No Value: CITY OF SANTA MONICA VS LAUREN SILVA

Case Number: 22STCV05353 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff Julio Alberto Pineda (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Estate of Larry Edward Voit (Estate) and Does 1-25 for general negligence. On September 7, 2022, Estate filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint. On May 16, 2023, the Court granted Barrett Business Services, Inc.s motion to intervene. On June 14, 2023, Plaintiff-in-Intervention Barrett Business Services, Inc. (Barrett) filed a complaint against Estate and Moes 1-100. On July 24, 2023, Estate filed an answer to Barretts complaint. On February 5, 2024, Plaintiff amended the complaint to include Defendants Bruce Wilson as Doe 1, Allied Aerospace, Inc., doing business as Allied Aircraft Engine, doing business as Allied Aero Engines, as Doe 2, Great American Aviation as Doe 3, Baker Aero Electric as Doe 4, Corona Aircraft Engines, Inc., doing business as Corona Engines , as Doe 5 (Corona), Bob Walmsley as Doe 6, David Baker as Doe 7, R.G. Walmsley as Doe 8, and Dan Woodside as Doe 9. On May 17, 2024, Corona filed a demurrer to be heard on June 18, 2024. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On June 11, 2024, Corona filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to July 12, 2024. Trial is currently scheduled for November 13, 2024. PARTIES REQUESTS Corona asks the Court to sustain the demurrer to Plaintiffs general negligence claim. Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 provides: The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue. (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action. (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties. (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, uncertain includes ambiguous and unintelligible. (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct. (h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a) [When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading].) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate facts alleged, but not conclusions, deductions, or conclusions of facts or law). (L. Edmon and C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 7:43, p. 7(l)-25, emphasis omitted (Cal. Practice Guide).) DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs complaint Plaintiffs complaint alleges the following: On or about February 19, 2021, at 2500 Navy Way in the City of San Pedro, County of Los Angeles, State of California, Decedent Larry Edward Voit (Decedent) negligently and carelessly entrusted, managed, maintained controlled, flew and operated his Piper PA-32-260 Cherokee Six aircraft, and failed to use reasonable care while flying and landing the aircraft among other negligent and unlawful acts, directly and proximately causing the aircraft to collide with the semi-tractor trailer that Plaintiff was operating. Decedents negligence and carelessness caused Plaintiff to sustain injuries and damages. Estate and Does 1-25 were the legal (proximate) cause of Plaintiffs damages. Does 1-15 were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to name Corona as Doe 5. B. Coronas demurrer Corona argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts (1) showing that Corona breached a duty to Plaintiff or (2) showing that any breach of Coronas duty caused Plaintiffs injuries. In opposition, Plaintiff argues Corona has no standing to demur because the complaint had mistakenly and improperly been served on Corona and the Court did not sign the Doe amendment. Corona has standing to demur. Whether mistakenly or not, Plaintiff served the complaint on Corona. And the Court does not require an order for this kind of amendment. (See Amendment to Complaint form, LASC CIV 105 (Rev. 09/23) on Los Angeles Superior Court website.) Because Plaintiff filed the Doe amendment and served the complaint on Corona, Corona is a defendant in this case. Plaintiff also asserts that Corona violated the meet and confer requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Corona disputes the assertion, pointing to his counsels efforts to contact Plaintiffs counsel before filing the demurrer. (See LaScola dec. ¶¶ 4-6; Reply, fn. 1.) The Court need not resolve this dispute because [a] determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4).) In a misleading gloss on his complaint, Plaintiff contends that he alleged: [Defendants] negligently and carelessly entrusted, managed, maintained, controlled, flew and operated& [the] aircraft. (Opposition p. 5.) In fact, the complaint alleges that Decedent LARRY EDWARD VOIT negligently and carelessly entrusted, managed, maintained controlled, flew and operated his Piper PA-32-260 Cherokee Six aircraft . . . . (Capitalization in the original.) Misrepresentations do not advance Plaintiff's arguments. [A] bare allegation that defendants negligence caused plaintiff injury is not sufficient. Plaintiff must allege the acts or omissions that are claimed to have constituted the negligence. (Cal. Practice Guide, supra , ¶ 6:129, p. 6-44.