Proof of Service: AYALA MORALES, LEOVIGILDO vs. AYALA MORALES, LEOVIGILDO

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Friday, July 26, 2024, Line 15. DEFENDANT MAVENFORM, INC. DBA PATHRISE, LEIF TECHNOLOGIES, INC AND LEIF SERVICING, LLC's Motion To Compel Arbitration And Stay Proceedings. Continued to August 12, 2024 on the court's motion for failure to timely comply with Local Rule 2.7(B) (courtesy copies). =(302/RCE)

S-CV-0052534 Atwood, Patricia vs. Fullerton, Sheryl Trial Date & Length: 01/12/26 5 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 01/02/26 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 12/19/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.

Case Number: 24STCV10898 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Friday, July 26, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 24STCV10898 CASE NAME: Akemi Minami v. Wesley Minami, et al. MOVING PARTY: Defendants Wesley Minami, Raquel Minami, and Bekon Corporation OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Akemi Minami TRIAL DATE: Not Set PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: Motion for Order Requiring Plaintiff to Post Bond OPPOSITION: 11 July 2024 REPLY: 17 July 2024 TENTATIVE: Defendants Motion requiring Plaintiff to Post Bond pursuant to Corp. Code § 800(c) is denied. Defendants to give notice. Background On May 1, 2024, Akemi Minami (Plaintiff), individually and derivatively on behalf of the Nominal Defendant Bekon Corporation, filed a Complaint against Wesley Minami (Wesley); Raquel Minami (Raquel), and Bekon Corporation (collectively Defendants). The Complaint alleges the following ten causes of action: 1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty (derivatively) against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 3) Fraud - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 4) Conversion - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 5) Violation of Pen. Code § 496 - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 6) Violation of corp. Code § 1001 - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 7) Failure to Permit Inspection of Records - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; 8) Unjust Enrichment (individually and derivatively) - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel; and 9) Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200) - against Defendants Wesley and Raquel. On June 21, 2024, Defendants filed a motion requiring Plaintiff to Post a Bond pursuant to Corp. Code § 800(d). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court. motIon requiring plaintiff to post bond I. Legal Standard Corp. Code § 800 states in relevant part: (c) [In a shareholder derivative suit], at any time within 30 days after service of summons upon the corporation or upon any defendant who is an officer or director of the corporation, or held such office at the time of the acts complained of, the corporation or the defendant may move the court for an order, upon notice and hearing, requiring the plaintiff to furnish a bond as hereinafter provided. The motion shall be based upon one or both of the following grounds: (1) That there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the cause of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party will benefit the corporation or its shareholders. (2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not participate in the transaction complained of in any capacity. The court on application of the corporation or any defendant may, for good cause shown, extend the 30-day period for an additional period or periods not exceeding 60 days. (d) At the hearing upon any motion pursuant to subdivision (c), the court shall consider such evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be material (1) to the ground or grounds upon which the motion is based, or (2) to a determination of the probable reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, of the corporation and the moving party which will be incurred in the defense of the action. If the court determines, after hearing the evidence adduced by the parties, that the moving party has established a probability in support of any of the grounds upon which the motion is based, the court shall fix the amount of the bond, not to exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), to be furnished by the plaintiff for reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, which may be incurred by the moving party and the corporation in connection with the action, including expenses for which the corporation may become liable pursuant to Section 317 . A ruling by the court on the motion shall not be a determination of any issue in the action or of the merits thereof. If the court, upon the motion, makes a determination that a bond shall be furnished by the plaintiff as to any one or more defendants, the action shall be dismissed as to the defendant or defendants, unless the bond required by the court has been furnished within such reasonable time as may be fixed by the court. III. Discussion Plaintiff brought this action to assert her ownership rights in the Bekon Corporation. The Complaint alleges that after her husband passed away in 2001, his brother, Masaru Minami (Masaru), hid the fact that Plaintiff was the successor in interest of her husbands 23.3% shares in the Bekon Corporation. (Corp. Code, ¶¶ 5, 7, 8.) After Masaru passed away in December 2023, his wife Raquel Masaru (Raquel) and his son Wesley Minami (Wesley) tried to pressure Plaintiff into selling her ownership interest in the Bekon Corporation and excluded Plaintiff from the corporation, failed to give Plaintiff notice of shareholders meetings as the Bylaws require, failed to permit Plaintiff to exercise votes on corporate decisions, and paid Masaru and his family members distributions, thinly disguised as officer compensation, without similarly paying Plaintiff distributions proportionate to her 23.3% interest in the Corporation. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 26.) Moreover, Wesley and Raquel hid the sale of Bekons sole asset, the Fairview Property, without Plaintiffs knowledge or consent and caused Bekon to purchase a property in North Carolina as part of a 1031 exchange transaction in a manner that placed the interest of Wesley and Raquel ahead of Plaintiffs interest. (Compl. ¶ 26.) Defendants request that Plaintiff post a bond in the amount of $50,000.00 pursuant to Corp. Code § 800(c) on the grounds that (1) there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the purported causes of action alleged in the Complaint will benefit Defendant Bekon Corporation or its shareholders; and (2) Bekon Corporation will incur fees and costs more than $200,000.00 defending this action. The purpose of the section 800 security provision is to prevent unwarranted shareholder derivative lawsuits. [Citations.] The justification for the security is derived from the fact that the cause of action and potential remedy belong to the corporation, not the shareholder [citation], and the corporation has chosen not to pursue the litigation. ( Donner Management Co. v. Schaffer ( 2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305 ( Donner ).) In assessing whether there is no reasonable possibility the action will benefit the corporation, the court must evaluate the possible defenses which the plaintiffs would have to overcome before they could prevail at trial. ( Id . at pp. 13031304.) The burden lies with Defendants to show that this action is not beneficial to the corporation. ( Donner , supra , 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) Specifically, th ere is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the cause[s] of action alleged in the complaint against the [Defendants] will benefit the [Bekon Corporation] or its shareholders. (Corp. Code, § 800(c)(1).) Defendants admit that Masaru was the only shareholder in attendance at the 2023 annual shareholder meeting when he appointed himself, his wife, and his sons as the sole directors of the Bekon Corporation. (Wesley Minami Decl., ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that she was never given notice of this shareholder meeting or Board meeting when the Board of Directors made up exclusively of Defendants, retroactively approved all corporate actions for the past 50 years. (Compl., ¶¶ 23, 24.) The Complaint further alleges that on March 13, 2024, Bekons sole asset, the Fairview Property was sold, without Plaintiffs knowledge or consent. (Compl., ¶ 15.) Defendants admit that it was not until May 14, 2024, that Plaintiff was allowed to participate in Bekon Corporations annual shareholder meeting, which occurred after the sale of the Fairview Property and the filing of this action. (Wesley Minami Decl., ¶ 22.) Moreover, the Complaint alleges a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation because it alleges that Defendants failed to preserve Bekons assets and comply with its bylaws and engaged in self-dealing by paying themselves an excessive officer compensation thereby depriving Bekon the bulk of its profits. (Comp., ¶¶ 32, 33, 34.) The Complaint further alleges that Defendants sold the Fairview Property and purchased the North Carolina Property outside the usual and regular course of business in violation of Corp. Code § 1001(a). (Compl., ¶¶ 63, 64.) The Complaint also alleges that Bekon Corporation was harmed because Defendants engaged in self-dealing because they paid themselves dividends disguised as Officer compensation. (Compl, ¶ 74-77.) A shareholder derivative suit seeks to enforce the corporations rights and redress the corporations injuries when the board of directors fails or refuses to do so. ( Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1108.) An action is deemed derivative if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock and property without any severance or distribution among individual holders, or it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the dissipation of its assets. [Citation]. ( Ibid . [internal quotation marks omitted].) The court finds that the first, sixth, eighth, and ninth causes of actions allege facts to show that Plaintiffs seek recovery of assets in the form of payments made to Defendants under the guise of Officer compensation and to force Defendants to adhere to Bekons bylaws and the Corporations Code. As to Plaintiffs other allegations, such as the fact that Plaintiff has been prevented from participating in the affairs of the corporation and denied the right to inspect the books, they are intended to assert Plaintiffs personal rights as a shareholder, and not those of the corporation such that a bond is not required. (See Hagan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1960) 53 Cal.2d 498, 503 [T his part of the complaint in intervention asserts rights that are indisputably personal to petitioners . . . It is therefore in excess of the jurisdiction of respondent court to condition the vindication of these rights upon a posting of security.]) In sum, Defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that this action will not be beneficial to the Bekon Corporation or its shareholders. To the extent that Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not assert a derivative claim or lacks standing to bring a derivative action because she failed to make a litigation demand to the board pursuant to Corp. Code § 800(b)(2), such a finding would also compel this court to deny the motion to post a bond because section 800(c) is only applicable to derivative actions, not individual suits. For this reason, the court declines to decide the above issues on the merits because it has no bearing on whether Plaintiff is required to post a bond. Based on the above, the Motion is denied. Conclusion Defendants Motion requiring Plaintiff to Post Bond pursuant to Corp. Code § 800(c) is denied. Defendants to give notice.

