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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 02/13/2020 10:40 AM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by C. Monroe,Deputy Clerk
20STCV05888
Assigned for all purposes to: Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Judicial Officer: Michael Linfield
Joseph R. Manning, Jr., Esq. (State Bar Ko. 223381)
MANNING LAW, APC
20062 SW Birch Street, Ste. 200
Newport Beach, CA 92660
Office: (949) 200-8755
Fax: (866) 843-8308 ffice.corn
DisabilityRights@manning lawo
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Attorney for Plaintiff CESAR COTTO
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
9 Case No.:
CESAR COTTO, an individual
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Plaintiff, Complaint For Damages And Injunctive Relief
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For:
V.
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GREEN OLIVE ENTERPRISES, INC., a 1. VIOLATIONS OF THE UNRUH CIVIL
13 California corporation; and DOES 1-10, RIGHTS ACT, CALIFORNIA CIVIL
inclusive, CODE tj 51 et seq.
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff CESAR COTTO (" Plaintiff") alleges the following upon information and belief
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based upon personal knowledge:
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INTRODUCTION
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1. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who requires screen
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reading software to read website content using a computer. Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
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"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
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definition of blindness in that they have a visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to
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20 x 200. Some blind people who meet this definition have limited vision. Others have no
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COMPLAINT
I
I vision.
2 2. Plaintiffbrings this civil rights action against GREEN OLIVE ENTERPRISES,
3 INC., a California corporation, (" Defendant" ) for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and
4 operate its website (hereinafter the "Website" or "Defendant's Website" which shall refer to
5 greenoliveca.corn, and any other website operated by or controlled by Defendant as well as
6 any third party content which is located on or used in connection with greenoliveca.corn and
7 any other website operated by or controlled by Defendant, for the purposes described herein)
8 to be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-
9 impaired people. Defendant's denial of full and equal access to the Website and therefore
10 denial of its products and services offered thereby and in conjunction with its brick-and-mortar
11 locations, is a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the California's Unruh Civil Rights Act
12 ('UCRA").
13 3. Plaintiff further brings this civil tights action against Defendant for failing to
14 design, construct, maintain, and operate its mobile application (" Mobile App" or "App") to be
15 fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired
16 people. Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its Mobile App also denies Plaintiff
17 products and services Defendant offers, which in conjunction with its physical locations is a
18 violation of Plaintiff s rights under the UCRA.
19 4. The California Legislature provided a clear and statewide mandate for the
20 elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities when it enacted the Unruh
21 Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code $ 51, er seq. Discrimination sought to be eliminated by the
22 Unruh Civil Rights Act ("UCRA") includes barriers to full integration, independent living, and
23 equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, v.hich then necessarily includes barriers
24 created by websites and other places of public accommodation that are inaccessible to blind
25 and visually-impaired individuals.
26 5. Because Defendant's Website and Mobile App are not equally, independently,
27 or fully accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers in violation of the UCRA,
28 Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies,
COMPLAINT
1 practices, and procedures so that Defendant's Website and Mobile App will become and
2 remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.
3 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4 6. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. This Court has
5 personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it conducted and continues to conduct substantial
6 business in the State of California, County of Los Angeles, and Defendant's offending
7 Website and Mobile App is available throughout California.
8 7. Venue is proper in this Court because Defendant conducts substantial business
9 in this County. Venue is also proper because a substantial portion of the conduct complained
10 of herein occurred in this District.
PARTIES
12 8. Plaintiff, at all times relevant and as alleged herein, is a resident of California,
13 County of Los Angeles. Plaintiff is legally blind and cannot use a computer without the
14 assistance of screen-reading software {othetwvise known as a "screen-reader"). However,
15 Plaintiff is a proficient user of the JAWS screen-reader and uses it to access the internet.
16 Plaintiffhas visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. During
17 Plaintiff's separate visits to Defendant*s Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple access
18 barriers which denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services
19 offered to the public and made available to the public on Defendant's Website. Due to the
20 widespread access barriers Plaintiff encountered on Defendant's Website, Plaintiff has been
21 deterred, on a regular basis, from accessing the Website.
22 9. Plaintiff did not encounter, nor does she in any way base her UCRA claims
23 alleged herein, upon the presence of any physical or architectural barrier in any public place of
24 accommodation.
25 10. Plaintiff is a tester in this litigation seeking to ensure compliance with federal
26 and state law. See Civil Rights Educ. and Enforcement Center v. Hospitality Props. Trust, 867
27 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017).
28 11. Plaintiff is also a consumer who wishes to access Defendant's good and
COMPLAINT
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services.
12. Plaintiff is being deterred from patronizing the Defendant's Website and brick-
and-mortar locations on particular occasions.
13. Plaintiff also attempted several times to navigate Defendant's Mobile App with
an iPhone. However, on each such occasion. Plaintiff had been denied the equal, full use, and
enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services offered by Defendant as a result of accessibility
barriers on its Mobile App.
14. If informed that the Website has been made accessible within the meaning of
the UCRA and the ADA, Plaintiff will return to the Website and Mobile App to test its
10 accessibility within 45 days to test such a claim of compliance with the law.
15. Plaintiff has standing to sue Defendant under the 1JCRA. As the California
12 Supreme Court explained in Angelucci v. Cenrury Supper Club, 41 Cal.4th 160 (2007),"an
13 individual plaintiff has standing under the [Unruh] Act if he or she has been the victim of the
14 defendant's discriminatory act." Id. at 173.
15 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges Defendant is a
16 California corporation, and has its principal place of business in Gardena, California.
17 Defendant operates brick-and-mortar locations in Los Angeles County, California.
18 Defendant's brick-and-mortar locations constitute places of public accommodation. Both
19 Defendant's Website and Mobile App provide consumers with access to an array of goods,
20 services, and information related to Defendant's brick-and-mortar locations including menu
21 item descriptions, catering options, food truck schedule and details, store location
22 information, and many other benefits.
23 17. The true names and capacities of the Defendants sued herein as DOES I
24 through 10, inclusive, are currently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues such Defendants
25 by fictitious names. Each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE is legally responsible
26 for the unlawful acts alleged herein. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint
27 to reflect the true names and capacities of the DOE Defendants when such identities become
28 known.
COMPLAINT
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18. At all relevant times as alleged herein, each and every Defendant was acting as
an agent and/or employee of each of the other Defendants and was acting within the course
and/or scope of said agency and/or employment with the full knowledge and consent of each
of the Defendants. Each of the acts and/or omissions complained of herein were alleged and
made known to, and ratified by, each of the other Defendants (Defendant, together with any
DOE Defendants, are collectively referred to hereinafter as "Defendant" or "Defendants" ).
