Judgment: ALBERT GUERRA VS NOOR ALDEEN AREF, ET AL.

Case Number: 21STCV46924 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: B Tavit Hallajian v. Beatriz Stephani Delgado, et al. Wednesday, July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 21STCV46924 Request for Default Judgment against Defendants Beatriz Stephani Delgado and Maria Del Rosario Chavez Aguilar Tentative : The Court has reviewed the request for default judgment against Defendants and is CONTINUING the matter in order for Plaintiff to correct the following defects: 1. Does 1-20 must be dismissed prior to obtaining default judgment. 2. There is no declaration and supporting evidence in support of the judgment sought.

Case Number: 21STCV36851 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING CYNTHIA JUAREZ vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al. Case No.: 21STCV36851 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Plaintiffs motion to compel responses to her supplemental RFPs and Special Interrogatories is MOOT. The Court declines to award sanctions at this time. On 10/5/2021, Plaintiff Cynthia Juarez (Plaintiff) filed suit against County of Los Angeles, Billy Nettles, and Andrea Wood, alleging: (1) whistleblower retaliation; (2) civil rights: free speech; (3) failure to provide a safe workplace; (4) failure to provide a safe workplace; (5) failure to provide a safe work place; and (6) defamation. On 4/23/2024, Plaintiff move to compel responses from Defendant County of Los Angeles (the County) to Plaintiffs supplemental Requests for Production (RFPs) and supplemental Special Interrogatories. Discussion Plaintiff argues that an order compelling the County to provide responses to her supplemental RFPs and Special Interrogatories is necessary. In opposition, Defendant indicated that it has since served supplemental responses as of 6/21/2024. As such, these motions are moot. After review, the Court concludes that these motions could have been avoided with adequate meet and confer. Accordingly, the Court declines to award sanctions at this time. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to compel responses to her supplemental RFPs and Special Interrogatories is moot. The Court declines to award sanctions at this time. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Case Number: 23STLC01390 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 25 PROCEEDINGS : MOTION FOR AN ORDER SEEKING LEAVE OF THE COURT TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendant/Cross-Complainant Abbie L. Lill RESP. PARTY : None MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND (CCP § 473(a)) TENTATIVE RULING : Defendant/Cross-Complainant Abbie L. Lills request for leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED TO ____ at _____ a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendant Lill must file and serve supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. SERVICE : [ X ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK [ X ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK [ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) NO (location) OPPOSITION : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None REPLY : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None ANALYSIS: I. Background On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed an action against Defendants Abbie L. Lill; Emily Salinas; Miguel Fuentes; Does I through V. Defendant Lill filed an Answer on June 7, 2023. Defendant Lill filed the instant Motion for an Order Seeking Leave of the Court to File a Cross-Complaint (the Motion) on June 14, 2024. No opposition has been filed. II. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) III. Discussion Defendant Lill seeks leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint seeking equitable indemnity and declaratory relief against Emily Salinas and Miguel Fuentes. (Mot., p. 3.) The Motion, however, does not comply with all requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324. Specifically, Motion does not identify the pages and line numbers where allegations would be added, deleted, or modified. Defendant Lills counsels supporting declaration also does not state when he discovered the information, the effect, or why it is necessary. As a final note, the Motion fails to provide a courthouse address. Thus, the Notice is defective. Thus, the hearing will be CONTINUED so that Defendant Lill may correct these errors. IV. Conclusion & Order For the foregoing reasons, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Lills request for leave of court to file an amended Cross-Complaint is CONTINUED TO ____ at _____ a.m. in Department 25 at the SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. At least 16 court days before the next scheduled hearing, Defendant Lill must file and serve supplemental papers addressing the issues discussed herein. Failure to do so may result in the Motion being placed off calendar or denied. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23SMCV04043 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: The Loretta LLC v. ZGB Homes Inc., et al. CASE NO.: 23SMCV04043 MOTION: Petition/Motion to Compel Arbitration HEARING DATE: 7/11/2024 LEGAL STANDARD Under California and federal law, public policy favors arbitration as an efficient and less expensive means of resolving private disputes. ( Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.) Accordingly, whether an agreement is governed by the California Arbitration Act (CAA) or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), courts resolve doubts about an arbitration agreements scope in favor of arbitration. ( Moncharsh, supra , 3 Cal.4th at 9; Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs. (9th Cir. 2009) 553 F.3d 1277, 1284; see also Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972 [California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability [citation] and a requirement that an arbitration agreement must be enforced on the basis of state law standards that apply to contracts in general].) [U]nder both the FAA and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ( Higgins v. Superior Crout (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to