judgment . Thus, under California law , attachment is a purely statutory remedy, subject to strict construction . ( Epstein v. Abrams ¿(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168.) REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Instant seeks judicial notice of the first amended complaint filed in this action and the declaration of David Klein in support of Instants Opposition to A&Ms application for a right to attach order, writ of attachment and temporary protective order, previously filed in this action on November 29, 202 3 . It is unnecessary to ask the court to take¿ judicial notice of materials previously¿ filed in this case . [A] ll that is necessary is to¿ call the court s¿ attention to such papers. ( Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 9:53.1a ) .) Accordingly , the Court denies Instants request for judicial notice. Plaintiff requests judicial notice of (1) the Grant Deed from Dror Alperovich and Gila Leibovitch to Christopher Klein dated July 1, 2020 for the real property known as 1315 Schuyler Road, Los Angeles, CA 90210; (2) the Deed of T rust from borrower Christopher Klein to lender OCMBC, Inc., dated September 9, 2020 secured by the real property located at 1315 Schuyler Road, Los Angeles, CA 90210, (3) the Entity Information page pertaining to Stelaro , LLC on the Nevada Secretary of States website as of December 18, 2023, (4) the Entity Information page pertaining to Alondra Group, LLC on the Nevada Secretary of States website as of December 18, 2023; (5) the Statement of Information, Limited Liability Company filed by Christopher Klein Enterprises LLC with the State of California Office of the Secretary of State on July 5, 2023; (6) the Statement of Information, Limited Liability Company filed by Christopher Klein Enterprises LLC with the State of California Office of the Secretary of State on August 31, 2021; (7) the Articles of Organization of a Limited Liability Company for Christopher Klein Enterprises LLC, filed with the Secretary of State for the State of California and dated June 26, 2015; (8) the Statement of Information, Limited Liability Company filed by Executive Auto Rentals LLC with the State of California Office of the Secretary of State on July 5, 2023; (9) the Statement of Information, Limited Liability Company filed by Executive Auto Rentals LLC with the State of California Office of the Secretary of State on July 16, 2021 ; (10) the Amendment to Articles of Organization of a Limited Liability Company for Executive Auto Rentals, LLC, filed with the Secretary of State for the State of California and dated January 14, 2021 ; (11) the Articles of Organization of a Limited Liability Company for Andares Car Rental, LLC, filed with the Secretary of State for the State of California and dated January 8, 2021 ; (12) the Summary for Luxury Lifts LLC found on the Colorado Secretary of States website on November 21, 2023 ; (13) the Statement of Change Changing the Registered Agent Information filed by Luxury Lifts LLC on July 6, 2023 with the Colorado Secretary of State ; (14) the Articles of Organization for a Limited Liability Company filed by Luxury Lifts LLC on February 3, 2022 with the Colorado Secretary of State ; (15) Defendants Consolidated Opposition to Ex Parte Applications for Right to Attach Orders etc., filed in this matter on October 6, 2023 ; (16) the Opposition of Defendants Stelaro , LLC and Alondra Group, LLC to Applications for Right to Attach Orders etc., filed in this matter on November 29, 2023 ; (17) Defendant Stelaro , LLCs Answer to Unverified Complaint filed in this matter on November 17, 2023 ; (18) Defendant Alondra Group, LLCs Answer to Unverified Complaint filed in this matter on November 17, 2023 ; (19) Order and Alternative Writ of Mandate dated April 9, 2024 in A&M Engineering, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District case number B335766 l; (20) Letter dated May 2, 2024 from Leah C. Gershon, Court Counsel, to the Justices of Division Seven of the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District pertaining to case number B335766 ; (21) Brief of Defendants Stelaro , LLC and Alondra Group, LLC Regarding the Courts Response to the Court of Appeals Order and Alternative Writ of Mandate dated April 24, 2024 and filed in this matter ; and (22) Preliminary Opposition of Real Parties in Interest Stelaro , LLC and Alondra Group, LLC to Petition for Writ of Mandate or Other Appropriate Relief dated April 5, 2024 and filed in A&M Engineering, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District case number B335766. The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 2 as recorded documents pertaining to ownership of property as official acts of the County of Los Angeles or as facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (g), (h) .) The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 3 through 14 as enactments of the offices of the Secretaries of State of California, Nevada, and Colorado, or as official acts of those Secretaries of State. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (b) & (c).) The Court denies the request for judicial notice of Exhibits 15 through 22 as unnecessary as they are documents filed in this case . EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS The Court overrules the Alter Ego Defendants Objection Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and sustains Objection Nos. 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 , 16, 17, 18, 19, to the Declaration of Boris Beljak , Jr. The Court sustains the Alter Ego Defendants Objection Nos. 20, 21 , 22 to the Declaration of Anthony Brown . The Court sustains the Alter Ego Defendants Objection No. 23 to the Declaration of Ryan Thomas Dunn . The Court sustains the Alter Ego Defendants Objection Nos. 24 and 25 to the Declaration of Ivonne Franco . The Court sustains Instants Objection Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 to the Declaration of Boris Beljak , Jr. ANALYSIS Basis of Attachment Section 483.010, subd . ( a ) provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, a writ of attachment can be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney's fees. (C ode C iv. P roc. § 483.010(a).) The purpose of the fixed and readily ascertainable requirement is [t]o ensure that the defendant has meaningful notice of what she is contending with, and to ensure that the attachment amount may be accurately determined in summary proceedings prior to trial. ( Royals v. Lu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5 th 328, 350.) It is a well-recognized rule of law in this state that an attachment will lie upon a cause of action for damages for a breach of contract where the damages are readily ascertainable by reference to the contract and the basis of the computation of damages appears to be reasonable and definite. The fact that the damages are unliquidated is not determinative . But the contract sued on must furnish a standard by which the amount due may be clearly ascertained and there must exist a basis upon which the damages can be determined by proof. (See CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4 th 537, 541.) Here, the amount owed is readily ascertainable , and there is a basis upon which the damages can be determined . A&M submitted the three outstanding promissory notes, which totaled $14,000,000 . ( Exs . B, C, D to Beljak Decl.) A&M also submitted A &M bank statements showing that Stelaro had repaid A&M $1,000,000 . (Ex. E to Beljak Decl .) The promissory notes and bank records are properly authenticated in the declaration of Boris Beljak . ( Beljak Decl. ¶¶ 12, 18, 21, 24-25 . ) A&M now seeks the unpaid balance on the promissory notes of $13,000,000 . A ccordingly , the notes sued on furnish a standard by which the amount due can be calculated and the amount of damages can be determined by resort to proof ( i.e. , the notes and the bank statements ) . Probable Validity Stelaro Plaintiff has shown the probable validity of its claims against Stelaro . There is no dispute that Stelaro borrowed $14 million from Plaintiff . The parties dispute the amount that has been repaid, but even under Stelaros version of events, it owes $ 11,065,000 ($14 million in loans less the $ 2,935,000 Stelaro claims it paid) . (C. Klein Decl. ¶ 2 ; Ex s . 