VISIJALLY-IMPAIREII PFRSONS'CCESS TO THE INTERNET
19. The Internet has become a significant source of information, a portal, and a tool
for conducting business, doing everyday activities such as shopping, learning, banking,
10 researching, as well as many other activities for sighted, blind and visually-impaired persons
alike. As an essential tool for many Americans, when accessible, the Internet provides
12 individuals with disabilities great independence. Blind persons are able to access websites
13 using keyboards in conjunction with screen access sottware that vocalizes the visual
14 information found on a computer screen. This technology is known as screen-reading
15 software. Except for legally blind individuals whose residual vision allows them to use
16 magnification, screen-reading software is currently the only method a blind person can fully
17 and independently access the internet.
18 20. Blind and visually-impaired users of Windows computers and devices have
19 several screen-reading software programs available to them.
20 21. Job Access With Speech, otherwise known as "JAWS," is currently the most
21 popular, separately purchased screen-reading sottware program available for Windows.
22 22. For blind and visually-impaired users of Apple operating system-enabled
23 computers and devices, the screen-reading software available, pre-installed, and built into all
24 Apple products is VoiceOver. Apple's devices, including the iPhone, have the VoiceOver
25 program integrated into their iOS operating system for use by blind and visually-impaired
26 users.
27 23. For screen-reading software to function, the information on a website must be
28 capable of being rendered into text. If the website content is not capable of being rendered
COMP I.AINT
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into text, the blind or visually-impaired user is unable to access the same content available to
sighted users using their keyboards because they are unable to see the screen or manipulate a
mouse.
24. Screen-reading software is cunently the only method a blind or visually-
impaired person may independently access the internet, websites, and other digital content.
25. If the website content is not capable of being rendered into text, the blind or
visually-impaired user is unable to access and navigate the same content on a website or
mobile app that is available to sighted users.
26. There are well-established industry adopted guidelines for making websites
10 accessible to visually-impaired people who require screen-reading software programs. These
guidelines have existed for at least several years and are successfully followed by large
12 business entities who want to ensure their websites are accessible to all persons. The Web
13 Accessibility Initiative ("WAI"), an initiative of the World Wide Web Consortium developed
14 guidelines on website accessibility. Through Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, the federal
15 government also promulgated website accessibility standards. These guidelines, easily found
on the Internet, recommend several basic components for making websites accessible,
17 including, but not limited to: adding invisible Alt-text to graphics; ensuring all functions can
18 be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse: ensuring that image maps are accessible;
19 and adding headings so blind and visually-impaired people can navigate websites and mobile
20 applications just as sighted people do. Without these basic components, websites and mobile
21 applications are inaccessible to a blind person using screen-reading software.
22 27. Common barriers encountered by blind and visually-impaired persons include,
23 but are not limited to, the following:
24 a. A text equivalent for every non-text element is not provided;
25 b. Title frames with text are not provided for identification and navigation;
26 c. Equivalent text is not provided v hen using scripts;
27 d. Forms with the same information and functionality as for sighted
28 persons are not provided;
COMPLAINT
6
e. Information about the meaning and structure of content is not conveyed
by more than the visual presemation of content;
f. Text cannot be resized without assistive technology up to 200 percent
without loss of content or functionality;
g. If the content enforces a time limit, the user is not able to extend, adjust,
or disable it;
h. Web pages do not have titles that describe the topic or purpose;
i. The purpose of each link cannot be determined from the link text alone
or from the link text and its programmatically determined link context;
10 j. One or more keyboard operable user interface lacks a mode of operation
where the keyboard focus indicator is discernible;
12 k. The default human language of each web page cannot be
13 programmatically determined;
14 1. When a component receives focus, it may initiate a change in context;
15 m. Changing the setting of a user interface component may automatically
16 cause a change of context where the user has not been advised before
17 using the component;
18 n. Labels or instructions are not provided when content requires user input;
19 o. In content which is implemented by using markup languages, elements
20 do not have complete start and end tags, elements are not nested
21 according to their specifications, elements may contain duplicate
22 attributes andior any IDs are not unique;
23 p. Inaccessible Portable Documem Format (PDFs); and,
24 q. The name and role of all User Interface elements cannot be
25 programmatically determined; items that can be set by the user cannot
26 be programmatically set, and/or notification of changes to these items is
27 not available to user agents, including screen-reading software.
28 28. In California and the Ninth Circuit controlling law recognizes the viability of
COMPLAINT
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Unruh and Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") claims against commercial
website and mobile application owners and operators with regard to the accessibility of such
websites and mobile applications. Jfobies v. Doinino's Pizza, LLC, 17-55504, 2019 WL
190134(9th Cir. January 15, 2019) (Holding the ADA and UCRA apply to websites and
mobile applications, that imposing liability under Title III of the ADA and Unruh Act would
not violate Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, that the ADA is not impermissibly
vague in this context, that regulated parties have received fair notice of their obligations since
1996, that it was error to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and finally that an order
requiring compliance with WCAG 2.0 is a possible equitable remedy); Long v. Live Nation
10 8'orldwide, Inc., No. C16-1961 TSZ 2018 WL 3533338 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2018) (denying
Defendant's summary judgment motion based on voluntary cessation and mootness and
12 finding that defendant's website is subject to the accessibility regulations under the ADA as a
13 matter of law); Carroll v. Fedfinancial Fed. Credit Union, 2018 WL 3212023 (E.D. Va. June
14 25, 2018) (denying Defendant's Motion to Dismissed based on jurisdiction, Title III
15 applicability, and due process arguments); Haynes v. Hooters of Am., LLC, 17-13170, 2018
16 WL 3030840 (11th Cir. June 19, 2018) (holding that a private settlement agreement does not
17 moot a new web access claim by a different plaintiff); Gil v. SMG Holdings, No. I:18-cv-
18 20107 (S.D. Fl. May 28, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss and holding that mootness and
19 voluntary cessation defenses did not apply when defendant claimed it was already in the
20 process of correcting the barriers on its website); 71tttrston v. Midvale Corporation, et al., Los
21 Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC663214 (Judge Samantha P. Jessner) (May 17, 2018)
22 (granting plaintiff s summary judgment motion finding "a plain reading of the statute, as well
23 as the [DOJ'sj treatment of websites under the ADA, indicate that Defendant's website falls
within the categories of 'services, ... privileges. advantages, or accommodations of'
