Preview
Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 02/13/2020 09:58 AM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by V. Rico,Deputy Clerk
20CHCV00106
Assigned for all purposes to: Chatsworth Courthouse, Judicial Officer: Melvin Sandvig
1
MACAULEY EKPENISI, ESQ. {SBN 296326)
2 OCEANBRIDGE LAW FIRM
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
14640 VICTORY BLVD., SUITE 202
VAN NUYS, CALIFORNIA 91411
TEL: (818) 668-3359
FAX: (818) 561-3660
Attorney for Plaintiffs: Desire Avalos. Et Al
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
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Desire Avalos, Arnold Ortiz, Lisa ) CASE NO:
Zavala, Amber Sanchez )
) COMPLAINT AGAINST LANDLORD
) BASED ON:
)
)
Plaintiffs, ) 1. NEGLIGENCE [Civ. Code {I'1714(a),
vs 2. BREACH OF WARRANTY OF
) HABITABILITY;
) 3. BREACH OF COVENANT OF
16
Jon Settle, and Does 1 QUIET ENJOYMENT;
Inclusive, 4. PREMISES LIABILITY
) {NEGI,IGENCE PER SE);
18 ) 5. NUISANCE;
Defendants
10 6. CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION;
)
7. INTENTINAL INFLICTION OF
20 ) EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
)
21 )
)
22 )
) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
23
INTRODUCTION
25 At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs, Desire Avalos, Arnold Ortiz, Lisa Zavala
26 and Amber Sanchez were/are tenant pursuant to written or oral rental Agreements for
27 unit located at 9735 Hayvenhurst Ave Northridge, County of Los Angeles, State of
California 91343 (hereinafter "the building,*'the premises," Subject property" or "the
COMPLAINT FOR DA.'vCAG ES
apartment") for more than four years. Tenant-Plaintiff occupied the premises at all
relevant times. herein. Tenant-Plaintiff seek damages for injuries they sustained as a
result of the uninhabitable conditions existing at the building.
Defendant, Jon Settle is the owner, agent and manager of 9735 Hayvenhurst Ave
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Northridge, County of Los Angeles, State of California 91343. Tenant-Plaintiff suffered
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from Defendants'eglect of the propertythat included defective water pipes,
deteriorating, damaged, warped flooring, peeling paint on walls and ceilings, mold /black
substance on bathroom walls and ceilings, missing closet and bedroom doors, lack of
ventilation throughout the unit, inoperable smoke detectors, defective electrical wiring,
and lack of running hot water and cockroach infestation. Defendants consistently failed
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and refused to make necessary repairs. Faulty plumbing, water leaks caused the
ll property to become infested with mold, black substance and other airborne toxins.
Tenant-Plaintiffs has suffered, and continue to suffer, from contamination and exposure
to the microbial organisms. Infestation of cockroaches throughout the apartment unit.
The County of I,os Angeles Department of Public Health, Environmental Health
and Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department issued various orders
requiring Defendants to make much-needed repairs, but these orders went unheeded,
l7 Defendants often would take as long as a year to make repairs the City required, if at
all, and t,hen the repairs made would be inadequately.
Tenant-Plaintiffs now seek damages for the injuries caused by the
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Defendants'egligence
and mismanagement of the property.
PARTIES
A. Tenant-Plaintiffs
1. At all relevant time, Plaintiffs'esire Avalos, Arnold Ortiz resided at 9735
23 Hayvenhurst Ave Northridge, Unit 1 of the subject property from August 2018 to
24 11/13/2019.
25 2. At all relevant time, Plaintiffs'isa Zavala, Amber Sanchez, was resided at 9735
Hayvenhurst Ave Northridge, L'nit 1 of the subject property from 2005 to present.
27
B. Defendants
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
3. Jon Settle is and has been the owner, co-owner, trustee, or operator of the
2 building, have exercised real or apparent authority regarding the subject
property, or have been employee or agent of the owner, and have been responsible
for maintaining the building in a lawful, habitable condition.
Tenant-Plaintiffs're ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Defendant
sued herein as DOES 1 through 00, inclusive, and therefore, sue these
Defendants by such fictitious names and capacities. Tenants-Plaintiff will amend
this (:omplaint to allege their true identities when ascertained. Tenant-Plaintiffs
is informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each fictitiously- named
Defendant is responsible in some manner for the acts and failures to act herein
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alleged, and that Tenant-Plaintiffs injuries as herein alleged were legally caused
by the conduct of each Defendants.
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5 Tenants- Plaintiffs're informed and based upon such information believe that
13 each of the DEFENDANTS named herein were, at all times relevant to this action,
the agents, employees, representing partners, alter ego or joint venture of the
remaining DEFENDANTS and was acting within the course and scope of that
relationship.
17 6. Tenants-Plaintiffs're further informed and believe and thereon allege, that each
18 of the DEFENDANTS herein gave consent to, ratified, and authorized the acts
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alleged herein to each of the remaining DEFENDANTS.
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7. Tenants-Plaintiffs're informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times
hereto mentioned, unless hereafter specifically otherwise alleged, the
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DEFENDANTS and their agents and servants employed each of the remaining
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DEFENDANTS and were at all timesrelevant hereto acting within the course and
scope of their authority as such agents, servants and employees and with the
permission and consent of each of the remaining DEFENDANTS, or in the
'j 5
alternative, acted individually for their personal advantage and conspired to do
the acts alleged herein, and that Tenants-Plaintiffs damages were proximately
27 caused by said DEFENDANTS.
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
8. Tenants-Plaintiffs're informed and believe, and thereon allege, that there exists,
2 and at all times herein mentioned there existed, a unity of interest between all
3 DEFENDANTS such that any individuality. and separateness between each of
said DEFENDANTS, and each of the remaining of said DEFENDANTS, has
ceased.
ALLEGATIONS
During Tenant-Plaintiffs'enancy at the building and while Defendant owned
and operated it, the building was unsafe, unsanitary, unhealthy, uninhabitable,
untenable in a serious state of disrepair and in gross violation of building health
and safety laws. Relevant laws that Defendant violated by renting the premises
10
in this condition included, among others, the habitability laws and standards
contained in the California Civil Code, California Health and Safety Code, and
Los Angeles Public Health Code. A description of long-term problems that existed
in the building and their effects on the Tenant-Plaintiff follows:
Mold Infestation:
10. On or about August, 2018: Plaintiffs'ESIRE AVALOS, ARNOLDS ORTIZ in
17 unit 1 become increasingly aware of numerous and substantial defective and
dangerous conditions of the premises, including: inadequate plumbing, water
leaks, buckling, warped flooring, peeling, cracked paint on the walls and ceiling;
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as a result of water leaks and the abundant growth of fungi and mold on the walls,
carpet and ceiling.
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11. On or about FEBRUARY 30-', 2016; Plaintiffs LISA ZAVALA, AMBER
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SANCHEZ, in unit 1 become increasingly aware of numerous and substantial
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defective and dangerous conditions of the premises, including: inadequate
plumbing, water leaks, buckling, warped flooring, peeling, cracked paint on the
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walls and ceiling; as a result of water leaks and the abundant growth of fungi and
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mold on the walls, carpet and ceiling.
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2B
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
12. In spite of Tenant-Plaintiffs'ontinuous complaints, the Defendant have failed to
2 make any repairs to the unit. The water stains on Tenant-Plaintiffs ceilings and
3 wall were painted over, but the leakage was not repaired. Nevertheless,
Defendant continued to represent to Tenants-Plaintiff that fungi was harmless
and could be cleaned with chlorine bleach.
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Faulty Plumbing:
13. Tenants-Plaintiffs'lumbing problems included, leaks under sinks in bathroom
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and kitchen, rusty pipes, blackened water that backed up into the sinks and tubs;
toilets that backed up or leaked from their bases; and leaking faucets and drains.
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14. The faucets and drains leaked profusely. 1Vater coming from the faucets is always
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dirty-contaminated, and unfit for drinking. Toilets backed up and did not flush
properly.
Lack of%'ater Service:
15. Tenant-Plaintiffs experienced interruptions of hot water services that lasted for
hours, days and frequently and without warning Tenant-Plaintiff would have no
running water in her unit because of rusty and damaged plumbing pipes and
16 repairs will take Defendant up to days, weeks or months to effect, if any and
17 negligently done.
Lack of Electricity and Heat:
16. Tenant-Plaintiffs experienced interruptions of electricity service that lasted for
hours, days, weeks and months, frequently and without warning. Tenant-Plaintiff
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has had no heat for several months and had made extended complaints and
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requested for repair of the air conditioner or change the heating system, but
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Defendants had continued to neglect their requests and refused to make the
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required repairs. If repairs are carried out at all, it will be negligently or
inadequately done, and the lack of heat problem continues without abatement.
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Damages and Dangerous Flooring:
17. Tenant-Plaintiffs were improperly installed and damaged flooring. The linoleum
28 in the bathroom is in a constant state of disrepair due to the water intrusion and
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1 microbial growth. The carpeting is malodorous and filthy. It is mildewed due to
2 the damp conditions in the apartment.
