Downtown Executive Multiplex, Llc, A California Limited Liability Company Vs L&S Enterprises, Llc, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, Et Al.

Case Number: BC718464 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A CONTINUANCE JULY 26, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # BC718464 MP: The City of Los Angeles (Defendant) RP: Lodie Pollard, Luna Skyy Pollard, Jayden Devaughn Carter, and Pink Selkin (Plaintiffs) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ANALYSIS: On July 19, 2024 the Los Angeles Superior Court suffered a cyber security attack which resulted in the significant impairment of most Court systems. Due to this complication, additional time is required for the Court to review these motions and issue a tentative ruling. The Court, on its own motion, thus continues the motions for summary judgment brought by the City of Los Angeles to August 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER The City of Los Angeless Motions for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on Jukly 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE CONTINUED TO AUGUST 14, 2024 AT 9:00 AM. ALL OTHER DATES REMAIN. DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Case Number: 24STCP01350 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Case Name: Chevy Chase 18, LLC v. Development Bar, Inc. Case No.: 24STCP01350 Matter: Petition to Expunge Mechanics Lien, etc. Moving Party: Chevy Chase 18, LLC Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Petition is granted. Chevy to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 26, 2024, Chevy Chase 18, LLC (Chevy) filed a Petition for Release of Property from Mechanics Lien. Respondent Development Bar, Inc. is alleged to have recorded a mechanics lien against Chevys real property in the amount of $83,667.33, together with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the lien for alleged work furnished by Respondent for a new bathroom, electrical construction, and roofing. Chevy now seeks to expunge the mechanics liens because Respondent failed to bring an action to enforce the lien within 90 days after the recordation of the claim of lien, as required by California Civil Code section 8460. [ ] No action has been filed to foreclose the lien, no extension of credit has been granted under Civil Code section 8460, and the time period during which suit can be brought to foreclose the lien has expired. Civ. Code § 8480(a) states, The owner of property or the owner of any interest in property subject to a claim of lien may petition the court for an order to release the property from the claim of lien if the claimant has not commenced an action to enforce the lien within the time provided in Section 8460. Civ. Code § 8460(a) states, The claimant shall commence an action to enforce a lien within 90 days after recordation of the claim of lien. If the claimant does not commence an action to enforce the lien within that time, the claim of lien expires and is unenforceable. Here, the subject lien was recorded on November 9, 2023, but no lawsuit has apparently been filed to enforce the lien. Because an opposition was not submitted, Respondent failed to establish the validity of the subject lien. (See Civ. Code § 8488(a) [The claimant has the burden of proof as to the validity of the lien.].) Therefore, the Petition to Expunge Mechanics lien is granted. The Court awards attorneys fees in the amount of $3,475. (Civ. Code § 8488(c).) Chevy to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 23STCV20323 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT JORGE L. VASQUEZ HERNANDEZ, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated , Plaintiff, vs. CALIBER AEROSPACE, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company; EMPLOYER SOLUTIONS STAFFING GROUP II, LLC, a Minnesota Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive , Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV20323 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA REPRESENTATIVE ACTION SETTLEMENT Date: July 26, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: JORGE L. VASQUEZ HERNANDEZ, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (Plaintiff) RESPONDING PARTY: None The Court has considered the moving papers. The motion is unopposed. BACKGROUND On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants CALIBER AEROSPACE, LLC and EMPLOYER SOLUTIONS STAFFING GROUP II, LLC (collectively, Defendants) for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. (PAGA) stemming from Defendants alleged violations of the Labor Code. Upon joint stipulation seeking leave of court to file Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (FAC), which was granted, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC asserting the following causes of action: 1) Violation of Labor Code §§ 204, 246, 510, 1194, 1198 (Failure to Pay All Wages); 2) Violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods); 3) Violation of Labor Code § 226.7 (Failure to Provide Rest Periods); 4) Violation of Labor Code § 226, (Failure to Keep Accurate Itemized Wage Statements); 5) Violation of Labor Code §§ 201-203 (Failure to Pay Wages Upon Termination of Employment); 6) Violation of Labor Code § 2802 (Failure to Reimburse for Necessary Expenditures); 7) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (Unfair Business Practices); and 8) Violation of the Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code sections 2698, et seq. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for preliminary approval of class and PAGA representative action settlement (the Motion). No opposition or reply has been filed. DISCUSSION Legal Standard Approval of class action settlements occurs in two steps. First, the court preliminarily approves the settlement and the class members are notified as directed by the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(c), (f); Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118.) Second, the court conducts a final approval hearing to inquire into the fairness of the proposed settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(e); Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at 1118.) Any party to a settlement agreement may serve and file a written notice of motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(c).) The settlement agreement and proposed notice to class members must be filed with the motion, and the proposed order must be lodged with the motion. ( Id. ) The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the settlement is fair. ( Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at 1117 [quoting Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801].) In determining whether to approve a class settlement, the courts responsibility is to prevent fraud, collusion or unfairness to the class through settlement and dismissal of the class action because the rights of the class members, and even named plaintiffs, may not have been given due regard by the negotiating parties. ( Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 46, 60.) ANALYSIS A. Class Certification is Appropriate. A class action is proper when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) The party seeking certification bears the burden of establishing the existence of an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members. ( Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1806.) The proposed class consists of approximately 82 class members, all of whom may be identified by reference to Defendants records that pertain to non-exempt status and dates of employment. (Motion, p. 9; Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement (Settlement), ¶ 4.1.) Class members share a common interest in determining whether Defendants violated wage and hour requirements under state and related federal law, including the following issues: i. Whether or not Defendants paid proper wages to the Class; ii. Whether or not Defendants provided meal periods to the Class; iii. Whether or not Defendants provided rest periods to the Class; iv. Whether or not Defendants paid compensation timely upon separation of employment to former Class Members; v. Whether or not Defendants paid compensation timely throughout Class Members employment; vi. Whether or not Defendants provided accurate itemized wage statements to the Class; vii. Whether or not waiting-time penalties are available to the Class for violation of California Labor Code § 203; viii. Whether or not Defendants reimbursed for necessary business expenses pursuant to California Labor Code § 2802; ix. Whether or not Defendants engaged in unlawful or unfair business practices affecting the Class in violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200-17208; and x. Whether or not Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to penalties pursuant to PAGA. (Declaration of Lilit Tunyan in Support of Plaintiffs Motion (Tunyan Decl.), ¶ 37.) Thus, based on the commonality of issues and numerosity of class members, class resolution is a superior method of adjudication. Plaintiffs claims, as alleged in the FAC, are typical of the class and arise from the same common questions, and Plaintiff is an adequate representative whose interests align with the class. Like other class members, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in a non-exempt position during the proposed class period, and Plaintiff claims that he was subject to the same policies alleged to have impacted the entire class. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that he and other class members share the same claims stemming from Defendants alleged violations of the Labor Code. Additionally, the proposed class counsel is qualified to represent the class. Plaintiffs counsel is experienced in wage and hour class action litigation and has no conflicts of interest with absent class members. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 20-26, 39.) Accordingly, class certification is appropriate. B. The PAGA Penalties Are Appropriate. A court must review and approve any PAGA penalties sought as part of a proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (l).) [C]ivil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 75 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency for enforcement of labor laws and education of employers and employees about their rights and responsibilities under this code, to be continuously appropriated to supplement and not supplant the funding to the agency for those purposes; and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (i).) The PAGA penalties here comply with this requirement. (Settlement, p. 9, ¶ 3.2.5.) Accordingly, the PAGA penalties are appropriate, subject to a finding that the settlement is fair. Additionally, a proposed PAGA settlement must be submitted to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) at the same time that it is submitted to the court for review and approval. (Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) Here, counsel for Plaintiff provided a copy of the notice of the PAGA settlement to the LWDA through the online submission portal. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 42-43; Exh. 2.) Thus, Plaintiff demonstrated compliance with Labor Code section 2699(l)(2). C. The Terms of Settlement Are Fair. Settlement of a class action requires court approval to prevent fraud, collusion, or unfairness to the class. ( Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1800-1801.) In making the fairness determination, a presumption of fairness exists where (1) the settlement is reached through arms-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. ( Id. at p. 1802.) The proposed settlement was reached through a mediation session with Michael Young, Esq., a highly experienced and well-regarded mediator for wage and hour class action litigation, during which the Parties discussed at length the burdens and risks of continuing with the litigation as well as the merits of the claims and defenses. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 7.) In connection with the mediation, the parties engaged in substantial discovery and investigation, including, inter alia, the exchange of informal data and discoverable information in preparation for the settlement negotiations. The Parties have analyzed payroll and other data pertaining to Plaintiff and the Class during the relevant Settlement Period, including but not limited to the numbers of former and current members of the Class, average workweeks, sample size time and pay records and average rate of hourly pay, wage and hour policies. ( Id. ¶ 5.) The settlement was therefore reached through arms-length bargaining with sufficient investigation to allow counsel and the Court to act intelligently. Defendants will pay a gross settlement amount of $110,000.00, which is about 74% of the $148,367.80 estimate of risk-adjusted recovery (excluding interest) at this stage in the litigation. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 10(c), 17; Settlement, ¶ 3.1.) Of this amount, no more than $10,000.00 will be paid to Plaintiff as a class representative service payment, no more than $36,666.67 will be paid as attorney fees, no more than $16,000.00 will be paid as class counsel litigation expenses payment, no more than $10,000.00 will be paid for settlement administration, and $15,000.00 will be paid as PAGA penalties. (Settlement, pp. 7-9, ¶ 3.) Of the PAGA payment, $11,250.00 (75%) will be paid to the LWDA and $3,750.00 (25%) will be allocated to the individual PAGA payments. Class members individual payments will be based on their number of workweeks during the class period. (Settlement, p. 8, ¶ 3.2.4.) Incentive payments are based on the expense and risk undertaken by named plaintiffs for the benefit of other class members. ( Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 399, 412.) Based on Plaintiffs involvement in this action (Tunyan Decl. ¶ 32), a $10,000.00 payment to Plaintiff is reasonable. The requested $36,666.67 in attorney fees is reasonable and consistent with fee awards in class actions. ( Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66, fn. 11 [Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery, internal quotation marks omitted].) Additionally, the requested $16,000.00 in costs is reasonable. The parties agreed to recommend Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions (Phoenix) as the settlement administrator. (Tunyan Decl., ¶ 33.) Based on the Courts experience, the $10,000.00 requested fee is reasonable. As discussed above, Plaintiffs counsel has extensive experience in labor and employment law, including class and representative actions. (Tunyan Decl., ¶¶ 20-26.) There are no objectors to the settlement at this time, so at the preliminary approval stage, the proposed settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness. D. The Notice Procedure Is Appropriate. The Notice to Class Members (Notice) will issue within 14 days of receipt of the Class List (Settlement, ¶ 7.4.2). The Notice describes how to dispute workweeks, submit an objection in writing, in person, or through an attorney, or request exclusion (Settlement, ¶¶ 7.4 7.7) The content of the Notice contains a brief explanation of the case, a statement regarding exclusion from the class, a procedure for exclusion, a statement that judgment will bind all non-excluded members, and a statement that any member who does not request exclusion may appear through counsel, in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.766(d). If a class member wants to be excluded, one can exclude himself or herself from the Settlement by submitting a written request for exclusion or otherwise notifying the Administrator in writing. Class members do not need to take any action to submit a claim if they do wish to remain in the class. (Exh. A to Settlement, Notice.) Accordingly, the proposed notice procedure is appropriate. RULING Based on all the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion is GRANTED. The Court sets the following dates related to the settlement: Defendants must provide the Class Data to the Administrator within 14 days of the preliminary approval. The Administrator must serve notices to Class Members within 14 days of receiving the Class List. Members of the Settlement Class shall have 45 calendar days from the mailing of the Class Notice to object or opt out. The Final Approval Hearing is set for November 5, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Class Counsel shall file the Motion for Final Approval of Settlement at least 16 court days prior to hearing. Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 26th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23BBCV00532 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 26, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV00532 MP: Arsen Hovanesyan M.D. (Defendant) RP: Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, Karina Nazarian, Artin Aghakhani and Linda Nguyen (Co-Defendants) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: Rima Shafrazian, Gevik Shafrazian, and Greta Shafrazian, individually and as successor in interest of the estate of Joseph Shafrazian (Decedent) (collectively Plaintiffs) bring this action against Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, WellRx, Inc. dba Wellness Lab, Jivan Melikian, M.D., Artin Aghakhani, R.PH., Karina Nazarian, Linda Nguyen, R.PH., Aram Manoukian, and Arsen Hovanesyan, M.D. (Hovanesyan) (collectively Defendants). Plaintiffs allege Defendants negligently failed to deliver Decedents prescriptions for a heart condition, ultimately resulting in his death. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Hovanesyan. Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against Hovanesyan for (1) Wrongful Death by Medical Negligence and (2) Survival Action. Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition; however, an opposition was filed by Natalie Gold, Inc. dba Burbank Tower Pharmacy, Karina Nazarian, Artin Aghakhani and Linda Nguyen (hereinafter Co-Defendants). ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (C.C.P. § 437c(a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangsterv. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) II. MERITS Co-Defendants Opposition The Court notes that neither it, nor the parties, have located any California state court authority directly addressing whether a co-defendant can oppose another co-defendants motion for summary judgment. However, in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, the California Supreme Court held that "any adverse party" may oppose a summary judgment motion. A real party in interest has standing to prosecute an action, except as otherwise provided by statute. (C.C.P. §367.) A real party in interest must have an actual, substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. ( County of Alameda v. State Board of Control (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103.) A person who has an actual interest in the subject matter of an action, and therefore a right to relief, has standing. (Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351.) A party to whom indemnity might be owed or who would owe indemnity is a real party in such an action. ( Time for Living, Inc. v. Guy Hatfield Homes/All American Development Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 30, 40.). However, that is not the case here. On May 16, 2023, Co-Defendants filed their Cross-Complaint stating causes of action for (1) Equitable Indemnity, (2) Contribution, and (3) Declaratory Relief. The adverse parties in Co-Defendants Cross-Complaint are the fictious entities/persons identified as Roes 1-50. A review of the Courts records reveals that Co-Defendants have never amended their Cross-Complaint to identify the parties unknown to them at the time of filing. Nor have Co-Defendants ever independently filed a Cross-Complaint against Hovanesyan. As such, it would appear to the Court that Co-Defendants lack standing to oppose this motion. In reaching this conclusion, in addition to Aguilar as noted above, the court finds the United States District Court case of Eckert v. City of Sacramento (E.D. Cal. 2009) 2009 WL 3211278, helpful. In Eckert , the Court stated: Union Pacific raises a procedural question that has been infrequently addressed: [i]n the absence of cross-claims, may one co-defendant be the sole & opposition to another co-defendants motion for summary judgment? The Blonder Court answered the question in the negative, concluding that in the absence of a crossclaim, a co-defendant lacks standing to oppose his co-defendants motion for summary judgment. Under the rationale of Blonder , since there is no crossclaim between the Defendants, Union Pacific and the City are not adverse parties and the City therefore does not have standing to oppose Union Pacifics motion for summary judgment. The Citys arguments opposing Union Pacifics motion will therefore not be considered. ( Id . at 3, citing to Blonder v. Casco Inn Residential Care, Inc. (D.Me. May 4, 2000) 2000 WL 761895, at *1 [internal citations omitted].) The Court finds the rationale set forth, and referred to in Eckert is persuasive. (See also Fraioli v. Lemcke , 328 F.Supp.2d 250 (D.R.I.2004) 263 n. 4 [[S]ince none of the defendants in this case have filed cross claims against each other, the defendants are not adverse parties who are entitled to object to each others motions for summary judgment.]; Dixon v. County of Alameda (N.D.Cal. Apr.18, 1997) 1997 WL 220311, at *6 n. 8 [noting that co-defendant did not have standing to oppose co-defendants motion for summary judgment]; C.F. Bean Corp. v. Clayton Indus. Ltd. (E.D.La. Aug.19, 1996) 1996 WL 470644, at *1 [same].) Further, that language of C.C.P. § 437c indicates there is no standing for a co-defendant to oppose a motion for summary judgment that does not seek relief against it. (See C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2) [If the defendant meets its burden to show that a cause of action has no merit by showing that an element of the cause of action cannot be established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.].) Request for a Continuance Although the Court finds that the Co-Defendants do not have standing, it will further note that a request for continuance is denied for the reasons stated in Hovanesyans Repy to Co-Defendants Opposition. Facts In order to determine whether Hovanesyan has produced unrefuted evidence that he adhered to the standard of care, the Court finds it useful to provide a brief summary of the general facts of the case. On February 2, 2022, Decedent presented to his cardiologist, Hovanesyan, for a history and physical. (Exh. G. pp. 1997.) Decedents history and physical revealed that he suffered from a small to medium anterior perfusion defect consistent with ischemia. ( Id .) On March 1, 2022, Decedent presented to Adventist Health Glendale wherein Hovanesyan performed a coronary angiography. ( Id . at pp. 1982-1987.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs claims for medical negligence against Hovanesyan are purely in reference to his alleged failure to ensure Decedents receipt of the medication Plavix. Plaintiff makes no allegations as to whether Hovanesyan negligently performed the coronary angiography. (See FAC ¶ 24 [Defendants Dr. Hovanesyan and Dr. Melikian and DOES 1 through 10 were responsible for prescribing the Clopidogrel/Plavix, following up, and making sure that Mr. Shafrazian was taking Clopidogrel/Plavix after his procedure.].) Hovanesyans post-procedure Progress Notes for Decedent show that Dr. Melikian prescribed Plavix, Nitroglycerin, and Aspirin on March 1, 2022 on an inpatient basis. (See Exh. G, p. 1989-1993 & 2090.) Decedents records also indicate that, on March 2, 2022 at 9:41 a.m., Hovanesyan ordered outpatient prescriptions for Plavix, Nitroglycerin, and Aspirin. ( Id . at 2091.) These prescriptions appear to have been ordered to Burbank Tower Pharmacy. ( Id .) Further, the discharge paperwork issued to and signed by Decedent included a Home Medications list which instructed Decedent to take a daily dose of Plavix. ( Id . at 2045, 2067.) Records reflect that on March 2, 2022 at 9:42 a.m., Burbank Tower Pharmacy received Hovanesyans prescription order. (Aghakhani Depo. p. 89, ¶¶ 19-25; Abramian Depo. p. 73, ¶¶ 8-25; Koroglu Depo. p., 53, ¶¶ 2-5.) Though the parties disagree as to why, it is clear that the Plavix and Aspirin prescriptions were placed on hold by Burbank Tower Pharmacy. Hovanesyan is of the opinion that the medications were placed on hold as the result of Decedents not having been given the medication. (See Aghakhani Depo. p. 26, ¶¶ 8-15 [She told me the patient never picked up the medication&thats why they put it on hold.].) On March 14, 2022, Decedent suffered a heart attack and died. (Exh. I.) An autopsy report revealed that Decedents cause of death was a myocardial infarction in the left ventricular free wall. (Exh. J.) Medical Negligence As concerns the action for Medical Negligence, Hovanesyan argues that summary judgment must be granted because there is no triable issue of fact as to whether his actions adhered to the standard of care in treating Decedent. The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury; and (4) resulting loss or damage. ( Chakalis v. Elevator Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1571.) The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their testimony. ( Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601.) When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence. ( Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 977, 984985 [citations omitted].) Hovanesyan submits the declaration of Michael L. Chaikin, M.D. (Chaikin), in support of his motion. Chaikin states that he is a board-certified cardiologist and has been practicing cardiology since 1980. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 2.) Chaikin bases his declaration on his review of Decedents medical records as well as the depositions of Greta Shafrazian, Givek Shafrazian, Rima Shafrazian, Artin Aghakhani, Linda Nguyen, Sarineh Abramian, and Yolanda Siraki. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 5.) Chaikin states that, in his medical opinion, Hovanesyan appropriately documented that Decedent was receiving Plavix on an inpatient basis after the procedure. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 9.) Chaikin further states that Hovanesyans ordering of Plavix to Burbank Tower Pharmacy was within the standard of care. ( Id .) Chaikin states that the records for Burbank Tower Pharmacy indicate they received the prescription order on March 2, 2022. ( Id .) Chaikin states that, from the review of the deposition testimony in this matter, it is unclear why the Plavix prescription was placed on hold. ( Id.) Regardless, Chaikin states that, from his review of the records and testimony, it is clear that Hovanesyan did not place any prescriptions on hold. ( Id .) Chaikin concludes that, in his medical opinion, no act or omission of Hovanesyan caused or contributed to Decedents passing. (Chaikin Decl. ¶ 10.) The Court is satisfied from the testimony of Chaikin that Hovanesyans actions were within the applicable standard of care. The Court notes that Plaintiffs have produced no expert testimony in contravention of Chaikins statements. It follows that Hovanesyan has demonstrated by unrefuted evidence that no triable issue of fact exists as to his breach of the standard of care in prescribing Plavix to Decedent. The holding in Munro makes abundantly clear that summary judgment must therefore be granted in favor of Hovanesyan. Survival Action A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedents successor in interest, subject to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7000) of Part 1 of Division 7 of the Probate Code, and an action may be commenced by the decedents personal representative or, if none, by the decedents successor in interest. (C.C.P. § 377.30.) A survivor claim is also a statutory cause of action; however, unlike a wrongful death claim, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action but merely prevent the abatement of the decedents cause of action and provide for its enforcement by the decedents personal representative or successor in interest. ( San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 1545, 1553.) Here the Court finds Plaintiffs survival action must also fail as they are unable to establish any triable issues of material fact regarding the breach element of the wrongful death cause of action above. Conclusion Hovanesyan has adequately demonstrated that his behavior was within the standard of care by virtue of his experts testimony. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to the contrary and a non-opposition was filed. As Plaintiffs survival action assumes the medical negligence of Hovanesyan, it too presents no triable issue of fact. Co-Defendants do not have standing to contest the summary judgment and have not justified a continuance. Accordingly, Hovanesyans unopposed motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER Arsen Hovanesyan M.D.s Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on June 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, HOVANESYAN TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Case Number: 23BBCV02095 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B oscar ochoa , Plaintiff, v. american honda motor co., inc., et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23BBCV02095 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion to compel deposition; and motion to compel further responses to request fcor production, set two BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Oscar Ochoa (Plaintiff) alleges that on March 31, 2022, he purchased a 2019 Honda HR-V, which was a certified pre-owned (CPO) purchase that was accompanied by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.s (AHM) new and full CPO warranty, such that the vehicle constitutes a new motor vehicle under the Act. Plaintiff alleges that the causes of action arise out of the warranty and repair obligations of AHM in connection with the vehicle for which AHM issued a written warranty. Plaintiff alleges that the subject vehicle was delivered with serious defects and nonconformities to the warranty, including electrical and transmission system defects. Plaintiff alleges that he presented the vehicle for repairs in July 2022 for the vehicles mileage gauge malfunctioning, October 2022 for an inoperative phone charger, February 2023 for the vehicle intermittently not accelerating faster than 40 mph, in May 2023 for the vehicle not accelerating and having difficulty shifting, and in June 2023 for the vehicle losing power at speeds higher than 55 mph and not accelerating. Plaintiff alleges that he hereby revokes acceptance of the sales contract. The complaint, filed September 12, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) violation of the Song Beverly Act breach of express warranty against AHM; (2) violation of the Act breach of implied warranty against AHM; (3) violation of the Act, section 1793.2(b) against AHM AHM and (4) negligent repair against Defendant Keyval, Inc. dba Keyes Honda (Keyes). B. Motions on Calendar On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel the deposition of AHMs person most knowledgeable (PMK) and production of documents to RPD Nos. 1-18. On July 15, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition brief. On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to request for production, set two (RPD), set one, Nos. 1-101 from Defendant AHM. On July 15, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition brief. On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF PMK Plaintiff moves to compel the deposition of AHMs PMK concerning AHMs alleged inability to repair Plaintiffs vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts and for failing to compensate Plaintiff despite AHMs alleged knowledge that Plaintiffs vehicle suffered from serious defects and nonconformity to warranty. Plaintiff states that on February 1, 2024, Plaintiff served the deposition notice for AHMs PMK. (Mot., Ex. 1.) On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff served an amended deposition notice. (Mot., Ex. 2.) On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff served the second deposition notice, seeking 34 deposition categories and 18 RPDs. (Mot., Ex. 3.) Plaintiff argues that AHM did not respond to any of the deposition notices (Mot. at p.4), but also argues that Plaintiff attempted to meet and confer to discuss AHMs objections (Mot. at pp. 5, 7). Plaintiff argues that his counsel attempted to meet and confer with AHM from April 2024 to May 2024 regarding the PMK deposition, AHMs objections, and to discuss alternate dates. The Court notes that AHMs opposition papers include a copy of AHMs objections to the original deposition notice (dated June 25, 2024), amended deposition notice (dated June 20, 2024), and the second deposition notice (dated June 27, 2024), but these are dated after the filing of the motion papers on June 17, 2024. (Opp. at Exs. E-G.) It is unclear if AHM provided different objections that predate the motion. AHM argues that the motion should be denied because AHM agreed to produce a witness and documents for the RPDs on December 18, 2024 subject to reasonable limitations (trial is scheduled for March 10, 2025), Plaintiff has refused to meet and confer, the motion is not accompanied by a separate statement, and the deposition notice is objectionable. Plaintiff has not accompanied the motion with a separate statement for the 34 categories of deposition topics and 18 RPDs. CRC Rule 3.1345 requires that motions seeking to compel answers at a deposition and to compel the production of documents at a deposition must be accompanied by a separate statement, except where no response has been provided to the request of discovery or where the Court has allowed the moving party to submit a concise outline in lieu of a separate statement. (CRC Rule 3.1345(a) and (b).) Here, it appears that AHM provided objections in response to the deposition notices. (See Mot., Ex. 4 [Plaintiffs April 15, 2024 Letter acknowledging AHMs boilerplate objections]; Ex. 5 [Plaintiffs May 3, 2024 Letter acknowledging AHMs boilerplate objections].) At this time, the Court will continue the hearing on the motion to compel the deposition. The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding AHMs objections to the second deposition notice (dated June 27, 2024). Plaintiff is ordered to file a separate statement or concise outline (i.e., grouping deposition similar deposition categories and RPDs, discussing them with AHMs objections, and the reasons for why the deposition categories should go forward and the RPDs should be produced). The separate statement should detail what matters have been resolved and what issues remain. Further, while the jury trial is set for March 10, 2025, AHMs offer to produce a PMK by December 18, 2024 is too delayed and AHM has not explained why a date so far out is the only available date for its PMK. The parties should meet and confer regarding a PMK deposition date that is within 90 days of this order. DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Plaintiff moves to compel AHMs further responses to RPD, set two, Nos. 1-101. RPD Nos. 1-9 relate to AHMs policies and procedures for handling Song-Beverly cases and the subject vehicle; and RPD Nos. 10-101 relate to AHMs internal investigations of the defects exhibited in the subject vehicle including electrical defects (Nos. 10-32), engine defects (Nos. 33-55), structural defects (Nos. 56-78), and transmission defects (Nos. 79-101). AHM argues that it did not initially provide substantive responses to the RPDs because Plaintiff improperly served AHM by electronic service rather than mail service. AHM states that it will be providing further responses to most of the RPDs after the parties meet and confer. AHM has not specified which RPDs it will be providing further responses to and when responses will be provided. To aid the parties and prevent further delay of discovery, the Court will discuss the merits of the motion. RPD No. 1 seeks all documents referencing, evidencing, and/or relating to AHMs policies, procedures, or guidelines for determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase under the Act. RPD No. 2 seeks all documents regarding the subject vehicle that are within AHMs Customer Relations Center. RPD No. 3 seeks all documents regarding any service, warranty, and other documents that relate to, or may relate to, the alleged defect in the subject vehicle, that AHM issued to any dealer, regional or zone offices, fleet purchasers, or other entities. RPD No. 4 seeks AHMs recall policy and procedure. RPD No. 5 seeks all documents, including live telephone call records, audio records, tape recordings, voice messaging records, caller message recordings, digital voice recordings, interactive voice response unit (IVR/VRV) recordings, unified messaging files, and computer-based voice mail files between AHM and/or AHMs call center representative(s) and AHMs authorized dealers regarding the subject vehicle. RPD No. 6 seeks all documents/ESI setting forth AHMs document retention policy from 2011 to the present, including retention policies for electronic data communications. RPD No. 7 seeks all documents which evidence, describe, refer, or relate to AHMs rules, policies, or procedures since 2011 concerning the issuance of refunds to buyers or providing replacement vehicles to buyers in California under the Act. RPD No. 8 seeks all documents that AHM used, since 2011, to evaluate consumers requests for repurchases pursuant to the Act. RPD No. 9 seeks all documents reflecting AHMs plans, policies, procedures, programs, or measures, since 2011, for achieving any of AHMs warranty buyback reduction goals. AHM objected to RPD Nos. 1-9 on the basis that they were vague and overly broad, sought irrelevant documents, failed to describe with reasonable particularity the documents requested, and sought documents on behalf of other entities. The Court finds that the RPDs are overly broad in that they seek documents pertaining to any type of vehicle without reference to any time period. This action involves a pre-owned 2019 Honda HR-V that Plaintiff purchased on March 31, 2022. The Court will limit the discovery to documents from 2019 to the present, pertaining/applying to the same year, make, and model as the subject vehicle, and limited to Los Angeles County, California. To the extent that there may be documents that are privileged, the Court will allow AHM to produce a privilege log or allow the production pursuant to a protective order. The motion is granted as to RPD Nos. 1-9 to this limited extent. RPD Nos. 10-32 relate to AHMs internal investigations of the defects exhibits in the subject vehicle regarding Electrical Defects: · RPD No. 10 seeks all documents/ESI/emails concerning, referring, or relating to any field technical reports (FTRs) from AHMs agents, representatives, or employees to AHM which provide it with information relating to warranty parts replacement trends relating to the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 11 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any internal analysis or investigation by AHM or on AHMs behalf regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 12 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to AHMs decision to issue any notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, TSBs, and recalls concerning the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 13 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any internal analysis/investigation by AHM or on AHMs behalf concerning the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 14 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any FTRs from AHMs agents, representatives, or employees to AHM which provide AHM with information relating to common parts failures relating to the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 15 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 16 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to Failure Mode and Effects Analysis reports (or comparable root cause analyses) concerning the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 17 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any NHTSA complaints regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 18 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any Early Warning Reports (EWR) complaints regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 19 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) complaints regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 20 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle, including any databases in AHMs possession with information from dealers, service departments, part departments, or warranty departments, and all documents concerning its response to each complaint, claim or reported failure. · RPD No. 21 seeks all documents/ESI/emails that were sent, received, prepared, and/or reviewed by AHMs Field Review Committee or its equivalent regarding any investigation, reports, surveys, countermeasure, or failures, regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 22 seeks all documents/ESI/emails within AHMs customer satisfaction surveys, or the equivalent, regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 23 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any field technical reports from AHMs agents, representatives, or employees to AHM which provide AHM with information relating to suggested repair procedures for commonly observed problems relating to Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 24 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning, referring, or relating to any field technical reports from AHMs agents, representatives, or employees to AHM which provide it with information relating to repeat repair failures relating to Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 25 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning any internal analysis or investigation by AHM or on its behalf regarding Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 26 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning any customer concerns AHM has relating Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 27 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning any decision to issue notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, TSBs, and recalls concerning the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 28 seeks all documents/ESI/email, concerning any decision to modify any component parts in response to the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 29 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning any fixes in response to the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 30 seeks all documents/ESI/email concerning any internal investigation and analysis by AHM or on its behalf regarding the Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 31 seeks all documents related to any email which in any way relate to Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. · RPD No. 32 seeks all documents/ESI/email, concerning any internal analysis or investigation by AHM or on its behalf regarding Electrical Defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle. RPD Nos. 33-35 regarding Engine Defects, Nos. 56-78 regarding Structural Defects, and Nos. 79-101 regarding Transmission Defects follow the same pattern as Nos. 10-32 (Electrical Defects). As such, Nos. 10-101 will be discussed together. The RPDs define the defects as follows: · Electrical Defects refers to defects which result in symptoms including: defects causing the mileage gauge to display incorrectly; defects resulting in the mileage gauge being distorted; defects leading to replace the mileage gauge control; defects involving a faulty USB port that cannot be used; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the Subject Vehicle. · Engine Defects refers to defects which result in symptoms including: defects causing the vehicle not to accelerate over 55 mph intermittently; defects causing the vehicle to lose power; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the Subject Vehicle. · Structural Defects refers to defects which result in symptoms including: defects causing the mileage gauge to display incorrectly; defects resulting in the mileage gauge being distorted; defects leading to replace the mileage gauge control; defects involving a faulty USB port that cannot be used; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the Subject Vehicle. · Transmission Defects refer to defects which result in symptoms including: defects causing the vehicle not to respond when accelerating; defects causing the vehicle to have a hard shift; defects leading to perform a TCM software update; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the Subject Vehicle. (Mot. at Ex. 3 [RPD, set two, at p. 2].) AHM objected to these RPDs on the basis that they were vague and overly broad, sought irrelevant documents, sought documents for unrelated part failures in other vehicles of the same year/make/model, sought documents beyond the scope of Plaintiffs complaint, failed to describe with reasonable particularity the documents requested, and sought documents on behalf of other entities. AHM argues that the defect terms are imprecise and overbroad and that the RPDs virtually seek all documents at AHM relating to each and every one of the 13 listed defects in the clumped definitions above. However, in its separate statement, AHM states that it will be producing further substantive responses to most of the requests. To aid the parties in their discovery matters, the Court will limit the discovery that should be produced. A lthough these RPDs are limited to the vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle, the responses shall be further limited to documents from 2019 to the present and within Los Angeles County only. Further, if, upon review of AHMs further responses, Plaintiff finds that the responses are lacking, the parties should meet and confer about the definitions of the Electrical, Engine, Structural, and Transmission Defects that Plaintiff is claiming in the subject vehicle. The motion to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 10-101 is granted to this limited extent based on AHMs representations that further responses are forthcoming. No sanctions were requested. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiff Oscar Ochoas motion to compel the deposition of Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.s person most knowledgeable is continued to August 23, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding AHMs objections to the second deposition notice (dated June 27, 2024) and the deposition PMK date that is within 90 days of this order. Plaintiff is ordered to file a separate statement or concise outline (i.e., grouping deposition similar deposition categories and RPDs, discussing them with AHMs objections, and the reasons for why the deposition categories should go forward and the RPDs should be produced). The separate statement should detail what matters have been resolved and what issues remain. Plaintiffs separate statement shall be due by August 12, 2024 and Defendants responsive separate statement shall be due by August 16, 2024. Plaintiff Oscar Ochoas motion to compel Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.s further responses to RPD, set two, Nos. 1-101 is granted subject to the limitations stated in this written order and based on Defendants representations that further responses will be produced. Defendant is ordered to provide further responses within 20 days of notice of this order. No sanctions were requested. Plaintiff shall give notice of this order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV01212 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B MARTIN HUTTO, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV01212 vs. [TENTATIVE] RULING CITY OF TORRANCE, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant City of Torrance Responding Party: Plaintiff Martin Hutto (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One (2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff Martin Hutto is ordered to serve further responses to defendants Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 and to defendants Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60 within twenty days. BACKGROUND On April 19, 2023, plaintiff Martin Hutto filed a complaint against City of Torrance and Torrance Police Department for (1) violation of POBRA, (2) declaratory relief, and (3) Labor Code §1102.5. On April 25, 2023, the court (Judge Frank) issued a TRO on April 25, 2023. On September 15, 2023, the court issued a preliminary injunction. LEGAL AUTHORITY 45-Day Rule : This motion must be served within 45 days after service of the response in question (extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, or fax; see CCP §1013); otherwise, the demanding party waives the right to compel any further response to the CCP §2031.010 demand. CCP §§2031.310(c), 2016.050; see Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745. The 45-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1410. The parties, however, can also agree in writing on a specific later date by which to file the motion to compel. CCP §2031.310(c). Meet-and-Confer Requirement : The motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the issues outside of court (so-called meet and confer). CCP §§2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2). Separate Statement : Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. This includes a motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection of documents or tangible things. CRC Rule 3.1020(a)(3). Interrogatories CCP §2030.300 states: (a) On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. . . . (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. . . . CCP §2030.220 states: (a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party. CCP §2030.230 states: If the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. . . . CCP §2030.010(b) provides: An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. Request for Production of Documents On receipt of a response to an inspection demand, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. CCP § 2031.310(a). A statement of compliance shall state that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. CCP § 2031.220. A representation of inability to comply with [a] particular demand for inspection . . . shall affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. This statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. CCP § 2031.230. A motion to compel further response to requests for production shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to show both: [1] Relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and [2] Specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). The fact that there is no alternative source for the information sought is an important factor in establishing good cause for inspection. But it is not essential in every case. Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial , 8:1495.6 (citations omitted). Declarations are generally used to show the requisite good cause for an order to compel inspection. The declarations must contain specific facts rather than mere conclusions. Id. at 8:1495.7 (citation omitted). The declarations may be on information and belief, if necessary. However, in such cases, the specific facts supporting such information and belief (the sources of the information) must also be alleged. Id. at 8:1495.8 (citation omitted). Most declarations are made by the attorney for the moving party, who is usually more familiar with the relevancy and specific facts constituting good cause for inspection. Id. at 8:1495.9. If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure (the same as on motions to compel answers to interrogatories or deposition questions. . . ). Id. at 8:1496 (citation omitted). DISCUSSION Defendant City of Torrance requests that the Court compel plaintiff to respond further to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 and Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60. The Court notes only the requests that remain at issue based on the reply. In the reply, the City withdrew its motion as to Special Interrogatories, Nos. 1-46, 48, 50-53, 55, 57, 59-59, 61, 63, 65-66, 68-72, 74, 83, 85, 87-89, and 91-102 and Requests for Production of Documents, Nos. 3-4, 8-13, 26, 38, 41, 44, 50, and 54-57 based on plaintiff providing supplemental responses. On December 19, 2023, defendant served its discovery requests. On February 12, 2024, plaintiff served responses and objections. On July 1, 2024, pursuant to joint stipulation and order, the hearing on the motions was continued to allow the parties to reach a stipulation regarding the discovery and use in the litigation of plaintiffs confidential police officer personnel records and information, and protective order, without the need for a noticed Pitchess motion. The complaint alleges that that plaintiff was investigated and given educational reminders in connection with two arrests he made. Plaintiff apprehended suspects in a catalytic converter theft on May 17, 2021 and commented to one of the arrestees, Welcome to Torrance. Plaintiff was investigated for the comment and invoked his rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) and/or the Meyers-Milias Brown Act, including use of a representative of his choice. Defendants ultimately concluded the investigation and gave plaintiff an educational reminder for misconduct based on the Welcome to Torrance comment. Plaintiff arrested a suspect who was disturbing the peace on March 4, 2022. During the arrest, plaintiff used force against the suspect, who ultimately stabbed plaintiffs partner in the clavicle area with a pen and struck plaintiff in the head. Plaintiff was administratively investigated for his use of force during the arrest. Defendant ultimately concluded that plaintiff should be given an educational reminder to be more thorough in his reports of use of force. Plaintiff filed a personnel complaint against Chief Hart for inappropriate comments and social media posts on November 2, 2022. Plaintiff alleges Torrance Police Department revived the Internal Affairs investigation against him after his complaint. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated his rights under POBRA, including by failing to provide proper notice of the nature of the investigations, subjecting plaintiff to punitive action and/or threatening him with punitive action for exercising his rights under POBRA and placing comments adverse to his interest in his personnel file. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants committed whistleblower retaliation in response to his complaints about Chief Harts inappropriate comments and social media posts. Special interrogatories Defendant contends that Special Interrogatories, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 remain at issue because they do not implicate confidential peace officer personnel information and that plaintiffs Pitchess objections are without merit. Defendant also argues that plaintiffs response to Nos. 60, 62, 64, 73, 84, 86, and 90 directing defendant to other documents is improper under CCP §2030.230 because the interrogatories do not necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from. In the opposition, plaintiff contends that the discovery requests were improperly served because they were sent via email although the parties had not stipulated to email service. Plaintiff also argues that the motion was filed untimely on April 2, 2024. In reply, defendant contends that its discovery requests were properly electronically served pursuant to CRC Rule 2.251(c). Moreover, defendant argues, the motion was timely filed on April 2, 2024 because April 1 was a court holiday. The Court finds that the request was properly served and that the motion was timely filed. The Court also finds that plaintiffs objections lack merit, including based on Pitchess. The remaining special interrogatories at issue do not implicate Pitchess for the reasons argued by defendant. Further, plaintiffs responses under CCP §2030.230 are improper. The motion is thus GRANTED. Requests for production of documents Defendant asserts that Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60 remain at issue. Defendant argues that as to the remaining requests, plaintiff has failed to state whether plaintiff possesses additional documents that do not constitute protected police officer personnel records and information and has failed to produce any such non-Pitchess record documents, in compliance with CCP §2031.240. Under CCP §2031.240, (a) If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category. Defendant argues that even if Pitchess applies to any responsive peace officer personnel records, plaintiff still has the ability to either identify and produce any non-personnel records and information, or state he cannot comply because he has no records. Further, defendant asserts, the City is entitled to obtain documents within plaintiffs possession, custody, or control, irrespective of whether the City may already possess or have access to them, citing to CCP §2031.010. Defendant further argues that plaintiffs objections that certain defined terms (communication, relate, and refer) are overly broad and ambiguous are without merit because none of the Citys requests utilize the defined term communication and only Request Nos. 54-60 include refer or relate, and such requests are limited in scope. In opposition, plaintiff argues that a Pitchess motion was and is required as the requests seek personnel files. Plaintiff also argues that the requests were improperly served via email and that the motion was untimely filed. The Court finds that the requests were properly served, and the motion was timely filed. The Court also finds that plaintiffs responses do not comply with CCP §2031.240 and that plaintiffs objections lack merit as to non-Pitchess documents. The motion is GRANTED. Sanctions Under CCP § 2023.030(a), [t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Under CCP § 2023.010, an example of the misuse of the discovery process is (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel further responses against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. CCP § §2030.300(d), 2031.310(h). Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a) states: The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. The Court denies each partys request for sanctions. ORDER The motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff Martin Hutto is ordered to serve further responses to defendants Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 and to defendants Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60 within twenty days. Defendant is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 22STCV04747 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Jane Doe filed this action against Defendants, LBUSD and Thomas Maggio for damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse. 2. Motion to Stay Proceedings a. Legal Standard Any party may file a motion for an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.5 staying the proceedings in any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination, or the court may stay the proceedings on its own motion. The motion for a stay may be included with a petition for coordination or may be served and submitted to the Chair of the Judicial Council and the coordination motion judge by any party at any time prior to the determination of the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515.) b. Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 451, 452, subds. (d) and (h), 453, Defendants request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits B-G. Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 is also granted. c. Analysis Defendant moves to stay the trial because (1) there are two pending writs before two different appellate courts to decide the constitutionality of California Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218) and (2) Defendant wants to be able to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations without fear that its relevant Board will violate the law to authorize payments for any settlement agreement. To elaborate, AB 218 authorized a three-year window beginning in January 1, 2020 that allowed claims of childhood sexual assault to be brought regardless of how long the abuse allegedly occurred. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (q).) AB 218 amended Government Code § 905 to retroactively strip statutory governmental immunities for public entities which violates Article XVI section 6 of the Constitution and its prohibition of gifts of public funds. Defendant states the first pending writ, West Contra Costa U.S.D. v. Superior Court (First Appellate District Case No. A16934), wherein the parties are awaiting the requested oral arguments and have submitted their respective briefs. In the second pending writ, Roe # 2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707), the court requested an informal response to the filed writ, granting the school district until May 17, 2024 to file an informal reply to the response. In exercising its discretion [regarding stay] . . . the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions . . . [and] whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. (Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215.) First, Defendant argues that like Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 807-808 wherein a stay of a state court action involving the obligation to pay attorneys fees was justified because a broad action involving RICO was pending in federal court that would govern that case and other cases involving such fee obligations, here this case should be set aside because one or both of the two pending appellate writ proceedings could resolve the issue as to AB 218s unconstitutionality. Defendant further explains that staying this case is the only way to ensure the case will not conflict with the decisions reached in the two pending Appellate Court cases. Next, Defendant also asserts staying the action will not prejudice Plaintiffs rights because Plaintiff waited 25 years to file the lawsuit and any stay would toll the time within which Plaintiff is required to bring the case to trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) In opposition, Plaintiff responds that (1) no legal support exists to mandate a stay in similar contexts and (2) staying the action would prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that the First District has issued a tentative ruling agreeing that these actions are not barred by the Constitutional limitation argued by Defendant, and contends the appellate court will likely adopt that ruling as final after arguments on 7/18/24. Plaintiff notes that the Second District has summarily denied similar writ petitions. Plaintiff notes that, in the event the different courts of appeal split, this case will be in the same procedural posture it is in now. Plaintiff also notes that the issue will likely go to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the courts of appeal split, and this could take years. Pursuant to Nken v. Holder (2009) 556 U.S. 418, 426, when considering whether to impose a stay, the Court must consider several factors. Those factors are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. (Id., at p. 434.) Once an applicant satisfies the first two factors, the traditional stay inquiry calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest. The Court wishes to hear from the parties at the hearing concerning the outcome of the 7/18/24 oral arguments. Specifically, the Court wishes to know whether the First District issued a ruling. Regardless, the Court is not inclined to grant the motion. Granting the instant motion would prejudice Plaintiff. Defendant has not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. There is no guarantee that the decisions made by the Court of Appeals in the pending writs would create a definitive ruling on the issue as it could always be further appealed to the Supreme Court, potentially taking years to resolve. The Court notes that the vast majority of trial courts have held against the District on this argument, and this trial court has consistently held against the District on this issue. The motion is therefore denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 23STCV30186 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT ELIZABETH SHUAI WONG , Plaintiff, vs. FLIPFIT, f.k.a. HUMANS, INC., a Delaware corporation, NOORULDEEN ALAARIF, a.k.a. NOOR AGHA, an individual, and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive , Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV30186 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIESS, SET ONE Date: August 9, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Elizabeth Shuai Wong (Plaintiff) RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Flipfit, fka Humans, Inc. (Defendant) The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. BACKGROUND This is a representative action filed by Plaintiff on December 11, 2023, seeking recovery of civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code §2698, et seq . (PAGA), for alleged Labor Code violations of: failure to pay minimum wage, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide all required meal periods, failure to authorize or permit all required rest periods, failure to pay all earned wages each pay period, failure to provide accurate wage statements, failure to pay vested vacation wages, failure to reimburse necessary business expenditures, failure to pay all wages due upon separation of employment, failure to maintain an effective Injury and Illness Prevention Program and retaliation for use of Covid-19 supplemental sick pay. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Production, Set One (the RFPs Motion), and a Motion to Compel Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs Special Interrogatories, Set One (the SIs Motion) (collectively, the Motions). Defendant filed a consolidated opposition to the Motions on July 9, 2024, and Plaintiff filed a reply on July 15, 2024. DISCUSSION SIs Motion Under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 2030.290, subdivision (b), when a party directs interrogatories towards a party, and that party fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The moving party need only show that the interrogatories were served on the opposing party, the time has expired to respond to the interrogatories and no responses have been served in order for the court to compel the opposing party to respond. ( Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.) Here, Plaintiff served Defendant with Special Interrogatories, Set One (SIs) on January 30, 2024. (Declaration of Leonard H. Sansanowicz in Support of SIs Motion, ¶ 3.) Defendant had not served responses to the SIs as of the date of filing of the SIs Motion on April 22, 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) On June 7, 2024, however, Defendant responded to all discovery requests served by Plaintiff, without objections. (Declaration of Matthew Theriault (Theriault Decl.), ¶ 10.) Plaintiff does not dispute, and in fact, acknowledges that Defendant did provide objections-free responses to the SIs on June 7, 2024. (Supplemental Declaration of Leonard H. Sansanowicz in Support of Plaintiffs Reply (Sansanowicz Supp. Decl.), ¶ 22.) Accordingly, since responses to the SIs, without objections, have now been served, the SIs Motion is MOOT. To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the responses are insufficient or not otherwise complete or Code-compliant, Plaintiff has forty-five days from the date of this order to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses. RFPs Motion When a party fails to serve a timely response to an inspection demand, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling a response to the inspection demand. (CCP § 2031.300, subd. (b).) A party who fails to provide a timely response waives any objection, including one based on privilege or work product. ( Id. , § 2031.300, subd. (a).) Here, Plaintiff served Defendant with Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (RFPs) on January 30, 2024. (Declaration of Leonard H. Sansanowicz in Support of RFPs Motion, ¶ 3.) Defendant had not served responses to the RFPs as of the date of filing of the RFPs Motion on April 22, 2024. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) On June 7, 2024, however, Defendant responded to all discovery requests served by Plaintiff, without objections. (Theriault Decl., ¶ 10.) Additionally, on July 9, 2024, Defendant produced documents. ( Id. ) Plaintiff does not dispute, and in fact, acknowledges that Defendant did provide objections-free responses to the RFPs on June 7, 2024. (Sansanowicz Supp. Decl., ¶ 22.) Accordingly, since responses to the RFPs, without objections, have now been served, and documents have been produced, the RFPs Motion is MOOT. To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the responses and documents produced are insufficient or not otherwise complete or Code-compliant, Plaintiff has forty-five days from the date of this order to file a Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses. Monetary Sanctions Nevertheless, the question of sanctions still remains before the Court. [P]roviding untimely responses does not divest the trial court of its authority [to hear a motion to compel responses]. ( Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 407.) Even if the untimely response does not contain objections [and] substantially resolve[s] the issues raised by a motion to compel responses&the trial court retains the authority to hear the motion. ( Id. , at pp. 408-409.) This rule gives an important incentive for parties to respond to discovery in a timely fashion. ( Id. , at p. 408.) If the propounding party [does not] take the motion off calendar or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions, the trial court may deny the motion to compel responses as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part, and just impose sanctions. ( Id. at p. 409; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a) [The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed].) The court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2030.290, subd. (c).) [T]he court shall impose a monetary sanction& against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id. , § 2031.300, subd. (c).) In this case, Defendant asserts that the delayed responses were caused by unexpected medical issues experienced by the previous attorney handling the case. The Court also acknowledges that there have been multiple changes in the counsel representing Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff agreed to an extension for Defendant to provide responses by June 7, 2024, and Defendant complied with this deadline. (Sansanowicz Supp. Decl., ¶¶ 17-22; Theriault Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Thus, the Court finds that, under the circumstances, there is substantial justification for the delayed responses and that monetary sanctions are not warranted. Accordingly, no sanctions are imposed. RULING The Motions are DENIED as moot. The requests for monetary sanctions are also DENIED. Moving Party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 9 th day of August 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court