No Value: IN THE MATTER OF: ERICK QUINTANAR

Case Number: 20STCV02469 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 17 Pro hac vice granted

Case Number: 23CHCV02952 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/29/24 TRIAL DATE: 9/29/25 Case #23CHCV02952 MOTION FOR TRIAL SETTING PREFERENCE Motion filed on 3/22/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant BigBattery, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Xi Wang; Defendants Bixia Liu, BatteryEvo, Inc. and IT Asset Partners, Inc. NOTICE: ok (The motion was served on Responding Parties attorney at the time. New counsel subsequently substituted in to represent Responding Parties). RELIEF REQUESTED : An order for trial setting precedence pursuant to CCP 1062.3. RULING : The motion is denied. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of a corporate dispute between Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant BigBattery, Inc. (Big Battery/Company) and one of its shareholders, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Xi Wang (Wang) who BigBattery claims to be a former officer and director. In its complaint, BigBattery alleges that Wang used his access to its bank accounts to embezzle more than $660,000, and then used his position as an agent of BigBattery to seize and divert major shipments of the Company inventory to his own facility overseas in Panama for the purpose of relabeling and reselling the Company inventory as his own property and products and for his own profit. BigBattery alleges Wang concurrently engaged in a broad scheme of publishing and disseminating false information to Company clients, business partners and vendors to divert attention from his own conduct and to poison the Companys existing and prospective business relationships to further divert, redirect and usurp these Company business relationships for his own gain and to the deliberate detriment of the Company. As a result of Wangs alleged wrongful conduct, the Company removed Wang as an officer and director of the Company. On 10/2/23, BigBattery filed this action against Wang, Bixia Liu, IT Asset Partners, Inc., BatteryEvo, Inc, and Does 1-10 for: (1) Conversion, (2) Concealment, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) Trespass to Chattels, (5) Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations, (6) Negligence Misrepresentation, (7) Negligent Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage and (8) Violation of Business & Professions Code 17200, et seq. Intentional Infringement of Right of Integrity and Violation of Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) In the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint, Wang alleges causes of action against BigBattery, Clifford Eric Lungren (Lungren) and Does 1-15 for: (1) Determining Directors of Corporation (Corporations Code 709), (2) Involuntary Dissolution of Corporation, (3) Fraud, (4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (5) Imposition of Constructive Trust, and (6) Accounting. On 3/22/24, BigBattery filed and served the instant motion seeking an order for trial setting precedence pursuant to CCP 1062.3. No opposition or other response to the motion has been filed. ANALYSIS The motion cites CCP 1060, CCP 1062.3 and CRC 3.729 in support of the relief requested. CCP 1060 provides: Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract. He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought. CCP 1062.3 provides: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be set for trial at the earliest possible date and shall take precedence over all other cases, except older matters of the same character and matters to which special precedence may be given by law. (b) Any action brought under the provisions of this chapter in which the plaintiff seeks any relief, in addition to a declaration of rights and duties, shall take such precedence only upon noticed motion and a showing that the action requires a speedy trial. (emphasis added) Neither the complaint nor the First Amended Cross-Complaint contain causes of action for declaratory relief brought under Title 14 of Miscellaneous Provisions, Chapter 8, Declaratory Relief, of the California Code of Civil Procedure beginning with CCP 1060 and ending with CCP 1062.5. ( See Complaint, generally; First Amended Cross-Complaint, generally). As such, BigBattery has failed to establish that it is entitled trial preference under CCP 1062.3. BigBattery also cites CRC 3.729(2) which provides: In setting a case for trial, the court, at the initial case management conference or at any other proceeding at which the case is set for trial, must consider all the facts and circumstances that are relevant. These may include: . . . (2) Whether the case has statutory priority; . . . As noted above, BigBattery has failed to establish that the case has statutory priority as neither the complaint nor operative cross-complaint contain causes of action based on the statute relied on (i.e., CCP 1060). Additionally, it does not appear that BigBatterys counsel raised the issue when the Court set the case for trial on 6/20/24. ( See 6/20/24 Minute Order). CONCLUSION The motion is denied.

