Chase Bank Usa N A Vs Steve Carty

Case Number: 22STLC01266 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 26 State Farm v. Soto, et al. VACATE DISMISSAL AND ENTER JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO STIPULATION (CCP § 664.6) TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR AND AGAINST DEFENDANT LLUVIA NORIKO SOTO IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,303.11 PRINCIPAL, PLUS $456.15 COSTS. ANALYSIS: On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed this subrogation action against Defendant Lluvia Noriko Soto (Defendant). Defendant filed an answer on July 25, 2022. On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a copy of the parties settlement agreement with a request for dismissal and retention of jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. The Court dismissed the action pursuant to the stipulation on the same date. (Order for Dismissal, 11/21/23.) On April 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Vacate Dismissal, Enforce Settlement, and Enter Judgment. To date, no opposition has been filed. Legal Standard The instant motion is brought under Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6, which states in relevant part: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).) Prior to January 1, 2021, parties under section 664.6 meant the litigants themselves, not their attorneys. ( Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586.) The current statute provides that parties includes an attorney who represents the party and an insurers agent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (b).) The settlement must include the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement, and against whom enforcement is sought. ( J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.) P laintiff has demonstrated the settlement agreement complies with the statutory requirements set forth above because it was signed by both parties and their attorneys. (Motion, Benson Decl., Exh. 1, p. 4.) Furthermore, the request for retention of jurisdiction must be made in writing, by the parties, before the action is dismissed for the Courts retention of jurisdiction to conform to the statutory language. ( Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 433 [If, after a suit has been dismissed, a party brings a section 664.6 motion for a judgment on a settlement agreement but cannot present to the court a request for retention of jurisdiction that meets all of these requirements, then enforcement of the agreement must be left to a separate lawsuit.].) The parties request for retention of jurisdiction complies with these requirements because it was made in writing to the Court before the action was dismissed. (Motion, Benson Decl., Exh. 1, ¶10.) The settlement provides that Defendant would pay Plaintiff $4,905.70 through an initial payment from Defendants insurer of $4,305.70, followed by Defendants monthly payments starting on October 1, 2023. ( Id . at Exh. 1, ¶2.) The settlement agreement also provides that upon Defendants default, Plaintiff may seek judgment in the demand of the Complaint ($5,608.81), plus costs of suit and prejudgment interest, less any monies paid. ( Id . at ¶¶1, 6.) Payments of $4,305.70 were made towards the settlement, after which Defendant defaulted. ( Id . at ¶¶6-7 and Exh. 2.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment against Defendant in the amount of $1,303.11 principal ($5,608.81 - $4,305.70) plus costs of $456.15. ( Id . at ¶10.) Conclusion Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR AND AGAINST DEFENDANT LLUVIA NORIKO SOTO IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,303.11 PRINCIPAL, PLUS $456.15 COSTS. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 22STCV02823 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 52 Plaintiff Maneesh Bansals Motion to Disqualify Counsel Plaintiff Maneesh Bansal, M.D. moves to disqualify Michael W. Caspino and Forward Counsel LLP from representing defendants Arunpal Sehgal, M.D. and Paramjot Mann, M.D. Plaintiff contends Forward Counsel LLP must be automatically disqualified due to simultaneous adverse representation. Generally, there is a per se rule requiring disqualification of an attorney or a law firm when there is a conflict of interest based upon concurrent representation of multiple clients. [Citations.] This is the case irrespective of whether the representation of one client has anything to do with the representation of the other client. ( MGuinness v. Johnson (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 602, 625.) Plaintiff does not show Forward Counsel simultaneously represents adverse clients. Forward Counsel currently represents Shelby Hospitality, LLC (Shelby) in another action (the Shelby Litigation). (Bansal Decl., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff is one of three managing members of Shelby. ( Id. , ¶¶ 3-4.) Shelby has nine