Motion-Secondary: CHRISTOPHER A. ZAMORA AN INDIVIDUAL VS RUBRIK, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION

Case Number: 23STCV16156 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 73 07/10/24 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding CARTER v. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF LOS ANGELES ( 23STCV16156 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Orlando Cabanday (Cabanday Law Group) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Nicole Sheth (Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE ( filed 05/06/24) TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs further response to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified responses within 30 days. The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of $1,590 . Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order. I. BACKGROUND On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff Moieshai Carter (Plaintiff) filed this employment action against Defendant Neighborhood Housing Services of Los Angeles County, a California Corporation, doing business as NHS LA County (NHS or Defendant). Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: C/A 1: Disability Discrimination C/A 2: Racial Discrimination C/A 3: Sexual Discrimination C/A 4: Retaliation C/A 5: Wrongful Termination in violation of Public Policy C/A 6: Hostile Work Environment Harassment C/A 7: Failure to Provide Employment File C/A 8: Unpaid Wages C/A 9: Failure to Pay Overtime C/A 10: Failure to Provide Rest Periods C/A 11: Failure to Provide Off-Duty Meal Period C/A 12: Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements C/A 13: Waiting Time Penalties The Complaint alleges that in October 2012, NHS hired Plaintiff as a lending specialist. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff worked under the management of its Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, JP Veen. ( Ibid .) Plaintiff continuously worked for NHS until November 2022 when she was wrongfully terminated while on disability. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges multiple violations of Californias Labor Code and FEHA by NHS. On May 6, 2024, Defendant NHS filed the instant Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, and request for sanctions. No opposition was filed. II. ANALYSIS A. Meet and Confer Requirement A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(2); 2016.040.)¿ Here, Defendants counsel declares that a meet and confer letter was sent to Plaintiffs counsel on April 29, 2023 explaining why the discovery responses were deficient and requesting supplemental responses. (Whang Decl., ¶ 7.) Defendant did not receive a response. ( Id., ¶ 8.) The Court finds that counsel has satisfied the meet and confer requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(2). B. Discussion Defendant moves to compel Plaintiffs further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. Under CCP § 2017.010, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The Section specifically provides that [d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action, and that discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property. CCP § 2031.310(a) provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. In the more specific context of a demand for production of a tangible thing, the party who asks the trial court to compel production must show good cause for the requestbut unless there is a legitimate privilege issue or claim of attorney work product, that burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. ( TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) It is not necessary for the motion to show that the material sought will be admissible in evidence. Good cause may be found to justify discovery where specific facts show that the discovery is necessary for effective trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial. (See Associated Brewers Dist. Co. v. Superior Court (1967) 65 Cal.2d 583, 586-588; see also Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2017.010, 2019.030(a)(1) (Information is discoverable if it is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and it is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.); Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (noting a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence).) If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer. ( Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220221 [addressing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories]; see also Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) Furthermore, to the extent there is any doubt in whether these records should be discoverable, Californias liberal approach to discovery provides that doubt should be resolved in favor of permitting discovery. ( Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.) Here, Plaintiff responded to every Request for Production with the same objection: Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent that it seeks confidential, trade secret, proprietary, financial, and/or commercially sensitive information that is privileged and/or confidential and protected from disclosure by applicable law. Plaintiff objects to this request on the ground that the information sought is in the possession of, known to, or otherwise equally available to the propounding party. Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff objects to this request on the ground that it invades the right of privacy guaranteed to whom it seeks information. Plaintiff objects to this request to the extent it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney work-product rule. Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the Request is vague and ambiguous. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs boilerplate objections are too general and unmeritorious because they do not state how or why Plaintiff believes Defendants requests are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or in what way they are confidential, vague or ambiguous. The Court agrees, and notes that Plaintiff has failed to oppose the instant motion. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. C. Sanctions A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) Sanctions may be imposed for misuse of discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2023.030, subd. (a). ) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., section 2023.010, subd. (d).) Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348 provides that a court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery even if no opposition was filed. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff engaged in the misuse of the discovery process by failing to make good faith efforts to respond to Defendants Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. Defendant requests $2,650 in sanctions for counsels work on this motion, including 5 hours spent on the instant motion and an anticipated 5 additional hours to review the opposition, prepare a reply and appear at the hearing. The Court finds sanctions are warranted. However, since no opposition was filed, the Court awards sanctions in the reduced total amount of $1,590 (6 hours of attorney time at the billing rate of $265 an hour.) III. DISPOSITION Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs further response to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall provide verified responses within 30 days. The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of $1,590 . Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order.

Case Number: 22STCV06583 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING CHRISTOPHER RASCON vs. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Case No.: 22STCV06583 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendant to produce a PMK on any of the nine (9) topics of examination is DENIED. Defendant is to comply with Document Request No. 1 by producing the Appraisals of Promotability for 2020-2023 for those Battalion Chiefs that never had a 40-hour position before promoting to Battalion Chief. On 2/23/2022, Plaintiff Christopher Rascon (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles, alleging: (1) racial discrimination; (2) racial harassment; (3) age discrimination; (4) age harassment; (5) retaliation; (6) failure to prevent. On 5/28/2024, Plaintiff moved to compel Defendants Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) to appear for deposition. Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in connection with this motion. Discussion Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendants PMK to appear for deposition. Plaintiff argues that Defendant continues to improperly object to the deposition Notice for all 3 topics and the single document request. Topic 1 concerns [t]he accuracy, authenticity, and foundation for documents produced by the County of Los Angeles as COLA_1187-COLA_1205. Defendant offered to stipulate to the authenticity and foundation of the records produced to avoid the deposition and unnecessary law and motion practice. However, Plaintiff argues that it was Plaintiffs position that he would like to further inquire about the documents that are to be produced with a person most knowledgeable. (Motion, 4: 25-26.) A vague assertion that he would like to further inquire about the documents, without more, is insufficient. Topics 2 and 3 initially concerned the the accuracy, authenticity, and foundation for the data included in the Countys responses and supplemental responses, respectively, to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One. Then, in an amended notice, these topics were broadened to include not merely the accuracy, authenticity, and foundation of the subject documents but also the identities of all persons who prepared the documents and/or compiled the data, how the documents/data were compiled, and the sources of information used to compile the documents/data. The Amended Notice also set forth new topics 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 which were not part of the original notice. (Atkins Decl., ¶ 12, and Baisch Decl., Exh. 4.) CCP section 2016.040 requires that parties meet and confer in a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the [discovery] motion. To determine whether the moving party made a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer, courts will look at a variety of factors including the history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, and the prospects for success. ( See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) After review of the records, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently engage in a good faith attempt to meet and confer regarding Countys objections to Plaintiffs notice and Amended Notice of the PMK deposition. Moreover, after review, the Court finds that Defendant need not produce a PMK because the document requests are overbroad and unduly burdensome. As for Topic 1, Plaintiff broadened the scope of the topic to include not only discovery about the authenticity, accuracy, and foundation of the records but also the identities of all persons who prepared the documents and/or compiled the data, how the documents were compiled, and the sources of information used to compile the documents. While Plaintiff may be entitled to know how these documents were prepared and the sources of information used to prepare them, the topic of examination as drafted is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and harassing. To the extent any of the information sought is discoverable, there are less burdensome and less intrusive means of seeking the information, such as propounding written interrogatories. Similarly, as for Topics 2 and 3, Plaintiff broadened the scope of the topic to include not only discovery about the authenticity, accuracy, and foundation of the Countys responses and supplemental responses to the special interrogatories, but also the identities of all persons who prepared and/or compiled the data, how the data was compiled, and the sources of information used to compile the data. As such, the topic of examination as drafted is overly broad, unduly burdensome and harassing. As with the documents produced by the County as COLA_1187 through COLA_1205, multiple people at the County assisted with preparing and compiling the data that was included in the Countys responses and supplemental responses to Plaintiffs special interrogatories, and therefore designating a person most knowledgeable about each data set is neither reasonable nor practicable. To the extent any of the information sought is discoverable, there are less burdensome and less intrusive means of seeking the information, such as propounding written interrogatories. Topic No. 4 states: The IDENTITY of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief. Topic No. 5 states: The IDENTITY of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had not worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief. Topic No. 6 states: The age of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief. Topic No. 7 states: The age of each Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had not worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief. Topic No. 8 states: The race and ethnicity of each Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief. Topic No. 9 states: The race and ethnicity of each of the Battalion Chiefs who were employed by YOU in the LACOFD between 2020 and the present who had not worked in 40 hour positions as Captains prior to their promotion to Battalion Chief. The Court agrees that: Topics 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are harassing for several reasons. First, it is duplicative of information already provided in discovery. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Countys wrongful conduct, Plaintiff was not accepted for a 40 hour position, which he argues is a critical component of his ability to be considered for a promotion. But even if that is so, Plaintiff fails to explain how knowing the identities of the Battalion Chiefs who worked in 40 hour positions will lead to discoverable information, when Plaintiff has already requestedand the County has providedextensive information about the relevant personnel in the Los Angeles County Fire Department. (See Atkins Decl., Exh. N, at Responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set Two, No. 19 [for each year from 2017 to 2023, the number of Battalion Chiefs who were promoted, who had not worked in 40- hour positions (as opposed to a short-term temporary detail assignment) as Captains prior to their promotions]; No. 20 [for each year from 2017 to 2023, the number of Battalion Chiefs who were promoted, who had not worked in 40-hour positions as Captains prior to their promotions, and who were Hispanic].) (See also Atkins Decl., Exhs. O and P.) Moreover, even if Plaintiff were entitled to the information again, requiring the County to produce a person most knowledgeable to testify about the identities of the Departments Battalion Chiefs who previously worked in 40-hour positions is harassing and unduly burdensome. This information can just as easily be discovered through less intrusive means, such as a written interrogatory, or a request for production of documents, without requiring the County to incur the time, expense, and disruption of producing a PMK for deposition. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion to compel is be denied, and Defendant is not required to produce a PMK on any of the nine (9) topics of examination. As for the document request, Plaintiff seeks The Appraisals of Promotability for all candidates for Battalion Chief between 2020 and the present. Defendant argues that [t]here is no justification to provide five (5) years (2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024) all of the Appraisal and Promotability evaluations for every firefighter personnel who applied for Battalion Chief back to 2020, when the Plaintiff never applied for a Battalion Chief position, and Plaintiff has not articulated any reason why going back so far and to the present is relevant. (Opp., 19-22.) The Court agrees, and limits the request as suchDefendant is to provide for 2020-2023 those BCs that have never had a 40-hour position before promoting to Battalion Chief, as this would be relevant to Plaintiff showing that one can promote to Battalion Chief without having worked a permanent 40-hour position. Defendant is to redact the Appraisals of Promotability as is necessary to preserve the confidentiality of the applicants. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to compel Defendant to produce a PMK on any of the nine (9) topics of examination is denied. Defendant is to comply with the Document Request No.1 by producing The Appraisals of Promotability for 2020-2023 for those Battalion Chiefs that had never had a 40-hour position before promoting to Battalion Chief. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Case Number: 20VECV01236 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: T HADDADI V KEY TOY 20VECV01236 [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Petitioner/Defendant Key Toy, LLCs Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award is GRANTED. Introduction Petitioner/Defendants Key Toy, LLC. and Wael Ghali petition to confirm the arbitration award awarded against Respondent/Plaintiff Loubna Haddadi (Plaintiff). The arbitration award granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. No opposition was filed. Discussion Defendants submitted a copy of the arbitration award levied against Plaintiff that was entered on April 22, 2024. Unless a petition or response seeking to correct or vacate an arbitration award was filed properly based upon valid grounds, or the proceeding is dismissed, courts are required to enter judgment in conformity with the award. (Code of Civ. Proc. sec. 1286; Valsan Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Calcor Space Facility (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 809, 818.) Because Plaintiff did not file a separate petition to correct or vacate and did not file a response/opposition to the instant Petition despite sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, the Petition is persuasive. The Petition to Confirm the Award is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED, CLERK TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND GIVE NOTICE OF ENTRY.

Case Number: 24STCV01047 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 EMILY ARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. CONTEMPORARY SERVICES CORP., et al., Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV01047 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: Plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with subpoena BACKGROUND On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff Emily Arrington filed this action against Defendants Contemporary Services Corporation and Daniel Larry Fernandez III. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffered sexual harassment and sexual assault by her supervisor (Defendant Fernandez) throughout her employment. The complaint specifically alleges that on February 6, 2022, Plaintiff was drugged and assaulted by Fernandez while working at the LA Coliseum. On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff issued a subpoena to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for the production of records pertaining to the February 6, 2022 incident. LAPD has declined to disclose the information due to the pending criminal investigation. On June 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel LAPDs compliance with the subpoena. LAPD filed its opposition on June 28, 2024. Plaintiff filed her reply on July 2, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things &, the court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party] . . . may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1(a), (b).) Good cause must be shown to compel a nonparty to produce documents. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.) DISCUSSION A public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose official information, and to prevent another from disclosing official information, if the privilege is claimed by a person authorized by the public entity to do so and either of the following apply: (1) Disclosure is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the United States or a statute of this state. (2) Disclosure of the information is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice; but no privilege may be claimed under this paragraph if any person authorized to do so has consented that the information be disclosed in the proceeding. In determining whether disclosure of the information is against the public interest, the interest of the public entity as a party in the outcome of the proceeding may not be considered. (Evid. Code, § 1040(b).) As used in this section, official information means information acquired in confidence by a public employee in the course of his or her duty and not open, or officially disclosed, to the public prior to the time the claim of privilege is made. ( Id. , § 1040(a).) In applying the privilege, [t]he threshold determination is whether the information . . . was acquired in confidence. If the information was acquired in confidence, the trial court next must balance the interests to determine whether the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice. ( Marylander v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1128-1129.) This involves consideration of the consequences to the litigant of nondisclosure and the consequences to the public of disclosure. ( Id. at p. 1129.) Consideration of the consequences to the litigant of nondisclosure involves familiar issues concerning the importance of the information to the fair presentation of the litigant's case, the availability of the material to the litigant by other means, and the effectiveness and relative difficulty of such other means. Consideration of the consequences to the public involves matters relating to the effect of disclosure on public processes and procedures. ( Ibid. , internal citations omitted.) Evidence gathered by police as part of an ongoing criminal investigation is by its nature confidential. ( County of Orange v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) Therefore, the contents of police investigative files sought in civil discovery must remain confidential so long as the need for confidentiality outweighs the benefits of disclosure in any particular case. ( Id. at p. 765.) Plaintiff argues that the evidence sought in the subpoena is critical to her case because it pertains to a sexual assault that serves as a central basis of the lawsuit. The evidence is pertinent to proving that the assault occurred and thus proving liability for the claims alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff argues that she has no other means to obtain material that could only be in LAPDs possession, such as reports, recordings, and physical evidence. On the other hand, LAPD invokes the public interest in the effective prosecution of crimes. Citing to County of Orange , LAPD argues that [r]eleasing LAPDs investigation, notes, reports, videos gathered thus far would greatly compromise the criminal prosecution of the case, as well as, jeopardizing justice for the victim, the plaintiff herein. (Opp. 4:12-14.) In County of Orange , the parents of a deceased child sued due to the way they were treated during the sheriffs department investigation. ( County of Orange, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) The sheriffs department refused to comply with a production demand for its investigative file of the childs death, asserting the official information privilege. ( Ibid. ) The court agreed with the Countys compelling picture of the dire consequences that could result from the disclosure of the contents of an investigative file to the suspects in a possible murder. ( County of Orange, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) There is an obvious danger that they may learn crucial information that would enable them to avoid apprehension. More specifically, permitting suspects to review materials in an investigative file will enable them to invent stories, explain away evidence thus far gathered, and intimidate or otherwise influence potential witnesses. ( Ibid. ) The court concluded that these dangers outweighed the parents interest in seeking vindication for their mistreatment. ( Id. at pp. 767-68.) Plaintiff argues in reply that LAPD has presented no evidence of the dangers of disclosure in this case. Specifically, LAPD cites to the declaration of Detective Kristina Montoya for its proposition that disclosure would compromise the criminal investigation. (Opp. 4:12-14.) Yet, Det. Montoyas declaration was neither served on Plaintiff nor filed with the Court. This appears to be a mere oversight. Assuming Det. Montoyas declaration states what LAPD claims it states, the Court would agree with LAPD and County of Orange that the risks of disclosure during an ongoing investigation outweigh Plaintiffs interest in prosecuting her case. Thus, the Court is inclined to deny the motion if LAPD files Det. Montoyas declaration. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion to compel compliance with subpoena is DENIED on the condition that LAPD file Det. Montoyas declaration.

Case Number: 21STCV27304 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles BLANCA CALDERON, Plaintiff, vs. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al. Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV27304 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] ORDER Action Filed: 07/26/21 Trial Date: 12/02/24 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Moving Party: Defendant Regents of the University of California (erroneously sued as Regents of the University of California DBA UCLA Santa Monica Medical Center and UCLA Health) Responding Party: Plaintiff Blanca Calderon Motion for Protective Order The court has considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. The court DENIES Defendants motion for protective order. The court DENIES Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions. Background On July 26, 2021, plaintiff Blanca Calderon (Plaintiff) initiated this action against defendant Regents of the University of California (erroneously sued as Regents of the University of California DBA UCLA Santa Monica Medical Center and UCLA Health) (Defendant), alleging causes of action for (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of Government Code § 12940(a); (2) Failure to Reasonably Accommodate in Violation of Government Code § 12945.2; (3) Failure to Provide Medical Leave in Violation of Government Code § 12945.2; (4) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code § 12940(n); (5) Failure to Maintain a Workplace Free from Discrimination and Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(k); (6) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; and (7) Wrongful Termination in Violation of FEHA. The Complaint alleges Plaintiff worked as a housekeeper at Defendants ULCA Santa Monica Medical Center from 2007 to May 14, 2019. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff sustained an initial workplace injury to her back on April 13, 2009, and she was referred to doctors under Defendants workers compensation insurance. ( Id. at ¶¶ 16.) When Plaintiff attempted to return to work with restrictions, Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations and this behavior continued after Plaintiff returned from various durations of medical leave. ( Id . at ¶¶ 17-20.) On May 15, 2010, Plaintiff sustained a second workplace injury to her right thumb and hand, and despite reporting the injury to her direct supervisor, she was instructed to keep working. ( Id. at ¶ 21.) After four days, Plaintiff approached a different supervisor who referred her to a workers compensation doctor, and this injury was also categorized as a permanent injury. ( Ibid. ) By December 18, 2015, Plaintiff received a final orthopedic evaluation on both of her injuries, and it was determined that Plaintiffs physical condition had stabilized and her medical conditions were permanent. ( Id. at ¶ 23.) Thus, Plaintiffs had several work restrictions needing to be accommodated. ( Ibid. ) On December 13, 2019, defendant Michael E. Pfau (hereinafter, Defendant) filed this motion for protective order. Plaintiff filed an opposition on January 29, 2020. No reply was received. However, her supervisors did not make any good faith attempts to accommodate Plaintiffs work restrictions, and as a result, Plaintiff was forced to perform her full duties. ( Id. at ¶ 24.) Plaintiff repeatedly complained of the lack of accommodations from December 2015 through March 2017. By never being accommodated for her injuries, they worsened, and Plaintiff sought further treatment in March 2017 due to ongoing back and shoulder pain. ( Id. at ¶ 26.) Because of her injuries, Plaintiff was placed on the most restrictive restrictions available, but Defendant ignored Plaintiffs request for reasonable accommodations. ( Id. at ¶ 27.) In January 2018, Plaintiff experienced pain in the same hand that had been injured in 2010, and when she informed her direct supervisor of this injury, no action was taken. ( Id. at ¶ 28.) By June 15, 2018, Plaintiff sustained another workplace injury to her knee because of Defendants refusal to provide reasonable accommodations. ( Id. at ¶ 29-30.) It is alleged that Defendant continued to fail to accommodate Plaintiff for her work restrictions, and her knee and hand injuries worsened. ( Id. at ¶¶ 31-37.) Because of the worsening condition in her hand, Plaintiff had to have surgery, and she was placed on medical leave from November 9, 2018 through December 3, 2018. ( Id. at ¶ 37.) Upon returning to work, Plaintiff informed Defendant of her most recent work restrictions, but Defendant insisted that Plaintiff return to full duties without any accommodations. ( Id. at ¶ 38.) Because Plaintiffs injuries were worsening, she was placed on medical leave for three days in February 7, 2017 and released with work restrictions. ( Id. ¶ 40.) Again, Defendants did not provide reasonable accommodations when Plaintiff returned to work on February 10, 2019. ( Id. at ¶ 41.) By March 6, 2019, Plaintiffs restrictions were reverted back to permanent restrictions for her knee injury. ( Id. at ¶ 42.) On May 13, 2019, Defendants terminated Plaintiff on the ground that they could no longer accommodate Plaintiffs restrictions as they were permanent, despite having been designated as permanent since December 2015. ( Id. at ¶ 43.) On May 20, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for protective order in relation to Plaintiffs attempt to take the deposition of sixteen third party lay witnesses. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition to the instant motion. On July 2, 2024, Defendant filed its reply. Legal Standard Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. (CCP § 2025.420(a).) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (CCP § 2025.420(b).) This protective order may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions set forth in CCP §§ 2025.420(b)(1)-(16). Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (b), provides a nonexclusive list of permissible directions that may be included in a protective order. ( Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 316.) If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may order that the deponent provide or permit the discovery against which protection was sought on those terms and conditions that are just. (CCP § 2025.420(g).) [T]he issuance and formulation of protective orders are to a large extent discretionary. [Citation.] ( Nativi , supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at 316.) The court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2025.420(h).) Furthermore, CCP §2017.020(a) provides, as follows: The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. Also, under CCP § 2019.030(a)(1), the court may restrict the frequency or extent of use of a discovery method if [t]he discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. Evidentiary Objections Defendant objects to various portions of the Declaration of Brennan S. Kahn, which was submitted in support of Plaintiffs opposition. These objections are overruled in their entirety. Discussion As a preliminary matter, the court finds that Defendant has sufficiently met and conferred on the issue of the protective order. (See Afshar Decl. ¶¶ 11-13, Exhs. G-I.) Merits of the Motion Defendant moves for a protective order pursuant to CCP §§ 2025.420, 2017.010, and 2019.030 to bar and limit Plaintiff from taking the depositions of additional third-party lay witnesses. Defendant first contends that there is good cause to issue the requested protective orders because, in past depositions of other lay witnesses, Plaintiffs counsel has improperly asked questions relating to legal conclusions and that require the lay witnesses to interpret medical records and opine on the performance of work duties under medical conditions. (Motion at pp. 8-9.) Effectively, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is seeking the lay witnesses to speculate based on various hypotheticals. ( Id. at pp. 9-10.) Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiff seeks duplicative testimony because, in the previous eight depositions of lay witnesses, Plaintiff has nearly identical questions that concerned her specific work restrictions, the accommodations offered and provided, modified work duties, the work actual performed, and hypotheticals relating to work restrictions. ( Id. at pg. 11; Afshar Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, Exh. C.) Defendant also argues that it would suffer irreparable harm if the court declines to intervene in this instance because the third-party witnesses will continue to be harassed to answer questions that they lack personal knowledge about. ( Id. at pg. 12.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the instant motion is deficient because Defendant fails to argue why any specific witness should not be deposed or why any specific question should not be asked. (Opposition at pg. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff reasons that Defendant is improperly requesting the court to issue an blanket prohibition without a specific factual basis. ( Id. , relying on Meritplan Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 237, 241-242.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant should not be allowed to arbitrarily limit her ability to conduct necessary depositions or even to curtail certain line of questionings without further information. ( Id. at pg. 10.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the witnesses that she intends to depose are relevant to her claims because they were Plaintiffs direct supervisors, direct co-workers, executives over Plaintiffs department, or personnel associated with accommodation requests. ( Id. at pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff further contends that she should be permitted to question the deponents without restrictions because Defendants objections are premised on the lack of relevance of the testimony elicited, but they can be later contested on admissibility grounds. ( Id. at pp. 14-15.) In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs reliance on Mertiplan Insurance Co. is misplaced because the protective order issued there did not establish whether the depositions were harassing, duplicative or burdensome, and it did not address any potentially proper questioning. ( Mertiplan Insurance Co., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at 241-242.) Defendant maintains that there is good cause for the protective order on the ground that the line of improper questioning amounts to harassment and annoyance and that the testimony that Plaintiff seeks to elicit is duplicative of prior deposition testimony. (Reply at pp. 6-8.) As an initial matter, the court is not inclined to issue a broad sweeping order that bars the taking of further third-party witness depositions. After all, the scope of discovery is broad. ( Childrens Hosp. of Central CA v. Blue Cross of CA (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1276.) While the court is concerned that Plaintiff is repeatedly seeking to elicit testimony of legal conclusions from third-party lay witnesses, the court does not find the questioning generally complained of warrants the prohibition of those questions from being asked when they could be within the proposed third-party witnesses personal knowledge. Primarily, the court finds that Defendant has failed to show how allowing Plaintiff to proceed with additional proposed third-party lay witness depositions would result in unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (CCP § 2025.420(b).) The only irreparable harm that Defendant identifies is that the third-party witnesses will be harassed and made to feel uncomfortable. However, this is not persuasive because, if these third-party lay witnesses lack personal knowledge to answer the questions that Plaintiff seeks to ask, then they may merely testify in the negative. Additionally, considering that Plaintiff has already deposed eight third-party lay witnesses, there is no declaration from them to suggest that any of them felt harassed during their depositions. Moreover, to the extent that Defendant seeks to restrict the use of deposition because Plaintiff is seeking duplicative information, the Court is not persuaded by this information because Defendant has failed to show that the proposed third-party lay witnesses lack the personal knowledge needed to answer Plaintiffs questions. The court therefore DENIES Defendants motion for protective order. Requests for Monetary Sanctions Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions against Defendant in the total amount of $7,000 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.420(h) for unsuccessfully making the instant motion. However, the Court does not find that Defendant acted without substantial justification in moving for the requested protective order. As stated above, one concern was Plaintiffs repeated questions to lay witnesses about legal conclusions, and another was that Plaintiff had already deposed eight witnesses asking similar questions. Thus, it appeared to Defendant that further depositions without court intervention would prove duplicative and unnecessarily protracted. On this ground, Defendant acted with substantial justification in moving for the requested protective order. The court therefore DENIES Plaintiffs request for monetary sanctions. It is so ordered. Dated: July 10, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the

Case Number: 22PSCV00114 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: K Counsel for Defendant Second Street Promenade, LLC dba Metro Event Centers (i.e., Cummins & White, LLP) Motion to be Relieved as Counsel is GRANTED, effective upon the filing of a proof of service showing service of the signed order upon the Client at the Clients last known address. An Order to Show Cause Re: Representation of LLC is set for October 1, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Background Plaintiff Julio Garcia (Plaintiff) alleges as follows: Plaintiff worked for Second Street Promenade, LLC dba Metro Event Center (erroneously sued as Metro Event Center) (Metro) from 2016 through August 12, 2019. On or about June 2019, Plaintiff informed his manager he was not feeling well and that his arm was bothering him due to nerve damage in his right arm. Plaintiff noticed that his hours were being cut shortly thereafter. Defendant never informed Plaintiff why his hours were being cut. After weeks of gradually reducing Plaintiffs hours, Defendant then took him off the schedule completely. Plaintiff was never called back to work by Defendant. On February 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Metro and Does 1-10 for: 1. Employment Discrimination in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940(a)) 2. Failure to Accommodate in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940(m)) 3. Failure to Engage in a Timely & Good Faith Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940(n)) 4. Harassment in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940(j)) 5. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code §§ 12940(h)(m)) 6. Failure to Prevent/Remedy Discrimination, Harassment and/or Retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Gov. Code § 12940(k)) 7. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 9. Failure to Permit Inspection or Copying of Employment Records On June 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, wherein Second Street Promenade, LLC was named in lieu of Doe 1. On October 10, 2022, an Order Granting Stipulation to Agree that Metro Event Center and Second Street Promenade, LLC will be a Single Entity Known as Second Street Promenade, LLC dba Metro Event Center was entered. The Final Status Conference is set for August 27, 2024. Trial is set for September 10, 2024. Discussion Cummins & White, LLP (Firm) s eeks to be relieved as counsel of record for Metro (Client). The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1362 requires (1) a notice of motion and motion directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion, the declaration, and the proposed order on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) a proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. Attorney Erick J. Becker (Becker) attests that the Client refuses to follow counsels advice that necessary trial preparation and discovery be conducted and will not agree to pay for any work to be performed in preparation for trial, which has caused an irreconcilable breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. Becker states that he has served the Client by mail at the Clients last known address with copies of the motion papers served with his declaration and that he has confirmed, within the past 30 days, that the address is current, via email and mail. Becker explains that the Client corresponded with counsel from the same email address the Client was served with the instant motion and also paid invoices that were sent to this email address within the last 30 days. He advises that the Client was also served with the instant motion via mail, which was confirmed as current via a review of their business website within the last 30 days. The motion is not opposed. The court determines that the requirements of Rules of Court Rule 3.1362 enumerated above have been sufficiently met. Accordingly, the motion is granted, effective upon the filing of a proof of service showing service of the signed order upon the Client at the Clients last known address. The court will set an Order to Show Cause Re: Representation of LLC for October 1, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.

Case Number: 22STCV40216 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 73 07/11/2024 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding MARTINEZ v. FARMERS FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al. ( 22STCV40216 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/moving party: Marcelo Dieguez (Diefer Law Group, PC) Counsel for Defendants/opposing party: Clayton Hix (Hill, Farrer & Burrill LLP) PLAINTIFFS motion FOR ATTORNEYS FEES ( filed 05/16/2024) TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND On December 27, 2022, Plaintiff Citlali Lopez Mayte Martinez filed this employment action against Defendants Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Simplified Labor) and William Espinoza (Espinoza). The Complaint asserts the following causes of action: 1. Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940 et seq. (FEHA); 2. Harassment in Violation of the FEHA; 3. Retaliation in Violation of the FEHA; 4. Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(K); 5. Negligent Supervision and Retention; 6. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 7. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; and 8. Failure to Permit Inspection of Personnel and Payroll Records. The Complaint alleges the following. On or about January 11, 2022, Plaintiff began working for Defendants as a laborer at Defendants warehouse in Lynwood, California. Plaintiff was a full-time, non-exempt employee, and performed all of Plaintiffs job duties satisfactorily before Defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiffs employment on or about April 20, 2022, in retaliation for making protected FEHA complaints about supervisor Espinozas sexual harassment of Plaintiff. On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney Fees , arguing: · Plaintiff moves for an order awarding her attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal in the amount $17,094.20 from Defendant and their attorneys, pursuant to the appellate court decision dated May 15, 2024. · Defendants filed an unsuccessful motion to compel arbitration. the present sexual harassment case was clearly barred by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFASASH) and they filed their motion anyways. · The appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court ruling. · The appellate court granted costs on appeal to Plaintiff. · California public policy supports Defendants paying for the delay they caused by covering Plaintiffs Attorney Fees and costs. SB 365 was later passed in January 2024 to stop attorneys like those from Hill Farrer in this case from strategically bringing frivolous appeals as a delay tactic. · Plaintiffs counsels rates and hours billed are reasonable. On June 27, 2024, Defendant Simplified Labor filed an opposition, arguing: · The trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain or decide the motion. No remittitur has issued and the appellate process is still underway with a petition for review pending before the California Supreme Court. · Plaintiff is not entitled to costs because costs must first be awarded in, and claimed after, the remittitur is issued. · Here, Plaintiff contends she is entitled to attorneys fees as the prevailing party, pursuant to Government Code section 12965(b). However, Plaintiff cannot avail herself of that statute because the case is still pending and there has been no adjudication of the merits. Plaintiff did not file a reply. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard As a general rule, the prevailing party may recover certain statutory costs incurred in the litigation up to and including entry of judgment. [Citations.] These costs may include attorney fees, if authorized by contract, statute . . . or law. [Citation.] . . . attorney fees require a separate noticed motion. [Citations.] ( Lucky United Props. Inv., Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 137.) This motion may be brought: (1) after judgment or dismissal, for fees incurred up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court--including attorneys fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment&; and (2) on an interim basis, upon remittitur of appeal, of only fees incurred on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 3.1702(b)-(c).) Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), the party prevailing in the Court of Appeal in a civil case (other than a juvenile case) is entitled to costs on appeal. The prevailing party is the respondent if the Court of Appeal affirms the judgment without modification or dismisses the appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).) Unless the court orders otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorneys fees on appeal nor precludes a party from seeking them under rule 3.1702. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.) However, [w]here attorneys fees are authorized by statute they are authorized on appeal as well as in the trial court. ( People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana Theater (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 378, 387.) B. Whether Plaintiff Can Seek Attorneys Fees Plaintiff moves for an order awarding her attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal in the amount $17,094.20 from Defendant and their attorneys, pursuant to the appellate court decision dated May 15, 2024. On April 7, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement purportedly signed by Plaintiff. On July 13, 2023, this Court denied Defendants motion to compel Plaintiffs sex harassment case to arbitration, finding that the case was barred by the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFASASH). Defendant appealed the trial courts order. On May 15, 2024, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court ruling. (Avila Decl., Ex. A.) In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees and costs because no remittitur has issued and the appellate process is still underway with a petition for review pending before the California Supreme Court. Plaintiff did not present an argument in response. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rules 3.1702 and 8.2782, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs at this time. Rule 3.1702 allows a motion for attorney fees to be brought upon remittitur of appeal of the fees incurred on appeal. As stated in Rule 8.2782, the clerk/executive officer of the Court of Appeal must enter on the record, and insert in the remittitur, a judgment awarding costs to the prevailing party. Plaintiff has not established that remittitur was issued. Thus, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion to seek attorneys fees at this time. III. DISPOSITION Plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees is DENIED.

Case Number: 23AHCV01025 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT ODETTE VIVANCO , Plaintiff(s), vs. OTTIMO RESOURCES INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV01025 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO TAX COSTS Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 10 , 2024 ) I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Odette Vivanco (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Ottimo Resources Inc. and Pacific Clinics on May 8, 2023. On April 11, 2024, the Court sustained the demurrer filed by Pacific Clinics (Defendant) to Plaintiffs operative First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. Defendant filed a memorandum of costs and proposed judgment on April 29, 2024. On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an objection to the memorandum of costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed a noticed motion to strike or tax costs on May 14, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD Generally, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. ( Id ., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount. ( Id ., subd. (c)(3). The losing party may dispute any or all of the items in the prevailing partys memorandum of costs by a motion to strike or tax costs. (CRC 3.1700(b).) Verification of the memorandum of costs by the prevailing partys attorney establishes a prima facie showing that the claimed costs are proper. ( Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267.) To overcome that prima facie showing, the objecting party must introduce evidence to support its claim that the claimed costs were not reasonably necessary to carry out the litigation. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) Where a motion to tax costs is based on factual disputes as to nature or amount of particular costs, the motion must be supported by declarations. ( County of Kern v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113-1114.) Mere conclusions that the item was neither necessary nor reasonable do not satisfy the objecting partys burden. ( Id .) III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants memorandum of costs in its entirety on the grounds that it was prematurely filed. The premature filing of a memorandum of costs is treated as a mere irregularity at best that does not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice. ( Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 880.) Prematurely filed cost bills are treated as being timely filed. ( Id .) Although Plaintiff claims to have been prejudiced by Defendants premature memorandum of costs, her claim is unsubstantiated. Plaintiff argues that she was forced to incur unnecessary attorney fees and costs by bringing this motion. (Reply, p. 2.) However, Plaintiff does not contend that a motion was wholly unnecessary. Therefore, it appears only to be an issue of when the motion needed to be filed, as opposed to whether one had to be filed at all. This does not constitute a sufficient showing of prejudice. Therefore, the motion to strike the costs bill in its entirety is DENIED. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves to tax Defendants costs and requests that Defendant be awarded no more than $1,267.61 on the grounds that the costs incurred are either highly inflated or not necessary. The challenged costs include $1,709 claimed for court reporter fees. Court reporter fees as established by statute are expressly recoverable. (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(11).) Plaintiff argues that the two court reporter fees are unreasonably high at $750 and $959 because the hearings for which they were hired were less than an hour long. (Motion, pp. 4-5.) Plaintiff includes no evidence that court reporters charge on an hourly basis or that Defendants court reporters charged fees which were outside the industry standard. Plaintiff only complains that Defendant failed to provide any invoice or receipts with its cost bill, which is not a requirement, and in any event, Defendant attached those invoices to its opposition showing the rate of hire for court reporters for a half day. Even in her reply brief, Plaintiff does not explain why she considers Defendants court reporter fees to be unreasonably high, nor does she provide evidence in support of her claim. (Reply, p. 3.) The motion to tax the court reporter fees is DENIED. Plaintiff also challenges Defendants cost of $803.08 for a court-ordered transcript from the March 6, 2024, hearing on Defendants demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff argues that the invoice for the transcript only cost her $419.47, therefore Defendant should not have paid more than that. The amount claimed by Defendant for the court-ordered transcript is reasonable because the invoice attached to the Perera Declaration identifies the cost of an original transcript, which is more expensive that Plaintiffs copy, as well as a fee to expedite the transcript, which was not charged to Plaintiff. (Perera Decl., Ex. M.) Accordingly, the motion to tax the cost of the transcript is DENIED. Last, Plaintiff argues that Defendants electronic filing and service fees of $985.05 are either unnecessary or unreasonably high. Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(14) allows a prevailing party to recover [f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents. In addition, [m]essenger fees are not expressly authorized by statute, but may be allowed in the discretion of the court. ( Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 132.) Plaintiff contends that a reasonable charge for routine electronic filings ranges from $15 to $17 dollars instead of $70 or $80 but submits nothing in support other than a bare assertion in counsels declaration. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant should not be able to recover the costs for courtesy copies delivered to the courthouse because they were not required and therefore unnecessary. However, the operative First Amended General Order re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil requires printed courtesy copies for pleadings and motions that include points and authorities as well as demurrers; furthermore, the courtesy copies of Defendants demurrers, motions to strike, and reply briefs were certainly used by the Court. Therefore, the Courts denies the motion to tax these costs incurred to prepare and deliver those courtesy copies. In addition, Plaintiff disputes what she calls a credit card charge, but neglects to state that the charge was incurred in connection with filing the demurrer and motion to strike. Overall, the Court taxes $74 from Defendants cost bill for fees associated with filing the notice of remote appearance, which was not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion to strike the entire memorandum of costs is DENIED. Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is GRANTED in the amount of $74. Dated this 10th day of July , 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.