25 restaurant, which is a place of public accommodation under the ADA.'*); Castillo v, do-Ann
26 Stores, LLC, No. 5:17-cv-20110-KBB (N.D. Ohio February 13, 2018) (denying motion to
27 dismiss finding plaintiff has stated a cognizable website ADA claim and has standing, plaintiff
28 successfully alleged a nexus between defendant's website and its brick and mortar stores, and
COMPLAINT
8
the injunctive relief sought does not violate due process rights); Gathers v. I-B00-
FLOIVERS.corn, No. I:17-cv-10273 (Mass. February 12, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss
sought against ADA claims); Robles v. Yum.'rands, Inc. dib!a Pizza Hut, No. 2:16-cv-08211-
ODW(SS) at *15. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018) (Wright) (denying a motion for summary
judgment sought against ADA and California's Lnruh Civil Rights Act claims) (" Pizza Hut
cannot simply post a customer service phone number on its website and claim that it is in
compliance with the ADA unless it shows that a visually-impaired customer 'will not be
excluded, denied services, segregated or otherv ise treated differently'rom non-visually
impaired customers who are able to enjoy full access to Pizza Hut's website" [citations
10 omitted]); Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, No. I:17-cv-00767-JBW-RLM (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 21, 2017) (Weinstein, J.} (Memorandum and Order approving settlement of website
12 accessibility case in the form of judgment); Brooke v. A-Ventures, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-2868-
13 HRH at 19. (A.Z. Nov. 22, 2017) (granting declaratory judgment that defendant's website did
14 not comply with ADA; defendant enjoined to ensure equal access) ("[D]efendant was in
15 violation of the Americans with Disability Act because its hotel reservations website did not
16 afford disabled persons equal access to defendant's public accommodation"); Rios v. New York
17 Company, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-04676-ODW (AGr) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017) (Wright)
18 (denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings sought against Unruh Act claims) (" [T]he
Court finds that this case is not unique, 'as federal courts have resolved effective
20 communication claims under the ADA in a variety of contexts— including cases involving
21 allegations of unequal access to goods, benefits, and services provided through
22
websites.'obby
Lobby, 2017 WL 2957736, at *7'"}; Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-
23 116-JL at 21. (C.D. N.H. November 8, 2017) (denying a motion to dismiss sought against
24 ADA claims) ("[Plaintiffs] rely on Title III of the ADA as governing the defendant's potential
25 liability and invoke compliance with the WCAG 2.0 AA standards as a sufficient condition,
26 but not a necessary condition, for such compliance, and therefore as a potential remedy.");
27 Gorecki v. Dave d'c Buster's, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01138-PSG-AGR (C.D. Cal. October 10, 2017)
28 (Gutierrez, P.) (denying a motion for summary judgment sought against ADA and California's
COMPLAINT
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Unruh Civil Rights Act claims) ("a finding of liability regarding the Website's compliance
with the ADA does not require sophisticated technical expertise beyond the ability of the
Court" ); Kayla Reed v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-03877-MWF-SK, at ~9. (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (Fitzgerald) (denying a motion to dismiss sought against ADA and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act claims) (" The DOJ's position that the ADA applies to
websites being clear, it is no matter that the ADA and the DOJ fail to describe exactly how any
given website must be made accessible to people with visual impairments. Indeed, this is often
the case with the ADA's requirements, because the ADA and its implementing regulations are
intended to give public accommodations maximum flexibility in meeting the statute's
10 requirements. This flexibility is a feature, not a bug, and certainly not a violation of due
process."); Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2017 WL 3278898, at *12,
12 *15-*18 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. I, 2017} (Weinstein, J.); Gomez v. Lego Systems, Inc., Case I:17-cv-
13 21628-CMA (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2017} (denying a motion to dismiss an ADA claim alleging an
14 inaccessible commercial website) [ECF t)40]: Thurston v. Chino Commercial Bank, NA., No.
15 CV 17-01078 BRO (JCx), 2017 WL 3224681, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) (citing Gorecki);
16 Markett v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC, No. I:17-cv-00788-KBF, slip op. at 4-6 [ECF tt33]
17 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2017); Gorecki v. Hohhy'obby S'tores, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01131-JFW-SK,
18 2017 WL 2957736 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017) (Walter, J.) (denying a motion to dismiss sought
19 against ADA and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act claims) ("[T]his is a relatively
20 straightforward claim that Hobby Lobby failed to provide disabled individuals full and equal
21 enjoyment of goods and services... by not maintaining a fully accessible website. There is
22 nothing unique about this case, as federal courts have resolved effective communication claims
23 under the ADA in a wide variety of contexts — including cases involving allegations of unequal
24 access to goods, benefits and services provided through websites."); Gil v. IVinn-Dixie Stores,
25 Inc., No. 16-23020-Civ-Scola, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2017 WL 2547242, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 13,
26 2017) (finding that the defendant, a large supermarket chain, had violated the plainti f1" s rights
27 under the ADA by failing to maintain an accessible website after a non-jury trial); Frazier v.
28 Ameriserv Financial Bank, Nos. 2:16-cv-01898-AJS (Lead Case), 17cv0031 [ECF it)07], slip
COMPLAINT
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op. at 20 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017) (denying a motion to dismiss an ADA claim alleging an
inaccessible commercial website}: Frarder v. Churchill Downs Inc., Nos. 2:16-cv-01898-AJS
(Lead Case), 2:16-cv-0007 (Member Case) [ECF ¹107] slip op. at 20 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017)
(same); Omaha teaks.corn, Inc. v. Access Novv, Inc., et al., No. 8:17-cv-00060-LSC-CRZ
[ECF ¹9-1] (D. Neb. Apr. 17, 2017} (consent decree); Access Now, Inc., et al. v.
Omahasteaks.corn, Inc., Nos. 2:16-cv-01898-AJS (Lead Case), 2:17-cv-00269-AJS (Member
Case) [ECF ¹99] (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2017 (satne); Gil v. 1Finn-Dixie Stores Inc., — F. Supp.
3d —, No. 16-23020-Civ-Scola, 2017 WL 2609330 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2017) (denying a
motion for judgment on the pleadings sought against an ADA claim alleging an inaccessible
10 commercial website); Nat 'I Ass'n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ., Case 3:15-cv-30023-MGM,
2016 WL 3561622, at *12-*20 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) (Robertson, Mag. J.) (recommending
12 the denial of a motion to dismiss or stay predicated on the primary jurisdiction doctrine),
13 adopted in Nat'l Ass 'n of the Deaf v. Harvard Univ,, Case 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL
14 6540446, at *1-*3 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2016) (Mastroianni, J.); Nat'l Ass'n of the Deaf v.
15 Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., Case 3:15- cv-30024-MGM, 2016 WL 3561631, at *1 (D. Mass.
16 Feb. 9, 2016) (Robertson, Mag. J.) (recommending the denial of a motion to dismiss or stay
17 predicated on the primary jurisdiction doctrine), adopted in Nat'l Ass'n of the Deaf v.
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., Case 3:15-cv-30024-MGM, 2016 WL 6652471, at *1 (D. Mass.