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing Coronas acts or omissions constituted negligence or caused Plaintiffs injuries. The Court sustains the demurrer. CONCLUSION The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer of Corona Aircraft Engines, Inc., doing business as Corona Engines, to Plaintiff Julio Alberto Pinedas complaint with 30 days leave to amend. Moving parties are ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving parties are ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 23GDCV02613 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 12 Date: 7/12/2024 Case No: 23 GDCV02613 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Sadhegian v. Adventist Health Glendale, et al. DEMURRER MOTION TO STRIKE Moving Party: Defendants Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale and Adventist Health Foundation Responding Party: Plaintiff Silva Sadhegian RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to complaint Strike improper prayer for damages CAUSES OF ACTION: from Complaint 1) Professional Malpractice 1) Wrongful Death (There are two First Causes of Action) SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Silva Sadhegian alleges that on or about the year 2022 and to the current date, and prior thereto and thereafter, Esraeil Ghadimi engaged for compensation the services of defendants Adventist Health Glendale and Adventist Health Foundation, and defendants undertook to examine, diagnose, prescribe medicine and drugs, and handle and control the care and treatment of Ghadimi. The complaint alleges that defendant failed to possess and exercise that degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by other physicians, surgeons, hospitals, nurses, attendants and the like, failed to comply with the applicable legal standard, and neglected to adequately select a competent medical staff or periodically review the competency of the medical staff. The complaint also alleges that defendants failed to obtain the informed consent of Ghadimi. The complaint alleges that as a result of the acts and omissions of defendants, Ghadimi suffered severe, serious and permanent injury to his person, and suffered loss of earnings and earnings capacity. Plaintiff alleges in the second First cause of action that the damages and injuries alleged that were caused by defendants resulted in the death of decedent Ghadimi, resulting in plaintiff being deprived of decedents presence, companionship, protection, affection and comfort, and also being deprived of decedents future support and maintenance, and expectancy in the estate of Ghadimi. Plaintiff also alleges plaintiff has incurred funeral and burial expenses. ANALYSIS: Procedural Untimely The declaration submitted with the demurrer indicates that the complaint was served on moving defendants pursuant to an acknowledgment of receipt which counsel executed on or about January 4, 2024. [Wells Decl., para. 4]. Proof of service has evidently not yet been filed with the court. Under CCP §436, the court may upon motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court. Under CCP §435, a party may serve and file a notice of motion to strike within the time allowed to respond to a pleading& Under CCP §430.40, the time permitted to demur to a complaint is within 30 days after service of the complaint& CRC Rule 3.110(d) provides: The parties may stipulate without leave of court to one 15-day extension beyond the 30-day time period prescribed for the response after service of the initial complaint. As noted above, counsel has represented that counsel executed an acknowledgment of receipt on January 4, 2024. Under CCP section 415.30(c), where service is by mail made by acknowledgment of receipt, Service of a summons pursuant to this section is deemed complete on the date a written acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed, if such acknowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender. Here, the service was therefore complete on January 4, 2024. Thirty days after this service would have been February 3, 2024. On February 2, 2024, defendants counsel filed a declaration to invoke the automatic extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading under CCP sections 430.41(a)(2) and 435.5(a)(2), acknowledging that the responsive pleadings would now be due on March 4, 2024. Those sections provide that Any further extensions shall be obtained by court order upon a showing of good cause. The demurrer and motion to strike were filed on June 4, 2024, and served on June 3, 2024. This filing is months late, and well beyond the fifteen-day extension to which the parties were permitted to agree. There is no court order permitting such a lengthy extension of time for responses to the pleading. The motion could be denied, and the demurrer overruled on this ground alone, but the court elects not to do so. However, the declaration filed in support of the demurrer shows that plaintiff permitted defendants several extensions of time to respond during meet and confer communications, with the final extension being to June 3, 2024. [Wells Decl., paras. 4-7]. The motion and demurrer were in fact served by that date (although not filed until the following day, one day late). The court accordingly reluctantly has considered the very untimely motion to strike and demurrer, but the parties are cautioned that in the future the court may refuse to consider papers not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules, and procedures governing this action. Substantive Demurrer Statute of Limitations Defendants Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale and Adventist Health Foundation argue that the complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, CCP section 340.5, which provides: In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such persons alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. As acknowledged by defendants, under CCP section 364 (d), this statutory period may be extended upon the service of a notice of intent to sue within 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. Defendants argue that although the complaint does not specify a date of malpractice or death, the complaint was filed on December 8, 2023, and it can be inferred