grant a petition to compel arbitration if the court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. ( Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59, quotations omitted.) Accordingly, when presented with a petition to compel arbitration, the courts first task is to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to arbitrate the dispute. ( Ibid . ) A petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. ( Id . at 71.) As with any other specific performance claim, a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement must show the agreements terms are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce. ( Ibid . [internal citations omitted].) Only the valid and binding agreement of the parties, including all material terms well-defined and clearly expressed, may be ordered specifically performed. ( Ibid . ) An arbitration agreement must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) The language of the contract governs its interpretation if it is clear and explicit. (Civ. Code, § 1368.) If uncertainty exists, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist. (Civ. Code, § 1654.) The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence. ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) It would then be plaintiffs burden, in opposing the motion, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to her opposition. (See Ibid. ) In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the courts discretion, to reach a final determination. ( Ibid . ) ANALYSIS Defendant 2026 Walnut, LLC asserts that the instant claims are required to go to arbitration because Plaintiff the Loretta LLC signed an arbitration agreement covering their claims. As with any contract, mutual assent or consent is necessary for the formation of a valid arbitration agreement. (Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565.) Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense. (Civ. Code, § 1580.) The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Mitri v. Arnel Mgmt. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1169 [Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.].) Defendant cites a purchase agreement between the principals of the Loretta LLC and itself. (See Sokol Decl., Exs. 1-3.) Paragraph 22(A) of the Purchase Agreement is entitled DISPUTE RESOLUTION, and includes a mediation clause which reads in part: "The Parties agree to mediate any dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, or any resulting transactions, before resorting to arbitration or court action through the C.A.R. Real Estate Mediation Center for Consumers..." Further, Paragraph 22(B) is entitled ABITRATION OF DISPUTES and provides: "The Parties agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.... The arbitrator shall be a retired judge or justice, or any attorney.... unless the parties mutually agree to a different arbitrator..... Judgment upon the award... may be entered into any court having jurisdiction. Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act... "NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE 'ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES'ROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTAL ARBITRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALIFORMA LAW AND YOU ARE GIVING UP ANY RIGHTS YHOU MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED IN COURT IN A COURT OR JURY TRIAL BY INITIALING... IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS PROVISIOPN, YOU MAY BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE CALIFORINIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE." Plaintiff argues that it is not in privity of contract with Walnut. Examining the record, the Agreements show that Plaintiffs principal, Rebekah Gainsley, signed the agreement on behalf of Loretta. The purchase agreement defines the Buyer as Rebekah Gainsley or Assignee . (Emphasis added.) Ms. Gainsley signed the agreements as either Rebekah Gainsley or Rebekah Gainsley or Assignee . (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff does not deny that it is the assignee referenced in the Agreements. The record shows that following the purchase of the Property from Defendant Walnut, Plaintiffs principal transferred ownership of the Property to Plaintiff. (¶ 13.) Thus, there is no reasonable dispute that Ms. Gainsley assigned the property to Plaintiff. Moreover, under certain circumstances, a nonsignatory beneficiary can be forced to arbitrate. ( See e.g. Harris v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 475, 478 [It is well established that a nonsignatory beneficiary of an arbitration clause is entitled to require arbitration... Whether a nonsignatory beneficiary can be forced to arbitrate is a closer question.].) Here, the parties have expressed an intent to bind Plaintiffs assignee, that is, Loretta. Plaintiff does not present any evidence to dispute that Ms. Gainsley had authority to bind it to the Agreements as Lorettas principal. Plaintiff argues that the claim does not arise from the agreement because the claim is based upon a preexisting statutory right. However, the broad arbitration agreement would include such claims. Plaintiffs SB800 Right to Repair claim pertains to construction defects in the purchased property. Such a claim is dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between [Walnut and Ms. Gainsley/Assignee] out of this Agreement since the claim relates to the condition of the property when it was sold, even if it is statutory in nature. Plaintiff also argues that there is a mediation scheduled later this summer. However, Plaintiff is not entitled to mediation against Walnut, as mediation could only occur before resorting to arbitration or court action. ( Sokol Decl., Ex. 1 .) Here, Plaintiff resorted to court action. Therefore, mediation is now unavailable under the plain terms of the agreement. The action against Walnut should therefore proceed to arbitration. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. The action is stayed only as to the claims against Walnut until completion of arbitration. A status conference re arbitration shall be set for December 5, 2024, at 8:30 a.m.

