The Kingdom Of God - Ark Palace Vs Temple City

Case Number: 23SMCV04773 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Nassara LLC v. Stoll, et al. CASE NO.: 23SMCV04773 MOTION: Petition/Motion to Compel Arbitration HEARING DATE: 7/10/2024 LEGAL STANDARD Under California and federal law, public policy favors arbitration as an efficient and less expensive means of resolving private disputes. ( Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.) Accordingly, whether an agreement is governed by the California Arbitration Act (CAA) or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), courts resolve doubts about an arbitration agreements scope in favor of arbitration. ( Moncharsh, supra , 3 Cal.4th at 9; Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs. (9th Cir. 2009) 553 F.3d 1277, 1284; see also Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972 [California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability [citation] and a requirement that an arbitration agreement must be enforced on the basis of state law standards that apply to contracts in general].) [U]nder both the FAA and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ( Higgins v. Superior Crout (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 requires a trial court to grant a petition to compel arbitration if the court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. ( Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59, quotations omitted.) Accordingly, when presented with a petition to compel arbitration, the courts first task is to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to arbitrate the dispute. ( Ibid . ) A petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. ( Id . at 71.) As with any other specific performance claim, a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement must show the agreements terms are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce. ( Ibid . [internal citations omitted].) Only the valid and binding agreement of the parties, including all material terms well-defined and clearly expressed, may be ordered specifically performed. ( Ibid . ) An arbitration agreement must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) The language of the contract governs its interpretation if it is clear and explicit. (Civ. Code, § 1368.) If uncertainty exists, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist. (Civ. Code, § 1654.) The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence. ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) It would then be plaintiffs burden, in opposing the motion, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to her opposition. ( Ibid . ) In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the courts discretion, to reach a final determination. ( Ibid . ) ANALYSIS Defendants Keith Kim and Helen Kim as Trustees of the Kim Family Trust (hereinafter, Defendants or the Kims) move to compel Plaintiff Nassara, LLCs claims to arbitration. Defendants assert that the instant claims are required to go to arbitration because Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement covering their claims. As with any contract, mutual assent or consent is necessary for the formation of a valid arbitration agreement. (Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565.) Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense. (Civ. Code, § 1580.) The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Mitri v. Arnel Mgmt. Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1169 [Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.].) On April 13, 2023, the Kim Family Trust, by and through its yacht broker David Inglis, made a written contingent offer (the Offer) to purchase a 2020 Azimut 50 motor yacht Nassara (the subject Vessel) from the owner of record for $1,230,000. (Wales Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) On April 14, 2023, Yassine Amallal, claiming to be the owner of record and representative of Nassara, LLC, accepted the Kim Family Trusts conditional offer to purchase the vessel. (Id., Ex. 1.) On June 2, 2023, the Kim Family Trust withdrew its offer as they could not clear the contingency of a Successful transfer of LLC ownership, free and clear of any and all encumbrances. (Wales Decl. ¶ 7.) The Vessel Purchase Agreement upon which Plaintiff bases its claims against Defendants contains a broad and unambiguous agreement to arbitrate. It states: 13. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES. Any Dispute, Claim or Controversy arising out of or related to this Agreement , or the invalidity, interpretation, performance or breach thereof, directly or indirectly, shall be decided by binding arbitration under the Rules of the California Yacht Brokers Association, or of the Maritime Arbitration Association of the United States, pursuant to the rules that are in effect for such organizations on the date arbitration is requested. The arbitral organization where arbitration is first commenced shall administer all arbitral proceedings covered by this Agreement. If any provision of this agreement conflicts with such rules, this agreement shall control. Buyer and Seller agree to give up any rights they might possess to have the dispute litigated in court or jury trial and their judicial rights to discovery and appeal . If either party refuses to submit to arbitration, such party may be compelled to arbitrate under law. Arbitration shall be conducted in the county of Brokers place of business handling this transaction. The prevailing party may be awarded attorneys fees and costs of arbitration. Judgment may be entered upon the arbitration award and enforced in any court having jurisdiction thereof. (Id., Ex. 1, ¶ 13, emphasis added.) There is