from the allegation that the acts occurred, on or about the year(s) 2022 to the current date that the death occurred prior to December 8, 2022, so that complaint was filed more than one year after the purported events in question. The problem with this argument is that the complaint does not in fact allege facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that the death occurred prior to December 8, 2022, as the only timeframe alleged in the pleading is that defendants were engaged for their services, on or about the year(s) 2022 and to the current date, and prior thereto and thereafter. [Complaint, para. 16]. This allegation is general enough to encompass a time period within the one-year statute, and the pleading also does not affirmatively foreclose the possibility that the statute has been extended under CCP section 364. As argued in the opposition, to sustain a demurrer based on a statute of limitations defense, the running of the statute must appear clearly and affirmatively from the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint may be time-barred. Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4ths 32, 42, citing and quoting Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781: We conclude the demurrer in the present case should have been overruled. A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.] (Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 339.). Geneva Towers, at 781. The pleading does not include any facts or allegations from which it appears clearly and affirmatively that the action is necessarily barred. The demurrer on this ground accordingly is overruled. Standing Defendants argue that a primarily insufficiency in the pleading is that it is nowhere pled how plaintiff Silva Sadhegian has standing to pursue the claims in the pleading, which appear to belong to decedent or decedents estate or to wrongful death plaintiffs who stand in a particular relationship to the decedent. The complaint does not indicate how this plaintiff has standing to pursue the claims that defendants engaged in professional negligence toward decedent Esraeil Ghadimi. In addition, the complaint is confusing, as it refers throughout to plaintiffs when only one plaintiff is named. The opposition indicates that defense counsel has been informed that plaintiff Silva Sadhegian is decedents daughter, and that these issues can be cleared up in discovery. These facts should be alleged in the pleading. With respect to the wrongful death claim, the second first cause of action, defendants rely on CCP section 377.60, under which a wrongful death cause of action may be asserted by any of the following persons, or by the decedents personal representative on their behalf: (a) The decedents surviving spouse,...children... Plaintiff must clearly allege facts which show that plaintiff has standing to pursue the wrongful death cause of action. Defendants also point out that, with respect to a wrongful death claim, all necessary parties must be joined. Defendants rely on CCP section 430.10(d), which provides that the grounds for demurrer include, There is a defect or misjoinder of parties. Defendants also argue that the repeated references to plaintiffs in the pleading suggest that there are other parties in existence. It is held that a wrongful death cause of action is a single cause of action, and that the heirs bringing such an action have a mandatory duty to join all known omitted heirs in the single action for wrongful death, as the omitted heirs are necessary parties. Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (2000) 53 Cal.App.4th 801. Under Ruttenberg, where an heir was not joined in the original proceeding, the omitted heir has a remedy against the other heirs, not a right to bring the wrongful death claim again. In any case, plaintiff has not responded to these arguments. Hence, the demurrer is sustained on this ground with leave to amend to permit plaintiff to allege facts supporting her standing, as well as to establish the joinder of necessary parties or the existence or non-existence of any other wrongful death claimants and any reasons for non-joinder. On amendment, if there is more than one plaintiff, the pleading must clearly allege and differentiate the capacities in which each plaintiff is pursuing each claim. To the extent the first first cause of action for professional negligence appears to be a survival claim, it is also not clearly alleged how plaintiff has standing. CCP § 377.20 (a), provides that a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the persons death, but survives subject to the applicable statute of limitations period. Under CCP § 377.30: A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedents successor in interest, subject to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7000) of the Part 1 of Division 7 of the Probate Code, and an action may be commenced by the decedents personal representative or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. It is not alleged here that plaintiff is decedents successor in interest, or decedents personal representative, and the opposition does not address this issue. The demurrer is sustained, and plaintiff is required on amendment to clearly allege the basis for any standing to pursue a claim on behalf of decedent on a survival theory, and if necessary, allege compliance with all procedures required for the pursuit of such a claim in that representative capacity. See, e.g. CCP § 377.32 (requiring affidavit or declaration of successor in interest). To the extent defendants seem to argue that certain damages cannot be recovered in a wrongful death cause of action, the pleading