19 Nov. 4, 2016) (Mastroianni, J.}: Edward Davis v. Orlando tFilshire Investments Ltd., et al.,
20 No. 5:15-cv-01738-MWF-KK, slip op. at 10 [ECF ¹17] (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) (Fitzgerald,
21 J.) (denying motion to dismiss in a website accessibility case) ("the Court concludes that the
22 Complaint sufficiently alleges that the inaccessibility of the Website impedes the full and
23 equal enjoyment of the Hotel."); Sipe v. Huntington rVational Bank, 15-CV-1083, Doc No. 21
24 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss based on claims the DOJ had not yet
25 issued regulations governing website accessibility), Nat 'I Fed'n of the Blind v. Scribd, Inc., 98
F. Supp.3d 565, 576 (D. Vt. 2015) (denying a motion to dismiss an ADA claim against a
27 commercial website operator); James Patrick Brown v, BPS Direct, LLC, et al., Case No.
28 LACV 14-04622 JAK (JEMx) slip op. at 4-7 [ECF ¹30] (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014) (Krondstadt,
COMP LALNT
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J.) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss while relying on the Target decision as
"persuasive", and holding "the Complaint does aBege that Bass Pro Shops is a chain of brick-
and-mortar stores and that BassPro.cons is a website providing information about Bass Pro
Shops products, offers, and locations.... [and that] a nexus could be established here through
discovery."); Penney v. Kohl's 't Stores. Inc., et al., No. 8:14-cv-01100-CJC-DFM [ECF
Dep
¹12] slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014) (Carney, J.) (denying a motion to dismiss and
stating, "Thus, the Complaint states plausible facts that establish the requisite nexus between
the challenged service and the place of public accommodation."); National Ass'n of the Deaf v.
Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012) (excluding web-based services would
10 "run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and vvould severely frustrate Congress's intent that
individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and advantages
12 available indiscriminately to other members of the general public" ); id. at 200-01 (" [T]he
13 legislative history of the ADA makes clear that Congress intended the ADA to adapt to
14 changes in technology.") (quoting H.R. Rep. 101-485(ll), at 108 (1990)) (" [T]he Committee
15 intends that the types of accommodation and services provided to individuals with disabilities,
16 under all of the titles of this bill, should keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of the
17 times."); Shields v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts UX Inc., 279 F.R.D. 529, 559 (C.D. Cal.
18 2011) (rejecting as "unpersuasive" Disney's argument that "there is no accepted accessibility
standard" and the argument that the DOJ has yet to determine what standards to apply to
20 websites and stating, "The lack of a widely accepted standard for website accessibility does
21 not preclude injunctive relief that would improve access to Defendants'ebsites by the
22 visually-impaired."); Nat 'I Federation of the IJ/ind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953
23 P4.D. Cal. 2006) ("To limit the ADA to discrimination in the provision of services occurring
24 on the premises of a public accommodation would contradict the plain language of the
25 statute."); id. at 953-54 ("consistent with the plain language of the statute, no court has held
26 that under the nexus theory a plaintiff has a cognizable claim only if the challenged service
27 prevents physical access to a public accommodation. Further, it is clear that the purpose of the
28 statute is broader than mere physical access— seeking to bar actions or omissions which impair
COMPLAINT
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a disabled person's "full enjoyment" of services or goods of a covered accommodation. 42
U.S.C. tj 12182(a). Indeed, the statute expressly states that the denial of equal "participation"
or the provision of "separate benefit[sj" are actionable under Title III. See 42 U.S.C. tj
12182(b)(1)(A)."); cf. Rindel v. Rusted, No, 2017 WL 432839, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. I, 2017)
(granting a permanent injunction against the Ohio Secretary of State based on the accessibility
of the state's website under Title II of the ADA and requiiing accessibility); Rindel v. Rusted,
No. 17-3207 (6th Cir., Nov. 13, 2017) (defendant bears the burden of production and
persuasion as to affirmative defenses such as fundamental alteration and subject matter of state
election laws do not relieve defendant of these burdens); Davis v. BMIIBNB Travelware
10 company No. CIVDS1504682 WL2935482 (Cal.Super. March 21, 2016) (granting motion for
summary judgment for plaintiff and ordering that defendant's website be made WCAG 2.0
12 compliant and awarding Unruh damages in favor of plaintiff).
13 29. Each of Defendant's violations of the ADA is likewise a violation of the
14 UCRA. Indeed, the UCRA provides that any violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of
15 the UCRA. Cal. Civ. Code fs 51(f).
16 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
17 30. Defendant offers its commercial Website and Mobile App to the public.
18 31. The Website and Mobile App offer features which should allow all consumers
19 to access the goods and services offered in connection with its brick-and-mortar locations.
20 32. The Website provides consumers wdth access to an array of goods, services, and
21 information related to Defendant's brick-and-mortar locations which include, but are not
22 limited to, the following: menu item descriptions, catering options, food truck schedule and
23 details, store location information, and many other benefits, as well as access to various other
24 goods, services, and privileges Defendant offers on the Mobile App.
25 33. Based on information and belief, it is Defendant's policy and practice to deny
26 Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant's Website and
27 Mobile App, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and
28 integrated with Defendant's brick-and-mortar locations and otherwise.
COMPLALNT
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34. Due to Defendant's failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website
and Mobile App, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied
equal access to Defendant's brick-and-mortar locations and the numerous goods, services,
privileges, and benefits offered to the public through Defendant's Website and Mobile App.
35. Plaintiff cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading
software.
36. However, Plaintiff is a proficient user of the JAWS screen-reader and uses it to
access the Internet.
37. Plaintiff has visited Defendant's Website on separate occasions using the
10 JA WS screen-reader.
38. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple
12 accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to:
13 a. The home page has graphics. links, and buttons that are not labeled or
14 are incorrectly labeled, or lack alternative text ("Alt-text" ). Alt-text is
15 invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web
16 accessibility requires that Alt-text be coded with each picture so that
17 screen-reading software can speak the Alt-text where a sighted user sees
18 pictures. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a
19 text box shows when the cursor moves over the picture. The lack of
20 Alt-text on these graphics prevents screen-readers from accurately
21 vocalizing a description of the graphics.
22 b. Plaintiff encountered multiple unlabeled or mislabeled buttons and
23 links. Without descriptive alternate text, Plaintiffs, and other screen-
24 reader users, have no clue about the purpose or function of the button or
25 link;
26 c. Plaintiff encountered multiple pages containing insufficient navigational
27 headings requiring Plaintiff to expend substantial additional time to
28 access information; and,
CQMPLAINT
14
d. Plaintiff was unable to browse the menu because the menu links and
descriptions were inaccessible to screen reading technology, and
experienced difficulty in the labeling of the menu.
