Paid Leave and Parental Leave in California

In July 2024, secretary Dinah Whidbee (Whidbee) emailed Plaintiff instructions on how to apply for paternity leave through the State. Plaintiff followed the instructions and applied for paternity leave th rough the Employment Development Department (EDD ). Plaintiffs paternity leave was approved from approximately August 8 , 2024 to approximately November 2024 .

Plaintiffs contend that they have not been able to complete discovery and counsel is on paternity leave until the start of the year, making it impossible to prepare for a trial set for March 10, 2025. Among other things, plaintiffs contend that they propounded discovery on Zeray and did not receive responses until September of 2024, and that those responses were not adequate.

The fact of Plaintiffs counsels paternity leave was also not diligently presented. While defense counsel was purportedly aware that Plaintiffs counsel was on leave, the Court had no indication from Plaintiffs counsel that they were unavailable for a given time. Plaintiffs counsel apparently began paternity leave on April 9, 2024 and was communicated to defense counsel on April 17, 2024. (Opp., Poulter Decl., ¶4 and Exh. 2.)

Defendant contends the failure to do so was the result of its attorney’s failure to communicate about the need for an extension of time to respond in light of Defense Counsel’s paternity leave. Plaintiff, in reply, contends Defendant has improperly included objections with the discovery even though objections have been waived. Plaintiff argues sanctions should be imposed due to the ongoing failure to serve compliant responses.

Second Cause of Action: FMLA/Paternity Leave Discrimination Defendant demurs on grounds that FEHA does not provide a cause of action for discrimination for requesting paternity leave under the FMLA, and Plaintiff has not asserted a cause of action under the California Family Rights Act or the California Parent Leave Act.

Defendants explained to Plaintiff in a letter dated February 18, 2020 that there had not been a denial of paternity pay, but rather there was a mistake in data entry treating his time off as vacation time and personal holiday when it should have been labeled as paternity leave and that the entry would be corrected. (De La Vega Decl., Ex. L.)

If lead counsel for the defendants is on paternity leave, that is something that will need to be addressed. However, the court is unclear why it is that this leaveabout which counsel must have known for many monthsis only being brought to the courts attention now. The other arguments lack merit. The FSC order was given on January 24, 2024well over a year ago. There was plenty of time to do what needed to be done.

Given the proximity to Plaintiffs upcoming paternity leave, I decided to wait until his return from paternity leave to discuss the logistics of the move and the impact on the organization.].) Further, McDowells contention that he was waiting for Plaintiff to return from paternity leave before raising this issue is undermined by Plaintiffs declaration that he did not even request his second paternity leave until January 2025 ( five months after he notified Defendants of his move). (Hand Decl., at ¶ 9.)

On the other hand, DoorDash treated its male employees that wanted to take parental leave much differently. In fact, DoorDash not only discouraged its male employees from taking the full amount of parental leave allotted under California and federal law, but DoorDash actively discouraged through intimidation, ridicule, and insults its male employees from taking any parental leave. (SH Compl., ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff’s counsel, however, informed Leeway that he would be on paternity leave at that time, and would not return to work until July 2, 2018. (Hottinger Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.) Discussing the matter, Leeway’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed the deposition should not go forward until after the paternity leave ended.

The Court finds good cause for continuance based on the stipulation and the fact that defendant's counsel is unavailable for the trial date due to paternity leave. The October 19, 2015 MSC and the December 1, 2015 trial dates are vacated. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the MSC is set for March 14, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. and trial is set for April 26, 2016.

(Langers or Defendant), alleges that Defendant allegedly violated numerous wage and hour laws, including the alleged violation of twice denying him paternity leave. On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit asserting the following causes of action (COAs): 1. Interference With Use Of California Family Rights Act [Cal. Govt Code § 12945.2] 2. Retaliation In Violation Of California Family Rights Act [Cal. Govt Code § 12945.2(L)] 3.

Defendant seeks a continuance on the grounds that its counsel Deputy Attorney General Kevin Hosn will be out on paternity leave from July 22 to August 22 and that given the December 5 trial date the last day to file a summary judgment motion is August 19, during counsel's leave.

The fact of Plaintiffs counsels paternity leave should also have been presented to the Court earlier. While defense counsel was purportedly aware that Plaintiffs counsel was on leave, no notice of unavailability was filed with the Court. Given that Plaintiffs counsels paternity leave began on April 9, 2024, no explanation is provided as to why a notice of unavailability was not filed well in advance of the hearing on May 1, 2024.