Case Number: 24SMCP00171 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE June 13, 2024, continued to July 25, 2024 CASE NUMBER 24SMCP00171 MOTION Motion to Compel Arbitration MOVING PARTY Petitioner Wasser, Cooper & Mandles P.C. OPPOSING PARTY (none) BACKGROUND Petitioner Wasser, Cooperman & Mandles P.C. (Petitioner) moves to compel Respondent Shazeen Shah (Respondent) to arbitration regarding a dispute over legal fees incurred in connection with Petitioners provision of legal services to Respondent in the matter, Marriage of Shah/Aschinger. (Verified Petition at ¶ 1; Ex. A.) The petition is unopposed. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION LEGAL STANDARDS [T]he advantages of arbitration include a presumptively less costly, more expeditious manner of resolving disputes. It follows a party to a valid arbitration agreement has a contractual right to have its dispute with another party to the contract resolved quickly and inexpensively. ( Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc . (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 94, 99100 [cleaned up].) Thus, on petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see also EFund Capital Partners v. Pless (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320 [the language in section 1281.2 compelling arbitration is mandatory].) The right to compel arbitration exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a partys conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subds. (a)-(c).) On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court must first determine whether an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature. ( Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 [cleaned up].) The party seeking to compel arbitration must also plead and prove a prior demand for arbitration and a refusal to arbitrate under the agreement. ( Mansouri v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 633, 640-641.) And while the moving party on a motion to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, [a] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination. ( Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 [cleaned up]; see also Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability].) ANALYSIS As a threshold matter, [a] petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. ( Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 515, 532.) As such, a courts personal jurisdiction over the respondent requires compliance with the same service rules that apply for service of a summons and complaint in any other lawsuit. ( Frey & Hogan Corp. v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco (1936) 5 Cal.2d. 401, 403-404.) Moreover, due process requires that a respondent be given written notice of the moving and supporting papers at least sixteen court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Here, there is no proof of service indicating that the original Petition to Compel arbitration was ever served on Respondent in a manner that would give the Court personal jurisdiction to hear the matter. Further, there is no proof of service indicating that the notice of the hearing was ever served on Respondent. The Court continued the hearing to allow Petitioner to file a proof of service, but no proof of service has yet been filed. The Court acknowledges that a Notice of Continuance was filed on June 14, 2024, but no proof of service attached to that notice. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Because the Court finds no proof of service demonstrating that Respondent was notified about this lawsuit or was given proper notice of the hearing, the Court denies without prejudice the Petition to Compel Arbitration. Further, the Court continues that Case Management Conference to January 23, 2025 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207. Petitioner shall provide notice of the Courts order and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 25, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV29725 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT KPG HEALTHCARE LLC, Plaintiff, vs. SAVANT CARE INC., et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV29725 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES; GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO DEEM RFAs ADMITTED Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 30, 2024 On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff KPG Healthcare LLC filed this action against Defendant Mindful Values and others. On March 14, 2024, Plaintiff served Form Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for Admission on Defendant. After an extension of time, the deadline for Defendant to respond was May 31, 2024, but to date, no responses have been received. On June 25 and 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed motions to compel responses to the Form Interrogatories and to deem the RFAs admitted. Where a party fails to serve timely responses to discovery requests, the court may make an order compelling responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300; Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.) A party that fails to serve timely responses waives any objections to the request, including ones based on privilege or the protection of attorney work product. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (a), 2031.300, subd. (a).) When a party fails to timely respond to a request for admission, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) The party who failed to respond waives any objections to the demand, unless the court grants them relief from the waiver, upon a showing that the party (1) has subsequently served a substantially compliant response, and (2) that the partys failure to respond was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) The court shall grant a motion to deem admitted requests for admissions, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Defendant filed no opposition to these motions and did not serve timely responses. It does not appear that Defendant served substantially compliant responses prior to the hearing. Accordingly, the motions are GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to provide verified responses, without objections, to Form Interrogatories, Set One within 30 days. The Requests for Admission served on March 14, 2024 are deemed admitted. The request for sanctions is granted in part. Defendants counsel is ordered to pay total sanctions of $2,000.00 to Plaintiff within 30 days. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 30th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24PSCV00990 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: G Plaintiff City of Pomonas Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction, and Appointment of Receiver Respondent: Defendants Kanu Patel and Hemlata Patel TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff City of Pomonas Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction, and Appointment of Receiver is GRANTED IN PART as to the Request for a Preliminary Injunction and DENIED IN PART as to the Request for Appointment of Receiver. BACKGROUND This is a nuisance abatement action involving the Passport Inn in Pomona. The Passport Inn is a motel that is operated by Defendant HJ Hospitality, Inc. (HJ Hospitality) on property owned by Defendant Pomona Lodge LLC (Pomona Lodge). Defendants Kanu Patel and Hemlata Patel are managing members of Pomona Lodge while Defendant Hima N. Naik serves as HJ Hospitalitys managing member. Since before 2020, the Passport Inn has allegedly served as a place for illicit activity including prostitution, human trafficking, and drug use. In August 2020, Pomona Lodge and the Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office (LA County DA) entered into a stipulated judgment that enjoined Pomona Lodge from engaging in a public nuisance and required them to take proactive steps that included installing security cameras, ending the practice of hourly room rentals, and posting human trafficking awareness notices. Subsequently, it appears the LA County DA has chosen not to enforce the judgment, and Passport Inn allegedly continues to be an ongoing public nuisance. On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff City of Pomona (the City) filed a complaint on the behalf of the state against Pomona Lodge, the Patels, HJ Hospitality, Naik, and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) abatement pursuant to the Red Light Abatement Act, (2) abatement pursuant to the Drug Abatement Act, and (3) public nuisance. On May 22, 2024, the City filed the present motion. On July 19, 2024, the Court granted the Citys ex parte application to advance the hearing date for the present motion. A hearing on the present motion is now set for July 29, 2024, with a case management conference and OSC Re: Failure to File Proof of Service set for August 21, 2024. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE The Citys request for judicial notice of a grant deed related to the subject location is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). ANALYSIS The City moves for injunctive relief and the appointment of a receiver. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Citys request for a preliminary injunction and DENIES the Citys request for the appointment of a receiver. Preliminary Injunction Legal Standard [A] court will deny a preliminary injunction unless there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will be successful on the merits, but the granting of a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the merits. ( Beehan v. Lido Isle Community Assn. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 858, 866.) The function of a preliminary injunction is the preservation of the status quo until a final determination of the merits. ( Ibid .) In evaluating a partys request for a preliminary injunction, courts consider (1) how likely it is that the moving party will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative harm the parties will suffer in the interim due to the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. ( Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Services, Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420.) [T]he greater the . . . showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. ( Ibid , quoting Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) The balancing of harm between the parties also involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. ( Husain v. McDonalds Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860, 867, quoting Abrams v. St. Johns Hospital & health Center (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 628, 636.)¿The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as the moving party to show all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. ( OConnell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) But [w]here a governmental entity seeking to enjoin the alleged violation of an ordinance which specifically provides for injunctive relief establishes that it is reasonably probable it will prevail on the merits, a rebuttable presumption arises that the potential harm to the public outweighs the potential harm to the defendant. If the defendant shows that it would suffer grave or irreparable harm from the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the court must then examine the relative actual harms to the parties. ( IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 72 (internal footnote omitted).) Discussion In this case, the City seeks an injunction pursuant to Penal Code section 11227, subdivision (a) which authorizes injunctive relief to abate a nuisance that exists pursuant to the Red Light Abatement Law. Pursuant to the Red Light Abatement Law, every building or place in or upon which acts of . . . lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, are held or occur, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance. (Pen. Code, § 11225, subd. (a)(1).) Furthermore, every building or place used for the purpose of human trafficking, and every building or place in or upon which acts of human trafficking are held or occur, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance. (Pen. Code, § 11225, subd. (b)(1).) The City also seeks an injunction pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11571 which authorizes injunctive relief to abate a nuisance as defined in Health and Safety Code section 11570, which reads as follows: Every building or place used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, storing, keeping, manufacturing, or giving away any controlled substance, precursor, or analog specified in this division, and every building or place wherein or upon which those acts take place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance. (Health & Safety Code, § 11570.) Here, the City provides the following evidence in support of its requests for injunctive relief. According to Corporal Paul Lucifora of the Pomona Police Department, the Passport Inn has generated a total of 558 calls for service from January 2020 to April 2024 which include thirty (30) calls related to narcotics, thirteen (13) calls related to prostitution, and sixteen (16) calls related to overdoses. (Lucifora Decl., ¶ 5.) Lucifora provides a sampling of sixteen (16) calls of service from February 2023 to February 2024 which include two (2) calls for shootings (Lucifora Decl., ¶ 5(a), (b)), four (4) calls involving prostitution or human trafficking (Lucifora Decl., ¶ 5(c), (f), (i), (m)), seven (7) calls for battery or domestic violence (Lucifora Decl., ¶ 5(d), (g), (h), (j)-(l), (n)), and three (3) calls involving illicit drug use (Lucifora Decl., ¶ 5(e), (o), (p)). Based on the evidence provided above, the court finds the City has established the Passport Inn constitutes a nuisance pursuant to Penal Code sections 11225, subdivision (a)(1) and 11225, subdivision (b)(1). However, the court does not find that the City adequately established the Passport Inn constitutes a nuisance pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11570. While Luciforas declaration establishes ongoing