Raquel Baez, Et Al Plaintiff Vs. Citizens Property Ins Corp Defendant

Case Number: 20STCV33913 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling Judge Joel L. Lofton, Department X HEARING DATE: July 9, 2024 TRIAL DATE: No date set. CASE: Choi, et al. v. Marchino CASE NO.: 20STCV33913 MOTION TO SEAL AND/OR REDACT RECORDS MOVING PARTY : Defendant Filippo Marchino RESPONDING PARTY : Plaintiffs Ik Hoon Choi and Hannah Choi SERVICE: OK. Filed/served June 6, 2024. OPPOSITION: Unopposed; nine court days prior, via email. (CCP 1010.6(a)(3)(B) requires 2 additional court days for email; often disregarded by counsel w/ no objection from OP.) REPLY: Unopposed; five court days prior, via email. (Same CPCP 1010.6 error, no objection.) RELIEF REQUESTED Defendant Filippo Marchino moves to seal and/or redact pleadings, trial exhibits, and portions of trial transcripts containing any personal address formerly affiliated with Defendant. (Mot., 1:25-28.) BACKGROUND This is a dog bite case. Plaintiffs Ik Hoon Choi and Hannah Choi sued defendant Filippo Marchino on September 4, 2020, asserting a single cause of action for negligence. The case was tried to a jury; the jury returned a verdict on May 6, 2024, finding that Defendants dog did not bite plaintiff Ik Soon Choi as alleged. (05-06-2024 Minute Order, p. 2.) The Court entered judgment for Defendant against plaintiff Ik Soon Choi on June 7, 2024, and amended its judgment to include plaintiff Hannah Choi on June 21, 2024. On June 6, 2024, after the verdict but before judgment was entered, Defendant filed the instant motion to seal or redact references to his address that appear in the record. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs opposed Defendants motion, and on July 1, 2024, Defendant replied. TENTATIVE RULING The motion is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open to the public.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).)¿In order to seal court records, a party must first obtain a court order via noticed motion. ( Id. , Rule 2.511(a), (b)(1).) In order to issue such an order, the court must find: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. ( Id. , Rule 2.550(d); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (Locke) (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217-1218.) DISCUSSION Defendant has not made the showing necessary for the Court to order records sealed or redacted. Defendant argues disclosure of his (former) personal address violates his right to privacy. The Court is not convinced it does; regardless, Defendants right to privacy does not, by itself, override the publics right of access to Court records. Defendant attests he has been followed, harassed, had websites put up about [him], stalked, and robbed, and [g]oons were sent to [his] house as a result of some of his work as a consumer rights litigator. (Marcino Decl., ¶ 2.) This brief conclusory testimony does not demonstrate a substantial probability that his safety will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed. Defendant has also not proposed specific, narrowly tailored redactions. He seeks an order sealing the entire trial transcript and multiple pages of twenty-five (25) other filings, as well as seven deposition records and audio recordings in their entirety. The proposal is not narrowly tailored, nor has Defendant demonstrated it is the least restrictive means of achieving his objective. Finally, perhaps most importantly: Defendant had the opportunity to seek a protective order or to move for an order sealing this information from public view at a prior time. [T]here is no justification for sealing records that contain only facts already known or available to the public. ( H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe ¿(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 898.) Defendants motion is denied. CONCLUSION Defendants motion is denied. Moving party to give notice. Dated: July 9, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org

Case Number: 20STCV30564 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT JANE DOE L.P., Plaintiff, vs. DOWNEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV30564 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe L.P. served a Notice of Taking Deposition of Defendant Downey Unified School Districts Person Most Knowledgeable and Fact Witness Principal Tom Houts and Request for Production of Documents (RFPs) on Defendant Downey Unified School District. On February 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to RFP No. 4. At the March 19, 2024, hearing, the Court found that some information about K.G., such as that related to Defendants knowledge of his prior similar misconduct and need for supervision, may be relevant. However, the Court found that RFP No. 4 was overbroad. The Court also noted that the request infringed on K.G.s privacy rights without giving him notice before the disclosure. Accordingly, the Court continued the hearing, ordered the parties to meet and confer about the scope of RFP No. 4, and ordered Defendant to provide K.G.s guardians last known address and phone number to Plaintiff so that Plaintiff could provide notice of the motion and the continued hearing date. On May 3, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a supplemental declaration. Plaintiff has served K.G.s guardian with notice of the motion via U.S. mail and email. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 13.) Since the last hearing, Plaintiff and Defendant have been discussing the scope of RFP No. 4. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6-10.) However, from April 18, 2024 through May 1, 2024, Defendants counsel stopped responding to Plaintiffs counsel. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 11.) At the June 4, 2024 hearing, the Court ordered supplemental briefing and continued the hearing. Defendant timely filed a supplemental brief with exhibits. One of these exhibits is an email from K.Gs guardian in response to a conversation with Defendants counsel, which states, I do not Authorize Downey Unified School District to release [K.G.s] school records. And also [K.G.] will be pleading the Fifth Amendment. (Evenstad Decl., Ex. D.) As propounded, RFP No. 4 requests Any and all SCHOOL RECORDS in YOUR possession, custody or control for K.G. SCHOOL RECORDS is defined as any and all written notes, memos, reports, or other writings regarding a student including but not limited to report cards, progress reports, letters, notes, nurses notes, attendance records, health records, incident reports, IEP reports, correspondence, class schedules, or any other written material having anything whatsoever to do with the student in YOUR possession, custody or control. Defendants last specific offer (March 26, 2024) was for K.G.s student profile, enrollment history, attendance history, entry into the special education program dates, and the September 2019 IEP outlining the supervision/services that his IEP called for at the time of the incident. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 7.) On April 23, 2024, Defendants counsel communicated that she think[s] the production should be limited to the IEP in place at the time of the incident, which is really the only thing that would meet the directly relevant standard. (Evenstad Supple Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiffs last request (April 25, 2024) was for K.G.s student profile, enrollment history, class schedule for the 2019-2020 school year, entry into the special education program dates, IEP/504 Triennial Plans for the time period of August 1, 2012 - December 6, 2019, behavioral and psychosocial reports up until December 6, 2019, Disciplinary Records from August 1, 2012 - December 6, 2019, if any, which shall include written/recording verbal warnings, written warnings, incident reports, suspensions, detentions, complaints regarding behavioral issues and incidents, reprimands, and any similar admonishments of inappropriate behavior demonstrated by K.G. (Baldermann Suppl. Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 11.) In its supplemental opposition, Defendant now asks the Court to limit the production to K.G.s student profile with his demographic information and enrollment history and special education program information, which includes the special education programs and dates from 2011 through the time of the incident; K.G.s September 2019 IEP; and K.G.s discipline history from the start of summer school 2019 until the incident, which is the only time that plaintiff and K.G. attended Downey High School. (Suppl. Opposition at p. 4.) Defendant contends that it cannot offer more or less supervision of a student where it is not called for in an IEP and agreed to by the parent, and a school cannot implement any special education program or provide services to a child if the parent doesnt agree to them. (Suppl. Opposition at pp. 6-7.) However, Defendant focuses only on the IEPs requirement of parental consent to the provision of special education and related services, not Defendants general duty to supervise and protect against foreseeable harms for all students. (See id. at pp. 6-8 [citing Education Code sections 56340, 56341, 56341.1, 56345].) California courts have long recognized that a student may recover for injuries proximately caused by a breach of [a schools] duty to supervise. ( M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518.) The existence of a duty of care of a school district toward a student depends, in part, on whether the particular harm to the student is reasonably foreseeable. ( Ibid. ) The harm may be foreseeable when the alleged perpetrator was repeatedly disciplined for grave acts of defiance and inappropriate and violent behavior. ( Id. at p. 520.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2019, her one-on-one aide abandoned her, resulting in Plaintiff being assaulted by K.G. (Complaint ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant negligently failed to carry out its duties to properly and adequately supervise Plaintiff L.P. and failed to discipline, investigate, warn, appropriately supervise, or suspend [K.G.] despite having actual or constructive knowledge that he had engaged in inappropriate conduct with other minor student. (Complaint ¶¶ 23, 46.) Accordingly, Defendants limitation to K.Gs student profile, September 2019 IEP, and discipline history from summer 2019 is too narrow. The limitation for K.G.s discipline history for the only time that plaintiff and K.G. attended Downey High School is particularly too narrow if Defendant had additional knowledge of K.G.s behavior from prior attendance at other schools in Defendants district. The motion to compel further is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is ordered to respond to RFP No. 4 by producing the following documents to Plaintiff within 30 days: K.G.s student profile; enrollment history; class schedule for the 2019-2020 school year; dates of entry into the special education program; IEP/504 Triennial Plans for the time period of August 1, 2012 to December 6, 2019; behavioral and psychosocial reports up until December 6, 2019; and Disciplinary Records from August 1, 2012 to December 6, 2019, if any, including written/recording verbal warnings, written warnings, incident reports, suspensions, detentions, complaints regarding behavioral issues and incidents, reprimands, and any similar admonishments of inappropriate behavior demonstrated by K.G. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23CHCV00240 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F49 Dept. F49 Date: 7/9/24 Case Name: James Howard v. Prosper Benhaim Case No. 23CHCV00240 LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH VALLEY DISTRICT DEPARTMENT F49 JULY 9, 2024 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23CHCV00240 Motion filed: 2/1/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendant Prosper Benhaim (Benhaim or the Defendant) RESPONDING PARTY: None. NOTICE: OK. RELIEF REQUESTED: A judgment on Plaintiffs Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED without LEAVE TO AMEND. BACKGROUND On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff James Howard (Howard or Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging Medical Malpractice. Subsequently, on March 8, 2023, Defendant filed his Answer to the Complaint. On January 29, 2024, Department F51 Court granted Defendants unopposed motions to compel Plaintiffs responses to discovery requests, and to deem admitted his Requests for Admission, Set One, filed on November 3, 2023. (1/29/24 Minute Order). On February 1, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (the Motion). No Opposition or Reply papers have been received by the Court. ANALYSIS A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the equivalent of a demurrer made after the pleadings are in. ( Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739, 746 [quoting Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 463].) A party may move for a judgment on the pleadings as to an entire complaint or as to a particular cause of action in a complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438, subd. (c)(2)(A).) If a defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings and argues that a complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant, then the court should grant a defendants motion only if the court finds as a matter of law that the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., §¿438, subd.(c)(1)(B)(ii); see also Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677.) The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Bezirdjian v. OReilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321.) A judgment on the pleadings attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d); Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court should assume that all facts alleged are true and should liberally construe the alleged facts with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties. (See Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232; Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. ( Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.) Whether a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted with or without leave to amend depends on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment& ( Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402 [quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318].) When a cure is a reasonable possibility, the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting leave to amend& ( Ibid .) A. Meet and Confer Requirement Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a) provides, Before filing a statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) However, determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to grant or deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Furthermore, [t]he moving party shall file and serve with the motion for judgment on the pleadings a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the claims raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the moving party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(3).) Here, Defendants counsel attests that on January 31, 2024, he called and spoke to Plaintiff in order to meet and confer regarding issues raised in the Motion. (Corson Decl. ¶ 7.) According to Defendants counsels declaration, during the meet and confer phone call, Plaintiff stated that he understood that Defendant would be seeking a dismissal based on matters deemed admitted, and Plaintiff indicated that he would try and get his case back in order. ( Ibid .) Based on the above records, the Court determines that the requirements for meet and confer have been sufficiently met. B. Requests for Judicial Notice Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: (1) This Courts January 29, 2024 Minute Order Deeming the Truth of Matters Specified in Requests for Admission Propounded on Plaintiff JAMES HOWARD Admitted (attached hereto as Exhibit A). (2) Defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D.s Request For Admissions, Set No. 1, Propounded on Plaintiff JAMES HOWARD (attached hereto as Exhibit B). A court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Dwan v. Dixon (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 260, 265; Foster v. Gray (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 434, 439.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants Request for Judicial Notice. C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 1) Cause of Action Medical Malpractice A prima facie case for medical malpractice consists of (1) a duty to conform to the relevant standard of care; (2) a breach of that duty, i.e., the negligent conduct; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting damage. ( Lattimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)¿A healthcare provider is negligent if he or she fails to use the level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that other reasonably careful healthcare providers of the same type would use in the same or similar circumstances. ( Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 408.) Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs action is barred because Plaintiff was deemed to have admitted that he had no basis for his action against Defendant. Specifically, it was deemed admitted that defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D., complied with the STANDARD OF CARE at all times when rendering treatment to [Plaintiff], that any action taken by defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D., was not a SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR in causing any INJURY to [Plaintiff], that any action which was not taken by defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D. was not a SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR in causing any INJURY to [Plaintiff], and that to a reasonable degree of medical probability [Plaintiff] have not suffered any INJURY due to a breach of the STANDARD OF CARE by defendant PROSPER BENHAIM, M.D. (RJN, Ex. A, and B.) Defendant contends that by these admissions, which demonstrate the absence of the necessary elements for the claim, Plaintiff cannot sufficiently state a cause of action for Medical Malpractice. (Mot. at pp. 4-5.) The Court agrees. The Court notes that a complaint's al legations may be disregarded when they conflict with judicially noticed discovery responses. ( Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 83.) Acc ordingly, a ple ading valid on its face may nevertheless be subject to demurrer when judicially noticed admissions render the complaint meritless. ( Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) Here, in alignment with these established precedents, the judicial notice of the Minute Order dated January 29, 2024, deeming matters admitted by Plaintiff, is dispositive in this case. The admissions conclusively establish that Defendant did not act below the standard of care and that no act or omission by Defendant was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs alleged injuries. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the essential elements of a medical malpractice claim. Therefore, given that Plaintiff has admitted that his action against Defendant was meritless, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 2) Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Ibid .) Here, Plaintiff does not submit any Opposition to the Motion or argue there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment, failing to meet his burden. Moreover, even assuming that Plaintiffs single-page Complaint may be amended to state a cause of action, it does not overcome the judicially noticed admissions rendering a valid complaint meritless. (See Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co ., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 604.) Accordingly, the Court DENIES leave to amend. CONCLUSION Defendants unopposed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Moving party to give notice.

22CV02834 JOHN ROE 1 et al. v. MOUNTAIN VIEW WHISMAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR STAY, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO CONTINUE TRIAL SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION TO COMPEL MENTAL EXAMINATION AND TESTING OF PLAINTIFF ROE 3 AND PLAINTIFF ROE 4 The motion to continue trial is denied. The motion to compel is granted. Motion to continue trial While Dr. Scott has another trial appearance slated for early October 2024, the parties and trial court can fashion a witness schedule to accommodate his other trial and conference commitments. Motion to compel mental exam and testing of plaintiffs Page 1 of 4 The parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the length of time which should be permitted for evaluation by psychiatrist Dr. Charles Scott. Plaintiffs assert a total of 8 hours per plaintiff is sufficient for examinations by both Drs. Hooker and Scott. Defendant contends Dr. Scott requires up to 8 hours of testing and Dr. Hooker requires up to 4 hours of testing. In support of this position, Dr. Scott provided a declaration explaining why up to 8 hours is required. Having reviewed his declaration, the court finds it sufficient to establish good cause to compel examination and testing of Roes 3 and 4 with Dr. Scott for up to 8 hours and for up to 4 hours with Dr. Hooker. That is, a total of 12 hours for each plaintiff. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2032.320, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs also assert they do not want to sign the document titled “Informational/Agreement For Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation” from UC Davis Health, School of Medicine before Dr. Scott’s evaluation, because it “may cause them to waive certain fundamental rights.” (Opp at pg. 7.) A copy of the form is attached to Dr. Scott’s declaration as exhibit C-2. The court reviewed the form and did not find it contained any waivers except the doctor-patient relationship and the duty of confidentiality that accompanies the relationship, which is expected given the context of the evaluation. Plaintiffs did raise any specific issues with the form, so the court is unable to further address their concerns regarding this form. Defendant SCCS’s Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request for the court take judicial notice of the first amended complaint and certificates of merit for Defendant Does 1 and 2 are denied since the court need not take judicial notice of records in its own file. Defendants SCCC’s Second Request for Judicial Notice 1. Court order in Doe v. Familiesfirst Inc. 