members: one LLC and eight individuals, including plaintiff. ( Id. , ¶ 4.) Shelbys operating agreement provides that, when it was executed in 2018, the LLC and five of the eight individuals had 10% membership interests, Bansal and two other individuals had an 11.1% interest, and the final member had a 16.67% interest. ( Id. , Ex. A, p. 13.) Representing Shelby does not mean Forward Counsel represents plaintiff himself. Generally, when representing a corporation, an attorneys client is the corporate entity, not individual shareholders or directors, and the individual shareholders or directors cannot presume that corporate counsel is protecting their interests. [Citation.] An attorney representing a corporation does not become the representative of its stockholders merely because the attorneys actions on behalf of the corporation also benefit the stockholders; as attorney for the corporation, counsels first duty is to the corporation. ( Sprengel v. Zbylut (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1042 ( Sprengel ).) Representing an entity, however, may create an implied attorney-client relationship with its individual owners. ( Sprengel, supra , 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1043.) When assessing the existence of an implied attorney-client relationship between a corporate attorney and the entitys individual members, the key inquiry is whether the totality of the circumstances implies an agreement that the corporate attorney will not act adversely to the individual shareholders interests with respect to the issues in dispute. ( Id. at p. 1047 .) The court must assess whether the parties conducted themselves in a way that would reasonably cause a shareholder to believe the attorney would protect the shareholders individual interests. ( Ibid. ) When determining this issue, courts consider factors including [t]he type and size of the entity, the nature and scope of the attorneys engagement, [t]he kind and extent of contacts, if any, between the attorney and the individual owner, and the attorneys access to information (e.g., partnership financial information) relating to the individual. ( Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1733 ( Responsible Citizens ).) The evidence in the record does not show that, under the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff reasonably believed Forward Counsel would protect his individual interests. The type and size of Shelby Hospitality, LLC do not support that conclusion. One primary purpose of a limited liability company is to limit the individual members liability for the companys debts. An LLCs debts or liabilities are solely the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the limited liability company (Corp. Code, § 17703.04(a)(1)) and do not become the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or manager acting as a manager for the limited liability company ( id. , subd. (a)(2)). Shelby has nine members. (Bansal Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff does not identify his current membership interest in Shelby, but he owned 11.1% of the company when it was formed. ( Id. , Ex. A, p. 13.) In contrast, in Responsible Citizens , the individual moving for disqualification was one of two partners in a general partnership. ( Responsible Citizens, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 1722 [remanding issue to trial court]) In Sprengel , the individual was one of two members who each owned 50 percent of a limited liability company. ( Sprengel, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033 [affirming summary judgment of malpractice action].) Plaintiffs interest in Shelby is far smaller. The nature and scope of the engagement also do not support the finding that Forward Counsel represents Bansal. Shelby operates a hotel. (Bansal Decl., ¶ 3.) Forward Counsel is defending Shelby in an action by a corporation that unsuccessfully tried to purchase the hotel property before Shelby purchased 83.33% of it. ( Id. , Ex. B, Complaint in Bhuvneshwari Corp. v. Ken Pansurai, et al. , ¶¶ 16-31.) The retainer agreement between Forward Counsel and Shelby states the Engagement is only for the persons or entities identified in the incorporated Letter Agreement which only lists Shelby (along with nonparties Fine Hospitality and Eurocan) and does not mention Bansal. (Caspino Decl., ¶ 9.) It further provides, Unless expressly agreed in writing, the Firm is not undertaking the representation of any related or affiliated person or entity& nor any of your or their officers, directors, shareholders, managers, members, agents, partners, or employees. ( Ibid. ) Nothing about the nature and scope of the representation involves plaintiffs individual interests. It only impacts him incidentally as a member of the LLC. Plaintiff largely relies on the fact that Forward Counsel planned to prepare him for his deposition in the action against Shelby (before the deposition