In The Matter Of: Erick Quintanar

Case Number: 24STLC01901 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 26 JAG Structural Services, Inc. v. Nasr, et al. MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE (CCP § 418.10) TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Roya Nasrs Motion to Quash Service of the Summons and Complaint is GRANTED. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IS SET FOR SEPTEMBER 12, 2024 AT 9:30 AM IN DEPARTMENT 26 IN THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. ANALYSIS: On March 18, 2024, Plaintiff JAG Structural Services, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed the Complaint in this action against Defendant Roya Nasr (Defendant). Plaintiff filed proof of substitute service on May 13, 2024. On June 13, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Quash Service of the Summons and Complaint. Plaintiff did not file a complete opposition but a declaration from Plaintiffs counsel. Discussion Defendant moves to quash service of the Summons and Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff did not serve them in compliance with the statutory requirements. The Motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, which states: A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1), emphasis added.) Where service is challenged, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the facts requisite to an effective service. When a defendant challenges the courts personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service. ( Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413; see also Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.) However, a proof of service containing a declaration from a registered process server invokes a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence of the facts stated in the return. (Cal. Evid. Code, § 647; see American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390.) Plaintiffs counsels declaration concedes that the Motion should be granted and that Defendant will be served at a different address than the one listed in the proof of substitute service filed on May 13, 2024. (Schachter Decl., p. 2:4-5, 13-16.) To date, no other proof of service of the Summons and Complaint has been filed. Therefore, the Motion to Quash Service is granted. Conclusion Defendant Roya Nasrs Motion to Quash Service of the Summons and Complaint is GRANTED. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IS SET FOR SEPTEMBER 12, 2024 AT 9:30 AM IN DEPARTMENT 26 IN THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. Court clerk to give notice.

Case Number: 22STCV11303 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 FIDEL HERNANDEZ MEDINA, an individual and PATRICIA HERNANDEZ, an individual, Plaintiff, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants . Case No.: 22STCV11303 Hearing Date: 7/10/24 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs Background Pleadings Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandez (Plaintiffs) sue Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota USA) pursuant to an October 14, 2022 Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging claims of (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b). The claims arise from allegations that Toyota USA has breached express and implied warranties in favor of Plaintiffs by failing to repair, replace, or repurchase a used Toyota vehicle purchased by the Hernandez Plaintiffs subject to express warranties through which Toyota USA undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiffs vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance. Relevant Procedural History On February 20, 2024, trial commenced in this action before concluding on February 26, 2024. On February 24, 2024, the jury issued its verdict in favor of Toyota USA. On March 8, 2024, judgment was entered in Toyota USAs favor. On March 21, 2024, Toyota USA filed its Memorandum of Costs, seeking to recover $22,309.48 in costs. On April 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Tax Costs. On June 26, 2024, Toyota USA filed its opposition to the instant motion. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply papers. Motion to Tax Costs Legal Standard : In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Assuming the prevailing party requirements are met, the trial court has no discretion to order each party to bear his or her own costs of suit. ( Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.) The term prevailing party for costs purposes is defined by statute to include: ¿ (1) The party with a net monetary recovery; ¿ (2) A defendant who is dismissed from the action; ¿ (3) A defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and ¿ (4) A defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) If the party does not fall within one of these four express categories, the court may exercise its discretion to award or deny costs. (See Lincoln v. Schurgin (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 100, 105.) If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) For example, even if a plaintiff maintains a net monetary recovery, in determining the prevailing party in the litigation, the trial court should also consider, if applicable, the defendants success on its declaratory relief claims and exercise its discretion to allow costs or not and, if allowed, to apportion them as appropriate. ( Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1142; see, e.g., Lincoln v. Schurgin , supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 104-105 [when plaintiff wins net monetary recovery but defendant prevails in its cross-action for declaratory relief, case presents circumstance not otherwise specified; in that case, determination of prevailing party is matter within courts discretion].) ¿Allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc . (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) A party seeking to tax costs must provide evidence to rebut this prima facie showing. ( Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266, superseded by statute on other grounds in Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1) [whether costs permissible from filing of complaint or from date of 998 offer].) Mere statements unsupported by facts are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing that costs were necessarily incurred. ( Jones v. Dumrichob , supra , at p. 1266.)¿On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. ( Ibid .) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. , supra , 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) However, because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute, a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized. ( Ibid .) Discretion is abused only when, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. ( Lincoln v. Schurgin , supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.)