Motion for Preference in California

Moreover, Defendant’s concern that trial preference should not be granted because Defendant has seven other trials at or near when trial would be set to if this motion is granted is meritless. This is because Defendant can seek continuances in those cases. Lastly, the prejudice that Defendant will suffer in not being able to complete discovery is not a sufficient grounds to deny this motion pursuant to the policy considerations being trial preference.

Plaintiff therefore has not shown that she is entitled to trial preference. Moreover, trial is currently scheduled for July 10, 2023only 97 days after the hearing on this motion. Even if Plaintiff had shown entitlement to trial preference, the current trial date is well within the preferential time period. The motion for trial preference is DENIED. Moving party to give notice.

A trial preference is not necessary for that purpose. Moreover, the underlying case remains on appeal. Thus, it is not clear that a preference would further the interests of justice. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for a trial preference will be denied.

Thus, in Biondi, although the Court of Appeal did not directly address the issue of whether a non-individual party may move for trial preference under section 36, subdivision (e), it did direct the trial court to grant a non-individual party trial preference under that subdivision of the statute.

Case Number: 23STCV28309 Hearing Date: February 26, 2024 Dept: 52 Plaintiff Neda Alhilalis Motion for Preference in Trial Setting Plaintiff Neda Alhilali moves for trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a). A party who is over 70 years old is entitled to trial preference if she has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and [t]he health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing her. (CCP § 36(a).)

If Subdivision (c) granted a separate basis for trial preference any time a party is over 70 years old, there would be no purpose or effect to Subdivision (a), as parties would simply move for trial preference any time they are 70 years of age. Accordingly, the Motion for trial preference is DENIED without prejudice. Moving party to give notice.

Upon the granting of a motion for trial preference, “the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date.” (CCP §36(f).) CCP §36.5 provides that: “An affidavit submitted in support of a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party.”

The Court finds that the trial preference should not be vacated at this time and that a continuance is not warranted. Initially, the Court agrees that the condition of Mr. Itnyre may no longer serve as grounds for a trial preference, as he has passed away. The Court acknowledges RDCSs arguments that Plaintiff should have known RDCS was an essential party and accordingly, should have served RDCS prior to filing the Motion for Trial Preference.

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Trial Preference and to Set Trial Date Tentative Ruling: To deny plaintiff’s motion for trial preference and to set trial date, without prejudice, for failure to present any evidence showing that plaintiff’s health is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing her interest in the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc. § 36, subd. (a)(2).)

Plaintiffs filed a motion for trial preference because Chaffee is 92 years old. Defendants oppose.

.: BC712571 HEARING: 12/11/18 TENTATIVE ORDER Plaintiff LAURA ZAMORA’s motion for trial preference is GRANTED. CCP §36(e). Moving Party to Give Notice. Plaintiff, LAURA ZAMOA moves for trial preference on the grounds that Defendant ROBERT A. PESCI is over 70 years old, and his health is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing Plaintiff in this litigation. In Opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek a trial preference based on Defendant’s age and health.

.: BC712571 TENTATIVE ORDER Plaintiff LAURA ZAMORA’s motion for trial preference is GRANTED. CCP §36(e). Moving Party to Give Notice. Plaintiff, LAURA ZAMOA moves for trial preference on the grounds that Defendant ROBERT A. PESCI is over 70 years old, and his health is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing Plaintiff in this litigation. In Opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek a trial preference based on Defendant’s age and health.

Defendants allege that Plaintiffs not seeking trial preference earlier in this action reflects that such preference is not necessary. Defendants moreover argue that granting the trial preference will deny the Defendants right to discovery, while Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by keeping the current date.

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE On December 4, 2018, plaintiff Ralph Dilibero filed this action against defendant Jeannette Brown Haynes for injuries arising from a pedestrian versus motor vehicle collision occurring on October 15, 2018. Plaintiff is 92-years old and moves for trial preference. Trial is currently set for June 2, 2020.