drug use at the Passport Inn, neither it nor the supplemental declaration provide any examples of commercial drug activity. Although it does describe one reported instance of violence over unpaid debts from a drug deal, it does not specify if the drug deal also occurred at the Passport Inn. (Lucifora Decl., ¶ 5(k).) Because the City has established the existence of a nuisance per se, the Patel Defendants now bear the burden of establishing grave or irreparable harm will result if the Citys request for a preliminary injunction is granted. In opposition, the Patels first argue the Court should not intrude on the jurisdiction of the previous judgment between the Patels and the LA County DA. (Opp., p. 12:9-13:5.) The legal authorities upon which the Patels rely on for this argument, however, are inapposite. ( In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426-427 [determining whether one judge could revisit bail imposed by a previous judge in the same case]; Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 493 [determining whether one judge could lift a stay imposed by a previous judge in the same case]; Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232 [determining whether one judge could reconsider ruling of the previous judge in the same case].) While these authorities limit a judges ability to revisit rulings by a different judge in the same action , this case is separate from the action brought by the LA County DA. The Patels fail to direct the court to any authority that limits the Citys ability to pursue its own enforcement action. The Patels also argue there is an inherent danger that the two judgments may contradict each other and are void for vagueness. (Opp., p. 13:15-15.) But while the Patels cite to City of San Bernardino Hotel/Motel Assn. v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 237, 250, the court notes this case is inapposite as it dealt with whether a municipal ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, the Patels have failed to identify how and where the language in the Citys proposed injunction is unconstitutionally vague. Nor do the Patels identify how the language of the proposed injunction conflicts with the language of the previous judgment. Next, the Patels contend there is a factual dispute as to whether the Passport Inn currently operates as a nuisance. While they admit the Passport Inn was previously operated by others from September 2020 to April 2024, they claim they assumed operation of the Passport Inn on April 18, 2024. (Patel Decl., ¶ 10-11, 13-16.) They then describe a series of changes they have implemented including posting signs to discourage criminal activity (Patel Decl., ¶ 18-19, Ex. 6-7), maintaining 24-hour video surveillance (Patel Decl., ¶ 20), hiring security to monitor the motel (Patel Decl., ¶ 21), not allowing hourly rental of rooms (Patel Decl., ¶ 22), prohibiting minors unaccompanied by an adult (Patel Decl., ¶ 23), requiring all motel guests to sign registration cards and provide identification (Patel Decl., ¶ 24-25), and even going beyond the requirements of the previous judgment by prohibiting visitors (Patel Decl., ¶ 26). In response, the City fails to contradict the Patels evidence. While Lucifora states in a supplemental declaration that the City has received an additional seventeen calls for service from April 17, 2024, to July 25, 2024, Lucifora failed to state what the calls for service involved. (Lucifora Suppl. Decl., ¶ 3(d).) Furthermore, based on the Citys own evidence, while the Passport Inn received 558 calls for service from January 2020 to April 23, 2024, which averages to one call for service every two to three days (1,574 days divided by 558 calls for service), the Passport Inn now only averages one call for service every five to six days (99 days divided by 17 calls for service). The court finds that the reduction in the number of calls for service is not insignificant. Further, the City failed to provide any additional evidence that establishes ongoing prostitution and human trafficking since the Patels assumed operations on April 18, 2024. The Patels contend the court cannot enjoin behavior that has been discontinued and cite the rule that [a] court of equity will not afford an injunction to prevent in the future that which in good faith has been discontinued in the absence of any evidence that the acts are likely to be repeated in the future. ( Mallon v. City of Long Beach (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 178, 190; see also People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 328, 333 [holding purpose of abatement action pursuant to the Red Light Abatement Law is reformation of the property and not punishment for past acts].) The present case, however, does not involve an absence of any evidence that suggests prostitution and human trafficking will continue at the Passport Inn. Instead, the Citys evidence of continued violations after the 2020 judgment suggests there is a significant risk that any abatement is a temporary response to the present action. Additionally, courts have generally found voluntary abatement defeats abatement actions when it occurs before the action is filed. ( See People ex rel. Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 766 [collecting cases]; see also People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 556, 562.) The Patels have not provided any authority that allows them to block the City from obtaining injunctive relief in an abatement action where they waited to abate the nuisance until after the action to abate was commenced. Ultimately, the court finds the Patels Defendants failed to demonstrate how being enjoined from allowing prostitution and human trafficking will cause grave and irreparable harm to them when they (1) do not have the right to allow such conduct in the first place and (2) have already purportedly taken steps to stop such conduct. Accordingly, the Citys request for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Appointment of Receiver The City also requests the court appoint a receiver pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 564, subdivision (b)(3) and (b)(9). (Motion, p. 15:25-16:28.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 565, subdivision (b)(3), the Court may appoint a receiver [a]fter judgment, to carry the judgment into effect. Because no judgment has yet been entered in the present action, the court declines to appoint a receiver pursuant to this provision. Next, Code of Civil Procedure section 564, subdivision (b)(9) allows the court to appoint a receiver [i]n all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party. Here, the court does not find necessary the appointment of a receiver given the Patels have taken action to abate the nuisance at issue as noted above. Accordingly, the Citys request for the appointment of a receiver is DENIED. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Citys motion in part as to the Citys request for a preliminary injunction and DENIES the Citys motion in part as to the Citys request for the appointment of receiver.