3 Water Damaged Walls and Ceilings:
18. Walls and ceilings of the building are in poor condition because of the leaking
plumbing. The leaking caused mold to form on the walls and ceilings and caused
them to be malodorous, discolored and to crack.
7
Rodent and Cockroach Infestation:
19. Tenant-Plaintiffs endure a persistent and severe infestation of bedbugs,
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mosquitoes, mites, fleas, rodents, and cockroaches occupy the building and appear
on the floors, kitchen cabinets, counters and tables of the apartment, and under
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or behind the refrigerator and stove. Besides observing the rodents and
cockroaches directly, Tenant-Plaintiffs has found evidence of the infestation in the
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form of gnawed, partially eaten foodstuffs, and rodent and roach droppings
present on the floors, tables and stove. In addition to contaminating Tenant-
Plaintiffs food, the rodents and roaches chewed through, urinated and defecated
on Tenant-Plaintiffs clothing's and beddings. Tenant-Plaintiff has discarded food,
clothing and bedding that were contaminated by the rodents and roaches.
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Physical Injury, Emotional Distress and Other Injuries:
20. Tenant-Plaintiffs'uffered from frequent colds, respiratory infections, stomach
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ailments, headaches, memory loss, rashes, ear infections and throat infections
caused by conditions at the property. Because of poor conditions of the property,
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safety risks, injuries sustained, hardships endured, Tenant-Plaintiff experienced
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considerable emotional distress. Tenant-Plaintiffs suffered from depression,
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feelings of hopelessness, insomnia and inability to concentrate at school or work.
In addition, the poor condition of the apartment caused Tenant-Plaintiffs to
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experience nausea. Tenant-Plaintiffs also lost much or nearly all of their personal
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possessions when the mold contaminated their personal property.
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1 THE PROPERTY
21. In the four (4) years prior to filing of this action, the Property was untenantable
3 as a result of the failure of Defendants, and each of them, to repair dilapidations
of the Property which have rendered it untenantable pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1941.1 and substandard pursuant to Health and Safety Code
Section 17920.3, in violation of numerous civil and criminal provisions of both
state and local law.
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22. The Property has substantially lacked any or all the following affirmative
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standard characteristics:
Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior wall,
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including broken windows;
Plumbing or gas facilities that conformed to applicable law in effect at the
time of installation, maintained in good working order;
Awater supply system that is under the control of the landlord that
produces hot and cold running water which is furnished to appropriate fixtures;
15 Heating facilities that conformed to applicable law at the time of
installation, maintained in good working order;
17 Electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment that conformed to
applicable
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law at the time of installation, maintained in good working order
Areas under the control of the landlord, kept in every part clean, sanitary,
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and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin;
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and/or
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Floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.
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23. Further, Defendants failed to abate, correct and/or repair any or all of the
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following conditions at the Property that have existed and/or continue to exist at
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the Property, to the extent that have endangered and/or continue to endanger the
life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the
27 Property:
28 Inadequate sanitation, including. but not limited to, the following:
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Improper water closet, lavatory, or bathtub or shower in dwelling units;
Lack of, or improper kitchen sink and leaky ceiling inside kitchen due to
rain;
Lack of hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in dwelling units;
Lack of adequate heating;
Lack of or improper operation of required ventilating equipment;
Dampness of habitable rooms;
Infestation of insects, cockroaches, vermin, or rodents; and/or
General dilapidation or improper maintenance;
Structural hazards including, but not limited to, the following:
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Defective or deteriorated flooring or floor supports; and/or
Members of ceilings, roofs, ceilings and roof supports, or other horizontal.
24. Within several months prior to the filing of this Complaint, the Property was
13 subject to repeated inspections by the County of Los Angeles - Environmental
Health Department. that have resulted in citation of the foregoing untenantable
and substandard conditions, all of which are violations of the Los Angeles
16 Municipal Code and the California Health and Safety Code. Tenant- Plaintiff is
17 however by this complaint seeking damages for the uninhabitable conditions of
the subject property within the last three years.
25 ~ Numerous notices have been issued to the Defendant. by public officers or
employees to abate or repair said condition and violations at the Property, yet
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Defendants failed to abate or repair said conditions within 35 days after issuances
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of said notices and such failure to abate or repair was without good cause.
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26. Defendants unlawfully demanded rent, collected rent, issued a notice of a rent
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increased and/or issued a three-day notice to pay rent or quit for the Property
following issuance of such notices to abate or repair said conditions and violations
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at the Property and after Defendants failed to abate or repair said conditions
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within 3o days after issuance of said notices, without a good cause.
27
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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
27. Tenant-Plaintiff complained about said conditions at the Property, verbally
2 and/or in writing to Defendants, but Defendants failed and refused to correct such
3 conditions in a timely manner. if at all.
28. The uninhabitable and substandard conditions alleged herein are a consequence
of Defendant's pattern and practice of failing to implement basic preventative
maintenance, timely repair work, inspection and fumigation efforts. Defendants,
as owners and managers of the Property, knew or should have known that these
failures would cause untenantable and substandard conditions.
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29. Defendants also unlawfully demanded, accepted or retained rent from Tenants-
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Plaintiffs'n excess of the maximum adjusted rent permitted by Los Angeles
Municipal Code Chapter XV (Rent Stabilization Ordinance).
30. Defendants also substantially and intentionally entered Tenant-Plaintiffs'nit
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Desires Avalos, Arnolds Ortiz on or about. 11/13/2019 without providing advance
written notice to Tenant%Plaintiff as required by Civil Code 1954 and/or have
entered Tenant.-Plaintiff unit for reasons other than those permitted by Civil Code
1954. Such entries were not justified by emergency conditions, or any other reason
permitted by law.
31. Also, Defendants wrongfully and intentionally interfered with plaintiffs
18 possessory interests in the above-described property and constructively evicted
19 plaintiffs Desire Avalos, Arnold Ortiz on 11/13/2019, by undertaking the following
acts: illegally converting the subject unit, which was formally garage and storage,
into a living area and permitted the subject, property to be overrun by roaches and
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mold and collected full rent from plaintiffs.
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32. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant demanded and or collected
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from Tenant-Plaintiffs the rent as it became due under the terms of the various
rental agreements.
25
33. As a proximate result of the dwelling's untenability and of the nuisance as alleged
in this complaint, Tenants-Plaintiffs suffered discomfort and annoyance, all to
27 their general damage in the sum to be proved at trial.
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COMPLAI'tfT FOR DAMAGES
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Negligent Maintenance of Premises
34. Tenant-Plaintiffs'ncorporate all the preceding facts against the
DEFENDANTS and incorporates them as though fully set forth herein.
35. At all times mentioned in this Complaints, Defendants and each of them,
owned, operated, maintained, and controlled that "rental unit".
30. The Defendant owners and managers of the subject property owed the
Plaintiffs both a statutory and contractual duty to inspect Plaintiffs
apartment as described above and make it safe from dangerous and/or
defective conditions. Defendants also had a duty to maintain the property
10
and make it habitable for the Plaintiff who rent paying tenant of the
Defendants.
37, Defendants failed to exercise ordinary care in the management of the above-
13 mentioned rental unit by failing to make necessary repairs in the rental
unit. including but not limited to repairs to the mold, warped flooring,
plumbing leaks, missing doors, deteriorating walLs and ceilings and cure
16 cockroach infestations.
38. Under the provisions of Civil Code Section 1941, Defendants were required
to put the premises in a condition fit for human occupation before renting it
and to repair all subsequent dilapidation, other than those caused by the
tenant's want of ordinary care, that rendered the premises untenantable.
39. At the time Defendants rented the premises to Plaintiff, Defendant so
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negligently owned, maintained, and repaired the premises as to cause them
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to be unfit for human occupation in that they violated Health and Safety
23
Code Section 17920.3, the premises substantially failed to comply with those
applicable building and housing code standards that materially affect the
25
health and safety of the tenants.
26
40. Specifically, as a proximate result of Defendants'egligence as alleged
27 above, the premises, at the time Plaintiff took possession, was uninhabitable
28 and unfit for human occupation in that, among other things was infested
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
with roaches, inadequate plumbing, and mold. None of these conditions
were known to Plaintiff at the time Plaintiff moved into the premises.
41. As a proximate result of Defendant.'s negligence and their failure to repair
the defective and dangerous conditions or to have them repaired within a
reasonable time or at all, as alleged above, Tenants-Plaintiff suffered serious
emotional and physical distress, all to Tenant-Plaintiffs damage in an
amount to be determined at trial, but which amount is within the
jurisdiction of this court.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
10
Breach of the Warranty of Habitability
42. Tenant-Plaintiffs'ncorporate all the preceding facts against all the
DEFENDANTS and incorporates them as though fully set forth herein.
13 43. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Tenant-Plaintiffs was a rent paying
tenant of Defendants in the rental unit herein mentioned.
44. Civil Code $ 1941.1 mandatee that landlords provide habitable and tenantable
dwelling to tenant during the pendency of their leasehold.
