Preview
20STCV06185
Assigned for all purposes to: Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Judicial Officer: Barbara Scheper
Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 02/14/2020 01:39 AM Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Barel,Deputy Clerk
1 Azar Mouzari, Esq. (State Bar No. 263461)
BEVERLY HILLS TRIAL ATTORNEYS, P.C.
2 468 N. Camden Drive, Suite 238
Beverly Hills, California 90210
3
Tel: 310-858-5567
4 Fax: 424-286-0963
Email: azar@bhtrialattorneys.com
5
Attorneys for Plaintiff Pamela Hill
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT
9
10
PAMELA HILL, an individual. Case No.:
11
Plaintiff,
12 v.
13 COMPLAINT
GUESS ?, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
14 and DOES 1-10, inclusive.
15 Defendants.
16 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
17
18
Plaintiff, Mrs. Pamela Hill (“Plaintiff”), alleges the following based upon information and
19
belief:
20
21 I. NATURE OF THE CASE
22 1. Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against Guess ?, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
23 (“Defendant”) seeking to put an end to the systemic civil rights violations committed by
24
Defendant against Plaintiff.
25
2. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who requires screen-reading
26
27 software to access and read website content using her computer. Plaintiff uses the terms “blind”
28 or “visually-impaired” herein to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
COMPLAINT
-1-
1 definition of blindness in that they fall within the meaning of California’s Unruh Civil Rights
2 Act (“UCRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq. and have a visual acuity with correction of less than
3
or equal to 20 x 200.
4
3. Plaintiff, and all other visually impaired individuals, are unnecessarily denied equal
5
access to the same online information and goods and services offered to others because
6
7 Defendant’s website, https://shop.guess.com/ (the “Website”), and all subgroups of webpages
8 contained in the Website are not fully accessible to screen-reading technology used by blind
9
individuals. This relegates visually impaired customers of Defendant to a second-class
10
experience. If Defendant’s Website was accessible, then visually impaired individuals could
11
independently access information relating to the pricing, description, and details of Defendant’s
12
13 goods and services, with the same convenience available to others. In contrast with Defendant,
14 many other businesses operate websites and mobile applications that are fully accessible to
15 visually impaired individuals.
16
4. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant produces, markets, offers
17
for sale, sells, and/or monetizes designer retail products and goods, including clothing, personal
18
19 goods and/or accessories, in various retailers including one(s) located within the County of Los
20 Angeles, California. The retail store(s) that offer Defendant’s products are commercial stores
21 that offer for sale clothing, accessories and other goods to the public. The retail store(s) that
22
offer Defendant’s products, including the one(s) within the County of Los Angeles, California,
23
are places of public accommodation open to the public.
24
25 5. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owns, operates, manages,
26 updates and/or monetizes its Website, which provides to the public a wide array of goods,
27 services, discounts, gift cards, and/or information concerning the brick-and-mortar retail store(s)
28
COMPLAINT
-2-
1 that offer Defendant’s products, including the one(s) located in the County of Los Angeles. The
2 Website also offers the public online features that allow the sale of Defendant’s goods and
3
services.
4
6. Defendant’s Website contains significant access barriers that make it impossible for
5
visually impaired customers to properly and fully utilize the Website. Specifically, these barriers
6
7 make it impossible for Plaintiff to have full access to the Website and independently purchase
8 goods and services online and access information concerning discounts, brick-and-mortar stores,
9
and other goods and services offered by Defendant online.
10
7. Defendant thus excludes the visually impaired from full and equal participation in the
11
growing Internet economy that is increasingly a fundamental part of the common marketplace
12
13 and daily living. In the wave of technological advances in recent years, assistive computer
14 technology is becoming an increasingly prominent part of everyday life for visually impaired
15 individuals, allowing them to fully and independently access a variety of goods and services,
16
including making online purchase of consumer products.
17
8. Despite readily available methods to render websites fully accessible to all, such as the
18
19 methods in use by other businesses, which make correct and proper use of alternative text,
20 accessible forms, descriptive links, resizable text, and labels, Defendant has failed to design,
21 construct, maintain, and operate its Website to be fully accessible to and independently usable by
22
Plaintiff and other visually-impaired individuals.
23
9. Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to its Website, and therefore denial of its
24
25 products and services offered thereby and in conjunction with the physical location(s) that offer
26 for sale Defendant’s products, is a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the UCRA.
27
28
COMPLAINT
-3-
1 10. The California legislature has provided a clear, national mandate for the elimination of
2 discrimination against individuals with disabilities when it enacted California’s UCRA, Cal. Civ.
3
Code § 51, et seq. Such discrimination includes barriers to full integration, independent living,
4
and equal opportunity for persons with disabilities, including those barriers created by websites
5
and other public accommodations that are inaccessible to blind and visually impaired persons.
6
7 Specifically, California state law mandates equal protection of persons with disabilities,
8 requiring that places of public accommodation provide access to goods, services and facilities for
9
persons with disabilities. See UCRA, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq.
10
11. Unless Defendant remedies the numerous access barriers on its Website, Plaintiff will
11
continue to be unable to independently navigate, browse, use, access and complete a transaction
12
13 on the Website. Because Defendant’s Website is not equally accessible to blind and visually-
14 impaired consumers in violation of the UCRA, this complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive
15 relief to correct Defendant’s policies and practices to include measures necessary to ensure
16
compliance with federal and state law and to include monitoring of such measures, to update and
17
remove accessibility barriers on the Website so that Plaintiff may be able to independently and
18
19 privately use Defendant’s Website. This complaint also seeks compensatory damages to Plaintiff
20 for having been subjected to unlawful discrimination.