Case Number: 22STCV04747 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Jane Doe filed this action against Defendants, LBUSD and Thomas Maggio for damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse. 2. Motion to Stay Proceedings a. Legal Standard Any party may file a motion for an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.5 staying the proceedings in any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination, or the court may stay the proceedings on its own motion. The motion for a stay may be included with a petition for coordination or may be served and submitted to the Chair of the Judicial Council and the coordination motion judge by any party at any time prior to the determination of the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515.) b. Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 451, 452, subds. (d) and (h), 453, Defendants request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits B-G. Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 is also granted. c. Analysis Defendant moves to stay the trial because (1) there are two pending writs before two different appellate courts to decide the constitutionality of California Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218) and (2) Defendant wants to be able to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations without fear that its relevant Board will violate the law to authorize payments for any settlement agreement. To elaborate, AB 218 authorized a three-year window beginning in January 1, 2020 that allowed claims of childhood sexual assault to be brought regardless of how long the abuse allegedly occurred. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (q).) AB 218 amended Government Code § 905 to retroactively strip statutory governmental immunities for public entities which violates Article XVI section 6 of the Constitution and its prohibition of gifts of public funds. Defendant states the first pending writ, West Contra Costa U.S.D. v. Superior Court (First Appellate District Case No. A16934), wherein the parties are awaiting the requested oral arguments and have submitted their respective briefs. In the second pending writ, Roe # 2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707), the court requested an informal response to the filed writ, granting the school district until May 17, 2024 to file an informal reply to the response. In exercising its discretion [regarding stay] . . . the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions . . . [and] whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. (Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215.) First, Defendant argues that like Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 807-808 wherein a stay of a state court action involving the obligation to pay attorneys fees was justified because a broad action involving RICO was pending in federal court that would govern that case and other cases involving such fee obligations, here this case should be set aside because one or both of the two pending appellate writ proceedings could resolve the issue as to AB 218s unconstitutionality. Defendant further explains that staying this case is the only way to ensure the case will not conflict with the decisions reached in the two pending Appellate Court cases. Next, Defendant also asserts staying the action will not prejudice Plaintiffs rights because Plaintiff waited 25 years to file the lawsuit and any stay would toll the time within which Plaintiff is required to bring the case to trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) In opposition, Plaintiff responds that (1) no legal support exists to mandate a stay in similar contexts and (2) staying the action would prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that the First District has issued a tentative ruling agreeing that these actions are not barred by the Constitutional limitation argued by Defendant, and contends the appellate court will likely adopt that ruling as final after arguments on 7/18/24. Plaintiff notes that the Second District has summarily denied similar writ petitions. Plaintiff notes that, in the event the different courts of appeal split, this case will be in the same procedural posture it is in now. Plaintiff also notes that the issue will likely go to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the courts of appeal split, and this could take years. Pursuant to Nken v. Holder (2009) 556 U.S. 418, 426, when considering whether to impose a stay, the Court must consider several factors. Those factors are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. (Id., at p. 434.) Once an applicant satisfies the first two factors, the traditional stay inquiry calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest. The Court wishes to hear from the parties at the hearing concerning the outcome of the 7/18/24 oral arguments. Specifically, the Court wishes to know whether the First District issued a ruling. Regardless, the Court is not inclined to grant the motion. Granting the instant motion would prejudice Plaintiff. Defendant has not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. There is no guarantee that the decisions made by the Court of Appeals in the pending writs would create a definitive ruling on the issue as it could always be further appealed to the Supreme Court, potentially taking years to resolve. The Court notes that the vast majority of trial courts have held against the District on this argument, and this trial court has consistently held against the District on this issue. The motion is therefore denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 24SMCV01816 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Afsar, et al., v. Marrari Inc., et al. CASE NO.: 24SMCV01816 MOTION: Demurrer and Motion to Strike HEARING DATE: 7/29/2024 LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70.) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) A demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction of instruments pleaded, or facts impossible in law. ( S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations omitted.) A special demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respondi.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Malys of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Ibid .) Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP §§ 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded].) Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given. ( Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The burden is on plaintiff to show¿ in what manner ¿plaintiff can amend the complaint, and¿ how ¿that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿( Id .) ANALYSIS Defendants Marrari Inc. dba R&S Auto, Ricardo Marrari, Ricardo Danial Marrari and Sally Marrari as Trustees of The Ricardo Marrari and Sally Marrari Living Trust Dated 1-11-17 demur to the fourth cause of action in Plaintiffs Sanaz Afsar, MSK and AKs Second Amended Complaint (SAC), as well as all causes based on alter ego liability against the individual defendants. Defendants also move to strike allegations in support of Plaintiffs claim of punitive damages. Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud The elements of fraud are: (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. ( Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled with specificity. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. ( Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.) Defendants assert that the SAC fails to state a claim for fraud with the requisite specificity because it i mproperly combines all the defendants. The fraud cause of action alleges that Marrari told Kashani that the preexisting fuel pump on the Lamborghini was clogged and had to be replaced to charge Plaintiffs for unnecessary work. (SAC ¶¶ 87-88.) Defendants argue that the definition of Marari creates an ambiguity in the charging allegations. However, the SAC does not create any ambiguity with its definition of Marrari. The SAC defines Marrari as Marrari Inc. and Ricardo Marrari, and more specifically alleges that Ricardo Marrari is the the proprietor of Marrari Inc. and the individual who actually performed the negligent work in question and perpetrated the fraud on plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 2.) With this definition in mind, the SAC refers to the individual, Ricardo Marrari, rather than Marrari Inc., when alleging the subject misrepresentations. The SAC alleges the fraudulent representations with sufficient specificity as to substance of the representations, who made the representations, and by what means they were made. The SAC alleges that following certain repairs by Marrari, on February 13, 2024, Marrari contacted Kashani and said that work on the subject car was complete and could be picked up. (SAC ¶¶ 13, 91.) Kashani collected the car from Marrari's shop and attempted to drive it to downtown Los Angeles, but noticed the car was losing power and stopping. (Id.) Kashani returned the car to Marrari and told Marrari the engine was losing power and there was also a smell of gas and exhaust coming in through the window when opened. (Id.) Marrari promised to check the car. (Id.) Marrari stated then (and on at least one other occasion) that a gas smell was normal for the car or indeed for any older car of this type due to incomplete combustion of fuel in the engine. (Id.) Marrari did not suggest the car could have a gas leak or that he should check for gas leaks. (¶ 14) In reality, the car was running lean because when Marrari installed a replacement fuel pump, he jammed a fuel line between the pump and the car frame, creating a bottleneck that reduced the fuel flow to the engine. (¶ 14A. ) Marrari knew that he had jammed a fuel line because Marrari could not have replaced the center mufflers without seeing the jammed fuel line. (¶ 14B.) Thus, even if the installation was merely a mistake, Marraris subsequent failure to notify Plaintiff was designed both to cover up Marrari's mistake and to obtain and charge for more work. (Id.) Instead of informing Plaintiffs and/or correcting this issue, Marrari told Kashani the low power was caused by a clogged center muffler and the center mufflers had to be completely removed and replaced or cleaned at great expense. (Id .) Kashani relied upon and accepted Marrari's explanation and, again, paid Marrari's invoice for replacing the center mufflers without question. (¶ 14C.) According to the SAC, Marrari thereby tricked Kashani into paying for unnecessary work caused by Marrari's own misconduct. (Id.) On March 1, 2024, Marrari contacted Kashani and said the car was ready and that the power problem had been caused by clogged center mufflers. (SAC ¶ 15.) Marrari stated he had removed and cleaned out the center mufflers and that the car was ready to pick and drive. (Id.) On March 2, 2024, Kashani went with a friend to pick up the car. (¶16.) Marrari assured Kashani the car was ready and safe to drive. (Id.) Marrari did state that the car lacked full power because the engine was "running lean" and was "thirsty for fuel" and recommended installing a second fuel pump in the future to deliver more fuel to the engine. (Id.) As before, Marrari did not admit he had caused the loss of power by jamming the fuel line, rather, he proposed even more work (adding a second fuel pump). (¶ 16A.) After driving home and noticing a continued lack of power and a gas smell, Kashani texted Marrari and informed him of these issues. (¶¶ 17-19.) Marrari