was postponed). (Bansal Decl., ¶¶ 12-14.) Preparing a witness for a deposition does not constitute personally representing the witness. Moreover, the email asking to prepare Bansal for his deposition was sent to five individual members of Shelby about their depositions. ( Id. , Ex. D.) Each deposition was scheduled for two hours. ( Ibid. ) Forward Counsel asked to have a short call with each witness only one to three days before their depositions and stated [e]ach call should not take more than 15-20 minutes. ( Ibid .) This email shows Forward Counsels plan to prepare plaintiff to testify at deposition was no different from how it treated four other members. A brief phone call to prepare for an unusually short deposition does not demonstrate any personal attorney-client relationship. Nothing in the circumstances would cause a reasonable person in plaintiffs shoes to believe Forward Counsel represents his personal interests. The only factor supporting a finding of concurrent adverse representation is the kind and extent of contacts between plaintiff and Forward Counsel. Plaintiff states he had at least four phone calls and videoconferences with Mr. Caspino (Bansal Decl., ¶ 9), and he exchanged at least 68 emails with Forward Counsel ( id. , ¶ 11). Plaintiff, however, explains the reason for having extensive communication with Forward Counsel. He states, I was elected by the non-interested members of Shelby (i.e., those without a personal interest in the Shelby Litigation) to represent their interests and deal with Forward Counsel and Mr. Caspino on their behalf. I am currently the only manager of Shelby that can make decisions for the entity without consideration of the needs and desires of the other two defendants, given that Gaurang Patel owns one of the named defendants and Nishant Karod is the business partner of another named defendant. I am the only manager or member of Shelby who has interacted with Forward Counsel on behalf of the non-interested members. ( Id. , ¶ 7.) He thus acknowledges he does not have a personal interest in the Shelby Litigation and interacts with Forward Counsel in his capacity as Shelbys managing member on behalf of Shelby and, in particular, the other non-interested members of Shelby. Except for being one of the three managing members, his relationship with Forward Counsel is the same as all the other individuals who own Shelby. None of these individuals, including Bansal, are parties in the Shelby Litigation and Forward Counsel does not represent them. Plaintiff also states he asked Caspino a personal legal question and requested advice on an issue personal to me in January 2023. (Bansal Decl., ¶ 12.) He did not explain the nature of the legal issue. Defendants show it was not personal. After the opposing counsel cancelled plaintiffs deposition, plaintiff wrote, Can we seek sanctions for this behavior. Scheduling a deposition takes time and planning. I have to reschedule my patients in clinic and cant switch schedules so capriciously. (Caspino Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Caspino replied, Absolutely. I am setting him up for this right now. ( Ibid. ) These emails involve at most a modicum of legal advice. The issue was plaintiffs frustration about how the litigation impacted his schedule as a practicing physician. Any witness, regardless of their relationship with Shelby or Forward Counsel, in plaintiffs shoes might share such frustration. And, as defendants argue, any sanctions would be paid to Shelby, not plaintiff, who is not a party to that action. Plaintiff does not identify any information relating to his individual interests that Forward Counsel can access. Under the circumstances, any information Forward Counsel has about Shelby only incidentally relates to plaintiff based on his status as one of its nine members. The totality of the circumstances does not imply an agreement that Forward Counsel would not act adversely to plaintiffs individual interests. Plaintiff states, I viewed Forward Counsel as my trusted lawyers. Forward Counsel has never communicated to me that it does not represent me or my interests. (Bansal Decl., ¶ 17.) His view was not reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. And Forward Counsel did expressly communicate that it does not represent him or his interests. It did so via the retainer agreement that serves as the basis for its relationship with Shelby (and therefore any resulting relationship with plaintiff). (Caspino Decl., ¶ 9.) That Bansal purportedly never saw a copy of the agreement until recently (Bansal Decl., ¶ 8) does not excuse him. An objectively reasonable member of Shelby Hospitality LLC would expect that the written contract between Shelby and Forward Counsel governs their relationship. Disposition Plaintiff Maneesh Bansal, M.D.s motion to disqualify counsel is denied . Defendants Arunpal Sehgal and Paramjot Manns Motion to Compel Arbitration Defendants/cross-complainants Arunpal Sehgal, M.D. and Paramjot Mann, M.D. move to compel arbitration of the entire action. A court may deny a motion to compel arbitration when [t]he right to compel arbitration has been waived. (CCP § 1281.2(a).) Defendants waived any right to compel arbitration of this action. [M]erely participating in litigation, by itself, does not result in a waiver. ( St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1203 ( St. Agnes ).) When determining waiver, courts consider factors including (1) whether the partys actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place. ( Id. at p. 1196, internal quotes omitted.) Defendants actions have been wholly inconsistent with the right to arbitrate. Before plaintiff filed this action, Bansal brought a demand for arbitration with JAMS against Sehgal in September 2021. (Beatty Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Rather than pursuing his counterclaims before JAMS, Sehgal demurred to the demand for arbitration on the basis that Bansals claim was not subject to arbitration. ( Id. , ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Before a ruling on the demurrer, the parties met and conferred and reached an agreement whereby Bansal agreed to voluntarily dismiss his Demand for Arbitration without prejudice and refile his claims in state court. ( Id. , ¶ 4.) Resisting arbitration and agreeing to proceed in court is a paradigmatic example of acts inconsistent with the right to arbitrate. Defendants conduct in this litigation has also been inconsistent with arbitration. They first appeared in this action by filing a case management statement on April 5, 2022. Defendants offer no explanation for not seeking to compel arbitration of this action until December 2023. Until filing this motion, defendants never indicated an intent to arbitrate. In their initial case management statement, defendants did not check the box indicating they were willing to arbitrate. (Apr. 5, 2022 Case Management Statement, ¶ 10.c(5).) Neither their demurrer to the initial complaint (Beatty Decl., Ex. E), answer to the first amended complaint ( id. , Ex. F), initial cross-complaint ( id. Ex. G), first amended cross-complaint ( id. , Ex. H), nor second amended cross-complaint ( id. , Ex. I) assert any demand to arbitrate. Defendants now argue, for the first time, the action is subject to arbitration. They seek to justify their change in position by arguing that plaintiffs initial demand for arbitration was different than plaintiffs operative complaint. But defendants initial cross-complaint alleges, Bansal initially filed a demand for arbitration asserting similar claims against Cross-Defendants as he alleges in this action. Cross-Complainant objected to arbitration. (Beatty Decl. . , Ex. G, ¶ 20.) Defendants substantially invoked the litigation machinery. Together, the two defendants have served three sets of Requests for Production of Documents (totaling 190 requests), two sets of Special Interrogatories (totaling 81 special interrogatories), two sets of Form Interrogatories, and two sets of Requests for Admission (totaling 43 requests). (Beatty Decl., ¶ 10, Exs. J-R.) They filed three motions to compel compliance with requests for production. ( Id. , ¶ 11, Exs. S & T.) In response to defendants requests for production, Bansal produced almost one million pages of documents. ( Id. , ¶ 12.) Furthermore, plaintiffs counsel states, Bansal has incurred more than $300,000 in attorneys fees in litigating this matter. ( Id. , ¶ 15.) The parties are well into preparation for the trial scheduled for July 28, 2025. Defendants also filed a cross-complaint (and two amended cross-complaints) without asking to stay this action. Plaintiff demonstrates that defendants delay has substantially prejudiced him. [C]ourts assess prejudice with the recognition that Californias arbitration statutes reflect a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution and are intended to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing. [Citation.] Prejudice typically is found only where the petitioning partys conduct has substantially undermined this important public policy or substantially impaired the other sides ability to take advantage of the benefits and efficiencies of arbitration. ( St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1204.) Such prejudice has occurred here. Beginning arbitration over two years after this action has been at issue and after extensive discovery, multiple discovery motions, and several demurrers would not be speedy or inexpensive. After considering all relevant factors, the court finds defendants waived any right to compel arbitration of this action. Plaintiff also argues defendants are judicially estopped from moving to compel arbitration. The court does not reach the issue. Disposition Defendants/cross-complainants Arunpal Sehgal, M.D. and Paramjot Mann, M.D.s motion to compel arbitration is denied .

Case Number: 20STCV46934 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 73 7/11/2024 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding BARRIOS v. TELACU NW FIVE, INC., et al. ( 20STCV46934 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Daniel Balaban (Balaban & Speilberger, LLP) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Benjamin Sampson (Bordin Semmer LLP) MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF RUDY ELIAS ( filed by Defendant Waste Management of California, Inc. on 04/04/24) TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Waste Management of Californias Motion to Compel Deposition of Rudy Elias is GRANTED. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. Moving party to give notice. BACKGROUND On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff Jerson Barrios (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Telacu NW Five, Inc.; Telacu 1270, Inc.; Telacu Development Corporation, Inc.; The East Los Angeles Community Union; Waste Management of California, Inc. (Waste Management); and Waste Management Collection and Recycling, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). The Complaint alleges that while in the course of Plaintiffs employment with Garibay Landscaping, Inc., Plaintiff sustained significant injuries during an incident on May 2, 2020. Plaintiff alleges he was standing on the outer ledges on the top of a dumpster, as he and others usually did, to empty the contents of the reusable trash bags full of leaves, shrubbery, branches, which was being handed to him by another member of the Garibay Landscaping crew. Plaintiff alleges he suddenly lost his balance and fell down to the ground hitting the back of his head, neck, back and the rest of his body onto the asphalt/concrete floor, suffering a skull fracture, respiratory failure, spinal injuries and shoulder abrasion, among other injuries. On April 4, 2024, Defendant Waste Management filed the instant Motion to Compel Witness Rudy Elias to Comply with the Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents. No opposition was filed. ANALYSIS Defendant Waste Management moves to compel the deposition of third-party witness Rudy Elias. A party may move to compel a non-partys compliance with a subpoena that requires the attendance of a witness. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.(a) Unlike a motion to compel a partys deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, the movant is not required to show good cause or include an accompanying meet and confer declaration. On February 12, 2024, Rudy Elias was served with a subpoena for his personal appearance at deposition which was set for March 21, 2024. Defendant Waste Management asserts that Mr. Elias testimony is highly relevant to this case. Plaintiff identified Mr. Elias as a post-incident employer, thus Defendant Waste Management argues Mr. Elias testimony is important for liability and damage-related issues. Defendant Waste Management contends that Mr. Elias never indicated he would not be able to appear. The Court notes that the motion is unopposed. Due to the lack of opposition, an inference is created that the motion is meritorious. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The Court GRANTS Defendant Waste Managements motion. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. CONCLUSION Defendant Waste Management of Californias Motion to Compel Deposition of Rudy Elias is GRANTED. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV21832 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV21832 MOTIONS : Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff A lex Omar Quevedo Herrera OPPOSING PARTY: N one BACKGROUND On September 11, 2023, Plaintiffs Maria B. Munoz de Cote Delgado, Alex Omar Quevedo Herrera, Stephanie Quevedo, Stacey Quevedo, and Alex Quevedo Jr. filed a complaint against Defendants Malek Zaki Shabbar, Shabbar Zaki Suleiman, Mona Shabbar, and Does 1 to 30 for injuries related to a motor vehicle accident. On August 13, 2023, Plaintiff Alex Quevedo Jr. (Decedent) passed away unrelated to injuries in this case. On June 10 2024, Plaintiff A lex Omar Quevedo Herrera (Herrera) filed the instant motion to amend the complaint and appoint Herrera as successor-in-interest to Alex Quevedo Jr. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD Amendment to Pleadings: General Provisions Under Code of Civil Procedure section 576, [a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order. Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: [t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.¿ The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.¿ This discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.¿( Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court ¿(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047.)¿ The Court of Appeal in Morgan v. Superior Court held If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. ( Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, citations omitted.) Moreover, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced by the amendment. ( Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [opposing party did not establish harm by the delay in moving to amend the complaint].) The court may grant leave to amend the pleadings at any stage of the action. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶ 6:636 (hereafter Weil & Brown).) Denial of a motion to amend is rarely justified if the motion is timely made and granting the motion will not prejudice the opposing party. ( Id . at ¶ 6:639, citations omitted.) However, if the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. ( Id . at ¶ 6:655, citations omitted. Absent prejudice, any claimed delay alone is not grounds for denial. If the delay in seeking the amendment has not misled or prejudiced the other side, the liberal policy of allowing amendments prevails. Indeed, it is an abuse of discretion to deny leave in such a case even if sought as late as the time of trial. ( Id . at ¶ 6:653 (citing Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565).) Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. . . . But the fact that the amendment involves a change in legal theory which would make admissible evidence damaging to the opposing party is not the kind of prejudice the court will consider. (Weil & Brown, supra , at ¶ 6:656, citations omitted.) Even if some prejudice is shown, the judge may still permit the amendment but impose conditions, as the Court is authorized to grant leave on such terms as may be proper. (Weil & Brown, supra , at ¶ 6:663, citation omitted.) For example, the court may cause the party seeking the amendment to pay the costs and fees incurred in preparing for trial. ( Id . at ¶ 6:664 (citing Fuller v. Vista Del Arroyo Hotel , 42 Cal.App.2d 400, 404).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324: Procedural Requirements Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must: (1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleadings, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. In addition, under Rule 3.1324(b), a motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies the following: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Successor in Interest California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.31 provides that the decedents personal representative or, if none, the decedents successor in interest may continue a decedents pending action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.30; see Adams v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 71, 78-79.) A successor in interest is the beneficiary of the decedents estate or other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular item of the property that is the subject of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.11.) Section 377.33 provides that the court in which an action is continued may make any order concerning parties that is appropriate to ensure proper administration of justice, including the appointment of the decedents successor in interest as a special administrator or guardian ad litem. Section 377.32 provides that a person who seeks to commence such an action as the decedents successor in interest must file an affidavit or declaration providing certain information, including the decedents name, date and place of decedents death, and statements regarding whether the estate has been administered and that the affiant or declarant is the successor in interest on decedents claim. ( Id ., § 377.32(a).) A certified copy of the decedents death certificate must also be attached to the affidavit or declaration. ( Id ., § 377.32(c).) DISCUSSION As an initial matter, the Declaration of Jazmin G. Barra, in support of this motion, does not state the effect of the amendment, why the amendment is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, or the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Moreover, the declaration does not state what allegations are proposed to be added or deleted to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located Nevertheless, the motion includes a copy of the proposed first amended complaint and asserts the amendment is solely to appoint Herrera as successor-in-interest for Decedent. The Declaration of Herrera does not state where Decedent died but includes a copy of his certified death certificate. (Exh. B.) However, the Herreras declaration states that Decedents mother (Maria B. Munoz De Cote Delgado) is also a potential successor-in-interest and has agreed to Herreras appointment. (Exh. C, Herrera Decl. ¶ 5.) No declaration by Maria B. Munoz De Cote Delgado attesting to that fact is provided. Because there is no declaration from Maria B. Munoz De Cote Delgado attesting that she has agreed to Herrera being appointed successor-in-interest, and Herreras declaration does not contain the place of Decedents death and does not provide specific facts regarding the assertions that no other person has a superior right to be substituted, the motion for leave to amend is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint is denied. Plaintiff to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 23NWCV03289 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C TONIA FLORES, ET AL. v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA CASE NO.: 23NWCV03289 HEARING : 7/10/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #8 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs Tonia and Allen Floress motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Moving Party to give NOTICE. On September 28, 2022, DOE defendants 1 through 25 allegedly collided with the vehicle driven by plaintiff Allen Burton Flores, causing it to collide with another vehicle driven by plaintiff Tonia Andrus Flores. DOE defendants 1 through 25 allegedly did not stop and identify themselves. Plaintiffs submitted the claim to defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America. Plaintiffs move to compel arbitration with Safeco Insurance Company of America. On June 5, 2024, the Court continued the motion to compel arbitration because Defendant filed its opposition late. Discussion Insurance Code section 11580.2 requires insurers to provide coverage for bodily injury or wrongful death caused by uninsured motorists. Uninsured motorist coverage requires the driver to have been injured by a vehicle with no available liability coverage, which includes when the identity of the owner or operator of the vehicle is unknown. (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (b).) Subdivision (f) states that if the insurer and the insured cannot agree whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motorist and the amount of such damages, arbitration will determine these issues. ( Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (f) .) The parties dispute liability and nature and extent of the damages. (Opp., pg. 2.) Thus, the parties dispute is subject to arbitration. Defendant states it will participate in arbitration once discovery is complete. However, Defendant can also conduct discovery in arbitration. Thus, the Court grants the motion.