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 36211. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 2. Court order in Jaber v. Cal. Envtl. Sys., 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 61456. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 3. Court order in Aguilar v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles 2021 Cal.Super. LEXIS 42435. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 4. Order on defendants SCCS’s Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Alternative, to Continue Trial Date, dated May 15, 2025. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of its own court records. Page 2 of 4 5. Oral Argument Notice from Court of Appeal First Appellate District dated June 25, 2024, appellate case no. A169314. Granted. 6. Temporary Stay Order from Court of Appeal Second Appellate District filed June 26, 2024, appellate case no. B334707. Granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

FCS057573 Motions for Contempt TENTATIVE RULING: Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied. No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to the court. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a contempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1

BAILEY VS. SHASTA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0203011 This matter is on calendar for review. The matter was stayed following a stipulation of the parties due to a related Federal Action. Nothing has been filed informing the Court of the status of the Federal Action. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 17STLC02908 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 26 Mercury Ins. Co. v. De La Rosa, et al. VACATE DISMISSAL AND ENTER JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO STIPULATION (CCP § 664.6) TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Mercury Insurance Companys Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR AND AGAINST DEFENDANT JOHAN VASQUEZ DE LA ROSA AKA JOHNAN DELAROSA VASQUEZ IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,050.00 PRINCIPAL, COSTS OF $529.50.00, AND ATTORNEYS FEES OF $875.00. ANALYSIS: On October 11, 2017, Plaintiff Mercury Insurance Company (Plaintiff) filed this subrogation action against Defendant Johan Vasquez De La Rosa aka Johnan Delarosa Vasquez (Defendant). Defendant filed an answer on November 22, 2017. On May 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal and retention of jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. The Court dismissed the action pursuant to the request on the same date. (Request for Dismissal, filed 05/11/18.) On May 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Vacate Dismissal, Enforce Settlement, and Enter Judgment. To date, no opposition has been filed. Discussion The instant motion is brought under Code of Civil Procedure, section 664.6, which states in relevant part: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).) Prior to January 1, 2021, parties under section 664.6 meant the litigants themselves, not their attorneys. ( Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 586.) The current statute provides that parties includes an attorney who represents the party and an insurers agent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (b).) The settlement must include the signatures of the parties seeking to enforce the agreement, and against whom enforcement is sought. ( J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 985.) The settlement agreement complies with the statutory requirements set forth above because it was signed by both parties. (Motion, Thai Decl., Exh. 1, p. 3.) Furthermore, the request for retention of jurisdiction must be made in writing, by the parties, before the action is dismissed for the Courts retention of jurisdiction to conform to the statutory language. ( Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 433 [If, after a suit has been dismissed, a party brings a section 664.6 motion for a judgment on a settlement agreement but cannot present to the court a request for retention of jurisdiction that meets all of these requirements, then enforcement of the agreement must be left to a separate lawsuit.].) The parties request for retention of jurisdiction complies with these requirements because it was made in writing to the Court before the action was dismissed. (Motion, Thai Decl., Exh. 1, ¶1; Request for Dismissal, 05/11/18, ¶1(b)(6).) The settlement provides that Defendant would pay Plaintiff $14,000.00 in monthly payments following their execution of the agreement. (Motion, Thai Decl., Exh. 1, ¶1.) The settlement agreement also provides that upon Defendants default, Plaintiff may seek judgment in the demand of the Complaint ($17,873.22) plus costs of $370.00 for filing and $99.50 for service, actual attorneys fees and costs, minus any monies paid. ( Ibid .) Payments of $11,950.00 were made towards the settlement, after which Defendant defaulted. ( Id . at ¶5 and Exh. 3.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff requests entry of judgment against Defendant in the amount of $2,050.00 principal ($14,000.00 - $11,950.00), costs of $529.50.00, and attorneys fees of $875.00. ( Id . at ¶9.) Conclusion Plaintiff Mercury Insurance Companys Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN PLAINTIFFS FAVOR AND AGAINST DEFENDANT JOHAN VASQUEZ DE LA ROSA AKA JOHNAN DELAROSA VASQUEZ IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,050.00 PRINCIPAL, COSTS OF $529.50.00, AND ATTORNEYS FEES OF $875.00. Moving party to give notice.