texted back that the car needed a second fuel pump and did not advise that the car was unsafe, or could be leaking fuel, or needed to be brought back to the shop. (Id. ¶ 19.) The SAC contends that if Marrari had not lied and blamed the problem on a clogged muffler, or need for another pump, and had instead admitted that Marrari had jammed a fuel line while making an unnecessary repair, Kashani could have had the problem corrected by a competent repair shop and the fire would have been prevented. (SAC ¶ 94.) If Marrari had not lied about the fuel pump, or had simply left it alone, there would not be a jammed fuel line which contributed to the fire. (¶ 95.) The SAC thereby supports each element of fraud with specificity. To summarize, on February 13, 2024, Marrari told Kashani in person at his shop that the low power was caused by a clogged center muffler. Marrari knew this was false, because that the truth was that he jammed the fuel line. Marrari chose to lie to Plaintiff in order to charge for more unnecessary services for Kashanis vehicle. Kashani relied on these false statements and permitted Marrari to replace the mufflers, instead of fixing the known fuel line jam. This led to charges for unnecessary work, and ultimately resulted in the subject fire. No more facts are required to support the fraud cause of action. Accordingly, Defendants demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fraud cause of action. Alter Ego Defendants argue that the SAC fails to establish alter ego liability between the Marrari Trust and Marrari Inc./Ricardo Marrari. In order to establish an alter ego theory, a plaintiff must allege: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists, and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone. ( Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399.) A claim against a defendant, based on the alter ego theory, is not itself a claim for substantive relief,... but rather, procedural, i.e., to disregard the corporate entity as a distinct defendant and to hold the alter ego individuals liable on the obligations of the corporation where the corporate form is being used by the individuals to escape personal liability, sanction a fraud, or promote injustice. ( Hennesseys Tavern, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1359.) In pleading an alter ego theory, one is only required to allege only ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. ( Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 236.) The alter ego test encompasses a host of factors to determine unity of interest, including: (1) commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses&; (2) the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own&; (3) the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same; (4) the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation&; (5) the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records&; (6) sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family&; (7) the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation&; (8) the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization&; (9) the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation&; (10) the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest, or concealment of personal business activities&; (11) the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships among related entities&; (12) the use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity&; (13) the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another&; (14) the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions&; and (15) the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity. ( Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft, LLP (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 223, 249-50.) This long list of factors is not exhaustive. The enumerated factors may be considered [a]mong others under the particular circumstances of each case. ( Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 812.) No single factor is determinative, and instead a court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine. [Citation.] ( VirtualMagic Asia, Inc. v. FilCartoons, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 228, 245.) The SAC alleges that Marrari, the Trust, and Marrari Inc. are all alter egos of each other and together own and operate the repair shop. (SAC ¶ 2A.) T he Trust owns the land, buildings, and fixtures which includes the car lifts and other fixed equipment. (Id.) As a mater of ultimate fact, the SAC alleges the following factors in support of alter ego liability: (a) Defendants' signage and website (an eBay storefront) refer only to "R & S Auto" or "Europeanautoparts" without any indication a corporation is involved; (b) Checks made out to "R & S Auto" are deposited directly into Ricardo Marrari's personal bank account; (c) There is no employment relationship between Marrari Inc. and Ricardo Marrari, no wages paid and no payroll taxes paid; (d) Marrari Inc. never had a board or shareholder meeting (beyond, possibly, the original organizational meeting that did not actually take place but may be reflected in the "corporate kit" paperwork), never issued any shares to anyone, has no share register, and rarely if ever made Statement of Information filings with the California Secretary of State; (e) Marrari Trust was set up for "asset protection"; (f) Marrari Inc. has no capital, no assets (the lifts and equipment at the shop being owned nominally by Marrari Trust) and is severely underinsured for the nature of vehicles it services; (g) There is no written lease between Marrari Inc. and Marrari Trust, and Marrari Inc. has never directly paid Marrari Trust, the supposed landlord, any rent. listed as the owner of any fictitious