1 .) Stelaro argue s that Plaintiff is barred from recovery due to the usurious nature of its loans . Stelaro has offered no facts to support this defense -- only the vague legal conclusion that there are usury issues A&M must rebut . ( Stealor Resp. Br. At 4.) But even if a usury defense were available in this case, Plaintiff is entitled to repayment of the principal amount on the notes which is the only amount it is seeking to attach . ( Gibbo v. Berger (2004) 123 Cal.App.4 th 396, 403 ( When a loan is usurious, the creditor is entitled to repayment of the principal sum only.).) The Court has credited all the amounts allegedly paid by Stelaro to principal, as Plaintiff has not shown what portion (if any) should be credited to interest . Accordingly , whether Plaintiff has charged usurious interest is simply not relevant to this application . Stelaro also argues that Boris Beljaks declaration is conclusory , and the amount due is inadequately documented . The Court disagrees . The declaration contains sufficient detail regarding the amounts due under the promissory notes and is supported by the notes and bank statements . ( Beljak Decl. ¶¶ 24-25.) A declaration signed under penalty of perjury, as Beljaks is, is sufficient to show A&M, of which Beljak is owner and CEO, disbursed the loan funds. However, while the Court concludes Plaintiff has shown the probable validity of its claim s against Stelaro , t he evidence is in equipoise as to the amount owed . The parties have filed dueling declarations that are equally credible . A ccordingly , because Plaintiff bears the burden of proof, a conclusion that the evidence is equal ly balanced means the Court can grant the application for only the amount that is undisputed: $ 11,065,000 . Al ter Ego Defendants Plaintiff has not shown the probable validity of its claim s against the Alter Ego Defendants . Plaintiffs claims against these defendants are based on an alter ego theory . A lter ego liability requires two elements : (1) such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, and (2) whether adherence to the fiction of separate existence would, under the circumstances, promote fraud or injustice. ( Watson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. ¿(1936) 8 Cal.2d 61, 68 .) ¿ Factors a trial court may consider when deciding unity of interest and whether the fiction of a separate existence would promote fraud and injustice include the following: Commingling of funds and other assets & ; the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own [citations]; & the failure to maintain & adequate corporate records & ; & sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by & the members of a family [citations]; & the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual & ; & [the] concealment of personal business activities [citations]; the use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity [citations]; & or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions. ( Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. ¿(1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 838840 .) Alter ego is an extreme remedy, sparingly used . ( Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 539 ; see also Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 301 (the corporate form will be disregarded only in narrowly defined circumstances and only when the ends of justice so require); Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249 (sound public policy dictates that imposition of alter ego liability be approached with caution).) Plaintiff argues it has met eight Associated Vendors factors . In doing so, Plaintiff relies heavily on the declaration of Boris Beljak , Jr., but Beljak lacks personal knowledge to attest to most (if not all) of these factors . Plaintiff also fails to systematically show it has met the eight Associated Vendors factors as to each Alter Ego Defendant . For example, it argues it has met the common ownership factor, but it has only shown common ownership of Stelaro and Alondra . It claims there is a commingling of assets; but it has only shown commingling of assets between Stelaro and CKE . It argues there is a sharing of offices, but it has only shown one defendant (Alondra) who has the same office as Stelaro . In any event, e ven if Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show unity of interest, the Court concludes it has not alleged facts to show an inequitable result would occur if the Court failed to pierce Stelaros corporate veil . Without citing any evidence, Plaintiff conclusorily argues that Klein will simply drain Stelaro of available funds (if he hasnt already) by transferring Stelaros funds to the alter ego entities, leaving Stelaro without assets to satisfy a judgment against it. But t here is no evidence that Stelaro is undercapitalized, is insolvent or cannot pay a judgment issued against it . Accordingly , Plaintiff has not shown the probable validity of its claim against the Alter Ego Defendants, and the Court denies its application as to the Alter Ego Defendants . Instant Plaintiff has shown it is more likely than not that it will prevail on its sole claim for fraudulent transfer against Instant . A fraudulent transfer under the UVTA is a transfer by the debtor of property to a third person undertaken with the intent to prevent a creditor from reaching that interest to satisfy its claim. [Citation.] ( Kirkeby v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 642, 648.) Under the U[V]TA , a transfer can be invalid either because of actual fraud ( Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a) ) or constructive fraud ( id. , §§ 3439.04, subd. (b) , 3439.05 ) & . ( Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4 th 657, 661 .) Actual fraud under the UVTA is shown when a transfer is made, or an obligation is incurred, [w] ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor. ( Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (a)(1) .) Such a transfer is voidable as to a creditor of the debtor, whether the creditor s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. ( Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (a) .) It is not voidable, however, against a person that took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value given the debtor or against any subsequent transferee or obligee . ( Civ. Code § 3439.08, subd. (a) . ) To determine whether there is an actual intent to defraud, the Court looks to eleven badges of fraud. ( Nagel v. Westen (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 740, 748.) The factors are: (1) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider. [¶] (2) Whether the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer. [¶] (3) Whether the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed. [¶] (4) Whether before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit. [¶] (5) Whether the transfer was of substantially all the debtor s assets. [¶] (6) Whether the debtor absconded. [¶] (7) Whether the debtor removed or concealed assets. [¶] (8) Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred. [¶] (9) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. [¶] (10) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred. [¶] [and] [¶] (11) Whether the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor that transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. ( Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (b) .) None of these factors is determinative, and no minimum or maximum number of factors is required. ( Aghaian v. Minassian, supra , 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 456; see also Filip v. Bucurenciu (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 825, 834 .) In Filip , the court explained the factors do not create a mathematical formula to establish actual intent. There is no minimum number of factors that must be present before the scales tip in favor of finding of actual intent to defraud . This list of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other. ( Id. at p. 834 .) The presence of one or more badges of fraud does not create a presumption of fraud . Rather, it is merely evidence from which an inference of fraudulent intent may be drawn. ( Legis. Com. com., Deering's Ann. Civil Code, § 3439.04 .) Constructive fraud under the UVTA can be shown in either of two ways . First, a transfer is constructively fraudulent where a debtor makes a transfer or incurs an obligation [w] ithout receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor either: [¶] (A) [w]as engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction[; or] [¶] (B) [ i ] ntended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor s ability to pay as they became due. ( Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (a)(2) .) As with actual fraud, this form of transfer is voidable as to a creditor no matter whether the creditor s claim arose before or after the transfer. ( Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (a) .) Second, a transfer is constructively fraudulent when a debtor makes a transfer or incurs an obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. ( § 3439.05, subd. (a) .) This form of transfer is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made. ( Id. ) Here, Stelaro made two transfers to Instant : (1) in March 2022 for $600,000 to repay Instants loan to CKE , and (2) monthly payments totaling over $50,000 for rent allegedly owed by Stelaro to CKE . (D. Klein Decl. ¶ ¶ 3 , 8 .) As to the first transfer, Plaintiff argues there is actual fraud because the transfer was made from son to father, and Stelaro received no reasonably equivalent value because it was paying Instant $600,000 to satisfy a loan made by a completely separate entity, CKE . (D. Klein Decl. ¶ 3.) There are also no contemporaneous documents showing that the loan was ever made such as a note or loan agreement . Instant relies on a balance sheet as of 8/31/2020 to prove the loan was made but it is unclear when the balance sheet was created . (Ex. A to D. Klein Decl .) In opposition, Instant argues there was no intent to hinder, delay or defraud because at the time these this transfer was made in March 2022 , and through October 23, 2022, Plaintiff admits it was still receiving payments for the interest owed on its loans from Stelaro . There is no evidence Stelaro was insolvent at the time of the transfers, or that it is in fact insolvent today . The Court concludes that this transfer bears four badges of fraud . First , the transfer was made to an insider ; Instant and Stelaro are wholly owned by members of the same family . ( Menick v. Goldy (1955) 131 CAl.App.2d 542, 547 (The relationship of parent and child, when coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may be sufficient to raise