Allyson M. Drucker, Et Al. Vs Kalsang Tshering Bhutia, Et Al.

Case Number: 20STCP01747 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 32 FRANKLIN ARMORY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 20STCP01747 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion for summary judgment or adjudication BACKGROUND This action was initially filed on May 27, 2020. The case was initially assigned to Judge James Chalfant in Department 85. The operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC) was filed on February 17, 2021. The SAC is filed by Plaintiffs Franklin Armory, Inc. (FAI) and California Rifle & Pistol Association (CPRA) against Defendants California Department of Justice (DOJ) and Xavier Becerra (Becerra). FAI is a federally-licensed firearms manufacturer that manufactures a series of firearms which are neither rifles, pistols, nor shotguns as defined by California law. (SAC ¶ 2.) FAI designates these firearms as Title I firearms. ( Ibid. ) Licensed firearm dealers in California are required to submit all background checks to DOJ through the Dealer Record of Sale Entry System (DES). ( Id. , ¶ 49.) The online DES submission form requires the user to input several pieces of information, among which is the type of firearm being exchanged. ( Id. , ¶ 58.) The DES form only allows the user to select long gun or handgun, and within the long gun category, the only options are rifle, rifle/shotgun, or shotgun. ( Ibid. ) However, FAIs Title I firearms are neither rifles, pistols, nor shotguns. ( Id. , ¶ 2.) The dropdown menu does not provide a catchall option for other types of firearms. ( Id. , ¶ 58.) Plaintiffs allege that this prevents firearms dealers from submitting the required information for the transfer of certain types of firearms and thereby acts as a technological barrier to the lawful sale of firearms. ( Id. , ¶¶ 6, 58.) This has resulted in lost profits from the sale of Title I guns. ( Id. , ¶¶ 138, 147, 150, 159, 161.) CPRA is a nonprofit organization of members who wish to purchase firearms with undefined subtypes, such as Title Is, but could not because of the restrictions in the DES system. ( Id. , ¶ 6.) Defendants allegedly carried out this scheme to delay the lawful transfer of Title I firearms until the Legislature could pass a law that made Title I firearms illegal. (SAC ¶ 109.) Indeed, SB 118 was passed on August 6, 2020, designating the Title I centerfire firearm as a banned assault weapon. ( Id. , ¶ 112.) SB 118 allows individuals already in possession of a banned assault weapon prior to September 1, 2020 to keep the firearm, under the condition that the firearm is properly registered. ( Id. , ¶ 113.) However, Defendants actions prevented those who placed deposits prior to September 1, 2020 from ever acquiring Title I centerfire firearms, thus allegedly depriving those individuals of their due process, Second Amendment, and property rights. ( Id. at ¶¶ 113-114.) The SAC asserts the following causes of action: (1) declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) petition for writ of mandate; (3) tortious inference with contractual relations; (4) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; (5) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; (6) violation of procedural due process; (7) violation of substantive due process; (8) declaratory and injunctive relief; and (9) violation of public policy. The DES system was overhauled in October 2021, resulting in the addition of a other category. Accordingly, on January 27, 2022, Judge Chalfant granted Defendants motion to dismiss the first, second, and eighth causes of action. Judge Chalfant subsequently ordered the case transferred to Department 1 for reassignment, whereafter the case was assigned to this department. On September 7, 2023, this Court granted Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action. On April 26, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment or adjudication as to the remaining causes of action. FAI filed its opposition on June 26, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on July 5, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS FAIs objections are not material to the Courts disposition of the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).) Defendants did not file any objections. DISCUSSION I. Governmental Immunity Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person. (Code Civ. Proc., § 815(a).) [S]ection 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities. ( Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899.) In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable . . . . ( Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) One such statute is Government Code section 815.6, which imposes liability on a public entity for injuries caused by a violation of a mandatory duty derived from another statute. [A]pplication of section 815.6 requires that the enactment at issue be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity. ( Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.) If a statute does not require that a particular action be taken, Government Code section 815.6 does not create the right to sue a public entity. ( Shamsian v. Department of Conservation (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 621, 632.) It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion. ( Id. at p. 633.) Here, the cited Penal Code provisions do not require a particular action to be taken with regards to the DES system. (See Pen. Code, §§ 28155, 28205, 28215, 28220.) To the extent DOJ was required to implement an electronic reporting system (see Pen. Code, § 28205(c)), it did so by implementing the DES, which has existed since 2003 (see SAC ¶ 49). How DOJ implements the reporting system, including what changes to make in response to the emergence of a new firearm type, is left in its discretion as the Penal Code provisions do not mandate any particular action in such a situation. (See Shamsian, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) The SAC identifies a few potential ways to alleviate the alleged defect in the DES, which confirms that DOJ has discretion over changes in DES. (See SAC ¶¶ 64-66.) FAI also acknowledges that Penal Code section 28205(c) grants DOJ authority to implement a variety of alternative means to allow for processing of Title I firearms. (Plntf.s Additional Facts (AF) 41.) Furthermore, Penal Code section 28245 states that [w]henever the Department of Justice acts pursuant to this article as it pertains to firearms other than handguns, the departments acts or omissions shall be deemed to be discretionary within the meaning of the Government Claims Act. In sum, the operation of DES, including the implementation of changes, is discretionary and therefore falls outside the mandatory duty exception under section 815.6. Furthermore, section 815.6 does not apply unless the enactment at issue was designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury. (Gov. Code, § 815.6.) The plaintiff must show the injury is one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty. ( Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499, quoting Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 