MOTION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING CHAUDHRY VS SHARMA, CVRI2202087 PLAINTIFF TO POST AN D.D.S UNDERTAKING Tentative Ruling: Appearances required.

DEMURRER TO SECOND CVRI2305206 LAM VS ROHR, INC. AMENDED COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: Overrule as to causes of action one through five. Sustain as to the sixth cause of action without leave to amend. Sustain as to the seventh cause of action with 20 days’ leave to amend.

Motion to Strike Complaint of DEMI HELEN CVPS2401473 PECINA vs RAGNARSSON PECINA by HILMAR RAGNARSSON Tentative Ruling: Hearing continued. Court to provide notice.

DENT VS. DENT Case Number: 22EA-0200030 This matter is trailing the Dent Trust matter. (Case No. CVPV21-0031299). That matter is being continued to September 30, 2024. Based on the foregoing, this matter is likewise continued to Monday, September 30, 2024, at 2:30 p.m. in Department 44 to trail the trust matter. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24STCV10112 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING SHANNON ROSE STECKLOFF , vs. CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, et al. Case No.: 24STCV10112 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Defendants Clifton Hollidays, Carol Hollidays, and Jasmine Hollidays motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Shannon Rose Steckloffs complaint is overruled. Defendants Clifton Holliday (Clifton), Carol Holliday (Carol), and Jasmine Holliday (Jasmine) (collectively, Defendants) move to strike portions of Plaintiff Shannon Rose Steckloffs (Steckloff) (Plaintiff) complaint (Complaint) to support an award for punitive damages in the following portions of the Complaint: (1) ¶25 was malicious in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in severe injury to others, and was conduct so base and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people; (2) ¶25B malicious; (3) ¶25E malicious; (4) ¶26 malicious and acted with malice in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in serious injury to others, and in a base and contemptible manner that would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people; (5) ¶40 was malicious in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in severe injury to others, and was conduct so base and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people; (6) ¶40B malicious; (7) ¶40E malicious; (8) ¶41 malicious and acted with malice in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in serious injury to others, and in a base and contemptible manner that would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people; (9) ¶52 was malicious in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in severe injury to others, and was conduct so base and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people; (10) ¶52B malicious; (11) ¶52E malicious; (12) ¶53 malicious and acted with malice in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in serious injury to others, and in a base and contemptible manner that would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people; and (13) Prayer ¶4 For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof. (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §436(a).) Background Plaintiff filed her operative Complaint on April 22, 2024, against Defendants alleging two causes of action: (1) strict liability; and (2) negligence arising from alleged injuries Plaintiff suffered from an attack by Defendants dog. On June 3, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion. On July 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On July 24, 2024, Defendants filed their reply. Meet and Confer Before filing a motion to strike, moving partys counsel must meet and confer, in person, telephone, or by video conference with counsel for the party who filed the pleading in an attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing a motion to strike. (C.C.P. §435.5.) A declaration must be filed with the motion to strike regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §435.5(a)(3).) Defendants counsel declares that on May 22, 2024, she spoke with Plaintiffs counsel by telephone regarding the instant motion, and the parties were unable to come to an agreement. (Decl. of Boiadjian ¶2.) Therefore, Defendants motion to strike is proper. Motion to Strike Legal Standard C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (C.C.P. §436(a).) Summary of Motion Defendants move to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages on the basis Plaintiffs complaint alleges nothing more than conduct that might support claims of negligence or common law and statutory strict liability. (Motion, pg. 6.) Punitive Damages Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code §3294(a).) Malice is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. ( Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Oppression means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the persons rights. ( Id. ) Fraud is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. ( Id. ) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. ( Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded to willful misconduct conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm. ( Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10, quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286.) Despicable Conduct is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. ( Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) [C]onclusory characterization of defendants conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, within the meaning of section 3294. ( Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Plaintiffs Complaint alleges: Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, the dog owned by defendants CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY and DOES 1-10 was vicious. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY, and DOES 1-10 were aware of the dogs vicious nature and propensities. Defendants, and each of them, knew that the dog was inherently and naturally violent and vicious. Prior to the incident giving rise to this action, defendants, and each of them, were aware that the dog had previously escaped from their yard and attacked and bitten people and other dogs, in addition to having aggressively barked, growled and threatened the public. Notwithstanding their knowledge of the dogs vicious propensities, defendants CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY and DOES 1-10 failed to leash, tether, chain, muzzle or otherwise take measures to ensure that the dog would not attack any person or member of the public. Notwithstanding their knowledge of the dogs vicious propensities, defendants CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY, and DOES 1-20, failed to provide a secure, enclosed, protected yard for the dog; and otherwise failed to take measures to ensure that the dog would not escape the yard and attack members of the public. (Complaint ¶13-16.) Plaintiffs allegations pertaining to Defendants knowledge that their dog had previously escaped from their yard and attacked and bitten people and other dogs, combined with the allegation that Defendants failed to leash, tether, chain, muzzle, or otherwise take measures to ensure that the dog would not attack any person or member of the public and the allegation that Defendants failed to provide a secured, enclosed, protected yard for the dog and otherwise failed to take measures to ensure that the dog would not escape the yard and attack members of the public are sufficient facts to allege malice. ( See Complaint ¶¶13, 15-16; Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 807, 818 [[T]he defendants conscious disregard of the plaintiffs rights or safety will be sufficient to support a finding of malice or oppression, as long as the conduct is also deemed to be despicable.].) Here, Defendants alleged conduct rises to the level of despicable conduct because a reasonable person would find the alleged conscious disregard for the danger posed by Defendants dog and conscious decision to not contain the dog in an enclosure that would ensure the dog would not escape would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary people. ( See id. ) Accordingly, Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages from the Complaint is overruled. Conclusion Defendants motion to strike is overruled. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court