appropriately states each respective claim. CCP § 377.30 provides for the pursuit of a cause of action that survives the death of a decedent. CCP § 377.34 limits damages in such an action to loss or damage sustained before death. CCP § 377.60 provides for the pursuit of a wrongful death cause of action. Under CCP § 377.61, damages in a wrongful death proceeding may not include damages recoverable under Section 377.34. This statute suggests that two claims may be necessary to recover both pre and post-death damages, and possibly by plaintiffs in differing capacities. Under the Code, a survival action and wrongful death action may be brought together: An action under Section 377.30 may be joined with an action under Section 377.60 arising out of the same wrongful act or neglect. CCP § 377.62(a). The pleading does not separate out which damages are being sought in connection with each cause of action, which creates some uncertainty with respect to the appropriateness of the causes of action stated. Plaintiff must on amendment state separate prayers for relief as to each separate cause of action and ensure that the damages sought are recoverable under the above statutes. Separate Causes of Action Defendants argue that the two causes of action should be consolidated and alleged as only a single cause of action, as with respect to allegations of professional negligence a defendant has only one duty, measured by one standard of care. Defendants cite briefly to Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 992, in which the California Supreme Court held: The Court of Appeal thus erred in finding plaintiff's pleadings broad enough to state a cause of action for ordinary negligence as well as professional negligence. This analysis necessarily implies that the same factual predicate can give rise to two independent obligations to exercise due care according to two different standards. But this is a legal impossibility: a defendant has only one duty, measured by one standard of care, under any given circumstances. Flowers, at 1000, italics in the original. This situation is not a case where plaintiff is attempting to allege an ordinary negligence claim in addition to a professional negligence claim. As discussed above, and acknowledged in the moving papers, the causes of action arise out of the same alleged professional negligence but are brought separately because they seek different relief on behalf of differently positioned plaintiffs: one claim being made as a survivor action as a representative of decedent, and one being made as a wrongful death claim on behalf of plaintiff directly as an individual suffering different harm. As set forth above, the Code recognizes that the two distinctly postured claims can be brought in the same action. CCP § 377.62(a). Hence, stating these theories separately could prove beneficial to all parties as the litigation proceeds, particularly if further facts alleged raise further standing or necessary party issues. The demurrer on this ground accordingly is overruled. Plaintiff on amendment, however, is ordered to identify a first and second cause of action, rather than two first causes of action. Motion to Strike The motion to strike is deemed moot in light of the sustaining of the demurrer with leave to amend. RULING: Defendants Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale and Adventist Health Foundations Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint: The Court has reluctantly considered the demurrer and motion to strike despite the fact that they are extremely untimely, because they were filed and served several months beyond the applicable statutory deadline. Defendants are cautioned that in the future the Court may refuse to consider pleadings not filed in conformity with the statutes, rules and procedures governing this litigation. Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the argument that the complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as it does not appear from the face of the pleading that the complaint must necessarily be barred. Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the grounds the complaint fails to allege the standing of the only named plaintiff, Silva Sadhegian, to pursue each of the causes of action, either a survival cause of action on behalf of decedent Esraeil Ghadimi, or a wrongful death cause of action, and has failed to sufficiently allege that all wrongful death plaintiffs have been joined in the action. The pleading is also uncertain and confusing to the extent it refers repeatedly to plaintiffs, when only one plaintiff is named. Plaintiff on amendment must clearly allege the basis for any standing to pursue a claim on behalf of decedent on a survival theory, and if necessary, allege compliance with all procedures required for the pursuit of such a claim in that representative capacity. Plaintiff must also allege the basis for any standing to pursue a claim for wrongful death and allege the inclusion of all necessary parties to that claim. On amendment, if there is more than one plaintiff, the pleading must clearly allege and differentiate the capacities in which each plaintiff is pursuing each claim. The pleading is also uncertain as it does not separate out which damages are being sought in connection with each cause of action, which creates uncertainty with respect to the appropriateness of the causes of action stated. Plaintiff must also on amendment state separate prayers for relief as to each separate cause of action and ensure that the damages sought are recoverable. Plaintiff on amendment must also identify a first and second cause of action, rather than two first causes of action. Demurrer on all other grounds is OVERRULED. Defendants Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale and Adventist Health Foundations Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Complaint is MOOT in light of the sustaining of the demurrer with leave to amend. Ten days leave to amend. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP §§ 430.41 and 435.5 before any further demurrer or motion to strike may be filed. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

Case Number: 24SMCV01139 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 JOSEPH ARIEL HAZANI, Plaintiff, v. USG CORPORATION, Defendant. Case No.: 2 4 SMCV0 1139 Hearing Date: Ju ly 10, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT This hearing is on Plaintiff Joseph Ariel Hazani s motion to amend complaint . The motion is 46 pages long and exceeds the page limit of 15 for an opening memorandum . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (d) ( Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages. ).) A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these¿rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1113 subd. (g).) [A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers. ( Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker ¿(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262 .) Accordingly , a trial court also has discretion to reject oversize briefs . The Court exercises its discretion to disregard Plaintiffs motion to amend. Even if Plaintiffs motion were not oversize, it is moot . The Court sustained Defendant USG Corporations demurrer to the complaint and gave Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend . (June 14, 2024 Minute Order.) Accordingly , there is no need for a separate motion to amend . Plaintiff also failed to properly serve Defendant with its motion . Plaintiff filed his motion on June 18, 2024 . There is no proof of service showing the motion was served . Based on Plaintiffs failure to serve, the Court cannot properly consider the motion without depriving Defendant of its due process rights . Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10 , 2024 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 20STCV46934 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 73 7/11/2024 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding BARRIOS v. TELACU NW FIVE, INC., et al. ( 20STCV46934 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Daniel Balaban (Balaban & Speilberger, LLP) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Benjamin Sampson (Bordin Semmer LLP) MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF RUDY ELIAS ( filed by Defendant Waste Management of California, Inc. on 04/04/24) TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Waste Management of Californias Motion to Compel Deposition of Rudy Elias is GRANTED. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. Moving party to give notice. BACKGROUND On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff Jerson Barrios (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Telacu NW Five, Inc.; Telacu 1270, Inc.; Telacu Development Corporation, Inc.; The East Los Angeles Community Union; Waste Management of California, Inc. (Waste Management); and Waste Management Collection and Recycling, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). The Complaint alleges that while in the course of Plaintiffs employment with Garibay Landscaping, Inc., Plaintiff sustained significant injuries during an incident on May 2, 2020. Plaintiff alleges he was standing on the outer ledges on the top of a dumpster, as he and others usually did, to empty the contents of the reusable trash bags full of leaves, shrubbery, branches, which was being handed to him by another member of the Garibay Landscaping crew. Plaintiff alleges he suddenly lost his balance and fell down to the ground hitting the back of his head, neck, back and the rest of his body onto the asphalt/concrete floor, suffering a skull fracture, respiratory failure, spinal injuries and shoulder abrasion, among other injuries. On April 4, 2024, Defendant Waste Management filed the instant Motion to Compel Witness Rudy Elias to Comply with the Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents. No opposition was filed. ANALYSIS Defendant Waste Management moves to compel the deposition of third-party witness Rudy Elias. A party may move to compel a non-partys compliance with a subpoena that requires the attendance of a witness. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.(a) Unlike a motion to compel a partys deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, the movant is not required to show good cause or include an accompanying meet and confer declaration. On February 12, 2024, Rudy Elias was served with a subpoena for his personal appearance at deposition which was set for March 21, 2024. Defendant Waste Management asserts that Mr. Elias testimony is highly relevant to this case. Plaintiff identified Mr. Elias as a post-incident employer, thus Defendant Waste Management argues Mr. Elias testimony is important for liability and damage-related issues. Defendant Waste Management contends that Mr. Elias never indicated he would not be able to appear. The Court notes that the motion is unopposed. Due to the lack of opposition, an inference is created that the motion is meritorious. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The Court GRANTS Defendant Waste Managements motion. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. CONCLUSION Defendant Waste Management of Californias Motion to Compel Deposition of Rudy Elias is GRANTED. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 22SMCV02350 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Woods Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Evidentiary Sanctions, and/or Issue Preclusion as Against Plaintiff is DENIED. Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Wood to give notice. REASONING Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Wood (Defendants) moves the Court for an order imposing terminating sanctions against Plaintiff Marcelino Arcos (Plaintiff) in the form of dismissing Plaintiffs case against Defendants for failing to provide code-compliant responses, without objections, and pay sanctions as ordered by the Court on August 8, 2023. If a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose sanctions including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery also constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).) [T]wo facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Admrs, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, ellipsis omitted.) A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) While Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Courts prior order, the Court finds that terminating sanctions are not warranted at this juncture. Notably, the Court considered an almost identical motion by Defendants on January 3, 2024, and denied it on the ground that it would be improper to jump from an order entering an order compelling discovery responses to an order for terminating sanctions because this did not represent the incremental approach contemplated by California law. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [the California discovery statutes provide an incremental approach to discovery sanctions].) The Court further noted that Defendants provided no proof of meeting and conferring with Plaintiff or attempts to contact Plaintiff to obtain the subject responses, less severe sanctions [may] produce compliance with the discovery rules, and until the Court had imposed incrementally harsher sanctions to curb Plaintiffs failure to provide discovery responses, the Court declined to impose the ultimate sanction of termination. (See ibid.) As to an alternative remedy of evidentiary or issue sanctions, Defendants had provided no argument for the same, such that the Court had no basis to determine whether those requested remedies were proper. Defendants have renewed their motion here, but it is more of a motion for reconsideration given that little more has happened since the Court issued its order on January 3, 2024. Plaintiff failed to appear before the Court on three dates, on December 5, 2023, January 3, 2024, and on May 9, 2024, and Plaintiff has not yet provided the same discovery responses, but failure to appear at court hearings is not a basis for ordering terminating sanctions, and the Court previously stated that the failure to provide that discovery alone would not warrant terminating sanctions. Defendants again provide no argument as to the alternative remedies of evidentiary or issue sanctions. Accordingly, Defendants Wood of Chiu Living Trust, Roman Chiu, and Abby Woods Second Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Evidentiary Sanctions, and/or Issue Preclusion as Against Plaintiff is DENIED.

Case Number: 21STCV23684 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal Moving Party: Plaintiff Hector Calderon Responding Party: Unopposed Tentative Ruling: Granted BACKGROUND On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff William Andrew Kennedy (Kennedy) filed a Complaint against Defendants Eduardo Martinez (Martinez) and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence; and (2) Negligence Per Se. This action arises from Plaintiff Kennedys vehicle being struck by Defendant Martinezs vehicle, which then caused Plaintiffs Kennedys vehicle to strike an additional vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) On October 12, 2021, Defendant Martinez filed an Answer to the Complaint. On October 20, 2021, Plaintiffs Hector Calderon and Miguel Calderon filed a Complaint against Defendant Martinez in Hector Calderon, et al. v. Eduardo Martinez, LASC Case No. 21STCV38689 (the Calderon Action). On June 1, 2023, the Court deemed the instant action and the Calderon Action as related, which the instant action being deemed the lead case. (06/01/23 Minute Order.) Both cases were assigned to the Honorable Jill Feeney in Department 30 at Spring Street Courthouse for all purposes. (06/01/23 Minute Order.) On June 14, 2023, pursuant to stipulation between the parties, the Court signed an order consolidating the instant action and the Calderon Action. (06/14/23 Order.) The instant action was deemed the lead case. (06/14/23 Order.) On June 22, 2023, a Request for Dismissal was filed in the Calderon Action as to Plaintiff Miguel Calderon and, on June 23, 2023, Plaintiff Miguel Calderon was dismissed from the Complaint in the Calderon Action with prejudice. On June 29, 2023, the Honorable Lynne M. Hobbs, sitting in Department 30 at Spring Street Courthouse, entered an order consolidating the instant action and the Calderon Action, with the instant action being deemed the lead case. (06/29/23 Minute Order.) On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff Kennedy filed a Request for Dismissal as to the entire action and all parties with prejudice. On April 3, 2024, the Court dismissed this action pursuant to the Request for Dismissal. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff Hector Calderon (Calderon) filed and served the instant unopposed Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal. The motion is unopposed. Any opposition to the motion was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (CCP § 1005(b).) MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiff Calderon argues that the law and public policy strongly favor the resolution of matters on their merits, and that the dismissal was filed by separate co-counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy should not have been entered as to Plaintiff Calderon. No opposition was filed. ANALYSIS I. Legal Standard/Applicable Law It is well recognized that all courts have inherent supervisory or administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist apart from any statutory authority. (First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 324, 333.) The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Section 473 permits the trial court to relieve a party . . . from judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 232-33.) A motion seeking such relief lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial courts discretion will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 233) Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. (Ibid.) It is well settled that appellate courts have always been and are favorably disposed toward such action upon the part of the trial courts as will permit, rather than prevent, the adjudication of legal controversies upon their merits. (Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. Co. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 525.) II. Setting Aside the Dismissal Here, counsel for Plaintiff Calderon, Christoper Mesaros (Mesaros), provides a declaration in support of the motion. According to counsel, on March 29, 2024, counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy filed a request for dismissal with the Court. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) The request for dismissal was for the entire action, which included all parties and all causes of action. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy did not and does not represent Plaintiff Calderon. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy had no authority to dismiss the action on behalf of Plaintiff Calderon. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 2.) Mr. Mesaros states that he believes that counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy simply made a mistake by filing a dismissal on behalf of all [p]arties when the dismissal should only have been filed as to Plaintiff Kennedy. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Calderons case has not been resolved and he requests that the order of dismissal be set aside. (Mesaros Decl., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that the dismissal should be set aside. Counsel for Plaintiff Calderon has attested to the fact that counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy mistakenly dismissed the entire action. Plaintiff Calderon has presented evidence that counsel for Plaintiff Kennedy had no authority to dismiss the action on behalf of Plaintiff Calderon. As such, the Court finds that the April 3, 2024 order of dismissal should be set aside. RULING Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Calderons Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal is GRANTED.

Case Number: 23SMCV00137 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: I Please call the courtroom after 8 am to obtain a copy of the courts tentative ruling.

Case Number: 23SMCV05929 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Travelers Commercial Insurance Co. v. Luckenbacher, Case No. 23SMCV05929 Hearing date July 11, 2024 Travelers Motions for Orders Compelling Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatives, and Demand for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions In this uninsured motorist case, plaintiff moves to compel defendants responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and demand for production of documents and requests sanctions. No opposition, which would have been due nine court days prior to the hearing (Code Civ. Proc. §1005(b)) was filed. If a party to whom interrogatories or an inspection demand were directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses without objections. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(b), 2031.300(b). Moreover, failure to timely serve responses waives objections to the requests. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(a), 2031.300(a). Failure to verify a response is equivalent to no response at all. Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636. If a party unsuccessfully made or opposed such a motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(c), 2031.300(c). Sanctions may be awarded even though no opposition was filed or the requested discovery was provided after the motion was filed. CRC Rule 3.1348(a). Defendant failed to respond. See generally Volk decls. All objections to the requests are waived. Monetary sanctions are warranted. Plaintiffs counsel requests $841.65 for each motion, representing 4 hours of work (2 hours to draft and 2 hours to prepare for and attend the hearing) at counsels hourly rate of $195, plus filing fee of $61.65. The request for sanctions is granted in a reduced amount because the three motions are virtually identical and are unopposed. The court awards a total of 6 hours (5 hours to draft, 1 hour for hearing) at $195/hour, plus filing fees of $184.95 for three motions. GRANTED. Defendant to serve complete, verified responses, without objection, within 20 days of this order. The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the total amount of $1,365, plus $184.95 in filing fees, payable within 30 days.