In this regard, plaintiff argues that defendants refused to provide a “reasonable extension” of 30 days to respond and that the attorney handling the matter has been out on paternity leave. OPP (Form Interrogatories) 3:28-4:4; Post Decl. (Form Interrogatories) ¶ 3. These would appear to support a finding of substantial justification on their face.

DISCUSSION Plaintiffs argue there is good cause to grant their requested continuances pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (c)(3), because Plaintiffs’ counsel will be on a pre-paid vacation and on paternity leave during the May 22, 2019 trial date. (Motion, pp. 2:13-2:16; 6:16-6:19; Bulone Decl., ¶ 2.)

Further, defense counsel has until recently been unavailable because of paternity leave. Moreover, both parties wish to allow time to complete discovery and to attempt informal settlement negotiations and possible mediation prior to expert designations and trial. The motion is GRANTED because moving party has shown good cause. CRC Rule 3.1332. The court orders that trial is continued from March 8, 2019 to August 8, 2019, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 4.

The evidence is ambiguous as to whether the failure to resolve the dispute informally was caused by Respondent’s counsel’s paternity leave. The objections were served on July 10 and the motion was filed on July 24, and Petitioner’s counsel’s attempts to resolve the matter informally presumably took place at some time between those two dates; Respondent’s counsel’s leave began on July 19.

The evidence is ambiguous as to whether the failure to resolve the dispute informally was caused by Respondent’s counsel’s paternity leave. The objections were served on July 10 and the motion was filed on July 24, and Petitioner’s counsel’s attempts to resolve the matter informally presumably took place at some time between those two dates; Respondent’s counsel’s leave began on July 19.

The evidence is ambiguous as to whether the failure to resolve the dispute informally was caused by Respondent’s counsel’s paternity leave. The objections were served on July 10 and the motion was filed on July 24, and Petitioner’s counsel’s attempts to resolve the matter informally presumably took place at some time between those two dates; Respondent’s counsel’s leave began on July 19.

Defendants counsel was on paternity leave from September 16, 2024 through November 4, 2024. (Soliman Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendants counsel activated an out-of-office notification indicating that he would be on paternity leave until November 4, 2024. (Soliman Decl. ¶ 3.) On September 24, 2024, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer email to Defendants counsel and requested a response by September 30, 2024. (Jain Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs counsel filed this motion on October 24, 2024.

Plaintiff moreover alleges facts suggesting sex-based animus, notably the initiation of the harassment after his return from paternity leave and an email that he alleges derisively mischaracterized it as maternity leave. (Complaint ¶¶ 24, 92.)

The Court is sympathetic to counsels parental leave. However, this is a 2019 case, approaching five years old. Trial has been continued repeatedly, over several years. The motion contains no information about trial readiness, or about efforts to settle. The Court will not countenance further delay in bringing this case to resolution. The Court will grant a brief continuance.

Second, in reply to the opposition, Defense Counsel declares his partner is expected to have a baby in February of 2017, and he intends to take paternity leave thereafter. In light of both of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds the requested six-month continuance is reasonable. Defendant requests a trial date of 6/12/17. The personal injury courts do not set trial dates on Mondays, and therefore the Court sets at trial date of 6/13/16.

As such, ENH has had significant notice of the date of trial, and ENH indicates that the expert informed them in July 2023, while destructive testing was taking place, that he would be on paternity leave in early October 2023. ENH does not outline any responsive steps it took in response to this information, nor does it offer a justification for why it did not inquire about the availability of its expert at any point prior.

In any event, the Court finds Defense Counsel’s impending paternity leave constitutes “good cause” to grant the motion to continue the trial date, and the motion is granted. The 4/30/19 trial date is advanced to today’s date and continued to Tuesday, 10/29/19 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 3 of the Spring Street Court. The 4/16/19 FSC is advanced to today’s date and continued to Tuesday, 10/15/19 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 3. All discovery cut-off dates are continued to reflect the new trial date.

Defendant argues that moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he was entitled to Paid Family Leave, this is a benefit offered by the State of California, not his employer. Defendant asserts that accordingly, there is no way for it to deny him this benefit. Defendant contends that additionally, the program provides only for wage replacement; it does not offer the job protection of the FMLA and CFRA.

