Engel & Engel, Llp Vs Shirene Hernandez

Case Number: 22STCV18342 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On June 6, 2022, Plaintiff Christian Castillo (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Does 1-25 for negligence (motor vehiclepersonal injuries and property damage). On May 20, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel Glotzer & Leib, LLP filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, to be heard on July 10, 2024. No trial date is currently scheduled. COUNSELS REQUEST Plaintiffs counsel Glotzer & Leib, LLP , asks to be relieved as counsel. LEGAL STANDARD California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362, provides: (a) Notice A notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051). (b) Memorandum Notwithstanding any other rule of court, no memorandum is required to be filed or served with a motion to be relieved as counsel. (c) Declaration The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). (d) Service The notice of motion and motion, the declaration, and the proposed order must be served on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case. The notice may be by personal service, electronic service, or mail. (1) If the notice is served on the client by mail under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, it must be accompanied by a declaration stating facts showing that either: (A) The service address is the current residence or business address of the client; or (B) The service address is the last known residence or business address of the client and the attorney has been unable to locate a more current address after making reasonable efforts to do so within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. (2) If the notice is served on the client by electronic service under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and rule 2.251, it must be accompanied by a declaration stating that the electronic service address is the client's current electronic service address. As used in this rule, current means that the address was confirmed within 30 days before the filing of the motion to be relieved. Merely demonstrating that the notice was sent to the client's last known address and was not returned or no electronic delivery failure message was received is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the address is current. If the service is by mail, Code of Civil Procedure section 1011(b) applies. (e) Order The proposed order relieving counsel must be prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-053) and must be lodged with the court with the moving papers. The order must specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action or proceeding, including the date of trial, if known. If no hearing date is presently scheduled, the court may set one and specify the date in the order. After the order is signed, a copy of the signed order must be served on the client and on all parties that have appeared in the case. The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) DISCUSSION Counsel has completed, filed, and served the paperwork required to support the request to be relieved as counsel. The Court grants the motion. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Glotzer & Leib, LLPs motion to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Christian Castillo. Counsel will be relieved upon filing proof of service on Plaintiff Christian Castillo of the Order Granting Attorneys Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (Judicial Council form MC-053). Counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Counsel is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Case Number: 23STCV18797 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Monica Gonzalez Sanchez, Plaintiff, vs. Lidia Pacheco, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV18797 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 08/08/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: None Set Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lidia Pacheco Responding Party: Plaintiff Maria Sanchez Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition. Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. Background This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58 th Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. ( Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. ( Id . at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. ( Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. ( Id. at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. ( Id. ) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. ( Id. at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. ( Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. ( Id. ) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action: 1. Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 2. Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Nuisance 5. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 6. Negligence 7. Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation 8. Fraud Concealment 9. Landlord Harassment 10. Constructive Eviction 11. Retaliatory Eviction 12. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 13. Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer. Discussion Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend. A. The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer. B. The Complaint is Vague As to Defendants second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled Facts. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.) Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below). C. Statute of Limitations Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. ( Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP (2018) 22 Cal.App.5 th 508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained in its entirety. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCP00555 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 26 Diya Finance, LLC v. Chute System, LLC, et al. PETITION TO RELEASE MECHANICS LIEN (Civil Code § 8480 ) TENTATIVE RULING: Petitioner Diya Finance, LLCs Petition to Release Property from Mechanics Lien is CONTINUED TO OCTOBER 10, 2024 AT 10:00 AM IN DEPARTMENT 26 IN THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. BY SEPTEMBER 12, 2024, PETITIONER IS TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE PETITION AND NOTICE OF HEARING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. ANALYSIS: Petitioner Diya Finance, LLC (Petitioner) filed the instant Petition for Release of Mechanics Lien against Respondent Chute Systems, LLC (Respondent) on February 14, 2024. No proof of service of, nor response to, the Petition has been filed to date. Discussion Petitioner moves to have the mechanics lien recorded against their property by Respondent released. Under Civil Code section 8484 the petition for release order must be verified by the petitioner and allege the following: (a) The date of recordation of the claim of lien. A certified copy of the claim of lien shall be attached to the petition. (b) The county in which the claim of lien is recorded. (c) The book and page or series number of the place in the official records where the claim of lien is recorded. (d) The legal description of the property subject to the claim of lien. (e) Whether an extension of credit has been granted under Section 8460, if so to what date, and that the time for commencement of an action to enforce the lien has expired. (f) That the owner has given the claimant notice under Section 8482 demanding that the claimant execute and record a release of the lien and that the claimant is unable or unwilling to do so or cannot with reasonable diligence be found. (g) Whether an action to enforce the lien is pending. (h) Whether the owner of the property or interest in the property has filed for relief in bankruptcy or there is another restraint that prevents the claimant from commencing an action to enforce the lien. (Civil Code, § 8484.) The Petition contains all the required information. However, Civil Code section 8486, subdivision (b) also requires service of the Petition and Notice of Hearing to be made in the same manner as service of summons, or by certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested . . . . (Civ. Code, § 8486, subd. (b).) Petitioner has not filed any proof of service of the Petition and the Notice of the Hearing Date. The Court cannot grant the Petition without compliance with the statutory service requirements. Conclusion Therefore, Petitioner Diya Finance, LLCs Petition to Release Property from Mechanics Lien is CONTINUED TO OCTOBER 10, 2024 AT 10:00 AM IN DEPARTMENT 26 IN THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. BY SEPTEMBER 12, 2024, PETITIONER IS TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE PETITION AND NOTICE OF HEARING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 20STCV33737 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: T Motion to Change Venue Moving Party: Plaintiff Mariana Accosta Responding Party: Defendant Hector Galbusera Tentative Ruling: Denied. BACKGROUND On September 03, 2020, Plaintiff Mariana Acosta (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint alleging motor vehicle action against Defendant Hector Eduardo Galbusera (Defendant) and DOES 1 through 30, inclusive. Defendant filed his Answer to the Complaint on October 20, 2020. On May 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Transfer. Defendant filed his opposition to the motion on June 13, 2024. Plaintiff has filed a reply. DISCUSSION Applicable Law Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made. [Citations.] [Citation.] (Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1076.)¿¿ [I]f an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as the proper court for the trial thereof, under this title, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced& (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b(a).) The burden is on the moving party to establish facts justifying the transfer. (Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 928.) Absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, the presumption is that the county in which the title of the action shows that it is brought is, prima facie, the proper county for the commencement and trial of the action. (Id.; Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.) Analysis The Complaint alleges a negligence cause of action against the Defendant for a motor = vehicle accident that occurred on the ramp of SR-60 E/B to the I-710 N/B, Los Angeles, CA 90022. (Compl.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fell asleep while driving, causing the crash with Plaintiff, and was cited for violating California Vehicle Code section 22350 - Unsafe Speed by the California Highway Patrol. (Id. p. 5.) Plaintiff seeks to transfer the action to a trial department in Downtown Los Angeles. (Mot. p. 2) Plaintiff argues that the lawsuit has no connection to Alhambra since the subject incident occurred downtown, neither party lives in Alhambra, and all witnesses, including first responders and Plaintiffs medical provider, live in/near or work in/near downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiff asserts that the venue is proper in the central district because the case was initially filed there and had remained there for nearly four years before being transferred to this Court. In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to provide any statutory authority to support the motion. The Court disagrees. First, Defendant mistakes the motion for a motion for forum non-convenes. That is not the case as Plaintiff rests the motion under Code of Civil Procedure Sections 395(a), 397(c). However, Plaintiff has not carried her burden in showing that a change in venue back to downtown is justifiable. Here, the standard is not so much about focusing on convenience but rather on the inconvenience of the venue for the action. The plaintiffs contention that witnesses are in or around downtown is simply not enough to carry her burden under the statute. While one courthouse may be more convenient to some witnesses, the level of inconvenience is not substantial and a transfer is not necessary to further the interests of justice. Further, Plaintiff argues that she would be prejudiced by a trial continuance. Because the matter is set for trial on October 14 in Department T and it is extremely unlikely that the case would be set any earlier in a downtown courthouse, denial of this motion protects Plaintiff from the perceived prejudice resulting from a trial continuance. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion to Change Venue is DENIED.