Case Number: 23AHCV01025 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT ODETTE VIVANCO , Plaintiff(s), vs. OTTIMO RESOURCES INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV01025 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO TAX COSTS Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 10 , 2024 ) I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Odette Vivanco (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Ottimo Resources Inc. and Pacific Clinics on May 8, 2023. On April 11, 2024, the Court sustained the demurrer filed by Pacific Clinics (Defendant) to Plaintiffs operative First Amended Complaint without leave to amend. Defendant filed a memorandum of costs and proposed judgment on April 29, 2024. On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed an objection to the memorandum of costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed a noticed motion to strike or tax costs on May 14, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD Generally, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. ( Id ., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount. ( Id ., subd. (c)(3). The losing party may dispute any or all of the items in the prevailing partys memorandum of costs by a motion to strike or tax costs. (CRC 3.1700(b).) Verification of the memorandum of costs by the prevailing partys attorney establishes a prima facie showing that the claimed costs are proper. ( Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267.) To overcome that prima facie showing, the objecting party must introduce evidence to support its claim that the claimed costs were not reasonably necessary to carry out the litigation. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) Where a motion to tax costs is based on factual disputes as to nature or amount of particular costs, the motion must be supported by declarations. ( County of Kern v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113-1114.) Mere conclusions that the item was neither necessary nor reasonable do not satisfy the objecting partys burden. ( Id .) III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants memorandum of costs in its entirety on the grounds that it was prematurely filed. The premature filing of a memorandum of costs is treated as a mere irregularity at best that does not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice. ( Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 863, 880.) Prematurely filed cost bills are treated as being timely filed. ( Id .) Although Plaintiff claims to have been prejudiced by Defendants premature memorandum of costs, her claim is unsubstantiated. Plaintiff argues that she was forced to incur unnecessary attorney fees and costs by bringing this motion. (Reply, p. 2.) However, Plaintiff does not contend that a motion was wholly unnecessary. Therefore, it appears only to be an issue of when the motion needed to be filed, as opposed to whether one had to be filed at all. This does not constitute a sufficient showing of prejudice. Therefore, the motion to strike the costs bill in its entirety is DENIED. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves to tax Defendants costs and requests that Defendant be awarded no more than $1,267.61 on the grounds that the costs incurred are either highly inflated or not necessary. The challenged costs include $1,709 claimed for court reporter fees. Court reporter fees as established by statute are expressly recoverable. (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(11).) Plaintiff argues that the two court reporter fees are unreasonably high at $750 and $959 because the hearings for which they were hired were less than an hour long. (Motion, pp. 4-5.) Plaintiff includes no evidence that court reporters charge on an hourly basis or that Defendants court reporters charged fees which were outside the industry standard. Plaintiff only complains that Defendant failed to provide any invoice or receipts with its cost bill, which is not a requirement, and in any event, Defendant attached those invoices to its opposition showing the rate of hire for court reporters for a half day. Even in her reply brief, Plaintiff does not explain why she considers Defendants court reporter fees to be unreasonably high, nor does she provide evidence in support of her claim. (Reply, p. 3.) The motion to tax the court reporter fees is DENIED. Plaintiff also challenges Defendants cost of $803.08 for a court-ordered transcript from the March 6, 2024, hearing on Defendants demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff argues that the invoice for the transcript only cost her $419.47, therefore Defendant should not have paid more than that. The amount claimed by Defendant for the court-ordered transcript is reasonable because the invoice attached to the Perera Declaration identifies the cost of an original transcript, which is more expensive that Plaintiffs copy, as well as a fee to expedite the transcript, which was not charged to Plaintiff. (Perera Decl., Ex. M.) Accordingly, the motion to tax the cost of the transcript is DENIED. Last, Plaintiff argues that Defendants electronic filing and service fees of $985.05 are either unnecessary or unreasonably high. Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(14) allows a prevailing party to recover [f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents. In addition, [m]essenger fees are not expressly authorized by statute, but may be allowed in the discretion of the court. ( Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 132.) Plaintiff contends that a reasonable charge for routine electronic filings ranges from $15 to $17 dollars instead of $70 or $80 but submits nothing in support other than a bare assertion in counsels declaration. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant should not be able to recover the costs for courtesy copies delivered to the courthouse because they were not required and therefore unnecessary. However, the operative First Amended General Order re Mandatory Electronic Filing for Civil requires printed courtesy copies for pleadings and motions that include points and authorities as well as demurrers; furthermore, the courtesy copies of Defendants demurrers, motions to strike, and reply briefs were certainly used by the Court. Therefore, the Courts denies the motion to tax these costs incurred to prepare and deliver those courtesy copies. In addition, Plaintiff disputes what she calls a credit card charge, but neglects to state that the charge was incurred in connection with filing the demurrer and motion to strike. Overall, the Court taxes $74 from Defendants cost bill for fees associated with filing the notice of remote appearance, which was not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs motion to strike the entire memorandum of costs is DENIED. Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is GRANTED in the amount of $74. Dated this 10th day of July , 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 21STCV27240 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 76 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to make payments for construction work pursuant to a written agreement. Several cross-complaints for indemnity have been filed. Cross-Defendant Keough Electric Corporation moves to compel further responses to form and special interrogatories and requests for production of documents from Cross-Complainant Good Times Group, LLC, and requests sanctions. TENTATIVE RULING Per the Oppositions, on March 15, 2024, Good Times Group provided supplemental written discovery responses. The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding these supplemental response and to file a joint supplemental separate statement. The hearing on the motion to compel is CONTINUED to August 30, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Joint supplemental separate statement to be filed by August 20, 2024.

Case Number: 22STCV07864 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Wednesday, July 10, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 14 PROCEEDINGS Gina Solis, et al. v. Estate of John Russell Calvert, et al. 22STCV07864 1. Nicholas J. Ajellos Application to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice TENTATIVE RULING Nicholas J. Ajellos Application to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice is granted. Background Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on March 3, 2022. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed on March 9, 2022. Plaintiffs allege the following facts. Plaintiffs decedent was killed in aircraft crash on March 13, 2020. Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 9.40 states, in relevant part: (d) The application must state: (1) The applicant's residence and office address; (2) The courts to which the applicant has been admitted to practice and the dates of admission; (3) That the applicant is a licensee in good standing in those courts; (4) That the applicant is not currently suspended or disbarred in any court; (5) The title of each court and cause in which the applicant has filed an application to appear as counsel pro hac vice in this state in the preceding two years, the date of each application, and whether or not it was granted; and (6) The name, address, and telephone number of the active licensee of the State Bar of California who is attorney of record. (e) An applicant for permission to appear as counsel pro hac vice under this rule must pay a reasonable fee not exceeding $50 to the State Bar of California with the copy of the application and the notice of hearing that is served on the State Bar. The applicant has met all the requirements mandated in Rule 9.40. The Application to be admitted as counsel pro hac vice is therefore granted. Nicholas J. Ajello is admitted as counsel pro hac vice in the pending matter. Defendant Rapco, Inc. is ordered to give notice of this ruling.