Defendants have provided evidence that part of the reasons the motion for summary adjudication was not filed sooner was due to Defendants' counsel's paternity leave in August and September of this year. Defendants have provided evidence they attempted to resolve the scheduling issues surrounding the motion for summary adjudication informally with Plaintiffs, but they were unsuccessful in doing so.

Plaintiff further contends that questions regarding private marital information are irrelevant and intrusive, questions about his paternity leave activities are unrelated to the claims and violate his right to privacy, certain questions improperly infringe on attorney-client privilege, and one of the disputed questions was already answered during his deposition (Opposition, pp.2-4).

DePaoli further explains that defense counsel previously requested a continuance until April to accommodate his paternity leave, but because Ms. DePaoli was also pregnant and due in April, she requested a continuance until summer. (Id. ¶6.) However, they did not ultimately stipulate to a continuance. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for a continuance. While the unavailability of an expert can constitute good cause, here, Plaintiff has failed to explain (1) why Dr.

Counsel avers that he will be unavailable for at least two months before the present trial date due to paternity leave. Counsel further avers that the parties have stipulated to the proposed continuance. (Declaration of Todd Vigus, ¶¶ 3-4, Exhibit A.) The Court finds that Defendant has shown good cause for a trial continuance pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332.

Counsel avers that he will be unavailable for at least two months before the present trial date due to paternity leave. Counsel further avers that the parties have stipulated to the proposed continuance. (Declaration of Todd Vigus, ¶¶ 3-4, Exhibit A.) The Court finds that Defendant has shown good cause for a trial continuance pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332.

Defendant contends that defense counsel will be on paternity leave and will be unavailable from September through mid-November. Further, the parties will be attempting mediation in November or December 2018, after an IME is conducted. The parties have agreed and stipulated to the continuance. The motion is GRANTED because moving party has shown good cause. The court orders that trial is continued from November 4, 2018 to February 11, 2019, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 4.

DISCUSSION City asks the Court to continue the trial and related dates because (1) Plaintiffs counsel will be taking paternity leave starting July 2023 and will be unavailable for trial, (2), despite the parties diligence in conducting discovery, the case is not ready for trial, (3) on May 23, 2023, deposition proceedings were interrupted due to a medical emergency, (4) at her deposition on May 23, 2023, Plaintiff reported she is still receiving treatment for her injuries.

On or around December 29, 2021, TAMORO was informed by Larkin that her parental leave was approved. TAMOROs parental leave would begin on January 17, 2022 and continue through April 10, 2022. TAMORO was expected to return to work on April 11, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 27.) On or around January 5, 2022, TAMORO emailed Laura Rebollo to inform her that her doctor had extended her PDL because she was receiving treatment for her Postpartum Depression. (Compl., ¶ 28.)

Moreover, Defendants lead co-trial counsel is expected to be on paternity leave beginning on or about January 14, 2023. (Motion, 5:7-13.) Defendant requests a 6-month continuance of the trial date and related dates to accomplish the completion of discovery, avoid the trial conflict, and permit co-counsel to take paternity leave. Good cause to grant the motion is demonstrated.

In January 2022, Plaintiff’s wife gave birth and Plaintiff took paternity leave from January 12, 2022 through February 2, 2022. On or around February 28, 2022, Plaintiff’s wife began to experience compilations and needed additional assistance with their newborn child. Plaintiff requested his remaining paternity leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. After requesting this additional time off, Defendant’s attitude towards Plaintiff changed.

The Court finds good cause for a continuance based on delays caused by Plaintiff’s Counsel’s intermittent paternity leave, Defendants’ requests for an extension to respond to written discovery, the need for additional time to complete the meet-and-confer process regarding written discovery disputes, and the factors set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332. The October 28, 2025 trial date is vacated.

Plaintiff contends there is good cause to continue the trial date because Plaintiffs counsel has just welcomed his first newborn and will be taking paternity leave. Further, Plaintiff provides that Plaintiffs counsel has been forced to take significant time off to care for his mother-in-law, who was in a serious car accident, and Plaintiff represents the matter is not ready to proceed to trial.