Case Number: 23STCV05225 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles ARMANI MARSALIS GATES I, Plaintiff, vs. LEMONADE INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV05225 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 03/09/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: 05/27/2025 Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lemonade Insurance Agency, LLC Responding Party: N/A - Unopposed Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1) The Court considered the moving papers. Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1), is GRANTED . T he Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Responses and the monetary sanctions are due to Defendant within 20 days of this order. Background Armani Marsalis Gates I filed a Complaint on March 9, 2023 alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The motion before the Court now is Lemonade Insurance Agency, LLCs (Defendant) Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set 1 (the Motion). No opposition has been filed, and Defendant files a Notice of Non-Opposition. Discussion Legal Standard If a party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed fails to serve a timely response to it, the following rules shall apply: (a) The party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed waives any objection to the demand, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4&(b) The party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP § 2031.300) The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. (CCP § 2023.030(a).) Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (CCP § 2023.010) Analysis Attached to the moving papers, Defendant provides the Declaration of William A. Hadikusumo (Hadikusumo Decl.) which states that on July 5, 2023, Plaintiff was served by Defendant with Requests for Production of Documents, Set 1. (Hadikusumo Decl., ¶3.) The deadline to provide responses was August 8, 2023 but no responses were provided. On August 9, 2023, Defendant reach out and provided an extension until September 6, 2023, however, no responses were ever received. (Hadikusumo Decl., ¶¶5-9.) Therefore, the Motion is granted, and sanctions are warranted. Sanctions Defense counsel provides the following calculations: · Counsels hourly rate is $240.00 · Counsel spent 5 hours preparing the instant Motion · Counsel anticipates the hearing taking 1 hour · Counsel incurred a filing fee of $60.00 · Counsel requests a total of $1,500.00 Accordingly, the Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Conclusion Defendants Motion to Compel Plaintiffs Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set 1), is GRANTED . T he Court will impose a sanction on Plaintiff, and award said sanction to Defendant in the amount of $1,500.00. Responses and the monetary sanctions are due to Defendant within 20 days of this order. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 20STCV41680 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 47 Plaintiff purports to move for sanctions against Defendant Kenneth Corkum for spoliation of evidence. However, no memorandum of points and authorities nor supporting evidence was included with Plaintiffs notice of motion. Moreover, the Court would not be inclined to award sanctions for discovery violations where Plaintiff has secured default against this Defendant and is proceeding to default judgment, as discovery sanctions are to be tailored to the harm caused by the withheld discovery. ( Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1618-1619.) Here, because he has secured default and is moving to obtain default judgment, Plaintiff does not appear to have been injured in this respect. Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions is therefore DENIED.

Case Number: 24NWCV00981 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Cerritos Retail Centercal, LLC vs. Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, Case No. 24NWCV00981 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendant moves ex parte to advance the hearing on the motion to set aside, which is currently set for August 7, 2024. Default judgment was entered on June 14, 2024. Defendant was served a five-day notice to vacate on July 2, 2024. Defendant filed the instant motion on Monday, July 8, 2024. Defendant argues that it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware that it had to answer within five days. On May 29, 2024, the Court issued the following order: [T]he Court conferred with Plaintiffs Counsel, Nahal Zarnighian. There was no appearance by Defendant. The Court stated that it had reviewed Defendants motion to set aside default and was inclined to grant the motion under CCP § 473, subd. (b). Defendant appears to argue that it relied upon a tentative ruling posted by the Court which granted Defendant an opportunity to file a Supplemental Reply by May 14, 2024. Defendant denies having received notice of the Courts final order requiring Defendant to Answer within 5 days. Given the Courts inclination with respect to Defendants motion to set aside default, and in an effort to expedite these proceedings, Plaintiffs Counsel had no opposition to the Court advancing Defendants motion to be heard today. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ex parte application to shorten time for hearing on Defendants motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendants motion to set aside default is ADVANCED to todays date and GRANTED. The demurrer filed on May 20, 2024 is STRICKEN because it was filed when Defendant was still in default. The hearing on Defendants demurrer is ADVANCED to todays date and taken OFF-CALENDAR. Defendant is ORDERED to file and serve an answer or other responsive pleading within 5 days. Clerk to give notice. The Court orders the default entered on 05/16/2024 as to Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, a California limited liability company vacated. Certificate of Mailing is attached. (5/29/24 Minute Order.) In the instant ex parte application, Defendant claims it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware it had to answer within 5 days. However, the minute order reflects that the Clerk provided notice of the Courts ruling to the parties. Moreover, the argument Defendant makes here is the same one it made in its previous motion to set aside default. The Court granted the previous ex parte application. With respect to the instant motion, the Court determines that Defendants claim of ignorance is not supported by the record and is made solely for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, the ex parte application is DENIED. Clerk to give notice.