Case Number: 21STCV37420 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT FARIBA NOURIAN, Plaintiff, vs. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO: 21STCV37420 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Dept. B 1:30 p.m. July 9, 2024 I. BACKGROUND On October 8, 2021, Plaintiff Fariba Nourian filed a complaint against Defendants City of Los Angeles, The Gary Michael Glushon and Kristan Ann Glushon Family Trust (the Trust), Gary Michael Glushon, Kristin Ann Glushon, and Gary Michael Glushon and Kristan Ann Glushon as Trustees of the Gary Michael Glushon and Kristin Ann Glushon Family Trust, alleging causes of action for negligence and premises liability, arising out of an alleged trip and fall on an uneven and/or raised and/or deteriorating sidewalk. On May 3, 2024, Defendant the Trust filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings. No opposition has been filed. II. LEGAL STANDARD A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438 subd. (c)(1)(B).) A non-statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made any time before or during trial. ( Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650.) Such motion may be made on the same ground as those supporting a general demurrer, i.e ., that the pleading at issue fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable claim or defense. ( Ibid. ) In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) When a court evaluates a complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable inferences from the facts pled. ( Duval v. Board of Tr. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 902, 906.) In deciding or reviewing a judgment on the pleadings, all properly pleaded material facts are deemed to be true, as well as all facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. ( Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452.) The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged complaint or be based on facts which the court may judicially notice. (§ 438(d); Tiffany v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 218, 225.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings normally does not lie as to a portion of a cause of action. ( Ibid. ) In the case of either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Gami v. Mullikin Medical Ctr. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 870, 876.) III. DISCUSSION Defendant the Trust argues that the complaint does not state sufficient facts against Defendant as it is not a legal entity and cannot be sued. A trust estate is not a legal entity; it is simply a collection of assets and liabilities. As such, it has no capacity to sue, be sued or defend an action. Any litigation must be maintained by, or against, the executor, administrator or trustee of the estate. ( Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344.) Here, the complaint names The Gary Michael Glushon and Kristan Ann Glushon Family Trust as a defendant. However, a trust is not a proper defendant. Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted without leave to amend. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend. The complaint against the Trust is DISMISSED. Defendant is ORDERED to give notice. DATED: July 9, 2024 _____________________ Karen Moskowitz Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV26639 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 MARYAM KHANI, Plaintiff, v. BOBBY BABAK SAADIAN, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV26639 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion for terminating sanctions BACKGROUND On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against Defendants Bobby Babak Saadian and Wilshire Law Firm, PLC. Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint on December 6, 2022, asserting causes of action for (1) legal malpractice, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) fraud. On December 8, 2023, the Court granted Defendant Wilshire Law Firms motion to compel further responses to requests for admissions and form interrogatories. On May 8, 2024, the Court granted Defendant Saadians motions to compel responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission. On June 12, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for terminating sanctions based on Plaintiffs failure to comply with those two orders. Defendants alternatively request issue, evidentiary, and monetary sanctions. Plaintiff filed her opposition on June 26, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on July 2, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD The Court may impose monetary or nonmonetary sanctions against a party engaging in misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) Misuse of the discovery process is defined as, among other things, failing to respond to an authorized method of discovery, making an evasive response to discovery, or disobeying a court order for discovery. ( Id. , § 2023.010.) If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. ( Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) The penalty should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. ( Wilson v. Jefferson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 952, 959.) Generally, two facts are prerequisite to the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions: (1) there must be a failure to comply with a court order; and (2) the failure must be willful. ( Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) DISCUSSION I. December 8, 2023 Order Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Courts December 8, 2023 order by failing to pay the monetary sanctions. (Coronel Decl. ¶ 4.) Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff otherwise complied with the order by serving further responses. ( Ibid. ) [I]t is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to issue a terminating sanction for failure to pay the sanction. ( Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610.) A monetary sanction is enforceable as a judgment, and in an appropriate case, failure to pay a sanction may be punishable as contempt. ( Ibid. ) Thus, terminating sanctions are not the appropriate way to address Plaintiffs failure to pay sanctions. ( Ibid. ) II. May 8, 2024 Order After the Courts order, Plaintiff only served responses to requests for admission and form interrogatories but did not serve responses to the requests for production or special interrogatories, nor paid sanctions. (Coronel Decl. ¶¶ 11-13.) Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly believed that all of the discovery responses had been sent on May 6, 2024, when in reality only the RFAs and FROGs were sent. (Seuthe Decl. ¶ 10.) Furthermore, the order required moving party to give notice, but there is no indication that Defendants served notice of the order to Plaintiff. Plaintiff served the missing responses soon after this motion was filed. ( Id. , ¶ 9.) The adequacy of the responses is not at issue in this motion. The May 8 order only concerned Plaintiffs failure to provide responses in the first instance, not the substance of the responses. III. Sanctions Based on the above facts, the Court finds that the requested sanctions are unwarranted. Specifically, the terminating, issue, and evidentiary sanctions would be disproportionate because Plaintiff only failed to serve two sets of responses and eventually did so upon realizing the error. Plaintiff has otherwise responded to the other discovery requests implicated in the prior orders. Plaintiffs failure to serve the RFAs and FROGs was not willful because counsel inadvertently believed that all of the responses had been sent together. CONCLUSION Defendants motion for sanctions is DENIED.

CASE NUMBER: 21STCV30905 MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS (CCP §§ 2023.010, et seq.) TENTATIVE RULING : Defendant CDC Madison Lomita LLCs Motion for Terminating Sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff Eva Mayess First Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants request for monetary sanctions is also GRANTED in the amount of $2,678.23, to be paid by Plaintiff Eva Mayes within thirty (30) days of the Courts Order. ANALYSIS: I. Background On August 20, 2021, Plaintiff Eva Mayes (Mayes) filed an action against Defendants The Regents of the University of California (Regents) and UCLA Sky Park Medical Facility (Sky Park) (collectively Defendants) for general negligence and premises liability. On November 4, 2022, Plaintiff amended the Complaint to add CDC Madison Lomita LLC (CDC) as Defendant Doe 1. On June 16, 2023, following stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint against Defendants Regents and CDC. Plaintiff alleges that on December 16, 2019, she sustained serious injuries on the premises owned, possessed, worked upon, managed, supervised, operated, maintained, or controlled by Defendants as a result of the negligent placement of a stanchion outside of the elevator. On July 31, 2023, Defendants Regents and CDC filed a Cross-Complaint against Roes 1 through 25 for equitable indemnity, contribution/apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, breach of contract, and express indemnity. On November 21, 2023, pursuant to Plaintiffs Request for Dismissal, the Court dismissed Defendant Regents without prejudice. On March 25, 2024, Defendant CDC filed the instant Motion for Terminating Sanctions and Request for Monetary Sanctions (Motion). No opposition has been filed. On July 2, 2024, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the Motion. On June 7, 2024, the matter was assigned to Judge Karen Moskowitz in Department B of the Van Nuys Courthouse East. II. Legal Standard Where a party willfully disobeys a discovery order, courts have discretion to impose terminating, issue, evidence, or monetary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010(d), (g), 2023.030; R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495.) Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.040 requires that [a] request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. Furthermore, the notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.040.) Monetary sanctions may be imposed ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct&unless [the Court] finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(a).) Issue sanctions may be imposed ordering that designated facts shall be taken as established in the action in accordance with the claim of the party adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process. The court may also impose an issue sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(b).) Evidence sanctions may be imposed by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(c).) In more extreme cases, the Court may also impose terminating sanctions by striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings, staying further proceedings, dismissing the action, or any part of the action, or rending a judgment by default against the party misusing the discovery process. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.030(d).) The court should look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether terminating sanctions are appropriate. ( Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77¿Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.) Ultimate discovery sanctions are justified where there is a willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. ( Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196¿Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.) [A] penalty as severe as dismissal or default is not authorized where noncompliance with discovery is caused by an inability to comply rather than willfulness or bad faith. ( Brown v. Sup. Ct. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 701, 707.) Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure [citations], a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. ( Lopez v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604-605.) In City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC , the Court ruled that Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2023.010 and 2023.030 list the available discovery sanctions but do not independently authorize a court to impose specific sanctions. ( PriceewaterhouseCoopers (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 466, 503-504.) Thus, a courts authority to impose the sanctions specified in §§ 2023.010 and 2023.030 must arise from a statute governing a particular method of discovery. ( Ibid. ) III. Discussion Defendant CDC moves for terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Mayes and for dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice. (Mot. pp. 1-2.) Defendant also moves for an order imposing monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,428.23 against Plaintiff. ( Ibid. ) Defendant states that Plaintiff has failed to appear at seven (7) properly noticed depositions. (Braun Decl. ¶¶ 2, 8-13, 15-16, Exs. A-I.) On November 17, 2023, after Plaintiff failed to appear at a deposition for the sixth time, Defendant Filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Deposition. The Court granted Defendants Motion on December 15, 2023, and ordered Plaintiff to appear at a mutually agreed upon date and to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,132.36. Sanctions were paid and the following deposition was set for February 6, 2024. (Braun Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. H.) On the day of the deposition, Plaintiffs counsel informed Defendant that she would not be attending the deposition. ( Ibid. at ¶ 6.) Defendant recorded a Certificate of Non-Appearance. ( Ibid. , Ex. I.) The Court notes that on March 28, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs counsels Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel and to date, the Court has been informed that Plaintiff has not retained a new representative. Defendant also requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,428.23 as follows: 10 hours of attorney time, billed at a rate of $500 per hour (6.5 hours for preparing the instant Motion, 0.5 hour spent at the February 6, 2024, deposition, additional 2 hours anticipated for reviewing Plaintiffs opposition and preparing a reply, and 1.5 hours to attend the hearing), $341.23 in Court reporter fees for the final deposition, $15 for CourtCall, $60 in motion filing fees, $12 for e-filing fees. (Braun Decl. ¶¶ 17-20.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has a pattern and practice of constant delays by failing to participate in the discovery process even to the point of defying a Court Order to appear for her deposition. (Mot. p. 4.) Although Plaintiff has been sanctioned by the Court, she has continued to fail to comply with the discovery process and the Courts order. ( Ibid. ) These delays have substantially interfered with Defendants ability to litigate and defend against Plaintiffs claims. ( Ibid. p. 5.) Defendant also argues that terminating sanctions are appropriate because Plaintiffs violation has been willful, demonstrated a history of abuse, and less severe sanctions have not been effective. ( Ibid. at p. 6.) First, the Court notes that the Notices of Taking Deposition for the following dates were issued solely by Defendant Regents, which has since been dismissed from the case: September 27 and December 19, 2022, and April 17 and June 27, 2023. (Braun Decl. ¶¶ 8-11, Exs. A-D.) On December 15, 2023, the Court noted that there was no evidence that Plaintiff has served any valid objections to the deposition notices and granted Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Deposition. (12-15-23 Minute Order.) Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.450 governs the imposition of sanctions when a party fails to obey a Court order compelling attendance, testimony, and production at a noticed deposition. According to § 2025.450(h), The court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that party deponent or against the party with whom the deponent is affiliated. In lieu of, or in addition to, this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against that deponent or against the party with whom that party deponent is affiliated, and in favor of any party who, in person or by attorney, attended in the expectation that the deponents testimony would be taken pursuant to that order. Pursuant to this section, the Court has authority to impose any of the sanctions specified in § 2030.030. In determining whether terminating sanctions are appropriate in the instant case, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, including whether there has been a willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. Here, the Court finds that Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to support its request for terminating sanctions. Plaintiff has failed to attend several noticed depositions and failed to comply with the Courts December 15, 2024 Order. Furthermore, monetary sanctions have not been effective in promoting compliance with the Courts order and there is a pattern of discovery abuse. The Motion is unopposed, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated any justification for her failure to comply with discovery. The Court also finds that $2,678.23 in monetary sanctions are appropriate, as follows: 4.5 hours of attorney time for preparing the Motion, attending the final deposition, and appearing at the hearing on the instant Motion, at $500 per hour, as well as $341.23 in Court reporter fees, $15 for CourtCall, $60 in motion filing fees, and $12 for e-filing fees. Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Terminating Sanctions is GRANTED. Defendants request for monetary sanctions is also GRANTED in the amount of $2,678.23. IV. Conclusion & Order For the foregoing reasons, Defendant CDC Madison Lomita LLCs Motion for Terminating Sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff Eva Mayess First Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Defendants request for monetary sanctions is also GRANTED in the amount of $2,678.23, to be paid by Plaintiff Eva Mayes within thirty (30) days of the Courts Order. Moving parties are ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 22TRCV00890 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B BARBARA CLARK, by and through her guardian ad litem, KEVIN CLARK, Plaintiff, Case No.: 22TRCV00890 vs. [Tentative] RULING PRIME HEALTHCARE CENTINELA, LLC DBA CENTINELA HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant Parkwest Rehabilitation Center, LLC dba Parkwest Healthcare Center Responding Party: Plaintiff Barbara Clark (1) Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Portions of SAC The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first and second causes of action in the SAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant Parkwest is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. BACKGROUND On October 3, 2023, plaintiff Barbara Clark, by and through her guardian ad litem, Kevin Clark, filed a complaint against Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba Centinela Hospital Medical Center, Dignity Community Care dba Northridge Hospital Medical Center, Parkwest Rehabilitation Center, LLC dba Parkwest Healthcare Center for (1) elder abuse and neglect, (2) violation of Resident Rights under Health & Safety Code 1430(b), and (3) negligence. On December 12, 2023, the Court sustained with leave to amend defendants demurrer to the first and second causes of action and overruled it as to the third cause of action. The Court granted the motion to strike with leave to amend as to the prayer under the first and second causes of action and denied it as to costs. On January 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a FAC. On March 12, 2024, the Court sustained defendant Dignity Community Care dba Northridge Hospital Medical Centers demurrer with leave to amend as to the first cause of action for elder abuse in the FAC. On April 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a SAC. On April 9, 2024, defendant Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba Centinela Hospital Medical Center filed an answer to the SAC. On May 2, 2024, defendant Dignity Community Care filed an answer to the SAC. LEGAL AUTHORITY Demurrer When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747. Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal. App. 2d 636, 643-44. Strike The court may, upon a motion . . ., or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP §436(b). CCP §431.10 states: (a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense. (b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (c) An immaterial allegation means irrelevant matter as that term is used in Section 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP §437. DISCUSSION Demurrer Defendant Parkwest Rehabilitation Center, LLC dba Parkwest Healthcare Center (Parkwest) demurs to the first cause of action for elder abuse and the second cause of action for violation of resident rights in the SAC on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. The SAC alleges that plaintiff Barbara Clark was born on October 5, 1936. SAC, ¶8. In the fall of 2021, Clark was 85 years old and was living independently. She had a history of atrial fibrillation and latent tuberculosis but was otherwise mobile and alert. On October 17, 2021, she suffered a stroke and was admitted to Centinela Hospital. The stroke resulted in right sided hemiplegia, and she required a g-tube and PEG placement for feedings. Id., ¶38. As a result of Clarks physical condition, while she was in the care and custody of Centinela Hospital, she required skilled, medical, and custodial care in addition to assistance with all activities of daily living, including maintaining her personal hygiene, continence care, transferring, and repositioning in bed, transferring in and out of bed and chair, eating, drinking, and managing her medication. Id., ¶39. Centinela Hospital failed to effectively assess Clarks care needs and because of the failure to assess, Centinela Hospital failed to develop, implement, and modify care plans designed to meet Clarks individualized care needs as to wound care, food and fluid, infection, and hygiene. Id., ¶41. When Clark became a patient at Centinela Hospital, her skin was intact and she was clear of skin breakdown. There is no documentation that Clark developed any skin breakdown during her admission to Centinela Hospital. Her hospitalization was complicated as she also became septic, developed a urinary tract infection, and pneumonia. She also had dysphagia status-post PEG placement. Id., ¶42. The SAC further alleges that on October 30, 2021, despite these complications, case managers at Centinela Hospital decided Clark was safe to be discharged to a skilled nursing facility for continued rehabilitation. It was arranged for her to be transferred to Windsor Terrace Healthcare Center via ambulance. When she arrived, she was not there for more than ten minutes as she had developed acute respiratory failure and was hypoxic. She was immediately transferred to the nearest emergency room, Northridge Hospital. Id., ¶43. Centinela Hospital knew, or should have known, Clark required 24-hour hospitalization until she was stable from the stroke and related sequelae. Instead of retaining her, they made the financial decision to discharge her to a lower level of care at a skilled nursing facility knowing she required a higher level of care. As a result of the premature