939.) The injury alleged here is financial loss due to the inability to sell Title I firearms. (SAC ¶¶ 138, 147, 150, 159, 161.) However, the relevant Penal Code provisions were designed to protect public safety, not to preserve the financial interests of firearms dealers. (See People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 479 [requiring an applicant to undergo a background check is designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, law-abiding, responsible citizens].) FAI does not directly address Defendants authorities or analysis on the application of sections 815 and 815.6. Instead, FAI characterizes these arguments as irrelevant because FAI does not assert liability against DOJ for the three remaining causes of action. (Opp. 11:2-7.) FAI argues that it only seeks liability against Becerra, who is not covered under section 815 because that statute only protects public entities, not individuals. (See Gov. Code, §§ 811.2, 815.) FAI effectively concedes that DOJ is not liable. Therefore, DOJ is not liable as a matter of law. II. Discretionary Immunity [1] Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused. (Gov. Code, § 820.2.) Unlike section 815, section 820.2 expressly applies to individual employees. Section 820.2 confers a general immunity for discretionary acts taken within the scope of authority. ( Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 928.) The protection is broad and applies even to lousy decisions . . . no matter how horrible the outcome. ( Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1285.) However, discretionary immunity does not apply to all acts that involve discretion in the literal sense. [A]lmost all acts involve some choice among alternatives, and the statutory immunity thus cannot depend upon a literal or semantic parsing of the word discretion. ( Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 981.) Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions [which have] . . . been [expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government, and as to which judicial interference would thus be unseemly. ( Ibid. , quoting Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 793.) [T]here is no basis for immunizing lower-level, or ministerial, decisions that merely implement a basic policy already formulated. ( Ibid. ) Furthermore, immunity requires a showing that the specific conduct giving rise to the suit involved an actual exercise of discretion, i.e., a [conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages. ( Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 983, quoting Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 794, 795, fn. 8.) Once this showing is made, however, a government official is immunized even for carelessness, malice, bad judgment, or abuse of discretion because immunity does not require a strictly careful, thorough, formal, or correct evaluation. ( Id. at pp. 983-84.) The evidence shows that Defendants exercised discretion by initiat[ing] a review to evaluate the resources required for a potential DES enhancement to add a other option. (Mendoza Decl. ¶ 8.) This involved a balancing of multiple factors and a weighing of competing priorities among the multiple proposed DES enhancement requests pending at that time. ( Ibid. ) Defendants also evaluated and weighed the allocation of available resources to such an enhancement, such as the number of personnel required, budgeting of the enhancement, and the time it would take to complete said enhancement. ( Ibid. ) As a temporary alternative, Defendants considered the potential of doing some sort of free-form field for dealers . . . to type in something specific related to the Franklin Armory Title 1. (Barvir Decl., Ex. 11 (Mendoza Depo.) 141:1-12.) However, allowing dealers to type in anything would have made it very difficult for us to be able to track those firearms and identify those firearms in the systems. ( Id. at 145:17-21.) Defendants ultimately decided not to implement this particular change due to the anticipated operational difficulties and public safety concerns. (Mendoza Decl. ¶ 10.) Defendants ultimately decided to add a other option to the DES application after SB 118 was passed, upon weighing competing priorities among the multiple information technology projects pending at that time in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Mendoza Decl. ¶ 11.) This enhancement was completed in October 2021, simultaneously deploying with other assault weapon registration changes. ( Ibid. ; Barvir Decl., Ex. 11 (Mendoza Depo.) 128:7-11.) These facts show that changing the DES is a policy-level decision requiring the exercise of discretion, rather than a ministerial implementation of an existing directive. FAIs disputes against Director Mendozas testimony are not material disputes that negate Mendozas description of the process of implementing changes to DES. (See Plntf.s Resp. to UF 14-17.) Ultimately, FAI does not dispute that the process involves considerations of competing interests, resource allocation, budget constraints, and the like. (See Mendoza Decl. ¶ 5.) FAI also presents no evidence to materially dispute the fact that implementing a other option to DES required many months, diversion of over a dozen employees from other projects, and changes to other applications and databases beyond DES. ( Id ., ¶ 9.) Defendants may have made these assessments incorrectly, or even acted with malice, in relation to the Title I issue. For example, Plaintiff contends that changes should have been implemented much sooner, specifically before the passage of SB 118. (See Plntf.s Resp. to UF 16-18; AF 49-53, 60.) However, the law is clear that section 820.2 immunizes carelessness, malice, bad judgment, or abuse of discretion. ( Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 983-84.) [G]overnment officials are not personally liable for their discretionary acts within the scope of their authority even though it is alleged that their conduct was malicious. ( Freeny v. City of San Buenaventura (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1343.) For Defendants to be held civilly liable for not implementing a certain change within a certain timeframe would amount to judicial interference with the policymaking process. (See Caldwell, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 981.) Therefore, section 820.2 precludes liability for the challenged conduct as a matter of law. CONCLUSION Defendants motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. [1] Although the Court earlier rejected Defendants immunity argument in denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment/adjudication motions are law and motion proceedings entirely distinct from an attack on a pleading by demurrer. Therefore, it [is] proper for the trial court to decide the . . . claim on summary adjudication differently from its prior disposition of the claim on demurrer. ( Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 634, fn. 10.) With the benefit of evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court is entitled to reassess the immunity issue and reach a different conclusion.