Case Number: 24NNCV03048 Hearing Date: October 8, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Strike Moving Party: Defendant Home Express Delivery Service, LLC Responding Party: Plaintiff Pedro Echeverria Tentative Ruling: Granted with leave to amend BACKGROUND This is a wrongful termination case arising from Plaintiffs termination of employment after taking time off due to a combination of a personal injury caused by an automobile accident as well as for paternity leave. (Complaint at ¶¶ 25-26).

On or about September 13, 2023, Plaintiff texted Defendant Andrew to follow up on his paternity leave request and ensure it was appropriately communicated to management, but Defendant ANDREW did not respond to the substance of the request. (FAC, ¶ 15.)

However, every other person was promoted except Plaintiff in the following year as Plaintiff was the only one to become pregnant and use maternity leave benefits. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff alleges that Actums discriminatory culture was evidenced by managements praise of employees who avoided family leave. ( Id. , ¶ 20.)

The California Family Rights Act (CFRA) provides that new fathers can take 12 weeks of unpaid family leave within one year of a childs birth with guaranteed job protection. This includes maintaining the new fathers eligibility for health insurance coverage and other employee benefits while he is out on leave. 31. Hexacorps employee handbook similarly provides that its employees are entitled to take 12 weeks of paid job-protected family leave because of the birth of a child. 32.

Fourth, Defendant’s sole justification for the delay is that its out-of-state general counsel is on paternity leave and must attend the depositions. (Harshaw Decl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff objects to this testimony as hearsay. Even if the statement were admissible, it is not a substantial justification, particularly given a year long delay for 5 key depositions and other alternative options such as remote attendance or other counsel. Finally, Plaintiff has shown good cause for the requested PMK documents.

Fourth, Defendant’s sole justification for the delay is that its out-of-state general counsel is on paternity leave and must attend the depositions. (Harshaw Decl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff objects to this testimony as hearsay. Even if the statement were admissible, it is not a substantial justification, particularly given a year long delay for 5 key depositions and other alternative options such as remote attendance or other counsel. Finally, Plaintiff has shown good cause for the requested PMK documents.

Fourth, Defendant’s sole justification for the delay is that its out-of-state general counsel is on paternity leave and must attend the depositions. (Harshaw Decl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff objects to this testimony as hearsay. Even if the statement were admissible, it is not a substantial justification, particularly given a year long delay for 5 key depositions and other alternative options such as remote attendance or other counsel. Finally, Plaintiff has shown good cause for the requested PMK documents.

Plaintiff’s meet and confer effort consisted of a single e-mail to Attorney Brian Yasuzawa (Yasuzawa),the partner on the matter, on 5/2/23, while Yasuzawa was out on paternity leave. Yasuzawa’s e-mail had an auto-reply stating he was out of the office from 4/26/23 through 5/13/23 and was checking e-mails sporadically. The reply provided the attorney’s cell phone number and advised senders if they needed an immediate response.

From April 2013 to October 2013, father took paternity leave and was then on unemployment, so he watched Ben during the day; few months after he returned to work, mother, father and Ben went to a local Mexican restaurant and the waitress came up and addressed one-year-old Ben by name; when mother questioned father about how the waitress would have known Ben, he told her that while he had been on paternity leave he took Ben to local bars several times per week; she was shocked; he had given her detailed daily

Independently, for the reasons discussed at prior hearings, including the paternity leave of Plaintiffs counsel, which began earlier than expected, the Court finds that under the circumstances the imposition of sanctions would be unjust. Conclusion The Court GRANTS the motions to compel. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff Bradley Dodds to provide code compliant, verified responses, without objection, to Supplemental Interrogatory (Number One) within 10 days of notice of this order.

On or around December 29, 2021, TAMORO was informed by Larkin that her parental leave was approved. TAMOROs parental leave would begin on January 17, 2022 and continue through April 10, 2022. TAMORO was expected to return to work on April 11, 2022. ( Id. , ¶27 .) Following the birth of her newborn TAMORO began to suffer from Postpartum Depression.

Lasso, acting as Director of Department of General Services Office of Risk and Insurance Management for State of California (Lasso), the State of California, Employment Development Department (EDD), and Paid Family Leave OfficeFresno (collectively, Defendants), arising from the denial of Plaintiffs Paid Family Leave claim. Plaintiff is self-represented.

The Court does not find that Mother presently has the opportunity to earn the income she 22 was previously earning as a tenured teacher before she began her parental leave. Father’s 23 request to impute Mother with the income she was previously earning as a tenured 24 teacher before she began her parental leave is denied. 25 b.