45. Tenant-Plaintiffs'epeatedly notified Defendant by writing, orally and
otherwise of the defective and dangerous conditions described in this
1!3
complaint and requested that Defendants have them repaired, but
Defendants failed andtor refused to repair them, within a reasonable time.
46. DEFENDANTS knew, or reasonablv should have known, that Tenant
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Plaintiff would suffer damages as a result of this breach. Tenant-Plaintiff has
22
been damaged by DEFENDAiNTS'onduct and is entitled to damages and
23
costs in an amount to be proven at, trial.
47. As a direct and proximate result. of DEFENDANTS'reach of the warranty of
25
habitability and covenant of quiet, enjoyment, the value of the leasehold held
by Tenant-Plaintiff was diminished. Consequently, Tenant-Plaintiff is
27
damaged in the amount equal to the rental payment due and paid during
28 Tenant-Plaintiff lease holds, or in an amount to be proven at trial.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
48. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANTS'onduct, Tenant-Plaintiff
has suffered, and will continue to suffer, illness, mental stress, emotional
distress, discomfort., annoyance, anxiety, loss in the value of their leasehold,
property damage, all to Tenant-Plaintiff damage in an amount to be
determined at trial, but which amount is within the jurisdiction of this court.
49. DEFENDANTS'onduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has
been negligent, thereby entitling Tenants-Plaintiff to damages in an amount
to be determined at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
10
Breach of the Cooenant of Quiet Enjoyment
50. Tenant,-Plaintiffs'ncorporate all of the preceding facts against all of the
DEFENDANTS and incorporates them as though fully set forth herein.
51. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Tenant-Plaintiff was a rent paying
tenant of Defendants in the rental unit herein mentioned.
15 52. Civil Code Q 1927 and 1941.1 mandate that landlords allow tenant to the
possession and quiet enjoyment. of her unit during the pendency of their
17 leasehold.
58. As such, impliedly it is unlawful for DEFENDANTS to interfere with Tenant-
Plaintiff quiet enjoyment of the premises during the terms of Tenant-
Plaintiff's tenancy in that Defendant fraudulently obtained Tenant-Plaintiff
20
personal information and gave them to a third party without Tenant-Plaintiff
21
permission. Also, Defendants illegally increase Tenant-Plaintiff rent in
22
violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter XV (Rent Stabilization
23
Ordinance).
54. DEFENDANTS had a duty to abide by the implied covenant of quiet
25
enjoyment. DEFENDANTS breached this duty and the implied warranty of
26
quiet enjoyment by their conduct as described above, including, but not
27 limited to, failing to reasonably maintain the rental unit leased to Tenant-
28
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
Plaintiff. Also, Defendants illegally increase Tenant-Plaintiff rent in violation
of Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter XV (Rent Stabilization Ordinance).
55. DEFENDANTS knew, or reasonably should have known, that Tenant-
Plaintiff would suffer damages as a result of this breach. Tenant-Plaintiff has
been damaged by DEFENDANTS'onduct and are entitled to damages and
costs in an amount to be proven at trial.
56. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANTS'reach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment, the value of the leasehold held by Tenant-Plaintiff was
diminished. Consequently, Tenant-Plaintiffs was damaged in the amount
equal to the rental payment due and paid during Tenant,-Plaintiff leaseholds,
10
or in an amount to be proven at trial.
57. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANTS'onduct, Tenant-Plaintiff
12
has suffered, and will continue to suffer, illness, mental stress, emotional
distress, discomfort, annoyance, anxiety, loss in the value of his leasehold,
property damage, all to Tenant-Plaintiff damages in an amount to be
determined at trial, but which amount is within the jurisdiction of this court.
58. DEFENDANTS'onduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment have
17 been negligent., malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Tenant-Plaintiff
to damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
20
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Premises Liability (Negligence Per Se)
21
59. Tenant-Plaintiff incorporate herein by reference all the allegations set forth
22
in paragraphs 1 through 58, inclusive in their entirety as if fully set forth
23
herein and with the same effect.
60. California Civil Code Sections 1927 and. 1941.1 mandate that every landlord
25
allow each and every Tenant to have the possession and quiet enjoyment of
26
their units during the periods of the Tenant's leasehold or tenancy. As such,
27 it is unlawful for a landlord (in this case, Defendants), to interfere with the
2B tenant's (in this case, Plaintiff), and rented dwelling unit that lacks any of the
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
standards enumerated in California Civil Code section 1941.1 and California
Health & Safetv Code sections 17920.3 and 17920.10, et seq.
61. Defendants had a duty to abide by the afore-stated statutory requirement(s)
that they allow Plaintiff a quiet enjoyment of their respective rented
apartment(s) and the subject premises by providing Plaintiff an apartment
unit that is free of defective conditions so as to make the Plaintiffs rented
apartment(s) habitable.
62. Defendants breached this statutory duty by their conduct as described herein
in paragraph 9 through 32 including but not limited to, failing to correct the
substandard conditions and the uninhabitable conditions within Plaintiffs
10
apartment(s) and failing to maintain the premises in habitable condition by
allowing Plaintiffs apartment. to be infested with roaches, insects, mold
12
infestations, damaged, warped floors and buckled, deteriorated walls/ceilings;
13
by providing Plaintiff with an apartment. that had defective electrical wiring,
defective plumbing, defective/non-operable heating appliances and by
refusing to promptly make repairs of all defective conditions which existed in
16 Plaintiffs respective apartment(s), all of which grossly diminished the value
of the Plaintiffs apartment unit. below the rent amount.
63. Under the above California premises liability laws, property owners must
keep property reasonably safe and warn people who come onto their property
20
about possible dangers. The Defendants'ctions were in direct violation of the
California Statutes and/or Los Angeles City building codes, premises liability
21
laws and/or reasonable and customary practices, and, therefore,
22 Defendants'ctions
constitute negligence per se.
23
64. The California Statutes and/or Los Angeles City Building Code provisions and
premises liability laws at issue were enacted to protect the general public and
25
tenants while in structures in the State of California, particularly Civil Code
26
Sections 1941.1, 3479, Code of Civil Procedure Section 731 and Health and
27
Safety Code Section 17920.3 as they relate to plaintiff.
28
COMPLAIVT FOR DAMAGES
65. Plaintiff is members of the general public or tenants and are, therefore, in the
class of persons intended to be protected by the California Statutes and/or Los
Angeles City Building Code provisions and premises liability laws and/or
reasonable and customary construction practices.
66. The injuries sustained by Plaintiff is of the type of injuries the California
Statutes and/or Los Angeles City building code provisions and premises
liability laws and/or reasonable and customary construction practices were
established to protect against.
8
67. Defendants, and DOES 1 through 50, as the owners and operators of the
9
premises as hereinabove alleged, were negligent in that, among other things,
tn
they failed to exercise due care in the ownership, construction, operation, and
maintenance of the premises to ensure that visitors and residents were not
subject to any unreasonable risk of harm when on the premises.
68. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, recklessness,
and unlawfulness of defendants, and each of them, as aforesaid, Plaintiff
suffered from severe injuries and emotional damages, all to Plaintiffs
damages in a sum within the jurisdiction of this court and to be shown
according to proof.
69. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been required to employ the services
of hospitals, physicians. surgeons, nurses and other professional services, and
20
Plaintiff has been compelled to incur expenses for ambulance service,
medicines, x-rays, and other medical supplies and services. Plaintiff is
21
informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that further services of said
22
nature will be required by Plaintiff in an amount to be shown according to
23
proof.
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COMPLAINT FOR IIAMACES
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Maintenance of Xuisance
70. Tenant-Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate by reference every allegation
contained in the Preceding paragraphs of this complaint as though fully set
forth herein.
71. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Tenant-Plaintiff was paying tenant
of Defendants in the rental unit. herein mentioned.
72. Tenant-Plaintiff repeatedly notified Defendants, orally and in writing of the
alleged defective and dangerous conditions described in this complaint and
requested that Defendants have them repaired, but Defendants failed and/or
1O
refused to repair them at all or within a reasonable time,
73. The defective and dangerous conditions of the unit as alleged in this
12
Complaint constituted a nuisance within the meaning of Civil Code Section
3479 and Code of Civil Procedure Section 731 in that they deprived Plaintiff
of the safe, healthy, and comfortable use of the premises.
15 74. The defective and dangerous conditions of the premises as alleged in this
complaint., unreasonably and substantially interfered with the Tenant-
17 Plaintiff use and enjoyment of the rented unit herein.
75. In maint.sining the nuisance, Defendants acted with full knowledge of the
consequences thereof and of the damages being caused to Plaintiff. Despite
20
this knowledge, Defendants failed to abate the nuisance by repairing the
defective and dangerous conditions of the unit or causing them to be repaired.
21
Defendant's failure to act was both oppressive and malicious within the
22
meaning of Civil Code Section 3294 in that it's subjected Plaintiff to cruel and
23
unjust hardship in willful and conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights and
safety, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive damages.