Kusch (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 291, 299 [Unlike section 36, subdivision (d), where the granting or denying of a motion for trial preference lies in the sound discretion of the trial court [citations], section 36 subdivision (a), requires a trial court to give preferential trial setting to any civil case upon the motion of a party to that action who has reached the age of 70, irrespective of the circumstances leading to the motion for preference].)

However, her declaration offers no evidence in support of this claim, or how it is relevant to her request for trial preference. Accordingly, the renewed motion for trial preference is denied.

The record presented by Plaintiff appears to support a trial preference under section 36, subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but Plaintiff did not move for a preference under that subdivision.

MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE JARMAN VS HCR MANOR RIC10007764 STATUS PURSUANT TO CCP 36 JOHN CARE INC L JARMAN Tentative Ruling: Motion for Trial Preference per CCP §36 is granted.

Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks discretionary trial preference under section 36(e) . Code of Civil Procedure section 36(d) allows the Court in discretion to grant trial preference based on a showing of cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting such preference. ( Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 345-346.)

Anthony Kastenek for Plaintiff Joshua Bordin-Wosk for Defendants Issue Motion for Trial Preference RULING The motion is DENIED. Notwithstanding the denial of this motion for trial preference, the court will consider plaintiff’s health in setting a trial date at the 5/28/25 CMC. Analysis This is a motion for trial preference in a wrongful death/ survival action arising from a vehicle v. pedestrian accident occurring on March 8, 2024.

Accordingly, the motion for order granting preference for setting trial is granted. The Court shall set a trial date at the hearing.

In opposition, Defendant argues that McIntyre’s declaration is insufficient to support a granting of the trial preference. Defendant states that the pending knee surgery is not a sufficient medical basis to grant trial preference, and such trial preference is only granted in cases where the elderly plaintiff is suffering from some sort of terminal illness or mentally debilitating condition.

His general physician states Plaintiff is of an advanced age and has sustained severe injuries justifying a trial preference. Accordingly, under subdivision (a), trial preference is mandatory. The Motion for trial preference is GRANTED. The current trial date of April 5, 2019 is advanced to this date and continued to November 13, 2018, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 7.

s ("Flynns") motion for a trial preference pursuant to CCP 36(a) and (c) is DENIED for the reasons set forth below. This is an action for breach of contract and fraud regarding the sale of a business. Trial in the action is set for August 13, 2012. Flynns seek a preference under CCP 36(a) and (c). Plaintiffs and cross-defendants do not oppose a preference.

Plaintiff has demonstrated that his health is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing his interest in the litigation. Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for trial preference is GRANTED. Trial is scheduled for February 28, 2020. The Final Status Conference is scheduled for February 4 2020. Moving party to give notice.

An affidavit submitted in support of a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 may be signed by the attorney for the party seeking preference based upon information and belief as to the medical diagnosis and prognosis of any party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36.5.) “The issue under subdivision (a) is not whether an elderly litigant might die before trial or become so disabled that she might as well be absent when trial is called.

Plaintiff should address whether Omorian will be part of his case, and how a trial preference can be granted if a defendant is yet to be served with the complaint and was not served with the trial preference motion. Accordingly, the Motion for trial preference is DENIED without prejudice. Moving party to give notice.

Defendant also argues that the current trial date set for August 20, 2024 is already near the requested trial preference date and that granting the motion would only advance the trial date by several days. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that trial dates are often postponed by the court or the parties, and the motion for trial preference is intended to ensure that the trial date is firmly set.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements to support a claim for trial preference. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to show that her health is such that a trial preference is necessary to avoid prejudice.

Failure to complete discovery or other pre-trial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36. The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision. The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which supersedes such considerations.

Case Number: 24NNCV03705 Hearing Date: November 21, 2025 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE I.

On April 1, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for trial preference pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a). On April 22, 2020, the Court continued the hearing on the motion for trial preference to August 14, 2020. On June 3, 2020, the Court advanced the hearing on the motion for trial preference to July 24, 2020. Trial is set for May 5, 2021.

Trial is currently set for February 8, 2027, nearly 1.5 years from now . Plaintiff argues that trial preference is necessary given he meets the statutory requirements under Code Civ. Proc. § 36(a) .

Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 692 (reversing the trial Courts order to stay an action which was entitled to a mandatory trial preference and commenting that when an individual qualifies for a preference under Section 36(a) no discretion is afforded to the Court to deny a preference). Motion for Preference Plaintiff moves for a trial preference pursuant to CCP § 36(a), based on Plaintiffs age and health condition.

In opposition, defendant contends that plaintiff’s interest is not prejudiced and that plaintiff’s health does not necessitate a trial preference. Defendant contends that plaintiff will not benefit from a trial preference because she needs time to recover from her surgery. She has not appeared for her deposition, which was set for May 23, 2017 and continued to June 6, 2017. Defendant contends that he will be prejudiced if a trial preference is granted because plaintiff has not appeared for her deposition.

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center Plaintiff Edgar Flores Pinedas Motion for Trial Preference Plaintiff Edgar Flores Pineda moves for trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a) and (e). A party who is older than 70 years old is entitled to trial preference if he has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and [t]he health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 36(a).)

Superior Court ¿(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085.)¿ Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference ¿under¿subdivision (a) of section 3 6 .¿The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision.¿The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which supersedes such considerations.

“Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36. . . . The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which [supersedes] such considerations.” (Swaithes v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1086-1087 (citation omitted).) DISCUSSION Plaintiff is 89 years old. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff must advance her own declaration, or declarations from medical providers, to support her request for a trial preference. The Court also notes that trial is set for June 4, 2019, per stipulation of the parties. As the parties stipulated to set trial for 132 days from this hearing date, the Court sees little necessity of trial preference in this matter, since a trial preference would advance the case only twelve (12) days.

Motion for Trial Preference Plaintiff seeks trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36 subdivisions (a), (b), and (e). Subdivision (a) states: A party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings: (1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole.

Plaintiff's motion for a trial preference pursuant to CCP 36(b) is GRANTED. In accordance with CCP 36(f) this matter must be given a trial date on or before June 23, 2010. Plaintiff through her guardian ad liteum seeks a trial preference on the ground she is under the age of 14 (she is 7) and has a substantial interest in this litigation.(CCP 36(f)).

Plaintiffs' motion for a trial preference pursuant to CCP 36(a) is GRANTED for the reasons set forth below. The instant case is currently set for trial in May. In the event trial does not go forward at that time, this matter shall be set for trial on or before July 17, 2009. (CCP 36(f)). This is plaintiffs second motion for a trial preference. Earlier a preference was sought based upon the condition of plaintiff Anna Marie Wong.

These accommodations are consistent with the 120-day trial setting and will ensure that both parties have a fair opportunity to prepare for trial while honoring Plaintiffs statutory right to preference. Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs request for trial preference. IV. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs request for trial preference. Plaintiff to give notice.

An affidavit signed by an attorney based on information and belief as to the medical diagnoses and prognosis of a party may only be filed by a moving party who is over 70 years old and who is seeking trial preference under Section 36(a). Code Civ. Proc., § 36.5. The court therefore denies Plaintiff’s request for trial preference under Section 36(d).

Plaintiff’s counsel argues that if preference is not given, her health is such that her rights may be prejudiced. (Alfaro Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4.) Plaintiff argues that even though the preferential trial date is not much sooner than the current trial date, trial preference designation will prevent Defendant from requesting an additional trial continuance. Defendant argues Plaintiff should be precluded from moving for trial preference because she waited approximately one and one-half years to do so.

This hearing is on Plaintiffs motion for trial preference . Plaintiff argues that trial preference is necessary given he meets the statutory requirements under Code Civ. Proc. § 36(a) for a trial preference .

Arian, Dept 27 MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE Hearing Date: 6/24/24 CASE NO./NAME: 23STCV20337 CAROLINA S.

Defendants argue Plaintiff has not shown a trial preference is necessary, and trial preference would deprive Defendants of due process. Plaintiff submitted an attorney declaration and a physician declaration attesting to his health problems and likelihood of a short life expectancy. The Court finds that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing Plaintiff’s interest in the litigation. The Court advances the trial date from March 22, 2021 to March 20, 2020.