discharge, Clark suffered needlessly as she developed acute respiratory failure and became hypoxic enroute and had to be transferred immediately back to the hospital. Id., ¶44. The SAC alleges that on admission to Northridge Hospital, it is documented for the first time that Clark had a pressure injury on her right and left buttock, right elbow, and left ankle. Centinela Hospital concealed the existence, nature, and severity of these wounds from Clark and her family. Id., ¶45. Nursing staff of Northridge Hospital failed to implement a care plan for Clarks wound care that satisfied the requirements of Clark based on her high risk for pressure wounds. Id., ¶47. On several occasions during her hospitalization at Northridge, nursing staff maintained Clark supine in her bed, applying unnecessary pressure to her sacral area. This occurred several times including October 31-November 5, 2021 and December 28, 2021-January 1, 2022. Id., ¶48. Clark was hospitalized at Northridge Hospital from October 30, 2021 to November 5, 2021, where, in addition to treatment for her acute respiratory failure and hypoxia, she required would care treatment. Id., ¶49. Northridge Hospital failed to effectively assess Clarks care needs and because of the failure to assess, Northridge Hospital failed to develop, implement, and modify care plans designed to meet Clarks individualized care needs. Id., ¶50. As a result, Clarks wounds worsened. Id., ¶51. On November 5, 2021, case managers at Northridge Hospital decided Clark was safe to be discharged to a skilled nursing facility for continued rehabilitation. It was arranged for her to be transferred to Lake Balboa Care Center via ambulance. She was at Lake Balboa Care for only a day before she had to be brought back to the nearest hospital. This time she was transferred to Valley Presbyterian. Id., ¶52. The SAC further alleges that on admission to Valley Presbyterian on November 6, 2021, Clarks oxygen saturation was down to 85%, she had a fever of 102 degrees, and was documented as having multiple pressure injuries on admission. The right and left buttock wound merged to form a sacral wound that was at a State III. Her left and right ankle were classified as unstageable. Id., ¶54. The SAC further alleges that on December 1, 2021, Clark was transferred to Parkwest Healthcare, which failed to effectively assess Clarks care needs and because of the failure to assess, Parkwest Healthcare failed to develop, implement, and modify care plans designed to meet Clarks individualized care needs as to wound care, food and fluid, infection, and hygiene. Id., ¶56(a)-(d). Over the near month long stay at Parkwest Healthcare, Clark was neglected to such a degree that the failures noted above caused her to suffer a UTI, sepsis, and the deterioration of two of her wounds to stage IV. Id., ¶57. She was also documented as having malnutrition. On admission, Clark was required to receive 1680kcal nutrition daily, but she was not provided this required amount of nutrition. Id., ¶58. Nursing staff failed to transfer Clark to a higher level of care. On December 7, 2021, Clark was transferred to Northridge Hospital. Her son advocated for her transfer out of concern that she had pneumonia. At the hospital, she was diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and sepsis. It was also discovered Clarks wounds had worsened. She now had a left buttock that was classified as a Stage IV and coccyx wound classified as a Stage IV. Id., ¶59. The SAC further alleges that over the next several months, Clark had a series of transfers between hospitals and skilled nursing facilities to attempt to heal her wounds. The complications of these mismanaged wounds further complicated her ability to recover from her respiratory conditions. Id., ¶60. 1 st cause of action for elder abuse In order to state a cause of action under the Elder Abuse Act, a plaintiff must allege conduct essentially equivalent to conduct that would support recovery of punitive damages. Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 771, 789. Neglect is defined in section 15610.57 as (a). . . . (1) The negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder . . . to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. . . .(b) Neglect includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter. (2) Failure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs. . . . (4) Failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration. . . . It is true that statutory elder abuse includes 'neglect as defined in Section 15610.57,' which in turn includes negligent failure of an elder custodian 'to provide medical care for [the elder's] physical and mental health needs' (§ 15610.57(b)(2)). . . . '[N]eglect' within the meaning of [section 15610.57] covers an area of misconduct distinct from 'professional negligence.' As used in the Act, neglect refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the 'failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations.' Thus, the statutory definition of 'neglect' speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care. Notably, the other forms of abuse, as defined in the Act--physical abuse and fiduciary abuse [§15657]--are forms of intentional wrongdoing also distinct from 'professional negligence.'" Covenant Care, Inc. , supra, at 783. [T]he facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims. Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4 th 396, 407 (citing Covenant Care ). Allegations of misconduct directed against one defendant . . . do not state a cause of action against another defendant against whom the allegations of misconduct are not directed. Id. at 410 (citation omitted). [W]hen a plaintiff asserts a claim against a health care provider on a legal theory other than professional negligence, courts must determine whether the claim is nonetheless based on the health care providers professional negligence . Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal. App. 4 th 336, 347 (citation omitted). Citing to the content of the definition of neglect in Welf. and Inst. Code 15610.57(b), the Supreme Court stated, [w]hat they each seem to contemplate is the existence of a robust caretaking or custodial relationshipthat is, a relationship where a certain party has assumed a significant measure of responsibility for attending to one or more of an elders basic needs that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance. Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal. 4 th 148, 58. What seems beyond doubt is that the Legislature enacted a scheme distinguishing between and decidedly not lumping together claims of professional negligence and neglect. Id. at 159. Defendant Parkwest argues that the allegations fail to meet the heightened pleading requirement of specificity or particularity as to moving defendant. Defendant contends that while the SAC provides a medical chronology of plaintiffs health conditions, the alleged wrongful conduct that purportedly led to plaintiffs health decline is described generally. Further, defendant argues, the allegations are insufficient to demonstrate egregious abuse or that defendant acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Also, defendant argues, the SAC does not allege facts showing that an officer, director, or managing agent of defendant was involved in the abuse, authorized the abuse, ratified the abuse, or hired the person who did the abuse with advance knowledge of the persons unfitness. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the allegations are sufficient. The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient to meet the elements for elder abuse against Parkwest. The allegations are pled with the requisite particularity and support reckless neglect, including the statutory definition of neglect. See Welf. & Inst. Code §15610.57(b)(1), (2), (4). The allegations as to corporate ratification are also sufficient. See SAC, ¶¶30-33, 79. The demurrer is OVERRULED. 2 nd cause of action for violation of Residents Rights Under Health & Safety Code §1430(b)(1), A current or former resident or patient, or the legal representative, personal representative, or successor in interest of a current or former resident or patient, of a skilled nursing facility, . . . may bring a civil action against the licensee of a facility who violates any rights of the resident or patient as set forth in Section 72527 or 73523 of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, or any other right provided for by federal or state law or regulation. . . . Section 72527 provides a list of 26 specific rights. Defendant argues that the allegations are conclusory and merely reference the regulations in boilerplate fashion and mirror the language in the statute rather than any fact. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the allegations are sufficient. The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient as plaintiff alleges facts to support the elements. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations under the first cause of action, including that defendant permitted Clark to suffer infection, severe wounds, malnutrition and neglect; failed to assess, develop and follow care plans that matched Clarks individual needs; failed to notify Clarks family of changes in her condition and hiding her condition; failed to properly note nutrition and intake of Clark, wound notes, and other medical records deficiencies; and failed to have sufficient staff to meet Clarks supervision and care needs, which violated Clarks statutory rights. The demurrer is thus OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendant Parkwest requests that the Court strike page 50, lines 9 (general damages) and 10 (punitive damages), 11-12 (prejudgment and post judgment interest), 13 (costs of suit), and 15 (attorneys fees per Welf. & Inst. Code §15657) in the SAC. Punitive damages Civil Code §3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . . The Court in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95, found that [s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Civil Code §3294(c)(1). As the Court noted in College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 713, Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to require that, where malice is based on a defendants conscious disregard of a plaintiffs rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. The Court in College Hospital held further that despicable conduct refers to circumstances that are base, vile, or contemptible. Id. at 725 (citation omitted). In order to be entitled to the heightened remedies set forth in the Elder Abuse Act, Welfare & Institutions Code §15657, the plaintiff must establish recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse by clear and convincing evidence. As stated above, the Court finds that the allegations are sufficient as to the first cause of action for elder abuse, including reckless misconduct. Attorneys fees In light of the ruling on the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action, there is no basis to strike the prayer for attorneys fees. General damages In light of the ruling on the demurrer as to the first cause of action, there is no basis to strike the prayer for attorneys fees. Prejudgment and post judgment interest and costs of suit Defendant does not address in the memorandum of points and authorities. Further, in light of the ruling on the demurrer, there is no basis to strike the prayer for interest and costs. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED. ORDER The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first and second causes of action in the SAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant Parkwest is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.