Violations of the Ralph and Bane Acts in California

Defendants Regents and the officers now demur to the first COA for violation of the Bane Act. Salazar further demurs to the fifth COA for violation of the Ralph Act. The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law. Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420. A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, Doe v.

The Complaint alleges four causes of action against all defendants (Ruiz and FUSD): (1) Violation of the Bane Act, Civil Code §52.1; (2) Violation of the Ralph Act, Civil Code §51.7; (3) Negligence; and (4) Assault and Battery. FUSD now demurs to the first and second causes of action only.

Defendants argue Adefuye has not alleged he was attacked for a reason specified in the Ralph Act or because of his exercise of a right protected by the Bane Act. The SAC alleges he was assaulted because of his position in a labor dispute. SAC ¶86. The basis of this action is Adefuye was attacked because he asked to be paid for work he performed. This constitutes a labor dispute under the Ralph Act, as well as exercise of a legal right under the Bane Act. OVERRULED.

This is sufficient to allege a claim under the Bane Act. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Ralph Act and Unruh Act causes of action and DENIES Defendants motion as to the Bane Act.

Case Number: 22STCV22115 Hearing Date: June 6, 2025 Dept: 57 The Court is denying the motion of Defendant City of Los Angeles ("the City") for summary adjudication of the claims of Plaintiff Pablo Vera ("Vera") for violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Civil Code Section 52.1 ("Bane Act"), and Ralph Civil Rights Act ("the Ralph Act"), Civil Code Section 51.7.

The demurrer to the Ralph Act and Bane Act causes of action are sustained with leave to amend. (Elviras demurred as well to the complaints eighth cause of action for declaratory belief, ninth cause of action for battery; tenth cause of action for assault; and eleventh cause of action for gender violence.

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Page 1 of 3 The Court finds that Plaintiffs prevailed on their Ralph Act claims and their Bane Act claims and are entitled to an award of $25,000.00 each on the Ralph Act claim and $4,000.00 each on the Bane Act claim. The Court finds Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code Sections 52(b)(3) and 52.1(i).

Defendant Drake is not entitled to summary adjudication as to the Ralph Act claim. On the same analysis, defendant Regents is not entitled to summary adjudication as to the Ralph Act claim. Plaintiff’s Bane Act Claim Defendant Drake’s motion for summary adjudication as to plaintiff’s Bane Act claim contained in plaintiff’s second cause of action is DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f).) Defendant Drake has not shown that plaintiff cannot establish the elements required to prove the Bane Act claim.

Plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of the Ralph Act and the Bane Act allege conduct intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs, thereby adequately establishing the malice necessary for punitive damages. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).)

Tenth Cause of Action- Bane Act and Eleventh Cause of Action- Ralph Act Crescent argues that these claims fail to allege any violations against it and are time-barred. According to Crescent, Crescent cannot be liable for a Bane Act or a Ralphs Act violation based on the alleged conduct of the security guard Corrales employed by Defendant Green Knight Security, because Corrales was not Crescents employee.

Concluding that such conduct constitutes a violation of the Bane Act would, transform every battery claim into a Bane Act claim. This result would be contrary to much of Californias Bane Act jurisprudence, which makes clear that the Bane Act was passed primarily as hate crime legislation ( Jones v. Kmart Corp (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 338) and was meant to narrowly supplement the Ralph Act ( Stamps v. Superior Court (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1447).

Demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act and fifth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act is sustained without leave to amend. The pleading does not allege that the demurring defendants were parties who engaged in the alleged threatening or violent conduct. [§ 33.]

Ralph Act and Bane Act The Ralph Act is delineated in Civil Code Section 51.7.

Such allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the Bane Act. For these reasons, CDCR’s demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained. Second Cause of Action: Violation of Ralph Act Civil Code section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”) provides that all persons have the right to be free of “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons,” committed because of their political affiliation or any characteristic defined in Civil Code section 51.

Thus, because Government Code section 844.6 specifically provides that Government Code section 845.6 is an exception, the court finds that sovereign immunity does not apply to bar Plaintiff’s claims under the Ralph Act, as more fully discussed above with regard to the first cause of action under the Bane Act. For these reasons, CDCR’s motion is denied as to the second cause of action.

Sustain demurrer to third cause of action for Bane Act Violation. Sustain demurrer to fourth cause of action for Ralph Act Violation, without leave to amend. 20 days leave to amend on first through third causes of action.

The Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to state a cause of action under the Bane Act or the Ralph Act. The Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendant engaged in threatening, intimidating, or coercive conduct to interfere with rights secured by the Constitution or a statute within the meaning of the Bane Act and the Ralph Act. Additionally, the Complaint is silent as to the protected characteristic under the Ralph Act.

Regarding the Third Cause of Action for violations of the Ralph Act (Civil Code § 51.7) and the Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1), Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim. A prima facie Ralph Act claim requires allegations demonstrating that the defendants' intimidation or violence was motivated by bias or animus against a legally protected characteristic or class membership, which the current workplace allegations fail to establish.

LEXIS 101751, at *6-8 (dismissing plaintiff's Bane Act claim because falsified police reports are not sufficiently threatening, intimidating, or coercive for purposes of the Bane Act); Price v. Peerson (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) 2014 WL 12579814, at *3 .) The Demurrer is sustained as to the second cause of action. As to the Ralph Act, a false police report suffices for intimidation and violence. (Civ. Code § 51.7(b)(2).)

Violations of Bane Act and Ralph Act (6th and 8th Causes of Action) In the sixth and eighth causes of action, Plaintiffs assert violations of the Bane Act (Civ. Code § 52.1) and Ralph Act (Civ. Code § 51.7). (Compl. ¶¶ 85–93, 102–108.) RUSD argues that the Bane and Ralph Acts, which were enacted to combat hate crimes, do not apply to public entities such as school districts, and therefore, cannot support claims against RUSD in this case.

Demurring defendant DRMC challenges the first (Unruh), second (Ralph Act), and third (Bane Act) causes of action based on failure to state facts and uncertainty. To withstand a demurrer the complaint must contain “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10.)

Ralph Act & Bane Act The Ralph Act is delineated in Civil Code Section 51.7.

There is no need to consider whether DIAZ can be held liable as a supervisor for his subordinates’ Ralph Act violations where there are no violations. The Bane Act is similar.

Violation of the Ralph Act, CC 51.7 5. Violation of the Bane Act, CC 52.1 6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress RULING : The unopposed demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. This action arises out of an incident that occurred at a Trader Joe’s store in Chatsworth, California.

Ninth Cause of Action: Violation of the Ralph Act Civil Code section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”) provides that all persons have the right to be free of “violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons,” committed because of their political affiliation or any characteristic defined in Civil Code section 51. A person aggrieved under the Ralph Act may bring a civil action to recover damages, “a civil penalty of $25,000, exemplary damages, and an award of attorney fees.” ( D.C. v.

Case Number: 25STCV16920 Hearing Date: May 28, 2026 Dept: 517 The Court is overruling the demurrer of Defendant SMAGM, Inc. dba Elviras Mexican Grill to the Bane Act and Ralph Act claims in the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Saul Yasier Guevara Leyva. In the Court's view, Plaintiff has cured the pleading defects that led the Court to sustain Defendant's demurrer to those two claims in the First Amended Complaint.

This is sufficient under the Ralph Act. (Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291.) It is also sufficient to plead a cause of action for gender violence under Civil Code § 52.4 and a cause of action for Bane Act violations under Civil Code § 52.1. The Court rejects Defendant Merritt’s implied argument that a heightened pleading standard be applied at this stage of the litigation.

The demurrer to the fourth COA for violation of the Bane Act is OVERRULED.

Violation of the Bane Act The Bane Act prohibits interference, threats, or intimidation that violates an individual's constitutional rights. (Civ. Code 52.1) Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the Bane Act because Defendants did not act with the intent to violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Plaintiff asserts Defendants interfered with his First Amendment right to protest. This is sufficient to create of triable issue of fact as to violation of the Bane Act.

As to the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act Plaintiff alleges the sexual battery she endured violates the Ralph Act. (Civ. Code, § 51.7.)

Fourth Cause of Action Defendant McEwan demurs to the fourth cause of action arguing that the FAC does not allege that the violence or the motivating reason was due to Plaintiff’s membership in a classification set forth in the Ralph Act.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for violation of Civil Code, section 51.7 (the “Ralph Act”), and Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action for violation of Civil Code, section 52.1 (the “Bane Act”) fail because Plaintiff does not allege he was threatened or that his rights were interfered with because of his membership in a protected class.

The First Amended Complaint alleges assault; battery; breach of contract; NIED; malice; Ralph Act violation; Bane Act violation; premise liability; and vicarious liability. Defendants Chompol Properties, erroneously named as Surly Goat, Inc., and Sweeney, an officer of Chompol, demur and move to strike irrelevant matter and punitive damages.

