Barron, Maria De Jesus Vs. Ibarra, Edwin

BAILEY VS. OLSEN Case Number: 24CV-0204127 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Order Granting Prioritized Trial Setting: Plaintiff Rowland Bailey, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Shalana Bailey brings a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (c), for preference in setting trial. The motion is unopposed by Defendant Caleb Olsen. Merits of Motion: Code of Civil Procedure section 36 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (c) A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. (f) Upon the granting of such a motion for preference, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date… Here, Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of CCP § 36(c). Plaintiff is only 10 years old. Defendant does not oppose the motion on the merits. Finally, upon granting of a motion for preference, the clerk of the Court is required to set the case for trial not more than 120 days from the date the order is made. Here, the trial date is currently set outside of that timeframe. The Court will need to re-set the trial for a date no later than November 12, 2024. The date of November 12, 2024 is not a trial date. The closest trial date without going over the 120 days is November 5, 2024. The motion is GRANTED. A proposed order was lodged with the Court and will be modified to conform to the filing ruling. The trial date of December 17, 2024, and the mandatory settlement conference set for October 21, 2024 are VACATED. The Court notes that, upon granting a motion for preference, the clerk of the Court is required to set the case for trial not more than 120 days from the date the order is made. The Court intends to set trial no later than November 5, 2024, in compliance with CCP § 36. An appearance is necessary to provide the Court with acceptable trial and mandatory settlement conference dates.

Case Number: 22STCV26196 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 22STCV26196 MOTIONS : Motion to be Relieved from Waiver of Objections to Form Interrogatories and Special Interrogatories (Set One) MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: Cross-Defendant A.J. Molino & Associates, Inc. BACKGROUND Defendant/Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (Cross-Complainant), moves for relief from waiver of objections to Cross-Defendant A.J. Molino & Associates, Inc.s (Cross-Defendant) Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One. Cross-Defendant opposes and Cross-Complainant replies. LEGAL STANDARD A party who fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories waives any objection to the demand, including based on privilege or work product, unless the court finds that the party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance and the partys failure was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(a).) The Civil Discovery Act does not include a definition of substantial compliance, and few cases have addressed the circumstances under which a response will be deemed not in substantial compliance. (See St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 778 ( St. Mary ).) Substantial compliance means actual compliance with respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. ( Id . at 779.) However, substantial compliance should not be understood as requiring actual compliance with every specific statutory requirement. ( Ibid .)¿¿ ¿ A court may not find that only some portions of a document containing responses are code- compliant, but must instead determine whether the document as whole substantially complies. ( St. Mary , supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at 77980 [this position is supported by the fact that there is an effective statutory vehicle to compel a responding party to cure unsatisfactory responses].)¿ The statutory language mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect in the discovery statute should be interpreted using the same general principles developed in application of the identical language in section 473, subdivision (b). ( Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 275.) Although the party moving for relief under section 473 has the burden to show that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was excusable, any doubts as to that showing must be resolved in favor of the moving party. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420.)¿¿ DISCUSSION Cross-Defendant served Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One on Cross-Complainant on March 5, 2024. The responses were originally due April 5, 2024. (Sohrabian Decl. ¶ 2-3.) These responses were served on prior counsel. During this time, Cross-Complainant changed representation and the case file was being transferred to current counsel (who moved to a different firm). Current counsel substituted into this case on April 22, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 5.) However, the file still had not been transferred. As a result, Cross-Complainant requested an extension to May 31, 2024, which Cross-Defendant granted. However, [o]n Friday, May 31, 2024, our office experienced technical issues with the file, so our office emailed Cross-Defendants counsel in the evening that we would have responses by Monday morning, June 3, 2024. On June 3, 2024, Cross-Defendants counsel indicated that he had not granted the extension and therefore objections were waived. ( Id. ¶ 10-11.) Cross-Complainants counsel, Tiffany E. Sohrabian, declares that [o]ur firm explained that we were having technical issues and a further extension was granted to Wednesday, June 5, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 12.) On June 5, 2024, Cross-Complainant served Cross-Defendant with discovery responses. ( Id. ¶ 13.) In opposition, Cross-Defendant confirms that extensions were granted until Friday, May 31, 2024. However, on Monday, June 3, 2024, after seeing the May 31, 2024 email, Cross-Defendant stated that responses without objections were due by June 3, 2024. (Kim Decl. ¶ 24, Exh. J.) Cross-Complainant requested an extension by June 5, 2024 and asked for the discovery to be re-sent because the files could not be opened. ( Id. , Exh. J.) Cross-Defendant then re-sent the discovery on June 3 and expected responses without objections by June 5, 2024. (Kim Decl. ¶ 2526.) Cross-complainant provided responses on June 5, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 28.) Cross-Defendant argues that counsel acted negligently by attempting to complete the responses at the end of the day when they were due. (Opp., 5.) It also argues that the responses are not substantially compliant. Cross-Complainant describes the technical issues with the file with limited detail and asserts in reply, without a supporting declaration, that when Defendant Foot Lockers counsel attempted to open the discovery documents on May 31, 2024, in order to complete the responses, she discovered that the files were corrupted and she was unable to open them. Further, she was unable to obtain another copy of the discovery documents on May 31, 2024, because she did not realize this until after the end of the business day. (Reply, 2.) Counsel further argues that counsel served the responses as soon as possible once she obtained the discovery documents from Cross-Defendants counsel. ( Id .) However, it appears that when Cross-Complainant did receive the re-served electronic versions of discovery on June 3, Cross-Complainant did not complete the responses on the same day, and did not provide them until June 5, and indeed requested until June 5 to provide responses rather than offering to provide them the same day. Cross-Complainant does not explain the further untimeliness or otherwise provide a basis for the Court to find excusable neglect. This delay undermines Cross-Complainants argument that a technical issue resulted in delay. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc.s Motion to be Relieved from Waiver of Objections to Form Interrogatories and Special Interrogatories (Set One) is DENIED. Moving party to provide notice and file a proof of service of such .

