Dean Mckillen Vs Zachary Vella

Case Number: 24STCV06155 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Case Name: GFD Wilcox LLC v. Mathew Ludlow, et al. Case No.: 24STCV06155 Matter: Motion to Quash Service of Summons Moving Parties: Defendants Mathew Ludlow and Richard Abrams Responding Party: Plaintiff GFD Wilcox LLC Tentative Ruling: Defendants motion to quash service of summons is denied. This is an unlawful detainer action. On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff GFD Wilcox LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Mathew Ludlow and Richard Abrams (Defendants) based on alleged non-payment of rent. The Complaint alleges that when the action was filed, Defendants were in arrears over $37,000. On June 12, 2024, Defendants filed this motion to quash service of summons. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. No reply was filed. The motion to quash is denied. Factual and legal background A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes : ( 1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her . . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).) On April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed proofs of service one as to each Defendant that the summons was posted at the subject property on April 9, 2024. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed two more proofs of service one for each Defendant attesting to service by mail on April 9, 2024 under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.45. In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that courts personal jurisdiction over a defendant. When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service. ( Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 14391440; accord Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160 [It was incumbent upon plaintiff, after the filing of defendants motion to quash, to present evidence discharging her burden to establish the requisites of valid service on defendant].) [T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper, but only if it complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs. ( Id. at pp. 1441-1442.) Discussion Defendants Ludlow and Abrams now move the court to quash service of the summons and complaint on the ground they were not served with process. Both Defendants claims no personal service was made and that the summons was not posted at the leased property. Ludlow does admit that he received the summons and complaint by mail; Abrams denies receiving service by mail. On April 2, 2024, the court granted Plaintiffs application for an order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.45 allowing service of the summons and complaint by posting at the premises which are the subject of this unlawful detainer action and mailing them by certified mail. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿415.45(a).) Section 415.45 states: (a) A summons in an action for unlawful detainer of real property may be served by posting if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in any manner specified in this article other than publication and that: (1) A cause of action exists against the party upon whom service is to be made or he is a necessary or proper party to the action; or (2) The party to be served has or claims an interest in real property in this state that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court or the relief demanded in the action consists wholly or in part in excluding such party from any interest in such property. (b) The court shall order the summons to be posted on the premises in a manner most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served and direct that a copy of the summons and of the complaint be forthwith mailed by certified mail to such party at his last known address. (c) Service of summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after posting and mailing. Evidence Code § 647 states that the return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return. Where service is carried out by a registered process server, Evidence Code section 647 applies to eliminate the necessity of calling the process server as a witness as trial. ( Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1427.) The proof of service in this circumstance establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the return. ( Id. at 1428.) The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence. . . ( Id. ) Here, on April 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed proof of service by posting as to each Defendant on April 9, 2024, which shows that service was carried out upon Defendants by a registered process server. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed two more proofs of service as to each Defendant by certified mail. These were also executed by a registered process server. Defendants declarations erroneously claim that Plaintiff filed no proofs of service of process. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs submit exhibits of the postal service certified mail receipts for both Ludlow and Abrams with the address of the subject property showing delivery on April 12, 2024. The presumption of proper service applies. Defendants provide no evidence, other than their own declarations, to show that they were not served with the summons and complaint. A trial court is not required to accept self-serving evidence contradicting [a] process servers declaration. ( American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.) The party seeking to defeat service of process must present sufficient evidence to show that the service did not take place as stated. ( See Palm Property Investments, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.) Merely denying service took place without more is insufficient to overcome the presumption. ( Ibid. [defendants were required to come forth with evidence beyond their answer [denying service] to overcome the presumption of Evidence Code section 647].) Defendants declarations fail to rebut the presumption that service of process was effected. Conclusion The motion to quash service of the summons is denied.

Case Number: 24NNCV01081 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B 330 north brand, inc. , Plaintiff, v. johnhart corp ., Defendant. Case No.: 24NNCV01081 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (cont. from July 5, 2024) [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff 330 North Brand, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Defendant JohnHart Corp. (Defendant). The property at issue is located at 330 North Brand Blvd., Suite 130, Glendale, CA 91203. Plaintiff is the owner of the premises. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff as landlord and Defendant as tenant entered into a written Office Lease (as amended by a First Amendment to Office Lease dated January 3, 2017, a Second Amendment to Office Lease dated May 31, 2017, a Third Amendment to Office Lease dated February 15, 2018, and a Fourth Amendment to Office Lease dated August 18, 2020; hereinafter, Lease) whereby Defendant leased the premises. Plaintiff alleges that additional space within the building containing the premises was also leased by Defendant under the Lease, but possession of such space has been resolved and is not at issue in this matter. Plaintiff alleges that the Lease expired on December 31, 2020 and that all times thereafter, Defendant remained in possession pursuant to Article 15 of the Lease (the holdover provision), except that the parties agreed that Defendant would not pay 200% of the rent as (a) the time period was in the midst of Covid and (b) the parties were attempting to negotiate an extension of the Lease. Plaintiff alleges that the Lease expired on December 31, 2020 and the Lease became a month-to-month holdover tenancy. Plaintiff alleges that on October 8, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice To Terminate Tenancy (the Notice) on Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Lease by forwarding same according to the notice provisions of the Lease to Defendant at the Premises via FedEx. FedEx confirmed delivery as of October 11, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that the Notice required Defendant to quit the premises within 30 days after service of the Notice and also set forth Plaintiff's election to declare a forfeiture of the Lease. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is still in possession of the premises despite more than 30 days passing since service of the Notice (the expiration of the 30-day period was November 10, 2023). On May 23, 2024, the default of all unnamed occupants in possession was entered. B. Motion on Calendar On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant in this case for possession of the premises and for damages in the amount of $61,090.70 (190 days at $321.53 per day for each day that Defendant remains at the premises from January 12, 2024 until judgment). Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication on the following issue: · Issue 1: The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to an order summarily adjudicating the cause of action for unlawful detainer and granting possession of the premises because Defendants occupancy of the premises has been month-to-month for years. Plaintiff has served a 30-day notice to terminate the lease and Defendant failed to vacate the property. On July 3, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition brief. The Court held a hearing on the matter on July 5, 2024. The Court was informed that an opposition was filed and continued the hearing to July 10, 2024 in order to give Plaintiff an opportunity to file a reply brief by July 8, 2024. On July 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION CCP § 1161 defines unlawful detainer in relevant part as follows: 1. When the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property, or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to the tenant; provided the expiration is of a nondefault nature however brought about without the permission of the landlord, or the successor in estate of the landlord, if applicable; including the case where the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant, employee, agent, or licensee and the relation of master and servant, or employer and employee, or principal and agent, or licensor and licensee, has been lawfully terminated or the time fixed for occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired; but nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as preventing the removal of the occupant in any other lawful manner; but in case of a tenancy at will, it shall first be terminated by notice, as prescribed in the Civil Code. (CCP § 1161(1).) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant. In support of its motion, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Spencer Wilson, the Vice President of Transwestern, the agent and property manager for Plaintiff. (Wilson Decl., ¶1.) Mr. Wilson states that on December 19, 2011, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written Office Lease for the premises, which was subsequently amended 4 times (Lease). ( Id. , ¶3, Ex. A [Lease].) He states that all relevant times, Plaintiff has owned the premises. ( Id. , ¶4.) He states that Defendant has been month-to-month since the Lease term expired on December 31, 2020 as shown in paragraph 4 of the last amendment to the Lease. ( Id. , ¶5.) He states that because the parties were unable to agree upon the terms of a new lease or for an extension of the Lease, Plaintiff sought to take back the space after entering into a new lease for the premises with a new tenant and that new lease provides for a rental amount of $9,796.00 per month. ( Id. , ¶6.) Mr. Wilson states that after letters were sent back and forth with Defendant concerning the need for the return of the premises, it became clear that Defendant was not going to vacate as requested. ( Id. , ¶7.) He states that on December 8, 2023, he served a 30-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy (Notice) on Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Lease by forwarding the same according to the notice provision of the Lease to Defendant at the premises via FedEx (delivery confirmed as of December 11, 2023). ( Id .) He states that the Notice required Defendant to quit the premises within 30 days after service of the Notice. ( Id. , Ex. B [Notice with FedEx confirmation].) Mr. Wilson states that the action was not filed sooner than April 2024 because Plaintiff was trying to find a different space for the new tenant so that Defendant could possibly remain in the premises if the parties could reach an agreement on the terms; however, that did not happen. ( Id. , ¶8.) He states that while the parties have been negotiating an extension, they never reached an agreement on terms, there is no writing signed by the parties extending the Lease and no new lease between the parties for the premises. ( Id. , ¶10.) He states that Defendant has simply claimed to have some sort of agreement without any approval from Plaintiff. ( Id. ) Mr. Wilson states that Defendant is still in possession of the premises despite more than 30 days passing since service of the Notice and Plaintiff has not accepted any rent for the premises since the Notice was served. ( Id. , ¶9.) Mr. Wilson states that the rent called for in the new lease ($9,796.00 per month) is the reasonable rental value of the premises, as that is the most recent arms-length transaction for this exact space and based upon that monthly rent, the daily value of the premises is $322.06 (calculated by taking the monthly rent of $9,796.00 and multiplying it by 12 months and then dividing that by 365 days). ( Id. ) Mr. Wilson states, however, because Plaintiff asked for $321.53 in the complaint, Plaintiff will use that lower amount. ( Id. ) Here, Plaintiff has established its burden establishing that Defendant has continued in possession of the premises after the Lease expired. Paragraph 4 of the Fourth Amendment of the Lease states that the term respecting Suite 130 shall expire on December 31, 2020. After the tenancy became a holdover month-to-month tenancy, Plaintiff served the Notice on December 8, 2023 (confirmed delivery by FedEx on December 11, 2023). However, as stated by Mr. Wilson in his declaration, Defendant did not vacate the premises within 30 days and the parties were unable to agree upon a Lease extension or a new lease. Thus, Plaintiff has established the elements of an unlawful detainer claim for the real property at issue. As such, the burden shifts to Defendant to raise a triable issue of material fact. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment solely because the Lease expired. Defendant argues that it has partially performed the terms of a fully negotiated and agreed-to Fifth Amendment. ( Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291, 295 [While the defendant was not entitled to a judgment in the present proceedings decreeing specific performance of the agreement to execute the lease, nevertheless the part performance of such an agreement can be interposed as an equitable defense to the plaintiff's attempt to wrest from him the possession of the premises by the summary proceedings in unlawful detainer.]; Pearsall v. Henry (1908) 153 Cal. 314, 318 [The question whether there has been a part performance of the oral agreement is necessarily one of fact to be determined by the trial court.].) [1] In support of the opposition, Defendant provides the declaration of Harout Keuroghlian, the owner of Defendant, and a copy of the unexecuted Fifth Amendment. Mr. Keuroghlian states that as of September 2021, Defendant was responsible for leasing: (a) Suite 130 (lease expired December 31, 2020), which was approximately 2,930 square feet; (b) Suite 660 (lease expired January 31, 2022), which was approximately 1,662 square feet; and (c) Suite 701 (lease to expire on August 31, 2023), which was approximately 2,241 square feet. (Keuroghlian Decl., ¶5.) He states that in September 2021, Anneke Greco, the Executive Vice President of Jones Lang LaSalle, the authorized agent of Plaintiff, proposed that Defendant surrender Suites 660 and 701 early as a part of negotiations for an extension of Suite 130. ( Id. , ¶6.) He states that in reliance on the terms being negotiated, Defendant voluntarily and prematurely surrendered possession of the Giveback Premises (Suites 660 and 701, set to expire 4 months and 2 years later, respectively) and Defendant ceased paying rent for those spaces. ( Id., ¶7.) Mr. Keuroghlian states that on March 22, 2022, Ms. Greco sent Defendant a proposed Fifth Amendment to the Lease back dated to January 2022, honoring most of the mutually agreeable terms during the previous Suite 130 negotiations. ( Id. , ¶8.) On October 24, 2022, Ms. Greco sent a revised Fifth Amendment, which contained all of the terms needed for the Lease but had one mistake; Mr. Keuroghlian stated that he informed Ms. Greco that he was willing to execute the extension. ( Id. , ¶9, Ex. 1 [Fifth Amendment].) He states that in November and December 2022, Defendant continuously attempted to contact Plaintiff to finalize execution of the new Lease for Suite 130 and that Ms. Greco responded on December 21, 2022, stating that she needed an accounting reconciliation. ( Id. , ¶¶10-11.) He states that he attempted to contact Plaintiff until July 2023 and continued to pay monthly base rent which Plaintiff routinely accepted, believing that he was performing under the Fifth Amendment. ( Id. , ¶11.) Mr. Keuroghlian states that on July 21, 2023 (nearly a year later), Ms. Grecos associate responded to Defendants July 28, 2022 correspondence regarding reconciliations. ( Id. , ¶12.) On July 25, 2023, Defendant sent correspondent to Ms. Greco requesting an update on the Lease execution. ( Id. , ¶13.) He states that Ms. Greco responded on July 26, 2023, stating that Plaintiff leased Suite 130 to another tenant who agreed to a longer-term period. ( Id. , ¶14.) On September 12, 2023, Defendant received a Notice of Termination; on November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed the complaint; and on December 14, 2023, Plaintiff issued the December 8, 2023 Notice. ( Id. , ¶¶15-17.) While Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because Defendant partially performed under the Fifth Amendment by surrendering the Give Back Space and paying rent, Defendant has failed to present evidence in support of its burden in opposition. At most, Defendant provides Mr. Keuroghlians declaration and the unsigned Fifth Amendment, but Defendant fails to provide any documentary evidence of the parties communications (emails, letters, etc.) and fails to state what amount of rent was paidwhether it was the rent under the last lease amendment or the Fifth Amendmentor provide documentary evidence through canceled checks or bank statements of the rental amounts paid. It is Defendants shifted burden to provide opposing evidence of a triable issue of material fact and Defendant has failed to do so here. In addition, as pointed out by Plaintiff in the reply brief, Defendant cannot rely on an oral modification, as the Lease at section 30.8 states that the terms cannot be modified orally. ( Conley v. Matthes (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1465 [ Oral modifications of written agreements are precluded only if the written agreement provides for written modification.]; Mot., Ex. A [December 19, 2011 Office Lease at § 30.8].) [2] Plaintiff preemptively raised this in the motion papers on page 5 and again raised this in the reply brief, but Defendant did not address the integrated nature of the Lease (and its subsequent amendments) in the opposition brief. The cases cited by Defendant also fail to include a factually similar situation as this case. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has not raised a triable issue of material fact in its shifted burden on this motion for summary judgment. As such, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiff 330 North Brand, Inc.s motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to lodge with the Court and serve on Defendant a proposed judgment within ten (10) days and to provide notice of this order. Plaintiff shall provide notice of this order. DATED: July 10, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court [1] Defendant cites to various cases regarding partial performance of unexecuted agreements or oral agreements to argue that it has sufficiently raised a triable issue of material fact. However, the cases cited are factually distinguishable. For example, Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291 involved an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to execute a written lease. Unlike this case, Schubert did not involve an underlying written and executed agreement that required all subsequent amendments and modifications to be in writing. [2] Section 30.8, entitled Entire Agreement; Merger; Severability states that no provision of the Lease may be modified, waived or discharged except by an instrument in writing signed by the party against which enforcement of such modification, waiver or discharge is sought.

Case Number: 23NWCV00407 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Yadhira Esmeralda Carbajal, et al. vs The Maria De La Luz Gonzalez Living Trust, et al. Case No.: 23NWCV00407 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 @ 9:30 a.m. #2 Tentative Ruling Defendants Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cause of Action and SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to Third Cause of Action. Defendants Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below. Plaintiff to give notice. Background On September 1, 2016, Plaintiffs rented a one bedroom, one bathroom unit in the backyard of Defendants residence located at 12113 Ramsey Drive, Whittier, 90605. Plaintiffs allege the unit was uninhabitable. On July 27, 2023, Plaintiffs Yadhira Esmeralda Carbajal, Agustin Gamez, Agustin Carbajal, Jr., and Karen Carbajal (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants The Maria de la Luz Gonzalez Living Trust, Juan Gonzalez, and Lucero Vargas (collectively Defendants) alleging causes of action for: (1) Harassment; (2) Retaliatory Eviction; (3) Constructive Eviction and Willful Interruption of Services; (4) Violation Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200; (5) Statutory Breach of Habitability; (6) Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (7) Negligent Maintenance of Premises; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (10) Nuisance. Defendants generally demur to each cause of action in the FAC. Defendants also move to strike language in the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Thirty-Fourth causes of action, as well as the Demand for Relief. Meet and Confer CCP §430.41(a) states that, before filing a demurrer, the moving party must engage in a specified meet and confer process with the party who filed the pleading at issue for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached as to the filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer/motion to strike. [T]he demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. If an amended complaint&is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before a demurrer to the amended pleading. (emphasis added.) (CCP §430.41(a).) Although no such declaration accompanies the demurrer, the Court exercises its discrection to consider the briefs on the merits. DEMURRER Legal Standard The party against whom a complaint has been filed may object to the pleading, by demurrer, on several grounds, including the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e).) A party may demur to an entire complaint, or to any causes of action stated therein. (CCP § 430.50(a).) Analysis First Cause of Action: Harassment Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord's knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no lawful purpose. . . . (LAMC §¿45.33.) A landlord is defined as any owner, lessor, sublessor, manager, and/or person, including any firm, corporation, partnership, or other entity, having any legal or equitable right of ownership or possession or the right to lease or receive rent for the use and occupancy of a rental unit, and whether acting as principal or through an agent or representative or successor of any of the foregoing. (LAMC §¿45.32.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that the landlord threatened to evict the Carbajals& without reason, on six different occasions (FAC ¶ 45) and threatened to call the police shortly after they requested basic repairs (FAC ¶ 48). Further, Plaintiffs allege that from August 4, 2017, to June 22, 2022, the Carbajals made thirteen repair requests to Defendants. However, the Defendants failed to act on a single request. (FAC ¶ 36.) Also, [d]uring a rainstorm in October 2018, a leak in the Dwelling Units ceiling caused water from the outdoors to run down the walls. See Ex. A. The Carbajals had no other choice but to use buckets to catch the rainwater and prevent the unit from flooding. The electricity also completely went out during the rain. Despite their best efforts, the rainwater ruined many of the Carbajals personal belongings, including their clothing, mattress, refrigerator, and stove. (FAC ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the landlord knowingly and willfully directed conduct at Plaintiffs that caused detriment and harm without lawful purpose. Accordingly, demurrer as to the first cause of action is OVERRULED. Second Cause of Action: Retaliatory Eviction Civ Code, section 1942.5(a) provides that a lessor may not cause a lessee to quit voluntarily, increase rent, decrease any services, or recover possession of a dwelling within 180 days after a lessee makes a complaint to an appropriate agency as to tenantability of a dwelling. [T]enants who are the victims of retal iatory conduct by their landlords have complementary rights of action both in the common law and under the statutory scheme adopted by the Legislature.¿ ( Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 811.)¿¿¿ ¿ Here, Plaintiffs allege that on June 30, 2022, the Carbajals made a complaint to the Los Angeles Department of Public Health (LADPH), and on July 11, 2022 LADPH sent Defendants a Courtesy Notice to Abate, describing the violations identified in the Dwelling Unit. (FAC ¶¶ 60-61.) On July 28, 2022, in an attempt to terrorize and retaliate against the Carbajals, all four participants delivered an illegal three-day notice to pay or quit demanding the Carbajals pay rent for May 2022 and June 2022. (FAC ¶ 62.) Based thereon, the Court determines that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a cause of action for retaliatory eviction. While Plaintiffs admit to the stoppage of rental payments on May 1, 2022, Plaintiffs contend they were permitted to do so under California law. (FAC ¶ 58.) Courts have held that if the premises were indeed uninhabitable a tenant may be justified in the refusal to pay the full amount of the rent. (See Green v. Superior Court , (1974) 10 Cal. 3d 616, 628-29.) Given the allegations that Defendants refused to make any repairs to the dwelling, including repairs involving leaks in the ceiling, electricity, cockroach and rat infestations, a broken air conditioner, lack of heating in the unit, and damage to their front door , Plaintiffs sufficiently allege they were justified in withholding rent payments. (See FAC ¶¶ 57, 59.) Accordingly, the Demurrer as to the Second Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Third Cause of Action: Constructive Eviction and Willful Interruption of Services A construct ive eviction results from an interference with or disturbance of the tenants possession by the act of the landlord or someone acting under the landlords authority, whereby the whole or a substantial part of the premises is rendered unfit for occupancy for the purpose for which they were demised, or the tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises provided the tenant vacates or abandons the premises within a reasonable time. ( Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, review denied (Apr. 30, 2014).) Failing to repair residential premises and not keeping them in a condition suitable for purpose for which they were leased constitutes a constructive eviction. ( Stoiber v. HoneyChuck (1980) 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 912.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants willfully caused the interruption of heat and air conditioning for the unit by failing to provide them throughout the lease, with the intention of terminating the Carbajals occupancy. Likewise, Defendants willfully caused the interruption of electricity for the unit by failing to repair it since October 2018, with the intention of terminating the Carbajals occupancy. Therefore, the unit's heating, air conditioning, and electricity services were interrupted throughout the Carbajals occupancy of the unit. (FAC ¶ 99.) Despite these interruptions, Plaintiffs remained in the property from 2017-2022. It follows that Plaintiffs did not vacate or abandon the premises within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the demurrer as to the Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Fourth Cause of Action: Violation Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 To successfully plead a UCL claim for unfair business practices, a plaintiff must allege facts justifying relief in the form of protecting the public from unfair business practices or deceptive advertising. ( Day v. AT&T Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 325, 331-332.) A plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant engaged in a business practice that was either unlawful (i.e., is forbidden by law) or unfair (i.e., harm to victim outweighs any benefit) or fraudulent (i.e., is likely to deceive members of the public).¿( Albillo v. Intermodal Container Services, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 190, 206.)¿ Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conduct was fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading because they knowingly misrepresented to the Carbajals that the Unit they were about to rent was in a fit condition for human habitation. (FAC ¶¶ 106-108.) As to the unlawful prong, Plaintiffs allege [t]he uninhabitable and untenantable conditions at the property resulted from Defendants failure to maintain and repair the premises as required by numerous residential building, health and safety laws, statutes, and ordinances. The uninhabitable and untenantable conditions at the property further resulted from Defendants failure to maintain and repair the premises as required by Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1941, 1941.1, and 1942.4. (FAC ¶¶ 109-10.) As to the unfair prong, Plaintiffs allege [i]n light of the propertys deplorable health and safety conditions, Defendants decision to lease the property to the Carbajals and collect revenues in the form of rental payments constitutes an unfair and unlawful business practice. (FAC ¶ 111.) Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. Accordingly, the Demurrer as to the Fourth Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Fifth Cause of Action: Statutory and Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability The elements of a cause of action for breach of the implied w arranty of habitability are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages. ( Peviani v. Arbors at California Oaks Property Owner, LLC (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 874, 891 review denied (July 14, 2021), see also Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297 [applying Civ. C. §1942.4, and holding there is a statutory cause of action available to the residential tenant where the premises are untenantable and other circumstances exist.].) A violation of a statutory housing standard that affects health and safety is a strong indication of a materially defective condition. ( Ibid. )¿¿¿ As noted above, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to repair the dwelling including repairs involving leaks in the ceiling, electricity, cockroach and rat infestations, a broken air conditioner, lack of heating in the unit, and damage to their front door. (FAC, ¶ 57, 59.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants willfully caused the interruption of electricity for the unit by failing to repair it since October 2018. (FAC, ¶ 99.) Plaintiffs allege between August 4, 2017, to June 22, 2022, the Carbajals made thirteen repair requests to Defendants. (FAC, ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs also allege [t]he Carbajals have been damaged by Defendants conduct in an amount equal to the rents due and paid by her during his tenancy in the amount stated in the prayer for relief. (FAC, ¶ 128.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Accordingly, the demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Sixth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. (See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780; Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendants conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. ( Moncada , supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 780 (quoting Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883).)¿¿ Plaintiffs argue that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be based upon allegations of leaking sewage, cockroach infestation, broken walls, defective wiring, and lack of plumbing. ( Stoiber v. Honeychuck ( 1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 912.) In Stoiber , the plaintiff alleged that the defendant landlords failure to remedy the defects was knowing, intentional and willful, and caused her extreme emotional distress. ( Id . at 913.) As in Stoiber , Plaintiffs allege a series of defects including vermin/rodent infestation and chronic mold. Plaintiffs also allege they complained of these issues to Defendants who told the Carbajals that if they did not like the condition of the Unit, they should leave. (FAC, ¶ 39.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to remedy the defects in the unit for five years. (FAC ¶ 5.) Defendants told Plaintiffs to leave if they did not like the conditions. (FAC ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs allege they suffered illness, physical injury, mental stress, emotional distress, shame, anxiety, depression, helplessness, sleeplessness, frustration, discomfort, annoyance, fear, and loss in the value of their leasehold. (FAC ¶ 147) Based thereon, the Court determines that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Accordingly, the demurrer to the Eighth Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Ninth Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Whether plaintiffs can recover damages for NIED is dependent upon traditional tort analysis and the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation and damages must exist to support the cause of action.¿ ( Klein v. Childrens Hospital Medical Center (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 889, 894.) Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants owed a duty to them because they were the landlords of the property (FAC, ¶ 10.), Defendants breached that duty by knowingly ignoring and refusing to abate a dangerous and unhealthy nuisance at the Dwelling Unit (FAC,¶ 150), Defendants were the cause of the distress (FAC, ¶ 152), and they suffered damages as discussed above (FAC, ¶ 147). Based thereon, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a cause of action of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Accordingly, the demurrer as to the Ninth Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Tenth Cause of Action: Nuisance To state a cause of action for private nuisance, a party must first allege a non-trespassory interference with the private use and enjoyment of property. (CC § 3479 3481; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Sup. Ct . (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938.) Plaintiffs must therefore allege injury specific to the use and enjoyment of his land. (See Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 263, 302.) For the reasons stated above, the Court determines that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege materially defective conditions that substantially interfered with Plaintiffs use and enjoyment of the Unit. (FAC ¶¶ 37 59, 65.) Accordingly, the demurrer to the tenth cause of action is OVERRULED. MOTION TO STRIKE Legal Standard Upon motion, or at any time in its own discretion, a court may grant a motion to strike any of the following material: (1) irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. §436.) These provisions also authorize the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed. ( Ferraro v. Camarlinghi , (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528, emphasis in original.) Analysis Paragraph Three Paragraph Three of the FAC alleges what at first appeared to be the American dream, turned out to be a nightmare." Defendant contends this description of the familys journey to the United States is prejudicial. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the motion to strike language in Paragraph Three is GRANTED with 20 days leave to amend. Paragraph Four Paragraph four of the FAC alleges Defendants were "blinded by greed" and they "took advantage of the Carbajals. The Court finds this language is relevant to motive and not unduly prejudicial. Accordingly, the motion to strike language in Paragraph Four is DENIED. Paragraphs Six, Eleven, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Thirty-Four Defendants contend that language accusing Defendants of escalating& threats in Paragraph Six, "unsafe and "unhealthy conditions" in the rental unit in Paragraph Eleven, "the building has not been habitable or tenantable and therefore has a lesser rental value than what Defendants demanded in Paragraph Thirteen, "placing the Carabajals in harm's way by forcing them to live in unhabitable and deplorable conditions in Paragraph Fourteen, "pattern of unlawful threats in Paragraph Fifteen, and superficial habitable unit a (concealing the defects) and failed to inform" the Plaintiffs that the unit they were offering was unlawful, as alleged in Paragraph Thirty Four, should be stricken because there is no evidence to support them and/or they are conclusions which lie within the sole province of the trier of fact. The Court is satisfied that any absence of supporting facts in the above-referenced language is not fatal to the FAC at this stage of the proceedings. A plaintiff is only required to plead ultimate, not evidentiary facts. ( C.W. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carpenter (2020 53 Cal.App.5 th 165, 169.) To survive a demurrer, a complaint need only allege facts that state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union H.S. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4 th 861, 872. Moreover, the Court finds that the probative value of the above-referenced language is not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Accordingly, the motion to strike language in Paragraph Six, Eleven, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Thirty-Four is DENIED. Demand For Relief Defendants contend that the demand for relief is irrelevant because Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a demand for relief because the demurrer was overruled as to all causes of action but one. Accordingly, the motion to strike the demand for relief is DENIED.

Case Number: 23STCV25793 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Case Name: Spratt, et al. v. Ward, et al. Case No.: 23STCV25793 Matter: Anti-SLAPP Motion Moving Party: Plaintiffs Jessica Spratt, Steven Spratt, and Carla Whalen Responding Party: Defendants James M. Ward and Duopoly, LLC Notice: OK Ruling: The Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On October 23, 2023, Plaintiffs Jessica Spratt, Steven Spratt, and Carla Whalen filed the operative Complaint against their landlords, Defendants James M. Ward and Duopoly, LLC, for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (3) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, (4) negligence, (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (6) private nuisance, (7) premises liability, (8) retaliatory acts, and (9) violation of LA TAHO. On May 14, 2024, Defendants filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiffs for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, and (3) defamation. Plaintiffs now seek to strike the entirety of the third cause of action for defamation in the Cross-Complaint pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek to strike portions of the defamation claim. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets forth the procedure governing anti-SLAPP motions. In pertinent part, the statute states, A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1).) The purpose of the statute is to identify and dispose of lawsuits brought to chill the valid exercise of a litigants constitutional right of petition or free speech. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a); Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055-1056.) Courts employ a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions. ( Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) To invoke the protections of the statute, the defendant must first show that the challenged lawsuit arises from protected activity, such as an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. ( Ibid .) From this fact, courts presume the purpose of the action was to chill the defendants exercise of First Amendment rights. It is then up to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by showing a reasonable probability of success on the merits. ( Ibid .) In determining whether the plaintiff has carried this burden, the trial court considers the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(2); see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 ( Soukup ).) Protected Activity To meet their burden for the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defamation claim arises from protected activity. That is, it must be that defendants conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . the act underlying the plaintiffs cause or the at which forms the basis for the plaintiffs cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. ( Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 (internal citations omitted).) An act in furtherance of a persons right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e).) Plaintiffs argue that the subject defamation claim arises from protected activity under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(2)-(4). Defendants defamation claim alleges that Plaintiffs appeared on television for KTLA and stated: a. Cross-Complainant was a slumlord; b. Cross-Complainant refused to make repairs; c. Cross-Complainant refused to take complaints seriously; d. Cross-Complainant told her to just get a cat for the rodent problem and falsely stated that Cross-Complainant called the mice mosies; e. When her family returned to the remediated house, nothing had been done; and f. There was mold at the property. (Cross-Compl. ¶ 30.) Defendants also allege that Cross-Defendants provided pictures and videos to the news team which were not current, but assembled together, created a false representation of the current situation at the property. (Cross-Compl ¶ 32.) Plaintiffs have carried their burden to show that the allegations arise from protected activity under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(3). The definition of public interest within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity. ( Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479.) A statement concerns a public issue where it either [(1)] concerned a person or entity in the public eye [Citations], [(2)] conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants [Citations] or [(3)] a topic of widespread, public interest. ( Rivero v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924.) For the purposes of Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(3), [a] public forum is traditionally defined as a place that is open to the public where information is freely exchanged. ( Damon , supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 475.) Here, the subject statements relate to a matter of public interest because they pertain to misconduct by a local landlord that garnered a television audience and that could be relevant to any individual seeking to rent property from Defendants. Indeed, an issue of public interest within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) is any issue in which the public is interested. ( Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042.) Actually, KTLAs YouTube video of the incident, which includes Plaintiffs statements, has nearly 19,000 views alone. (https://youtu.be/nLEqoC3WUkQ?si=63CYmppgHh_pSp1g.) Furthermore, the statements were made in a public forum to the extent uttered on television on KTLA, which is known to be broadcast widely throughout Southern California. (See, e.g., Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1161 [A news publication is a public forum within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute if it is a vehicle for discussion of public issues and it is distributed to a large and interested community.].) Defendants merely argue that the statements are not a matter of public interest because they are false and misleading. Defendants have confused the analysis for the two prongs of the anti-SLAPP framework. The falsity of Plaintiffs statements pertains to the merit of Defendants claim for the second prong. The first prong merely examines whether the statements were a matter of public interest, which is to be construed broadly. The Court concludes that the defamation claim arises from protected activity under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(3) and that Plaintiffs have carried their burden. Minimal Merit On the second component of the analysis, courts employ a summary-judgment-like procedure, accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendants evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the plaintiffs evidence as a matter of law. ( Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.) In other words, the Court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. The Court accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. ( Soukup , supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) The tort of defamation consists of (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, and (4) unprivileged, and that (5) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. ( Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) Where, as here, the subject statements involve a public issue, a private figure cannot obtain presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. ( Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 749, 756; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 349; Brown v. Kelly (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 747 [A private-figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence to recover any damages and, when the speech involves a matter of public concern, he must also prove New York Times malice, supra , 376 U.S. 254, to recover presumed or punitive damages.] Here, Defendants one declaration does not establish pecuniary damages arising directly from the statements themselves and in fact hardly discusses the effects of the defamatory statements at all. The only expenses discussed relate to efforts at (a) remediation, (b) providing alternate housing, and (c) providing payment to induce Plaintiffs to vacate. These are not pecuniary damages caused by the defamatory statements. Therefore, for the purposes of this Motion, Defendants must show actual malice to establish a right to presumed damages. Actual malice requires that the statement at issue be made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 280.) [R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. (P. 731, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1325.) The quoted language establishes a subjective test, under which the defendant's actual belief concerning the truthfulness of the publication is the crucial issue. (See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc. (N.D.Cal.1977) 430 F.Supp. 1363, 13651366.) This test directs attention to the defendant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the material published ... [not] the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff. ( Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 415, 434, 142 Cal.Rptr. 304.) . . . [A]ctual malice can be proved by circumstantial evidence. [E]vidence of negligence, of motive and of intent may be adduced for the purpose of establishing, by cumulation and by appropriate inferences, the fact of a defendant's recklessness or of his knowledge of falsity. ( Goldwater v. Ginzburg (2d Cir.1969) 414 F.2d 324, 342; Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. , supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 415, 434, 142 Cal.Rptr. 304.) A failure to investigate (see Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. , supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 415, 434, 142 Cal.Rptr. 304), anger and hostility toward the plaintiff ( id. , at p. 436, 142 Cal.Rptr. 304), reliance upon sources known to be unreliable ( Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts , supra, 388 U.S. 130, 156, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1992, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094; Pep v. Newsweek, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1983) 553 F.Supp. 1000, 1002), or known to be biased against the plaintiff ( Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 627, 640, 188 Cal.Rptr. 216; Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc. (Colo.1983) 659 P.2d 1351, 13611362)such factors may, in an appropriate case, indicate that the publisher himself had serious doubts regarding the truth of his publication. ( Reader's Digest Assn. , supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 25658.) Actual malice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, andon a summary judgment or anti-SLAPP motionthe plaintiff must meet her burden by demonstrating that the evidence and all the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from it . . . meet the higher standard. ( Id. at p. 252.) The Motion should be granted unless it appears that actual malice may be proved at trial by clear and convincing evidence. ( Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1119.) Here, Defendants have not presented evidence approaching the clear and convincing standard that Plaintiffs statements were made with knowledge of or reckless disregard of falsity. There are no documents provided whatsoever. In essence, Defendants state that they have expended large sums of money to remediate any defects at the property and that there are text messages that could prove this. Defendants one declaration, without attachments, merely creates an ordinary factual dispute and does not approach the clear and convincing standard. Defendants have failed to establish an element of their claimdamages. Because Defendants have not carried their burden to show a reasonable probability of prevailing on their defamation claim, the Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted. Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice is granted. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 24NWCV00960 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Hernandez v. Lopez, et al., Case No. 24NWCV00960 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendants Daniel Lopez and Nidelvia Yah move ex parte to vacate and set aside the default and default judgment entered against them on June 17, 2024, quash any writ, and stay the execution in the instant case. On April 11, 2024, Defendants demurred to the complaint. On May 31, 2024, Defendants answered. On June 4, 2024, the Court overruled Defendants demurrer. Because Defendants both demurred and answered, the motion for default is vacated and the ex parte motion is MOOT.

Case Number: 23VECV00647 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T Tarzana Property LLC v Work 23VECV00647 Tentative ruling: Ex parte application to advance hearing on motion to intervene-Denied. Moving party Reinsdorf has failed to comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1202 which states: An applicant must make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte . There is no pending emergency to have this motion advanced in front of other AT LEAST 65 OTHER MOTIONS which have been waiting weeks to be heard . The court will hear the motion as currently scheduled.

Case Number: 24SMCV00828 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: I The court will discuss with the parties a date for the hearing, but would inquire whether plaintiff has reached out to the defense to try and get a date certain by which responses will be served. If so, the court is likely to GRANT the OSC. If not, that ought to be done.

Case Number: 23STCV28088 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 May 20 July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV28088 MOTION : Motion for Attorneys Fees MOVING PARTY: Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC OPPOSING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC MOTIONS Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC (Plaintiffs) dismissed their claims against Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC (Defendant). Now, Defendant seeks attorney fees . Plaintiff opposes the motion. ANALYSIS The parties disagree as to whether this case is a contract or tort action. In a contract action, [w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed . . . , there shall be no prevailing party . . . . (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) Plaintiffs complaint in this action is for unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint on February 21, 2024. As such, Plaintiffs argue Defendant is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to attorney fees. However, Plaintiffs claims do not constitute an action on the contract. [T]he unlawful detainer statute encompasses breach of lease (arguably contract-type matters) and holdover possession after expiration of the lease (arguably a noncontract issue). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp . (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims are based on Defendants holdover possession and are, therefore, noncontractual. Plaintiffs claim Defendant failed to surrender the premises after Plaintiffs served Defendant with a notice to quit. The 30-day notice to quit attached to the complaint does not identify any breach of the lease, rather it informs Defendant the month-to-month tenancy is terminated, and Defendant is required to quit and surrender possession of the premises. (See Complaint, filed November 13, 2023, Exhibit 2.) As such, Plaintiffs claims did not sound in contract. Thus, the prohibition on an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1777 for the voluntary dismissal of the complaint does not apply. The court determines Defendant is a prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1077.) The prevailing party must seek an award of attorney fees through the filing of a noticed motion and bears the burden of proof to justify the amount sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(A).) Defendant seeks an award of $50,000 in attorney fees. Defendant has not, however, advanced any billing records to support this amount. The court considers a request for attorney fees based on careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Without such evidence, the court cannot grant Defendants request for attorney fees. Defendant cites Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, which is not on point. In that case, the Court of Appeal stated, An attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. ( Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) The court also noted the attorneys declaration in that case included detailed evidence of hours spent, tasks concluded, and billing rates. ( Ibid. ) In the instant case, Defendant does not present any evidence of the number of hours Defendants attorneys billed on the matter, the specific nature of the services they provided, or the specific tasks that were completed. Defendant advances a declaration of its attorney, Navi Signh Dhillon (Dhillon) who simply states, I reviewed the billing records for this matter and I am confident that the number of hours billed are commensurate with the tasks performed. (Declaration of Navi Singh Dhillon, ¶ 7.) Dhillon does not aver to the number of hours he and/or any other attorney worked on this case nor the specific tasks that were performed. Although Dhillon suggests he has discounted the number of hours worked by as much as a half of the hours expended in the case and is, therefore, seeking only $50,000 for 50 hours of work at $1,000 an hour, that is not a sufficient accounting. Moreover, he has not established a billing rate of $1000 an hour in an unlawful detainer action is a reasonable hourly rate that is in keeping with the industry standard in Los Angeles. Defendant fails to present evidence to support the requested fees. Accordingly, the motion for attorney fees is denied without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.