On January 24, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for, according to the caption page, (1) sexual batter, (2) Ralph Act violation, (3) Bane Act violation, (4) gender violence, and (5) Unruh Act violation. The complaint’s body includes only four causes of action, none of which are for a Bane Act violation.

On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (SAC) alleging causes of action for (1) Ralph Act; (2) Bane Act; and (3) Negligence. On September 30, 2024, Defendants filed a demurrer and motion to strike portions of the SAC. On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On October 30, 2024, Defendants filed a reply.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed this action alleging causes of action against Trader Joe’s and Milosevich for: (1) False Imprisonment; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Violations of Unruh Civil Rights Act, CC 51; (4) Violation of the Ralph Act, CC 51.7; (5) Violation of the Bane Act, CC 52.1 and (6) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

In language closely similar to that in the Ralph Act, the Bane Act prohibits interference or attempts to interfere by "threat, intimidation, or coercion" with the exercise of statutory or constitutional rights. (Civ. Code sec. 52.1(b); see In re Michael M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 718, 725 ["The Bane Act and related California statutes dealing with discriminatory threats and violence are California's response to the alarming increase in hate crimes."].)

SUSTAIN the demurrer to the second cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act and to the third cause of action for violation of the Bane Act without leave to amend. OVERRULE the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief. 1st CofA: The first cause of action for negligence is pleaded on behalf of both Plaintiffs, although there is no dispute that APRL did not file a government tort claim. Nor are there any allegations that Deputy Lesso breached any duty owed to APRL. (FAC, ¶¶ 23-25.)

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act fails as a matter of law because CDCR did not aid, abet, and/or conspire with Officer Kardouni. 13. Defendant CDCR is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Bane Act and Ralph Act claims because Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of Officer Kardounis alleged conduct.

BANE ACT ALLEGATIONS Defendants seek to strike all references to the Bane Act in the Complaint because the Complaint fails to allege a cause of action for violation of the Bane Act. (Motion to Strike at pp. 5–7; Joinder at pp. 5–6.) The court notes as an initial matter that the basis for this Motion to Strike is more properly brought as a demurrer.

On October 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action against Bahna, Baxter Properties, and Does 1 to 50, inclusive, asserting causes of action for: (1) assault; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (3) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (the Bane Act); (4) violation of the Ralph Act; (5) negligence; and (6) premises liability.

Violation of Bane Act, Civ. Code § 52.1 (7th Cause of Action): Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the Bane Act by interfering with her right “to be free from assault, battery, and/or violence or threats of violence based on [] her sex.” (Compl. ¶ 70.)

Bane Act Similar to the Ralph Act, allegations for the Bane Act are incorporated by reference and infer intimidation (Complaint, ¶ 64). “Complaints generally incorporate prior allegations into subsequent causes of action.” Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of L. A. (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 921, 931-32. When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally, reasonably and in context. MKB Management, Inc. v. Melikian (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 796, 802; McKenney v.

(“SAC”) The SAC alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1) against CDCR and Does 1-20, (2) violation of Ralph Act (Civil Code § 51.7) against CDCR and Does 1-20, (3) battery against “Doe 1”, (4) negligent hiring against CDCR and Does 2-20 (5) negligent supervision against CDCR and Does 2-20, (6) negligent retention against CDCR and Does 2-20. CDCR and Kardouni now demur to the SAC.

(Apex), and Does 1 to 100 alleging seven causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) violation of the Bane Act; (3) assault; (4) battery; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) false arrest; and (7) violation of the Ralph Act. On August 1, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their initial motion to transfer venue.

Case Number: 23LBCV02156 Hearing Date: January 30, 2025 Dept: S27 Background Facts Plaintiff, Tracy McCrackin filed this action against Defendants, Uber Technologies, Inc. and William Doe for negligence, IIED, NIED, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, violation of the Bane Act, and violation of the Ralph Act.

On 10/25/24, the Collins Family, representing themselves, answered the complaint and filed a cross-complaint against Sasson for: (1) Assault, (2) Battery, (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (4) Trespass to Chattel, (5) Trespass to Land, (6) Violation of Ralph Act (Civil Code 51.7) and (7) Violation of Bane Act (Civil Code 52.1). On 11/28/24, Sasson filed the instant demurrer to the cross-complaint. On 1/15/25, the cross-complaint was dismissed rendering the demurrer moot.