Jaramillo Motion for Trial Preference Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 36(a), (c), (e) and (f) and Cal. Rule of Court 3.1335 and Setting a Trial Date Within 180 Days of This Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court grants the motion for a trial preference but sets the trial 120 days from the date of the hearing.

(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 257, 262 [trial court erred in granting summary judgment without permitting oral argument].) The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 36 despite the foreseeable prejudice granting trial preference may have on opposing parties. Failure to complete discovery or other pre-trial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36.

The Motion does not discuss any current medical prognosis that would indicate Plaintiff health is such that a preference is necessary. Based on the arguments made in the Motion, the Court is not persuaded a trial preference is warranted at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Trial Preference is denied without prejudice

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE On September 25, 2018, Plaintiff May Fong Wang (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Pei Qin Kwan (“Defendant”) for motor vehicle negligence arising out of an April 30, 2017 automobile versus pedestrian collision. Trial is currently set for March 25, 2020. Plaintiff moves for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 36, subdivision (a).

Shannon argues that the Appellate Courts conclusion conflates the two elements of a §36(a) trial preference motion. Shannon also argues that granting preference raises due process concerns that no appellate court has resolved because such an early trial date would undermine the parties ability to prepare for trial. (Id. at p. 5.)

Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36. The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision. The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which supersedes such considerations.” (Swaithes v.

Smith The motion for trial preference of Dublino is GRANTED. The motion for trial preference of Stephens is GRANTED. The motion for trial preference of Witcher is GRANTED. The motion for trial preference of Shadmirzadi is DENIED. The motion for trial preference of Silvey was DROPPED. The court has emailed a lengthy tentative decision to counsel.

Plaintiffs’ motion for trial preference is GRANTED.

In opposition, Defendants argue that Hovhnnisyan’s declaration is insufficient to support a granting of the trial preference. Defendants state that the above stated conditions do not show a sufficient medical basis to grant trial preference. Finally, Defendants argue that they will be prejudiced should the trial preference be granted. The Court first notes that the defendants’ purported prejudice is not a ground for denying this motion.

Motion for Trial Preference Moving Party: Plaintiff Livius Galio Responding Party: Defendant SSC Newport Beach Operating Co. LP; SSC P): Defendant SSC Beach Operating GP, LLC and Scott Meppen Ruling: Plaintiff Livius Galio’s Motion for Trial Preference is GRANTED. The trial shall be set for June 3, 2019. This date is 119 days after the hearing on February 4, 2019. Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 36 (a), Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for trial preference.

Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36. The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision. The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which supersedes such considerations.” (Swaithes v.

At a November 13, 2020 trial setting conference, the Court scheduled trial for October 18, 2021. On December 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed this Motion for trial preference .

LACMTA contends that an expedited trial date will not permit it to complete discovery in this matter. In reply, Barragan notes that if trial preference is granted, trial must be set no later than May 12, 2021, and currently, trial is set for May 5, 2021. In light of that fact, the Court is not inclined to grant trial preference. The parties have represented that they are diligently pursuing discovery and that much discovery has already been completed.

Boone TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs motion for trial preference is DENIED. ANALYSIS On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed this dog bite action. On January 21, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiffs initial motion for trial preference without prejudice, finding that the supporting declaration did not demonstrate Plaintiff was experiencing current symptoms that would prevent full participation at trial. The Court found the opinion of Plaintiffs expert, Dr.

On March 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for trial preference pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 36. Also on March 20, 2020, the Court continued the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for trial preference to May 18, 2020. On April 20, 2020, the Court continued the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for trial preference to July 2, 2020. Trial is set for July 29, 2021.

Plaintiff is 83 years old and moves for trial preference. Defendant opposes.

Plaintiff argues both her health and that of Cabal could prejudice her interests in this action if trial preference is not granted. (Coletti Decl., ¶ 4.) No opposition was filed. There is good cause for trial preference based on Plaintiff’s age, interest in this action, and deteriorating health condition, including injuries and multiple surgeries arising out of the subject-accident. The Motion for trial preference is GRANTED.