In his MC-052 declaration, Moving Counsel explains that Plaintiff refused to sign a substitution of attorney form and that staffing limitations within his office, including one attorney on parental leave, another recovering from surgery, and his own age, prevent him from continuing representation. (Decl. ISO Mot., ¶¶ 13.) No party filed an opposition. On November 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Substitution of Attorney (MC-050) electing to represent herself.

Lasso, acting as Director of Department of General Services Office of Risk and Insurance Management for State of California (Lasso); the State of California, Employment Development Department (EDD), and Paid Family Leave OfficeFresno (collectively, Defendants), arising from the denial of Plaintiffs Paid Family Leave claim. Plaintiff is self-represented. On March 8, 2024, the clerk of the court entered default against the State of California, EDD, and Paid Family Leave Office Fresno.

Defense counsel cannot “reliably promise” the deposition of Im prior to January 27, 2020 because he is on paternity leave. Plaintiff’s counsel states that he is in trial on January 27, 2020. Counsel are to meet and confer as to a date in February 2021. The motion is thus MOOT. Plaintiffs are ordered to serve notice of this ruling.

While Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s counsel was on paternity leave, it has made no attempt to meet and confer since counsel has returned.

Walmart’s HR told Plaintiff she had until 4/17/21 to enroll in family leave or return to work. (Ibid.) Plaintiff informed HR she had already applied for family leave, which was in process. (Ibid.) In early April, Plaintiff received a letter of termination dated 3/31/23 for her failure to return to work. (Ibid.)

Thereafter, defense counsel represents he went out on paternity leave from June 14, 2023 to August 14, 2023 after his wife gave birth prematurely to their son. The Court finds defense counsel meets his burden to show he did not counsel discovery abuse. Accordingly, sanctions are imposed against Defendant only in the amount of $1,050 representing 3 hours at Plaintiffs; counsels hourly rate. IV. CONCLUSION The motions are moot.

this motion in the Spring of 2018, if, after doing the necessary fact-finding and research, including consulting experts, they concluded that they could establish liability against California Creations, but that counsel at that time became distracted by his own divorce matter, in which he represented himself, and which involved the custody of minor children, and by the time he turned to the issue, it was learned that the Sapphos Operation Manager, the key witness concerning the trimming project, as on paternity leave

Kahl, will be on paternity leave during the currently-scheduled trial date. (Kahl Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.) The parties have stipulated to a 6-month continuance and request a trial date in July 2023. The Court finds good cause for a continuance. The month of July does not have any trial slots available and the earliest trial date available after July 2023 is August 14, 2023. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs unopposed motion is GRANTED.

Dizon was on paternity leave, she did not know defendants responses were overdue until plaintiffs counsel sent a meet and confer letter on October 9, 2024. (Dizon Decl., ¶ 12; Exh. B ¶¶ 3-6.) Once Ms. Calderon learned of counsels mistake, she requested a 30-day extension and when that was denied, defendant served responses as soon as practicable. (Dizon Decl., Exh. B ¶¶7, 8, 13.)

The complaint alleges that after Plaintiff took paternity leave to bond with his newborn, Defendant retaliated against him by failing to return him to the same or a comparable position and later terminating him. On 3/12/2024, Defendant moved to compel arbitration based on an Arbitration Agreement it argued Plaintiff executed on August 25, 2020 (the August 2020 Arbitration Agreement). Plaintiff opposed the motion.

Counsel was on paternity leave at the time of service. Counsel does acknowledge, however, that he received the e-mail. Plaintiff argues that due to this failure to serve the paralegal, Plaintiff was never put on notice as to the pending motion for summary judgment. The Courts record clearly reflects otherwise.

Plaintiff requests that the trial date be continued to complete depositions, participate in an MSC, and accommodate counsels family leave. Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.

However, given that Carcamo was on parental leave, Woodbury was not his usual place of business at the time. Substitute service can only be rendered at defendants dwelling house (usual place of abode), usual place of business or usual mailing address. (CCP §415.20(b).) Shugart testifies that she was no longer employed at Woodbury when service was rendered. Woodbury was therefore not her usual place of business under CCP §415.20(b).

All of this occurred prior to the date on which Plaintiff asked for information regarding a family leave of absence. Plaintiff maintains that the illegal retaliation stems from his March 4, 2021 inquiry into the availability of family leave.

Father further states that he has reduced income due to 3 his parental leave following the birth of his daughter this year and he has had to obtain assistance 4 from his family to pay his own retainer. 5 8) On 12/18/2025, Father filed an Income and Expense Declaration. Father states that he is 35 years 6 old and is an associate attorney for a law firm. Father states that he took EDD family leave from 7 9/20/2025 – 11/20/2025.

Among other things Plaintiff attaches various state and federal acts contending that employers are required to provide up to 10 days paid leave for employees unable to work or are teleworking because of specific circumstances caused by the CORONA virus. Plaintiff recorded telephone conversations with various health clinics to play for Defendant to establish how difficult it was to find a physician in a pandemic that could examine him.

FUNDS DEPOSITED INTO ACCOUNT ARE EXEMPT: FAMILY LEAVE ACT, SOCIAL SECURITY AND STATE DISABILITY. =(302/CWW)

Since Plaintiffs hiring in October of 2017 Plaintiff experienced discrimination and humiliation by managers D/Chen and D/Dang for being taking paternity leave and for being Taiwanese. On December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and later on December 24, 2020 a First Amended Complaint (FAC).

Claimant’s wages have been reduced from $5427.30/mo. to $4539.52/mo., presumably related to her medical/family leave issue. Her expenses appear reasonable. Respondent to give notice.

On June 18, 2020, Petitioner John Doe was placed on involuntary paid leave by the University of California, Santa Cruz ("UCSC") pending an investigation of allegations of sexual misconduct by three current or former students.

Leigh carried her burden of showing that the alleged harassment that occurred in July 2022 when she responded to MacEachern's request for intermittent family leave is not actionable under FEHA because it was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as required by controlling precedent. This shifted the burden to MacEachern to show the existence of a disputed issue of material fact on the harassment claim. He failed to satisfy the burden.

Lasso, acting as Director of Department of General Services Office of Risk and Insurance Management for State of California (Lasso), the State of California (the State), Employment Development Department (EDD), and Paid Family Leave OfficeFresno (PFLO) (collectively, Defendants), arising from the denial of Plaintiffs Paid Family Leave claim.

Plaintiff does not plead whether she requested leave, what type of family leave she requested, and whether Tyco refused to grant her request. In fact, she states that she was terminated after returning from an authorized family leave. [FAC ¶ 15] Plaintiff says that her termination after she took family leave “constituted a violation of her statutory right to freedom from denial of her right to family leave, or from interference with that right.”

Among other facts, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that [d]uring the months of June, July, and August of 2021, after [Plaintiffs] wife gave birth to their child, he opted to take a protected leave for baby bonding; (2) that Plaintiff returned to work from his protected leave on September 1, 2021 and that [p]rior to his paternity leave he had been working the night shift from 4:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m., which was best for his childcare situation; (3) that [o]n his second day back to work, [Plaintiff] was abruptly advised

Among other facts, Plaintiff alleges: (1) that [d]uring the months of June, July, and August of 2021, after [Plaintiffs] wife gave birth to their child, he opted to take a protected leave for baby bonding; (2) that Plaintiff returned to work from his protected leave on September 1, 2021 and that [p]rior to his paternity leave he had been working the night shift from 4:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m., which was best for his childcare situation; (3) that [o]n his second day back to work, [Plaintiff] was abruptly advised

Counsel Mark Lim from Shegerian & Associates, Inc. is unavailable for trial due to scheduled paternity leave. (Lim Decl., ¶ 4.) Mr. Lim has taken a substantial role in completing discovery and has been the primary handling attorney for this action. (Lim Decl., ¶¶ 2-3; Ciarimboli Decl., ¶ 3.) Further, both counsel for the remaining law firm have a conflict with another matter entitled Ridge v. Alameda Health System (the “Ridge action”). (Ciarimboli Decl., ¶ 2.)

Roths parental leave and the events in the personal life of Plaintiffs counsel delayed the filing of this motion (Motion), as Plaintiffs counsel deemed it improper to seek to amend the operative complaint while Defendants primary attorney was on parental leave. (Pl. Mot. p.3-4.)

Lasso, acting as Director of Department of General Services Office of Risk and Insurance Management for State of California (Lasso), the State of California (the State), Employment Development Department (EDD), and Paid Family Leave OfficeFresno (PFLO) (collectively, Defendants), arising from the denial of Plaintiffs Paid Family Leave claim.

Defendants counsel states that he intend[s] to be on paternity leave from mid-February 2024 to mid-April 2024. (Waneis Decl., ¶ 13.) In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff has had his deposition taken as [sic] is prepared to go to trial on the merits. Any delay in the case, would lead to prejudice, since it would be a delay to his day in court.

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

Following her family leave and in front of plaintiff Kaushik’s team, plaintiff Kaushik was told by her supervisor that defendant Intuit did not want plaintiff taking any more unplanned time off and taking unplanned time off was unacceptable. (Complaint, ¶21.) Plaintiff Kaushik again requested and took family leave in the fall of 2022 to assist in her mother’s medical care. (Complaint, ¶22.)

However, Defendant’s counsel will be on family leave starting on or about April 23, 2018. Therefore, Defendant will likely require additional time to complete Plaintiff’s deposition and to prepare a motion for summary judgment. No previous continuance has been requested or granted by any party, and no party submits that they will suffer any prejudice as a result of a trial continuance. Therefore, the Court finds good cause to grant the trial continuance.

In paragraph 21, Plaintiffs allege that Bergero falsely accused Plaintiff of failing to perform assigned tasks (which were handed off while Plaintiff was on parental leave) and spreading falsehoods to others throughout the bank. (Comp. ¶21.) In paragraph 45, Plaintiffs list the alleged defamatory statements. The Court’s review of these allegations, and the complaint overall, show that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing publication of statements.

Booser; in 9/2017 the trial date was continued by stipulation and Court order to 2/5/19 to accommodate defense trial counsel because he had paternity leave the last week of November of 2018 and the first week of December 2018; the MSC date was not changed; no settlement was reached on 10/12/18; almost a month later, the request for a second IME was made in a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel on 11/9/18 [the parties had stipulated and the Court had ordered that all expert witness exchange and all expert discovery

Plaintiffs counsel was out on paternity leave on December 11, 2025, when the Demurrer was filed, until January 5, 2026. In Plaintiffs counsels absence, the support staff neglected to calendar the Demurrer. As such, although the hearing on the Demurrer was held on January 15, 2026, Plaintiffs counsel did not attend, nor did counsel oppose the Demurrer.

Petitioner seeks to stay the operation of a July 14, 2020 decision by The Regents of the University of California's Committee on Privilege & Tenure to deny Petitioner's grievance of his involuntary paid leave pending an investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct with three of Petitioner's former students. The statutory basis for Petitioner's request is Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5(g).

Second Cause of Action for Harassment: The Complaint contains a single factual allegation against Hernandez: Human Resources manager Irene contacted Michele and told her she had until April 17, 2021, to either enroll in family leave or return to work. To which Michele responded she had already applied for family leave and was in the process.

Plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Masset about the end of Plaintiff’s pregnancy disability leave, Plaintiff’s return date, and Plaintiff’s desire for paid family leave, during which time Masset asked about returning to work before the end of Plaintiff’s leave, presented the option to work part time while receiving paid family leave, and noted that not everyone took the full amount of baby bonding leave. (Id. at ¶ 28.)

Background Petitioner filed a Petition, on 6/8/26, to review the decision of the state unemployment insurance appeals board (“the Board”), rendered on 3/17/26, in which the Board affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge to deny Petitioner family leave benefits. In this Motion, Petitioner seeks to amend the Petition by converting it into a complaint. He cites Section 473 of the CCP, but he does not suggest how this section applies to his matter.

During the relevant time, (1) Core transitioned to a work at home policy on 3-12-20; (2) Vitela went on paternity leave and was not present in the office from 4-11-20 through 5-1-20; and (3) on 7-10-20, Core did not allow anyone to come into the office due to COVID. See Supplemental Dec. of J. Thatcher, ¶¶4-8. Thatcher’s testimony on these issues corroborates Vitela’s assertion that he was working from home more intensely than ever before is corroborated.

Even when an employee resigned years after the maternity or paternity leave at issue, it is possible that Lambert could have perceived them as distracted by SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA RG19036830: Nelson VS The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. A Corporation 12/08/2023 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by Jennifer Anne Nelson (Plaintiff) in Department 520 their parental duties.