Case Number: 23STCV13104 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 61 RAYMOND GHERMEZIAN, et al. vs ALMA NUNEZ, et al. TENTATIVE Plaintiffs Raymond Ghermezian and Raymond Ghermezian, APCs Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. No sanctions are awarded. Plaintiffs Raymond Ghermezian and Raymond Ghermezian, APCs Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Joseph H. Low IV is GRANTED. No sanctions are awarded. Defendant Joseph H. Low IVs Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff Raymond Ghermezian is GRANTED. No sanctions are awarded. Plaintiffs to give notice. DISCUSSION MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Before, during, or after a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc. 2025.420, subd. (a).) The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) Plaintiff Raymond Ghermezian (Plaintiff) moves for an order preventing Defendants Alma Nunez and Joseph H. Low, IV (Defendants) from using an audio recording made by Nunez in the presence of Plaintiff without his consent in discovery, hearings, mediation, or any other purpose in this matter. (Motion at p. 2.) Plaintiff states that Nunez made an audio recording of him speaking to her regarding the underlying case, a fact revealed to him on May 28, 2024, during mediation in this matter.. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff states the recording was played for the mediator and partially for himself. (Ibid.) Plaintiff contends that he did not consent to be recorded. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 4.) He argues that Defendants likely intend to present the recording at his deposition, in order to elicit testimony that may contradict its contents. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendants have no produced the recording in discovery. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff relies on Penal Code § 632, which makes guilty of a misdemeanor any person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, uses an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (a).) This same statute states: Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this section, evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential communication in violation of this section is not admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (d).) Defendants argue that Penal Code § 632s prohibition does not apply here, because the presence of a third person during the recorded conversation evidenced by a third voice on the recording renders the conversation not confidential. (Opposition at pp. 89.) But Defendants cite no authority for this argument, and it is contradicted by the statutory text. The statute prohibits a persons recording of a confidential communication without the consent of all parties, and does not indicate a limitation to bilateral communications between two persons. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (a), italics added.) The statute defines confidential communication to mean any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, once more indicating no limitation of confidentiality to two persons. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (c).) Defendants further argue that Penal Code § 632 is not applicable to civil proceedings(Opposition at p. 8), but this argument is contradicted by the statutory language itself, which prescribes inadmissibility in any judicial . . . proceedings, naturally including civil cases. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (d).) It is also contradicted by case authority, which has gone on to apply the provision to civil proceedings. (See Frio v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1480, 1492 [Neither the tainted recordings nor the notes derived from them can be read in evidence.].) Defendants arguments for the inapplicability of Penal Code § 632 is therefore unpersuasive. But regardless of whether or not Penal Code § 632 is applicable, Plaintiff has not shown good cause for the protective order he seeks here. Plaintiff seeks a total prohibition on the use of the recording, a sweeping order finding no basis in the operative statute. The legislature has defined the remedy appropriate for illicit recordings, which include criminal penalties and direction that such evidence be not admissible in judicial proceedings. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (d).) Plaintiff in fact misquotes the statute in his motion, stating that it prohibits the use of any illegal recording in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding. (Motion at p. 5, italics added.) But the statute does not prohibit the recordings use; it renders the recording not admissible. (Penal Code § 632, subd. (d).) Such a recording therefore may not be admitted into evidence but it may be used for other purposes, such as, refreshing the recollection of the parties to the conversation. (See Frio, supra, 203 Cal.app.3d at p. 1494 [[W]e are unaware of any decision holding that a witness may not testify after simply refreshing recollection with tainted evidence.].) Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to a protective order. The motion for protective order is therefore DENIED. II. MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION A party may make a motion compelling a witnesss deposition after service of a deposition notice if that witness fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (a).) The motion must include a meet-and-confer declaration and show good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1), (2).) In competing motions, Plaintiff seeks to compel the deposition of Defendant Joseph R. Low, IV (Low), and Defendants seek to compel the deposition of Plaintiff. Defendants served Plaintiff with a deposition notice on April 30, 2024, with the deposition set for May 17, 2024, for which Plaintiff failed to appear after serving objections based on his lack of availability. (Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 34, Exhs. A, B.) Plaintiff stated in informal correspondence that he has priority for his deposition because he had noticed Lows deposition to take place first. (Lewis Decl. Exh. E.) Plaintiff, meanwhile, served Low with a deposition notice on February 1, 2024, with the deposition noticed for February 16, 2024. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.) Low objected to the date and to the requests for production on February 8, 2024. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B.) Plaintiff sent an email on February 8, 2024, seeking alternative dates to depose Mr. Low in my office in February. (Ghermezian Decl. Exh. C.) Defendants evidently provided no dates. In a March 7, 2024 email, Defendants counsel told Plaintiff that Lows trial calendar one lasting six to eight weeks, another expected to last ten days would prevent his attendance at a mediation any earlier than the May 28 date offered by the mediator, (Ghermezian Decl. Exh. E.) But Defendants declined to offer dates for Lows deposition, even after noticing Plaintiffs deposition for May 17. (Ghermezian Decl. Exh. D.) Both parties motions shall be granted, and both Ghermezian and Low compelled to attend deposition. Both parties object on the basis of availability, yet neither have provided any dates of availability for the depositions to proceed. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to take the deposition of Low first because he noticed the deposition first. (Opposition at pp. 23.) Plaintiff was not so entitled, because the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or another method, shall not operate to delay the discovery of any other party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.020, subd. (a).) Plaintiff relies on State Bar civility guidelines stating, When another party notices a deposition for the near future, absent unusual circumstances, an attorney should not schedule another deposition in the same case for an earlier date without opposing counsels agreement. (Cal. Attorney Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism, § 9, subd. (a)(1).) But the taking of Lows deposition during the time allotted by Plaintiff was prevented by Lows trial schedule. And in any event, these guidelines do not excuse either partys refusal to offer dates, in light of an express statutory directive against Plaintiffs argument limiting discovery based on priority. In addition to compelling Lows attendance at deposition, Plaintiff also seeks an order directing him to produce documents responsive to three requests for production contained in the deposition notice, which seek documents related to the settlement and Nunezs client file. (Motion at p. 5; Ghermezian Decl. Exh. A.) Although Defendants argue that they have already responded to similar requests offered as inspection demands (Opposition at pp. 34), Plaintiff may seek the same discovery by deposition notice that they earlier sought by written discovery, if they are dissatisfied with the earlier responses. (See Carter v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997 [[T]he inspection of documents procedure is quite different from a deposition at which a party is required to bring documents. Nothing in either section 2025 or section 2031 suggests that seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under the other.].) The documents sought here relate to the subject matter of the action, and good cause for the production has been shown, subject to a privilege log under Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.240. The motions to compel deposition are therefore GRANTED. III. SANCTIONS If a motion to compel deposition is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).) Plaintiff seeks $2,400.00 in sanctions against Defendants and their counsel, representing six hours of attorney work at $400 per hour. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 11.) Defendant Low seeks $3,660.00 in sanctions against Plaintiff, representing six hours of attorney work at $600 per hour plus a $60 filing fee. (Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 1315.) No sanctions are awarded on either motion, as the parties have obtained relief against each other. Sanctions are also mandatory against the party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, absent substantial justification or other circumstances that make the award of the sanctions unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420, subd. (h). Plaintiff seeks $2,100.00 in sanctions, representing a miscalculation of seven hours of attorney work at $400, which should yield a total of $2,800.00. (Ghermezian Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendants in turn seek $2,880.00 in sanctions on the same motion, representing a miscalculation of 4.5 hours of attorney work at $600 per hour, which should yield a sanctions request of $2,700.00. (Lewis Decl. ¶ 13.) No sanctions under the protective order motion are appropriate, as Plaintiff sought the order based on a misinterpretation of the reach of Penal Code § 632, subd. (d), and Defendants opposed it based on a misinterpretation of Penal Code § 632, subd. (c). It would therefore be unjust to award sanctions to either party

Case Number: 23STLC06362 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 26 23STLC06362 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY SPECIALTY INS CO -- Motion for Discharge - No Tentative Ruling - Motion withdrawn on 6/6/24

Case Number: 24SMCV01057 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M City of Santa Monica v. Colonial Manor et al., 24SMCV01057 Background On April 25, 2024, the parties stipulated in this matter and the related matter, 24SMUD00651, Colonial Manor v. Reyes, to have the Court resolve the legal issue of whether Santa Monica Rent Control Charter Amendment (SMRCC) Section 1806(c) and other ordinances permit Colonial Manor to raise the rent to the market rate under the agreed upon factual circumstances of the case. (4/25/24 Order.) On July 6, 2024, the parties submitted their Stipulated Facts for the July 10, 2024, Non-Jury Trial on Rent Increase Validity. The specific issue to be addressed is whether Colonial Manor had the right to impose an unlimited rent increase for a unit that was occupied by the spouse of the original occupant who is now deceased. Colonial Manor contends that when the original occupant(s) vacate a unit, the landlord can raise the rent on everyone else. Colonials interpretation of the statute relies upon the language in Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) permitting an owner to increase rent to a lawful sublessee or assignee when the original occupant(s) are no longer permanently residing there. If Mrs. Reyes falls within that category, then the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act preempts the local Santa Monica rent control ordinance preventing Colonial from raising the rent. Therefore, the Court must interpret the terms sublessee and assignee as used in section 1954.53, as well as the term original occupant. Does Section 1954.53(d)(2) Apply to the Facts of this Case The effect of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act provision allowing residential landlords to establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit is to permit landlords to impose whatever rent they choose at the commencement of a tenancy. ( Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232.) The term occupant is not limited to a party to the rental agreement, but rather applies to any individual who has resided in the dwelling from the start of a tenancy, with the landlord's permission. ( Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arb. Bd. , (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 505, 512 [city rent control protections applied to tenants' sons occupancy because he was an original occupant that continuously resided at the Unit pursuant to the original lease even after the sons parents had moved out]; Cobb v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Bd. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 345 [landlord did not have authority to increase tenant's rent where tenant occupied apartment before effective day of rent increase, tenant was not assignee or sublessee of previous tenant, and landlord negotiated prior rent increase with tenant, and demanded prompt payment of rent].) Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) authorizes unlimited rent increases only when the occupants that remain are sublessee[s] or assignee[s] of the previous tenant. The Court concludes that the terms sublessee or assignee was not an attempt to refer to all persons still occupying a unit after the original occupants. The use of the term occupant in the same subsection suggests that the legislature was intending to use the more specific meanings behind sublessee and assignee, as opposed to non-original occupants. ( See In re M.A. , (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5 th 143, 150 (when different terms are used in part of same statutory scheme, they are presumed to have different meanings.) The statute can be fairly read to narrowly permit rent increases only to a sublessee or assignee who occupied a unit after January 1, 1996, and where the original occupants have vacated. Thus, if the individual is not a sublessee or assignee, the provisions would not apply even if the original occupants have vacated. This conclusion is supported by the remaining sections of Civil Code section 1954.53. Section 1954.53 subsection (d)(1)-(4) all refer to subletting. For example, subsection (d)(1) states that the Act does not preclude express agreements in leases establishing rent for sublessees. ((d)(1) Nothing in this section or any other provision of law shall be construed to preclude express establishment in a lease or rental agreement of the rental rates to be applicable in the event the rental unit subject thereto is sublet&) (d)(3) provides the subdivision does not apply to partial changes in occupancy of a dwelling or unit where one or more of the occupants of the premises& remains an occupant in lawful possession of the dwelling or unit (emphasis added). As discussed below, this case could be considered a partial change in occupancy referred to in (d)(3), which demonstrates a recognition of the type of situation presented here . Furthermore, subsection (d)(4) also recognizes that nothing in the section prohibits a covenant against sublease or assignment, unless the owner received written notice from the tenant and accepted rent. Thus, the context of subsection (d)(2) supports the position that it is referring specifically to sublets or assignments, as opposed to any other kind of occupant whether original or not. As the caselaw explains, the purpose of this subsection was to preclude friends and family from creating subtenancies and assignments that could avoid the Costa Hawkins Act. It would not preclude an owner establishing a new, oral lease with occupants during partial changes in occupancy. Giving a strict interpretation of the terms, section 1954.53(d)(2) would not preempt Santa Monicas ordinance and allow for the 400% increase in rent. The stipulated facts admit that Vilma Reyes is not an assignee or subtenant. Milton Reyes lived at the Unit as a tenant until his death on September 8, 2023. (Stipulated Fact (SF) 2.) Defendant, Mrs. Reyes, moved into the Unit in about February 2021. (SF 4, 5.) The couple got married in February 2022. (SF 3.) Mrs. Reyes never paid Milton Reyes rent. (SF 6.) Mrs. Reyes also never entered into any written, verbal, or