¿ Order Striking or Taxing Costs : GRANTED IN PART As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Toyota USA is not seeking to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) because that statute is limited to buyers of consumer goods. Rather, as the prevailing party in this action, Toyota USA is entitled to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(a)(4) and 1033.5. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs appear to argue the opposite. (See Reply at pp. 3-4, relying on Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264.) However, this argument is not persuasive. Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) does not explicitly preclude a seller of consumer goods from recovering their costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 1032. Indeed, in Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, the Court rejected this argument. ( Id. at p. 988 [In this case, plaintiff filed suit under the Song-Beverly Act, but defendants prevailed. Defendants sought to recover their costs and expert witness fees under sections 1032, subdivision (b) and 998, subdivision (c), whereas plaintiff argued the more specific provisions of the Act prohibited prevailing defendants from any such recovery. We conclude defendants are entitled to their costs and expert witness fees].) Thus, in determining whether an award of costs should be issued, the Court will rely on the guideline set forth under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c). Here, Toyota USA seeks $22,309.48 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1032 and 1033.5. By way of its motion, Plaintiffs seek to tax these costs in the following categories: (1) motion and filing fees in its entirety or alternatively $181.08; (2) deposition costs in the amount of $4,351.70; (3) court reporter fees in their entirety; and (4) other costs and fees in the amount of $2,338.49. First, Plaintiffs argue that Toyota USAs requested costs of $1,447.72 for motion and filing fees should be stricken because they include attorney service fees, and Toyota USA has failed to correctly identify the actual court motion and filing fees incurred. (Motion at pg. 5.) However, this ignores the numerous invoices enclosed and referenced by Toyota USAs Memorandum of Costs at Attachment 1g that identify the court motion and filing fees incurred. Furthermore, [i]f the items in a cost memorandum appear proper, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence the expenses were necessarily incurred by the prevailing party. (Citation.) To controvert this evidence, the burden is on the objecting party to present evidence showing the contrary. (Citation) ( Whatley-Miller v. Cooper (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1115.) Filing fees and electronic filing fees are recoverable costs (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(1), (14).) Thus, it is Plaintiffs burden to present evidence to show why these costs should not be awarded. In this regard, Plaintiffs identify $181.08 worth of filing fee costs that should be taxed. (Motion at pp. 6-7.) Of these costs, the Court finds that the filing fees associated with Toyota USAs Motions in Limine were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation because they had been untimely filed. Therefore, these costs are taxed in the amount of $65.34. As to the costs associated with unsuccessful motions, the Court finds that these costs were not prepared merely out of convenience and are recoverable as a result. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c).) Second, Plaintiffs argues the claimed deposition costs should be taxed in the amount of $4,351.70 because the amounts are excessive and unnecessary. Recovery of deposition costs is allowed. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(3).) Defendants point out that multiple deposition dates for the plaintiffs had to be scheduled and rescheduled. In this instance, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to undermine the prima facie evidence that the expenses were necessarily incurred by Toyota USA. ( Whatley-Miller, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 1115.) Third, Plaintiffs contend that Toyota USAs claimed court reporter fees should be taxed because they are not recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033 subd. (b)(5). (Motion at pg. 8.) This argument is not persuasive. The Court has discretion to allow additional costs that are reasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5 subd. (c)(4). Based on the invoices submitted with its Memorandum of Costs, Toyota USA has shown that these claimed costs were for court reporting fees during the trial. Such expenses are reasonable in light of the understandable prudence of preserving a record for appeal. Notably, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to suggest that the amount of these fees is unreasonable. Therefore, the Court declines to tax this category of costs. Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that the claim for other costs and expenses that include meals, copying charges, travel, and lodging. (Motion at pp. 8-12.) The Court largely agrees that many of these costs are either not allowed or not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. For instance, Toyota USA seeks to recover $50.37 in FedEx charges of trial documents and the final status conference. Courier and messenger fees are recoverable, at the discretion of the trial court, if they are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. ( Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 696, as modified (July 18, 2019), rehg denied (Aug. 9, 2019), review denied (Oct. 23, 2019).) Because these costs are not expressly allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5, it is Toyota USAs burden to establish why these costs were necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) However, the opposition fails to articulate such a necessity. Thus, the Court taxes these courier costs as not reasonable. Also, Toyota USA seeks to recover $19.98 associated with a CARFAX report for trial, but Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(b)(2) excludes investigation costs. Moreover, Toyota USA seeks to recover a combined amount of $2,095.49 for meals, lodging, and travel. While it is in the Courts discretion to award these costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c)(4), they have been properly objected to, and Toyota USA has failed to meet its burden in establishing why these costs were not merely convenient and reasonable in amount. In terms of the $196.90 in costs spent for additional copies of trial exhibits, these costs are allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(13) and appear to be reasonable in amount. Thus, the Court declines to tax these amounts. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is granted in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs. Conclusion Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs.