39. Due to the unlabeled buttons, lack of Alt-text, the structure of the headings and
Website, cursor traps, and other barriers, Plaintiff was unable to fully and independently access
the Website when visiting for the dual purpose of testing for compliance with the UCRA and
ADA and to view menu items and find the closest brick-and-mortar location.
40. Since as early as September of'019, and until the current date, during
Plaintiffs separate visits to the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which
10 denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities. goods, and services offered to the public
and made available to the public on the Website.
12 41. In the course of several separate attempts to utilize Defendant's Mobile App,
13 Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which denied Plaintiff full and equal access to
14 the facilities, goods, and services offered to the public and made available to the public on
15 Defendant's Mobile App.
16 42. Plaintiff also cannot use a mobile device without assistance of screen-reading
17 software.
18 43. Plaintiff is a proficient Voice-Over user and regularly uses an iPhone to access
19 online content found on websites and mobile applications.
20 44. Plaintiff also attempted to use the Mobile App with an iPhone on several
21 separate occasions using the Voice-Over screen reader.
22 45. In the course of several separate attempts to utilize Defendant's Mobile App,
23 Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers which denied Plaintiff full and equal access to
the facilities, goods, and services offered to the public and made available to the public on
25 Defendant's Mobile App.
26 46. Since at least as early as September of 2019, and until the current date, Plaintiff
27 attempted to access Defendant's Mobile App, sought additional information about Defendant's
28 goods and services offered, and attempted to do business with Defendant using Defendant's
COMPLAINT
15
IOS Mobile App. Plaintiff was unable to access information contained on the Mobile App or
browse the Mobile App due to accessibility barriers that made the Mobile App inaccessible.
Plaintiff was unable to do business with Defendant because of the accessibility barriers
contained on the Mobile App and was unable browse Defendant's offerings using the Mobile
App due to the inaccessibility of the Mobile App. While trying to navigate
Defendants'obile
App, Plaintiff encountered access barriers similar to those encountered on
Defendants'ebsite.
The accessibility barriers included, but were not limited to:
a. A lack of Alt-text for images and graphics, inaccessible forms,
unlabeled or mislabeled buttons, inaccessible image maps, and a lack of
10 any adequate prompting and labeling;
b. Inadequate navigational headings. Headings are essential for screen
12 reader users to easily understand the page structure and to navigate.
13 Without headings, screen reader users are forced to painstakingly read
14 the entire page from beginning to end, rather than jump between
15 headings to streamline navigation;
16 c. Plaintiff was unable to create an account because of an inaccessible
17 signup system;
18 d. Plaintiff was unable to make a purchase because of an inaccessible
19 checkout system; and,
20
e. Plaintiff was unable to find a brick-and-mortar location because the
21
interactive map was inaccessible.
22
47. Due to the widespread access barriers Plaintiff encountered on the Website and
23
Mobile App, Plaintiff has been deterred, on a regular basis, from accessing the Website and
24
Mobile App. Similarly, the access barriers Plaintiff encountered on the Website and Mobile
25
App have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant's brick-and-mortar locations.
26
48. If the Website and Mobile App were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could
27
independently navigate the Website and Mobile App as sighted individuals do.
28
COKIPLAJNT
16
49. Having attempted to use the Website Mobile App, Plaintiff has actual
knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently
unusable by blind and visually-impaired people.
50. There are readily available, well established guidelines, available to Defendant
on the Internet, for designing, constructing, and maintaining websites to be accessible to blind
and visually-impaired persons. Other large business entities have used these guidelines, or
have otherwise been able, to make their websites accessible, including but not limited to:
adding Alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard.
In addition, incorporating these basic changes and adding certain elements to Defendant's
10 Website and Mobile App would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant's business nor
would it result in an undue burden to Defendant. Because maintaining and providing a website
12 where all functions can be performed using a keyboard would provide full, independent and
13 equal access to all consumers to the Website and Mobile App, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
14 has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination including, but not limited to the following
15 policies or practices:
16 a. Construction and maintenance of a website and a mobile app that are
17 inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff;
18 b. Failure to construct and maintain a website and a mobile app that is
19 sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired
20 individuals, including Plaintiff; and,
21 c. Failure to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of
22 substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired
23 consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class.
24 51. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies for maintenance
25 and operation of the Website and Mobile App, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably
26 calculated to make its website fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by,
27 blind and other visually-impaired consumers, including Plaintiff.
28 52. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will
CQMPLALVT
17
continue to be unable to independently use Defendant's Website and Mobile App in violation
of their rights.
3 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
4 VIOLATION OF THE UNRL'H CIVIL RICHTS ACT. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 8
51 et sett. ICRKENOLIVECA.COM1
(By Plaintiff Against All Defendants)
53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs alleged above
and each and every other paragraph in this Complaint necessary or helpful to state this cause of
action as though fully set forth herein.
10 54. California Civil Code ( 51 et seq. guarantees equal access for people with
disabilities to the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, and services of all
12 business establishments of any kind whatsoever. Defendant is systematically violating the
13 UCRA, Civil Code ( 51 et seq.
14 55. Defendant's brick-and-mottar locations are "business establishments" within
15 the meaning of the Civil Code ( 51 et seq. Defendant generates revenue through its Website.
16 Defendant's Website is a service provided by Defendant that is inaccessible to patrons who are
17 blind or visually-impaired like Plaintiff. This inaccessibility denies blind and visually-
impaired patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant
19 makes available to the non-disabled public. Defendant is violating the UCRA, Civil Code ( 51
20 et seq., by denying visually-impaired customers the goods and services provided on its
21 Website. These violations are ongoing.
22 56. Defendants'ctions constitute intentional discrimination against Plaintiff on the
23 basis of a disability, in violation of the UCR.A, Civil. Code ss 51 et seq., because of the
24 following: Defendant has constructed a website that is inaccessible to Plaintiff; Defendant
25 maintains the Website in this inaccessible format; and, Defendant has failed to take action to
26 correct and remove these barriers even after being on notice of the discrimination that such
27 barriers cause to persons with Plaintiff's disability.
28 57. Defendant is also violating the UCRA, Civil Code ) 51 et seq. because the
COMPLAINT
18
conduct alleged herein violates various provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. ) 12181 et seq. as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-325), as
set forth above. Section 51(fl of the Civil Code provides that a violation of the right of any
individual under the ADA also constitutes a violation of the UCRA.
58. The actions of Defendant violate LCRA, Civil Code II 51 et seq., and Plaintiff
is therefore entitled to injunctive relief remedying the discrimination.
59. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory minimum damages pursuant to Civil Code tj 52
for each and every offense.
60. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys'ees and costs.