25
76. Defendants'ailure to put the unit into a condition fit for human occupation
at the time of renting it to Plaintiff and their failure to repair the defective
27
and dangerous conditions or to have them repaired within a reasonable time
28 after Plaintiff notified them or at all, as alleged above, were oppressive and
COMPLAINT FOR DAMACES
malicious within the meaning of Civil Code Section 3294 in that they
subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in willful and conscious
disregard of Plaintiffs rights and safety, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an
award of punitive damages.
77. As a proximate result of Defendants'aintenance of the nuisance, Plaintiff
suffered discomfort and annoyance, all to plaintiffs damages within the
jurisdiction of this court.
78. As a further proximate result of Defendants'aintenance of the nuisance,
Plaintiff suffered property damage and economic loss including, but not
limited to medical cost for insomnia, severe cold, sicknesses, soaked beds,
10
clothing, decaying or rotten foods and food stuffs all to Plaintiffs further
damages in the amount within the jurisdiction of this court.
12
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiffs Desire Avalos, Arnold Ortiz cause of action for
15 Constructive Eviction against defendants.
79. Plaintiff incorporate herein by reference all the allegations set forth in
17 paragraphs 1 through 78, inclusive in their entirety as if fully set forth herein
and with the same effoct.
18
8D. As alleged in this complaints, defendants continued to maintain and failed or
20
refused to abate nuisance in that, defendant illegally converted a portion of
subject property into an illegal unit and permitted the subject property to be
21
overrun by roaches and mold and collected full rent from plaintiff.
22
81. The defective and dangerous conditions of the premises as alleged in this
23
complaint constituted a nuisance within the meaning of Civil Code Section
3479, Code of Civil Procedure Section 731 and they deprived Plaintiff of the
25
safe, healthy, and comfortable use of the premises.
26
82. Defendants also substantially and intentionally entered Tenant-Plaintiffs unit
27
without providing advance written notice to Tenant-Plaintiff as required by
28 Civil Code 1954 and/or have entered Tenants-Plaintiff unit for reasons other
17
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
than those permitted by Civil Code 19o4. Such entries were not justified by
emergency conditions, or any other reason permitted by law.
83. Plaintiff has duly performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required
to be performed by her under the lease in accordance with its term and
conditions, except for those acts that have been prevented, delayed, or excused
by acts or omissions of defendants.
84. Defendants wrongfully interfered with plaintiffs possessory interests in the
above-described property and constructively evicted plaintiffs Desire Avalos,
Arnold Ortiz on 11/13/2019 .by undertaking the following acts: illegally
converting the subject unit, which was formally garage and storage, into a
living area and perinitted the subject property to be overrun by roaches and
mold and collected full rent from plaintiffs.
85. On or about July 25, 2019, in violation of Los Angeles Municipal Codes,
Defendants also interfered with Plaintiffs right to quite enjoyment of the
subject property and constructively evicted plaintiff from her unit when
defendants would fail and refuse to repair the noted defects in the unit at all
or within a reasonable time.
17 86. The total amount of rent payable under the terms of the lease from August
11, 2018 to 11/13/2019 is the sum of $ 13,200.00. The rental value of the lease
for the same period is $ 13,200.00 at $ 1,100.00 per month.
87. As a proximate result of Defendant's maintenance of nuisance and
20
Defendants'onstructive eviction of Plaintiff from the premises, Plaintiff will
21
sustain damages in the sum approximating $ 13,200.00.
22
88. As a further proximate result of Defendants'aintenance of nuisance and
23
Defendant's constructive eviction, Plaintiff will suffer property damage and
economic loss including, but not limited to, relocation fees to their further
25
damage in the sum of about $ 20,500 pursuant to s'ection 163.02 of Los Angeles
Municipal Code and Health and Safety Code Section 17975.
27 89. Defendants'onstructive eviction of plaintiff from the premises was
2B oppressive and malicious within the meaning of Civil Code Section 3294 in
COMPLAIVT FOR DAMAGES
that it subjected plaintiff to unreasonable disturbance, cruel and unjust
hardship in willful and conscious disregard of plaintiffs rights and safety of
the plaintiff, thereby entitling plaintiff to an award of punitive damages.
SEUENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentionetl In fliction of Seuere Emotional Distress
90. Tenant. -Plaintiffs incorporates all of the allegations in the preceding
paragraphs and by this reference incorporates said allegations as part of this
CAUSE OF ACTION.
91. As a result of the repeated refusal to heed Plaintiff demand to make repairs
10
as described above. Defendants and each of them knew or should have known
of Tenant-Plaintiffs susceptibility to emotional distress because Defendants
12
collected full rent as at when due in the face of the defective conditions in the
13 subject property.
92. Defendants wrongfully and intentionally interfered with plaintiffs possessory
15 interests in the above-described property and constructively evicted plaintiffs
16 Desire Avalos, Arnold Ortiz on 11/13/2019,by undertaking the following acts:
17 illegally converting the subject unit, which was formally garage and storage,
into a living area and permitted the subject property to be overrun by roaches
and mold and collected full rent from plaintiffs.
98. The above conduct of Defendants and each of them described in the foregoing
20
CAUSES OF ACTION were intended to cause Tenant-Plaintiffs emotional
21
distress, because Defendants'eceived several oral and written notices from
Plaintiffs to make repairs but Defendants would ignore the notice and ask
Plaintiffs to vacate the premises. Even the county and city authorities
inspected and notified Defendants to make repairs, Defendants ignored the
order to comply and failed to make need repairs.
94. Defendants'nowledge that the subject property was in such a substandard
27 and defective condition and refuses to make repairs after several notices were
28
la
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1 intentional, malicious and done for the purpose of causing Tenant-Plaintiff to
2 suffer humiliation, mental anguish, depression and physical injuries.
95. Defendants'onduct was done with knowledge that Tenant-Plaintiffs mental
and physical distress would thereby increase and was done with a wanton and
reckless disregard of the consequences to Tenant-Plaintiffs.
96. Defendants conducts as described more specifically from paragraphs 9 to 33
above were extreme outrageous and offensive to the sense of an ordinary
person.
97. As proximate result of the acts, Tenant-Plaintiffs was required to and did
employ the services of physicians and surgeons to examine, treat and care for
10
them, and incurred medical expenses in an amount, to be proven at trial.
Tenant-Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that they will
12
incur some additional medical expenses the exact amount of which is
unknown.
14 98, The aforementioned acts of Defendants were willful, wanton, malicious, and
15 oppressive, and justify the awarding of exemplary and punitive damages to be
16 determined at trial.
17
PRAYER FOR RELIEFS
WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFFS'rays for judgment against DEFENDANTS,
Related Content
in Los Angeles County
Ruling
YOUNG CHOW DAI VS PAUL P. CHENG & ASSOCIATES, ET AL.
Jul 30, 2024 |
Echo Dawn Ryan |
18STCV10177
Case Number:
18STCV10177
Hearing Date:
July 30, 2024
Dept:
26
Dai v. Paul P. Cheng & Associates, et al.
MOTION FOR LEAVE
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff Young Chow Dais Motion for Leave is DENIED.
ANALYSIS:
On December 31, 2018, Plaintiff Young Chow Dai (Plaintiff) filed the instant action against Defendants Paul P. Cheng & Associates and Marsha S. Mao. Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on October 4, 2019 against Defendants Paul P. Cheng (Defendant Cheng), Marsha S. Mao (Defendant Mao), and Law Offices of Paul P. Cheng & Associates (Defendant Cheng & Associates). The SAC, which arises from alleged wrongful actions in connection with a settlement agreement, alleges causes of action for: (1) accounting; and (2) fraud.
On February 7, 2023, Defendant Cheng filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ). On March 1, 2023, Defendant Cheng filed a motion to deem the truth of the matters in Defendants Requests for Admission, Set One, served on Plaintiff, admitted and for monetary sanctions. On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer venue to the Santa Monica Courthouse.
On July 24, 2023, after hearing and oral argument, the Court: (1) granted the MSJ filed by Defendant Cheng; (2) granted Defendant Chengs motion to deem the truth of the matters in Defendants Requests for Admission, Set One, as admitted and awarded Defendant monetary sanctions; and (3) denied Plaintiffs motion to transfer and change venue. (Minute Order, 07/24/23.) On August 4, 2023, Defendant Cheng filed and served Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order as to the Courts July 24, 2023 order.
On August 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Enter a New and Different Judgment
. On August 8, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant Cheng and against Plaintiff. The Courts order for entry of summary judgment provides that Plaintiffs case against Defendant Paul P. Cheng is therefore dismissed with prejudice. (Minute Order, 08/08/23, p. 3:1-4.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment and Enter a New and Different Judgment on August 11, 2023. Plaintiff filed similar motions to vacate on August 25, 2023 and September 29, 2023.
In a ruling considering all three Motions to Vacate, the Court denied the request to vacate the judgment on January 17, 2024. (Minute Order, 01/17/24.) Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 23, 2024. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on March 26, 2024. (Minute Order, 03/26/24.) On April 16, 2024, the Court granted Defendants Motion to Deem Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant. (Minute Order, 04/16/24.) Plaintiff sought to challenge that ruling via a motion in Department 1, which was denied on June 27, 2024. (Minute Order, 06/27/24.)