Plaintiff established that his health is not expected to improve, and preference is necessary to prevent prejudice to his interest in the litigation. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for trial preference. Trial is advanced from May 6, 2020 to April 8, 2020 and the Final Status Conference is advanced from April 22, 2020 to March 25, 2020. Moving party to give notice.

It is doubtful whether Plaintiff will have the physical and mental capacity, or be alive, to testify under oath and/or recover an awarded judgment if not granted trial preference. (Ramirez Decl. ¶ 6.) Defendants contend Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving a medical condition that makes trial preference necessary.

“Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36. . . . The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which [supersedes] such considerations.” ( Swaithes v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1086-1087 [citation omitted].)

YC058023 Christopher Trejo’s Motion for Trial Preference TENTATIVE RULING Christopher Trejo’s Motion for Trial Preference is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff moves for a trial preference pursuant to CCP § 36(e) and (f).

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Donna Lee Scoular RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Earl Mendes Hyman TRIAL DATE: Not Set. MOTION: (1) Motion for Trial Preference Tentative Rulings: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Trial Preference is GRANTED. Trial to be set in late March or early April depending on trial counsels schedules I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On May 30, 2023, Plaintiff, Donna Lee Scoular (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant, Earl Mendes Hyman (Defendant), and DOES 1 through 50.

While that may be the case, Defendants’ interest is not sufficient reason to grant trial preference where Plaintiff has not shown that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing her interest in the litigation.[4] Accordingly, the court DENIES the subject motion for a trial preference without prejudice.

On December 27, 2024, Plaintiffs moved for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivisions (a) and (e). No opposition was filed. The motion for trial preference is denied.

If the court grants the motion for trial preference, the court must set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from the date of the hearing on the motion for preference. (Id., subd. (f).) There is no dispute that Craig is over the age of 70 or that he has a substantial interest in this litigation. Rather, the dispositive issue is whether Craig Feagins’s health requires a trial preference.

On June 30, 2020, the Court denied a motion for trial preference Plaintiff had filed on May 27, 2020. On October 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for trial preference pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 36. On October 27, 2020, the Court advanced the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for trial preference to November 13, 2020. Trial is set for July 19, 2021.

Plaintiff moves for trial preference on the grounds that she is over the age of 70 and her health is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing Plaintiff’s interest in the litigation.

However, as noted above, trial preference must be granted where a party meets the requisite standard for calendar preference based on the party’s health and status as more than 70 years of age under section 36(a), and no weighing of interest is involved. (Fox, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at 534.) Motion for Trial Preference: GRANTED Trial to be set for July 10, 2026

Before Trial (TRG 2000) § 12:247.4.) Defendant did not do so. Also, a plaintiff moving for a trial preference under subdivision (a) does not have to show that she is likely to die or become incapacitated before the case goes to trial if a preference is not granted. “Section 36, subdivision (a), says nothing about ‘death or incapacity.’

DISCUSSION Lawrence Friemel requests trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a), because he is 79 years old, has a substantial interest in this case, and has health issues that necessitate trial preference to protect his interest in the litigation. (Motion, pp. 5:1-7:12.) In the alternative, Friemel requests trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (e).

Upon the granting of a motion for trial preference, “the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36, subd. (f).) It is well established that, when a plaintiff is entitled to trial preference, “[m]ere inconvenience to the court or to other litigants is irrelevant. . . . The trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision.

The conclusory statement that plaintiffs life expectancy is uncertain is not sufficient to warrant a trial preference under CCP § 36(a). It follows that plaintiff has not made a showing that the interests of justice will be served by granting a trial preference pursuant to CCP § 36(e).

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR TRIAL PREFERENCE On February 14, 2019, Plaintiff Gwendolyn Harris (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Freeman Med. Towers, Inc., Ethan Christopher, LLC, Grabel Management LLC, Linton Financial, LLC, Garamax, LLC, and Linton Management, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) for negligence and premises liability. Trial is set for August 30, 2020. Plaintiff moves for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a).

Plaintiff argues that trial preference is warranted pursuant to CCP 37, which mandates trial preference where a plaintiff is seeking damages caused by the defendant during the commission of a felony for which the defendant has been convicted. Here, Mr. Hendrick was convicted of a felony for the child sexual abuse of Plaintiff, and thus Plaintiff argues that preference must be granted.