10 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATION OF THE UNRL H CIVIL RIGHTS ACT. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE ti
12 51 et sett. (GREEN O
Related Content
in Los Angeles County
Case
S. G., VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Jul 23, 2024 |
Claims Involving Mass Tort (General Jurisdiction) |
Claims Involving Mass Tort (General Jurisdiction) |
24STCV18236
Ruling
JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ CASTILLO, ET AL. VS FRANCISCO CADENA, ET AL.
Jul 30, 2024 |
21STCV18162
Case Number:
21STCV18162
Hearing Date:
July 30, 2024
Dept:
56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ CASTILLO,
et al.
,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FRANCISCO CADENA,
et al.
,
Defendants.
CASE NO.: 21SCTV18162
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Date: July 30, 2024
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept. 56
Jury Trial: January 27, 2025
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America (collectively, Hyundai or Defendants)
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action was filed on May 13, 2021 and arises out of an automobile accident in which a Hyundai automobile (the Vehicle) driven by Defendant Francisco Cadena, struck Plaintiff Jose Castillo and decedent Maria Perez.
The currently operative second amended complaint (the SAC) alleges claims against Defendants for: (1) negligence; (2) product liability; and (3) wrongful death and survival action, arising, among other things, from alleged defects in the Vehicle.
On June 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion (the Motion) for leave to file Third Amended Complaint (the TAC). On July 10, 2024, Hyundai filed its opposition papers to the Motion and on July 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
California
Code of Civil Procedure
(CCP) section 473 permits the trial court in its discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in the furtherance of justice.
(
See
CCP § 473, subd. (a).)
CCP section 576 provides that any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.
(CCP § 576.)
There is a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the pleadings at any stage of the proceeding.
(
Berman v. Bromberg
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945.)
An application to amend a pleading is addressed to the trial judges sound discretion.
(
Id
.)
If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.
(
Morgan v. Superior Court of Cal. In and For Los Angeles County
(1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)
Where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party, the liberal rule of allowance prevails.
(
Higgins v. Del Faro
(1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564.)
Under California Rules of Court (CRC) rule 3.1324, a motion for leave to amend a pleading must be accompanied by a declaration that sets forth: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made sooner.
(CRC, r. 3.1324(b).)
Plaintiffs have met these requirements.
In support of the Motion, Plaintiffs counsel declares that Plaintiffs obtained the facts underlying the proposed additional allegations of defects from discovery responses and test results received by Plaintiffs since his retention as co-counsel to Plaintiffs on February 13, 2024.
(Declaration of John F. Medlar, Jr. (Medlar Decl.).
In opposition to the Motion, Hyundai takes the position that Plaintiffs purportedly recently-obtained evidence in support of the amendment was or should have been known to Plaintiffs at least ten months before the Motion was filed and that therefore the Motion was not timely filed.
Hyundais primary argument, however, is that the Motion is only being filed as a delaying tactic to avoid Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (the MSJ), which is set for hearing on August 21, 2024.
If the Motion is granted, the MSJ, which is directed to the SAC, will become moot and will be taken off-calendar.
The MSJ was filed on February 7, 2024 and set for hearing on April 24, 2024.
On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application to continue the hearing on the MSJ (the Ex Parte), on the ground that they needed to obtain further discovery upon which to oppose the MSJ.
Although Hyundai opposed the continuance, the Court granted the Ex Parte as it is required to do under CCP section 437c(h). which provides:
If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order that may be just.
The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.
The Court granted the Ex Parte and continued the MSJ hearing to the current date of August 21, 2024.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs did file opposition papers to the MSJ on June 20, 2024 the same date that the Motion was filed.
Plaintiffs assert that they have discovered new facts relating to a condition known as brake pedal drift, which they have determined to be the cause of the accident underlying this lawsuit, and that the pleadings need to be amended to allege these new facts.
Hyundai contends that Plaintiffs either knew or should have known of these additional claimed facts at least ten months before the Motion was filed, and that therefore the Motion should be denied as untimely.
The Court disagrees.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have provided sufficient credible evidence that amendment of the SAC and filing of the proposed TAC are warranted under the law.
The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion and orders Plaintiffs to file the TAC within five (5) court days of the date of this order.
If the TAC is filed, it will be the operative pleading in the case and the current MSJ will be MOOT.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 30th day of April 2024
Hon. Holly J. Fujie
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
REBECCA CASTILLO VS BIG ALS LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Jul 25, 2024 |
23PSCV03859
Case Number:
23PSCV03859
Hearing Date:
July 25, 2024
Dept:
6
Plaintiff Rebecca Castillos Request for Entry of Default Judgment
Defendant: Big Als LLC
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
This is an ADA/Unruh case. On December 13, 2023, plaintiff Rebecca Castillo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Big Als LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging one cause of action for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. On February 6, 2024, default was entered against Defendant. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $9,074.00, including $8,000.00 in damages, $570.00 in attorney fees, and $504.00 in costs. The Court finds Plaintiffs damage request is excessive.
Plaintiff cites the case of
Johnson v. Guedoir
(E.D. Cal. 2016) 218 F.Supp.3d 1096 (
Johnson
)
as the basis for requesting $4,000.00 in deterrence damages plus $4,000.00 for encountering the barriers, for a total demand of $8,000.00. (Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 5-6; Summary of the Case, 2:1-8.)
Johnson
does not support this outcome. The court in
Johnson
found $8,000.00 in statutory damages was warranted based on two incidents wherein the plaintiff was deterred on one date and then personally encountered the barriers on a different date. (
Johnson, supra,
218 F.Supp.3d at p. 1100.)
Here, Plaintiff states that she attempted to access Defendants goods and services on November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff then confusingly states that she was deterred from visiting Defendants brick-and-mortar location in Ontario on November 2, 2023 and November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 14.) It is unclear how Plaintiff was deterred on November 2, 2023 before she visited the website on November 8, 2023. (See Castillo Decl., ¶¶ 5, 14, Ex. 1.) Additionally, Plaintiffs browsing history only shows her having attempted to visit Defendants website on November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., Ex. 1.) At most, the Court finds evidence of one violation on November 8, 2023, which adds up to $4,000.00, not $8,000.00.
The Court also finds that, based on the reduced damage calculation, Plaintiffs request for attorney fees must also be reduced. (Local Rule 3.214.) The Court finds the correct amount of attorney fees that Plaintiff can recover here is $330.00.
Additionally, Plaintiff did not complete items 4, 5, or 6 of Judicial Council Form CIV-100. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 585.5, 587; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6400 et seq.)
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.