The instant Motion for Leave was filed by Plaintiff on May 2, 2024. The Motion was originally set for hearing on July 3, 2024 and then continued to July 30, 2024. Defendant filed an opposition on July 24, 2024.
The instant Motion does not explain what relief is sought or on what basis.
The memorandum must contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(b).) Indeed, Plaintiffs failure to provide a memorandum as required by the Rule is an admission that the [request] is without merit and cause for its denial. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(a), (b);
In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 976.) As the Court cannot discern what relief Plaintiff seeks or the legal basis for any relief, the Motion for Leave is denied.
Conclusion
Plaintiff Young Chow Dais Motion for Leave is DENIED.
Court clerk to give notice.
Ruling
THE MANIJEH SHAMS TRUST, ET AL. VS FARIBA JAVAHERPOUR
Jul 26, 2024 |
22BBCV00226
Case Number:
22BBCV00226
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT A
TENTATIVE RULING
JANUARY 25, 2024
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 22BBCV00226
MP:
THE MANIJUE SHAMS TRUST AND MANIJEH SHAMS (Plaintiff)
RP:
FARIBA JAVAHEROUR, ET AL (Defendant)
All parties are requested to appear either in person or via LA Court Connect to address the tentative ruling.
Brief Summary of Requested Relief
The Court has read and considered Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement, Defendants opposition, as well as Defendants Further Opposition to the Motion.
The parties entered into a settlement as set forth in Plaintiffs moving papers, which included a CCP §664.6 provision.
Defendant has declined to sign the written settlement agreement until Plaintiff amends her trust to reflect that the settlement of $60,000 will inure to the benefit of the Plaintiffs grandchildren, specifically the children of Plaintiffs deceased son, Massoud Bahmanyar.
The parties appear to be at an impasse.
Ruling on Motion to Enforce Settlement
Pursuant to CCP §664.6, a Court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement.
As such, the Court exercises its authority under CCP §664.6 and orders the following be completed within the next 30 days:
1.
Plaintiff Manijeh Shams is to create a new irrevocable trust: The Manijeh Shams Irrevocable Grandchild Trust in which she is the primary beneficiary, and the children of Massoud Bahmanyar are the contingent beneficiaries.
Manijeh Shams shall be the initial trustee, with a successor trustee to be named by Ms. Shams in the trust.
2.
The terms of the trust will include that the $60,000 settlement, as well as any earnings, may be used for the direct support of the settlor, and upon settlors death will inure to the benefit of Massoud Bahmanyars children in equal parts
per stirpes
. In the event that any grandchild predeceases the settlor, that grandchilds share shall inure to the grandchilds children
per stirpes.
In the event that a deceased grandchild has no children, the share shall be divided equally among the remaining living grandchildren.
3.
Defendant Fariba Javaherpour shall deposit the total sum of $60,000 into the newly established trust within ten days of being informed that the new irrevocable trust has been established and a bank account in the name of the new trust is set up.
4.
The Manijeh Shams Irrevocable Grandchild Trust shall be subject to Part 4, Chapter 1 of the California Probate Code, beginning at §16060 et seq., including but not limited, to §§16062 and 16063.
Upon request from any contingent beneficiary, the contingent beneficiaries shall have a right directly, or through their representative if minors, to have an accounting no more than annually.
The accounting may be informal, and the cost of the accounting shall be incurred by the trust.
Any contingent beneficiary has the right to petition the court for a formal accounting if there is a prima facie basis to believe that the informal accounting does not properly reflect the trust distributions and expenses.
5.
The individual trustee shall not be entitled to compensation for administration of the trust, nor shall any bond be required of any individual trustee.
A professional or commercial trustee shall be entitled to compensation as permitted by law.
Manijeh Shams may propose specific language to the Court if necessary, with objections and alternative language being proposed by Defendant Fariba Javaherpour.
The Court sets a Status Conference Re: Settlement Agreement compliance for August 8, 2024 at 10:00 AM.
ORDER
The Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement c
ame on for hearing on July 25, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:
THE MOTION TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS GRANTED.
PLAINTIFF TO CREATE NEW IRREVOCABLE TRUST CONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MEMORIALIZED IN THE COURTS PRIOR MINUTE ORDER.
NEW IRREVOCABLE TRUST SHALL CONTAIN THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THIS RULING.
DEFENDANT IS TO FUND THE TRUST WITHIN 10 DAYS OF BEING NOTIFIED OF THE NEW TRUSTS CREATION AND BEING PROVIDED BANKING INFORMATION IN THE NAME OF THE NEW TRUST.
STATUS CONFERENCE RE: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE IS AUGUST 8, 2024 AT 10:00 AM.
UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: July 26, 2024
_______________________________
F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Ruling
MARIA PADILLA, ET AL. VS JOSEPH HEFFESSE, ET AL.
Jul 29, 2024 |
23STCV15942
Case Number:
23STCV15942
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles Central District
Department 53
maria padilla
, et al.;
Plaintiffs
,
vs.
joseph heffesse,
as trustee of the Coldwater Canyon Trust
, et al.;
Defendants
.
Case No.:
23STCV15942
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Time:
10:00 a.m.
[tentative] Order
RE:
petition for approval of compromise of claim for minor claimant anthony jayden diaz
MOVING PARTY:
Petitioner Jeanette Oliveros
RESPONDING PARTY:
Unopposed
Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim for Minor Claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz
The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this petition.
No opposition papers were filed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff and petitioner Jeanette Oliveros (Petitioner) seeks court approval of the settlement made on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz (Minor Claimant) in this action.
The compromise of a minors disputed claim for damages is valid only after it has been approved, upon the filing of a petition, by the court.¿ (Prob. Code, § 3500.)¿ The petition must be verified by the petitioner, must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise, and must be prepared on Judicial Council form MC-350.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.)¿
Defendants Joseph Heffesse, as trustee of the Coldwater Canyon Trust, Sandra B. Sternberg Heffesse, and LA Properties Heffesse LLC have agreed to pay a total of $175,000 to settle this action, of which $5,000 will be separately allocated to Minor Claimant.
(MC-350, ¶¶ 10-11.)
Of the $5,000 allocated to Minor Claimant, $1,250 will be paid to counsel for attorneys fees and $134.35 will be paid to counsel for legal costs.
(MC-350, ¶¶ 13, 16.)
The remaining $3,615.65 will be paid or delivered to the parent of Minor Claimant, i.e., Petitioner, without bond, on the terms and under the conditions specified in Probate Code sections 3401-3402.
(MC-350, ¶ 18, subd. (b)(5); MC-350, Attachment 18b(5), Oliveros Decl., ¶¶ 1-2, 6; Prob. Code, §§ 3401, 3402.)
The court has reviewed the petition and finds the settlement to be fair and reasonable, and in the best interest of Minor Claimant.
The court further finds that the declaration of Rachel Fishenfeld is sufficient to support the request for attorneys fees in the amount of $1,250 (representing 25 percent of the $5,000 settlement).
(Fishenfeld Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 6-11; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 7.955.)
The court therefore grants Petitioners petition.
ORDER
The court grants petitioner Jeanette Oliveross petition for approval of compromise of claim on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz.
The court orders that the $3,615.65 settlement on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz may be paid to plaintiff and petitioner Jeanette Oliveros pursuant to Probate Code sections 3401 and 3402.
The court orders petitioner Jeanette Oliveros to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
July 29, 2024
_____________________________
Robert B. Broadbelt III
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
IRENE YOUNG, ET AL. VS PACIFIC PLAZA ELITE - ALHAMBRA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; AND DOES 1-20;
Jul 31, 2024 |
22STCV08879
Case Number:
22STCV08879
Hearing Date:
July 31, 2024
Dept:
20
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kevin C. Brazile
Department 20
Hearing Date:
July 31, 2024
Case Name:
Young, et al. v. Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association, et
al.
Case No.:
22STCV08879
Matter:
Motions to Compel Further Responses (4x)
Moving Party:
Plaintiffs Irene Young and Jesse Chang
Responding Party:
Defendant Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association
Notice:
OK
Ruling:
The Motion as to Requests for Production is granted in part.
The Motions as to Form Interrogatories and Request for Admission
are granted.
Moving parties to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly
encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Plaintiffs Irene Young and Jesse Chang seek to compel further responses from Defendant Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association as to their requests for production, set two, form interrogatories, set two, request for admission no. 15.
Request for Admission
Request for Admission no. 15 states, Admit that YOU have not repaired the defects that were the subject of the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTE.
Previously, Defendant responded: After a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter contained in this request, admit in part and deny in part. The Court compelled a further response because there was no specificity as to what was admitted and denied.
Defendant then served the following amended response that is the subject of the current Motion: After a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter contained in this request, to the best of Responding Partys knowledge, the Developer has completed the repairs to Plaintiffs property and therefore responds: Deny.
Plaintiffs argue that this is evasive because the request did not relate to the Developer, who is never identified in the response anyway. They also contend that it is unclear whether the phrase Plaintiffs property relates to Plaintiffs unit or the entire condominium building that was the subject of the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTE.