Concerning Plaintiffs Ralph Act claim, Plaintiff contends the FAC alleges that Plaintiff is Hispanic, officers targeted him despite being a clear non-match, and officers ignored exculpatory information. Concerning Plaintiffs Bane Act claim, City contends the FAC alleges that city used force to detain Plaintiff without legal justification, interfering with his constitutional rights. The Court finds the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to state claims for violations of the Ralph Act and Bane Act.

There are, however, no allegations in the Complaint that would support a Bane Act claim against either Nazarian or Shatrang. The BHJ Defendants demurrer to the Bane Act claim is overruled as to BHJ and sustained with leave to amend as to Nazarian and Shatrang. UPSs demurrer to the Bane Act claim is overruled. 6.

Therefore, summary adjudication of Plaintiffs claim for violations of the Ralph Act against Miller is not proper. 5 th Cause of Action: Violation of the Bane Act Triable issues of material fact exist with respect to Plaintiffs Bane Act claim against Miller.

Third and Fifteenth Causes of Action – Ralph Act, Harassment Delgado argues that the complaint lacks factual allegations to show that Delgado’s conduct was motivated by Plaintiff’s protected characteristic, as required for a cause of action under the Ralph Act and Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j). (Demurrer at pp. 10-11.)

Uber case was correctly decided, the demurrer to the third (assault), fourth (Ralph Act), fifth (Bane Act), seventh (IIED), eighth (conversion), and ninth (false imprisonment) causes of action is sustained. Because this is a purely legal issue, leave to amend is denied. The Court notes that Defendants make additional arguments concerning the Ralph Act, Bane Act, and fraud causes of action.

The County further argues that the claims for harassment and Ralph Act/Bane Act violations fail for the same reasons the claims against the Individual Defendants fail.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Bane Act claims against them fail for the same reasons as to Plaintiffs Ralph Act, discussed below. (Motion, 25-27.) In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that triable issues of material fact exist with regard to the Bane Act cause of action for the same reasons as the Ralph Act cause of action. (Opposition, 11-14.)

The first amended complaint ("FAC") asserts causes of action for (1) sexual assault; (2) sexual battery; (3) gender violence; (4) violation of the Ralph Act; (5) violation of the Bane Act; (6) sexual harassment; and (7) negligence. Plaintiff moves to summarily adjudicate the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd causes of action.

This amended complaint includes the following six causes of action: (1) General Negligence; (2) Battery; (3) Assault; (4) Intentional Infliction of Extreme Emotional Distress; (5) Civil Code § 51.7 (Ralph Act); and (6) Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act). On May 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating that their registered process server personally served Legends on April 30, 2026, at 1:40 a.m. (May 1, 2026, PoS, ¶¶ 2-5.)

Therefore, the Court finds that Sergeant Santamaria and the Backup Officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Bane Act cause of action. Violation of Bane Act Against Remaining Officers Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Bane Act by subjecting Plaintiffs to an unlawful arrest and the use of excessive force during the arrest. (Compl., ¶ 52.)

Also, while she references the Unruh Act and Bane Act in the rest of the complaint, including the prayer for damages, these references do not make the cause of action defective or uncertain, as plaintiff’s primary allegations make it clear that she seeks to state a claim under the Ralph Act. Therefore, the court intends to overrule the demurrer to the fifth cause of action.

The facts alleged do not constitute a violation of The Bane Act. Banging on a door, even in a loud manner, is not sufficient to constitute threats, intimidation or coercion. More importantly, the facts do not disclose actual interference with any rights. Even liberally construed, the facts rise to nothing more than an attempt to interfere with the exercise and enjoyment of rights. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

violation of the Ralph Act (against the County and Henry) 11. violation of the Bane Act (against the County and Henry) Individual Defendants now demur to the 4th, 9th, 10th and 11th causes of action for failure to state sufficient facts.

Moreover, with respect to any claims resulting from alleged violations of the Ralph Act (Civ. Code ? 51.7) or the Bane Act (Civ. Code ? 52.1), Plaintiff fails to allege that any violent acts or threatened violent acts were committed by anyone, let alone the moving party. Plaintiff alleges verbal abuse by another named defendant but this is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation of rights per Title 42 U.S.C. ? 1983. (Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero (9th Cir. 1987) 830 F.2d 136, 139.)

BACKGROUND On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff Walther Medina filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants Montebello Unified School District (MUSD) and Anthony Martinez, asserting causes of action for (1) violation of Ralph Act; (2) sexual battery; (3) gender violence; (4) violation of Unruh; (5) violation of Bane Act; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligence; and (8) violation of Education Code.