implied agreement for Mr. Reyes to assign or transfer his tenancy rights to the Rental Unit. (SF 7.) Thus, it is undisputed that she never paid rent to, or entered into an assignment with, her husband. Furthermore, Mrs. Reyes persuasively argues that a marital relationship cannot create a common law subtenancy between husband and wife. As such, the Court concludes that Vilma Reyes is neither a subtenant or assignee of Milton Reyes and Costa Hawkins does not authorize a rental increase that would violate SMRCC law. Alternatively, Mrs. Reyes would still be protected from the rent increase as a tenant. A landlord and new occupant may informally create a tenancy. It is well established that a tenancy need not be created by a lease, but may be created by occupancy by consent. ( Miller v. Elite Ins. Co. , (1980) 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 750; see also Parkmerced Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. , (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 490, 494-95.) Family members and friends who subsequently move into the apartment are not protected unless the landlord consents to the occupancy and accepts rent from the new occupant, thus creating a new tenancy. Here, the evidence before the Court set forth in the stipulated facts is that Colonial Manor explicitly, implicitly, or by operation of law, created a new tenancy with Mrs. Reyes. Once married in 2022, Mrs. Reyes can be considered to have owed and paid rent to Colonial Manor based upon her husbands rental payments. Mrs. Reyes did not owe a duty to pay rent to her husband but did owe an obligation to Landlord to pay the rent owed to it by her husband. (Family Code § 914(a)(1).) Since Plaintiff accepted this rent from Mr. Reyes and his spouse (the new occupant), a new tenancy would have been created so long as the landlord was aware that Mrs. Reyes was occupying the unit. There is no evidence that Colonial Manor was not aware of Mrs. Reyes occupying the Unit. In fact, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion since Colonial Manor sent her the notice of the rent increase immediately after her husband died. Therefore, as an alternative to concluding that section 1954.53(d)(2) is inapplicable, the Court would conclude that Colonial Manor and Mrs. Reyes created a new tenancy in 2021 or February 2022, which pursuant to the terms of the December 2022 notice, was at a rental rate of $666.00, including all surcharges. (SF 9.) As stated, there is no evidence that Colonial Manor did not know the Reyes were married, and that Vilma Reyes was residing with Milton Reyes at the Unit. By accepting rent from Milton Reyes, Colonial Manor was accepting rent from husband and wife. Furthermore, the Courts ruling would fulfill the purpose behind the Costa Hawkins Act. As the legislative history makes clear, t he Costa-Hawkins Act establishes vacancy decontrol for residential dwelling units where the former tenant has voluntarily vacated, abandoned or been legally evicted. (Legis. Analyst, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1164 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.) It was not intended to be used to evict or raise rental rates on a surviving spouse, who was not part of the initial lease agreement.

Case Number: 23PSCV02203 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: K 1. Defendant Juan Hernandez Banuelos Motion for Order Compelling Plaintiff, Ricardo Penaloza, to Appear for an In-Person Deposition is GRANTED. Ricardo is ordered to submit to an in-person deposition within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded in the reduced amount of $1,082.20 and are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 2. Defendant Juan Hernandez Banuelos Motion for Order Compelling Plaintiff, Rosa Penaloza, to Appear for an In-Person Deposition is GRANTED. Rosa is ordered to submit to an in-person deposition within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded in the reduced amount of $560.00 and are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 3. Defendant Juan Hernandez Banuelos Motion for Order Compelling Plaintiff, Jasmine Penaloza, to Appear for an In-Person Deposition is GRANTED. Jasmine is ordered to submit to an in-person deposition within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions are awarded in the reduced amount of $1,232.20 and are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Background Plaintiffs Jasmine Penaloza (Jasmine), Rosa Penaloza (Rosa) and Ricardo Penaloza (Ricardo) (together, Plaintiffs) allege that they sustained injuries and damages in an April 23, 2022 motor vehicle accident on the westbound 60 in Diamond Bar. On July 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Juan Luis Hernandez Banuelos (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for: 1. Motor Vehicle 2. General Negligence A Case Management Conference is set for July 16, 2024. 1. Motion to Compel Plaintiff Ricardos Deposition Legal Standard If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection . . ., fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (a).) A motion to compel deposition shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).) The motion shall also set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document , electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1).) A court shall impose monetary sanctions if the motion to compel is granted, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).) Discussion Defendant moves the court for an order compelling Ricardo to appear for an in-person deposition on a date and time certain within 30 days of the courts ruling on this motion. Defendant also seeks sanctions against Ricardo and his counsel in the amount of $1,957.20. Defendants counsel Dwayne S. Beck (Beck) represents as follows: On September 19, 2023, Defendant served Ricardo with a Notice of Deposition, wherein Ricardos deposition was scheduled for April 2, 2024 at Becks office in Riverside. (Beck Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A.) On October 11, 2023, Defendant served Ricardo with a Notice of Continuance of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff, rescheduling Ricardos deposition to March 8, 2024 at Becks office. ( Id. , ¶ 6, Exh. B.) On February 14, 2024, Ricardo served an objection thereto, advising that he was not available for his deposition at the date and time scheduled. ( Id. , ¶ 7, Exh. C.) On February 14 and 23, 2024, Becks office emailed Ricardos counsels office to obtain Ricardos availability for deposition. ( Id. , ¶ 8, Exh. D.) On February 27, 2024, Beck sent Ricardos counsel a letter, advising therein that while he had received Ricardos February 14, 2024 objection, he would be moving forward with the depositions of the three plaintiffs as scheduled since he hadnt received alternate dates. ( Id. , Exh. E.) On February 27, 2024, Ricardos counsels office responded that Ricardo was available for deposition on April 19, 22, and 26, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. via Zoom. ( Id. , ¶ 9, Exh. D.) Becks office responded the same day, advising that none of the above dates worked but that Beck was available May 6, 2024 to take all three plaintiffs depositions in-person. ( Id. , ¶ 10, Exh. D.) Ricardos counsels office advised that May 6, 2024 was not a workable date and offered Beck their office to conduct in person depositions. ( Id., ¶ 11, Exh. D.) Counsel thereafter exchanged communications disputing the location of the deposition. ( Id. , ¶¶ 12-18, Exhs. D and F.) On March 8, 2024, Beck took a Certificate of Non-Appearance after Ricardo failed to appear for deposition. ( Id. , ¶ 20, Exh. G.) The procedural history on ecourt reflects that Beck requested an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) on March 29, 2024, which the court granted on April 2, 2024 and set for May 22, 2024. On May 17, 2024, the court advanced the IDC pursuant to Defendants ex parte application, heard the IDC, noted that the discovery issued were not resolved and permitted the parties to file discovery motions. The instant motion followed on May 23, 2024. Ricardo, in opposition, contends that the motion is moot, because the March 8, 2024 date scheduled for deposition has since passed. Ricardos argument is nonsensical because it was Ricardos failure to appear at his deposition on March 8, 2024, which lead to the filing of the instant motion. Ricardo then asserts that [t]here is Good Cause for Protective Order. (Opp., 3:3). Ricardo, however, never moved for a protective order. Counsels dispute hinges on their varying interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.310, which reads, in relevant part, as follows: (a) At the election of the deponent or the deposing party, the deposition officer may attend the