Demurrer to First Amended Cross- CVPS2305945 STARGARDT vs O'NEILL Complaint Tentative Ruling: Overruled. Plaintiff/Cross Defendant to file their answer to 1st Amended Cross Complaint within 20 days of this order becoming final. Defendant/Cross Complainant to provide notice pursuant to CCP § 1019.5. Plaintiff Scott Stargardt (“Stargardt”) alleges Defendant Helen O’Neill (“O’Neill”) owns a mobile home located at 74711 Dillon Road, Space 416 in Desert Hot Springs, which Stargardt rented. Stargardt alleges there were various problems at the property which O’Neill did not resolve and instead turned off utilities. On December 7, 2023, Stargardt filed this action. On May 22, 2024, Stargardt filed his operative First Amended Complaint alleging ten (10) causes of action: 1) Unfair & Unlawful Business Practices (Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200); 2) Wrongful interruption of a utility service (Civ. Code, § 789.3); 3) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment (Civ. Code, § 1297); 4) Breach of Warranty of Habitability Pertaining to Interior Maintenance (Civ. Code, § 1941.1); 5) Breach of Warranty of Habitability pertaining to Exterior Maintenance (Civ. Code, § 1941.1); 6) Negligence; 7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 8) Nuisance; 9) fraud, deceit, misrepresentation; and 10) unjust enrichment. On April 25, 2024, O’Neill filed her operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FAXC”) alleging three (3) causes of action: 1) fraud, deceit and misrepresentation; 2) breach of contract; and 3) elder abuse. Stargardt now demurs to each cause of action on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense and is uncertain. (C.C.P., § 430.10(e), (f).) Stargardt states his motion is timely and he gave proper notice and met and conferred in good faith. Stargardt argues O’Neill has not alleged sufficient facts to state any claim and the elder abuse claim is untimely under the two-year statute of limitations of C.C.P., § 335.1. No demurrer opposition filed. Demurrer In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125). The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 666, 672). 1st Cause of Action – Fraud The elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant concealed a material fact; (2) the defendant had a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intentionally concealed the fact with intent to defraud; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted had she or he had knowledge of the concealed fact; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the concealment. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 868.) A defendant does not have to owe the plaintiff a fiduciary duty in order to be liable for fraudulent concealment. (Warner Const. Corp. v. L.A. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 294.) When a fiduciary duty does not exist, a claim for fraudulent concealment can arise in three instances: “(1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knowns they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff.” Id. Where the defendant has exclusive knowledge, the duty to disclose may arise from a transactional relationship between the parties. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 328, 336-337.) Although fraud claims required a heightened pleading standard, it is not practical to allege facts showing how, when and by what means something did not happen. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System Planning Assn. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) However, if the concealment is based on providing false or incomplete statements, the pleading must at least set forth the substance of the statements at issue. (Id.) Additionally, the specificity requirement of fraud is “relaxed when it is apparent from the allegations that the defendant necessarily possesses knowledge of the facts.” (Quelimane Co. v. Steward Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 27.) Stargardt contends that this cause of action fails because of lack of specificity. However, O’Neill has sufficiently alleged Stargardt failed to disclose his dogs were not well-behaved and would attack and used said information to induce O’Neill to lease her property to him. These allegations are sufficient. Any other information would be more within Stargardt’s knowledge than O’Neill’s which would allow for the relaxing of the specificity requirements for fraud. (Quelimane Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at 27.) OVERRULED. 2nd Cause of Action – Breach of Contract “The elements of breach of contract are ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.’” (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 70 [quoting Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388].) “If the action is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) O’Neill has sufficiently alleged the terms of the contract. OVERRULED. 3rd Cause of Action – Elder Abuse Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult means any of the following: (a) physical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering. (b) The deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering. (c) Financial Abuse….” (Welf. & Inst. § 15610.07.) Section 15610.30 provides in pertinent part: (a) “Financial abuse” of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: (1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70. (b) A person or entity shall be deemed to have taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained property for a wrongful use if, among other things, the person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains the property and the person or entity knew or should have known that this conduct is likely to be harmful to the elder or dependent adult. (c) For purposes of this section, a person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property when an elder or dependent adult is deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder or dependent adult. Here, O’Neill has alleged a variety of actions by Stargardt, including that he has rekeyed the home, installed a wall to prevent access, and refused O’Neill any access. (FAXC,¶ 34.) This is sufficient to constitute a taking or appropriation of her property depriving her of any property right. OVERRULED.