BACKGROUND: Plaintiff commenced this action on 10/24/16 against defendants for: (1) battery; (2) assault; (3) sexual battery; (4) discrimination; (5) harassment; (6) retaliation; (7) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (8) violation of the Ralph Act; (9) violation of the Tom Bane Act; (10) gender violence; (11) declaratory relief; (12) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (14) failure to pay wages; (15) failure to pay

Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, the court sustains the City Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act, the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act, and the sixth cause of action for violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, without leave to amend.

Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for Violation of the Ralph Act fails as a matter of law because CDCR did not aid, abet, and/or conspire with Officer Kardouni. 13. Defendant CDCR is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Bane Act and Ralph Act claims because Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of Officer Kardounis alleged conduct.

First Cause of Action – Bane Act Civil Code § 52.1 is also known as the Thomas Bane Civil Rights Act. (Civ. Code s 52.1(a).) The Bane Act was enacted as an anti-hate crime statute, though courts have since held that discriminatory animus is not necessary. (Cornell v City and County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal. App.5th 766, 791.)

Ninth Cause of Action for Violation of the Bane Act The Bane Act, enacted in 1987, prohibits all interference or attempted interference with another’s rights under federal and California law by "threats, intimidation, or coercion." (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).)

Conclusion Defendants’ demurrer on the basis that the six causes of action fail to state a claim is OVERRULED as to the first (stalking), second (Bane Act), and sixth (IIED) causes of action, and SUSTAINED as to the third (Ralph Act), fourth (Civil Harassment/Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6), and fifth (punitive damages) causes of action. The demurrer on uncertainty grounds is OVERRULED.

Bane Act A claim for violation of the Bane Act can be brought by an individual against a private person, where that person interferes with the Plaintiffs legal rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion. (Civ. Code § 52.1(a), (b).) Martinez contends that the claim for violation of the Bane Act fails because Plaintiff cannot establish an interference with a legal right. In opposition and in the operative complaint, Plaintiff does not specify legal rights with which Martinez interfered.

Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action: Violations of the Bane Act and Ralph Act "The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., threats, intimidation or coercion), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law. (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883.)

Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action Civil Code § 51.7 (Ralph Act) and Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act) To state a cause of action under the Ralph Act, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating, the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that the defendant aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right. [Citations.] ( Gabrielle A. v.

The second cause of action alleges violation of the Ralph Act.

Party: None The instant motion is DENIED BACKGROUND: Plaintiffs commenced this action on 1/15/16 against defendants, asserting 31 causes of action for FEHA violations; violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Ralph Act, and Bane Act; assault; battery; breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; conversion; fraud; failure to indemnify; Labor Code violations; unfair business practices; whistleblower retaliation; intentional infliction of emotional

Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action still amalgamates several civil rights claims into one, but Plaintiff has removed his claim for a violation of the Ralph Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7.). As such, Defendants argument that school districts cannot be liable under the Ralph Act is moot. Plaintiffs claims of violations of the Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code §52.1), Cal. Civ. Code §43, and the right to free education (Art. IX, Section 5 of the Cal. Constitution) remain.

Violation of the Ralph Act, CC 51.7 5. Violation of the Bane Act, CC 52.1 6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress RELIEF REQUESTED IN MOTION TO STRIKE : An order striking allegations regarding punitive damages contained in the 1 st (¶25), 2 nd (¶31), 4 th (¶42) and 5 th (¶48) causes of action and the prayer (No.3) for punitive damages.

The FAC alleges five causes of action: (1) violation of Bane Act (Civil Code § 52.1), (2) violation of Ralph Act (Civil Code § 51.7), (3) battery against Doe 1, (4) negligent hiring and retention, (5) negligent supervision. On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC).

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action for violation of the Bane Act and the fifth cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act is overruled to the extent it is based on the ground that the second amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute these causes of action. The second amended complaint alleges facts that indicate defendant FORSYTHE may have directed violence toward plaintiffs, and thus may have violated these civil rights statutes.

BACKGROUND On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff Walther Medina filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants Montebello Unified School District (MUSD) and Anthony Martinez, asserting causes of action for (1) violation of Ralph Act; (2) sexual battery; (3) gender violence; (4) violation of Unruh; (5) violation of Bane Act; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) negligence; and (8) violation of Education Code.

Plaintiff’s operative TAC included causes of action for: Common Carrier Negligence (Uber); Sexual Battery (Humberto); Assault (Humberto); Violation of Ralph Act (Humberto); Violation of Bane Act (Uber, Humberto); Violation of Civil Code §52.4 (Humberto); IIED (Humberto); Conversion (Humberto); False Imprisonment (Humberto); Negligence (Humberto); Intentional Misrepresentation (Uber); Negligent Misrepresentation (Uber).

As such, CSCs demurrer to the fifth cause of action for Civil Code section 51.7 (Ralph Act) is SUSTAINED. Sixth Cause of Action Civil Code § 52.1 (Bane Act) CSC demurs to Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for Civil Code section 52.1 (Bane Act) on two primary grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support each essential element of the claim, and (2) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (Dem., pp. 9:7-8, 10:19-12:1.)

The operative SAC includes causes of action for: Common Carrier Negligence (Uber); Sexual Battery (Humberto); Assault (Humberto); Violation of Ralph Act (Humberto); Violation of Bane Act (Uber, Humberto); Violation of Civil Code §52.4 (Humberto); IIED (Humberto); Conversion (Humberto); False Imprisonment (Humberto); Negligence (Humberto); Intentional Misrepresentation (Uber); Negligent Misrepresentation (Uber).

Accordingly, collateral estoppel applies to Plaintiffs Ralph Act claim.

As pled, these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action under the Ralph Act or the Bane Act. IV. Second Cause of Action—Violation of Gov.

· Regarding the Bane Act, Calderon failed to allege that the County has engaged in any intimidation, threat or interference with a Constitutional right. He addresses the illegal conduct of gangs at his workplace but failed to allege any interference with his work. · Calderons Ralph Act claim suffers from the same deficiencies of his claim under the Bane Act. · Plaintiff cannot obtain punitive damages from co-Defendant County of Los Angeles.

Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiff seeks leave to add fourth and fifth causes of action for violations of the Tom Bane Act and the Ralph Act, respectively. Plaintiffs attorney declares he asked Defendants to stipulate to the filing of the TAC, but they refused. Any opposition to the motion was due on or before 1/29/25. Defendant filed untimely opposition papers on 1/31/25. The Court has not considered the late-filed opposition.

Plaintiff does not address any Ralph Act violation in her opposition MPA. Accordingly, for purposes of summary adjudication, there is no evidence to establish a Ralph Act violation. County is granted summary adjudication of this claim, contained within the second cause of action. 2. Bane Act i.

Ralph Act (Acts of Violence) 2. Ralph Act (Threats of Violence) 3. Bane Act 4. Assault 5. Battery 6. Hate Crimes 7. Negligence 8. Negligence Per Se 9. Trespass to Real Property 10. Malicious Prosecution 11. Intrusion Upon Seclusion 12. Violation of Constitutional Right to Privacy 13. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 14. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 15. Conversion 16.

The gravamen of this complaint for: (1) false arrest, (2) false imprisonment, (3) negligence, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“iied”), (5) violation of the Bane Act CC § 52.1, (6) violation of the Ralph Act CC § 51.7 and (7) negligent hiring and training is that Plaintiff (“P”) was lawfully arrested for brandishing a firearm but the arrest became unlawful at some point during the one and one-half hours that P was left in the patrol car with temperature in the car reaching approximately 140

Defendants seek to strike the following portions of the TAC: paragraphs 18, 26, 39, 47, 49, 54, 56, 62, 67, prayer for punitive damages, prayer for attorneys fees, and prayer for statutory penalties under Civil Code §52 (Ralph Act) and § 52.1 (Bane Act). Defendants argue that the TAC fails to allege facts supporting punitive damages because it fails to sufficiently allege malice, oppression, or fraud.

As to the seventh cause of action for violation of the Ralph Act Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated his rights under the Ralph Act. (FAC, ¶¶ 1, 21-22, 98, 100-101.)

On October 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against the same defendants for negligence, negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention, battery, assault, violations of the Ralph Act, violations of the Unruh Act, violations of the Bane Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On November 23, 2020, the District filed an answer. On January 22, 2021, Kamara filed an answer. On May 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.

The operative First Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) Ralph Act, (2) sexual battery, (3) gender violence, (4) Unruh Civil Rights Act, (5) Bane Act, (6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (7) Negligence, and (8) Education Code. On June 4, 2021, Defendant Montebello Unified School District filed a Motion to Continue Trial. Plaintiff did not oppose the Motion.

Violation of The Ralph Act, Civil Code § 51.7 6. Violation of The Bane Act, Civil Code § 52.1 7. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress On November 27, 2024, the instant petition was filed. On December 30, 2024, the instant motion to seal was filed.