an inference of fraud in the conveyance.).) Second , the value of the consideration received by Stelaro was not reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred . There is no dispute that the transfer here was made to repay the loan of a separate entity, CKE, and therefore, Stelaro received no consideration from the transfer . Third , the transfer occurred shortly after Stelaro incurred a substantial debt . Stelaro transferred $600,000 to Instant in March 2022, just seven days after A & M loaned Stelaro $5,000,000 . Fourth , while not a badge of fraud identified in Civ. Code § 3439.04, subd. (b) , the Court finds compelling the fact that there are no contemporaneous documents supporting the existence of the loan from Instant . While Instant is correct that most of the badges of fraud are not present here, [t] here is no minimum number of factors that must be present before the scales tip in favor of finding of actual intent to defraud . This list of factors is meant to provide guidance to the trial court, not compel a finding one way or the other. ( Filip , 129 Cal.App.4th at 834 .) As to the second transfer for rental payments, there are also no contemporaneous documents supporting the existence of any liability or debt owed by Stelaro to Instant . For example, there is no rental agreement . The absence of this documentation coupled with the relationship between the owners of Stelaro and Instant supports a finding of an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors . Accordingly , the Court also concludes Plaintiff has shown it is more probable than not that it will prevail on its fraudulent transfer claim again st Instant for the transfers for alleged rent payments . Purpose and Amount of Attachment Code of Civil Procedure section 484.090 states that the Court shall issue a right to attach order if the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based . . . [and] the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero. Plaintiff declares that attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on Plaintiffs claim . (Appl. ¶ 4.) The amount to be secured is greater than zero. Subject Property Code of Civil Procedure section 487.010(a) provides that [w]here the defendant is a corporation, all corporate property for which a method of levy is provided is subject to attachment . S ection 487.010(a) also applies to LLCs . Defendants cite no authority to the contrary . Exemptions Defendants have not claimed any specific exemptions . Also, generally, corporate defendants may not claim exemptions. Reduction of Amount to be Secured Code of Civil Procedure section 483.015(b) provides that the amount to be secured by the attachment shall be reduced by, inter alia : (2) The amount of any indebtedness of the plaintiff that the defendant has claimed in a cross-complaint filed in the action if the defendants claim is one upon which an attachment could be issued. (3) The amount of any claim of the defendant asserted as a defense in the answer pursuant to Section 431.70 if the defendant's claim is one upon which an attachment could be issued had an action been brought on the claim when it was not barred by the statute of limitations. [T]o sustain reduction in a writ amount, most courts require that the defendant provide enough evidence about its counterclaims and/or defenses to prove a prima facie case [for attachment against Plaintiff]. (Ahart, California Practice Guide: Enforcing Judgments and Debts , ¶ 4:64 (1998 rev.).) Defendants have not supported an attachable defense or claim for offset . Undertaking Instant argues that Plaintiff should be required to post an undertaking of $150,000 which represents the amount of fees Instant will incur to litigate this action to prove the attachment was wrongful . The Court disagrees . Code of Civil Procedure section 489.210 requires the plaintiff to file an undertaking before issuance of a writ of attachment . Code of Civil Procedure section 489.220 provides, with exceptions, for an undertaking in the amount of $10,000 . However, that amount is subject to augmentation [ i ]f, upon objection to the undertaking, the court determines that the probable recovery for wrongful attachment exceeds the amount of the undertaking, in which case the court must order the amount of the undertaking increased to the amount it determines to be the probabl e recovery for wrongful attachment if it is ultimately determined that the attachment was wrongful. (Code Civ. Proc. § 489.220(b).) An attachment is wrongful if a plaintiff does not ultimately recover judgment in the underlying action . (Code Civ Proc. §490.010(b).) A plaintiffs liability for a wrongful attachment includes (1) all damages proximately caused to the defendant by the wrongful attachment, and (2) all costs and expenses, including attorneys fees, reason ably expended in defeating the attachment . (Code Civ. Proc. §490.020(a). ) There is ambiguity and uncertainty as to what the Legislature intends a trial court to consider in determining a probable recovery for wrongful attachment under § 489.220(b) . ( N. Hollywood Marble Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 683, 688 . ) In N. Hollywood Marble Co. , the California Court of Appeal held that the term probable recovery in § 489.220(b) should be construed as giving the trial court discretion to consider the probability of a plaintiff prevailing in the underlying action in determining a defendant s probable recover y for wrongful attachment under § 489.220(b) and, accordingly, denied the defendant s motion to increase the plaintiff's undertaking because the defendant effectively conceded the merits of the plaintiff's claim. ( Id. at 688 . ) There, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract, obtained a right-to-attach order to seize inventory, equipment, and supplies of defendant s business equal to the amount of plaintiff s breach of contract claim, and posted the statutory undertaking. ( Id. at 686 . ) The defendant moved to increase the plaintiff s undertaking pursuant to § 489.220(b) . ( Id. ) The trial court denied the defendant s motion, finding that section 489.220[b] contemplates the trial court s consideration of the probable validity of the plaintiff s claim in the process of determining the probable recovery of defendant for wrongful attachment. ( Id. at 688 . ) On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court was precluded from considering the probable validity of the plaintiff's claim in determining its probable recovery for wrongful attachment under section 489.220(b) . ( Id. at 689, 691 . ) Like Instant here, the defendant in N. Hollywood Marble Co. advanced a reading of § 489.220(b) that was confined to a determination of a monetary amount , i.e., a determination of the likely amount of the recovery for wrongful attachment, and whether it exceeds the amount of the posted undertaking . ( Id. at 689 . ) As explained by the California Court of Appeal, under the defendant s posited reading of § 489.220 , a court should simply assume the attachment is wrongful and increase the undertaking to the total damages [or amount the] defendant competently demonstrates it is likely to sustain from the attachment. ( 157 Cal. App. 3d at 689 . ) This reading, in effect, equates probable recovery with probable loss. ( Id. ) The N. Hollywood Marble Co. court rejected the defendant s construction of § 489.220(b) as contrary to the purpose of the attachment remedy. ( Id. at 689-91 . ) As stated by the court, the purpose of the attachment procedure is to protect an unsecured creditor plaintiff from the dissipation of the defendant s assets before the plaintiff can obtain and enforce a judgment against the defendant, by allowing the plaintiff to attach certain assets in satisfaction of the plaintiff s claim. ( Id. at 690 . ) This purpose would be frustrated by the defendant s proffered construction of § 489.220, because a plaintiff would then be required to unnecessarily finance a massive undertaking on a claim of certain merit. ( Id. at 690 . ) Under the specific facts of Hollywood Marble Co. , the court concluded that enforcing a literal interpretation of section 489.220 would lead to an absurd result in the case before it, because the defendant had essentially conceded the merits of plaintiff s underlying claim. ( Id. at 691 . ) Instead, the court adopted a more expansive construction of the term probable recovery. It construed the term as giving the trial court discretion to consider . . . the probability that plaintiff will prevail on his claim in the action in determining a defendant s probable recovery for wrongful attachment . ( Id. at 689, 691-92 . ) The court concluded that the ambiguous language of section 489.220, subdivision (b) , does not reflect a clear legislative intent to divest trial courts of [their inherent discretion] and to preclude the consideration of facts that are critical to the purpose of attachment. ( Id. at 692 . ) Applying the principles in N. Hollywood Marble Co. , this court finds no evidence in the record to suggest that Instant is more likely to prevail than Plaintiff . As such, the court finds that the amount of Plaintiff's undertaking should not be increased. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs applications for writ of attachment against Stelaro in the amount of $11,065,000; GRANTS as to Instant and DENIES as to Alondra , Klein, CKE, EAR and Luxury . Plaintiff is required to make an undertaking of $10,000. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 28 , 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 A&M ENGINEERING, INC. , Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER KLEIN, et al. , Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 SMCV0 4468 Hearing Date: Ju ly 1 8 , 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS CHRISTOPHER KLEIN, GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE SOLUTIONS, LLC, STELARO, LLC, ALONDRA GROUP, LLC, CHRISTOPHER KLEIN ENTERPRISES, LLC, LUXURY LIFTS, LLC AND EXECUTIVE AUTO RENTALS, LLCS DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT BACKGROUND This action arises from a breach of promissory notes . Plaintiff A&M Engineering Inc. made three short-term loans to two Defendants , Global Automotive Solutions LLC (GAS) and GASs successor - in - interest, Stelaro LLC ( Stelaro ) . The loans total $14 million, only $1 million of which Plaintiff claims has been repaid . The loans were purportedly used to buy cars in Mexico which were re-sold for a profit in other countries . Defendant Christopher Klein served as the CEO of GAS and Stelaro . Defendant Alondra Group, LLC is the sole shareholder of Stelaro . Plaintiff has sued other corporate defendants who it claims are the alter egos of Klein , including Klein Enterprises LLC (CKE), Executive Auto Rentals, LLC (EAR) , and Luxury Lift , LLC (L uxury ) . Plaintiff has also sued Instant Infosystems, Inc. (Instant), a company owned by Christopher Kleins father (David Klein), which Plaintiff claims received fraudulent transfers from Stelaro . Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging ten causes of action for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud-misrepresentation, (3) fraud-concealment, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) receiving stolen property Penal Code § 496(a), (c); (6) fraudulent transfer Civ. Code § 3439 et seq.; (7) breach of fiduciary duty, (8) unfair competition Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (9) constructive trust, and (10) unjust enrichment . This hearing is on Defendants Klein, GAS, Stelaro , Alondra, CKE, Luxury and EARs (Moving Defendants) demurrer . Moving Defendants argue that (1) the second, third and fourth causes of action fail because Plaintiff has not plead fraud with specificity ; (2) the fourth cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged theft or receipt of stolen property with the requisite criminal intent, and (3) the ninth and tenth causes of action fail because they are not causes of action. N o opposition has been filed . MEET AND CONFER ¿ Code Civ. Proc. §430.41 requires that [b] efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (C ode C iv. P roc. § 430.41(a).)¿ The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C ode C iv. P roc. § 430.41(a)(2).)¿ Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (C ode C iv. P roc. § 430.41(a)(3).)¿ Moving Defendants submit the declaration of Johnny White attesting that counsel met and conferred by phone on May 13, 2024, the same date Moving Defendants filed their demurrer . This does not satisfy the meet and confer requirements . However, the Court cannot overrule a demurrer based on an insufficient meet and confer . (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(4).)¿ LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer to a complaint may be general or special . A general demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) A special demurrer challenges other defects in the complaint, including whether a pleading is uncertain. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f) .) The term uncertain means the pleading is ambiguous and unintelligible. ( Id. ) A demurrer for uncertainty should be sustained if the complaint is drafted in such a manner that the defendant cannot reasonably respond , i.e. , the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. ( Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 .) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) ANALYSIS Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not plead fraud or negligent misrepresentation with sufficient particularity . The Court disagrees. The ele ments of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment or nondisclosure), (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity, (c) intent to induce reliance, (d) justifiable reliance, and (e) resulting damage. ( Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4 th 289, 294.) The facts constituting the fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked . ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 C a l.4 th 631, 645.) The particularity requirement demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Id. ) The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation include [m] isrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with intent to induce anothers reliance on the fact misrepresented, ignorance of the truth, and justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed and resulting damage. ( Hydro-Mill Co. Inc. v . Hayward , Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4 th 1145, 1154.) Negligent misrepresentation, like fraud, must be pled with specificity . ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 .) Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants misrepresentations fall into two categories : (1) misrepresentations about GASs and Stelaros financial status and outl ook and (2) misrepresentations about how Defendants would use the loan money received from Plaintiff . (First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶121.) As to the first category, Plaintiff alleges Klein provided him with false financial statements in the beginning of 20 20, 2021 and 2022 . (FAC ¶ ¶ 123 , 124, 125.) The financial statement s falsely inflated the assets, revenues, and equity of Stelaro . ( Id. ) Plaintiff also alleges seven specific statements in other documents, primarily powerpoint and Zoom presentations that purpo r tedly touted the financial health of Stelaro , including that it was awarded exclusive rights by Mercedes Benz Direct Fleet Sales for Export of all Mercedes Models to Middle East , Africa, and Asia, that it was a profitable $60 million business with a path to double the companys revenue to $125 million over the next 18 months , that it sold vehicles to 125 different customers in 12 countries, that it maintained a procurement network of over 100 different dealerships in and across Mexico, and that in 2019, GAS sold 602 cars, resulting in $33,107,000 total sales and a net profit of $2,689,000. ( Id. ¶127.) As to the second category, Plaintiff alleges Klein misrepresented how he would use the proceeds of loans received from Plaintiff . Smith repeatedly told Beljak that GAS and STELARO would use the money [Plaintiff] loaned and invested to buy cars for resale to customers in China and other foreign countries which was the essence of GAS/STELARO business. ( Id. ¶130.) Plaintiff identifies four specific misrepresentations made by Klein that Defendants intended to use Plaintiffs loans t o buy cars for resale . ( Id. ¶¶132-135.) For example, Klein sent B e ljak on January 17, 2020 a powerpoint presentation which represented that GASs $10 Million Deb Offering was To Fund Monthly Mercedes B e nz Direct Distribution of 300-500 Vehicles per month. ( Id. ¶132.) These allegations are sufficient to meet the particularity requirement for pleading fraud and negligent misrepresentation . Moving Defendants argue that the bulk of the alleged mis statements were not made by Klein but were instead made by Scott Smith (a confessed embezzler and a CFO of both Plaintiff and Stelaro ) . This argument may ultimately prevail , but it is not appropriate on a demurrer where the Court must accept Plaintiffs allegations as true . In any event, the Complaint alleges that Smith is an agent of the other Defendants (FAC ¶20), and on this basis, his misrepresentations may be attributed to Moving Defendants . Moving Defendants also take issue with particular misrepresentations , arguing they are opinions and not statements of fact . Even if that were so, false financial statements can clearly be the basis of a fraud claim . And to the extent other misstatements identified by Plaintiff are mere puffery or sales talk , this still does not support a demurrer as a demurrer cannot be made to only part of a claim . ( Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1562; PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1681; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 163-164.) Moving Defendants further argue that the second category of misrepresentations (relating to how Plaintiffs loans would be used) is controverted by the promissory notes which do not state how the loans would be used . While this argument may ultimately prevail , it is a challenge to the merits of Plaintiffs allegations which the Court cannot consider on a demurrer . The Court may not consider any other extrinsic evidence or judge the credibility of the allegations plead or the difficulty a plaintiff may have in proving his allegations . ( Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 .) Moving Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has made fundamentally inconsistent allegations regarding Klein . The Complaint alleges that Klein revealed Mr. Smiths embezzlement to Plaintiff . (FAC ¶¶ 74-75.) If Klein was operating a Ponzi s cheme , taking investor money to pay himself and family members, then, according to Defendants, it makes no sense that he would reveal Smiths embezzlement and transmit records of it to Plaintiff . Again, while this argument has some appeal , the Court cannot weigh the evidence on a demurrer . ( Ion Equip. Corp. , 110 Cal.App.3d at 881.) In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for fraud and negligent misrepresentation , and the Court overrules the demurrer to the second and fourth causes of action . Fraudulent Concealment The elements of fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) intent to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of fact. ( Hambridge v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162 .) For a cause of action for fraudulent concealment to be actionable, there generally must exist a fiduciary relationship between the parties . ( Fink v. Weisman (1933), 132 Cal.App . 