Case Number: 22STCV39573 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 22STCV39573 MOTIONS : Motion to be Relieved as Counsel MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ryan Caldwells Counsel OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Plaintiff Ryan Caldwells (Plaintiff) counsel of record, Khashayar Eshraghi (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. Counsel contends relief is necessary because there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. No opposition has been filed for this motion. LEGAL STANDARD To be granted relief as counsel, counsel must comply with California Rules of Court (CRC) 3.1362. Even where grounds for termination exist, attorneys seeking to withdraw must comply with the procedures set forth in California Rule of Professional Conduct (CRPC) 3.700 and are subject to discipline for failure to do so. CRPC 3.700(B) lists various grounds for mandatory withdrawal. An attorney's right to terminate the attorney-client relationship and withdraw from a case is not absolute. (See Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 197; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) The decision whether to grant or deny an application for withdrawal is within the court's discretion, and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the application on the ground that the attorney's withdrawal would work injustice upon a third party. ( Hodcarriers, Bldg. and Common Laborers Local Union No. 89 v. Miller (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 391.) The rules have been liberally construed to protect clients. ( Vann v. Shilleh , supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 192.) An attorney, either with client's consent or court's approval, may withdraw from a case when withdrawal can be accomplished without undue prejudice to client's interests; however, an attorney shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, complying with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2).) A lawyer violates his or her ethical mandate by abandoning a client ( Pineda v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 753, 758 759), or by withdrawing at a critical point and thereby prejudicing the clients case. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2); Vann v. Shilleh , supra.) DISCUSSION Counsel has filed forms MC-051 and MC-052 and has lodged with the Court a copy of the proposed order on form MC-053 as required. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) Counsel states the instant motion is filed for the following reason: This motion is based upon the grounds that there has been an irremediable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that stands in the way of effective representation. (MC-052.) Counsel has provided information for all future proceedings in this case. Additionally, Counsel has been unable to confirm Plaintiffs address despite mailing the motion papers to Plaintiffs last known address, return receipt requested, calling Plaintiffs last known telephone number or numbers, attempting to contact Plaintiffs emergency contact, conducting a TLO search, and hiring a private investigator. However, the declaration in support states that Plaintiff was served by mail. (MC-052, item 3a(2).) This conflicts with the proof of service filed on July 8, 2024, showing that Plaintiff was served personally. Counsel provides no proof of service by mail. Additionally, the personal proof of service states that Plaintiff was served on July 1, 202410 court days before this hearing. Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 requires written notice of a motion including the date, time and location of the hearing on a motion. A moving partys failure to serve the notice of motion and moving papers on a non-moving party violates the basic principles of procedural due process under the federal and state constitutions notice and an opportunity to be heard.¿ ( Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co . (1982) 455 U.S. 422, 428 [minimum due process requires notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case]; Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612 [due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard].) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b), moving papers must be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. Therefore, because Counsel did not provide the minimum notice period, the motion to be relieved is denied on procedural grounds. Additionally, as stated in the previous minute order, the proposed order does not contain Plaintiffs full zip code. (See Min. Order, 5/29/24.) Counsel must correct the zip code in a subsequent motion. Also, the service indicated in MC-052, item 3 must accurately reflect the type of service in the proof of service. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to relieve counsel. Counsel shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file proofs of service of such.

RODRIGUEZ, ET AL VS. HEDRICK, ET AL Case Number: CVPM22-0199069 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of bankruptcy. On January 16, 2024, at the Settlement Conference, the Court was informed that Herman Hedrick filed for bankruptcy, which the Court noted stays the civil action. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to provide the Court with a status of the bankruptcy.

23CV02864 KELLEY v. R.C. BENSON & SONS INC. (UNOPPOSED) MOTION TO INTERVENE County of Santa Cruz’s motion for leave to intervene is granted. Although the County failed to attach the proposed complaint in intervention as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (c), the Court waives that defect. The complaint in intervention shall be filed within 14 days of the hearing. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

C23-02161 CASE NAME: VALERIE MCDUFFIE VS. AHMAD FAIZI *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL FILED BY VALERIE MCDUFFIE FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Hearing required.

Re: David Nanez, III v. California Kidds Pediatric Dentistry Superior Court Case No. 22CECG02854 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: Petition to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claim of Minor Tentative Ruling: To continue the hearing on this petition to Thursday, August 8, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 502. Petitioner must file a supplemental declaration explaining why it is in the best interests of the minor for the funds to be placed into a blocked account as opposed to an annuity. The declaration must be filed by Thursday, July 25, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. Explanation: A petition for court approval of a compromise of a minor's disputed claim “must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise, covenant, settlement, or disposition.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950, emphasis added.) Petitioner must explain why placing the funds into a blocked account instead of an annuity, as originally proposed, is the most reasonable option in the best interests of the minor. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/17/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)