deposition at a different location than the deponent via remote means. A deponent is not required to be physically present with the deposition officer when being sworn in at the time of the deposition. (b) Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent. . . (d) An exercise of the authority granted by subdivision (a) or (b) does not waive any other provision of this title, including, but not limited to, provisions regarding the time, place, or manner in which a deposition shall be conducted . . . Defendants counsel contends that Ricado must attend his deposition in-person, while Ricardos counsel contends that Ricardo may attend same remotely. The court is persuaded that when subdivisions (a) and (d) are read together an election made pursuant to subdivision (a) is not intended to supplant Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2025.220, subdivision (a) [1] and 2025.250, subdivision (a) [2] regarding the place where a deposition is conducted. The deposing party chooses the location of the deposition pursuant to the above provisions, provided that the location is within certain geographical limits. The motion, then, is granted. Ricardo is ordered to submit to an in-person deposition within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions Defendant seeks sanctions against Ricardo and his counsel in the amount of $1,957.20 [calculated as follows: 2 hours preparing motion, plus 1 hour meeting/conferring, plus 1.5 hours preparing reply plus 1 hour attending hearing at $250.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee, plus $522.20 for Certificate of Non-Appearance]. Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,082.20 (i.e., 1 hour preparing motion, plus 0.5 hours meet/confer, plus 0.5 hours attending hearing at $250.00 /hour, plus $60.00 filing fee, plus $522.20 Certificate of Non-Appearance fee). Sanctions are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 2. Motion to Compel Plaintiff Rosas Deposition Legal Standard See Motion #1. Discussion Defendant moves the court for an order compelling Rosa to appear for an in-person deposition on a date and time certain within 30 days of the courts ruling on this motion. Defendant also seeks sanctions against Rosa and her counsel in the amount of $1,435.00. See synopsis of Motion #1. [3] The motion is granted. Rosa is ordered to submit to an in-person deposition within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions Defendant seeks sanctions against Rosa and her counsel in the amount of $1,435.00 [calculated as follows: 2 hours preparing motion, plus 1 hour meeting/conferring, plus 1.5 hours preparing reply plus 1 hour attending hearing at $250.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee]. Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $560.00 (i.e., 1 hour preparing motion, plus 0.5 hours meet/confer, plus 0.5 hours attending hearing at $250.00 /hour, plus $60.00 filing fee). Sanctions are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. 3. Motion to Compel Plaintiff Jasmines Deposition Legal Standard See Motion #1. Discussion Defendant moves the court for an order compelling Jasmine to appear for an in-person deposition on a date and time certain within 30 days of the courts ruling on this motion. Defendant also seeks sanctions against Jasmine and her counsel in the amount of $2,607.20. See synopsis of Motion #1. [4] The motion is granted. Jasmine is ordered to submit to an in-person deposition within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Sanctions Defendant seeks sanctions against Jasmine and her counsel in the amount of $2,607.20 [calculated as follows: 3 hours preparing motion, plus 1 hour meeting/conferring, plus 1.5 hours preparing reply plus 2 hours attending hearing at $250.00/hour, plus $60.00 filing fee, plus $672.20 for Certificate of Non-Appearance]. Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,232.20 (i.e., 1 hour preparing motion, plus 0.5 hours meet/confer, plus 0.5 hours attending hearing at $250.00 /hour, plus $60.00 filing fee, plus $672.20 Certificate of Non-Appearance fee). Sanctions are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. [1] Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.220, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (a) A party desiring to take the oral deposition of any person shall give notice in writing. The deposition notice shall state all of the following, in at least 12-point type: (1) The address where the deposition will be taken. (2) The date of the deposition, selected under Section 2025.270, and the time it will commence. (3) The name of each deponent, and the address and telephone number, if known, of any deponent who is not a party to the action. If the name of the deponent is not known, the deposition notice shall set forth a instead a general description sufficient to identify the person or particular class to which the person belongs. (4) The specification with reasonable particularity of any materials or category of materials, including any electronically stored information, to be produced by the deponent. (5) Any intention by the party noticing the deposition to record the testimony by audio or video technology . . . (6) Any intention to reserve the right to use at trial a video recording of the deposition testimony of a treating or consulting physician or of an expert witness under subdivision (d) of Section 2025.260 . . . (7) The form in which any electronically stored information is to be produced, if a particular form is desired. (8)(A) A statement disclosing the existence of a contract, if any is known to the noticing party, between the noticing party or a third party who is financing all or part of the action and either of the following for any service beyond the noticed deposition: (i) The deposition officer. (ii) The entity providing the services of the deposition officer. (B) A statement disclosing that the party noticing the deposition, or a third party financing all or part of the action, directed his or her attorney to use a particular officer or entity to provide services for the deposition, if applicable. [2] Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.250, subdivision (a) provides as follows: (a) Unless the court orders otherwise under Section 2025.260, the deposition of a natural person, whether or not a party to the action, shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the deponents residence, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of the deponents residence. [3] Rosas deposition was noticed on September 29, 2023 to take place on April 3, 2024 at Becks Riverside office. (Beck Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A.) On October 11, 2023, Defendant served Rosa with a Notice of Continuance of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff, rescheduling Rosas deposition to March 3, 2024 at Becks office. ( Id. , ¶ 6, Exh. B.) On February 14, 2024, Rosa served an objection thereto, advising that she was not available for her deposition at the date and time scheduled. ( Id. , ¶ 7, Exh. C.) The remainder of Becks declaration accompanying the motion pertaining to Rosa is identical to his declaration filed in support of Motion #1. Rosa, in opposition, asserts that the motion is moot and that she is entitled to a protective order, which is what Ricardo also argued. While a Certificate of Non-Appearance was not taken for Rosa, this motion followed after counsel were unable to resolve the issue of where all three plaintiff depositions would occur. Additionally, the issue in Motion #2 is identical to that in Motion #1 (i.e., regarding Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.310). [4] Jasmine's deposition was noticed on September 19, 2023 to take place on April 4, 2024 at Becks Riverside office. (Beck Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. A.) On October 11, 2023, Defendant served Jasmine with a Notice of Continuance of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff, rescheduling Jasmines deposition to March 4, 2024 at Becks office. ( Id. , ¶ 6, Exh. B.) On February 14, 2024, Jasmine served an objection thereto, advising that she was not available for her deposition at the date and time scheduled. ( Id. , ¶ 7, Exh. C.) On March 4, 2024, Beck took a Certificate of Non-Appearance after Jasmine failed to appear for deposition. ( Id. , ¶ 20, Exh. G.) The remainder of Becks declaration accompanying the motion pertaining to Jasmine is identical to his declaration filed in support of Motion #1. Jasmine, in opposition, asserts that the motion is moot and that she is entitled to a protective order, which is what Ricardo also argued. Additionally, the issue in Motion #3 is identical to that in Motion #1 (i.e., regarding Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.310).