Case Number: 21STCV16002 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 32 IGNITE INTERNATIONAL, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs, v. 10979 CHALON, LLC, Defendant. Case No.: 21STCV16002 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion to tax costs BACKGROUND On April 28, 2021, Plaintiffs Ignite International, Ltd. and Ignite International Brands, Ltd. filed this action for breach of contract against Defendant 10979 Chalon, LLC. Plaintiffs sued to recover amounts due under a settlement agreement between the parties. On January 9, 2023, Defendant made a section 998 offer to pay $2.5 million secured by a deed of trust. Plaintiffs rejected the offer. After a bench trial from March 5 to 7, 2024, the Court found for Plaintiffs. On April 11, 2024, the Court granted judgment for Plaintiffs in the amount of $2.5 million. On April 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum of Costs (MOC) totaling $35,103.84. On May 8, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion to tax costs. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on June 26, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 establishes this general rule: Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding. ( Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1112, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 1032(b).) Section 1033.5 specifies the items allowable as costs under section 1032. ( Id. at p. 1108.) One such allowable cost is attorneys fees, when authorized by statute, contract, or law. ( Ibid. ) Section 998 modifies the general rule of section 1032 that only the prevailing party recovers its costs. ( Scott, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) Specifically, section 998 provides that [i]f an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendants costs from the time of the offer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 998(c)(1).) However, [a] plaintiff who rejects a settlement offer that is greater than the recovery it ultimately obtains may nonetheless recover its preoffer costs to which it would otherwise be entitled, including preoffer attorney fees. ( Scott, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) DISCUSSION On January 9, 2023, Defendant tendered the following offer under section 998: In exchange for . . . dismissal of the Complaint in this action with prejudice, Defendant 10979 Chalon, LLC will execute and deliver to Plaintiffs a Promissory Note and second Deed of Trust for $2,500,000, at 3.5% interest, the terms of which will require repayment on the sale of the property, and Defendant 10979 Chalon, LLC will also pay Plaintiffs the total sum to ten dollars ($10.00), and each party shall bear its own attorneys fees and costs. (Berokim Decl., Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs did not accept this offer. ( Id. , ¶ 10.) At trial, Plaintiffs recovered $2.5 million. ( Id. , Ex. 3.) Defendant argues that the offer provided for $2.5 million secured by a deed of trust, which made it more favorable than the trial award of $2.5 million unsecured. Plaintiffs argue that because the offer did not provide for $2.5 million until the property at issue was sold at some unspecified time, the offer was speculative and not more favorable than an enforceable money judgment of $2.5 million. An offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 must be sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to evaluate the worth of the offer and make a reasoned decision whether to accept the offer. ( Fassberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 720, 764.) Any nonmonetary terms or conditions must be sufficiently certain and capable of valuation to allow the court to determine whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer. ( Ibid. ) Additionally, the offer must be unconditional to be enforceable. ( Elite Show Services, Inc. v. Staffpro, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 263, 268.) Here, Defendants offer was not certain nor unconditional. Instead of making an unequivocal offer to pay $2.5 million, Defendant conditioned Plaintiffs receipt of $2.5 million on sale of the property at issue. Plaintiffs would not have been able to reasonably evaluate the value of this offer because it is unclear from the terms of the offer when, if at all, Defendant would be required to sell the property. For this reason, it is also unclear how the offer could be more favorable than a cash judgment of $2.5 million. Because Defendants settlement offer was insufficiently certain for Plaintiffs to evaluate its worth or for the Court to determine its value compared to the judgment, the offer was invalid and does not serve to cut off Plaintiffs costs. CONCLUSION Defendants motion to tax costs is DENIED.

Case Number: 22STCV29462 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 57 Defendant's motion to compel Plaintiff's attendance for a deposition of Plaintiff is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to appear for her deposition within 10 days of this order. Defendant's request for an order imposing sanctions against Plaintiff's counsel in the form of an award of the attorney's fees and costs Defendant incurred in connection with the motion to compel Plaintiff's deposition is denied because, in the Court's view, the actions of Plaintiff's counsel were substantially justified. Plaintiff's motion for a protective order is denied as moot in light of the ruling on Defendant's motion to compel Plaintiff's deposition. No sanctions are imposed on either side in connection with the motion for a protective order. The Court also is taking this opportunity to advise the parties in advance of today's hearing that the Court will be denying Plaintiff's ex parte application to advance to August 1, 2024 the hearing on Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories. The Court is unavailable on August 1, 2024.

Case Number: 20STCV03304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 74 MOVING PARTY: Defendants RRM Properties, Ltd. and Robertsons Ready Mix, Ltd. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Motion for Leave to Supplement List of Expert Witnesses The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply in connection with this motion. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority filed its complaint in eminent domain against defendants RRM Properties, Ltd.; H.D. Nogle & Sons, Inc.; Helena A. Hartfield; Frank K. Lyon; Ben Shiffman; William G. Isaac; Consolidated Rock Products Co.; Calmat Co.; Roberts Ready Mix, Ltd.; and all persons known or unknown, on January 27, 2020. Plaintiff seeks to acquire various property interests belonging to Defendants according to its power of eminent domain under the Public Utilities Code, section 130050 et seq., for the Rosencrans/Marquardt Grade Separation Project and for public transportation purposes and all uses necessary, incidental or convenient thereto. (Compl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1 [description of property interests].) Three defendants did not answer, and five have been dismissed. The remaining two, RRM Properties, Ltd. and Robertsons Ready Mix, Ltd. (together Defendants) answered on March 11, 2020. Jury trial is set for August 19, 2024. On May 23, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for an order granting leave to supplement its list of expert witnesses. They seek to designate Michael Orozco, P.E., a civil engineer employed by RRM, as an expert witness for examination at trial. On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On July 1, 2024, Defendants replied. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1258.290 governs the amendment of an expert witness list post-exchange in an eminent domain proceeding. The section permits the court to grant leave for such an amendment if the court finds that such party has made a good faith effort to comply with Sections 1258.210 to 1258.260, inclusive, that he has complied with Section 1258.270, and that by the date of exchange he: (1) Would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call such witness or discovered or listed such opinion or data; or (2) Failed to determine to call such witness or to discover or list such opinion or data through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1258.290(a).) In making a determination under [section 1258.290], the court shall take into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied on the list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data and will be prejudiced if the witness is called or the testimony concerning such opinion or data is given. ( Id. , subd. (b).) DISCUSSION 1. Compliance with Sections 1258.210 through 1258.260 Defendants argue they made good-faith efforts to comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1258.210 through 1258.260 and have complied with section 1258.270. Plaintiff does not directly contest their actual compliance prior to the date of the hearing, and it is not necessary for the Court to examine their compliance to dispose of this motion. Plaintiff prevails on other grounds in particular, Defendants failure to exercise diligence, discussed below. 2. Reasonable Diligence or Mistake The Code requires the Court to find that Defendants could not have uncovered the need for their proposed expert with due diligence, or that they failed to initially designate their expert due to mistake, inadvertence, etc. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1258.290(a)(1)-(2).) Defendants have not shown either. Defendants repeatedly argue they would have produced Orozco as their person most knowledgeable for deposition, but Plaintiff did not proceed with that deposition, which Defendants contend shows Defendants complied in good faith with the expert exchange statutes. (Mot., 2:25; Madueno Decl., ¶ 24.) But Defendants willingness to produce Orozco as a PMK (a fact witness) is not the same as designating him as an expert. Defendants do not explain why Plaintiff had to take Orozcos deposition in order for Defendants to identify him as an expert. Defendants counsels declaration establishes that numerous depositions took place and, in particular, depositions of other expert witnesses from at least January 4, 2023. (Madueno Decl., ¶ 10 [I took the deposition of Metros designated fixtures and equipment appraisal expert].) Defendants do not explain why, if as they anticipate Orozco will be testifying as a fact witness, and they had considered which experts will testify, they did not further designate Orozco as an expert witness, or did not move to supplement earlier. In short, Defendants could have uncovered the need for Orozcos designation earlier by exercising due diligence. Defendants have also not shown mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Counsel testifies [n]either [she] nor [her] office intentionally or knowingly failed to designate Orozco as an expert. (Madueno Decl., ¶ 23.) This is not the standard. Lack of intent is not the same as excusable neglect. The Court must make one of the findings described in section 1258.290, subdivisions (a)(1) and (2), in order to grant Defendants motion. The Court cannot do so. Defendants motion must be denied. 3. Reliance and Prejudice a. Reliance The statutory date for expert exchange was November 16, 2022, more than eighteen months ago. Plaintiff has spent a year and a half preparing for trial while relying on Defendants designation list. This reliance is substantial, particularly given that the case is set for trial only forty-one (41) days from the date of this ruling. b. Prejudice Defendants apparently intend to call Orozco at trial based on his percipient knowledge of relevant facts. But Defendants have already designated an expert James Roberts to testify to the opinions he formed based on Orozcos personal knowledge. If Orozco is also permitted to testify to the same, Defendants will be permitted to duplicate their expert testimony and bolster the credibility of a fact witness, to Plaintiffs detriment and on short notice. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants motion. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 23CHCV01244 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F51 JULY 8, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV01244 Motion Filed: 4/17/24 JURY TRIAL: 8/5/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendants Christopher Johnson; and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Maryam Haidari (Plaintiff) NOTICE: OK RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiffs complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. BACKGROUND This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 5/29/22, while riding her bicycle, she was injured in a collision with Defendant Johnsons vehicle at the intersection of Oso Avenue and Saticoy Street, Los Angeles, California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at the time of the subject collision. ( Id. at ¶¶ 78.) On 4/28/23, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging a sole cause of action for Negligence. On 6/27/23, Defendants filed their answers. On 4/17/24, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 6/25/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 7/3/23, Defendants filed their reply. ANALYSIS The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 15191520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. ¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A. Evidentiary Objections The court has reviewed the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties. While all objections have been considered, due to their extensive nature, the Court will not address each objection individually in this tentative ruling. Instead, the Court's analysis will focus on the substance of the objections raised and their relevance to the determination of the motion at hand. B. Negligence Plaintiffs sole cause of action against Defendants is Negligence. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) the existence of a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in an injury. ( McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Here, Defendants argue that they are not liable to Plaintiff under a Motor Vehicle Negligence theory because it is Plaintiff who caused the incident as a matter of law by running a red light and driving on the wrong side of the roadway, and Defendant Johnson, in stark contrast, drove through the intersection pursuant to a green light after looking both ways, exercising due care. (MSJ 8:1417.) Defendants contend that Johnson, exercising due care in driving through the intersection, was legally stopped at his red stoplight, and when the light turned green, saw that the intersection was clear to proceed through, and only first saw Plaintiff at the moment just before impact. ( Id. at 4:1216, 5:69.) 1. Plaintiffs Comparative Negligence Defendants argue that Plaintiff ran a red light, on the wrong side of the roadway, as corroborated by four independent third party witnesses and the police report. (MSJ 10:611:14.) Defendants therefore contend that Plaintiffs act of running a red light caused the impact, which caused Plaintiffs physical injuries. Had Plaintiff not run a red light, she would not have been in the roadway with oncoming traffic coming towards her, and no impact or injury would have occurred. ( Id. at 11:1619.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that in comparative negligence cases (such as this one), a plaintiffs purported negligence cannot, as a matter of law, obliviate Defendants own negligence. (Pl.s Opp. 1:89.) Plaintiff further asserts that this case presents material factual disputes that must necessarily be decided by a jury to appropriately apportion liability: (1) whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe Plaintiff in the crosswalk and (2) whether Plaintiff had the right of way under Vehicle Code § 21451. ( Id. at 6:47.) Courts are very reluctant to uphold a summary judgment in comparative negligence cases. & Ordinarily, issues of negligence are jury questions and the court may rarely decide comparative negligence questions without submitting them to the jury. & In short, negligence is a question of fact if different conclusions can be rationally drawn from the evidence. ( Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 186 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Plaintiff argues that whether or not a vehicle with a green light [has the right of way] depends upon whether another vehicle or pedestrian was lawfully in the intersection previously. (Pl.s Opp. 7:2426, citing Veh. Code § 21451, subd. (a); People v. Hahn (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d Supp. 841, 843844; Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 459.) Here, Plaintiff proffers her own deposition testimony, and an expert declaration (albeit lacking foundation in many areas) and surveillance camera footage purporting to show that Plaintiff began crossing the intersection during her green light, while Defendant was stopped at his red light, turned around to retrieve a sweater she had dropped, before again proceeding to cross the intersection while her light was still green. (Ex. 1 to Decl. of Colleen M. Mullen, 52:2056:9; Exs. 410 to Decl. of Jon B. Landerville, MSME, P.E.) Plaintiff therefore contends that here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff, who lawfully entered the intersection with a green light, had the right of way pursuant to Vehicle Code § 21451(a). (Pl.s Opp. 8:45.) The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to Plaintiffs own potential comparative negligence, as different conclusions as to whether Plaintiff ran a red light can be rationally drawn from the evidence. 2. Defendants Breach of the Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care The general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of ones activities & indisputably applies to the operation of a motor vehicle. ( Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) Here, Defendants argue that Johnson exercised reasonable care at all relevant times as he drove through the intersection. (MSJ 12:1619.) Defendants support their contentions with Johnsons deposition testimony, third-party witness declarations, and LAPD Officer Solis deposition testimony. In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that it is for the jury to decide whether the reliance upon anothers due care is reasonable. (Pl.s Opp. 6:2324, citing Hendricks v. Pappas (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 774, 778.) Plaintiff argues that here, there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe and account for Plaintiff crossing the intersection when he had a green light. ( Id. at 6:2728.) Plaintiff asserts that there was nothing obstructing Defendants field of vision, and thus his view of the intersection, through which Plaintiff was crossing prior to the collision. ( Id. at 7:13.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff proffers the deposition testimony of both Johnson and LAPD Officer Solis, and her experts declaration. Plaintiff argues that under these circumstances, a jury may find that Defendant Johnsons negligence in failing to observe Plaintiff for over ten seconds in the crosswalk directly in front of him rather than Plaintiffs purported negligence in continuing to cross an intersection she lawfully entered caused Plaintiffs injuries. ( Id. at 9:2225.) The Court agrees. While Defendants dispute the credibility of Plaintiffs expert declaration, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue exists as to whether Johnson breached his duty of reasonable care, and likewise whether his conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs injuries. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied. C. Vicarious Liability An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees committed within the course or scope of their employment. ( Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 138139.) As the Court finds that triable issues exist as to the nature and degree of each partys comparative negligence, and the parties have not raised any issues regarding whether Johnsons conduct was committed within the scope of his employment, it finds that a triable issue remains as to whether JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is vicariously liable for Johnsons conduct. CONCLUSION The motion is denied.