The Motion to Compel is granted. A further response should be provided in 10 days that (a) admits that Defendant itself did not do the repairs at issue, but (b) denies that the repairs were never done, because the developer, Pacific Plaza Investments, LLC, addressed them. This would seem to better embody a response that complies with CCP § 2033.220. The Court declines to award sanctions.
Form Interrogatories (2x)
The next Motions pertain to form interrogatory no. 17.1 as it relates to requests for admission nos. 7 and 15.
Given that the Court has required a further response for RFA no. 15, a further accompanying response should also be provided for FI no. 17.1.
With respect to request no. 7, the response for form interrogatory no. 17.1 is deficient. No facts or documents are specifically identified and no contact information is provided for Partners Community Management.
Thus, the Motions to Compel are grantedfurther responses are required within 30 days. The Court awards reduced sanctions to Plaintiffs in the amount of $750.
Requests for Production
With respect to the requests for production, Defendant contends that supplemental documents were served such that the Motion is moot. Defendant, however, never addresses its actual responses. The Motion is granted as to request nos. 1-7, 9-12, 15-22 because the non-privilege objections lack merit and Defendant should provide updated responses in which documents are identified with Bates numbers. For its privilege log, Defendant should indicate recipients and authors.
With respect to request nos. 8, 13, 14, 24, and 25, Defendant should provide a response that complies with Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.230. The Motion is denied without prejudice as to request no. 23, which seems to target predominantly privileged matters. Further responses are to be provided within 30 days. The Court awards Plaintiffs reduced sanctions in the amount of $750.
Moving parties to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ruling
FLOSSIE C PARUNGAO VS RONAL B. BIBONIA, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE THE RONALD B. BIBONIA AND WILFRED T. CO REVOCABLE TRUST DATED NOV
Jul 30, 2024 |
23PSCV02165
Case Number:
23PSCV02165
Hearing Date:
July 30, 2024
Dept:
K
Defendant Ronald B. Bibonias Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Bibonia is ordered to file an Answer within 10 days.
Wilfred T. Cos Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED in part (i.e., as to the first through fourth, sixth and seventh, and ninth causes of action). The court will inquire of the parties whether leave to amend should be granted.
Background
Plaintiff Flossie C. Parungao (Plaintiff) alleges as follows: Plaintiff and Wilfred T. Co aka Winnifredo T. Co (Co) are siblings. In June 2004, Plaintiff located and negotiated the purchase of the property located at 302 S. Loraine Ave., Glendora, California 91741 (Property) to serve as her residence. Co offered to assist Plaintiff with the purchase of the subject property. Plaintiff and Co agreed that (1) Co would co-sign the purchase financing documents and take record title to the subject property, (2) Plaintiff would provide all of the funds needed for the down payment and closing costs, (3) Plaintiff would thereafter directly pay or provide funds for payment of the loan, property taxes, insurance and other subject property related-expenses, and that (4) upon request from Plaintiff, Co would execute such documents and take such other actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the subject property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Contract). Plaintiff did all things required of her under the Contract.
In 2023, Plaintiff asked Co to sign over record title to her; Co refused. Plaintiffs ensuing investigation revealed that Co transferred the subject property into the Ronald B. Bibonia and Wilfred T. Co Revocable Trust dated November 24, 2020 (Trust).
On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Co, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust, Ronald Bibonia (Bibonia), individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust (collectively Defendants), and Does 1-50 for:
1.
Specific Performance of Oral Contract
2.
Breach of Oral Contract
3.
Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform]
4.
Intentional Misrepresentation
5.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
6.
Conversion
7.
Violation of Penal Code § 496
8.
Quiet Title
9.
Accounting
10.
Imposition of Constructive Trust
On April 26, 2024, the court sustained with leave to amend the demurrer as to the first through fourth, and sixth and seventh causes of action. It also overruled the demurrer as to fifth and eighth causes of action. On May 16, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Co, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust, Bibonia, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust (collectively Defendants), and Does 1-50 for:
1.
Specific Performance of Oral Contract
2.
Breach of Oral Contract
3.
Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform]
4.
Intentional Misrepresentation
5.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
6.
Conversion
7.
Violation of Penal Code § 496
8.
Quiet Title
9.
Accounting
10.
Imposition of Constructive Trust
A Case Management Conference is set for July 30, 2024.
Legal Standard
A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading,
inter alia
, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (
Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (
SKF Farms v. Superior Court
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. (
Semole v. Sansoucie
(1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) [A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge. (
S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen
(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].)
Discussion
Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to the first through ninth causes of action in Plaintiffs complaint, on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and are uncertain.
[1]
Request for Judicial Notice
The court rules on Defendants Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) as follows: Granted as to Exhibit A (i.e., deed of trust recorded April 11, 2007).
Merits
As to Bibonia
Bibonia contends that the demurrer should be summarily sustained as it pertains to him, on the basis that the FAC is again completely devoid of factual allegations against him. (Dem., 18:9). A review of the FAC demonstrates that Bibonia was not contractually bound based on the alleged oral contract but merely listed on the Propertys title. Plaintiffs contention that Bibonia is a beneficiary to the property is insufficient to allege his involvement in the alleged oral agreement. Nevertheless, Bibonias name on the Propertys title is sufficient to include him on the eighth cause of action for quiet title. As a result, Bibonias demurrer is sustained on this basis as to causes of action one through seven, and nine without leave to amend.
As to Co
First and Second Causes of Action (i.e., Specific Performance of Oral Contract and Breach of Oral Contract, Respectively)
[T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (
Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Plaintiff has alleged that in June 2004, she located and negotiated the purchase of the Property to serve as her residence and that [a]t the time, . . . [her brother] Co offered to assist [her] with the purchase of the Property (FAC, ¶¶ 7 and 8); that she and Co agreed that (1) Co would assist [her] by co-signing the purchase financing documents and taking record title to the Property, (2) [she] would provide all of the funds needed for the down payment and closing costs, (3) [she] would thereafter directly pay or provide funds for the payment of the loan, property taxes, insurance and other Property related expenses, and (4) upon request from [her, Co would execute such documents and take such other actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the Property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Contract) (
Id.
). Co first argues that the alleged oral contract is barred by the Statute of Frauds. (See Civil Code § 1624, subd. (a)(3) [The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the parts agent: . . . (3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein . . .]
On April 26, 2024, the court overruled the demurrer on statute of frauds grounds.
As a result, the court will not consider the Statute of Frauds argument. Co next argues that the alleged oral contract fails for lack of consideration. (See Civ. Code § 1550 [It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: 1. Parties capable of contracting; 2. Their consent; 3. A lawful object; and, 4. A sufficient cause or consideration].) Plaintiffs only response is that making substantial payments over an extended period of time constitutes consideration. (See Opposition at 14.) Plaintiff relies on
Flojo International, Inc. v. Lassleben
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 713, 719, in support of her contention. However,
Flojo
does not support her contention. In
Flojo
, a former distributor of products for a company obtained ownership of the company, extinguished the debts the company owned to the distributor, and provided the former owner royalty rights for future sale of goods. (
Id
. at 719-20.) The court reversed an order granting summary judgment and held that consideration to the companys prior owner in extinguishing debt was sufficient reason or consideration to bind the company. (
Id
. at 720.) Here, Plaintiff again fails to articulate the consideration that Co received. Her contention that other family members benefited by making the Property available as a residence for a sibling demonstrates a sibling promissory estoppel cause of action more so than an oral agreement. Moreover, it appears this alleged consideration was not alleged as part of the original oral agreement. The demurrer is sustained.
Third and Fourth Causes of Action (i.e., Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform and
Intentional Misrepresentation, Respectively)
The essential allegations of an action for fraud are a misrepresentation, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage. (
Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz
(1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109.)
Promissory fraud is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. (
Lazar v. Superior Court
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Co asserts that there is no actionable misrepresentation because, [Plaintiff] herself failed to perform her own obligations under the alleged agreement, including (1) failure to co-sign for the loan and (2) failure to pay off the mortgage as agreed. (Dem., 13:15-17). Plaintiff alleges that Co promised beginning in 2004 that he would execute documents and take such [] actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the Property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Promise). (FAC ¶ 23.) However, there is no specificity as to the specific false statements made by Co. (
Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) In fact, it is unclear what actionable statements are alleged in the FAC except for that found in paragraph 30 in the FAC (I will do that.). (
People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C.
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 549.) Because the consideration (i.e. as to Co) under the alleged oral agreement is ambiguous, the statement in paragraph 30 does not provide the necessary sufficiency to support a claim because the extent of the agreement has not been fully described. Cos demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action is sustained.
Sixth Cause of Action (i.e., Conversion)
The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendants conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. (
Los Angeles Federal Credit Union v. Madatyan
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1387
[quotations and citation omitted].) Further, [t]he tort of conversion applies to personal property, not real property. (
Salma v. Capon
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1295.)
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Co has repudiated his agreement to replace himself with Plaintiff as record title holder of the Property, denied Plaintiffs interest as owner of the Property. In doing so, Defendants have effectively converted and taken for their own use and benefit all of the monies expended by Plaintiff in connection acquisition [sic] and ownership of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 43).