724, 730 .) In addition, courts have found other circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) possession of exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (2) active concealment of a material fact from the plaintiff; or (3) when partial representations are made but a material fact is withheld . ( LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336 .) Concealment is a species of fraud, and [f] raud must be pleaded with specificity. ( Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 878 (bold emphasis added).) However, the standard particularity requirement is relaxed as to fraudulent concealment claim s . ( See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 ( less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposing party ); see also Committee on Children s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216 - 217 (less particularity required where it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant necessarily possesses full information concerning facts in controversy). ) Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to disclose (1) they were using Plaintiffs loans for expenses other than vehicle purchases and they were instead using the loan proceeds to pay for personal expenses (FAC ¶150), (2) Stelaro had not filed tax returns for 2019, 2020 or 2021 (FAC ¶151) , (3) Stelaro was losing money on sales in Europe (FAC ¶152), (4) Stelaro was consistently falling short of its sales goals (FAC ¶153 ), and (5) Stelaro had negative cash flow; it lost money each year between 2019 and 2022 (FAC ¶154.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants had a duty to disclose these facts because they made partial representations regarding the financial health of Stelaro , while omitting these material facts . (FAC ¶156.) The Court concludes these allegations are sufficient to meet the more relaxed particularity requirement for a concealment claim . Accordingly , the Court overrules the demurrer to the third cause of action . Receipt of Stolen Property Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not properly stated a claim for receipt of stolen property under Penal Code § 496 . The Court agrees. Section 496(a) provides, in relevant part, that: Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft ..., knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained ... shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 . Section 496(c) states that [a] ny person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision (a) ... may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney s fees. Cal. Penal Code § 496(c) . California courts have held that [s] ection 496(a) extends to property that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft. ( Bell v. Feibush (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1041) . Penal Code § 484 defines theft and states that [e]very person ... who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, ... is guilty of theft. ( Cal. Penal Code § 484(a) . ) Additionally, [t]he elements required to show a violation of section 496(a) are simply that ( i ) property was stolen or obtained in a manner constituting theft, (ii) the defendant knew the property was so stolen or obtained, and (iii) the defendant received or had possession of the stolen property. ( Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116) . The California Supreme Court has emphasized that not all commercial or consumer disputes alleging that a defendant obtained money or property through fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of a contractual promise will amount to a theft. ( Siry Inv., L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal. 5th 333, 361.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that it is owed $13,000,000 in loans, and Defendants have engaged in fraudulent transfers . These allegations do not amount to theft . Plaintiff voluntarily made loans to Stelaro LLC for which it allegedly received some but not all repayments . Defendants did not steal Plaintiffs money . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the fifth cause of action . Constructive Trust Moving Defendants argue that there is no cause of action for constructive trust . The Court agrees. In California, constructive trust is a remedy, not a cause of action. ( PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal. App. 4th 384, 398 (A constructive trust, however, is an equitable remedy, not a substantive claim for relief.).) Because California does not recognize constructive trust as a cause of action, plaintiff does not, and can never, state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for constructive trust . Pleading constructive trust as a cause of action instead of a remedy subjects the claim to demurrer. ( Stanfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 59, 76.) Moreover, even if constructive trust was a cause of action, P laintiff cannot satisfy the conditions for the imposition of a constructive trust . [A] constructive trust may only be imposed where the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a res (property or some interest in property); (2) the right of a complaining party to that res; and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another party who is not entitled to it. ( Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 980, 990. ) Here, there is no res as to which P laintiff has any colorable claim of right that can be subject to a constructive trust . Plaintiff merely has a generalized claim for money allegedly owed . ( Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal. App. 3d 354, 373 ([A] constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed where the defendant holds title or some interest in certain property which it is inequitable for him to enjoy as against the plaintiff.); Michaelian v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1114 (specific identifiable property to which defendant has title is a pleading requirement).) A constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy for a claim that is essentially one for money damages. ( Evans v. Scribe One Ltd. LLC ( D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2022) 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11600 *28.) In sum, California law holds that constructive trust is a remedy, and not a standalone cause of action, and Plaintiff has not identified a specific identifiable property that could be subject to a constructive trust . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the ninth cause of action . Unjust Enrichment Moving Defendants argue there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment . The Court agrees . [T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. ( Melchior v. New Line Prods. Inc. (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 79 3 .) It is a general principle rather than a remedy in its own right . ( Id. ) It describes the theory underlying a claim that a defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit by the plaintiff . Return of that benefit is the remedy typically sought in a quasi-contract cause of action. (55 Cal. Jur. 3d (2024) Restitution § 2; Munoz v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 648, 661.) However, a plaintiff may not plead the existence of an enforceable contract and simultaneously maintain a quasi - contract claim unless the plaintiff also pleads facts suggesting that the contract may be unenforceable or invalid. ( Berlanga v. Univ. of San Francisco (2024) 100 Cal. App. 5th 75, 89.) Here, P laintiff does not plead a quasi-contract cause of action . There are also express contracts under which P laintiff seeks to recover , and no allegations as to how those contracts are or may become invalid or unenforceable . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the tenth cause of action . CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Moving Defendants demurrer without leave to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 25 , 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22CHCV01194 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-26-24 Case #22CHCV01194, Kai-Lin Chang vs. Brittany A. Doremus, et al. Trial Date: 8-26-24 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOVING PARTY: Defendant Southern California Permanente Medical Group RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Kai-Lin Chang RELIEF REQUESTED Motion for Summary Judgment RULING : Motion for summary judgment is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION At around 8:40 a.m. on September 12, 2022, Defendant Brittany A. Doremus (Doremus) was driving her motor vehicle when she struck Plaintiff Kai-Lin Changs (Plaintiff) bicycle. Doremus was on her way to work and was turning into the parking lot of a dry cleaner when she struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he sustained serious injuries because of the accident that required surgery and months of physical therapy. Plaintiff alleges that he had the right of way at the time of the accident and has sued Doremus for negligence. Though Plaintiff dismissed Doremus from the case on July 24, 2024, Plaintiff has also sued Defendants employer, Southern California Permanent Medical Group (SCPMG), on the theory that Plaintiff was acting in the scope of her employment at the time the accident occurred. SCPMG has filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs causes of action based on the going and coming rule. SCPMG argues that this rule acts as a complete bar to vicarious employer liability. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections (Plaintiffs objections are not numbered, so the Court has numbered them based on the order in which they appear): Sustained: None Overruled: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 ANALYSIS The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. ( Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The pleadings frame the issues for motions, since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond. ( Citation. ) ( Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 635, 640-641; FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-383; Jordan-Lyon Prods., LTD. v. Cineplex Odeon Corp. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1472.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. ( Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. ( Ibid .) Issue 1 SCPMG argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs causes of action against SCPMG because the going and coming rule applies without exception and acts as a complete bar to vicarious employer liability. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for an employees negligent acts or omissions committed in the course and scope of employment. ( Lobo v. Tamco (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 297, 301.) Conduct within the course and scope of employment encompasses conduct that is typical of or incidental to employment. ( Jeewarat v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 427, 434.) An exception to the doctrine of respondeat superior is the going and coming rule. Under this rule, an employee is not regarded as acting within the course and scope of employment while going to or coming from his or her workplace, and it is based on the concept that [t]he employment relationship is suspended from the time the employee leaves work until he or she returns, since the employee is not ordinarily rendering services to the employer while traveling. ( Jeewarat , supra , 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 435, citing Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 162.) In Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 458, the Court applied the going and coming rule in granting summary judgment in favor of an employer whose employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident while turning into the parking lot of the Kaiser hospital where she worked to begin her shift. In so doing, the Court reasoned that the risks associated with an employees commute to and from work generally are not, absent special circumstances . . . inherent in, typical of, or created by their work. Certainly . . . [the employees] involvement in a car accident could not fairly be said to be characteristic of her work as a physical therapist for Kaiser. Just because employers have to employ workers and workers have to get to and from their work does not mean the commute is part of the enterprise risk of the employer. ( Id . at 469-70.) In another case, the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment for an employer after determining that an employees call to his supervisor, made while driving eight minutes before his accident, did not support a contention that he was acting within the course and scope of his employment. ( Miller v. American Greetings Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1055.) In Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 487, the Court of Appeal affirmed the granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer despite cell phone records showing the employee was actively on a call with her coworker when the accident occurred. There, the Court sided with the employer because the plaintiff could not prove that the content of the employees call was related to work. ( Id . at 495.) There is no dispute in this case that Doremus was commuting to work. In fact, when the accident occurred, she was turning into a dry cleaners parking lot to take care of a personal errand unrelated to work. (UMF 20-22.) It is clear that the going and coming rule would apply in this case, and Doremus was not acting in the scope of her employment. While there are exceptions to the going and coming rule, none would apply here. The vehicle-use exception applies where the employer furnishes, or requires the employee to furnish, a vehicle as an express or implied condition of employment. ( Moradi v. Marsh USA, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.4th 886, 895.) That is not the case here. Next, the incidental benefit exception is based on the part of CACI No. 3725 that states: The drive to and from work may & be within the scope of employment if the use of the employees vehicle provides some direct or incidental benefit to the employer. There may be a benefit to the employer if (1) the employee has agreed to make the vehicle available as an accommodation to the employer, and (2) the employer has reasonably come to rely on the vehicles use and expects the employee to make it available regularly. ( Pierson v. Helmerich & Payne Intl Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 629, quoting CACI No. 3725.) There is no indication that Doremus was required to make her vehicle available as an accommodation to her employer. Finally, under the special errand exception to the going and coming rule, an employee is considered within the scope of employment while on a special errand, either as part of their regular duties or at a specific order or request of the employer. ( Fields v. State of California (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1396-97.) Doremus was not on a special errand for her employer; she was running a personal errand during her commute to work. SCPMG has presented evidence that Doremus was not acting in the scope and course of her employment. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that she was. Plaintiff attempts to argue that if Doremus was using a work-issued cell phone in the moments before the collision, then that means that she was acting within the scope of her employment. Plaintiff also attempts to argue that Doremus was texting coworkers about work-related matters in the moments before the collision, but nothing in the phone records obtained from AT&T supports this argument. The records do not show the content of the texts, only the number and time. The records do show that Doremus did not send or receive any text messages until 8:44 a.m., when she texted her coworkers that she was in an accident, as supported by the text screenshots that Defendant submitted as evidence. First, the text log is in UTC time and shows the first texts occurred at 15:44 hours. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that UTC is seven hours ahead of Pacific Daylight Savings Time, meaning that those texts occurred at 8:44 a.m. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (f).) Next, the text log time of 8:44 a.m. matches with the text screenshot submitted by Doremus because it shows that the text Doremus sent at 8:44 a.m. states that she was in an accident. While her call log shows a 911 call at 7:39 a.m., that is unexplained and has not been tied to the accident, which occurred an hour later. Finally, the next call on her call log was at 8:44 a.m., also after the accident. Accordingly, Doremus did not, in fact, send any messages until or make any relevant calls until after the accident had occurred. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Doremus was acting in the scope and course of her employment at the time of the accident. Instead, Plaintiffs opposition is based on conclusions that do not line up with the evidence presented. Accordingly, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether Doremus was acting in the scope and course of her employment at the time of the accident. The going and coming rule applies. Defendant SCPMGs motion for summary judgment is granted for all causes of action against it. CONCLUSION Defendant SCPMGs motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Defendant is ordered to submit a proposed judgment. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 21STCV13165 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT SSI REFRIGERATED EXPRESS, INC. , et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. UTILITY TRAILER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, et al. , Defendants. CASE NO.: 21STCV13165 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO: 1) SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET TWO); AND 2) REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET 2); AND MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO: 3) REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION (SET ONE); 4) FORM INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE); AND 5) REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS (SET 1) Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 Judge: Holly J. Fujie MOVING PARTIES: (1-2)Jay Mehta (JM); and (3-5) Southern Counties Lubricants, LLC (Southern) RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff SSI Refrigerated Express, Inc. (Plaintiff) The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. BACKGROUND SSI alleges a single cause of action for negligence based on Plaintiff being provided hydraulic oil as opposed to what was ordered, i.e., motor oil, which resulted in damage to Plaintiffs semi fleet. The 55 gallon drum of hydraulic oil was mislabeled on the outer top portion of the barrel as motor oil. The drum was then sold to Plaintiff, who used it on a number of his vehicles. (Complaint, ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had a duty to inspect said barrel of oil to make certain, verify and confirm that the contents were correct and that the barrel's labeling was accurate. Since the barrel was mislabeled, defendant breached said duty when the defendant supplied the incorrect product to plaintiff. ( Id . at ¶11.) DISCUSSION Legal Standard The Motions to Compel Interrogatories Under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 2030.290, subdivision (b), when a party directs interrogatories towards a party, and that party fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The moving party need only show that the interrogatories were served on the opposing party, the time has expired to respond to the interrogatories and no responses have been served in order for the court to compel the opposing party to respond. ( Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.) When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (CCP § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Here, JM seeks responses to its Special Interrogatories (SIs) (Set 2) directed to Plaintiff. No responses to those SIs have been served and, as such, JMs Motion to Compel Responses to its SIs (Set Two) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to serve full, Code-compliant and verified responses to JMs SIs (Set Two), without objection, on JM within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of this order. Requests for Production When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (CCP § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2031.300, subd. (a).) JM seeks responses to its Requests for Production (RFPs) (Set Two) directed to Plaintiff. No responses to those RFPs have been served and, as, JMs Motion to Compel Responses to its RFPs (Set Two) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to serve full, Code-compliant and verified responses, to JMs RFPs (Set Two), without objection, on JM within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of this order. Motions to Compel Further Document Requests A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) Motions to compel further responses must always be accompanied by a meet-and confer-declaration (per Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040) demonstrating a reasonable and good faith attempt an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. ( Id. , §§ 2030.300(b), 2031.310(b)(2), 2033.290(b).) They must also be accompanied by a separate statement containing the requests and the responses, verbatim, as well as reasons why a further response is warranted. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) The separate statement must also be complete in itself; no extrinsic materials may be incorporated by reference. ( Id. , rule 3.1345(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. Good cause may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. ( Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; CCP §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) (Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.); Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (noting a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).) Southern seeks further responses to its Requests for Production (RFP) (Set One) nos. 7-12, 14, 17-20, 22-25, 35-38, 41 and 44. These RFPs are directed to contentions of Plaintiff in its Complaint regarding Defendants. Plaintiff objects to RFPs relating to documents regarding various defendants, stating that it is not that defendant. This is not the issue. The allegations state that defendants took certain actions, and Plaintiff is required to answer as to its knowledge and as to documents supporting that knowledge regarding that defendant. Southerns motion to compel further responses to its RFPs (Set One) is well-taken and is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to serve serve full, Code-compliant and verified responses, to JMs RFPs (Set Two), without objection, on JM within twenty (20) calendar days. Form Interrogatories Under CCP section 2030.300, on receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under CCP section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (CCP § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Southern seeks further responses to its FIs (Set One) Nos. 4.1, 7.1-7.3, 8.1-8.8, 9.1-9.2, 12.1 and 17.1. The Court finds that further responses are warranted only as to FIs 4.1, 7.1, 7.3, and 17.1, and Plaintiff is ordered to serve further, Code-compliant, verified responses to Southerns FIs (Set One), without further objection, within twenty (20) days of the date of this order. Requests for Admissions Under CCP section 2033.290, subdivision (a), on receipt of a response to requests for admissions (RFAs), the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that either of the following apply: (1) an answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete; or (2) an objection to a particular request is without merit or too general. (CCP § 2033.230, subd. (a).) As to requests for admission: (1) if only a part of a request for admission is objectionable, the remainder of the request shall be answered; and (2) if an objection is made to request or to a part of a request, the specific ground for the objection shall be set forth clearly in the response, and if an objection is based on a claim of privilege then the particular privilege invoked shall be clearly stated. (CCP § 2033.230, subds. (a)-(b).) Southern requests further responses to its RFAs (Set One) nos. 2-4, 14-15, 18-20, 22-24. Plaintiff objects on the ground that the information sought in the RFAs is not within their possession. Plaintiff is required, however, to state this in a Code-compliant response according to CCP 2033.230. Plaintiff is therefore ordered to serve full, Code-compliant and verified responses, to Southerns RFAs (Set One), without futher objection, within twenty (20) calendar days. Sanctions Under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 2023.030, where a party engages in misuse of discovery process, the court may impose monetary, issue, evidence, terminating, or contempt sanctions. ( See CCP § 2023.030.) Misuses of the discovery process include failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery and disobeying a court order to provide discovery. ( See CCP § 2023.010, subds. (d), (g).) The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. ( Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to the dereliction and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. ( Id .) Continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. ( Id .) Where discovery violations are willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. ( Id .) A trial court has broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions, but absent unusual circumstances, the court must generally find: (1) a failure to comply with a court order; and (2) the failure was willful. ( Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp . (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) The court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful, the determent to the propounding party, and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain discovery. ( Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.) Reasonable sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff and its counsel, jointly and severally, in the following amounts: 1) on JMs Motion to Compel Responses to its SIs(Set Two), in the amount of $915; 2) on JMs Motion to Compel Responses to its RFPs (Set Two), in the amount of $630; 3) on Southerns Motion to Compel Further Responses to its RFPs (Set One), in the amount of $880; 4) on Southerns Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, in the amount of $880; and 5) on Southerns Motion to Compel Further Responses to FAs, in the total amount of $880. Said sanctions are to be paid to the respective moving parties within twenty (20) days of the date of this order. Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 29th day of July 2024 Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCP04655 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 26 Oates v. Hi-Tech Builders, Inc., et al. PETITION TO RELEASE MECHANICS LIEN (Civil Code § 8480 ) TENTATIVE RULING: Petitioner Julie Oates Petition to Release Property from Mechanics Lien is GRANTED. PETITIONER IS TO FILE AND SERVE A PROPOSED ORDER WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS RULING. ANALYSIS: Petitioner Julie Oates (Petitioner) filed the instant Petition for Release of Mechanics Lien against Respondent Hi-Tech Builders, Inc. (Respondent) on December 28, 2023. The Petition initially came for hearing on May 28, 2024 and was continued to allow for proper notice on Respondent. No response to the Petition has been filed to date. Discussion Petitioner moves to have the mechanics lien recorded against their property by Respondent released. Under Civil Code section 8484 the petition for release order must be verified by the petitioner and allege the following: (a) The date of recordation of the claim of lien. A certified copy of the claim of lien shall be attached to the petition. (b) The county in which the claim of lien is recorded. (c) The book and page or series number of the place in the official records where the claim of lien is recorded. (d) The legal description of the property subject to the claim of lien. (e) Whether an extension of credit has been granted under Section 8460, if so to what date, and that the time for commencement of an action to enforce the lien has expired. (f) That the owner has given the claimant notice under Section 8482 demanding that the claimant execute and record a release of the lien and that the claimant is unable or unwilling to do so or cannot with reasonable diligence be found. (g) Whether an action to enforce the lien is pending. (h) Whether the owner of the property or interest in the property has filed for relief in bankruptcy or there is another restraint that prevents the claimant from commencing an action to enforce the lien. (Civil Code, § 8484.) The Petition contains all the required information. Civil Code section 8486, subdivision (b) also requires service of the Petition and Notice of Hearing to be made in the same manner as service of summons, or by certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested . . . . (Civ. Code, § 8486, subd. (b).) Petitioner has now filed a compliant proof of service of the Petition and the Notice of the Hearing Date. The proof of service filed on June 27, 2024 shows substitute service of the papers on Respondent by delivery to the receptionist at its office, following multiple attempts to serve Respondents agent for service of process. (Proof of Service, 06/27/24, ¶¶3-5 and pp. 4-5.) This complies with the statute for service of process on a corporation. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.10.) Conclusion Therefore, Petitioner Julie Oates Petition to Release Property from Mechanics Lien is GRANTED. PETITIONER IS TO FILE AND SERVE A PROPOSED ORDER WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS RULING. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 21STCV12123 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE July 25, 2024 CASE NUMBERS 21STCV12123 MOTION Motion to Enforce Settlement MOVING PARTIES Defendants Uber Technologies; Rasier, LLC and Rasier-CA, LLC OPPOSING PARTIES Plaintiffs Jacqueline Benjamin and Ayanna Smith MOTION Defendants Uber Technologies; Rasier, LLC; and Rasier-CA, LLC (Moving Defendants) move to enforce a settlement agreement purportedly entered into with Plaintiffs Jacqueline Benjamin and Ayanna Smith (Plaintiffs.) Plaintiffs oppose the motion. ANALYSIS Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides that [i]f parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) In ruling on a motion to enter judgment, the court acts as a trier of fact. The court must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. To do so, the court may receive oral testimony in addition to declarations. (Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.) The issue on a motion to enforce settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement. (See Viejo v. Bancorp. (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 209, fn. 4 [a court's power to make factual determinations under section 664.6 is generally limited to whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement].) In other words, the only issue before the court is whether an agreement exists; not whether the agreement has been breached. Here, following an unsuccessful global mediation on May 14, 2024, Moving Defendants and Defendant Shaoba Ma (Ma) continued settlement discussions with Plaintiffs. (Rogaski Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) On a June 7, 2024 phone call, Plaintiffs counsel orally agreed to settle the case with Moving Defendants and Ma for $120,000. (Rogaski Decl. ¶ 5(a)-(d).) Counsel for Moving Defendants followed up the phone call by sending Plaintiffs counsel an email and proposed settlement agreement for Plaintiffs to sign. (Rogaski Decl. ¶ 6 and Exs. A-B.) On June 12, Counsel for Moving Defendants inquired with Plaintiffs counsel via text message about the status of the settlement agreement, to which Plaintiffs counsel responded, Dont worry. She will sign it. Im not taking you for a ride. (Rogaski Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. C.) On June 20, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel took the position that there was no settlement. Moving Defendants contend that the text messages coming from Plaintiffs counsels cell phone constitute counsels electronic signature, and Plaintiffs should be bound by Plaintiffs counsels representation that an agreement had been reached. The Court disagrees. At best, the text message communication indicates Plaintiffs counsels belief that his clients would sign the settlement agreement. It is not, on its face, an agreement on Plaintiffs behalf or with Plaintiffs consent. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, having found the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that a valid and binding settlement agreement exists between the parties, the Court denies Moving Defendants motion to enforce settlement. Moving Defendants shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 25, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV01768 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., et al. , vs. R.O.A.R. MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., et al. Case No.: 22STCV10768 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Moving Defendants Ari Resniks, R.O.A.R. Management Company, Inc.s, and 11 Funding, LLCs unopposed application for an order admitting B. Gammon Fain to appear pro hac vice is denied without prejudice. Moving Defendants Ari Resniks, R.O.A.R. Management Company, Inc.s, and 11 Funding, LLCs unopposed application for an order admitting Charles Gilliam-Brownlee to appear pro hac vice is denied without prejudice. Defendants Ari Resnik (Resnik), R.O.A.R. Management Company, Inc. (ROAR), and Defendant 11 Funding, LLC (11 Funding) (collectively, Moving Defendants) apply unopposed to permit B. Gammon Fain (Fain) to appear pro hac vice on their behalf. (Notice Pro Hac Vice Fain, pg. 3; CRC, Rule 9.40.) Moving Defendants apply unopposed to permit Eugene Zilberman (Zilberman) to appear pro hac vice on their behalf. (Notice Pro Hac Vice Zilberman, pg. 3; CRC, Rule 9.40.) Background On March 6, 2024, Moving Defendants filed the instant applications for Kain and Zilberman to be admitted pro hac vice. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed. Motion to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice C.R.C., Rule 9.40(d) provides that an application to be admitted pro hac vice must state the following: (1) The applicants residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a licensee in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel¿ pro hac vice¿ in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active licensee of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. C.R.C., Rule 9.40(e) provides as follows, [a]n applicant for permission to appear as counsel pro hac vice under this rule must pay a reasonable fee not exceeding $50 to the State Bar of California with the copy of the application and the notice of hearing that is served on the State Bar. 1. Fains Application Moving Defendants application on behalf of Fain provides the information required by C.R.C., Rule 9.40(d). Moving Defendants submitted proof that the $50.00 fee was paid to the State Bar of California. (C.R.C., Rule 9.40(e) ; Decl. of Ram ¶4, Exh. 1. ) Moving Defendants proof of service on the application indicates that the State Bar of California was provided notice of the hearing of this application. (C.R.C., Rule 9.40(c)(1); Decl. of Ram ¶4; see POS Fain.) However, Moving Defendants have not provided this Court with Fains bar numbers in Kentucky and the District of Columbia. While this requirement is not enumerated in C.R.C., Rule 9.40, the Court needs this number to enter Fains application into the Courts system. Accordingly, Moving Defendants unopposed motion for an order admitting Fain to appear pro hac vice is denied, without prejudice. Moving Party to give notice. 2. Zilbermans Application Moving Defendants application on behalf of Zilberman provides the information required by C.R.C., Rule 9.40(d). Moving Defendants submitted proof that the $50.00 fee was paid to the State Bar of California. (C.R.C., Rule 9.40(e); Decl. of Ram ¶4, Exh. 1.) Moving Defendants proof of service on the application indicates that the State Bar of California was provided notice of the hearing of this application. (C.R.C., Rule 9.40(c)(1); Decl. of Ram ¶4; see POS Zilberman.) However, Moving Defendants have not provided this Court with Zilbermans bar numbers in Texas and New York. While this requirement is not enumerated in C.R.C., Rule 9.40, the Court needs this number to enter Zilbermans application into the Courts system. Accordingly, Moving Defendants unopposed motion for an order admitting Zilberman to appear pro hac vice is denied without prejudice. NOTE: The Court wiil grant these motions if counsel provide their bar #s at the hearing. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court