Case Number: 23STCV05225 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles ARMANI MARSALIS GATES I, Plaintiff, vs. LEMONADE INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV05225 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 03/09/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: 05/27/2025 Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lemonade Insurance Agency, LLC Responding Party: N/A - Unopposed Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1) The Court considered the moving papers. Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1), is GRANTED . T he Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Responses and the monetary sanctions are due to Defendant within 20 days of this order. Background Armani Marsalis Gates I filed a Complaint on March 9, 2023 alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The motion before the Court now is Lemonade Insurance Agency, LLCs (Defendant) Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set 1 (the Motion). No opposition has been filed, and Defendant files a Notice of Non-Opposition. Discussion Legal Standard If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply: (a) The party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4&(b) The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2031.300) The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. (CCP § 2023.030(a).) Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (CCP § 2023.010) Analysis Attached to the moving papers, Defendant provides the Declaration of William A. Hadikusumo (Hadikusumo Decl.) which states that on July 5, 2023, Plaintiff was served by Defendant with Requests for Production of Documents, Set 1. (Hadikusumo Decl., ¶3.) The deadline to provide responses was August 8, 2023 but no responses were provided. On August 9, 2023, Defendant reach out and provided an extension until September 6, 2023, however, no responses were ever received. (Hadikusumo Decl., ¶¶5-9.) Therefore, the Motion is granted, and sanctions are warranted. Sanctions Defense counsel provides the following calculations: · Counsels hourly rate is $240.00 · Counsel spent 5 hours preparing the instant Motion · Counsel anticipates the hearing taking 1 hour · Counsel incurred a filing fee of $60.00 · Counsel requests a total of $1,500.00 Accordingly, the Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Conclusion Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1), is GRANTED . T he Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Responses and the monetary sanctions are due to Defendant within 20 days of this order. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV08384 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 norma gomez , et al.; Plaintiffs , vs. kia america, inc. , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV08384 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs motion for attorneys fees MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Norma Gomez and Juan Gomez RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants Kia America, Inc., and Kia of Carson Motion for Attorneys Fees The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs Norma Gomez and Juan Gomez (Plaintiffs) move the court for an order awarding attorneys fees and costs in their favor, and against defendant Kia America, Inc. (Defendant) [1] in the total amount of $38,417.09, consisting of $36,738.50 in attorneys fees and $1,678.59 in costs. First, the court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides:¿ If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.¿¿¿ Plaintiffs have presented evidence, and Defendant does not dispute, that (1) on November 27, 2023, Defendant sent a second Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Plaintiffs for the repurchase amount of $75,000; (2) Plaintiffs accepted Defendants offer on December 29, 2023; and (3) Defendants offer also provided [that Defendant was] to pay reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys fees based on actual time expended determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs. (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 17-19; Proudfoot Decl., ¶¶ [Defendant served, and Plaintiffs accepted, its CCP 998 offer for $75,000 plus attorneys fees].) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs from Defendant pursuant to Civil Code section 1794 and the terms of the parties settlement agreement. Second, the court finds that Plaintiffs have established, as to the attorneys fees incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action and the preparation of the pending fee motion, a lodestar amount of $31,647.50 ((32.1 hours x $600 hourly rate for attorney Saeedian) + (1.3 hours x $600 hourly rate for attorney Ostoia) + (8.3 hours x $525 hourly rate for attorney Urner) + (29 hours x $250 hourly rate for law clerk Acosta)). (Saeedian Decl., Ex. A; Saeedian Decl., ¶ 23.) [T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.¿ ( PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (internal citations omitted); Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method].) [T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.¿ ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)¿¿¿ Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Michael Saeedian (Saeedian), in which Saeedian attests to the qualifications, skill and experience of the legal staff that performed work on this action. (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2-6.) The court finds that a reasonably hourly rate for attorneys Saeedian and Adina Ostoia is $600. (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 2-4.) The court finds that the hourly rates charged by attorney Christopher Urner ($525) and law clerk Jorge Acosta ($250) are reasonable in light of their qualifications, skill, and experience. (Saeedian Decl., ¶¶ 5-6.) The court has reviewed each work and time entry on the billing statement attached as Exhibit A to Saeedians declaration, which establishes that the legal staff working on this action expended a total of 74.1 hours to prosecute this action. (Saeedian Decl., Ex. A, p. 9.) The court notes that Defendant has argued, in its opposition, that Plaintiffs seek unreasonable attorneys fees for the time expended (1) by law clerk Jorge Acosta, and (2) to prepare form pleadings and discovery. Defendant did not cite particular entries in support of its contention that the hours expended were unreasonable. [2] ( Pont v. Pont (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 428, 447 [The party opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers objectionable] [internal citation omitted].) However, as set forth above, the court has reviewed each work and