Case Number: 23AHCV02226 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANTS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE I. I I. INTRODUCTION This is a lemon law case. On October 9, 2018, Plaintiff Jose Garcia Ruiz (Plaintiff) purchased a new 2019 Honda Pilot (the Vehicle), which was subject to a warranty by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc., (Defendant). On September 26, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint alleging causes of action for (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act breach of express warranty, and (2) fraudulent concealment. On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC). On November 29, 2023, Defendant demurred to the second of cause of action as articulated in the FAC pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure §§ 430.10 (e), (f), and concurrently filed with notice, a proposed order, and the declaration of Defendants counsel, Patrick J. Raue (Decl. of Raue). Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 26, 2024. Defendant filed a reply on June 3, 2024. The hearing is scheduled for July 10, 2024. II. PROCEDURAL MATTERS A. Timeliness of Filings Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.40, subdivision (a), a demurrer to a complaint should be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint. Similarly, per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿435, subdivision (b)(1), a motion to strike should be filed within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, which is 30 days. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿412.20, subd. (a)(3).) Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿1005, subdivision (b), moving papers should be filed at least 16 court days before they are set for hearing, oppositions thereto should be filed at least nine court days before the set hearing, and replies to any oppositions should be filed at least five court days before the set hearing. Judges have discretion as to whether to consider or strike an untimely demurrer or pleading. ( McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 281; Tuck v. Thuesen (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 193, 196, disapproved on other grounds by Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176.)¿ Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed on October 30, 2023, and Defendants Demurrer with Motion to Strike was filed on November 29, 2023. We are satisfied that all filings made in connection with the Demurrer and Motion are timely. B. The Meet and Confer Requirement California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.41, subdivision (a) and §¿435.5, subdivision (a) requires parties to meet and confer in good faith before the filing of a demurrer or a motion to strike, respectively, to attempt to informally resolve the objections raised in the demurrer or the motion to strike. Each section requires that such meet and confer be done in person or by telephone. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§¿430.1, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a).)¿¿¿ Defendant submits with the Demurrer and the Motion a declaration by its counsel, which confirms that parties spoke about the issues raised in the Demurrer and the Motion on October 16, 2023, and November 17, 2023, but were unable to resolve their dispute before their filings. (Raue Decl., ¶ 3.) Therefore, the Court is satisfied that this requirement has been met. III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Demurrer Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded. Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247. A demurrer is treated as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. A ubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967. The general rule on demurrer is that the pleadings are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604. Questions of plaintiffs ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. A plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, no matter how improbable they are. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 ( Del E. Webb ). Allegations need not be accepted as true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474. Pleadings are to be broadly construed (Code Civ. Proc. §452) and demurrers are to be overruled where the facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38. A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the complaint or in judicially noticeable material but cannot be based on evidence. Speaking demurrers are not permitted. Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), §7.8. Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(f) provides for a demurrer where a pleading is uncertain. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible a defendant cannot reasonably respond. A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. IV. ANALYSIS A. Demurrer as to Fraudulent Concealment i. Elements of Fraudulent Concealment are Met Defendant demurs on the ground that Plaintiffs cause of action falls below the pleading standard. (Demurrer, p. 11.) Each element must be pleaded with particularity. ( Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1090; Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 989.) Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading. . . . Accordingly, the rule is followed everywhere that fraud must be specifically pleaded. The effect of this rule is twofold: (a) General pleading of the legal conclusion of fraud is insufficient; the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged. (b) Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner (i.e., factually and specifically), and the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings ... will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect. ( Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp . (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216, superseded by statute on other grounds.) A fraud cause of action must contain: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages. ( Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co . (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816.) Fraud based on concealment requires that (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. ( Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc . (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-311.) Less specificity is required to plead fraud by concealment. (Ibid.) Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party. ( Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc . (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1384. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew as early as 2012 that the transmission was defective because Defendant began issuing technical service bulletins to dealers regarding the same transmission defects that Plaintiffs vehicle experienced. (FAC, ¶¶ 61-62.) These defects allegedly caused a sudden violent jerking or shaking of the vehicle, creating dangerous driving hazards and serious safety risks. (FAC, ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff was unaware about these defects and reasonably expected that the vehicle would not experience these defects. ( Id .) Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had superior knowledge of the transmission issues and had a duty to disclose such information because the information was confidential and no amount of Plaintiffs diligence could have led to the discovery of these facts. ( Id . at ¶¶ 69-71.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered diminution in the vehicles value, damages to the difference between the value of the vehicle equipped with a defective transmission and the value of the vehicle if it had been equipped as warranted, reliance damages, and expenses relating to the vehicles maintenance. ( Id . at ¶ 122.) ii. Transactional Relationship is Sufficiently Alleged Defendant argues that the FAC does not adequately plead facts sufficient to establish the existence of a legal duty to disclose because Plaintiff has not alleged a direct transactional relationship or fiduciary duty. (Demurrer, p. 10.) A duty to disclose does not exist in all circumstances. There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.] ( LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.) Where there is no fiduciary relationship, a duty to disclose exists only where the parties are in a direct transactional relationship. (CACI 1901; Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe , LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1187.); Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc . (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 844 (allegations that plaintiff bought the vehicle from defendants authorized dealership is sufficient to prove the existence of a transactional relationship). Specifically, the Court in Dhital held that the fraudulent concealment cause of action was not barred by failure to plead a buyer-seller relationship, as the plaintiffs alleged in that case that they bought the car from an authorized dealership; an express warranty accompanied the vehicle; and that the dealerships were the authorized agents of the manufacturer. ( Id .) As review has been granted, Dhital is not binding authority but may have persuasive value. (CRC 8.1115(e)(1).) Here, the Complaint contains identical allegations to the plaintiffs in Dhital , namely, that the car was bought from an authorized dealership, that the dealership and its salesman were agents of GM, and that there was an express warranty in place. (Complaint ¶ 6.) The court in Dhital , supra at 844, found that plaintiffs adequately pled the existence of a relationship between themselves and the vehicles manufacturer because they alleged that (1) they bought the vehicle from the manufacturers dealership, (2) the manufacturer backed the car with an express warranty, (3) the manufacturers authorized dealerships [were] its agents for purposes of¿the sale of [the manufacturers] vehicles to consumers. Plaintiffs FAC alleges that Defendant manufactured and/or distributed hundreds of thousands of 2014-2019 Honda Pilot vehicles throughout the United States equipped with defective transmissions. (FAC, ¶ 11). In establishing a relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Plaintiff purchased the vehicle on October 9, 2018, from Defendant Goudy Honda in Alhambra, California, an authorized American Honda dealership ( Id. , ¶ 49), (2) Defendants express written warranty covered the vehicle and Defendant entered an express written warranty contract with Plaintiff ( Id., ¶ 96-97.), and (3) Plaintiff relied on statements made during the sales process at Gouda Honda, an agent of Defendant, Defendants agents and Defendants marketing materials. ( Id. , ¶ 52.) Because the Complaint alleges the existence of a transactional relationship between the parties that supports the existence of a duty to disclose, fraudulent concealment is sufficiently alleged. Therefore, Defendants demurrer as to the second cause of action alleged is OVERRULED. iii. Tolling The delayed discovery rule does not apply to claims for breach of implied warranties. ( Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2020) 487 F.Supp.3d 845, 854 fn.3.) In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to show diligence; conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer. (( Ibid .) Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc . (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808. See also NBC Universal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1232.) Here, the FAC alleges that the statute of limitations is tolled under the delayed discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. (FAC ¶ 67.) Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle was equipped with a defective transmission, and Defendants dealerships made inadequate repairs, incapable of addressing the root cause of the malfunctions. ( Id. , ¶ 68. Plaintiff places the date of notice of the concealed facts on or about April 10, 2023 (FAC ¶ 67.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence by always taking the vehicle in for service or repair when needed. The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the tolling of statute of limitation under the delayed discovery doctrine. B. Motion to Strike Defendant moves to strike the FACs prayer for punitive damages. (Motion to Strike, p. 2.) Given that the demurrer is overruled, the Defendants motion to strike is DENIED. IV. ORDER Defendant American Honda Motor., Inc.s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the second cause of action for fraudulent concealment. Defendant American Honda Motor., Inc.s motion to strike punitive damages from Plaintiffs FAC is DENIED. Counsel for Plaintiff to give notice of this order. Dated: July 10, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT