Stipulation,Agreement: PSP INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS L.A. DOWNTOWN PALM, LLC, ET AL.

Case Number: 18STCV10177 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 26 Dai v. Paul P. Cheng & Associates, et al. MOTION FOR LEAVE TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Young Chow Dais Motion for Leave is DENIED. ANALYSIS: On December 31, 2018, Plaintiff Young Chow Dai (Plaintiff) filed the instant action against Defendants Paul P. Cheng & Associates and Marsha S. Mao. Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on October 4, 2019 against Defendants Paul P. Cheng (Defendant Cheng), Marsha S. Mao (Defendant Mao), and Law Offices of Paul P. Cheng & Associates (Defendant Cheng & Associates). The SAC, which arises from alleged wrongful actions in connection with a settlement agreement, alleges causes of action for: (1) accounting; and (2) fraud. On February 7, 2023, Defendant Cheng filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ). On March 1, 2023, Defendant Cheng filed a motion to deem the truth of the matters in Defendants Requests for Admission, Set One, served on Plaintiff, admitted and for monetary sanctions. On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer venue to the Santa Monica Courthouse. On July 24, 2023, after hearing and oral argument, the Court: (1) granted the MSJ filed by Defendant Cheng; (2) granted Defendant Chengs motion to deem the truth of the matters in Defendants Requests for Admission, Set One, as admitted and awarded Defendant monetary sanctions; and (3) denied Plaintiffs motion to transfer and change venue. (Minute Order, 07/24/23.) On August 4, 2023, Defendant Cheng filed and served Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order as to the Courts July 24, 2023 order. On August 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Enter a New and Different Judgment . On August 8, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant Cheng and against Plaintiff. The Courts order for entry of summary judgment provides that Plaintiffs case against Defendant Paul P. Cheng is therefore dismissed with prejudice. (Minute Order, 08/08/23, p. 3:1-4.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment and Enter a New and Different Judgment on August 11, 2023. Plaintiff filed similar motions to vacate on August 25, 2023 and September 29, 2023. In a ruling considering all three Motions to Vacate, the Court denied the request to vacate the judgment on January 17, 2024. (Minute Order, 01/17/24.) Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 23, 2024. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on March 26, 2024. (Minute Order, 03/26/24.) On April 16, 2024, the Court granted Defendants Motion to Deem Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant. (Minute Order, 04/16/24.) Plaintiff sought to challenge that ruling via a motion in Department 1, which was denied on June 27, 2024. (Minute Order, 06/27/24.) The instant Motion for Leave was filed by Plaintiff on May 2, 2024. The Motion was originally set for hearing on July 3, 2024 and then continued to July 30, 2024. Defendant filed an opposition on July 24, 2024. The instant Motion does not explain what relief is sought or on what basis. The memorandum must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(b).) Indeed, Plaintiffs failure to provide a memorandum as required by the Rule is an admission that the [request] is without merit and cause for its denial. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(a), (b); In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 976.) As the Court cannot discern what relief Plaintiff seeks or the legal basis for any relief, the Motion for Leave is denied. Conclusion Plaintiff Young Chow Dais Motion for Leave is DENIED. Court clerk to give notice.

Case Number: 22BBCV00226 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JANUARY 25, 2024 MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 22BBCV00226 MP: THE MANIJUE SHAMS TRUST AND MANIJEH SHAMS (Plaintiff) RP: FARIBA JAVAHEROUR, ET AL (Defendant) All parties are requested to appear either in person or via LA Court Connect to address the tentative ruling. Brief Summary of Requested Relief The Court has read and considered Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement, Defendants opposition, as well as Defendants Further Opposition to the Motion. The parties entered into a settlement as set forth in Plaintiffs moving papers, which included a CCP §664.6 provision. Defendant has declined to sign the written settlement agreement until Plaintiff amends her trust to reflect that the settlement of $60,000 will inure to the benefit of the Plaintiffs grandchildren, specifically the children of Plaintiffs deceased son, Massoud Bahmanyar. The parties appear to be at an impasse. Ruling on Motion to Enforce Settlement Pursuant to CCP §664.6, a Court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. As such, the Court exercises its authority under CCP §664.6 and orders the following be completed within the next 30 days: 1. Plaintiff Manijeh Shams is to create a new irrevocable trust: The Manijeh Shams Irrevocable Grandchild Trust in which she is the primary beneficiary, and the children of Massoud Bahmanyar are the contingent beneficiaries. Manijeh Shams shall be the initial trustee, with a successor trustee to be named by Ms. Shams in the trust. 2. The terms of the trust will include that the $60,000 settlement, as well as any earnings, may be used for the direct support of the settlor, and upon settlors death will inure to the benefit of Massoud Bahmanyars children in equal parts per stirpes . In the event that any grandchild predeceases the settlor, that grandchilds share shall inure to the grandchilds children per stirpes. In the event that a deceased grandchild has no children, the share shall be divided equally among the remaining living grandchildren. 3. Defendant Fariba Javaherpour shall deposit the total sum of $60,000 into the newly established trust within ten days of being informed that the new irrevocable trust has been established and a bank account in the name of the new trust is set up. 4. The Manijeh Shams Irrevocable Grandchild Trust shall be subject to Part 4, Chapter 1 of the California Probate Code, beginning at §16060 et seq., including but not limited, to §§16062 and 16063. Upon request from any contingent beneficiary, the contingent beneficiaries shall have a right directly, or through their representative if minors, to have an accounting no more than annually. The accounting may be informal, and the cost of the accounting shall be incurred by the trust. Any contingent beneficiary has the right to petition the court for a formal accounting if there is a prima facie basis to believe that the informal accounting does not properly reflect the trust distributions and expenses. 5. The individual trustee shall not be entitled to compensation for administration of the trust, nor shall any bond be required of any individual trustee. A professional or commercial trustee shall be entitled to compensation as permitted by law. Manijeh Shams may propose specific language to the Court if necessary, with objections and alternative language being proposed by Defendant Fariba Javaherpour. The Court sets a Status Conference Re: Settlement Agreement compliance for August 8, 2024 at 10:00 AM. ORDER The Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement c ame on for hearing on July 25, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFF TO CREATE NEW IRREVOCABLE TRUST CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEMORIALIZED IN THE COURTS PRIOR MINUTE ORDER. NEW IRREVOCABLE TRUST SHALL CONTAIN THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THIS RULING. DEFENDANT IS TO FUND THE TRUST WITHIN 10 DAYS OF BEING NOTIFIED OF THE NEW TRUSTS CREATION AND BEING PROVIDED BANKING INFORMATION IN THE NAME OF THE NEW TRUST. STATUS CONFERENCE RE: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE IS AUGUST 8, 2024 AT 10:00 AM. UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Case Number: 23STCV15942 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 maria padilla , et al.; Plaintiffs , vs. joseph heffesse, as trustee of the Coldwater Canyon Trust , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV15942 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: petition for approval of compromise of claim for minor claimant anthony jayden diaz MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Jeanette Oliveros RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim for Minor Claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this petition. No opposition papers were filed. DISCUSSION Plaintiff and petitioner Jeanette Oliveros (Petitioner) seeks court approval of the settlement made on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz (Minor Claimant) in this action. The compromise of a minors disputed claim for damages is valid only after it has been approved, upon the filing of a petition, by the court.¿ (Prob. Code, § 3500.)¿ The petition must be verified by the petitioner, must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise, and must be prepared on Judicial Council form MC-350.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.)¿ Defendants Joseph Heffesse, as trustee of the Coldwater Canyon Trust, Sandra B. Sternberg Heffesse, and LA Properties Heffesse LLC have agreed to pay a total of $175,000 to settle this action, of which $5,000 will be separately allocated to Minor Claimant. (MC-350, ¶¶ 10-11.) Of the $5,000 allocated to Minor Claimant, $1,250 will be paid to counsel for attorneys fees and $134.35 will be paid to counsel for legal costs. (MC-350, ¶¶ 13, 16.) The remaining $3,615.65 will be paid or delivered to the parent of Minor Claimant, i.e., Petitioner, without bond, on the terms and under the conditions specified in Probate Code sections 3401-3402. (MC-350, ¶ 18, subd. (b)(5); MC-350, Attachment 18b(5), Oliveros Decl., ¶¶ 1-2, 6; Prob. Code, §§ 3401, 3402.) The court has reviewed the petition and finds the settlement to be fair and reasonable, and in the best interest of Minor Claimant. The court further finds that the declaration of Rachel Fishenfeld is sufficient to support the request for attorneys fees in the amount of $1,250 (representing 25 percent of the $5,000 settlement). (Fishenfeld Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 6-11; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 7.955.) The court therefore grants Petitioners petition. ORDER The court grants petitioner Jeanette Oliveross petition for approval of compromise of claim on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz. The court orders that the $3,615.65 settlement on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz may be paid to plaintiff and petitioner Jeanette Oliveros pursuant to Probate Code sections 3401 and 3402. The court orders petitioner Jeanette Oliveros to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 29, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV08879 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Case Name: Young, et al. v. Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association, et al. Case No.: 22STCV08879 Matter: Motions to Compel Further Responses (4x) Moving Party: Plaintiffs Irene Young and Jesse Chang Responding Party: Defendant Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion as to Requests for Production is granted in part. The Motions as to Form Interrogatories and Request for Admission are granted. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs Irene Young and Jesse Chang seek to compel further responses from Defendant Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association as to their requests for production, set two, form interrogatories, set two, request for admission no. 15. Request for Admission Request for Admission no. 15 states, Admit that YOU have not repaired the defects that were the subject of the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTE. Previously, Defendant responded: After a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter contained in this request, admit in part and deny in part. The Court compelled a further response because there was no specificity as to what was admitted and denied. Defendant then served the following amended response that is the subject of the current Motion: After a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter contained in this request, to the best of Responding Partys knowledge, the Developer has completed the repairs to Plaintiffs property and therefore responds: Deny. Plaintiffs argue that this is evasive because the request did not relate to the Developer, who is never identified in the response anyway. They also contend that it is unclear whether the phrase Plaintiffs property relates to Plaintiffs unit or the entire condominium building that was the subject of the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTE. The Motion to Compel is granted. A further response should be provided in 10 days that (a) admits that Defendant itself did not do the repairs at issue, but (b) denies that the repairs were never done, because the developer, Pacific Plaza Investments, LLC, addressed them. This would seem to better embody a response that complies with CCP § 2033.220. The Court declines to award sanctions. Form Interrogatories (2x) The next Motions pertain to form interrogatory no. 17.1 as it relates to requests for admission nos. 7 and 15. Given that the Court has required a further response for RFA no. 15, a further accompanying response should also be provided for FI no. 17.1. With respect to request no. 7, the response for form interrogatory no. 17.1 is deficient. No facts or documents are specifically identified and no contact information is provided for Partners Community Management. Thus, the Motions to Compel are grantedfurther responses are required within 30 days. The Court awards reduced sanctions to Plaintiffs in the amount of $750. Requests for Production With respect to the requests for production, Defendant contends that supplemental documents were served such that the Motion is moot. Defendant, however, never addresses its actual responses. The Motion is granted as to request nos. 1-7, 9-12, 15-22 because the non-privilege objections lack merit and Defendant should provide updated responses in which documents are identified with Bates numbers. For its privilege log, Defendant should indicate recipients and authors. With respect to request nos. 8, 13, 14, 24, and 25, Defendant should provide a response that complies with Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.230. The Motion is denied without prejudice as to request no. 23, which seems to target predominantly privileged matters. Further responses are to be provided within 30 days. The Court awards Plaintiffs reduced sanctions in the amount of $750. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 23PSCV02165 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: K Defendant Ronald B. Bibonias Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Bibonia is ordered to file an Answer within 10 days. Wilfred T. Cos Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED in part (i.e., as to the first through fourth, sixth and seventh, and ninth causes of action). The court will inquire of the parties whether leave to amend should be granted. Background Plaintiff Flossie C. Parungao (Plaintiff) alleges as follows: Plaintiff and Wilfred T. Co aka Winnifredo T. Co (Co) are siblings. In June 2004, Plaintiff located and negotiated the purchase of the property located at 302 S. Loraine Ave., Glendora, California 91741 (Property) to serve as her residence. Co offered to assist Plaintiff with the purchase of the subject property. Plaintiff and Co agreed that (1) Co would co-sign the purchase financing documents and take record title to the subject property, (2) Plaintiff would provide all of the funds needed for the down payment and closing costs, (3) Plaintiff would thereafter directly pay or provide funds for payment of the loan, property taxes, insurance and other subject property related-expenses, and that (4) upon request from Plaintiff, Co would execute such documents and take such other actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the subject property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Contract). Plaintiff did all things required of her under the Contract. In 2023, Plaintiff asked Co to sign over record title to her; Co refused. Plaintiffs ensuing investigation revealed that Co transferred the subject property into the Ronald B. Bibonia and Wilfred T. Co Revocable Trust dated November 24, 2020 (Trust). On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Co, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust, Ronald Bibonia (Bibonia), individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust (collectively Defendants), and Does 1-50 for: 1. Specific Performance of Oral Contract 2. Breach of Oral Contract 3. Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform] 4. Intentional Misrepresentation 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 6. Conversion 7. Violation of Penal Code § 496 8. Quiet Title 9. Accounting 10. Imposition of Constructive Trust On April 26, 2024, the court sustained with leave to amend the demurrer as to the first through fourth, and sixth and seventh causes of action. It also overruled the demurrer as to fifth and eighth causes of action. On May 16, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Co, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust, Bibonia, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust (collectively Defendants), and Does 1-50 for: 1. Specific Performance of Oral Contract 2. Breach of Oral Contract 3. Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform] 4. Intentional Misrepresentation 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 6. Conversion 7. Violation of Penal Code § 496 8. Quiet Title 9. Accounting 10. Imposition of Constructive Trust A Case Management Conference is set for July 30, 2024. Legal Standard A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia , does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) [A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge. ( S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].) Discussion Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to the first through ninth causes of action in Plaintiffs complaint, on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and are uncertain. [1] Request for Judicial Notice The court rules on Defendants Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) as follows: Granted as to Exhibit A (i.e., deed of trust recorded April 11, 2007). Merits As to Bibonia Bibonia contends that the demurrer should be summarily sustained as it pertains to him, on the basis that the FAC is again completely devoid of factual allegations against him. (Dem., 18:9). A review of the FAC demonstrates that Bibonia was not contractually bound based on the alleged oral contract but merely listed on the Propertys title. Plaintiffs contention that Bibonia is a beneficiary to the property is insufficient to allege his involvement in the alleged oral agreement. Nevertheless, Bibonias name on the Propertys title is sufficient to include him on the eighth cause of action for quiet title. As a result, Bibonias demurrer is sustained on this basis as to causes of action one through seven, and nine without leave to amend. As to Co First and Second Causes of Action (i.e., Specific Performance of Oral Contract and Breach of Oral Contract, Respectively) [T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Plaintiff has alleged that in June 2004, she located and negotiated the purchase of the Property to serve as her residence and that [a]t the time, . . . [her brother] Co offered to assist [her] with the purchase of the Property (FAC, ¶¶ 7 and 8); that she and Co agreed that (1) Co would assist [her] by co-signing the purchase financing documents and taking record title to the Property, (2) [she] would provide all of the funds needed for the down payment and closing costs, (3) [she] would thereafter directly pay or provide funds for the payment of the loan, property taxes, insurance and other Property related expenses, and (4) upon request from [her, Co would execute such documents and take such other actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the Property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Contract) ( Id. ). Co first argues that the alleged oral contract is barred by the Statute of Frauds. (See Civil Code § 1624, subd. (a)(3) [The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the parts agent: . . . (3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein . . .] On April 26, 2024, the court overruled the demurrer on statute of frauds grounds. As a result, the court will not consider the Statute of Frauds argument. Co next argues that the alleged oral contract fails for lack of consideration. (See Civ. Code § 1550 [It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: 1. Parties capable of contracting; 2. Their consent; 3. A lawful object; and, 4. A sufficient cause or consideration].) Plaintiffs only response is that making substantial payments over an extended period of time constitutes consideration. (See Opposition at 14.) Plaintiff relies on Flojo International, Inc. v. Lassleben (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 713, 719, in support of her contention. However, Flojo does not support her contention. In Flojo , a former distributor of products for a company obtained ownership of the company, extinguished the debts the company owned to the distributor, and provided the former owner royalty rights for future sale of goods. ( Id . at 719-20.) The court reversed an order granting summary judgment and held that consideration to the companys prior owner in extinguishing debt was sufficient reason or consideration to bind the company. ( Id . at 720.) Here, Plaintiff again fails to articulate the consideration that Co received. Her contention that other family members benefited by making the Property available as a residence for a sibling demonstrates a sibling promissory estoppel cause of action more so than an oral agreement. Moreover, it appears this alleged consideration was not alleged as part of the original oral agreement. The demurrer is sustained. Third and Fourth Causes of Action (i.e., Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform and Intentional Misrepresentation, Respectively) The essential allegations of an action for fraud are a misrepresentation, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage. ( Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109.) Promissory fraud is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Co asserts that there is no actionable misrepresentation because, [Plaintiff] herself failed to perform her own obligations under the alleged agreement, including (1) failure to co-sign for the loan and (2) failure to pay off the mortgage as agreed. (Dem., 13:15-17). Plaintiff alleges that Co promised beginning in 2004 that he would execute documents and take such [] actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the Property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Promise). (FAC ¶ 23.) However, there is no specificity as to the specific false statements made by Co. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) In fact, it is unclear what actionable statements are alleged in the FAC except for that found in paragraph 30 in the FAC (I will do that.). ( People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 549.) Because the consideration (i.e. as to Co) under the alleged oral agreement is ambiguous, the statement in paragraph 30 does not provide the necessary sufficiency to support a claim because the extent of the agreement has not been fully described. Cos demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action is sustained. Sixth Cause of Action (i.e., Conversion) The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendants conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. ( Los Angeles Federal Credit Union v. Madatyan (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1387 [quotations and citation omitted].) Further, [t]he tort of conversion applies to personal property, not real property. ( Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1295.) Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Co has repudiated his agreement to replace himself with Plaintiff as record title holder of the Property, denied Plaintiffs interest as owner of the Property. In doing so, Defendants have effectively converted and taken for their own use and benefit all of the monies expended by Plaintiff in connection acquisition [sic] and ownership of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 43). [2] Co asserts that Plaintiffs cause of action fails because the Property cannot be the subject of a claim for conversion. Plaintiff, in turn, argues that [w]hat was taken was not real property, but instead a specific corpus of personal propertymoney. . . (Opp., 12:14-15). Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that the monies expended by Plaintiff to live in the property ever went to Co, as opposed to the lender. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. Seventh Cause of Action (i.e., Violation of Penal Code § 496) Penal Code § 496, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that [e]very person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. While Co does not provide any authority for his position that Penal Code § 496 does not apply to real property, Plaintiffs allegation portend to allow a lower threshold or burden to obtain more than compensatory damages. As stated before, without greater foundation and briefing, the court will not allow this cause of action to proceed at this time. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. Ninth Cause of Action (i.e., Accounting) A cause of action for an accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. ( Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179.) Plaintiff has alleged that she is entitled to an accounting of all loans and other transactions secured by or relating in any way to the Property from 2004 to the present, an accounting of any charges or liens against the Property resulting from the conduct and activities of Defendant, as well as an accounting of all property and other assets obtained or derived by Defendants with funds borrowed against or otherwise obtained with respect to the Property. (FAC, ¶ 55). As the court held before, Plaintiff has not alleged that Co ever received any monies for the Property from Plaintiff or anyone else in connection with the Property at any time. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that Co encumbered the Property at any time. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. [1] The court previously overruled the demurrer as to the fifth and eighth causes of action. (See Order, April 26, 2024.) As a result, the court will consider only the demurrer as to the first through fourth, sixth and seventh, and ninth causes of action. [2] It appears Plaintiff failed to edit the FAC as the same grammatical mistakes are repeated in both versions.

Case Number: 24STCV08420 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: None Set CASE: Main Co. LLC v. Janna Simon Lewis CASE NO.: 24STCV08420 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MOVING PARTY : Plaintiff Main Co., LLC RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Defendant Janna Simon Lewis STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent that was filed on April 3, 2024. Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Courts June 11, 2024 order granting Defendant Janna Simon Lewiss motion for summary judgment. TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. DISCUSSION: Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Courts June 11, 2024 order granting Defendant Janna Simon Lewiss motion for summary judgment. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 provides, in relevant part: a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts , circumstances, or law , make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown . * * * (c) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (d) A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7. In addition, an order made contrary to this section may be revoked by the judge or commissioner who made it, or vacated by a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending. (e) This section specifies the courts jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a), (c)-(e) (bold emphasis added).) Timeliness A motion for reconsideration must be made within 10 days after service upon the moving party of written notice of entry of the order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) Here, the Court Clerk served notice of the Courts June 11, 2024 ruling granting the Motion for Summary Judgment on June 11, 2024. (April 29, 2024 Notice of Ruling.) This motion followed on June 20, 2024, less than ten days later. (See Proof of Service.) The Court therefore finds that this motion is timely made. Analysis Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Courts June 11, 2024 order granting Defendant Janna Simon Lewiss motion for summary judgment based on what Plaintiff characterizes as evidence and/or facts and law which were not available or considered at the time of the hearing. The evidence offered consists of a Los Angeles Certificate of Occupancy showing a change in use of the premises to an artist in residence unit on November 29, 1993 and two Document Reports with the same date referring to the same CHG OF USE apparently concerning the same unit. (Declaration of Yousef Monadjemi, ¶¶ 3-5, Exh. D-F.) The motion for reconsideration must be rejected for several reasons. First, Plaintiff has offered no explanation, much less any evidence, showing why the evidence belatedly presented was not submitted for the Courts consideration in connection with its ruling on Defendants motion for summary judgment. A party moving for reconsideration must show something more than that the new evidence was not previously presented. Instead, reconsideration may only be granted where there is proof that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced the evidence in opposition to the original motion. ( New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any valid reason for not presenting the new evidence in opposition to Defendants original motion. ( Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) As the documents presented are all dated November 29, 1993, the Courts assumption is that they were available to Plaintiff during the pendency of the summary judgment motion, if Plaintiff had sought to secure them for submission to the Court. Second, the documents recently submitted to the Court are not relevant to the unlawful detainer action before the Court. Plaintiffs complaint alleges: The building in which the premises is located is under L.A.M.C. 150.000 et seq. (1979) as amended, but that defendants unit is exempt from LARSO, because it is an Artist-in-Residence unit. (Complaint, p. 3 & Attachment 17.) As is proper for any motion for summary judgment, Defendants motion was predicated on these allegations of the Complaint and necessarily limited by those allegations. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 [The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues].) Defendants summary judgment motion did not contest the exemption now being advanced by Plaintiff, and given the narrow scope of the Complaint, such an exemption could not have been challenged in such a motion. As a result, the motion Plaintiff asserts is not one that calls for reconsideration of the prior motion but rather for a ruling on a separate question that falls outside the scope of this lawsuit. Finally, the recently submitted evidence does not support the conclusion Plaintiff urges. The exemption relied on excludes housing accommodations from regulation under LARSO if the units are located in a structure for which the first Certificate of Occupancy was issued after October 1, 1978 (L.A.M.C. § 151.02, Rental Units, exemption 6), but the records offered say nothing about when the first Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the structure. The records suggest, however, that there may have been such a certificate previously issued because the documents recognize the building as an existing structure that was used as a Retail/Sro Hotel/Dance Hall building. (Exh. D-F.) Even if considered, therefore, Plaintiffs new evidence does not raise a triable issue of fact that would preclude entry of summary judgment in Defendants favor. CONCLUSION : For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 21STCV37556 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-26-24 Case #21STCV37556, Hamid Reza Mirshojae, et al. vs. 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd LLC, et al. Trial Date: N/A MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Hamid Reza Mirshojae and Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd, LLC and Ahang Mirshojae RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees in the amount of $ 619,675 , plus $17,036.01 in costs, from Defendants. RULING : Motion for attorney fees is granted at a reduced amount. No costs will be awarded at this time. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) and Defendant Ahang Zarin Mirshojae (Ahang) were formerly married and were engaged in extensive litigation against each other prior to 2017. The assets in dispute were in excess of $20 million. At mediation, Hamid and Ahang entered a complex settlement agreement. Immediately after, Hamid alleges that Ahang breached the settlement agreement, and he was forced to incur attorney fees to enforce various terms of the agreement. Eventually, Hamid filed the current suit to enforce the settlement agreement on October 12, 2021. Ahang accused Hamid and his counsel of inducing her to sign the settlement agreement and sued him for $7 million in damages. This Court eventually struck Ahangs complaint based on Plaintiffs anti-SLAPP motion and determined that Ahang was a vexatious litigant. After this ruling, Ahang attempted to disqualify Hamids lead counsel, though that motion was rejected. Hamid alleges that he has incurred significant legal fees over the course of this litigation. Finally, after two years of litigation, the parties settled via a 998 Offer on November 17, 2023. The 998 Offer required Defendants to pay Plaintiffs $270,000 and reasonable fees and costs as determined by the Court. Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees pursuant to the part of the 998 Offer that allows for reasonable fees to be paid. Plaintiffs are requesting $619,675 in attorney fees from Defendants. Plaintiffs argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs evidence in support of their request for attorney fees included a declaration from their attorney, Christopher Beatty, and billing statements (with some redactions) that show which attorney worked on a task, what the task was, and how much time was spent on the task. (Beatty Decl., Ex. H.) The Beatty Declaration also includes a table which shows the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case and their hourly rates at different times. (Beatty Decl., ¶ 35.) Christopher Beattys hourly rates were $950 (for 2.5 hours in 2021), $975 (for 19.2 hours in 2022), and $1,300 (for 1.5 hours in 2022 and 71.6 hours in 2023). Tami K. Sims hourly rate was $1,115 (for 83.4 hours in 2023). Trevor T. Garneys hourly rate was $955 (for 87.8 hours in 2023). Arron J. Paks hourly rate was $705 (for 277.3 hours in 2023). Minh-Van Dos hourly rates were $795 (for 0.5 hours in 2021) and $840 (for 76.1 hours in 2022). Benjamin Mandels hourly rate was $595 (for 89.6 hours in 2022). Finally, Scarlet Speakmores hourly rate was $350 (for 38.8 hours in 2022). The total lodestar was calculated by multiplying each of these attorneys hourly rate by their hours worked then adding them all together. The total hours worked for the attorneys totaled 748.3. The total lodestar amount, as previously noted, is $619,675. Plaintiffs have also requested costs in the amount $17,036.01. However, costs are awarded pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700. If Plaintiffs wish to request costs, Plaintiffs should file a memorandum of costs at the appropriate time. Defendants Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Keith M. Maziarek: Sustained: Entire Declaration (irrelevant), Paragraph 11 Overruled: None Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of June D. Coleman and the Declaration of Raffi Kassabian: The individual evidentiary objections presented by Plaintiffs to these two declarations are not consecutively numbered. Typically, when written objections to evidence are filed, the written objection must be number consecutively. (See Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1354 (applies to written objections to evidence for summary judgment motions).) While Plaintiffs listed them by paragraph number from the declarations, this is not necessarily effective, because in some instances Plaintiffs objected to different sentences from the same paragraph and listed them separately with the same paragraph number. The Court will not rule on the individual evidentiary objections based on this procedural deficiency. Plaintiffs have objected to the entire Coleman Declaration on the basis that it is improper expert testimony because Coleman has not shown any special knowledge, skill, etc., related to billing for these types of cases pursuant to Evidence Code § 720. The Court has determined that Coleman has sufficiently demonstrated her special knowledge as a fee expert with this declaration and her recently submitted supplemental declaration. Plaintiffs objection to the entire Coleman Declaration is overruled. On April 9, 2024, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees. That same day, the Court issued a ruling on the submitted matter requesting that the parties submit additional briefing and that Plaintiffs submit invoices that do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed, along with supplemental points and authorities supporting their fee requests in light of that information. On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs submitted their supplemental brief. In their brief, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should award standard hourly rates and that the fees sought for all tasks are reasonable. Plaintiffs submitted new billing records that still contain some redactions, but they do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed. On June 25, 2024, Defendants submitted their supplemental opposition brief. Defendants argue that the Court should significantly reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration. Defendants also acknowledge that Plaintiffs conceded that the actual hourly rates and amounts billed are not privileged. ANALYSIS A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. ( Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.) Plaintiffs are the prevailing party by virtue of the fact that the parties settled in Plaintiffs favor via the 998 Offer. Plaintiffs have requested a total of $619,675 in attorney fees. Defendants previously opposed Plaintiffs motion on the basis that Plaintiffs agreed only to recover fees actually incurred and according to proof in the 998 Offer, and Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have not provided this proof. However, this argument was resolved with Plaintiffs supplemental brief, as Plaintiffs have now provided unredacted hourly rates and amounts billed. Plaintiffs attorney Christopher D. Beatty acknowledges in his supplemental declaration that the actual amount charged to the client was $543,156. (Beatty Supp. Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendants argue in their supplemental opposition that this should be the baseline from which any reductions in the requested amount should be made. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should only be able to recover fees actually incurred because that is what the 998 Offer between the parties allowed. (See San Dieguito Pship, L.P. v. San Dieguito River Valley Regl Open Spake Park Joint Powers Auth. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 910, disapproved on other grounds by PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084.) The Court agrees. Plaintiffs should only recover the fees actually incurred, which in this case is, at a maximum, $543,156. Next, Defendants contest the reasonableness of the fees incurred by Plaintiffs. In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from Wollersheim are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsels education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. ( Id. ) Plaintiffs argued in the initial motion that they met all of these factors. First, Plaintiffs argue that large amounts of money were involved in this litigation because of Ahangs cross-complaint for $7 million and the fact that the original settlement agreement divided the parties assets that were valued in excess of $20 million. Next, for the second factor, Plaintiffs argue that the nature of this case was an emotional case between two ex-spouses and business partners with significant assets at issue, and Ahang had been determined by the Court to have engaged in fraud. For the third factor, Plaintiffs argued that this was a complex case that required an experienced legal team to handle it, and Beattys team were the logical ones to handle it because Beatty had handled the cases that led to the settlement agreement. For the fourth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had to devote significant attention to this case. For the fifth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had success throughout the case in prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion and defeating the attempt to disqualify Beatty, as well as being the prevailing party for the 998 Offer. Finally, for the sixth factor, Plaintiffs argued that this case consumed considerable time and went on for two years and would have gone on much longer if Hamid had not accepted the 998 Offer. Defendants argue that the attorney fee award should be reduced as the hours billed are excessively unreasonable. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. ( Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 990-991(citing Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635).) This Court previously acknowledged in its tentative ruling the apparent excessive billing for several of Plaintiffs motions: the Anti-SLAPP Motion (160.5 hours), Opposition to Motion to Disqualify (96.5 hours), Demurrer (90.2 hours), Motion for Attorney fees re Anti-SLAPP Motion (49 hours), and Motion to Quash Summons (38.6 hours). This Court also suggested reducing the time spent on those motions by 25%. Defendants argue that they should be reduced by at least 60% because they are beyond excessive. Other specific tasks that Defendants argue were excessively billed were the 4.0 hours for a half-page notice of continuance; 12.1 hours for a subpoena with 8 document requests; 14.7 hours spent on two identical subpoenas with 6 document requests; 22.3 hours spent on 3 page ex parte application and 2 page declaration to advance a hearing date; 18.3 hours preparing for and drafting a mediation brief; and 10.3 hours on generic case analysis over 48 entries. Defendants argue that the Court should also take into account all of these minor issues in awarding the attorney fees. Defendants also argue that the at least 209.5 hours spent in relation to the Anti-SLAPP motion was beyond excessive and should be reduced by more than 25%. Defendants cite a case where the Court of Appeal affirmed a reduction in attorney fees and costs related to an Anti-SLAPP motion from $112,288.63 to just $23,000, with the Court of Appeal stating that claiming 200 hours of work & seems excessive and that such a motion should not have been such a monumental undertaking. ( Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1252.) Defendant Finally, Defendants argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration because it would be admissible because the experts declaration included descriptions of her experience as a fee expert. (See Coleman Decl., ¶¶ 3-10, 14, and 15.) The Court previously sustained Plaintiffs objections to the Coleman Declaration, but in light of Defendants arguments and Colemans supplemental declaration, the Court will consider Colemans declaration. In light of all of the foregoing, the Court believes that some reduction of the requested fees is necessary. Both the previously indicated major issues and the minor issues that Defendants have brought to the attention of the Court should be reduced. The amount that the Court will start with is $543,156 in fees actually incurred. The Court previously considered reducing certain fees by 25%. Defendants request an across the board reduction of 60%, which would be $217,262 in fees awarded. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court do an across the board reduction of 25%, since that percentage is what the Court previously found was appropriate. Based on both the major and minor issues with the billing records, the Court agrees that an across the board reduction is appropriate. The Court also finds that an across the board reduction of 25% is reasonable. That would make the fee award $407,367. The Court will award this amount. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their attorneys hourly rates are rates are reasonable. Furthermore, this was a complex class requiring a lot of motion practice, particularly where the Anti-SLAPP motion is concerned. Plaintiffs have provided proof of the amount of time spent on the case through the now-unredacted billing statements. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $407,367.00. Costs should be requested in a memorandum of costs. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV27912 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 805 WOOSTER, LLC , Plaintiff, vs. BRETT HYMAN , et al ., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV27912 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. of The Law Office of Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. (Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendant Brett Hyman. While Counsel has provided sufficient reason for withdrawal, Items 5, 6, and 7 of the proposed order (Form MC-053) are blank. If Counsel provides the Court with a revised order prior to the hearing, the Court will grant the motion.¿ Counsel is ordered to give notice of this order.¿ DATED: July 26, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court