21 II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
22
12. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. This Court also has personal
23
jurisdiction over Defendant because it conducts and continues to conduct a substantial and
24
25 significant amount of business in the County of Los Angeles, in the State of California and
26 because Defendant’s offending Website is available across California. Brick-and-mortar
27
28
COMPLAINT
-4-
1 location(s) of retail store(s) that offer for sale Defendant’s products are also located within the
2 County of Los Angeles.
3
13. Defendant has been and is committing the acts alleged herein through its Website
4
accessible in the County of Los Angeles, and has been and is violating the rights of Plaintiff and
5
other consumers with disabilities in this County, and has been and is causing injury to Plaintiff in
6
7 this County. All events giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action took place in the State of
8 California, County of Los Angeles. Therefore, jurisdiction of this Court is proper.
9
14. Venue is proper in this Court because Plaintiff resides in the County of Los Angeles,
10
Defendant conducts and continues to conduct a substantial and significant amount of business in
11
this County, Defendant is also subject to personal jurisdiction in this County, and a substantial
12
13 portion of the conduct complained of herein occurred in this County.
14 III. PARTIES
15 15. Plaintiff, at all times relevant and as alleged herein, is a resident of Los Angeles, California.
16
16. Plaintiff is a blind, visually-impaired handicapped person. Plaintiff uses screen-reader
17
software to access and operate websites and mobile applications. She is knowledgeable about
18
19 various tools which allow visually impaired individuals to access websites, including various
20 screen-reader software.
21 17. Plaintiff has attempted to use Defendant’s Website in order to access information
22
concerning Defendant’s goods and services available online and in brick-and-mortar retail
23
store(s). She has been unable to access information and goods and services offered to others
24
25 through the Website. She desires to use Defendant’s Website and has the necessary computer
26 technology to do so if it were fully accessible to the visually impaired.
27
28
COMPLAINT
-5-
1 18. The access barriers Plaintiff has encountered on Defendant’s Website have deterred
2 Plaintiff from purchasing goods and services through Defendant’s Website as well as visiting the
3
brick-and-mortar location(s) that offer for sale Defendant’s products.
4
19. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant owns, operates,
5
manages, updates and/or monetizes its Website, which provides to the public a wide array of
6
7 goods, services, discounts, gift cards, and/or information concerning brick-and-mortar retail
8 store(s) that offer for sale Defendant’s products, including the one(s) located in the County of
9
Los Angeles. The Website also offers the public online features that allow the sale of
10
Defendant’s goods and services.
11
20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that, at all relevant times,
12
13 Defendant has continuously been doing business in Los Angeles, California.
14 21. The brick-and-mortar location(s) that offer for sale Defendants’ products, including the
15 retail store(s) located within the County of Los Angeles, California, are commercial stores that
16
offer for sale clothing, accessories and other goods to the public. Those retail store(s) within the
17
County of Los Angeles, California are places of public accommodation open to the public. See
18
19 UCRA, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of
20 those physical location(s). Through the Website, customers may review information and make
21 purchases relating Defendant’s goods and services offered online and in physical brick-and-
22
mortar location(s).
23
22. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered on Defendant’s Website have caused a denial of
24
25 Plaintiff’s full and equal access multiple times in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular
26 basis from full access to Defendant’s Website. Similarly, the access barriers Plaintiff
27
28
COMPLAINT
-6-
1 encountered on Defendant’s Website have impeded Plaintiff’s full and equal enjoyment of goods
2 and services offered at brick-and-mortar location(s) that offer for sale Defendant’s products.
3
23. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise of
4
defendants, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore sues said
5
DOE defendants by such fictitious names.
6
7 24. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that each of the defendants
8 designated herein as a DOE is responsible for the unlawful acts as herein alleged, and Plaintiff
9
will ask leave of the Court to amend this complaint to show its true names and capacities when
10
same have been ascertained.
11
25. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned
12
13 Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants and employees each of the other, acting
14 within the course and scope of said agency and employment, with the full knowledge and
15 consent of each of the Defendants. Each of the acts and/or omissions alleged herein were made
16
known to and ratified by each of the Defendants (including any DOE defendant).
17
26. Defendant and each and every DOE Defendant shall be referred to collectively as
18
19 “Defendants” hereafter.
20 IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
21 27. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendants manage, own,
22
operate, partner with and/or collaborate with brick-and-mortar location(s) that offer Defendants’
23
goods and services for sale to the general public, including but not limited to commercial retail
24
25 store(s) that are places of public accommodation.
26 28. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendants operate, maintain,
27 update, monetize and/or own a branded commercial Internet website located at
28
COMPLAINT
-7-
1 https://shop.guess.com/ for potential and existing customers to conveniently obtain information
2 and make purchases related to Defendants’ goods and services, which include clothing,
3
accessories and other goods and services. Among other features on the Website, Defendants
4
promote accessing information about Defendant’s products and brick-and-mortar store(s) that
5
offer for sale Defendants’ products and making purchases online through the Website. Through
6
7 its Website, Defendants provide to the public a wide array of goods, services, discounts, gift
8 cards, and/or information concerning brick-and-mortar retail store(s) that offer for sale
9
Defendants’ products, including the one(s) located in the County of Los Angeles.
10
29. Customers use Defendants’ Website to access many goods and services available at
11
brick-and-mortar location(s) that offer Defendant’s products.
12
13 30. It is undisputed that the Internet has become a significant source of information for
14 conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for
15 sighted and visually impaired individuals. When properly accessible, the Internet provides
16
individuals with disabilities significant independence. Visually impaired individuals regularly
17
access a broad range of accessible Internet websites through the use of screen-reader technology,
18
19 which can translate visual information on a website into nonvisual formats such as synthesized
20 speech and refreshable Braille.
21 31. Visually impaired individuals regularly access a broad range of accessible Internet
22
websites through the use of screen-reader technology, which can translate visual information on
23
a website into nonvisual formats such as synthesized speech and refreshable Braille.
24
25 32. Except for legally blind individuals whose residual vision allows them to use them to use
26 magnification, screen reading technology is the only method which allows visually impaired
27
28
COMPLAINT
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1 individuals independent access to the Internet. In this case, Plaintiff can only access the Internet
2 independently with the assistance of a screen-reader.
3
33. For the screen reader technology to function, the information on a website must be
4
capable of being rendered into meaningful text. If the website content is constructed such that it
5
cannot be rendered into meaningful text, visually impaired individuals are unable to access the
6
7 same content available to sighted individuals because they cannot detect what is depicted on the
8 screen and, for example, click where required to access further information and services.
9
34. There are well-established industry adopted guidelines for making websites accessible to
10
visually impaired individuals. These guidelines have been in place for at least several years and
11
have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites
12
13 accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web
14 Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for
15 website accessibility.
16
35. The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under
17
Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so
18
19 that a business designing a website can easily access them.
20 36. These guidelines recommend several basic and easily to implement components for
21 making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: adding invisible alt-text to graphics;
22
ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and screen reader; ensuring that
23
image maps are accessible; removing empty links or headings which are confusing; removing
24
25 documents which do not allow screen-readers to properly read the text; and adding headings and
26 links so that visually impaired people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic
27 components, a website will be inaccessible to visually impaired persons using screen readers.
28
COMPLAINT
-9-
1 37. In this case, based on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have a
2 policy and practice of denying the visually impaired full access to their Website, including
3
access to the goods and services offered by Defendants through their Website. Due to
4
Defendants’ failure and refusal to remove access barriers to their Website, visually impaired
5
individuals have been and are being denied equal access to physical location(s) that offer
6
7 Defendants’ products, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the
8 public through their Website.
9
38. Defendants deny the visually impaired full access to goods, services and information
10
made available through their Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website.
11
39. Defendants’ Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by visually
12
13 impaired persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and
14 include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text or text equivalent on graphics, inaccessible forms,
15 the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links and
16
headings, inability to complete important tasks using the keyboard and screen reader alone, and
17
content which is not fully readable or navigable using a screen reader.
18
19 40. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a
20 website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen
21 reader can speak the alternative text while a sighted user sees the picture. Alt-text does not
22
change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves
23
over the picture. There are many important pictures on Defendants’ Website that lack a text
24
25 equivalent. The lack of Alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately
26 vocalizing a description of the graphics. Screen readers detect and vocalize Alt-text to provide a
27
28
COMPLAINT
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1 description of the image to a blind computer user. As a result, visually impaired customers of
2 Defendants are unable to effectively determine what is on the Website and fully browse the site.
3
41. Defendants’ Website also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to
4
allow visually impaired shoppers who use screen readers to locate and accurately fill-out online
5
information. Specifically, due to the lack of adequate and functional labeling, visually impaired
6
7 customers cannot, for example, independently and fully access and utilize the Website.
8 42. Defendants’ Website also includes numerous instances of empty links, labels and/or
9
headings which prevent visually-impaired individuals from recognizing the function or purposes
10
of links, labels and/or headings contained in the Website. If a link, label or heading contains no
11
text, the function or purpose of the link, heading or heading will not be presented to the user.
12
13 This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen reader users.
14 43. As another example of barriers present on Defendant’s Website, there are several
15 occurrences where functions cannot be performed using a keyboard and screen reader. This
16
includes, but is not limited, to the section relating to Defendant’s products.
17
44. Due to Defendants’ Website inaccessibility, visually impaired customers of Defendants
18
19 cannot independently investigate goods and services offered by Defendants and make purchases
20 via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do.
21 45. Defendants’ Website thus contains significant access barriers which deny full and equal
22
access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use their Website and who would otherwise be able to
23
fully and equally enjoy the benefits of the physical location(s) that offer for sale Defendants’
24
25 products.
26 46. Plaintiff has personally patronized Defendants’ Website in the past, and intends to
27 continue to patronize Defendants’ Website. However, unless Defendant is required to eliminate
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COMPLAINT
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1 the access barriers at issue, and required to change their policies so that access barriers do not
2 reoccur on Defendants’ Website, Plaintiff will continue to be denied full access to the Website as
3
described, and will be deterred from fully using Defendants’ Website.
4
47. Specifically, the last time Plaintiff attempted to do business with Defendants using their
5
Website was in or around late 2019, and Plaintiff still encountered barriers to access on their
6
7 Website. Despite past and recent attempts to do business with Defendants on their Website, the
8 numerous access barriers contained on the Website and encountered by Plaintiff have denied
9
Plaintiff full and equal access to Defendants’ Website. Plaintiff, as a result of the barriers on the
10
Website, continues to be deterred on a regular basis from accessing Defendant’s website.
11
Likewise, based on the numerous access barriers Plaintiff has been precluded from the full and
12
13 equal enjoyment of physical location(s) that offer for sale Defendants’ products.
14 48. If Defendants’ Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently
15 navigate the website, complete a desired transaction, and find a location to visit.