Failure to complete discovery or other pre-trial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of section 36. ( Swaithes v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085 ( Swaithes ).)

The affidavit is not admissible for any purpose other than a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36.” “Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 . . . . The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which [supersedes] such considerations.” ( Swaithes v.

Searing has also demonstrated that she is over 70 years old and has health conditions such that preference is necessary to avoid prejudice. Plaintiff is thus entitled to trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a). Accordingly, the motion for order granting preference for setting trial is granted.

The affidavit is not admissible for any purpose other than a motion for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36.” “Failure to complete discovery or other pretrial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference under subdivision (a) of Section 36 . . . . The express legislative mandate for trial preference is a substantive public policy concern which supersedes such considerations.” Swaithes v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.

Thus, Plaintiff has met all necessary criteria to qualify for a trial preference under section 36, subdivision (a). Because Plaintiffs deteriorating mental state threatens to prejudice her interest in this matter, the Court finds the granting of a trial preference proper. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence to justify trial preference. A motion for trial preference pursuant to section 36, subdivision (a) need not include a doctors declaration. ( Fox v.

(2) Motion for Trial Preference Plaintiff Sally Emr moves for trial preference pursuant to CCP § 36(a). Defendant Lifttech Elevator Services, Inc. opposes the motion. A reply was filed.

Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that he qualifies for trial preference, the court shall set the matter for trial not more than 120 days from that date. (CCP § 36(f); see also, Sprowl v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 777, 780.)

Plaintiff moves for a trial preference under CCP 36(a) and 36(e). Defendant opposes preference on the ground that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for preference and plaintiff cannot make such a motion on defendant's behalf. Plaintiff's motion for preference is DENIED for the reasons set forth below. Plaintiff seeks trial preference in this automobile accident case under both CCP 36(a) and 36(e).

[T]he decision to grant or deny a preferential trial setting rests at all times in the sound discretion of the trial court in light of the totality of the circumstances. Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co . (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 344. Plaintiff moves for a trial preference pursuant to CCP § 36(a), based on Plaintiffs age and health condition. Plaintiff submitted adequate evidence that her health is such that a trial preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing Plaintiff. (Decl., Matthew J.

The trial date in this matter was set when the complaint was filed. (Jacobs Decl., ¶ 4.) However, Plaintiffs’ counsel declares he has observed Plaintiff’s mental and physical abilities are “slipping” and that she will be unable to testify on her own behalf to support her case if trial preference is not granted. (Jacobs Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6.) Defense counsel agreed he would not oppose this Motion for trial preference. (Jacobs Decl., ¶ 8; Exh. 1.)

Trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a) is mandatory. “Where a party meets the requisite standard for calendar preference under subdivision (a), preference must be granted. No weighing of interests is involved. [footnote omitted.]” ( Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529, 535.) Under section 36(f), a Court must set the trial date for no more than 120 days from the finding.

Plaintiffs controlled hypertension and discomfort due to a fall from nearly a year ago are insufficient to establish prejudice if trial preference is not granted. Plaintiffs Motion for Trial Preference is denied. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Trial Preference is DENIED.

Based on these same facts, trial preference would serve the interests of justice.

Defendants argue they will suffer prejudice if a preferential trial date is granted and note difficulties in obtaining Plaintiff’s medical records. However, where the two prongs of subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(2) are met, trial preference is mandatory. Defendants request that if trial preference is granted, the Court set a discovery schedule that would allow percipient witness discovery until two weeks before the trial date and that expert discovery remain open until trial.

Nor does the court finds that given the fact the case was filed just this year that a preference would further the interests of justice. Accordingly, the court will deny defendants' motion for a trial preference.

Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 692 (reversing the trial Court’s order to stay an action which was entitled to a mandatory trial preference and commenting that when an individual qualifies for a preference under Section 36(a) no discretion is afforded to the Court to deny a preference). Plaintiff Alan Naito moves for trial preference on pursuant to CCP § 36(a) based on Plaintiff’s age and health condition.