time entry on the billing statement submitted in support of Plaintiffs motion. Upon the courts review of the billing statement and Defendants opposition, the court finds that (1) of the 4.2 hours billed to draft plaintiff Norma Gomezs special interrogatories, requests for admission, form interrogatories, and requests for production of documents, 0.3 of those hours billed by Saeedian and 1 of those hours billed by Jorge Acosta were not reasonably expended, (2) of the 2.3 hours billed to draft a meet and confer letter regarding Defendants discovery responses, 1.3 of those hours billed by Saeedian were not reasonably expended, and (3) of the 1.6 hours billed to draft a meet and confer letter regarding defendant Kia of Carsons discovery responses, 0.8 of those hours billed by Saeedian were not reasonably expended. (Saeedian Decl., Ex. A, pp. 3-4, 8.) The court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have shown that their attorneys and their attorneys legal staff reasonably expended a total of 70.7 hours in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action and the preparation of the pending fee motion at the hourly rates of $600 (Saeedian and Adina Ostoia), $525 (Christopher Urner), and $250 (Jorge Acosta). (Saeedian Decl., ¶ 23; Saeedian Decl., Ex. A; Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Third, the court finds that Plaintiffs (1) are entitled to recover the costs and expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action, and (2) are entitled to an award of $1,678.59 in costs because (i) Plaintiffs have supported their request for costs in this amount by filing a verified memorandum of costs with the court on February 9, 2024, and (ii) Defendant did not file a motion to strike or tax costs within the time required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700. ( Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486 [A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of the propriety of the items listed on it, and the burden is on the party challenging these costs to demonstrate that they were not reasonable or necessary]; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1700, subds. (b)(1), (b)(4); Memorandum of Costs, p. 7 [proof of electronic service of memorandum of costs on February 9, 2024].) The court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have shown that they are entitled to recover $ 31,647.50 in attorneys fees and $1,678.59 in costs from Defendant. ORDER The court grants plaintiffs Norma Gomez and Juan Gomezs motion for attorneys fees and costs as follows. The court orders that plaintiffs Norma Gomez and Juan Gomez shall recover a total of $33,326.09, consisting of $ 31,647.50 in attorneys fees and $1,678.59 in costs, from defendant Kia America, Inc. pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). The court orders plaintiffs Norma Gomez and Juan Gomez to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court [1] The court notes that Plaintiffs named two defendants in this action: (1) Kia America, Inc., and (2) Kia of Carson. However, it appears that Plaintiffs have only requested that defendant Kia America, Inc. pay their attorneys fees and costs pursuant to the settlement agreement executed by the parties. (Notice of Mot., p. i:24-26.) [2] The court notes that Defendants assertion does not appear to accurately reflect the billing statement as to the hours expended to draft the Complaint. Although Defendant states that Plaintiffs billed 2.3 hours on the form complaint, Plaintiffs attorneys billed only 1.3 hours to draft the Complaint and 0.1 hours to review the conformed summons, complaint, and other case management documents. (Opp., p. 7:9-10; Saeedian Decl., Ex. A, pp. 1 [4/14/2023 entry to Review file and draft Complaint for 1.3 hours], 2 [4/17/2023 entry to review conformed summons, Complaint, and other documents for 0.1 hours].)

Case Number: 23LBCV01593 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S25 Procedural Background On August 23, 2023, Plaintiff Martin and Graciela Ruiz filed a complaint against Defendants Frank Colaruotolo Consulting, Inc. (FCC), Pacific Crane Maintenance Company, LLC (PCMC), and Does 1-10. On April 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (FAC), alleging two causes of action: (1) Negligence against Defendants FCC, Frank Colaruotolo, and Does 2 through 10; and (2) Negligence against Defendants PCMC and Does 2 through 10. On June 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (SAC), adding CSI Services as a Defendant. Plaintiffs Martin Ruiz and Graciela Ruiz are the surviving biological father and mother of the decedent, respectively. (SAC ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiffs are suing for the loss of their adult son, decedent Edgar Ruiz. Decedent was killed during a forklift incident on January 18, 2022. (See SAC ¶¶ 16-23.) Since the filing of Plaintiffs original complaint, Nico Ruiz filed a separate action against Defendants FCC and CSI Services, Inc., LASC No. 24LBCV00081. LASC Case No. 23LBCV01593 and LASC Case No. 24LBCV00081 (hereinafter collectively referred to as Related Cases) were deemed related by this Court. (See March 14, 2024 Notice of Ruling Re: Related Cases and Upcoming Hearing Dates in Case No. 24LBCV00081; Forouzan Decl., ¶ 6.) On May 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to consolidate the Related Cases. Legal Standard CCP § 1048 provides: (a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (b) The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, avoid duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions, and avoid inconsistent results by hearing and deciding common issues together. (See Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 484-485.) Further, the granting or denial of a motion to consolidate rests in the trial court's sound discretion and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Feliner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.) Ruling The Court agrees the two related matters should be consolidated for the following reasons: (1) both involve the same incident and (2) include nearly identical Defendants, (3) involve identical questions of law and fact, (4) identical burdens of proof, and (5) similar if not identical witnesses. However, there appears no record of Plaintiffs filing a notice of motion to consolidate in LASC Case No. 24LBCV00081 (the Nico Ruiz case) as required by Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(1)(C). If the parties in 24LBCV00081 waive the requirement of a noticed motion, the Court will grant the Motion to Consolidate. If there is no waiver, the Motion to Consolidate is denied without prejudice for Plaintiffs to correct the procedural defects.