Ruling
LODIE POLLARD ET AL VS HAIG M BAZOIAN ET AL
Jul 26, 2024 |
BC718464
Case Number:
BC718464
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT A
CONTINUANCE
JULY 26, 2024
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # BC718464
MP:
The City of Los Angeles (Defendant)
RP:
Lodie Pollard, Luna Skyy Pollard, Jayden Devaughn Carter, and Pink Selkin (Plaintiffs)
NOTICE:
The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ANALYSIS:
On July 19, 2024 the Los Angeles Superior Court suffered a cyber security attack which resulted in the significant impairment of most Court systems. Due to this complication, additional time is required for the Court to review these motions and issue a tentative ruling. The Court, on its own motion, thus continues the motions for summary judgment brought by the City of Los Angeles to August 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.
---
RULING
:
In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records.
ORDER
The City of Los Angeless Motions for Summary Judgment
came on regularly for hearing on Jukly 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:
THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE CONTINUED TO AUGUST 14, 2024 AT 9:00 AM.
ALL OTHER DATES REMAIN.
DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________
F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Ruling
DEBORAH CARSON, ET AL. VS RED LINE COURIER SERVICE, A BUSINESS ENTITY FORM UNKNOWN, ET AL.
Jul 26, 2024 |
21STCV27576
Case Number:
21STCV27576
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
32
PLEASE NOTE
:
Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.
If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at
sscdept32@lacourt.org
indicating that partys intention to submit.
The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.
If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.
Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court
.
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPT
:
32
HEARING DATE
:
July 26, 2024
CASE NUMBER
:
21STCV27576
MOTIONS
:
Petition for Minors Compromise
MOVING PARTY:
Petitioner Deborah Carson
OPPOSING PARTY:
Unopposed
The Court has reviewed the petition filed on July 3, 2024 by Petitioner Deborah Carson (Petitioner) on behalf of Claimant Chase Carson, age 11.
The Court denies the petition without prejudice for the following reason:
The Court previously instructed Petitioner to complete item 10c describing the terms of the settlement. (See Min. Order, 7/1/24.) In this revised petition, item 10c is not complete.
Petitioner has cured all other defects identified in the previous petition.
Accordingly, the Court denies the petition without prejudice.
Petitioner shall give notice and file a proof of service of such.
Ruling
ENGELVER ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ CATALAN VS STEVEN MAURICE KANE, ET AL.
Jul 25, 2024 |
23TRCV03725
Case Number:
23TRCV03725
Hearing Date:
July 25, 2024
Dept:
8
Tentative Ruling
HEARING DATE: July 25, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV03725
CASE NAME: Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan v. Steven Maurice Kane, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Steven Maurice Kane
TRIAL DATE: Not Set.
MOTION: (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (3) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (4) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission (5) Request for Sanctions Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED if not already mooted (2) MOOTED (3) GRANTED in part and DENIED in part (4) GRANTED if not mooted (5) $2,000 to be awarded to Plaintiff. I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff, Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants, Steven Maurice Kane, Richard I Kane, Darlene Ryan, and DOES 1 through 100. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence. The parties meet and confer process and background of requests, responses, and such were outlined in the Courts June tentative ruling. B. Procedural
On April 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed these motions to compel further. On May 30, 2024, Defendant Kane filed an opposition briefs. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply briefs. On June 11, 2024, these motions along with the IDC were continued to June 26, 2024. On June 26, 2024, this Court conducted an IDC in light of the Courts posted tentative rulings, and CONTINUED the hearing on the motions to July 25, 2024 if any lingering issues remained after the IDC. II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Compel Further The Court provided a discussion of the legal standards to be applied for discovery and sanctions motions in its June 2024 tentative ruling. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories Form Interrogatory No. 16.9: Form Interrogatory No. 16.9 asks whether Defendant Kane or anyone acting on Defendant Kanes behalf have any document concerning claims for personal injuries made before or after the incident by a plaintiff in this case, and asks the responder, that if s, for each plaintiff, states: (a) the source of each document; (b) the date each claim arose; (c) the nature of each claim; and (d) the name, address, and telephone number of the person who has each document. Plaintiff seeks further responses to Form Interrogatory No. 16.9 on the grounds that Plaintiff argues he is entitled to know what Defendants contentions are and where he stands on each issue related the case. The Court discussed its agreement with the principal thrust of the motion as to prior claims evidence at the IDC. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories Special Interrogatory No. 55: Special Interrogatory No. 55 asks Defendant Kane to identify any automobile collisions he had been involved in during the three (3) years prior to the incident. Although Defendant Kane originally responded with numerous objections, it appears that he is submitting to further responses as no opposition brief was filed, and in his response to Request for an IDC, he noted that he will serve further responses to this interrogatory. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether Defendant has served the offered further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents RFP No. 4: RFP No. 4 asks for Defendant Kane to produce all documents related to all cellular and telephone records, including billing statements of his, on the day of the incident. Defendant Kane objected to this request indicating that such would violate his privacy rights. The Court discussed the request and objection at the IDC. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFP No. 12: RFP No. 12 asks Defendant Kane to produce all documents involving ISO claim searches conducted with regard to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks further discovery responses because he argues that if Defendant Kane conducted an ISO search on Plaintiff, he must produce said documents as they are not work product by the attorney. The Court disagrees. At the IDC the Court discussed this RFP as well. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFP No. 13, 17, and 18: RFP No. 13 asks Defendant Kane to produce all documents relating to his sub rosa surveillance on Plaintiff including photos, videos and reports. RFP No. 17 asks Defendant Kane to produce any and all film and/or video footage in his possession, custody, or control (or in the possession, custody, or control of his agents) of Plaintiff at any time. Lastly, RFP NO. 18 asks Defendant Kane to produce any and all audio recordings in his possession, custody, or control (or in the possession, custody, or control of his agents) of Plaintiff at any time. Defendant Kane objected to this information on the grounds that the request was in violation of Evidence Code section 785 and that it sought information protected by the attorney work product doctrine and attorney client privilege. The Court discussed this issue at the IDC and defense counsel was to inquire as to whether any surveillance videos would be approved by defendants principal to be disclosed in the spirit of attempting to resolve the case. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the principal agreed and whether further argument on this issue is required. RFP No. 16: RFP No. 16 seeks documents from Defendant Kane pertaining to claims made by any other person against him, pertaining to any motor vehicle accidents, prior to the incident. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Kanes prior driving history and claims made against him prior to the incident are relevant to the underlying incident and reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence. At the IDC the COurt discussed the potential for narrowing the time perido for this RFP and the potential relevancy of the same. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether Defendant provided a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission RFA No. 6: RFA No. 6 asks Defendant Kane to admit he has conducted an ISO search on Plaintiff. Defendant Kane objected to this arguing it is vague, ambiguous, and violates the applicable code of procedure section 2034.010, et seq. pertaining to the timing of expert witness discovery. The Court disagreed as discussed at the IDC, so at oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFA No. 7 and 8: RFA No. 7 asks Defendant Kane to admit he has sub rosa photos, videos, and reports on Plaintiff. RFA No. 8 asks Defendant Kne to admit he has conducted sub rose surveillance of Plaintiff. Defendant Kane objected to this arguing it is vague, ambiguous, and violates the applicable code of procedure section 2034.010, et seq. pertaining to the timing of expert witness discovery. Defendant Kane also objected noting that the request is in violation of Evidence Code section 785. The Court disagreed as discussed at the IDC, so at oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. B. Sanctions Additionally, Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions in connection with each of its four motions to compel further responses. For the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories and Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions as imposed on Defendant Kane and/or his counsel of record in the amount of $1,260 as to each motion ($2,520 total for the two.) At the IDC, the Court discussed the reasonableness of the claimed hours as well as the claimed justifications for several of the objections. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss the Courts tentative ruling that the Court might award $1,000 per motion ($2,000 total for the two motions), to be paid to Plaintiffs counsel on or before August 7, 2024. Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice.
