Joa, Carmen Eulalia - Decedent

Case Number: 22STCV28025 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 karen bang , et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. dill veterinary hospital, inc. , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 22STCV28025 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs motion to continue trial MOVING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Karen Bang and Linda Agajanian Otey RESPONDING PARTIES: Defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., and Amber Oliver Motion to Continue Trial The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs Karen Bang and Linda Agajanian Otey (Plaintiffs) move the court for an order continuing trial in this action, currently scheduled to begin on August 14, 2024, and all related deadlines. Defendants Dill Veterinary Hospital, Inc., and Amber Oliver (Defendants) have filed an opposition to Plaintiffs motion, stating that, while they do not oppose a brief trial continuance of 30-60 days, they oppose Plaintiffs request to continue all discovery and trial-related deadlines. The court finds that Plaintiffs have shown good cause to continue the trial and all related deadlines based on (1) the unavailability of Plaintiffs lead counsel on August 14, 2024, (2) Plaintiffs counsels representation that the parties are in the process of scheduling various depositions, and (3) the courts consideration of the factors set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subdivision (d), including that (i) there have not been any prior continuances of trial, (ii) Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced by the continuance of trial and related deadlines, (iii) Plaintiffs lead counsel will be engaged in another multi-week trial, and (iv) the interests of justice favor the continuance. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1332, subds. (c)(3), (c)(6), (d)(2), (d)(5), (d)(8), (d)(10); Lipps Decl., ¶¶ 1, 2-3.) The court therefore grants Plaintiffs motion and makes the orders set forth below. ORDER The court grants plaintiffs Karen Bang and Linda Agajanian Oteys motion to continue trial. The court orders: 1. The trial in this action is continued from August 14, 2024, to March 12, 2025, at 11:00 a.m., in Department 53. 2. The Final Status Conference is continued from August 2, 2024, to February 27, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53. 3. All discovery cut-off and discovery motion cut-off dates, and deadlines for the exchange of information concerning expert trial witnesses shall be based on the new trial date.¿ 4. The parties and their counsel shall hold a meeting, conference call, or videoconference to discuss and try to settle all issues in the case no later than January 17, 2025. The court orders plaintiffs Karen Bang and Linda Agajanian Otey to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 10, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCV06346 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 82 First Technology Federal Credit Union v. Matthew Christopher Thomas, et al. Case No. 24STCV06346 Order Denying Application for Writ of Possession INTRODUCTION Plaintiff First Technology Federal Credit Union (Plaintiff) moves for a writ of possession against Defendant Matthew Christopher Thomas (Defendant) over the following property: 2022 Tesla Model X, Vehicle Identification Number 7SAXCBE69NF333811 (the Vehicle). Plaintiff has not shown probable cause to believe that the Vehicle is located at the address specified in the application, as required by statute. (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 512.010(b)(4), 512.080.) Accordingly, the application is denied without prejudice. LEGAL STANDARD Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this chapter for a writ of possession by filing a written application for the writ with the court in which the action is brought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 512.010(a).) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b), the application must be submitted under oath and include: (1) A showing of the basis of the plaintiff's claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed. If the basis of the plaintiff's claim is a written instrument, a copy of the instrument shall be attached. (2) A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention. (3) A particular description of the property and a statement of its value. (4) A statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there. (5) A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure. Before the hearing on the Writ of Possession, the Defendant must be served with (1) a copy of the summons and complaint; (2) a Notice of Application and Hearing; and (3) a copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof. (Code Civ. Proc. § 512.030.) The writ will be issued if the court finds that the plaintiff's claim is probably valid and the other requirements for issuing the writ are established. (Code Civ. Proc. § 512.040(b).) A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 511.090.) DISCUSSION A. Probable Validity of Plaintiffs Claim Plaintiff seeks a writ of possession based on its claims for breach of contract and money lent. On or about November 29, 2022, Defendant entered into Loan and Security Agreements (the Contract) with Plaintiff to finance the purchase of the Vehicle. In consideration for an auto loan in the amount of $154,310.78, Defendant granted Plaintiff a security interest in the Vehicle and agreed to pay interest of 12.0300% per year. (Dexheimer Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, Exh. 1 and 2.) Defendant defaulted on the Contract by failing to make payments when due, and there is presently a balance due of $153,981.28, plus interest. (Id. ¶ 8, Exh. 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement. B. Wrongful Detention Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b)(2), the application must include a showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention. Under the Contract, Plaintiff has the right to repossess the Vehicle in the event of default. ( Dexheimer Decl. Exh. 1.) Plaintiff has demanded that Defendant surrender the Vehicle, and Defendant has refused to do so. (Id. ¶ 11.) Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement. C. Description and Value of Property Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b)(3), the application must include a particular description of the property and a statement of its value. Plaintiff has provided a particular description of the property, by make, and VIN number. Plaintiff has also given a statement as to value. Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement. D. Probable Location of the Vehicle The court denies this application without prejudice because Plaintiff does not include sufficient evidence of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b)(4). Plaintiffs application seeks a writ of possession directing the levying officer to take the Vehicle from Defendants last known residence address, which is a private place located at 4216 W. 59th Place, Los Angeles, CA 90043. (Appl. ¶ 6.) However, the declaration of Shaun Dexheimer is not sufficient to establish probable cause to believe the vehicle is located at that address. The declaration merely states: I am informed and believe that the Vehicle is currently in the possession of [Defendant] at his last known residence address and that Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant is concealing the Vehicle at his residence so Plaintiff cannot gain access to it. (Dexheimer Decl. ¶ 10.) The declaration provides no attribution for this information and appears to be based upon hearsay. Of equal concern, the record suggests that Plaintiff does not, in fact, reside at that address. Although Defendant listed the 59th Place address on his contract, Plaintiff has been personally serving Defendant at a different address: 3988 East Hardy Street, Apartment 132, in Inglewood, California 90303. The record does not clarify this inconsistency. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not establish sufficient probable cause to believe the vehicle is located at the address on the application. E. Turnover Order Plaintiff requests a turnover order. (See Memorandum 4:6-14.) Section 512.070 states: If a writ of possession is issued, the court may also issue an order directing the defendant to transfer possession of the property to the plaintiff. Such order shall contain a notice to the defendant that failure to turn over possession of such property to plaintiff may subject the defendant to being held in contempt of court. Thus a turnover order, issued pursuant to section 512.070 , is not a separate remedy but rather an alternative means of enforcing a writ of possession. ( Edwards v. Sup.Ct. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 173, 178.) Because the court is denying the application for a writ of possession, the court cannot issue a turnover order. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Based upon the foregoing, the court denies the application for a writ of possession without prejudice. Plaintiffs counsel shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

Case Number: 20STCV17676 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On May 8, 2020, Plaintiff Henry Martinez (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Jill Renner (Defendant) and Does 1-50 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On January 4, 2023, Defendant filed an answer. On January 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to form interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on February 22, 2024. On January 11, 2024, Defendant filed (1) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on February 23, 2024 and (2) a motion to compel Plaintiffs further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on February 22, 2024. On February 22, 2024, the Court placed the motions off calendar because the parties had not participated in an informal discovery conference. On February 28, 2024, Defendant scheduled an informal discovery conference for March 22, 2024 and filed an informal discovery conference form. On March 8, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff to appear in person or remotely via LACourtConnect, or appear through counsel other than Randall Awad (who is not eligible to practice law), on March 13, 2024, and inform the Court whether Plaintiff intends to seek another attorney to represent him or whether Plaintiff will proceed without counsel. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff appeared and asked for additional time to find new counsel. The Court continued certain hearing dates. On March 22, 2024, the Court continued the informal discovery conference to April 17, 2024. On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff appeared and stated that he intended to find new counsel. The Court continued the informal discovery conference to May 17, 2024. On May 17, 2024, the Court conducted an informal discovery conference with Plaintiff and Defendants counsel. Defendants counsel agreed to re-send the discovery requests and motions to compel further responses and to give Plaintiff 20 days to respond without objections if Plaintiff would allow Defendant to file the motions after the 20 days. The Court suggested the parties discuss filing deadlines to see if the parties could stipulate to deadlines. On June 14, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions, to be heard on July 10, 2024. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. Trial is currently scheduled for August 16, 2024. PARTYS REQUESTS Defendant asks the Court to compel Plaintiff to provide further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and to impose sanctions on Plaintiff. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides in part: (a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following: (1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (3) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. * * * (h) Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subds. (a), (b), (c), (h).) DISCUSSION On August 1, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motion to compel Plaintiffs responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and ordered Plaintiff to provide verified responses and to produce the documents, electronically stored information, and/or other things requested without objections by August 31, 2023. On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff served verified responses to the demand for production of documents. Considering the responses inadequate, Defendant filed a motion to compel further responses on January 11, 2024. The Court took the motion off calendar because Defendant had not scheduled or participated in an informal discovery conference. (In addition, the motion appears to have been untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c).) After participating in an informal discovery conference on May 17, 2024, Defendant filed another motion to compel further responses on June 14, 2024. The motion is untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c), which provides: Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (c).) Plaintiff served verified responses on September 25, 2023. Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff served supplemental responses or that the parties agreed in writing to allow Defendant to file a motion to compel further responses more than 45 days after service of the verified responses. Therefore, Defendant was required to file a motion to compel further responses within 45 days of September 25, 2023 that is, by November 9, 2023. On May 20, 2024, Defendant filed a notice stating that, at the May 17, 2024 informal discovery conference, the parties agreed that, if Plaintiff did not provide full and complete objection-free answers and documents within 20 days, Defendant will file Motions to Compel against Plaintiff . . . . Defendants notice does not constitute an agreement in writing for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (c). At most, it memorializes Defendants understanding of Plaintiffs purported oral agreement. Defendant has waived her right to compel further responses. The Court denies the motion. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Defendant Jill Renners motion to compel Plaintiff Henry Martinezs further responses to demand for production of documents, set one, and for sanctions. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling within five days.

Case Number: 23LBCV01651 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Daniel Kwan Haeng Lee filed this action against Defendant, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Successor-in-Interest for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2008-AR12 and Does 1-25 for quiet title, slander of title, cancellation and expungement of void instrument, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff filed the complaint on 9/06/23. On 10/09/23, JP Morgan filed a demurrer and motion to strike directed at the complaint. On 3/06/24, prior to the hearing on the pleading challenge, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint. The FAC includes causes of action for cancellation and expungement of void instruments and declaratory relief. 2. Demurrer a. Legal Standard on Demurrer A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing partys pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan 39 Cal.3d 311 (1985). No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no speaking demurrers). A demurrer is brought under CCP § 430.10 [grounds], § 430.30 [as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken], and § 430.50(a) [can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within]. Specifically, a demurrer may be brought per CCP § 430.10(e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. Per CCP §430.10(a) a demurrer may be brought where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Furthermore, demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. CCP § 430.10(f). However, in construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn, 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769 (1987). And, if the facts pled in the complaint are inconsistent with facts which are incorporated by reference from exhibits attached to the complaint, the facts in the incorporated exhibits control. Further, irrespective of the name or label given to a cause of action by the plaintiff, a general demurrer must be overruled if the facts as pled in the body of the complaint state some valid claim for relief. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (CCP § 92(c).) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 348 (1976). The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.) Finally, CCP section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP §430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (CCP §430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (CCP §430.41(a)(3).) b. Meet and Confer Defense Counsel, Steven M. Dailey filed a declaration establishing he and Plaintiff met and conferred prior to the filing of the demurrer, but were unable to agree on a resolution of the merits of the pleading challenge. The demurrer is therefore ripe for resolution. c. Grounds for Demurrer Defendants demur to the FAC, contending: Plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party to the lawsuit; Plaintiff is not the real party in interest to allege causes of action relating to the foreclosure because he is not the borrower; Plaintiffs FAC is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiffs claims are time-barred; The subject sale is presumed valid; Claims attacking the sale fail absent tender of all amounts due under the loan; WaMu was a bona fide encumbrancer on the property via its loan agreement with Plaintiffs spouse; Plaintiff does not allege facts to show any assignment was void; Each of Plaintiffs causes of action fails to state a cause of action. d. Summary of Opposition Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. He argues: Plaintiff needs to file a Second Amended Complaint to cure defects concerning the identification of the defendants to the action; Plaintiff is the only damaged party by way of Defendants actions, and there is no indispensable party who needs to be joined in the suit; Plaintiff wishes to add claims for fraud and wrongful foreclosure to cure any defects in his claims; Plaintiff is the real party in interest because he is the trustee of the trust that owns the subject property; Res judicata does not apply in this case because Plaintiff has never sued before, and the issues decided in the prior litigation were different from the issues posed by way of this action; There is no statute of limitations defense because the subject deed of trust is void, and there is no time bar to asserting a claim based on a void instrument; Similarly, claims based on the trustees sale are not barred by the statute of limitations because the sale is void; The presumption of valid sale does not operate to save Defendants from Plaintiffs claims; Tender is excused because the subject deed of trust is void on its face; It cannot be determined, at the pleading stage, whether WaMu was a bona fide encumbrancer for value; Plaintiff adequately alleged facts to support each of his causes of action pled, and if the Court finds he did not do so, he should be given leave to do so. e. Summary of Reply The reply restates the moving arguments and contends nothing in the opposition defeats the demurrer. Defendants ask the Court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. f. Request for Judicial Notice Defendants seek judicial notice of various documents relating to the subject property, all of which have been recorded in the County Recorders office. They also seek judicial notice of documents filed in two lawsuits, NC055738 and NC061515, as well as various documents filed in bankruptcy court and the court of appeals. The RJN is unopposed and granted. g. Allegations of the FAC and Facts Subject to Judicial Notice The crux of Plaintiffs FAC is that a deed of trust and assignment of deed of trust, Exhibits 3 and 4 to his FAC, are void and should be cancelled and expunged. Exhibit 3 to the complaint is a Deed of Trust in favor of Washington Mutual and indicating a security interest in the subject property due to a loan taken out by Yuri I. Lee, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. The document was recorded on 8/28/06. The document is signed by Yuri I. Lee, dated 8/18/06, and notarized by Michele D. Reynoso. Exhibit 4 to the FAC is an assignment of the deed of trust from Washington Mutual to Bank of America, and it is dated 11/04/10. The crux of Plaintiffs complaint is that the deed of trust is void because he, by virtue of his community property interest in the property, was a co-owner of the property at the time his wife encumbered the property. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the property using a community property fund he shares with his wife in January of 2004, and the residence was officially designated as community property by way of a grant deed executed on 7/28/06 and conveyed into a family trust via grant deed the same day. FAC, ¶2. Defendants, in their demurrer, show that the 7/28/06 grant deeds upon which Plaintiff relies were not actually recorded until 9/05/06, approximately one week AFTER Defendants predecessor-in-interest recorded the purportedly void deed of trust. Specifically, Defendants judicially noticeable documents show that, on 2/25/04, a grant deed was recorded showing the property owned by Daniel and Yuri as husband and wife. Then on 8/28/06, Daniel and Yuri conveyed the property to Yuri only as a married woman as her sole and separate property. The same day, Daniel and Yuri recorded an interspousal grant deed, which also conveyed all interest in the property from Daniel to Yuri. Exhibit 5 to the RJN shows that it was not until 9/05/24 that Daniel and Yuri recorded documents purporting to transfer interest in the property back to both of them as spouses. h. Analysis The Court finds the FAC fails to state a cause of action for numerous reasons set forth in the demurrer. First and foremost, the FAC does not plead the existence of a void deed of trust because the judicially noticeable documents show that Plaintiffs wife was the sole owner of the property on the date the deed of trust was recorded, and therefore Defendants predecessors were under no obligation to include Plaintiff on the loan or resultant deed of trust. The Court finds, as Defendants correctly note in their demurrer, that Plaintiffs spouse is a necessary party to this litigation. She is the one who signed the loan agreement that resulted in recording of the deed of trust. Pursuant to CCP §389(a), therefore, she qualifies as an indispensable party and must be named in the suit. Additionally, the Cout finds Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the deed of trust, assignment of deed of trust, or any resulting sale. Plaintiff was not the owner of the property, per recorded documents, on the date of the encumbrance. Only his wife was. Plaintiff sets forth no facts showing why the deed of trust was somehow void due his lack of signature on the loan if he was not an owner of the property on the date of the loan. Additionally, the Court finds this case is barred by res judicata. Plaintiffs spouse has filed two prior actions against Defendants or their predecessors. Pursuant to Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank (2016) 246 Cal.App.4 th 1387, 1394, Plaintiff is in privity with his spouse. Pursuant to Barnes v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5217393, Defendants are in privity with their predecessors. The Court has reviewed judicially noticeable documents from NC055738 and NC061515. In NC055738, Plaintiffs spouse sued JP Morgan Chase and California Reconveyance Company to enjoin a foreclosure sale. On 6/02/11, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer without leave to amend. In NC061515, Plaintiffs spouse sued US Bank and various others seeking injunctive relief precluding a foreclosure sale. The case was removed to the Bankruptcy Court, which ultimately dismissed the case; notably, Plaintiffs spouse appealed the dismissal, and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. The Court finds the two prior cases were sufficiently similar to this case, in that both of them sought to preclude foreclosure and this case seeks an order that the deed of trust upon which the foreclosure was conducted is void. Finally, the Court finds the claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs only contention in support of his position that the claims are not time-barred is essentially that void documents can always be challenged without a time limitation. However, as noted above, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to plead facts establishing the subject documents are void, and therefore he also failed to plead facts circumventing the statute of limitations. i. Leave to Amend Plaintiff, in the event the demurrer is sustained, seeks an order granting him leave to amend. Notably, he also seeks an order granting him leave to add additional defendants to the action and/or additional causes of action to the action. The Court finds this case presents purely legal issues for determination, and leave to amend would be entirely futile. Leave to amend is therefore denied. 3. Motion to Strike Defendants motion to strike is moot in light of the ruling on the demurrer. 4. Conclusion The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Defendants must prepare a judgment of dismissal for processing. Defendants are ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 23LBCV02364 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Bernald Rock filed this action against Defendants, Patricia J. Danis, Successor Trustee of the Jean L. Davis Revocable Living Trush, Sati AH, Inc., Castlehead, Inc., Jona Howe, and Vashti Clisby for damages arising out of a real estate purchase agreement. Plaintiffs operative complaint is his First Amended Complaint, which he filed on 2/29/24. The FAC includes causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, quiet title, and negligence. The crux of the FAC is that Plaintiff agreed to purchase a piece of property from Danis. The property did not come with a garage, but Danis also owned an adjoining property, which had a five-car garage. Danis had been unable to sell the subject property without a garage, and therefore listed the property with one of the garages from her adjoining property. However, during escrow, Danis discovered she could not extend the property line of the subject property to include the garage, and therefore the parties agreed that the subject property would be given a permanent easement over the subject garage. The parties drafted an exclusive easement agreement, which Defendant was to record with the escrow company prior to closing. Escrow, however, determined there was a problem with the declaration re: easement, and refused to record it. Plaintiff alleges Defendants instructed escrow to close despite the lack of declaration. Escrow closed on 6/11/21, and thereafter Plaintiffs attorney learned of the problem and attempted to resolve it. Danis signed a revised declaration to be recorded, which both parties signed. Danis failed, however, to ever record the revised declaration, and ultimately Daniss real estate agent demanded Plaintiff vacate the garage, which Plaintiff had been using since the close of escrow. Plaintiff learned that Danis, in the intervening time, had sold the property to Defendant SATI. In late 2022, Danis commenced harassing and bullying Plaintiff into removing his items from the garage, which he ultimately did in January of 2023. He filed this action on 12/08/23. Defendant Clisby represented Plaintiff during the subject sale transaction. Defendant Howe represented Danis during the subject transaction. Defendant Castlehead was the escrow provider for the subject transaction. As noted above, Defendant SATI purchased the property with the relevant garage from Defendant Danis. 2. Demurrer a. Legal Standard on Demurrer A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing partys pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan 39 Cal.3d 311 (1985). No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no speaking demurrers). A demurrer is brought under CCP § 430.10 [grounds], § 430.30 [as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken], and § 430.50(a) [can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within]. Specifically, a demurrer may be brought per CCP § 430.10(e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. Per CCP §430.10(a) a demurrer may be brought where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Furthermore, demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. CCP § 430.10(f). However, in construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn, 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769 (1987). And, if the facts pled in the complaint are inconsistent with facts which are incorporated by reference from exhibits attached to the complaint, the facts in the incorporated exhibits control. Further, irrespective of the name or label given to a cause of action by the plaintiff, a general demurrer must be overruled if the facts as pled in the body of the complaint state some valid claim for relief. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (CCP § 92(c).) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 348 (1976). The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.) Finally, CCP section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP §430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (CCP §430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (CCP §430.41(a)(3).) b. Meet and Confer Defense Counsel, Ani Setian filed a declaration establishing the attorneys met and conferred prior to the filing of the demurrer, but were unable to agree on a resolution of the merits of the pleading challenge. The demurrer is therefore ripe for resolution. c. First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract Danis demurs to the first cause of action, contending (a) Plaintiff failed to plead offer and acceptance because his signature is not on either grand deed re: easement declaration upon which he sues, and (b) Plaintiff alleges performance because he alleges he performed all terms of the purchase agreement, but he failed to plead the purchase agreement or allege its terms. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, contending the first grant deed would not have been signed by him because he did not own either property at the time it was created, and the second grant deed WAS signed by him, but he failed to retain a copy. He contends Defendants signature on the document is the relevant signature. He contends he need not attach the purchase agreement or plead its terms with specificity because the terms of the purchase agreement are not relevant to the claim. Defendant, in reply, contends the purchase agreement cannot be both the contract that she allegedly breached and also irrelevant to the contract. She contends Plaintiffs failure to provide a signed copy of any declaration shows lack of mutual assent. The Court finds in favor of Plaintiff at the pleading stage. Plaintiff has references the purchase agreement, but is not suing for breach of the purchase agreement. He is suing for breach of the obligation to record the grant deed re: easement and declaration, which represented the parties agreement re: Plaintiffs right to an easement over the subject garage. Plaintiff correctly notes that the first such declaration would not have contained his signature, as it was transferring an easement from one property owned by Danis to another property owned by Danis. Plaintiff also correctly notes that he alleged, at ¶22, that he signed the second declaration, but did not retain a signed copy in his records. This is sufficient, at the pleading stage, to allege both parties signed and assented to the agreement. Any remaining issues are evidentiary in nature and not the proper subject of a pleading challenge. The demurrer to the first cause of action is overruled. d. Second Cause of Action, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing The demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing rises and falls with the demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of contract. The demurrer is therefore also overruled. e. Third Cause of Action, Fraud The crux of Defendants demurrer to the fraud cause of action is that Plaintiff failed to plead the cause of action with the requisite specificity. Plaintiff, in opposition to the demurrer, contends he pled the cause of action with the requisite specificity, and to the extent he did not, it is because Defendant has better and more complete knowledge of the facts than he has. The Court again finds in favor of Plaintiff at the pleading stage. The FAC clearly alleges the parties agreed to recordation of the second declaration, but the defendants did not record the declaration. It is unclear which defendant (Danis or her agent) chose not to record the declaration, but clearly Danis and her agent would have better knowledge concerning who made that choice than Plaintiff would have. Danis argues, in reply, that Plaintiff cannot show knowledge of falsity or intent. These showings, however, can be presumed by the fact that Danis, prior to curing the failure to record, sold the property to a third party. The demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled. f. Fourth Cause of Action, Quiet Title Defendant demurs to the fourth cause of action for quiet title, contending Plaintiffs complaint admits the subject garage is currently owned by SETI, and a cause of action for quiet title can only be asserted against the owner of the property. Plaintiff, in opposition to the demurrer, contends the sale to SATI was fraudulent and, in the event the sale is set aside, the cause of action will be properly and necessarily pled against Danis. The fourth cause of action seeks an order permitting Plaintiff permanent use of the subject garage based on the easement agreement between Plaintiff and Danis. While it is true that Plaintiff alleges SATI currently owns the property and not Danis, the Court finds there is no harm in pleading the cause of action against both of them, as it is unclear whether their sale agreement will unravel as a result of this litigation. Additionally, at ¶¶28 and 29 of the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that, even though she had sold the property to SATI, Danis continued to harass Plaintiff to move his belongings out of the garage, which tends to show she was still asserting some sort of right to possession of the garage at least at that time. The demurrer is overruled. 3. Motion to Strike Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs prayer for attorneys fees and punitive damages, as well as all related allegations. Plaintiff agrees to strike the allegations and prayer for punitive damages and attorneys fees in connection with the second cause of action and the prayer for attorneys fees in connection with the fourth cause of action. The motion to strike is granted without leave to amend as to those allegations and portions of the prayer, which are deemed stricken as a result of this ruling. Plaintiff correctly notes that the subject grant deed declaration upon which he sues has an attorneys fees provision, and therefore the motion to strike the prayer for attorneys fees is denied. A well-pled cause of action for fraud supports a claim for punitive damages, and therefore the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is denied. All related allegations may also remain in the FAC. 4. Conclusion The demurrer is overruled. The motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part as set forth fully above. Defendant must file an answer to the FAC, with the subject allegations and portions of the prayer deemed stricken, within ten days. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 23STCV04433 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 61 DARCY FRENCH vs CITY OF LOS ANGELES TENTATIVE Plaintiff Darcy Frenchs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to file the proposed second amended complaint within 20 days of this ORDER. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice within five (5) days. DISCUSSION Code Civ. Proc. section 473 subd. (a)(1) states that: The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. The trial court has discretion to permit or deny the amendment of the complaint, but instances justifying the court's denial of leave to amend are rare. (Armenta ex rel. City of Burbank v. Mueller Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 636, 642.) Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [Citations], this policy should be applied only [w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . . [Citation.] A different result is indicated [w]here inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation.] (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) Pursuant to California Rule of Court Rule 3.1324, [a] motion to amend a pleading before trial must: (1) Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. Such a motion must include a supporting declaration stating, (1) The effect of the amendment; (2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (CRC Rule 3.1324, subd. (b).) Plaintiff Darcy French (Plaintiff) seeks leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC) alleging the same causes of action, but including new instances of protected activity and retaliation which have occurred since the original Complaint was filed. (Motion at pp. 67.) Such retaliatory actions include continuing to pass Plaintiff over for promotion from April 2023 through January 2024. (Motion at p. 7.) Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the amendment, as the facts to be included in the proposed SAC could not have been included in the original complaint. Defendant City of Los Angeles has filed no opposition to the present motion, and trial in this matter is not set to commence until June 3, 2025. The motion is therefore GRANTED.

Case Number: 23STLC05562 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 25 Tentative Ruling Commissioner Karine Mkrtchyan Department 25 Confidential Court-Privileged Document Hearing Date: Tuesday, June 25, 2024 Case Name: REAH SYBIRSKI v. VLADIMIR POLYAKOV Case No.: 23STLC05562 Motion: (Amended) Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Include Claim for Punitive Damages in Complaint and to Reclassify Under Unlimited Jurisdiction Moving Party: Plaintiff Reah Sybirski Responding Party: Defendants Vladimir Polyakov, D.D.S., and Vladimir Polyakov, D.D.S., Inc. Notice: OK Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Include Claim for Punitive Damages in Complaint and to Reclassify Under Unlimited Jurisdiction is DENIED. BACKGROUND This action arises from alleged dental malpractice. On August 29, 2023, Plaintiff Reah Sybirski (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint for Dental Medical Malpractice against Defendant Vladimir Polyakov. On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants Vladimir Polyakov, D.D.S., and Vladamir Polyakov, D.D.S., Inc. (collectively, Defendants) for Dental Malpractice, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Intentional Misrepresentation. On May 14, 2024, Defendants filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike the FAC. On May 7, 2024, the Court entered an order relating Reah Sybirski v. Nikou Zarabian, LASC Case No. 23STLC05564, with this action being deemed the lead case. (05/07/24 Minute Order.) On May 20, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Latrice A.G. Byrdsong sitting in Department 25 at Spring Street Courthouse. On May 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Include Claim for Punitive Damages in Complaint and to Reclassify Under Unlimited Jurisdiction. On May 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended motion of the same. On June 11, 2024, Defendants opposed the motion. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff replied. On June 3, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Karine Mkrtchyan sitting in Department 25 at Spring Street Courthouse. On June 20, 2024, Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was Sustained, with 20-days leave to amend the Complaint. On June 20, 2024, Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was Granted, with 20-days leave to amend. MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiff indicates having recently discovered information that would support claims for intentional torts and punitive damages. Plaintiff contends amendment will facilitate resolution of all disputes between the parties and that Defendants will suffer no prejudice if amendment is permitted, as these claims are already plead in the First Amended Complaint and discovery has just begun. Plaintiff contends to have discovered evidence showing Defendants conduct was highly unusual and improper. OPPOSITION In opposition, Defendants contend that permitting amendment would only delay formal resolution of this matter and would not further justice. Defendants contend that if the Court is inclined to grant leave to amend, the Court should condition such leave on precluding Plaintiff from reclassifying this case or adding a prayer for punitive damages to compensate Defendants for any inconvenience. Defendants contend Plaintiffs new facts were due to unexcused delay, since Plaintiff admits in the moving papers that she was aware of the documents giving rise to these new facts when she filed the Complaint. Defendants then contend that Plaintiffs motion is procedurally deficient for failure to file a proof of service, and for not including a copy of the proposed amended complaint with the moving papers. Defendants contend Plaintiffs motion does not state which allegations are proposed to be added or where in the proposed amended pleading they are to be located, and in fact no new additional allegations are included. Defendants also note that Plaintiff did not attach the report of Dr. Reznick to her declaration, which inhibits Defendants ability to determine whether the evidence is proper. Defendants contend the Court must treat Plaintiff the same as if she were represented by an attorney. Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs declaration fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 3.1324, subdivision (b), of the California Rules of Court, such as not indicating why the proposed amendment is necessary or proper or when the facts giving rise to the proposed new allegation were discovered, but then inconsistently claims she was aware of the report from Dr. Reznick before she filed the Complaint. Defendants contend Plaintiffs motion fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 and fails to show a substantial probability of prevailing on her punitive damages claim. Defendants also contend Plaintiff failed to provide expert evidence to support her negligence claim or any other claim. REPLY On reply, Plaintiff contends she filed a proof of service with the Amended Motion on May 29, 2024, as it was inadvertently omitted from the original motion filed on May 28, 2024. Plaintiff then contends the FAC is attached to the motion and that no additions or deletions are requested to the FAC. Plaintiff contends the purpose of this motion was only meant to satisfy the procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure 425.13, and that the FAC otherwise already sufficiently pleads a basis for punitive damages. Plaintiff also contends the proposed FAC is based on information and evidence that supports claims for intentional misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants. Plaintiff further contends the motion satisfies the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 and that her declaration details when she discovered that amendment was necessary. ANALYSIS I. Discussion A. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Include Claim for Punitive Damages The trial court has discretion to allow amendments to pleadings in the furtherance of justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.) There is a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the pleadings at any stage of the proceeding. Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 936, 945, citation omitted. An application to amend a pleading is addressed to the trial judges sound discretion. Ibid. , citation omitted. In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, n o claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13, subd. (a).) A party seeking leave to amend must attach a copy of the proposed pleading to the motion for leave to amend. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (a)(1).) A motion for leave to amend must also state what allegations are proposed to be added or deleted to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number the additional or deleted allegations or located. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (a)(2)-(3).) Under Rule 3.1324, subdivision (b) of the California Rules of Court, a separate declaration must accompany a motion for leave to amend and must specify: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (b).) The Court finds that Plaintiffs motion does not comply with Rule 3.1324 of the California Rules of Court. Defendants correctly note that there is no proposed amended complaint attached to the motion or served with the motion. In fact, Plaintiff admits that there are no new allegations to be added and contends the FAC is otherwise sufficient as is. (See Reply, 4:7-15.) Furthermore, on June 20, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants First Amended Complaint to the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and third causes of action for intentional misrepresentation with 20 days leave to amend. Thus, there is no operative pleading before the Court. While the Court understands Plaintiff intended to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 to add punitive damage allegations by first seeking permission from the Court to do so, the proposed amended pleading still needs to formally demand punitive damages. (a) A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain both of the following:& (2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a).) The proposed amended pleading must also specify the location of those allegations in the proposed amended pleading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subd. (a)(2)-(a)(3). Thus, the Court finds that the Amended Motion is deficient. Furthermore, the subject motion is moot in light of the Courts June 20, 2024 ruling. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff is representing herself in pro per ; however, pro per litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543 . Plaintiffs request for leave to amend is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. B. Motion to Reclassify (a) The plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. T he defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading. The court, on its own motion, may reclassify a case at any time. A motion for reclassification does not extend the moving party's time to amend or answer or otherwise respond. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification. (b) If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party to amend that party's initial pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint, or other initial pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The case is incorrectly classified. (2) The moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier. (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.040, subds. (a)-(b).) The Court finds that the Amended Motion contains no arguments in support of reclassification of this action from limited civil to unlimited civil. Contentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority. [Citation.] ( Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.) The Court will not speculate as to the reasons Plaintiff moved for reclassification. Additionally, in light of the Courts June 20, 2024 order, there is no operative pleading before the Court. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to Reclassify without prejudice. II. Conclusion In sum, Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to Include Claim for Punitive Damages in Complaint and to Reclassify Under Unlimited Jurisdiction is DENIED.

Case Number: 21STCV12444 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California ¿ County of Los Angeles ¿ Department 78 ¿ ¿ ENCINO NEWCASTLE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION , Plaintiff (s) , vs. DEL SOL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC. , et al., Defendant ( s ) . Case No.:¿ 21STCV12444 Hearing Date:¿ July 10 , 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER CONTINUING MOTION FOR OSC RE: CONTEMPT On May 15, 2024, defendant/cross-complainant D el Sol Property Management, Inc. ( D el Sol ) filed the instant motion for an OSC Re: Contempt based on non-party HOA Management Professionals, Inc.s (HMP) purported failure to produce business records pursuant to a subpoena issued on December 29, 2023 . T he hearing date is set for July 10, 2024. On May 28, 2024, HMP filed a motion to quash the December 29, 2023 deposition subpoena for production of business records issued by Del Sol . The hearing date is set for August 13, 2024. Considering the relationship between Del Sols motion for contempt, and HMPs motion to quash its underlying basis, the Court finds it in the interest of judicial efficiency and economy to continue Del Sols motion to be heard at the same time as HMPs related motion. Therefore, on its own motion, the Court CONTINUES Del Sols Hearing on Motion for an Order to Show Cause Re: Contempt (CCP 1209) to August 13, 2024 at 8 :30 a .m. in Department 78 of Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Moving Party is ordered to give notice . DATED: July 9 , 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting . " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.