[2]
Co asserts that Plaintiffs cause of action fails because the Property cannot be the subject of a claim for conversion. Plaintiff, in turn, argues that [w]hat was taken was not real property, but instead a specific corpus of personal propertymoney. . . (Opp., 12:14-15). Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that the monies expended by Plaintiff to live in the property ever went to Co, as opposed to the lender. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.
Seventh Cause of Action (i.e., Violation of Penal Code § 496)
Penal Code § 496, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that [e]very person who
buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
While Co does not provide any authority for his position that Penal Code § 496 does not apply to real property, Plaintiffs allegation portend to allow a lower threshold or burden to obtain more than compensatory damages. As stated before, without greater foundation and briefing, the court will not allow this cause of action to proceed at this time. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.
Ninth Cause of Action (i.e., Accounting)
A cause of action for an accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. (
Teselle v. McLoughlin
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179.) Plaintiff has alleged that she is entitled to an accounting of all loans and other transactions secured by or relating in any way to the Property from 2004 to the present, an accounting of any charges or liens against the Property resulting from the conduct and activities of Defendant, as well as an accounting of all property and other assets obtained or derived by Defendants with funds borrowed against or otherwise obtained with respect to the Property. (FAC, ¶ 55). As the court held before, Plaintiff has not alleged that Co ever received any monies for the Property from Plaintiff or anyone else in connection with the Property at any time. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that Co encumbered the Property at any time. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.
[1]
The court previously overruled the demurrer as to the fifth and eighth causes of action. (See Order, April 26, 2024.) As a result, the court will consider only the demurrer as to the first through fourth, sixth and seventh, and ninth causes of action.
[2]
It appears Plaintiff failed to edit the FAC as the same grammatical mistakes are repeated in both versions.
Ruling
MAIN CO., LLC VS JANNA SIMON LEWIS
Jul 29, 2024 |
24STCV08420
Case Number:
24STCV08420
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE:
July 29, 2024
TRIAL DATE:
None Set
CASE:
Main Co. LLC v. Janna Simon Lewis
CASE NO.:
24STCV08420
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
MOVING PARTY
: Plaintiff Main Co., LLC
RESPONDING PARTY(S)
: Defendant Janna Simon Lewis
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent that was filed on April 3, 2024.
Plaintiff moves for
reconsideration of the Courts June 11, 2024 order granting Defendant Janna Simon Lewiss motion for summary judgment.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
DISCUSSION:
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Courts June 11, 2024 order granting Defendant Janna Simon Lewiss motion for summary judgment.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 provides, in relevant part:
a)
When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and
based upon new or different facts
,
circumstances, or law
, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application
shall state by
affidavit
what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown
.
* * *
(c) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.
(d)
A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7. In addition, an order made contrary to this section may be revoked by the judge or commissioner who made it, or vacated by a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.
(e)
This section specifies the courts jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a), (c)-(e) (bold emphasis added).)
Timeliness
A motion for reconsideration must be made within 10 days after service upon the moving party of written notice of entry of the order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) Here, the Court Clerk served notice of the Courts June 11, 2024 ruling granting the Motion for Summary Judgment on June 11, 2024. (April 29, 2024 Notice of Ruling.) This motion followed on June 20, 2024, less than ten days later. (See Proof of Service.) The Court therefore finds that this motion is timely made.
Analysis
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Courts June 11, 2024 order granting Defendant Janna Simon Lewiss motion for summary judgment based on what Plaintiff characterizes as evidence and/or facts and law which were not available or considered at the time of the hearing. The evidence offered consists of a Los Angeles Certificate of Occupancy showing a change in use of the premises to an artist in residence unit on November 29, 1993 and two Document Reports with the same date referring to the same CHG OF USE apparently concerning the same unit. (Declaration of Yousef Monadjemi, ¶¶ 3-5, Exh. D-F.) The motion for reconsideration must be rejected for several reasons.
First, Plaintiff has offered no explanation, much less any evidence, showing why the evidence belatedly presented was not submitted for the Courts consideration in connection with its ruling on Defendants motion for summary judgment. A party moving for reconsideration must show something more than that the new evidence was not previously presented. Instead, reconsideration may only be granted where there is proof that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced the evidence in opposition to the original motion. (
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212-213.) Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any valid reason for not presenting the new evidence in opposition to Defendants original motion. (
Gilberd v. AC Transit
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) As the documents presented are all dated November 29, 1993, the Courts assumption is that they were available to Plaintiff during the pendency of the summary judgment motion, if Plaintiff had sought to secure them for submission to the Court.
Second, the documents recently submitted to the Court are not relevant to the unlawful detainer action before the Court. Plaintiffs complaint alleges: The building in which the premises is located is under L.A.M.C. 150.000 et seq. (1979) as amended, but that defendants unit is exempt from LARSO, because it is an Artist-in-Residence unit. (Complaint, p. 3 & Attachment 17.) As is proper for any motion for summary judgment, Defendants motion was predicated on these allegations of the Complaint and necessarily limited by those allegations. (
Juge v. County of Sacramento
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 [The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues].) Defendants summary judgment motion did not contest the exemption now being advanced by Plaintiff, and given the narrow scope of the Complaint, such an exemption could not have been challenged in such a motion. As a result, the motion Plaintiff asserts is not one that calls for reconsideration of the prior motion but rather for a ruling on a separate question that falls outside the scope of this lawsuit.
Finally, the recently submitted evidence does not support the conclusion Plaintiff urges. The exemption relied on excludes housing accommodations from regulation under LARSO if the units are located in a structure for which the first Certificate of Occupancy was issued after October 1, 1978 (L.A.M.C. § 151.02, Rental Units, exemption 6), but the records offered say nothing about when the first Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the structure. The records suggest, however, that there may have been such a certificate previously issued because the documents recognize the building as an existing structure that was used as a Retail/Sro Hotel/Dance Hall building. (Exh. D-F.) Even if considered, therefore, Plaintiffs new evidence does not raise a triable issue of fact that would preclude entry of summary judgment in Defendants favor.
CONCLUSION
:
For the reasons explained above,
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Moving Party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________
Theresa M. Traber
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at
Smcdept47@lacourt.org
by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.
Ruling
HAMID REZA MIRSHOJAE, ET AL. VS 5975-5999 TOPANGA CANYON BLVD LLC, ET AL.
Jul 26, 2024 |
21STCV37556
Case Number:
21STCV37556
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
F43 Dept. F43
Date: 7-26-24
Case #21STCV37556,
Hamid Reza Mirshojae, et al. vs. 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd LLC, et al.
Trial Date: N/A
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Hamid Reza Mirshojae and Woodland Hills Medical Clinic II, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants 5975-5999 Topanga Canyon Blvd, LLC and Ahang Mirshojae
RELIEF REQUESTED
Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees in the amount of $
619,675
, plus $17,036.01 in costs, from Defendants.
RULING
: Motion for attorney fees is granted at a reduced amount. No costs will be awarded at this time.
SUMMARY OF ACTION
Plaintiff Hamid Reza Mirshojae (Hamid) and Defendant Ahang Zarin Mirshojae (Ahang) were formerly married and were engaged in extensive litigation against each other prior to 2017. The assets in dispute were in excess of $20 million. At mediation, Hamid and Ahang entered a complex settlement agreement. Immediately after, Hamid alleges that Ahang breached the settlement agreement, and he was forced to incur attorney fees to enforce various terms of the agreement. Eventually, Hamid filed the current suit to enforce the settlement agreement on October 12, 2021.
Ahang accused Hamid and his counsel of inducing her to sign the settlement agreement and sued him for $7 million in damages. This Court eventually struck Ahangs complaint based on Plaintiffs anti-SLAPP motion and determined that Ahang was a vexatious litigant. After this ruling, Ahang attempted to disqualify Hamids lead counsel, though that motion was rejected. Hamid alleges that he has incurred significant legal fees over the course of this litigation.
Finally, after two years of litigation, the parties settled via a 998 Offer on November 17, 2023. The 998 Offer required Defendants to pay Plaintiffs $270,000 and reasonable fees and costs as determined by the Court. Plaintiffs are requesting attorney fees pursuant to the part of the 998 Offer that allows for reasonable fees to be paid.
Plaintiffs are requesting $619,675 in attorney fees from Defendants. Plaintiffs argue in their motion that the attorney fees and hourly rates are reasonable. Plaintiffs evidence in support of their request for attorney fees included a declaration from their attorney, Christopher Beatty, and billing statements (with some redactions) that show which attorney worked on a task, what the task was, and how much time was spent on the task. (Beatty Decl., Ex. H.) The Beatty Declaration also includes a table which shows the hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on the case and their hourly rates at different times. (Beatty Decl., ¶ 35.)
Christopher Beattys hourly rates were $950 (for 2.5 hours in 2021), $975 (for 19.2 hours in 2022), and $1,300 (for 1.5 hours in 2022 and 71.6 hours in 2023). Tami K. Sims hourly rate was $1,115 (for 83.4 hours in 2023). Trevor T. Garneys hourly rate was $955 (for 87.8 hours in 2023). Arron J. Paks hourly rate was $705 (for 277.3 hours in 2023). Minh-Van Dos hourly rates were $795 (for 0.5 hours in 2021) and $840 (for 76.1 hours in 2022). Benjamin Mandels hourly rate was $595 (for 89.6 hours in 2022). Finally, Scarlet Speakmores hourly rate was $350 (for 38.8 hours in 2022).
The total lodestar was calculated by multiplying each of these attorneys hourly rate by their hours worked then adding them all together. The total hours worked for the attorneys totaled 748.3. The total lodestar amount, as previously noted, is $619,675.
Plaintiffs have also requested costs in the amount $17,036.01. However, costs are awarded pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700. If Plaintiffs wish to request costs, Plaintiffs should file a memorandum of costs at the appropriate time.
Defendants Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Keith M. Maziarek:
Sustained: Entire Declaration (irrelevant), Paragraph 11
Overruled: None
Plaintiffs Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of June D. Coleman and the Declaration of Raffi Kassabian: The individual evidentiary objections presented by Plaintiffs to these two declarations are not consecutively numbered. Typically, when written objections to evidence are filed, the written objection must be number consecutively. (See Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1354 (applies to written objections to evidence for summary judgment motions).) While Plaintiffs listed them by paragraph number from the declarations, this is not necessarily effective, because in some instances Plaintiffs objected to different sentences from the same paragraph and listed them separately with the same paragraph number. The Court will not rule on the individual evidentiary objections based on this procedural deficiency. Plaintiffs have objected to the entire Coleman Declaration on the basis that it is improper expert testimony because Coleman has not shown any special knowledge, skill, etc., related to billing for these types of cases pursuant to Evidence Code § 720. The Court has determined that Coleman has sufficiently demonstrated her special knowledge as a fee expert with this declaration and her recently submitted supplemental declaration. Plaintiffs objection to the entire Coleman Declaration is overruled.
On April 9, 2024, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees. That same day, the Court issued a ruling on the submitted matter requesting that the parties submit additional briefing and that Plaintiffs submit invoices that do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed, along with supplemental points and authorities supporting their fee requests in light of that information.
On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs submitted their supplemental brief. In their brief, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should award standard hourly rates and that the fees sought for all tasks are reasonable. Plaintiffs submitted new billing records that still contain some redactions, but they do not redact the lawyers hourly rates or the amounts billed.
On June 25, 2024, Defendants submitted their supplemental opposition brief. Defendants argue that the Court should significantly reduce the fees requested by Plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration. Defendants also acknowledge that Plaintiffs conceded that the actual hourly rates and amounts billed are not privileged.
ANALYSIS
A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. (
Bowman v. City of Berkeley
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.)
Plaintiffs are the prevailing party by virtue of the fact that the parties settled in Plaintiffs favor via the 998 Offer. Plaintiffs have requested a total of $619,675 in attorney fees.
Defendants previously opposed Plaintiffs motion on the basis that Plaintiffs agreed only to recover fees actually incurred and according to proof in the 998 Offer, and Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have not provided this proof. However, this argument was resolved with Plaintiffs supplemental brief, as Plaintiffs have now provided unredacted hourly rates and amounts billed.
Plaintiffs attorney Christopher D. Beatty acknowledges in his supplemental declaration that the actual amount charged to the client was $543,156. (Beatty Supp. Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendants argue in their supplemental opposition that this should be the baseline from which any reductions in the requested amount should be made. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should only be able to recover fees actually incurred because that is what the 998 Offer between the parties allowed. (See
San Dieguito Pship, L.P. v. San Dieguito River Valley Regl Open Spake Park Joint Powers Auth.
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 910, disapproved on other grounds by
PLCM Group v. Drexler
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084.) The Court agrees. Plaintiffs should only recover the fees actually incurred, which in this case is, at a maximum, $543,156.
Next, Defendants contest the reasonableness of the fees incurred by Plaintiffs.
In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from
Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by
Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from
Wollersheim
are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsels education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. (
Id.
)
Plaintiffs argued in the initial motion that they met all of these factors. First, Plaintiffs argue that large amounts of money were involved in this litigation because of Ahangs cross-complaint for $7 million and the fact that the original settlement agreement divided the parties assets that were valued in excess of $20 million. Next, for the second factor, Plaintiffs argue that the nature of this case was an emotional case between two ex-spouses and business partners with significant assets at issue, and Ahang had been determined by the Court to have engaged in fraud. For the third factor, Plaintiffs argued that this was a complex case that required an experienced legal team to handle it, and Beattys team were the logical ones to handle it because Beatty had handled the cases that led to the settlement agreement. For the fourth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had to devote significant attention to this case. For the fifth factor, Plaintiffs argued that their counsel had success throughout the case in prevailing on the anti-SLAPP motion and defeating the attempt to disqualify Beatty, as well as being the prevailing party for the 998 Offer. Finally, for the sixth factor, Plaintiffs argued that this case consumed considerable time and went on for two years and would have gone on much longer if Hamid had not accepted the 998 Offer.
Defendants argue that the attorney fee award should be reduced as the hours billed are excessively unreasonable. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. (
Chavez v. City of Los Angeles
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 990-991(citing
Serrano v. Unruh
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635).)
This Court previously acknowledged in its tentative ruling the apparent excessive billing for several of Plaintiffs motions: the Anti-SLAPP Motion (160.5 hours), Opposition to Motion to Disqualify (96.5 hours), Demurrer (90.2 hours), Motion for Attorney fees re Anti-SLAPP Motion (49 hours), and Motion to Quash Summons (38.6 hours). This Court also suggested reducing the time spent on those motions by 25%. Defendants argue that they should be reduced by at least 60% because they are beyond excessive.
Other specific tasks that Defendants argue were excessively billed were the 4.0 hours for a half-page notice of continuance; 12.1 hours for a subpoena with 8 document requests; 14.7 hours spent on two identical subpoenas with 6 document requests; 22.3 hours spent on 3 page ex parte application and 2 page declaration to advance a hearing date; 18.3 hours preparing for and drafting a mediation brief; and 10.3 hours on generic case analysis over 48 entries. Defendants argue that the Court should also take into account all of these minor issues in awarding the attorney fees.
Defendants also argue that the at least 209.5 hours spent in relation to the Anti-SLAPP motion was beyond excessive and should be reduced by more than 25%. Defendants cite a case where the Court of Appeal affirmed a reduction in attorney fees and costs related to an Anti-SLAPP motion from $112,288.63 to just $23,000, with the Court of Appeal stating that claiming 200 hours of work & seems excessive and that such a motion should not have been such a monumental undertaking. (
Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc.
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1252.) Defendant
Finally, Defendants argue that the Court should consider Defendants expert declaration because it would be admissible because the experts declaration included descriptions of her experience as a fee expert. (See Coleman Decl., ¶¶ 3-10, 14, and 15.) The Court previously sustained Plaintiffs objections to the Coleman Declaration, but in light of Defendants arguments and Colemans supplemental declaration, the Court will consider Colemans declaration.
In light of all of the foregoing, the Court believes that some reduction of the requested fees is necessary. Both the previously indicated major issues and the minor issues that Defendants have brought to the attention of the Court should be reduced.
The amount that the Court will start with is $543,156 in fees actually incurred. The Court previously considered reducing certain fees by 25%. Defendants request an across the board reduction of 60%, which would be $217,262 in fees awarded. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court do an across the board reduction of 25%, since that percentage is what the Court previously found was appropriate. Based on both the major and minor issues with the billing records, the Court agrees that an across the board reduction is appropriate. The Court also finds that an across the board reduction of 25% is reasonable. That would make the fee award $407,367.
The Court will award this amount. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their attorneys hourly rates are rates are reasonable. Furthermore, this was a complex class requiring a lot of motion practice, particularly where the Anti-SLAPP motion is concerned. Plaintiffs have provided proof of the amount of time spent on the case through the now-unredacted billing statements.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $407,367.00. Costs should be requested in a memorandum of costs.
Moving party to give notice.
Ruling
805 WOOSTER, LLC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS BRETT HYMAN, AN INDIVIDUAL
Jul 26, 2024 |
23STCV27912
Case Number:
23STCV27912
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
50
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 50
805 WOOSTER, LLC
,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRETT HYMAN
,
et al
.,
Defendants.
Case No.:
23STCV27912
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Hearing Time:
10:00 a.m.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL
Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. of The Law Office of Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr.
(Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendant
Brett Hyman.
While Counsel has provided sufficient reason for withdrawal, Items 5, 6, and 7 of the proposed order
(Form MC-053)
are blank.
If Counsel provides the Court with a revised order prior to the hearing, the Court will grant the motion.¿
Counsel is ordered to give notice of this order.¿
DATED:
July 26, 2024
________________________________
Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet
Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court
Document
TONI HULL VS MANVEL CHAPKINYAN
Dec 20, 2023 |
Valerie Salkin
|
Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |
Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |
23VECV05619
Document
TONI HULL VS MANVEL CHAPKINYAN
Dec 20, 2023 |
Valerie Salkin
|
Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |
Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |
23VECV05619