22CV02834 JOHN ROE 1 et al. v. MOUNTAIN VIEW WHISMAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION FOR STAY, OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO CONTINUE TRIAL SANTA CRUZ CITY SCHOOL’S MOTION TO COMPEL MENTAL EXAMINATION AND TESTING OF PLAINTIFF ROE 3 AND PLAINTIFF ROE 4 The motion to continue trial is denied. The motion to compel is granted. Motion to continue trial While Dr. Scott has another trial appearance slated for early October 2024, the parties and trial court can fashion a witness schedule to accommodate his other trial and conference commitments. Motion to compel mental exam and testing of plaintiffs Page 1 of 4 The parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the length of time which should be permitted for evaluation by psychiatrist Dr. Charles Scott. Plaintiffs assert a total of 8 hours per plaintiff is sufficient for examinations by both Drs. Hooker and Scott. Defendant contends Dr. Scott requires up to 8 hours of testing and Dr. Hooker requires up to 4 hours of testing. In support of this position, Dr. Scott provided a declaration explaining why up to 8 hours is required. Having reviewed his declaration, the court finds it sufficient to establish good cause to compel examination and testing of Roes 3 and 4 with Dr. Scott for up to 8 hours and for up to 4 hours with Dr. Hooker. That is, a total of 12 hours for each plaintiff. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2032.320, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs also assert they do not want to sign the document titled “Informational/Agreement For Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation” from UC Davis Health, School of Medicine before Dr. Scott’s evaluation, because it “may cause them to waive certain fundamental rights.” (Opp at pg. 7.) A copy of the form is attached to Dr. Scott’s declaration as exhibit C-2. The court reviewed the form and did not find it contained any waivers except the doctor-patient relationship and the duty of confidentiality that accompanies the relationship, which is expected given the context of the evaluation. Plaintiffs did raise any specific issues with the form, so the court is unable to further address their concerns regarding this form. Defendant SCCS’s Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants request for the court take judicial notice of the first amended complaint and certificates of merit for Defendant Does 1 and 2 are denied since the court need not take judicial notice of records in its own file. Defendants SCCC’s Second Request for Judicial Notice 1. Court order in Doe v. Familiesfirst Inc. 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 36211. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 2. Court order in Jaber v. Cal. Envtl. Sys., 2018 Cal.Super. LEXIS 61456. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 3. Court order in Aguilar v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles 2021 Cal.Super. LEXIS 42435. Denied. Trial court orders have no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761.) 4. Order on defendants SCCS’s Motion to Stay Proceedings in the Alternative, to Continue Trial Date, dated May 15, 2025. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of its own court records. Page 2 of 4 5. Oral Argument Notice from Court of Appeal First Appellate District dated June 25, 2024, appellate case no. A169314. Granted. 6. Temporary Stay Order from Court of Appeal Second Appellate District filed June 26, 2024, appellate case no. B334707. Granted. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.