Case Number: 22STCV21691 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 JULIO LOPEZ, on behalf of himself, the State of California, and others similarly situated and aggrieved , Plaintiff, v. STEVEN LABEL, LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability Company; STEVEN LABEL CORPORATION, a California Corporation; STEVEN LABEL, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 22STCV21691 Hearing Date: 07/10/24 Trial Date: N/A [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Plaintiff Julio Lopezs Motion for Approval of Settlement Under Private Attorneys General Act Background Plaintiff Julio Lopez, as an aggrieved employee, and on behalf of all other aggrieved employees under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (the PAGA), sues Defendants Steven Label LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Steven Label Corporation, Steven Label, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 100 pursuant to a July 5, 2022 Complaint alleging the sole cause of action for Violation of the Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code §§ 2698, et seq. Plaintiff alleges Defendants committed the following violations: (1) failure to keep accurate records in violation of Labor Code § 1174; (2) failure to produce records in violation of Labor Code §§ 226, 1198.5, and 432; (3) failure to comply with meal period requirements under Labor Code § 512; (4) failure to comply with rest period requirements under Labor Code § 226.7; (5) failure to comply with minimum wage and overtime wage requirements under Labor Code §§ 510 and 1197; (6) failure to comply with statute wage requirements under Labor Code § 223; (7) failure to pay wages when due pursuant to Labor Code § 216; (8) failure to indemnify employees business expenses pursuant to Labor Code § 2802; (9) failure to comply with wage statement violations pursuant to Labor Code § 226; (10) failure to provide suitable seating pursuant to IWC Wage Orders, § 14(A-B); (11) standard conditions of labor violations pursuant to Labor Code §§ 1198 and 1199; (12) failure to comply with sick leave requirements under Labor Code §§§ 233-234, 245-248.5; (13) failure to provide supplemental paid sick leave as required under Labor Code § 248.2; (14) failure to timely pay final wages pursuant to Labor Code § 201(a); (15) unlawfully inquiring into salary histories in violation of Labor Code § 432.3; (16) failure to comply with Labor Code §§ 432.5 and 1024.5; (17) failure to comply with Labor Code § 432.7, and (18) failure to comply with Labor Code § 432.5. On September 8, 2023, the parties indicated to the Court that the case had settlement at mediation and that they were working in good faith to finalize a settlement agreement concerning Plaintiffs PAGA claim. initiated settlement discussions concerning Plaintiffs PAGA claim. On December 20, 2023, the parties represented that they were still working out the finalities of the settlement agreement. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff moved for an order approving settlement under California Labor Code PAGA and entering judgment thereon. The motion attaches the settlement agreement as Exhibit 1 to the declaration of Michael Jones. A separate proof of service was filed on June 5, 2024 indicating service by mail of the motion and supporting papers on June 5, 2024 on the Defendants and via online filing on the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. The motion is unopposed and is now before the Court. Motion to Approve PAGA Settlement Legal Standard The PAGA is a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil penaltiesfor Labor Code violationsthat otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies. ( Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003.) The statute provides a mechanism for private enforcement of Labor Code violations for the public benefit. (See Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 986.) To incentivize employees to bring PAGA actions, the statute provides aggrieved employees 25 percent of the recovered civil penalties. (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (i).) The remaining 75 percent is distributed to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) for enforcement of labor laws and education of employers and employees about their rights and responsibilities under [the Labor Code]. (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (i).) In reviewing the terms of a settlement agreement, the court determines whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all concerned, and not the product of fraud, collusion, or overreaching. ( Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 322, 337; Nordstrom Commission Cases (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 576, 581.) Although a PAGA plaintiff need not satisfy class action requirements (see Arias v. Superior Court , supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 975), general principles applicable to class action settlements apply equally in this context. In the context of a class action settlement, the court considers various factors including whether (1) the settlement is the result of arms length bargaining, (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently, (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation, and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. ( Nordstrom Commission Cases , supra , at p. 581; Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 245.) In considering the amount of settlement, the court is mindful that compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process. ( Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. , supra , at p. 250.) Order Approving PAGA Settlement : GRANTED. I. Summary of Settlement The terms of the settlement involve approximately 328 aggrieved employees, with a PAGA period of May 1, 2021 through July 18, 2023, a gross settlement amount of approximately $325,000, with reductions of $108,333.33 in Plaintiffs counsels fees (representing one-third of the gross settlement amount), $10,017.82 in litigation costs, and $4,000 in settlement administrator costs, for a net settlement of $202,649.39. The net settlement will be distributed 75% to be paid to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25% to the aggrieved employees, for commensurate payment amounts of $151,987.04 and $50,662.35, respectively. The distribution to the aggrieved employees is to be made on a pro rata basis according to the number of pay periods worked by each PAGA member from May 1, 2021 through July 18, 2023 (the PAGA period), with the aggrieved employees comprised of all current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who were employed by Defendant in the State of California at any time during the PAGA period. The funding of the settlement amount will take place no later than 14 days after the Court enters Plaintiffs proposed order and the judgment is final. The release under the settlement agreement narrowly applies to the civil penalty claims brought under PAGA. (Mot., pp. 3-4; Jones Decl., ¶¶ 3, 13-15, Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement, §§ 1, 3-5.) Plaintiff Julio Lopez also represents that he entered into a separate settlement in connection with his personal claims, and as a result, he is not seeking a service award. (Jones Decl. ¶ 12.) II. Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy & Fraud, Collusion, and Overreaching Plaintiff argues that the settlement should be found to be fair and reasonable for various reasons: Plaintiff complied with the necessary Labor Code administrative requirements; the settling parties reached a compromise through arms-length negotiations; sufficient investigation and discovery by experienced counsel to act competently in negotiating settlement; the settlement is reasonable in light of the parties legal positions, the risk of continued litigation, and the underlying purpose of the PAGA. (Mot., pp. 4-9; see Mot., Jones Decl., ¶¶ 16-28.) No opposition is on file. The Court finds that the settlement before the Court is a result of arms-length bargaining. A declaration from Plaintiffs counsel explains the parties negotiations. The negotiations included, among other things, a determination by Plaintiffs counsel that Defendants faced a maximum statutory penalty estimate of $3.66 million and a consideration of the risks of litigation and viability of defenses to Plaintiffs claims to determine that the gross settlement of $325,000 was fair and reasonable. (Mot., Jones Decl., ¶¶ 19-28.) III. Proof of Service A proposed PAGA settlement must be submitted to the LWDA at the same time that it is submitted to the court for review and approval. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) Here, Plaintiffs provide a copy of an electronically filed June 3, 2024 Notice to the LWDA Regarding Proposed PAGA Settlement, thus satisfying this statutory section. (Mot., Jones Decl. ¶ 29, Ex. 5.) IV. Administrator Appointment and Costs The proposed settlement contemplates using the services of Simpluris Inc. (Simpluris) as the neutral party that will administer the settlement. (See Mot., Jones Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement, §§ 1.2, 7.1-7.4.) Simpluris is allocated $4,000 for its services per the terms of the settlement agreement. ( Id. at § 3.2.2.) Simplurs itself has provided a declaration from Eric Springer, Simpluris Director of Client Services, which explains the qualifications and experience of Simpluris to be an administrator, the protection of class data, and procedures for notice preparation and distribution. Such distribution would include identification of the addresses of the aggrieved employees (including by skip tracing if necessary), mailing a notice of settlement to the aggrieved employees, and providing court-approved notices and translations to aggrieved employees. (Mot., Springer Decl., ¶¶ 1-9, Exs. A-C.) The Court GRANTS the settlement insofar as it seeks appointment of Simpluris as the settlement administrator. Simpluris is ORDERED APPOINTED as settlement administrator. V. Enhancement Award The motion seeks no enhancement award. VI. Attorneys Fees and Costs Plaintiffs motion seeks confirmation of $108,333.33 of the settlement agreements gross settlement to Plaintiffs counsels fees and $10,017.82 to Plaintiffs counsels costs. Counsels declaration provides grounds in support of the requested fees and costs, including counsels extensive experienced in class action and PAGA actions, counsels aggressive litigation approach and sponsorship of settlement discussions, counsels procedural litigation efforts, counsels skill and time expended on necessary tasks, the contingent nature of the case, and other grounds for reasonability. Counsels declaration provides that his firms applicable fee rate ranges from $650 to $800 per hour and that his firm worked 162.1 hours in this action, totaling $109,880 in possible fees, which is less than the requested amount, thus supporting reasonableness. Counsel also explains that the $10,017.82 in costs are comprised of filing fees, expert witness fees, mediation costs, and other costs associated with the action. (Mot., Jones Decl., ¶¶ 30-49; Ex. 6.) The Court finds that the fees sought are reasonable in light of the representations by Plaintiffs counsel, which are entitled to deference and adequately explain the grounds for the fees request here. (See Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651 [fees awarded based on attorneys representation as to hours actually spent on contingency fee representation where no time records were available].) The fee range provided of the various attorneys that worked on this matter is reasonable for practitioners with extensive experience in the Los Angeles area. (Mot., Jones Decl., ¶ 43-45.) The Court notes that the hours spent on this action are reasonable for recovery in light of the amount of time litigated on behalf of nearly 328 aggrieved employees under the Labor Code, with a reasonable return on the civil penalties that could be imposed on Defendants. (See Sections I and II above.) The Court thus GRANTS the settlement insofar as it relates to attorneys fees and costs related to Plaintiffs counsels work. VII. Discussion Conclusion The motion to approve PAGA settlement is thus GRANTED. Conclusion Plaintiff Julio Lopezs Motion for Approval of Settlement Under California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act is GRANTED.

Case Number: 22TRCV00563 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling HEARING DATE: July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV00563 CASE NAME: Ocean Recovery, LLC v. Sullivan Curtis Monroe Insurance Services, LLC and Scottsdale Indemnity Company . MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Maja Peci RESPONDING PARTY: Ocean Recovery, LLC ( No Opposition.) TRIAL DATE: None set. MOTION: Defendant, Maja Pecis Demurrer Tentative Rulings: OVERRULED but certain points to be argued as noted below I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On July 8, 2022, Plaintiff, Ocean Recovery, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Sullivan Curtis Monroe Insurance Services, LLC (SCM), and Scottsdale Indemnity Company (collectively Defendants). On July 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC). On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint (4AC). On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Fifth Amended Complaint (5AC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Professional Negligence This Court has previously sustained a number of demurrers from a number of different Defendants. Most recently, this Court overruled SCMs demurrer to the 5AC as to the cause of action for professional negligence. Defendant, Maja Peci (Peci) also filed a demurrer to the 5AC as to the third cause of action for professional negligence, on slightly different grounds. B. Procedural On May 30, 2024, Defendant Peci filed this demurrer. To date, no opposition has been filed. II . REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE: Filed concurrently with the moving papers, Defendant Peci has requested this Court take judicial notice of the following: 1. Exhibit 2 March 28, 2024 Minute Order re demurrers to Fourth Amended Complaint; 2. Exhibit 3 First Amended Complaint filed July 13, 2022; and 3. Exhibit 4 Fifth Amended Complaint filed April 18, 2024. The Court GRANTS this request and takes judicial notice of the above. III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿ A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, [a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿ B. Defendant, Maja Pecis Demurrer Preliminarily, this Court notes that Plaintiffs filing of the 5AC was a day late. On March 28, 2024, this Court sustained the previous demurrer and allowed twenty (20) days leave to amend, requiring plaintiff to amend its complaint by April 17, 2024. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs 5AC was not filed until 12:26 am on April 18, 2024, twenty-one (21) days after this Courts order. The Court will nonetheless address the tardy amended pleading. Defendant Peci demurs to the third cause of action for professional negligence on the grounds it fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. This cause of action has been the subject of multiple demurrers and multiple amended pleadings. As noted above, this Court most recently, on June 27, 2024, overruled SCMs demurrer to this third cause of action in the 5AC. Professional Negligence Defendant Peci argues that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for professional negligence against it, and that its cause of action remains fatally uncertain. As the Court has previously noted, [t] he elements of a cause of action for professional negligence are (1) the existence of the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional negligence. ( Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Peci contends that the 5AC alleges Plaintiff was provided with EPLI coverage, thereby negating any professional negligence claim, that the conduct alleged as against Defendant Peci does not constitute negligence, that any misrepresentation suggested in the 5AC is not alleged with requisite specificity, that the 5AC;s other allegations and the subject insurance policys express terms preclude any claim that Plaintiff was ignorant of the policys previsions or could have justifiably relied on any representation that EPLI coverage was included, that Defendant Peci owed no exceptional or fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, and that the 5AC does not establish Defendant Peci was an expert. Nowhere in the 5AC does Plaintiff allege that Defendants SCM or Peci failed to procure EPLI coverage as part of Plaintiffs SCOTTSDALE insurance policy. In fact, Defendant Peci contends that any suggestion to that effect continues to be negated by the allegation that: On or about April 29, 2020, SCOTTSDALE provided Plaintiff with Employment Practices liability insurance coverage. (5AC, ¶ 16.) The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants SCM and Peci breached these duties because: (1) Plaintiff inquired whether EPLI coverage was adequate and comprehensive and was assured by SCMs account manager Peci, that Plaintiff presumed was an expert, that Plaintiff purchased EPLI coverage; (2) Plaintiff had been advised that EPLI coverage was added to Plaintiffs policies because it was confirmed by SCMs account manager Peci; and (3) SCMs and Pecis negligence in procuring Plaintiffs insurance coverage fell below the standard of care when it failed to reasonably notice plaintiffs absence of longstanding EPLI coverage. (5AC, ¶ 38(a)-(c).) Plaintiff nebulously alleges that as a result of Peci failing to recommend EPLI coverage or as a result of her alleged failure to fulfil her alleged representation that Plaintiff did purchase EPLI coverage, Plaintiff wound up paying a quarter of a million dollars to defend a lawsuit that he allegedly believed he had coverage for. As this Court did in the June 27, 2024 demurrer hearing, the Court will allow oral argument as to whether these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence by a producer or brokerage whose alleged account manager is claimed to have made a representation to Plaintiff that he purchased EPLI insurance as opposed to the D&O policy he did purchase. As least as against SCM, this Court previously found, on June 27, 2024, that while it found the 5AC to be vague, nebulous, difficult to understand, and uncertain, that there was hidden among the murky reeds, a kernel of a cause of action pleaded within the contemplation of the Mark Tanner Construction case. Defendant Pecis demurrer indicates that she is joining SCMs demurrer. Moreover, many of the arguments previously overruling in SCMs demurrer are presented in Defendant Pecis demurrer. For example, page 5 of the moving papers argues that the 5AC persists in failing to allege any negligent conduct against Defendants SCM or Peci. (Demurrer, p. 5.) However, as noted, SCMs demurrer to the third cause of action in the 5AC was previously overruled by this Court on June 27, 2024. The arguments shared by both SCM and Peci were already overruled on June 27, 2024, such as the parties holding themselves out as experts and the negligence claims not being pleaded with the requisite specificity. However, the Court found these arguments did not warrant a sustaining of SCMs demurrer. Instead, this Court noted that the case of Mark Tanner Constr. v. Hub Internat. Ins. Servs . (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 574, 584, stood for the proposition that Plaintiffs 5AC had just enough to maintain its third cause of action. In Mark Tanner Construction , the Court found: Insurance brokers owe a limited duty to their clients, which is only to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in procuring the insurance requested by an insured. [Citations.] Accordingly, an insurance broker does not breach its duty to clients to procure the requested insurance policy unless (a) the [broker] misrepresents the nature, extent or scope of the coverage being offered or provided ... , (b) there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular type or extent of coverage ... , or (c) the [broker] assumes an additional duty by either express agreement or by holding himself out as having expertise in a given field of insurance being sought by the insured. [Citation.] (Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Services West, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1283, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 294 (Pacific Rim ).) California law is well settled as to this limited duty on the part of insurance brokers. [Citations.] (Ibid.) ( Mark Tanner Construction, supra , 224 Cal.App.4th 574, 584.) Plaintiff appears to allege that SCM breached this limited duty by having its alleged account manager, Defendant Peci, do each of these three things. At oral argument, the Court will seek input from Defendant Peci why such allegations in Paragraph 38 of the 5AC are insufficient at the pleading stage to survive a demurrer for uncertainty or for failing to state a viable cause of action in reference to Defendant Peci, but were sufficient as to SCM. As noted by this Court previously, The Mark Tanner Construction case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, not on a demurrer, where the Third District found that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to demonstrate error by the trial court. Here, there is no evidence before the Court (as there will be on a summary judgment motion), nor does the Court consider on demurrer anything but the allegations of the pleading plus any matters as to which the Court has granted request for judicial notice. The moving and reply papers by both Defendant SCM (in its previous demurrer) and Defendant Peci tend to argue that Plaintiff could not reasonably rely on what he claims Defendant Peci advised him, and that Plaintiff must have known the different between an EPLI policy and a D&O policy, but the Court cannot consider such inferences or credibility determinations on a demurrer. Plaintiff will also be asked as to why it failed to file an opposition brief to SCMs demurrer but not Ms. Pecis. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendant Pecis demurrer is tentatively overruled subject to oral argument on the points noted.