name; (i) Defendants never followed any corporate formalities. The Court finds that points (b), (c), (d), (f), and (i) would tend to support an alter ego theory. Presumed true, these ultimate facts show several alter ego factors, including commingling of funds, treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own, failure to maintain adequate corporate records, sole ownership of the corporation by one individual, inadequate capitalization, absence of corporate assets and undercapitalization of Marrari Inc., and use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for the business of an individual. The SAC alleges, also as a matter of fact, that recognizing the separate existence of any of Marrari Inc., Marrari Trust or Ricardo Marrari would work a fraud and injustice and allow Ricardo Marrari and the Marrari Trust to escape liability for fraud and negligence. (SAC ¶ 2C.) At the pleading stage, nothing more is required to establish alter ego liability. Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendants move to strike portions of the SAC related to punitive damages, as well as factual allegations Defendants deem to be untrue or speculative. As to punitive damages, Civil Code section 3294(c)(3) defines fraud as any intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. As discussed infra, the SAC supports the allegations of fraud against Defendants with sufficient factual specificity. Moreover, the specific facts allege that Marrari misrepresented material facts of the vehicles true condition and the necessity of repairs. Marrari did so with the intent to charge for unnecessary work, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of their money (and the vehicle). Such factual averments support a finding of fraud as defined by section 3294. Defendants also move to strike certain allegations in support of the fraud cause of action, which Defendants contend are based purely on speculation. (Mot. at 5; see SAC ¶¶ 88-96.) Defendants attempt to provide extrinsic evidence on this point. (See DaSilva Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. F.) However, the Court cannot determine the validity of these facts at the pleading stage. Defendants motion to strike these allegations as speculative or false is improper. As with all attacks on the pleadings, the allegations are presumed true. Such disputes of fact must be determined outside of the pleading stage. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.

Case Number: 24NNCP00161 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS PETITION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD The hearing is continued to September 13, 2024, at 8:30 AM for Petitioner to effect proper notice of the time and place of the rescheduled hearing. I. BACKGROUND On April 22, 2024, Petitioner Bill Me Later, Inc. petitioned to confirm an arbitration award rendered in its favor against respondents My Rx Pharmacy, Inc. d/b/a My RX Pharmacy and Tigran Silah on November 16, 2023. Respondent filed no opposition. II. LEGAL STANDARD Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) If a party duly serves and files a petition under section 1285, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding. ( Id. , § 1286.) Confirmation of the award is mandatory unless a response or petition to correct or vacate the award has been timely filed. ( See id. ; Valsan Partners Limited Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 809, 818.) III. ANALYSIS 1. Service A copy of the petition and a written notice of the time and place of the hearing thereof and any other papers upon which the petition is based shall be served in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement for the service of such petition and notice; but if the arbitration agreement does not provide the manner in which such service shall be made and the person upon whom service is to be made has not previously appeared in the proceeding and has not previously been served, the Petition must be served within California in the manner provided by law for the service of summons in an action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.4.) Here, the arbitration agreement provides for no method of service. Petitioner filed proofs of service indicating that its initial notice of motion and moving papers were served on Respondents in the manner of a summons. However, Petitioner subsequently amended its notice of motion to reflect a later hearing date. Section 1290.4 requires written notice of the time and place of hearing to be given in the manner of a summons. When Petitioner rescheduled its hearing, it was required to re-notice Respondent personally. There is no proof of service reflecting it did so. The hearing must be continued for Petitioner to effect written notice, in the manner of a summons, of the time and place of the rescheduled hearing. 2. Substance of Petition Petitioners petitioner is otherwise satisfactory. The contents of a petition to confirm an arbitration award shall set forth the substance of or have attached a copy of the agreement to arbitrate, the names of the arbitrators, and shall set forth or have attached a copy of the award and the written opinion of the arbitrators. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.4.) The petition complies with section 1285.4. Once it is served correctly, the Court may grant judgment. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The hearing on the petition is CONTINUED to September 13, 2024 at 8:30 AM in this department. The OSC re proof of service set for August 6, 2024 is advanced and vacated and reset for September 13, 2024. Petitioner is ordered to effect service of the instant order in the manner of a summons on all parties. Dated: July 29, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT