Western Paving Contractors Inc Vs Cedars-Sinai Medical Cente

Case Number: 23TRCV01598 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B MOHAMMED AMINUR RASHID, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV01598 vs. [Tentative] NO RULING BABUL MIAH, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Moving Party: Plaintiff Mohammed Aminur Rashid Responding Parties: Defendants Babul Miah, Abdul Miah, Jupiter West, LLC and South Five, LLC Motion to Disqualify Counsel At present Defendants Babul Miah, Abdul Miah, Jupiter West, LLC and South Five, LLC are all represented by the same counsel. Plaintiff seeks to disqualify Defendants counsel from representing Jupiter West, LLC and South Five, LLC. The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. BACKGROUND On May 19, 2023, plaintiff Mohammed Aminur Rashid, as an individual and director of South Five, LLC and Jupiter West, LLC filed a complaint against Babul Miah and Abdul Mian, individually and as directors of South Five, LLC and Jupiter West, LLC for (1) involuntary dissolution of LLC, (2) partition, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) accounting, and (5) declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 9, 2023, plaintiff filed a FAC for (1) involuntary dissolution of LLC, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) accounting, and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief and added South Five, LLC and Jupiter West, LLC as defendants. On March 13, 2024, the Court overruled defendants demurrer as to the first and second causes of action and granted the motion to strike with leave to amend. On April 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a SAC. In the SAC Plaintiff Mohammed Aminur Rashid alleges that he and his two siblings, Babul Miah and Abul Miah formed two corporations on September 12, 2007. One was Jupiter West, Inc. The other was South Five, Inc. Then in October 2007 they converted the two corporations into limited liability companies, Jupiter West, LLC and South Five, LLC. (Complaint ¶ 10.) Each of the LLCs owns a residential apartment building. Jupiter West, LLC owns the Rosecrans property while South Five, LLC owns the Roselle Avenue property. (Complaint ¶ 12.) 14. Plaintiff wants to obtain full ownership for one of the Properties. He has offered to pay the difference to obtain full ownership for one of the Properties. However, Defendants have refused to cooperate. Further, Defendants failed to provide bank records to allow Plaintiff to perform an adequate accounting to determine the amounts owing to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff is unable to determine the amounts owing to him in the event that Defendants wanted to buy Plaintiffs interest. 15. On July 26, 2022, Plaintiff sent a demand letter to Defendants that requested all bank statements for the Companies, and demanded that Defendants buy out his interests in the Companies and Properties. However, Defendants did not adequately respond. 16. On April 12, 2023, Plaintiffs counsel had an informal settlement discussion with Defendants former counsel Gerald Rome, Esq. wherein settlement discussions occurred regarding amounts of money owing to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs counsel again requested that Defendants provide all bank statements for the corporations to Plaintiff. However, Defendants counsel never provided all of the requested bank statements, which inhibited Plaintiff from being able to determine the amounts of money owing to him. (Complaint ¶ 14-16.) Plaintiff asserts as his First Cause of Action that he is entitled to an involuntary dissolution of Jupiter West, LLC and South Five, LLC. He sets forth as the grounds the fact that the defendants have withheld bank statements from him and abused their authority and exhibited persistent unfairness toward him. They have discussed settlement, but there is internal dissention and an inability to agree upon an acceptable price. 24. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have withheld amounts of money owing to him which are estimated to exceed $45,000. Defendants have been managing the Companies and the Properties without paying all amounts owing to Plaintiff. Therefore, it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the businesses and dissolution is reasonable and necessary for Plaintiff to protect his rights and interests against BABUL MIAH, ABUL MIAH, and DOES 1 to 30. (Complaint ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also asserts as his Second Cause of Action a claim for breach of fiduciary duty claiming that defendants breached their duties of loyalty to Plaintiff by withholding amounts due him, estimated to exceed $45,000. Defendants failed to account to plaintiff and provide adequate financial records to determine the amount owed him. He also alleges the failed settlement discussions and inability to agree upon a buyout price. The Third Cause of Action is for an accounting of all the financial transaction involving the companies from 2007 to present. The Fourth Cause of Action for declaratory relief seeks a declaration that: Plaintiff is the one third owner of the right, title and interest the Companies Properties, and that they and the Properties are free of any liens in favor of any other parties. On March 13, 2024, the Court overruled defendants demurrer as to the first and second causes of action and granted the motion to strike with leave to amend. On April 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a SAC. DISCUSSION Plaintiff requests that the Court disqualify Grant/Shenon APC and its attorneys from representing defendants South Five, LLC and Jupiter West, LLC. Plaintiff contends that Grant/Shenon APC has a nonwaivable actual conflict of interest in simultaneously representing two members of South Five, LLC and Jupiter West, LLC against another member, plaintiff Mohammed Rashid, citing to Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7. Plaintiff argues that [a] glaring conflict exists between the simultaneous representation of the Individual Defendant interests and the Corporate Defendant interests. Plaintiff cites to Corp. Code §17704.07(4), asserting that consent of all members of the companies was required to hire Grant/Shenon APC because the act was outside the ordinary course of the companies activities, which is to own and manage residential apartments for income. Plaintiff contends that he never consented to simultaneous representation and that the corporate defendants did not have a right to choose Grant/Shenon APC. Plaintiff also argues that Grant/Shenon APC does not have any compelling interest to continue representation of the corporate defendants; the corporate defendants do not have a financial burden for their change of counsel; defendants will be unable to show that there is any tactical abuse by plaintiff in filing the motion; and that disqualification of Grant/Shenon APC would ensure that the corporate defendants and their new counsel can effectuate fair resolution of the dispute with vigorous representation because the new counsel would be able to represent the corporate defendants without any conflicts of interest. In opposition, defendants argue that the motion is merely a tactical device based on plaintiffs delay and that significant discovery and briefing has already taken place. Defendants also assert that plaintiff was aware that Grant/Shenon was representing the individual Miah defendants throughout this time and did not object and that it was plaintiffs counsel that requested that Grant/Shenon accept service on behalf of the LLCs. Further, defendants assert, plaintiff fails to establish that any real danger exists as a result of Grant/Shenons representation because plaintiffs claims are not aimed at the LLCs and thus not derivative. Defendants argue also that disqualification would unnecessarily prejudice defendants and that Grant/Shenon has represented the individual defendants from the beginning. Moreover, given the adverse interests between plaintiff and the individual defendants, the prospect that they would agree on replacement counsel seems unlikely at best. Defendants request that, in the alternative, defendants should be permitted to appoint counsel for the LLCs while maintaining Grant/Shenon as counsel for the individual defendants. In reply, plaintiff argues that he has timely filed his motion and it is not a delay tactic. Plaintiff asserts that he filed this motion under the belief that the corporate defendants were paying attorneys that had not been agreed to by plaintiff, and that the corporate defendants did not accept service of the FAC until mid-November 2023, which is after plaintiff had already received subpoena results from the bank, which did not show any payments by the corporations to counsel. But, plaintiff explains, he has recently obtained additional records from the bank that show that the corporate defendants are making payments to counsel. Thus, plaintiff contends, defendants are using corporate money to fund a defense against plaintiff, who is a member of the corporations, and thus there is an inherent conflict. Plaintiff also argues that disqualification would not prejudice defendants as trial is not until April 2025 and that the parties have only just begun litigating and have not completed much other than written discovery. LEGAL AUTHORITY Under CCP §128(a)(5), one of the courts powers is to control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it in furtherance of justice. That power includes disqualifying an attorney. The issue of disqualification ultimately involves a conflict between the clients right to counsel of their choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility. The paramount concern, though, must be the preservation of public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar. The recognized and important right to counsel of ones choosing must yield to considerations of ethics that run to the very integrity of our judicial process. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer v. Tracinda Corp. (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 1832, 1838. In exercising its discretion to disqualify an attorney, the court is required to make a reasoned judgment which complies with the legal principles and policies applicable to the issue at hand. Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 109, 113. Where . . . a motion for disqualification is based on an asserted breach of confidentiality or conflict of interest, the trial court must cautiously balance the competing interests. Med-Trans Corp. v. City of Cal. City (2007) 156 Cal. App. 4th 655, 663. The court must weigh the combined effect of a partys right to counsel of choice, an attorneys interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding against the fundamental principle that the fair resolution of disputes within our adversary system requires vigorous representation of parties by independent counsel unencumbered by conflicts of interest. Id. at 663-64 (citation omitted). The Court notes that the claimed conflict is between the two individual defendants on the one hand and the entity defendants. Yet none of the parties claimed in be in a conflicting position are objecting to the representation. No defendant objects to sharing defense counsel. Does Plaintiff contend that the entities as entities are taking any particular position in this litigation? Is it Plaintiffs contention that the entities are required to play no role in this litigation, since the entities have three owners and they are not in agreement, and must agree or the entities can take no position? If that is correct, should the entities retain counsel for any purpose? If the entities are required to retain counsel separate from the individual defendants, who provides that counsel instructions? Plaintiff should be prepared to identify to the Court the adverse interests between the individual defendants and the entity defendants, and why this claimed adverse interest requires that the entities be stripped of their chosen counsel. It appears to the Court that the entity defendants have no real interest in the dispute. For instance, the entities are legally indifferent to the claim for involuntary dissolution. While the three owners have different views on that, the entities as entities appear to have no independent position. They are not harmed by not having separate counsel. In what way are the entities harmed by the representation? So too, Plaintiff has previously made it clear that the claim for breach of fiduciary duty is his personal claim that he had not been paid the amounts due him and he has not been provided the bank records by the other two owners. The Court discerns no position to be taken by the entities as entities. Nor do the entities appear to have any role or position with respect to the claim for an accounting. Finally, the declaratory relief claim does not involve the entities. It seeks a determination of the ownership rights of Plaintiff. In short, it appears to the Court that there is no meaningful position or role of either entity such that there is a conflict of interest. Plaintiff should also be prepared to address what the consequence would be should this Court grant this motion. Plaintiff takes the position that the entities may not retain any counsel absent unanimity between the three owners. Yet there appears to be no reasonable likelihood that the three will agree upon an attorney to separately represent the entities. Where does that leave the entities? Why should the Court burden the parties and the two entities with the added expense of retaining and paying separate counsel? And if the Court does impose that obligation on the entities, how will either entity be capable of taking any position in this litigation given the unanimity obligation articulated by Plaintiff? Shall the entities essentially be led entirely by retained counsel, separate from the decisions of any of any of the owners? In short, who calls the shots for the entities? What is the consequence if no counsel can be agreed upon by the three owners? Shall the entities suffer a default as they must be represented by counsel? But if they did suffer a default, would that have any real consequence? It appears not, as the entities have no apparent interest in this litigation. Perhaps the appropriate solution is to merely have all the parties stipulate that the entities as entities take no position on the claims presently asserted in the litigation and that to the extent that there is any judgment that impacts the entities, the entities shall be bound by the judgment of the Court. The Court expects argument.

Case Number: 24AVCV00237 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This is a quiet title action. Plaintiff Clearview Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Plaintiff) alleges presents that the real property at issue is commonly known as 1741 Viridian Ave., Lancaster, CA 93534 and provides the legal description in Exhibit A of the Complaint (the Subject Property). Plaintiff further presents that it is the current and true legal and equitable titleholder to the Subject Property by way of a perfected and duly recorded trustees deed upon sale; Defendant Amir Aki Shaheed-Edwards (Shaheed-Edwards) is the former borrower under that certain deed of trust dated September 16, 2019, and recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document Number 20190977291 and has no valid right, title, lien, or interest in the Subject Property; and that Defendant Society Ventures LLC (Society Ventures) claims to have a lien interest in the Subject Property through the fraudulent use of a UCC Financing Statement recorded against the Subject Property which was recorded as Document Number 20230558836 on or about August 22, 2023, but has no valid right to title, lien or interest in the Subject Property as UCC Financing Statement cannot create a security interest in real property. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title and cancel clouds on title on the Subject Property. On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Complaint alleging three causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Cancellation of Instrument, and (3) Slander of Title. On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 1 to Diane Merritt and a Notice of Lis Pendens. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 2 to Amir Aki Shaheed-Edwards dba Bait Califa Trust. On April 02, 2024, Society Ventures filed a Request to Waive Court Fees, subsequently denied. On April 05, 2024, Society Ventures filed a Motion to Quash Service. The Motion to Quash Service was voided on May 07, 2024 as Society Ventures, a corporation, was trying to proceed in pro per with an individual non-attorney representing it. (See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146 [A corporation has the capacity to bring a lawsuit because it has all the powers of a natural person in carrying out its business. However, under a long-standing common law rule of procedure, a corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. It must be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record.].) On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order Prohibiting Defendants from Encumbering/Transferring Real Property, subsequently granted on April 19, 2024. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff requested default as to Society Ventures, LLC. The Court set an Order to Show Cause (OSC) regarding entry of default on Society Ventures for April 30, 2024. On April 26, 2024, the Court held a hearing on an OSC titled, OSC RE: Why A Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue Cancelling the March 4, 2024 Trustee's Deed Upon Sale In Favor of Defendant Society Ventures, LLC, Recorded Against the Subject Property, Recorded In the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office. There were no appearances. At this hearing, the Court advanced and vacated the OSC regarding entry of default on Society Ventures and continued it to June 24, 2024 at 08:30 AM in Department A14 at Michael Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse. The Court gave notice of the change. On May 06, 2024, Shaheed-Edwards filed his Answer. On June 24, 2024, the OSC regarding entry of default on Society Ventures was held. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Opposition. On July 02, 2024, Society Ventures filed its Reply. . . .[A]ll reply papers [shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party] a t least five court days before the hearing. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).) Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section. ( Ibid .) The hearing is set for July 09, 2024. July 04, 2024 is a national holiday resulting in court closure. As such, five court days before the hearing is July 01, 2024. A Reply should have been filed by July 01, 2024 to be timely. The Reply is untimely. No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).) The Court, in its discretion, does not consider the late filed Reply. ----- Legal Standard Standard to Quash Service Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10 provides: A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. (3) To dismiss the action pursuant to the applicable provisions of Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 583.110) of Title 8. When a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service. ( Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403,413; see also Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [. . .where a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.].) Chapter 1.5 provides the Court with the discretionary ability to dismiss for delay in prosecution pursuant to this article on its own motion or on motion of the defendant if to do so appears to the court appropriate under the circumstances of the case. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.410.) ----- Discussion Application The Court notes that there is a Proof of Service that is signed by a registered process server. (See Proof of Substituted Service). This creates a presumption of service. (See Cal. Evid. Code § 647.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20, which discusses substituted service provides: (a) In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the person to be served as specified in Section 416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, at his or her usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. (b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the persons dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. (c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), if the only address reasonably known for the person to be served is a private mailbox obtained through a commercial mail receiving agency, service of process may be effected on the first delivery attempt by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the commercial mail receiving agency in the manner described in subdivision (d) of Section 17538.5 of the Business and Professions Code. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40, discussing out of state service provides: A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form of mail is deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing. The Court emphasizes that Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40 allows service on a person outside of this state (1) in any manner provided by this article or (2) by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Accordingly, the Court must take into consideration all allowed methods under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.10-416.3, which discuss manner of service of summons. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 allows service by mail in a similar fashion to the second alternative allowed in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40: A summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of the notice and acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30(a).) Though there are differences between the two Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.30 and 415.40, the Court finds case law on Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 helpful for the issue of whether PO box service is allowed by code: The Judicial Council comment following Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50 states service by mail is not required "where a defendant's whereabouts and his dwelling house or usual place of abode, etc. cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence." (Judicial Council of Cal. com., Deering's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1991 ed.) § 415.50, p. 676.) However, we do not read this comment to exclude service by mail in the instant case. Although respondent could not ascertain appellant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode," we believe the post office box falls into the "etc." category. (See Donel Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 327 [150 Cal. Rptr. 855] [where mailing of summons is reasonably feasible, any method of service less likely to provide actual notice is insufficient]; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 315-318 [94 L. Ed. 865, 873-876, 70 S. Ct. 652] [for the same proposition]; see also U.S. v. $84,740.00 U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1402 [in addition to service by publication, the government served defendants with a forfeiture complaint by sending two certified letters to defendants' post office box].) Our finding a post office box is a sufficient address for compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30 also is supported by case law interpreting the statutory predecessor to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50. Former Code of Civil Procedure section 413 required "a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited in the post office, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence. . . ." (Italics added.) At least two courts defined the term "residence" not as the defendant's abode, but rather as "the address at which letters would be most likely to reach the defendant." ( Sousa v. Freitas (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 663 [89 Cal. Rptr. 485]; cf. San Diego Sav. Bank v. Goodsell (1902) 137 Cal. 420, 427 [70 P. 299].) This interpretation of "residence" is relevant to our holding a post office box is a sufficient address for service under Code of Civil Procedure 415.30 because it demonstrates how statutory language and judicial comments should be read to achieve the statute's fundamental objective of serving notice on the defendant. Whenever possible, a statute should be interpreted as broadly as necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose. (See generally, S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 [interpreting language in Securities and Exchange Commision rule 10b-5 as broadly and as flexibly as necessary to accomplish the statute's purpose]; cf. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist . (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 408, 425 [261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 777 P.2d 157] [where a statute has two possible interpretations, courts should apply the more reasonable of the two].) ( Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 740, 745-46.) Thus, it appears when taking case law, statute, and the context of the mailed service into consideration, that Plaintiff has not effected service in a way that is authorized by California law. That is, Plaintiff has sent a copy of the summons and of the complaint to Diane Merrit at an address that is not associated with Society Ventures. The address associated with Society Ventures is 3500 Lennox Rd., Atlanta, GA 30326. (See Stewart Decl. 3, Exh. B.) The Court notes that the declaration provided by Jessie Stewart (Stewart), the manager of Society Ventures, states that Diane Merritts only authority was to conduct the trustee sales related to the Subject Property and Diane Merrit has no connection with the 8549 Wilshire Blvd. address other than its association with the one time public/private lien sale pursuant to UCC. (See Stewart Decl. ¿¿ 5-7.) Service on a corporation must be to (1) the person designated as agent for service of process as provided by any provision in Section 202, 1502, 2105, or 2107 of the Corporations Code (or Sections 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code, as in effect on December 31, 1976, with respect to corporations to which they remain applicable); (2) the president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.; (3) if the corporation is a bank, to a cashier or assistant cashier or to a person specified in subdivision (a) or (b); and (4) if authorized by any provision in Section 1701, 1702, 2110, or 2111 of the Corporations Code (or Sections 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code, as in effect on December 31, 1976, with respect to corporations to which they remain applicable), as provided by that provision. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10.) The registered agent for Society Ventures is Stewart. (See Stewart Decl. 3, Exh. B.) Plaintiffs Opposition, including the requests for judicial notice, does not address Society Ventures Georgia address or its agent for service of process on file with Georgias Secretary of State. As such, Plaintiffs Opposition does not affect the Courts analysis. As presented, the Summons and Complaint have been (1) served on an individual that is not authorized to accept service on behalf of Society Ventures in violation of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10; (2) served at an in-state address by mail only in violation of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40. Service; and served at an address that is not associated with Society Ventures. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED. ----- Conclusion Specially appearing defendant Society Ventures, LLCs Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint is GRANTED.

Case Number: 23SMCV05304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 CARL BARNEY , Plaintiff, v. SIENNA CHARLES, LLC, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 3 S M CV 0 5 304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BACKGROUND Th is is a breach of contract and fraud case . Defendants Sienna Charles LLC and Jaclyn Sienna India-Reinert (Ms. India) provide bespoke travel services for high-wealth individuals . (First Amended Complaint (FAC ) ¶8.) In mid-2021, Plaintiff Carl Barney desired to obtain the services of a high level, full service VIP travel agency to arrange all of the details f or his three-week trip to Europe. ( Id. ¶9.) He therefore spoke with Defendants about their services . ( Id. ¶10.) Ms. India assured Plaintiff that she knew how to get her clients access to exclusive experiences that would otherwise be unavailable to them . She claimed, in writing and orally, to be able to provide extraordinary private travel and the ability for Plaintiff to access top experts for his vacations. ( Id. ¶10.) Relying on these oral representations, Plaintiff paid $75,000 for the Europe trip and multiple additional trips he desired to have planned over a one year period (July 1 st Agreement) . H e describes the July 1 st A greement as a partially oral and partially written agreement to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Under the July 1 st Agreement, Defendants were to provide Plaintiff access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb[ ] the globe consistently procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living. ( Id. ¶20.) Plaintiff claims Defendants breached the July 1 st Agreement by their poor planning and lack of communication, an d Plaintiffs staff was forced to clean up their messes . ( Id. ¶13.) Specif i cally, Plaintiffs staff was forced to book VIP suites, arrange last minute flights that could have been scheduled weeks in advance and book other appointments for things such as required Covid-19 testing . ( Id. ) Pursuant to the July 1 st Agreement, Plaintiff then sought to use Defendants services for a three - week trip to the Middle East . ( Id. ¶14.) Plaintiff asked Defendants to prepare a proposed itinerary by September 7, 2021 . ( Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants ignored the re quest , instead providing a proposed agenda on September 14, 2021 which failed to include any specific dates (or even number of days) for visiting any of the countries and no details of available a ctivities that Defendants could curate . ( Id. ) This action ensued . The operative first amended complaint (FAC) alleges claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) fraud, (3) unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust and (4) unfair business practices . This hearing is on Defendants demurrer to and motion to strike the complaint . Defendant s demurrer is based on the grounds that (1) the FAC does not allege any actual contract or contractual terms; (2) Defendants alleged breach of contract doesnt equal fraud , and Plaintiff has not plead fraud with specificity ; (3) unjust enrichment is a mere remedy, not a valid cause of action; (4) the FAC doesnt identify any specific funds on which to impose a constructive trust, and (5) Plaintiff has no valid claim for unfair business practices . Defendants also move to strike (1) Plaintiffs punitive damages allegations because Plaintiffs fraud claim fails, and (2) any claim for money damages in connection with Plaintiffs claim for unfair business practices because under the unfair competition law, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief . LEGAL STANDARD [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable . (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading . (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) MEET AND CONFER Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).) Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (C ode C iv. P roc. §§ 430.41(a)(3) , 435.5(a)(3) .) Defendant s submit the Declaration of Kenneth Ruttenberg which attests the parties met and conferred by telephone on May 2 2 , 2024 , more than five days before the demurrer and motion to strike was filed (on May 28, 2024 ) . This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 and 435.5. Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not complied with the meet and confer requirements . Plaintiff, however, fails to explain why that is so . In any event, the Court cannot overrule a demurrer or deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient meet and confer . ( Code Civ. Proc. §§430.41 (a)(4) and 435.5 (a)(4) . ) DISCUSSION Breach of Contract Defendant s demur to the breach of contract claim on the ground that the contract terms are so vague that no one could judge whether Defendants supposedly breach those terms . The Court agrees . The Complaint alleges that i n exchange for $75,000, Defendants were to provide full service planning and implementation of travel itineraries over the course of one year from July 1, 2021 through June 20, 2022. ( FAC ¶ 22.) Defendants promised to provide access to the most exclusive luxury travel and lifestyle services available in the world and to comb the globe consistently, procuring only the best in ultra-luxury living for Plaintiff for one year . ( Id. ¶ 22.) These terms are too vague to determine whether a breach has occurred . It is not clear what full service planning entails . And t here is no basis to judge whether the luxury travel Defendants provided were the most exclusive or constituted the best in ultra luxury living. These promises are not definite enough to determine the scope of Defendants obligations or the limits of their performance . Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the breach of contract claim with leave to amend . Fraud Defendant s demur to Plaintiffs fraud claim as duplicative of the contract claim, as insufficiently plead and as failing to allege an intent not to perform . The Court agrees on the last ground . To allege promissory fraud, Plaintiff must plead Defendants made promises that they had no intention of performing . ( Lazar v. Super. Court (1996) 12 Cal.4 th 631, 638.) The fact that a promise was made and not fulfilled is insufficient to establish fraud by false promise . ( Tenzer v. Superscope (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 31.) Rather, something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendants intent not to perform his promise. ( Id. ) Making a promise with an honest but unreasonable intent to perform is wholly different from making one with no intent to perform and, therefore, does not constitute a false promise. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4 th 153, 159.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a showing that Defendants did not intend to perform on their promises at the time they made them . In fact, the FAC alleges partial performance by Defendants . (FAC ¶¶ 16, 18.) The fact that Defendants partially performed undercut s any claim they did not intend to perform at the time they made their promises . ( Castaic Vil lage Ctr . LLC v. Gymcheer USA, Inc. , 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 6377 at *5 (partial performance negate s an intent not to perform). ) Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs fraud claim withoug leave to amend . Unjust Enrichment Defendant demurs to the unjust enrichment claim on the ground it is a remedy and not a cause of action . Plaintiff argues it has not asserted an unjust enrichment claim . The caption to its complaint, however, characterizes its third cause of action as an unjust enrichment claim and imposition of constructive trust . This may have been a clerical error and a holdover from the prior complaint . A s Plaintiff maintains he is not asserting an unjust enrichment claim, the demurrer to the unjust enrichment claim is moot . Constructive Trust Defendant demurs to the constructive trust claim on the ground Plaintiff does not allege a specific identifiable property interest because money is fungible . The Court agrees . A prerequisite to the imposition of a constructive trust is the identification of a specific property belonging to the claimant . ( Korea Supply Co. V. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4 th 1134, 1150.) A constructive trust requires money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff [which can] clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant s possession. ( Id. ) A constructive trust is available where the specific res or funds can be identified and attached, but not where the plaintiff seeks to impose general personal liability as a remedy for the defendant s monetary obligations. ( Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee of United Ass'n Local Union No. 675 v. Foster (9 th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 1234, 1238 . ) In other words, a constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy for a claim that is essentially one for money damages , as is the case here . Further, constructive trust is not a cause of action per se, but an equitable remedy . ( Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82; see also Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1332 (constructive trust is an equitable remedy); PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398 (constructive trust is a remedy); Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 (constructive trust is a remedy). Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to the constructive trust claim without leave to amend . Unfair Business Practices Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 (UCL) fails because Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of any law . The Court agrees . UCL prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. Here, t he FAC alleges that Defendants violated the UCL prohibition against engaging in an unlawful act or practice by the conduct described above. (FAC ¶ 41.) To state a cause of action based on an unlawful business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law . ( People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 635; Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 608, 618.) Plaintiff has not identified any underlying law that was violated . In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants conduct also constituted unfair and fraudulent business practices . While Plaintiff did not allege this theory in his Complaint, the C ourt is not¿limited to plaintiff s theory of recovery in testing the sufficiency of their¿complain t against a¿demurrer, but instead must determine if the¿ factual ¿allegations of the complaint are¿adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (¿ Barquis¿ v. ¿Merchants Collection Assn . (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 103 .)¿ Mistaken labels and confusion of legal theory are not fatal; if appellant s complaint states a cause of action on any theory, he is entitled to introduce evidence thereon. ( Porten¿ v. ¿University of San Francisco ¿(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 833 .) California courts have not uniformly settled on a single approach to defining 'unfair' business practices in a consumer action under the UCL . Prior to 1999, California courts applied what is known as the balancing test. Courts defined unfair business practices as those offend[ ing ] an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers, or where the utility of the defendant s conduct does not outweigh the gravity of the harm to the victim . ( Cel-Tech Commc ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co. (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 163, 18 4 .) Under the balancing test, a determination of unfairness involves an examination of [the practice s] impact on its alleged victim, balanced against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer. ( McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1473¿(internal citations omitted) .) In 1999, the California Supreme Court rejected that test and held that a finding of unfairness must instead be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition. ¿ ( Cel-Tech , 20 Cal. 4th at 186-87 . ) The¿ Cel-Tech ¿court, however, expressly declined to extend this¿standard to consumer actions.¿ ( Id. ¿at 187 n.12 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a threatened impact on competition and has not alleged facts that would meet the balancing test . For example, Plaintiff does not allege that D efendants conduct was not motivated by legitimate business or economic need or that the harm and adverse impact of Defendants conduct outweighed these needs . Accordingly , P laintiff has not stated a UCL claim based on either test for unfairness . To state a claim under the fraudulent prong of the¿UCL, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be¿deceived.¿( Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct. (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267.) The determination as to whether a business practice is deceptive is based on the likely effect such [a] practice would have on a reasonable¿consumer. ( McKell, 142 Cal.App.4th at 1471 .) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that members of the public were likely to be deceived by Defendants conduct . Accordingly , Plaintiff has not met the fraudulent prong of the UCL. Accordingly , the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs UCL claim with leave to amend . Punitive Damages Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged fraud and therefore cannot seek punitive damages . As the Court concludes Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a fraud claim, punitive damages are unavailable . Money Damages for UCL Claim Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover damages for his UCL claim . The Court agrees. Under the UCL, a plaintiff is entitled only to restitution and injunctive relief; he may not recover damages . ( Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal.4 th at 1144.) Plaintiff seeks money damages for his UCL claim . ( FAC at p.10 lines 16-19.) Accordingly , the Court will strike the prayer for money damages as to the UCL claim . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Defendant s demurrer with 20 days leave to amend and DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART their motion to strike with out leave to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 9 , 202 4 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV07444 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Nicole Management, LLC v. B-Side Group, LLC CASE NO.: 23STCV07444 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Nicole Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 04/03/23: Complaint filed. · 10/17/23: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an action for breach of a rental contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay rent on a commercial lease agreement. Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. DISCUSSION: Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. // Legal Standard Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(a).) However, parties seeking to file untimely compulsory cross-complaints may file with the Court for leave to do so, even though the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.) In such a case, after notice to the adverse party, the Court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint if the party acted in good faith. This section is liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. ( Id .) The purpose of the compulsory cross-complaint statute is to prevent piecemeal litigation. ( Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) Compulsory cross-complaints consist of those causes of action existing at the time of service of the answer that the defendant must bring against the plaintiff, or else forfeit the right to bring them in any other action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30(a).) Specifically, compulsory cross-complaints consist of the causes of action that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).) To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term transactionit is not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . . . but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated. ( Align Technology , supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 960.) Thus, a motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint at any time during the action must be granted where forfeiture would otherwise result, unless the moving party engaged in bad faith conduct. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.) The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid.; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902 [We conclude that this principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section].) Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith. ( Silver Organizations Ltd, supra , 217 Cal.App.3d at 99 ) Rather, bad faith is defined as [t]he opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . . , but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. ( Id. at 100.) Whether Claims are Compulsory Defendants seek leave to file a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and new parties Masoud and Ramin Omrany alleging fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and related claims arising from the same rental agreement that is the basis of the original Complaint in this action. (Declaration of Rachel A. Baker ISO Mot. Exh. A.) Defendants counsel states that the proposed cross-complaint is substantively identical to the October 17, 2023 Cross-Complaint stricken by the Court. (Baker Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that B-Side is not entitled to pursue a cross-complaint in this action and that Defendants have not explained what discovery gave rise to their crossclaims. Neither argument is persuasive. First, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, B-Side Group is not named as a party on the proposed Cross-Complaint. (Baker Decl. Exh.1.) Second, no explanation of the facts giving rise to the crossclaim is required in the context of a compulsory cross-complaint. Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith with substantial evidence, the Court is obliged to grant a motion for leave to file an untimely cross-complaint. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902.) Plaintiff has made no such affirmative showing. Defendants motion must therefore be granted, as the proposed crossclaims are compulsory on their face. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. Moving Parties to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 23STCV27404 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 74 Living the Dream v. Hargrove et al. Defendants / Cross-Complainants Motion for an Order Compelling Plaintiff to Return Cross-Complainants Security Deposit or, Alternatively Deposit It With the Court BACKGROUND Plaintiff Living the Dream, a California Corporation, sued defendants Steven Hargrove and Jessica Hargrove on November 8, 2023, asserting a single cause of action for breach of a written lease. Plaintiff alleges it leased Defendants a property located at 526 Chalette Dr., Beverly Hills, (the Property), for a term of one year beginning May 11, 2023. (Compl., ¶¶ 9-10; Cross-Compl., ¶ 1.) Defendants agreed to pay monthly rent of $39,000.00. (Compl., ¶ 10.) Defendants also posted a security deposit of $117,000. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) As alleged, Defendants vacated the rented property (Property) in August 2023 and stopped paying rent. ( Id. , ¶¶ 16-17.) Also, upon retaking possession of the Property, Plaintiff discovered the Property had suffered damage in excess of the $117,000.00 security deposit. ( Id. , ¶¶ 17-19.) Plaintiff sued. On February 23, 2024, Defendants cross-complained against Plaintiff for (1) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) constructive eviction, (4) fraud and deceit, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) unlawful retention of a security deposit. Defendants argue Plaintiff misrepresented the Property as a luxury rental with numerous amenities. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 8-9.) But when Defendants moved in, they discovered many or most of the advertised amenities were not present or not properly maintained. (Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 10-19.) The Property also allegedly suffered from susbtandard conditions such as leaky plumbing and exposed electrical wiring. ( Ibid. ) On May 21, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to return their security deposit to them or deposit it with the Court. Defendants argue the security deposit was delivered to Plaintiff as trustee and Plaintiffs right to retain it has not been perfected, so it should be returned or deposited pending a dispositive ruling. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed its opposition. On July 1, 2024, Defendants replied. LEGAL STANDARD ¿¿ When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a party to the action, that he or she has in his or her possession, or under his or her control, any money or other thing capable of delivery, which, [1] being the subject of litigation, is held by him or her as trustee for another party, or which [2] belongs or which is due to another party or which [3] should, under the circumstances of the case be held by the court pending final disposition of the action, the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in court or delivered to such party, upon those conditions that may be just, subject to the further direction of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 572, bracketed numerals and emphasis added.) DISCUSSION It is undisputed that Plaintiff refused to return Defendants $117,000 security deposit based on the unpaid rent and property damages Plaintiff alleges in its complaint. Defendants argue Plaintiff could have withheld their security deposit on this basis if it had complied with the procedures prescribed in Civil Code section 1950.5. But Plaintiff admits it did not; because it did not, it lost its right to withhold, and it must return the deposit and seek damages independently after it returns Defendants deposit. In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendants cannot satisfy any of the three disjunctive conditions in Code of Civil Procedure section 572. The Court finds Defendants have satisfied at least the second condition in section 572: that Defendants have demonstrated, or Plaintiffs have conceded, a present right to the security deposit at issue. Defendants have demonstrated, via admissions in Plaintiffs complaint and in its responses to discovery, that Plaintiff failed to comply with Civil Code section 1950.5. Section 1950.5 governs a landlords right to withhold a deposit, which reads (as relevant here): No later than 21 calendar days after the tenant has vacated the premises, ... the landlord shall furnish the tenant, by personal delivery or by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a copy of an itemized statement indicating the basis for, and the amount of, any security received and the disposition of the security, and shall return any remaining portion of the security to the tenant. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(g)(1).) Plaintiff concedes in its Complaint that it withheld Defendants deposit. (Compl., ¶ 19 [seeking damages less the amount of the security deposit].) In its discovery responses, submitted by Defendants in support of their motion, Plaintiff confirms that it sent them the itemized statement described in section 1950.5 (1950.5 Statement) on September 22, 2023, no less than twenty-two days after Defendants vacated the premises. (See Mot, Exh. C, 4:19-20 [[T]he itemized statement of damages was deposited with the US Postal Service on September 22, 2023.].) If, within the specified period, the landlord has not provided the tenant with a written accounting of the portion of the security deposit he plans to retain, the right to retain all or part of the security deposit under section 1950.5, subdivision (f), has not been perfected, and he must return the entire deposit to the tenant. ( Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 745 ( Granberry ).) Granberry , supra , affirms that a landlord may assert a claim for damages as Plaintiff does here whether or not it withholds a deposit. ( Ibid. ) But as relevant to this motion, it also holds that the landlord must return the deposit in the interim if he fails to provide a 1950.5 Statement, whether or not he decides to sue. Plaintiff did not provide a timely 1950.5 notice; it must return the deposit, even though it has also sued Defendants. As an evidentiary matter, Plaintiff claims Defendants cannot avail themselves of Code of Civil Procedure section 572 unless they show Plaintiff clearly admitted ... in [its] pleading that Defendants are entitled to the deposit. ( Ex parte Elias (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 262, 273.) Not so. Defendants may show either that Plaintiff admitted their right to the deposit in his pleading, or if it has been otherwise shown in some proceeding in the cause[.] ( Ibid. ) Defendants evidence shows and Plaintiff does not factually contest that Plaintiff did not provide a timely 1950.5 Statement. Although Plaintiff may eventually recover as much as or more than the security deposit in damages, it has forfeited its right to hold the deposit in the interim. Defendants motion is granted. The Court will order Plaintiff to deliver the balance of Defendants deposit to Defendants and/or their counsel within thirty (30) days of this ruling. CONCLUSION Defendants motion is granted. Plaintiff ordered to deliver the balance of the security deposit to Defendants and/or their counsel within thirty (30) days of this ruling. Plaintiff shall give notice.

Case Number: 24NWCV00981 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Cerritos Retail Centercal, LLC vs. Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, Case No. 24NWCV00981 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendant moves ex parte to advance the hearing on the motion to set aside, which is currently set for August 7, 2024. Default judgment was entered on June 14, 2024. Defendant was served a five-day notice to vacate on July 2, 2024. Defendant filed the instant motion on Monday, July 8, 2024. Defendant argues that it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware that it had to answer within five days. On May 29, 2024, the Court issued the following order: [T]he Court conferred with Plaintiffs Counsel, Nahal Zarnighian. There was no appearance by Defendant. The Court stated that it had reviewed Defendants motion to set aside default and was inclined to grant the motion under CCP § 473, subd. (b). Defendant appears to argue that it relied upon a tentative ruling posted by the Court which granted Defendant an opportunity to file a Supplemental Reply by May 14, 2024. Defendant denies having received notice of the Courts final order requiring Defendant to Answer within 5 days. Given the Courts inclination with respect to Defendants motion to set aside default, and in an effort to expedite these proceedings, Plaintiffs Counsel had no opposition to the Court advancing Defendants motion to be heard today. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ex parte application to shorten time for hearing on Defendants motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendants motion to set aside default is ADVANCED to todays date and GRANTED. The demurrer filed on May 20, 2024 is STRICKEN because it was filed when Defendant was still in default. The hearing on Defendants demurrer is ADVANCED to todays date and taken OFF-CALENDAR. Defendant is ORDERED to file and serve an answer or other responsive pleading within 5 days. Clerk to give notice. The Court orders the default entered on 05/16/2024 as to Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, a California limited liability company vacated. Certificate of Mailing is attached. (5/29/24 Minute Order.) In the instant ex parte application, Defendant claims it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware it had to answer within 5 days. However, the minute order reflects that the Clerk provided notice of the Courts ruling to the parties. Moreover, the argument Defendant makes here is the same one it made in its previous motion to set aside default. The Court granted the previous ex parte application. With respect to the instant motion, the Court determines that Defendants claim of ignorance is not supported by the record and is made solely for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, the ex parte application is DENIED. Clerk to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV28088 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 May 20 July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV28088 MOTION : Motion for Attorneys Fees MOVING PARTY: Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC OPPOSING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC MOTIONS Plaintiffs Mohill Holdings, LP and MO Foundation Holdings, LLC (Plaintiffs) dismissed their claims against Defendant LA-Fig Parking Lot Lessee, LLC (Defendant). Now, Defendant seeks attorney fees . Plaintiff opposes the motion. ANALYSIS The parties disagree as to whether this case is a contract or tort action. In a contract action, [w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed . . . , there shall be no prevailing party . . . . (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(2).) Plaintiffs complaint in this action is for unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint on February 21, 2024. As such, Plaintiffs argue Defendant is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to attorney fees. However, Plaintiffs claims do not constitute an action on the contract. [T]he unlawful detainer statute encompasses breach of lease (arguably contract-type matters) and holdover possession after expiration of the lease (arguably a noncontract issue). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp . (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074.) In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims are based on Defendants holdover possession and are, therefore, noncontractual. Plaintiffs claim Defendant failed to surrender the premises after Plaintiffs served Defendant with a notice to quit. The 30-day notice to quit attached to the complaint does not identify any breach of the lease, rather it informs Defendant the month-to-month tenancy is terminated, and Defendant is required to quit and surrender possession of the premises. (See Complaint, filed November 13, 2023, Exhibit 2.) As such, Plaintiffs claims did not sound in contract. Thus, the prohibition on an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1777 for the voluntary dismissal of the complaint does not apply. The court determines Defendant is a prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). ( Drybread v. Chipain Chiropractic Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1077.) The prevailing party must seek an award of attorney fees through the filing of a noticed motion and bears the burden of proof to justify the amount sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(A).) Defendant seeks an award of $50,000 in attorney fees. Defendant has not, however, advanced any billing records to support this amount. The court considers a request for attorney fees based on careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved. ( Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 626, fn. 6, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Without such evidence, the court cannot grant Defendants request for attorney fees. Defendant cites Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, which is not on point. In that case, the Court of Appeal stated, An attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records. ( Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co . (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.) The court also noted the attorneys declaration in that case included detailed evidence of hours spent, tasks concluded, and billing rates. ( Ibid. ) In the instant case, Defendant does not present any evidence of the number of hours Defendants attorneys billed on the matter, the specific nature of the services they provided, or the specific tasks that were completed. Defendant advances a declaration of its attorney, Navi Signh Dhillon (Dhillon) who simply states, I reviewed the billing records for this matter and I am confident that the number of hours billed are commensurate with the tasks performed. (Declaration of Navi Singh Dhillon, ¶ 7.) Dhillon does not aver to the number of hours he and/or any other attorney worked on this case nor the specific tasks that were performed. Although Dhillon suggests he has discounted the number of hours worked by as much as a half of the hours expended in the case and is, therefore, seeking only $50,000 for 50 hours of work at $1,000 an hour, that is not a sufficient accounting. Moreover, he has not established a billing rate of $1000 an hour in an unlawful detainer action is a reasonable hourly rate that is in keeping with the industry standard in Los Angeles. Defendant fails to present evidence to support the requested fees. Accordingly, the motion for attorney fees is denied without prejudice. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.

Case Number: 24PSCV00472 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: G Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLCs Application for Default Judgment Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLCs Application for Default Judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $43,403.67. BACKGROUND This is an unlawful detainer action. In February 2023, Plaintiff Gershman Properties, LLC (Gershman) entered into a written lease agreement with Defendant CH Glendora, LLC (CH Glendora) in which Gershman agreed to lease commercial property in Glendora to CH Glendora. Subsequently, Gershman alleges CH Glendora breached the lease agreement by failing to pay rent. On January 24, 2024, Gershman served a three day notice to pay rent or quit on CH Glendora. CH Glendora subsequently failed to pay rent or vacate the Glendora property. On February 7, 2024, Gershman filed a complaint against CH Glendora and Does 1-30, alleging a cause of action for unlawful detainer. On March 1, 2024, Gershmans process server served CH Glendora by posting notice at the Glendora property. On March 19, 2024, the Court entered default against CH Glendora after CH Glendora failed to file a timely answer. On March 25, 2024, the Court granted a default judgment for Gershman on the issue of possession only. On May 17, 2024, Gershman submitted the present application for default judgment. A case management conference is set for July 9, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has filed to timely respond or appear. A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under CCP § 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (7) exhibits as necessary; and (8) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Gershman seeks default judgment against CH Glendora in the total amount of $43,403.68, including $40,476.72 in damages, $1,604.31 in attorney fees, and $1,322.65 in costs. Because the Court finds Gershman has submitted sufficient evidence, the Court GRANTS Gershmans application for default judgment with the following modification. While Gershman requests $1,604.31 in attorney fees, the correct calculation of attorney fees pursuant to Local Rule 3.214 is $1,604.30. Accordingly, the total requested damages will be reduced to $43,403.67. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Gershmans application for default judgment is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $43,403.67.