Ruling
MUGIHIKO MORIJIRI, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL. VS 24 CMN LLC, A BUSINESS ENTITY, EXACT FORM UNKNOWN, ET AL.
Jul 29, 2024 |
23STCV20959
Case Number:
23STCV20959
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles Central District
Department 53
mugihiko morijiri
, et al.;
Plaintiffs
,
vs.
24 cmn llc
, et al.;
Defendants
.
Case No.:
23STCV20959
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Time:
10:00 a.m.
[tentative] Order
RE:
defendants motion to strike portions of complaint
MOVING PARTIES:
Defendants 24 CMN, LLC and CYN, LLC
RESPONDING PARTIES:
Plaintiffs
Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiri
Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendants 24 CMN, LLC and CYN, LLC (Defendants) move the court for an order striking the prayer for punitive damages (Compl., Prayer, p. 23:20) and related allegations (Compl., ¶¶ 117, 161, 172
[1]
) in the Complaint filed by plaintiffs Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiri (Plaintiffs).
The court grants Defendants motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing (1) Defendants are guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, and (2) advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendants.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b).)
The court finds that the allegations that Ariana Javaheri, the property supervisor and managing agent of Defendants, informed Plaintiffs that the dark staining on their wall was not mold but mildew and advised Plaintiffs that they would have to pay for the mold test if the results were negative (Compl., ¶¶ 21-23) do not show that Defendants (1) engaged in conduct intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiffs, or (2) engaged in despicable conduct subjecting Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their rights.
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (c)(1) [defining malice], (c)(2) [defining oppression].)
Moreover, while the court acknowledges that Plaintiffs have also alleged that plaintiff Ewan Morijiri was diagnosed with leukemia, is immunocompromised, and was advised not to reside in a premises with mold because it would be injurious and possibly fatal (Compl., ¶ 23), Plaintiffs did not allege facts establishing that Defendants knew of this risk, such that Ariana Javaheris conduct may be considered malicious or oppressive.
ORDER
The court grants defendants CMN, LLC and CYN, LLCs motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and paragraphs 117, 161, and 172 of plaintiffs Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiris Complaint in this action.
The court grants plaintiffs Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiri 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects set forth in this ruling.
The court orders defendants CMN, LLC and CYN, LLC to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
July 29, 2024
_____________________________
Robert B. Broadbelt III
Judge of the Superior Court
[1]
The court notes that the notice of motion erroneously states this allegation is in paragraph 171.
(Notice of Mot., p. 2, ¶ 3.)
Ruling
DANA URICK, ET AL. VS ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE, LLP, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.
Jul 31, 2024 |
20STCV17462
Case Number:
20STCV17462
Hearing Date:
July 31, 2024
Dept:
20
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kevin C. Brazile
Department 20
Hearing Date:
July 31, 2024
Case Name:
Urick, et al. v. Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, et al.
Case No.:
20STCV17462
Matter:
Motion to Compel Deposition
Moving Party:
Defendant Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP
Responding Party:
Unopposed
Notice:
OK
Ruling:
The Motion is granted.
Moving party to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly
encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Defendant Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP seeks to compel the deposition of Plaintiff Trentyn M. Urick-Stasa.
Because there is no opposition, the Motion to Compel is granted. The deposition is to take place within 30 days. The Court awards reduced sanctions in the amount of $1,000.
Moving parties to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ruling
MARCUS SIREGAR VS MICHAEL ARDERN, ET AL.
Case Number:
21STCV04494
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
29
Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff filed by Defendant Avis Rent A Car System, LLC on behalf of Michael Arden.
Tentative
The motion is denied without prejudice.
Background
On February 4, 2021, Marcus Siregar (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Michael Ardern and Avis Rent A Car System, LLC for negligence cause of action arising out of an automobile accident occurring on February 16, 2019.
On August 22, 2023, Avis Rent A Car System, LLC on behalf of Michael Arden (Defendant) filed an answer.
On June 18, 2024, Defendant filed this motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff.
Defendant also seeks sanctions.
No opposition has been filed.
Legal Standard
Any party may obtain discovery & by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.)
Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210 through 2025.280 provide the requirements for (among other things) what must be included in a deposition notice, when and where depositions may be taken, and how and when the notice must be served.
The service of a deposition notice & is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying.
(
Id.
, § 2025.280, subd. (a).)
Section 2025.410, subdivision (a), requires any party to serve a written objection at least three days before the deposition if the party contends that a deposition notice does not comply with the provisions of sections 2025.210 through 2025.280.
Section 2025.450, subdivision (a), provides:
If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party,
or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230,
without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for¿inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order
compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.
Any such motion to compel must show good cause for the production of documents and, when a deponent has failed to appear, the motion must be accompanied by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.
(
Id.
, subd. (b).)
When a motion to compel is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (
Id.
, § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).)
Discussion
Defendant served Plaintiff with a notice of deposition scheduled for May 8, 2024. (Rubin Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. B.) The parties exchanged some correspondence prior to the deposition date, but the bottom line is that Plaintiff did not serve any objection and did not appear.
(Id., ¶¶ 7-10 & Exhs. C-F.)
Defendant now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to attend a deposition.
Defendant is certainly entitled to take Plaintiffs deposition under the Civil Discovery act, but to obtain a court order compelling the deposition, Defendant must comply with all statutory requirements.
Here, Defendant has not done so.
Specifically, Defendant presents no evidence that, following the nonappearance, it reached out to Plaintiff
to inquire about the nonappearance.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b).)
Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES Defendants motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff Marcus Siregar without prejudice.
Moving party to give notice.
Document
ANDY GARCIA VS NORMA ALICIA ESCOBEDO
Feb 21, 2020 |
Audra M. Mori
|
Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |
Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |
20STCV07167
Document
VALARIE ZAYAS VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
Feb 03, 2023 |
Kerry R. Bensinger
|
Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |
Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |
23STCV02454