16
49. Through her many attempts to use Defendants’ Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge
17
of the access barriers that make these privileges, goods or services inaccessible and
18
19 independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people.
20 50. There are readily available and easy to implement guidelines, available to Defendant on
21 the Internet, for designing, constructing and maintaining websites to be accessible to blind and
22
visually-impaired persons. Other large business entities have used these guidelines, or have
23
otherwise been able, to make their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-
24
25 text to graphics, including labels for each form control and text for all links, providing
26 alternatives to inaccessible content and ensuring that all significant functions can be performed
27 using a keyboard. In addition, incorporating these basic changes and adding certain elements to
28
COMPLAINT
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1 Defendants’ Website accessibility would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendants’
2 business nor would it result in an undue burden to Defendants.
3
51. Because maintaining and providing a website where all functions can be performed using
4
a keyboard, would provide full, independent and equal accessible to all consumers, Plaintiff
5
alleges that Defendants have engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not
6
7 limited to the following policies or practices:
8 a. Construction and maintenance of a Website that is inaccessible to visually-
9
impaired individuals, including Plaintiff;
10
b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be
11
equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and,
12
13 c. Failure to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial
14 harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers.
15 52. Because Defendants’ Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendants
16
lack a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the Website to become and remain
17
accessible, Defendants therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have
18
19 the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein.
20 53. If Defendants’ Website were equally and fully accessible to all, Plaintiff and similarly
21 situated visually impaired people could independently view information on the Website, access
22
details relating to physical location(s) that offer for sale Defendants’ products, make purchases of
23
goods and services online and review information relating to other goods and services available
24
25 via Defendants’ Website.
26
27
28
COMPLAINT
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1 54. Although Defendants may currently have centralized policies regarding the maintenance
2 and operation of their Website, Defendants lack a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make
3
the Website fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, the visually impaired.
4
55. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue
5
to be unable to independently use the Defendants’ Website in violation of their rights.
6
7 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act
8 (California Civil Code §§ 51, 52, et seq.)
(Injunctive Relief And Damages)
9
10 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs alleged above and each
11 and every other paragraph hereafter necessary or helpful to state this cause of action as though
12 fully set forth herein.
13
57. The Unruh Civil Rights Act guarantees, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are
14
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
15
16 business establishments of every kind whatsoever within the jurisdiction of the state of
17 California. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).
18 58. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that Defendants manage, own,
19
operate, partner with and/or collaborate with brick-and-mortar location(s) that offer Defendants’
20
goods and services for sale to the general public, including but not limited to commercial retail
21
store(s) that are places of public accommodation. Those retail store(s) are commercial stores that
22
23 offer for sale clothing, accessories and other goods to the public. Defendants’ business
24 transactions and/or establishments are within the jurisdiction of the State of California, and as
25
such are obligated to comply with the provisions of the URCA, California Civil Code §§ 51, et
26
seq.
27
28
COMPLAINT
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1 59. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owns, operates, manages,
2 updates and/or monetizes its Website, which provides to the public a wide array of goods,
3
services, discounts, gift cards, and/or information concerning the brick-and-mortar retail store(s)
4
that offer for sale Defendants’ goods, including the one(s) located in the County of Los Angeles.
5
The Website also offers the public online features that allow the sale of Defendant’s goods and
6
7 services.
8 60. Upon information and belief, Defendants generate significant revenue from the sale of
9
goods and services through their Website. Defendants’ Website is a service provided by
10
Defendants that is not fully accessible to patrons who are blind or visually-impaired like
11
Plaintiff. This inaccessibility denies blind and visually-impaired patrons full and equal access to
12
13 the facilities, goods, and services that Defendants make available to the non-disabled public.
14 Defendants are violating the UCRA, Civil Code §§ 51, et seq., by denying visually-impaired
15 customers the goods and services provided on their Website. These violations are ongoing.
16
61. Defendants’ actions constitute intentional discrimination against Plaintiff on the basis of
17
a disability, in violation of the UCRA, Civil Code §§ 51, et seq., because, among other things,
18
19 (1) Defendants have constructed, maintained, owned, monetized and/or operated a Website that
20 is inaccessible to visually impaired individuals, such as Plaintiff; (2) Defendants have opted to
21 maintain this Website in such an inaccessible form despite well-established and readily
22
implementable industry guidelines for making websites accessible; (3) and Defendants have
23
failed to take action to correct and rectify these barriers even after being on notice of the
24
25 discrimination that such barriers may create for visually impaired individuals, such as Plaintiff.
26 62. Defendants are further violating the UCRA, Civil Code §§ 51, et seq., because the
27 conduct as alleged herein violates various provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
28
COMPLAINT
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1 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., for the reasons set forth above. Under Cal. Civ. Code §
2 51(f), a violation of an individual’s rights under the ADA also constitutes a violation under the
3
UCRA. Defendants’ discriminatory conduct alleged herein includes, inter alia, the violation of
4
the rights of persons with disabilities set forth in Title III of the ADA and, therefore, also violates
5
the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).
6
7 63. Unless the Court enjoins Defendants from continuing to engage in these unlawful
8 practices, Plaintiff will continue to suffer irreparable harm. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to
9
injunctive relief remedying the discrimination. Plaintiff expressly limits the cost of all injunctive
10
relief sought to $15,000 or less.
11
64. Plaintiff is also entitled to statutory minimum damages pursuant to UCRA, Civil Code §
12
13 52 for each offense. Plaintiff hereby expressly limits the total amount sought for every single
14 offense to $34,999 or less.
15 65. Plaintiff is further entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
16
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
17
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays pray for judgment against Defendants, as follows:
18
19 A. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from further violations of
20 the UCRA, Civil Code §§ 51, et seq., with respect to their Website,
21 https://shop.guess.com/, and all of the webpages and urls contained therein;
22
B. A preliminary and permanent injunction requiring Defendants to take the steps necessary
23
to make their Website readily and fully accessible to and usable by blind and visually-
24
impaired individuals. Plaintiff expressly limits the cost of injunctive relief sought in
25
26 sections A and B to $15,000 or less;
27
28
COMPLAINT
- 16 -
1 C. An award of statutory minimum damages of $4,000 per violation pursuant to § 52(a) of
2 the California Civil Code;
3
D. For attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to all applicable laws including, without
4
limitation, pursuant to California Civil Code § 52(a);
5
E. For pre-judgment interest to the extent permitted by law;
6
7 F. For costs of suit; and
8 G. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
9
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
10
Plaintiff hereby respectfully requests a trial by jury on all appropriate issues raised in this
11
Complaint.
12
13
Dated: February 10, 2020 BEVERLY HILLS TRIAL ATTORNEYS, P.C.
14
15
.
16 Azar Mouzari, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
17 PAMELA HILL
18
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COMPLAINT
- 17 -
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Dept:
56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ CASTILLO,
et al.
,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FRANCISCO CADENA,
et al.
,
Defendants.
CASE NO.: 21SCTV18162
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Date: July 30, 2024
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept. 56
Jury Trial: January 27, 2025
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America (collectively, Hyundai or Defendants)
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action was filed on May 13, 2021 and arises out of an automobile accident in which a Hyundai automobile (the Vehicle) driven by Defendant Francisco Cadena, struck Plaintiff Jose Castillo and decedent Maria Perez.
The currently operative second amended complaint (the SAC) alleges claims against Defendants for: (1) negligence; (2) product liability; and (3) wrongful death and survival action, arising, among other things, from alleged defects in the Vehicle.
On June 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion (the Motion) for leave to file Third Amended Complaint (the TAC). On July 10, 2024, Hyundai filed its opposition papers to the Motion and on July 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
California
Code of Civil Procedure
(CCP) section 473 permits the trial court in its discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in the furtherance of justice.
(
See
CCP § 473, subd. (a).)
CCP section 576 provides that any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.
(CCP § 576.)
There is a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the pleadings at any stage of the proceeding.
(
Berman v. Bromberg
(1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945.)
An application to amend a pleading is addressed to the trial judges sound discretion.
(
Id
.)
If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.
(
Morgan v. Superior Court of Cal. In and For Los Angeles County
(1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)
Where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party, the liberal rule of allowance prevails.
(
Higgins v. Del Faro
(1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564.)
Under California Rules of Court (CRC) rule 3.1324, a motion for leave to amend a pleading must be accompanied by a declaration that sets forth: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made sooner.
(CRC, r. 3.1324(b).)
Plaintiffs have met these requirements.
In support of the Motion, Plaintiffs counsel declares that Plaintiffs obtained the facts underlying the proposed additional allegations of defects from discovery responses and test results received by Plaintiffs since his retention as co-counsel to Plaintiffs on February 13, 2024.
(Declaration of John F. Medlar, Jr. (Medlar Decl.).
In opposition to the Motion, Hyundai takes the position that Plaintiffs purportedly recently-obtained evidence in support of the amendment was or should have been known to Plaintiffs at least ten months before the Motion was filed and that therefore the Motion was not timely filed.
Hyundais primary argument, however, is that the Motion is only being filed as a delaying tactic to avoid Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (the MSJ), which is set for hearing on August 21, 2024.
If the Motion is granted, the MSJ, which is directed to the SAC, will become moot and will be taken off-calendar.
The MSJ was filed on February 7, 2024 and set for hearing on April 24, 2024.
On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application to continue the hearing on the MSJ (the Ex Parte), on the ground that they needed to obtain further discovery upon which to oppose the MSJ.
Although Hyundai opposed the continuance, the Court granted the Ex Parte as it is required to do under CCP section 437c(h). which provides:
If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order that may be just.
The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.
The Court granted the Ex Parte and continued the MSJ hearing to the current date of August 21, 2024.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs did file opposition papers to the MSJ on June 20, 2024 the same date that the Motion was filed.
Plaintiffs assert that they have discovered new facts relating to a condition known as brake pedal drift, which they have determined to be the cause of the accident underlying this lawsuit, and that the pleadings need to be amended to allege these new facts.
Hyundai contends that Plaintiffs either knew or should have known of these additional claimed facts at least ten months before the Motion was filed, and that therefore the Motion should be denied as untimely.
The Court disagrees.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have provided sufficient credible evidence that amendment of the SAC and filing of the proposed TAC are warranted under the law.
The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion and orders Plaintiffs to file the TAC within five (5) court days of the date of this order.
If the TAC is filed, it will be the operative pleading in the case and the current MSJ will be MOOT.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 30th day of April 2024
Hon. Holly J. Fujie
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
REBECCA CASTILLO VS BIG ALS LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Jul 25, 2024 |
23PSCV03859
Case Number:
23PSCV03859
Hearing Date:
July 25, 2024
Dept:
6
Plaintiff Rebecca Castillos Request for Entry of Default Judgment
Defendant: Big Als LLC
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
This is an ADA/Unruh case. On December 13, 2023, plaintiff Rebecca Castillo (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Big Als LLC (Defendant) and Does 1 to 10, alleging one cause of action for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. On February 6, 2024, default was entered against Defendant. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $9,074.00, including $8,000.00 in damages, $570.00 in attorney fees, and $504.00 in costs. The Court finds Plaintiffs damage request is excessive.
Plaintiff cites the case of
Johnson v. Guedoir
(E.D. Cal. 2016) 218 F.Supp.3d 1096 (
Johnson
)
as the basis for requesting $4,000.00 in deterrence damages plus $4,000.00 for encountering the barriers, for a total demand of $8,000.00. (Compl., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 5-6; Summary of the Case, 2:1-8.)
Johnson
does not support this outcome. The court in
Johnson
found $8,000.00 in statutory damages was warranted based on two incidents wherein the plaintiff was deterred on one date and then personally encountered the barriers on a different date. (
Johnson, supra,
218 F.Supp.3d at p. 1100.)
Here, Plaintiff states that she attempted to access Defendants goods and services on November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff then confusingly states that she was deterred from visiting Defendants brick-and-mortar location in Ontario on November 2, 2023 and November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., ¶ 14.) It is unclear how Plaintiff was deterred on November 2, 2023 before she visited the website on November 8, 2023. (See Castillo Decl., ¶¶ 5, 14, Ex. 1.) Additionally, Plaintiffs browsing history only shows her having attempted to visit Defendants website on November 8, 2023. (Castillo Decl., Ex. 1.) At most, the Court finds evidence of one violation on November 8, 2023, which adds up to $4,000.00, not $8,000.00.
The Court also finds that, based on the reduced damage calculation, Plaintiffs request for attorney fees must also be reduced. (Local Rule 3.214.) The Court finds the correct amount of attorney fees that Plaintiff can recover here is $330.00.
Additionally, Plaintiff did not complete items 4, 5, or 6 of Judicial Council Form CIV-100. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 585.5, 587; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6400 et seq.)
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice.
Ruling
LODIE POLLARD ET AL VS HAIG M BAZOIAN ET AL
Jul 26, 2024 |
BC718464
Case Number:
BC718464
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT
NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK
DEPARTMENT A
CONTINUANCE
JULY 26, 2024
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Los Angeles Superior Court Case # BC718464
MP:
The City of Los Angeles (Defendant)
RP:
Lodie Pollard, Luna Skyy Pollard, Jayden Devaughn Carter, and Pink Selkin (Plaintiffs)
NOTICE:
The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received.
Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412.
ANALYSIS:
On July 19, 2024 the Los Angeles Superior Court suffered a cyber security attack which resulted in the significant impairment of most Court systems. Due to this complication, additional time is required for the Court to review these motions and issue a tentative ruling. The Court, on its own motion, thus continues the motions for summary judgment brought by the City of Los Angeles to August 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m.
---
RULING
:
In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records.
ORDER
The City of Los Angeless Motions for Summary Judgment
came on regularly for hearing on Jukly 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows:
THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE CONTINUED TO AUGUST 14, 2024 AT 9:00 AM.
ALL OTHER DATES REMAIN.
DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES TO GIVE NOTICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________
F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Ruling
DEBORAH CARSON, ET AL. VS RED LINE COURIER SERVICE, A BUSINESS ENTITY FORM UNKNOWN, ET AL.
Jul 26, 2024 |
21STCV27576
Case Number:
21STCV27576
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
32
PLEASE NOTE
:
Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached.
If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at
sscdept32@lacourt.org
indicating that partys intention to submit.
The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling.
If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.
If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely.
Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court
.
TENTATIVE RULING
DEPT
:
32
HEARING DATE
:
July 26, 2024
CASE NUMBER
:
21STCV27576
MOTIONS
:
Petition for Minors Compromise
MOVING PARTY:
Petitioner Deborah Carson
OPPOSING PARTY:
Unopposed
The Court has reviewed the petition filed on July 3, 2024 by Petitioner Deborah Carson (Petitioner) on behalf of Claimant Chase Carson, age 11.
The Court denies the petition without prejudice for the following reason:
The Court previously instructed Petitioner to complete item 10c describing the terms of the settlement. (See Min. Order, 7/1/24.) In this revised petition, item 10c is not complete.
Petitioner has cured all other defects identified in the previous petition.
Accordingly, the Court denies the petition without prejudice.
Petitioner shall give notice and file a proof of service of such.
Ruling
ENGELVER ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ CATALAN VS STEVEN MAURICE KANE, ET AL.
Jul 25, 2024 |
23TRCV03725
Case Number:
23TRCV03725
Hearing Date:
July 25, 2024
Dept:
8
Tentative Ruling
HEARING DATE: July 25, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV03725
CASE NAME: Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan v. Steven Maurice Kane, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Steven Maurice Kane
TRIAL DATE: Not Set.
MOTION: (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (3) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (4) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission (5) Request for Sanctions Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED if not already mooted (2) MOOTED (3) GRANTED in part and DENIED in part (4) GRANTED if not mooted (5) $2,000 to be awarded to Plaintiff. I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff, Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants, Steven Maurice Kane, Richard I Kane, Darlene Ryan, and DOES 1 through 100. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence. The parties meet and confer process and background of requests, responses, and such were outlined in the Courts June tentative ruling. B. Procedural
On April 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed these motions to compel further. On May 30, 2024, Defendant Kane filed an opposition briefs. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply briefs. On June 11, 2024, these motions along with the IDC were continued to June 26, 2024. On June 26, 2024, this Court conducted an IDC in light of the Courts posted tentative rulings, and CONTINUED the hearing on the motions to July 25, 2024 if any lingering issues remained after the IDC. II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Compel Further The Court provided a discussion of the legal standards to be applied for discovery and sanctions motions in its June 2024 tentative ruling. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories Form Interrogatory No. 16.9: Form Interrogatory No. 16.9 asks whether Defendant Kane or anyone acting on Defendant Kanes behalf have any document concerning claims for personal injuries made before or after the incident by a plaintiff in this case, and asks the responder, that if s, for each plaintiff, states: (a) the source of each document; (b) the date each claim arose; (c) the nature of each claim; and (d) the name, address, and telephone number of the person who has each document. Plaintiff seeks further responses to Form Interrogatory No. 16.9 on the grounds that Plaintiff argues he is entitled to know what Defendants contentions are and where he stands on each issue related the case. The Court discussed its agreement with the principal thrust of the motion as to prior claims evidence at the IDC. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories Special Interrogatory No. 55: Special Interrogatory No. 55 asks Defendant Kane to identify any automobile collisions he had been involved in during the three (3) years prior to the incident. Although Defendant Kane originally responded with numerous objections, it appears that he is submitting to further responses as no opposition brief was filed, and in his response to Request for an IDC, he noted that he will serve further responses to this interrogatory. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether Defendant has served the offered further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents RFP No. 4: RFP No. 4 asks for Defendant Kane to produce all documents related to all cellular and telephone records, including billing statements of his, on the day of the incident. Defendant Kane objected to this request indicating that such would violate his privacy rights. The Court discussed the request and objection at the IDC. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFP No. 12: RFP No. 12 asks Defendant Kane to produce all documents involving ISO claim searches conducted with regard to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks further discovery responses because he argues that if Defendant Kane conducted an ISO search on Plaintiff, he must produce said documents as they are not work product by the attorney. The Court disagrees. At the IDC the Court discussed this RFP as well. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFP No. 13, 17, and 18: RFP No. 13 asks Defendant Kane to produce all documents relating to his sub rosa surveillance on Plaintiff including photos, videos and reports. RFP No. 17 asks Defendant Kane to produce any and all film and/or video footage in his possession, custody, or control (or in the possession, custody, or control of his agents) of Plaintiff at any time. Lastly, RFP NO. 18 asks Defendant Kane to produce any and all audio recordings in his possession, custody, or control (or in the possession, custody, or control of his agents) of Plaintiff at any time. Defendant Kane objected to this information on the grounds that the request was in violation of Evidence Code section 785 and that it sought information protected by the attorney work product doctrine and attorney client privilege. The Court discussed this issue at the IDC and defense counsel was to inquire as to whether any surveillance videos would be approved by defendants principal to be disclosed in the spirit of attempting to resolve the case. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the principal agreed and whether further argument on this issue is required. RFP No. 16: RFP No. 16 seeks documents from Defendant Kane pertaining to claims made by any other person against him, pertaining to any motor vehicle accidents, prior to the incident. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Kanes prior driving history and claims made against him prior to the incident are relevant to the underlying incident and reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence. At the IDC the COurt discussed the potential for narrowing the time perido for this RFP and the potential relevancy of the same. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether Defendant provided a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission RFA No. 6: RFA No. 6 asks Defendant Kane to admit he has conducted an ISO search on Plaintiff. Defendant Kane objected to this arguing it is vague, ambiguous, and violates the applicable code of procedure section 2034.010, et seq. pertaining to the timing of expert witness discovery. The Court disagreed as discussed at the IDC, so at oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFA No. 7 and 8: RFA No. 7 asks Defendant Kane to admit he has sub rosa photos, videos, and reports on Plaintiff. RFA No. 8 asks Defendant Kne to admit he has conducted sub rose surveillance of Plaintiff. Defendant Kane objected to this arguing it is vague, ambiguous, and violates the applicable code of procedure section 2034.010, et seq. pertaining to the timing of expert witness discovery. Defendant Kane also objected noting that the request is in violation of Evidence Code section 785. The Court disagreed as discussed at the IDC, so at oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. B. Sanctions Additionally, Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions in connection with each of its four motions to compel further responses. For the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories and Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions as imposed on Defendant Kane and/or his counsel of record in the amount of $1,260 as to each motion ($2,520 total for the two.) At the IDC, the Court discussed the reasonableness of the claimed hours as well as the claimed justifications for several of the objections. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss the Courts tentative ruling that the Court might award $1,000 per motion ($2,000 total for the two motions), to be paid to Plaintiffs counsel on or before August 7, 2024. Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice.
Ruling
MUGIHIKO MORIJIRI, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL. VS 24 CMN LLC, A BUSINESS ENTITY, EXACT FORM UNKNOWN, ET AL.
Jul 29, 2024 |
23STCV20959
Case Number:
23STCV20959
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles Central District
Department 53
mugihiko morijiri
, et al.;
Plaintiffs
,
vs.
24 cmn llc
, et al.;
Defendants
.
Case No.:
23STCV20959
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Time:
10:00 a.m.
[tentative] Order
RE:
defendants motion to strike portions of complaint
MOVING PARTIES:
Defendants 24 CMN, LLC and CYN, LLC
RESPONDING PARTIES:
Plaintiffs
Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiri
Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint
The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.
DISCUSSION
Defendants 24 CMN, LLC and CYN, LLC (Defendants) move the court for an order striking the prayer for punitive damages (Compl., Prayer, p. 23:20) and related allegations (Compl., ¶¶ 117, 161, 172
[1]
) in the Complaint filed by plaintiffs Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiri (Plaintiffs).
The court grants Defendants motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and related allegations because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing (1) Defendants are guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, and (2) advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification, or act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendants.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (a), (b).)
The court finds that the allegations that Ariana Javaheri, the property supervisor and managing agent of Defendants, informed Plaintiffs that the dark staining on their wall was not mold but mildew and advised Plaintiffs that they would have to pay for the mold test if the results were negative (Compl., ¶¶ 21-23) do not show that Defendants (1) engaged in conduct intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of Plaintiffs, or (2) engaged in despicable conduct subjecting Plaintiffs to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their rights.
(Civ. Code, § 3294, subds. (c)(1) [defining malice], (c)(2) [defining oppression].)
Moreover, while the court acknowledges that Plaintiffs have also alleged that plaintiff Ewan Morijiri was diagnosed with leukemia, is immunocompromised, and was advised not to reside in a premises with mold because it would be injurious and possibly fatal (Compl., ¶ 23), Plaintiffs did not allege facts establishing that Defendants knew of this risk, such that Ariana Javaheris conduct may be considered malicious or oppressive.
ORDER
The court grants defendants CMN, LLC and CYN, LLCs motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages and paragraphs 117, 161, and 172 of plaintiffs Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiris Complaint in this action.
The court grants plaintiffs Mugihiko Morijiri, Keiko Morijiri, and Zion Morijiri and Ewan Morijiri, by and through their guardian ad litem, Keiko Morijiri 20 days leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cures the defects set forth in this ruling.
The court orders defendants CMN, LLC and CYN, LLC to give notice of this ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
July 29, 2024
_____________________________
Robert B. Broadbelt III
Judge of the Superior Court
[1]
The court notes that the notice of motion erroneously states this allegation is in paragraph 171.
(Notice of Mot., p. 2, ¶ 3.)
Ruling
DANA URICK, ET AL. VS ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE, LLP, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.
Jul 31, 2024 |
20STCV17462
Case Number:
20STCV17462
Hearing Date:
July 31, 2024
Dept:
20
Tentative Ruling
Judge Kevin C. Brazile
Department 20
Hearing Date:
July 31, 2024
Case Name:
Urick, et al. v. Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP, et al.
Case No.:
20STCV17462
Matter:
Motion to Compel Deposition
Moving Party:
Defendant Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP
Responding Party:
Unopposed
Notice:
OK
Ruling:
The Motion is granted.
Moving party to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly
encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Defendant Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP seeks to compel the deposition of Plaintiff Trentyn M. Urick-Stasa.
Because there is no opposition, the Motion to Compel is granted. The deposition is to take place within 30 days. The Court awards reduced sanctions in the amount of $1,000.
Moving parties to give notice.
If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ruling
MARCUS SIREGAR VS MICHAEL ARDERN, ET AL.
Case Number:
21STCV04494
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
29
Motion to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiff filed by Defendant Avis Rent A Car System, LLC on behalf of Michael Arden.
Tentative
The motion is denied without prejudice.
Background
On February 4, 2021, Marcus Siregar (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Michael Ardern and Avis Rent A Car System, LLC for negligence cause of action arising out of an automobile accident occurring on February 16, 2019.
On August 22, 2023, Avis Rent A Car System, LLC on behalf of Michael Arden (Defendant) filed an answer.
On June 18, 2024, Defendant filed this motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff.
Defendant also seeks sanctions.
No opposition has been filed.
Legal Standard
Any party may obtain discovery & by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.)
Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210 through 2025.280 provide the requirements for (among other things) what must be included in a deposition notice, when and where depositions may be taken, and how and when the notice must be served.
The service of a deposition notice & is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying.
(
Id.
, § 2025.280, subd. (a).)
Section 2025.410, subdivision (a), requires any party to serve a written objection at least three days before the deposition if the party contends that a deposition notice does not comply with the provisions of sections 2025.210 through 2025.280.
Section 2025.450, subdivision (a), provides:
If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party,
or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230,
without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for¿inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order
compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.
Any such motion to compel must show good cause for the production of documents and, when a deponent has failed to appear, the motion must be accompanied by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.
(
Id.
, subd. (b).)
When a motion to compel is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (
Id.
, § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).)
Discussion
Defendant served Plaintiff with a notice of deposition scheduled for May 8, 2024. (Rubin Decl., ¶ 6 & Exh. B.) The parties exchanged some correspondence prior to the deposition date, but the bottom line is that Plaintiff did not serve any objection and did not appear.
(Id., ¶¶ 7-10 & Exhs. C-F.)
Defendant now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to attend a deposition.
Defendant is certainly entitled to take Plaintiffs deposition under the Civil Discovery act, but to obtain a court order compelling the deposition, Defendant must comply with all statutory requirements.
Here, Defendant has not done so.
Specifically, Defendant presents no evidence that, following the nonappearance, it reached out to Plaintiff
to inquire about the nonappearance.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b).)
Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES Defendants motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff Marcus Siregar without prejudice.
Moving party to give notice.
Document
ANDY GARCIA VS NORMA ALICIA ESCOBEDO
Feb 21, 2020 |
Audra M. Mori
|
Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |
Motor Vehicle - Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death (General Jurisdiction) |
20STCV07167
Document
VALARIE ZAYAS VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.
Feb 03, 2023 |
Kerry R. Bensinger
|
Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |
Premise Liability (e.g., dangerous conditions of property, slip/trip and fall, dog attack, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |
23STCV02454