no dispute that the subject litigation arises from the Purchase Agreement. Plaintiffs claims are based upon an alleged breach of the Purchase Agreement. Plaintiff does not contend otherwise in its opposition. Plaintiff, however, raises Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, which provides an exception to arbitration when the court determines that& [a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2(c).) To avoid inconsistent results and the possibility that each defendant will seek to escape liability by blaming the other, the court can refuse to compel arbitration and order all parties joined in a single action. ( Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 339340.) In such cases, the parties to the arbitration agreement are forced to litigate a dispute that they had agreed to arbitrate. ( Id . at 347350.) The right to arbitration, created by agreement, is not absolute: it may have to yield if there is an issue of law or fact common to the arbitration and a pending action or proceeding with a third party and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings thereon. ( Id . at 348.) The Court observes no risk of conflicting rulings of law or fact posed by the claims against the Kims when compared to the claims against the other defendants. As pled in the complaint, the issues are completely severable. The complaint alleges only the second cause of action against the Kims for breach of the sales agreement. Specifically, the Kims failed to close the purchase as required by the agreement. (Compl., ¶ 35.) On the other hand, the complaint alleges the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action against the other defendants, arising from separate duties or contracts. Plaintiff brings claims against RJ for failing to upkeep the Yacht as agreed in a completely separate contract. (See Compl., ¶¶ 13-16.) Because of these failures, Plaintiff withheld payments. (Id., ¶ 17.) In response, RJ filed a lien against the Yacht without notifying Plaintiff. (Id.) It was only after escrow began with the Kims that Plaintiff discovered the lien. (¶¶ 18-20.) As a result of the lien, and Plaintiffs apparent inability to transfer the title free and clear of the lien, the sale fell through. (¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that RJ, Johnson, Stoll, Engel and Wales breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff by filing the lien and engaging in conflicts of interests during the transaction. (¶¶ 39-49.) From these allegations, it is apparent that Plaintiffs claim against the Kims for breach of contract is not dependent upon the same facts or law as Plaintiffs claims against the other defendants. Plaintiffs claims against the other defendants do not arise out of Plaintiffs or the Kims rights or obligations under the Purchase Agreement. Instead, Plaintiffs claims against the other defendants arise from separate duties. At best, the claims are tangentially related because they relate to the Yacht and/or its sale. The Kims met their burden to demonstrate the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties that covers Plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff, in turn, fails to demonstrate any defense to enforcement. The Kims motion is therefore GRANTED and the Court orders Plaintiffs claims to arbitration, as discussed above. The action is STAYED as to the Kims, pending completion of the arbitration. (CCP § 1281.4.) A status conference re arbitration is set for June 3, 2025, at 8:30 a.m.

Case Number: 22STLC05545 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 26 Bill Davis Drywall, Inc. v. Pink, et al. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES ( Civ. Code § 1717; Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 ) TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Bill Davis Drywall, Inc.s Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,420.00. PLAINTIFF IS TO FILE AND SERVE A PROPOSED JUDGMENT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS ORDER. ANALYSIS: On August 22, 2022, Plaintiff Bill Davis Drywall, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Jeffrey Pink (Defendant Pink), Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, (Defendant Hartford), and later added Navigators Insurance Company (Defendant Navigators). Defendant Hartford was dismissed just one month into the action. On February 23, 2024, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Pink in the total amount of $33,609.44. Plaintiff dismissed Defendant Navigators on March 19, 2024. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs on March 28, 2024. No opposition has been filed to date. Discussion Timing of Motion Plaintiff brings the instant Motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032, 1033.5 and Civil Code section 1717. A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, including attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4); § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) A motion for attorneys fees must be filed and served with the time for filing a notice of appeal under Cal. Rules of Court Rule 8.822. (Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1702(a).) Cal. Rules of Court Rule 8.822 states that an attorneys fees motion must be filed within the earlier of (1) 30 days after the trial court clerk served the party filing the motion with notice of entry of judgment; or (2) 90 days after entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court 8.822(1).) Here, the Motion is timely because no notice of entry of judgment was served and the Motion was brought less than 90 days after entry of judgment. Prevailing Party Plaintiff contends it is the prevailing party in this action pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 as the party who recovered greater relief in the action on the contract. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1).) This is undisputed based on Plaintiff prevailing in its breach of contract action against Defendant Pink. The Court finds that Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to an award of its attorneys fees and costs. Amount of Attorneys Fees Plaintiff moves for an award of $12,420.00 in attorneys fees billed at $300.00 per hour. (Motion, Devine Decl., ¶32.) The moving party bears the burden of proof with respect to attorneys fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5)(A).) Specifically, a party seeking fees has the burden of showing the fees incurred are allowable, are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and are reasonable in amount. ( Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) The Courts objective is to award attorneys fees at the fair market value based on the particular action. ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. ( PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) [T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate . . . . ( Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134.) The lodestar method is based on the factors, as relevant to the particular case: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Id . at 1132.) The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong. ( Id .) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed . ( Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.) $300.00 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for a senior attorney in a limited breach of contract action. (Motion, Devine Decl., ¶30.) The number of hours billed, 41.4, was also reasonable. This action was filed in April 2022 and disposed of in February 2024. Over two years, Plaintiffs attorney drafted demand letters to Defendant Pink, drafted and filed the Complaint, reviewed communications regarding the construction project, communicated with representatives of the license surety bond about the production of documents and a possible settlement, propounded discovery on Defendant Pink and the license surety bond, drafted, filed and appeared for discovery motions following Defendant Pinks failure to respond, coordinated with opposing counsel and prepared for trial, appeared for trial, prepared post-trial filings, dismissed the license bond surety, and prepared and filed the instant Motion. ( Id . at ¶¶9-29 and Exh. D.) Accordingly, the requested fees are reasonable and Plaintiff is awarded attorneys fees of $12,420.00. Conclusion Plaintiff Bill Davis Drywall, Inc.s Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,420.00. PLAINTIFF IS TO FILE AND SERVE A PROPOSED JUDGMENT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THIS ORDER. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: BC452244 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER BC452244 MOTION Motions to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas MOVING PARTY Assignee Adam Harari OPPOSING PARTIES Judgment Debtor Dalia Nosrati MOTION In two separate motions, assignee Adam Harari (Harari) moves to compel compliance with subpoenas Harari purportedly served on Bank of America, N.A. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Deponents). Judgment Debtor Dalia Nosrati (Nosrati) responds to the motions. ANALYSIS Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides, If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party or a witness] . . . may make an order . . . directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) Assignee did not personally serve the motions on Deponents, as required. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1346 [A written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion to compel an answer to a deposition question or to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record].) Accordingly, the motions are denied. Further, the parties have apparently agreed Deponents are to produce responsive documents subject to the protective order this court entered in its July 1, 2024 order. As such, the motions are moot and are denied on that basis as well. Nosrati is to notify Deponents of the withdrawal of objections to the subpoenas within 30 days. Harari is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.

Case Number: 24SMCV00823 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 REZA SAFAIE , Plaintiff, v. LAW OFFICES OF RAFI MOGHADAM APC, et al., Defendant s . Case No.: 2 4 S M CV 0 0823 Hearing Date: July 9 , 2024 [ TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT BACKGROUND This case arises from an attorney fee dispute . Plaintiff Reza Safaie entered into an agreement with Defendants Law Offices of Rafi Moghadam APC and Rafi Moghadam to serve as a third party payor of attorneys fees of Defendants client , Fair Ocean Management LLC . ( Compl . ¶ 9 .) Defendants submitted invoices which Plaintiff refused to pay as Plaintiff claims the services and expenses were unconscionable and unreasonable. ( Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff told Defendants he no longer desired to serve as the third party payor for Defendants client . ( Id. ¶ 11.) Defendants advised Plaintiff that he did not have the legal right to terminate or cancel the third party payor agreement , nor did he have the right to contest or dispute any of the billing . ( Id. ¶ ¶ 12 -13 .) Defendants also told Plaintiff that once the case was over , Defendants would seek attorneys fees and if the Court award ed Defendants fees, Defendants would be willing to negotiate Plaintiffs liability associated with the third party payor agreement . ( Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff contends this advice converted Defendants relationship with him into one of attorney and client . ( Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff also claims Defendants advice was both malpractice and fraud . ( Id. ¶ ¶ 33 , 5 1 .) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges six claims for (1) legal malpractice, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) constructive fraud, (4) intentional fraud, (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (6) negligence . This hearing is on Defendant s motion to strike the complaint . Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs prayer for damages because it fails to state the amount of damages, and prayer for attorneys fees because there is no legal basis for the award of such fees . LEGAL STANDARD T he court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading . (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment . ( Goodman v. Kennedy ¿(1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348 .)¿ The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) MEET AND CONFER Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5 requires that before the filing of a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. (C ode C iv. P roc. § 435.5(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (C ode C iv. P roc. § 435.5(a)(2).) Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (C ode C iv. P roc. §435.5(a)(3) .) Defendant s submit the Declaration of Rafi Moghada m which attests defense counsel made several attempts to meet and confer by telephone with Plaintiffs counsel , but Plaintiffs counsel was either in trial or failed to respond . This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of § 435.5 . DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that Defendants motion to strike is untimely . Defendant Rafi Moghadam was personally served with the summons and complaint on March 1, 2024 , and his law firm was personally served on March 6, 2024 . The 30 day deadline to respond expired on April 1, 2024 and April 5, 2024 respectively . However, Defendants filed a declaration for an automatic extension of 30 days . Accordingly , their response deadline was extended to May 1, 2024 and May 6, 2024 . Defendants filed their motion to strike on May 2, 2024 . While one of the Defendants motion is one day late, the other Defendants motion is timely . Given the limited delay, t he Court will consider both Defendants motion s on their merits . ( CPF Agency Corp. v. R&S Towing (2005) 132 Cal.App.4 th 1014, 1020-1021 (court has discretion to rule on late-filed motion to strike ).) Plaintiff also argues Defendants waived their right to move to strike because they filed an answer . Plaintiff cites no authority for this argument . Its authorities stand for the proposition that a defendant cannot move to strike after it has filed an answer . Here, Defendants filed their motion to strike at the same time as their answer . In any event, the court has the discretion to consider the merits of the motion under the courts inherent authority to strike improper matter from pleadings at any time . ( Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a) ;¿ CPF Agency Corp. , 132 Cal.App.4th at 1021 .)¿ The Court now turns to the merits of the motion . Defendants argue that Plaintiffs prayer for money damages does not specify the amount of damages and is therefore invalid . The Court agrees . In non-personal injury cases, such as this one, [ i ]f the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10(a)(2).) Section 425.10 requires all complaints to state the amount of damages sought, except in personal injury or wrongful death cases. ( Electronic Funds Solutions v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1176.) The purpose of this rule is to place the defendants on notice of the maximum liability confronting them. ( Id. ) The rule aids a defendant in evaluating the validity of plaintiffs damage claims with regard to their provability. ( Plotitsa v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 755, 761.) Here, the Complaint alleges various monetary damages but specifies none. ( See Compl . at 6:6-8, 7:10-11, 8:2-3, 8:20-21, 9:15-16, 10:6-7, 10:18-19, 11:4, 11:5, 11:6, 11:7, 11:9.) The phrase in an amount to be proven at time of trial is not Code-compliant . Because this action is not a personal injury or wrongful death suit, Plaintiff is required to specify the amount of damages . ( See Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10(b).) Accordingly , Plaintiff s prayer for unspecified money damages is defective and must be stricken. Plaintiff argues he has alleged he suffered actual harm , and Defendants should simply resort to discovery to quantify that harm . The availability of discovery does not contravene the Codes specific command that Plaintiff state the amount of damages demanded by his Complaint . Were it otherwise, every plaintiff could simply point to discovery and refuse to state the amount demanded in his complaint, rendering the requirements of § 425.10 meaningless . Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has not stated a basis for his claim for attorneys fees . Again, the Court agrees . California generally follows what is commonly referred to as the American Rule which provides that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his or her own¿ attorneys fees . ( See, e.g., ¿ Trope v. Katz ¿(1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 278 .) The¿ American Rule is codified in¿ Code Civ. Proc. § 1021 , which states in¿relevant part :¿ Except as attorney s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties & . ¿ Here, the Complaint does not specify a statutory or contractual basis for Plaintiffs prayer for attorneys fees . Without a statutory or contractual basis, Plaintiff cannot recover any attorneys fees in the present case. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1021, 1033.5(a)(10); Trope , 11 Cal.4th at 278279 ( Except as attorneys fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.) .) In Opposition, Plaintiff argues he is entitled to attorneys fees under Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 , the private attorney general statute . [A]n award under [ section 1021.5 ] ¿requires a showing that (1) the litigation enforced an important right affecting the public interest; (2) it conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons; and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement (or enforcement by one public entity against another) were such as to make the award appropriate.¿ [Citation.] Since the statute states the criteria in the conjunctive, each element must be satisfied to justify a fee award. [Citation.] & [¶] The third element, the necessity and financial burden requirement, involves two issues: whether private enforcement was necessary and whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party s attorneys. [Citation.] ( Children & Families Com. of Fresno County v. Brown ¿(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 45, 55.) The Complaint fails to allege any of these essential elements . More importantly, Plaintiff is seeking to vin di cate a personal right . When & the primary effect of a lawsuit [is] to advance or vindicate a plaintiffs personal economic interests &. fees under section 1021.5 is improper. ( Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4 th 629, 635 .) Section 1021.5 ¿ was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the public interest. ( Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com . (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 106, 114.) Instead, its purpose is to provide some incentive for the plaintiff who acts as a true private attorney general, prosecuting a lawsuit that enforces an important public right and confers a significant benefit, despite the fact that his or her own financial stake in the outcome would not by itself constitute an adequate incentive to litigate. ( Satrap v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co . (1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 72, 80.) Here, Plaintiff s malpractice suit seek s recovery for Plaintiffs personal economic interests, and not to vindicate an important public right . Accordingly , the Court grants the motion to strike Plaintiffs prayer for attorneys fees. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs prayer for unspecified damages with 20 days leave to amend and Plaintiffs prayer for attorneys fees without leave to amend . IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 9 , 202 4 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24STCP00555 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 26 Diya Finance, LLC v. Chute System, LLC, et al. PETITION TO RELEASE MECHANICS LIEN (Civil Code § 8480 ) TENTATIVE RULING: Petitioner Diya Finance, LLCs Petition to Release Property from Mechanics Lien is CONTINUED TO OCTOBER 10, 2024 AT 10:00 AM IN DEPARTMENT 26 IN THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. BY SEPTEMBER 12, 2024, PETITIONER IS TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE PETITION AND NOTICE OF HEARING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. ANALYSIS: Petitioner Diya Finance, LLC (Petitioner) filed the instant Petition for Release of Mechanics Lien against Respondent Chute Systems, LLC (Respondent) on February 14, 2024. No proof of service of, nor response to, the Petition has been filed to date. Discussion Petitioner moves to have the mechanics lien recorded against their property by Respondent released. Under Civil Code section 8484 the petition for release order must be verified by the petitioner and allege the following: (a) The date of recordation of the claim of lien. A certified copy of the claim of lien shall be attached to the petition. (b) The county in which the claim of lien is recorded. (c) The book and page or series number of the place in the official records where the claim of lien is recorded. (d) The legal description of the property subject to the claim of lien. (e) Whether an extension of credit has been granted under Section 8460, if so to what date, and that the time for commencement of an action to enforce the lien has expired. (f) That the owner has given the claimant notice under Section 8482 demanding that the claimant execute and record a release of the lien and that the claimant is unable or unwilling to do so or cannot with reasonable diligence be found. (g) Whether an action to enforce the lien is pending. (h) Whether the owner of the property or interest in the property has filed for relief in bankruptcy or there is another restraint that prevents the claimant from commencing an action to enforce the lien. (Civil Code, § 8484.) The Petition contains all the required information. However, Civil Code section 8486, subdivision (b) also requires service of the Petition and Notice of Hearing to be made in the same manner as service of summons, or by certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested . . . . (Civ. Code, § 8486, subd. (b).) Petitioner has not filed any proof of service of the Petition and the Notice of the Hearing Date. The Court cannot grant the Petition without compliance with the statutory service requirements. Conclusion Therefore, Petitioner Diya Finance, LLCs Petition to Release Property from Mechanics Lien is CONTINUED TO OCTOBER 10, 2024 AT 10:00 AM IN DEPARTMENT 26 IN THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE. BY SEPTEMBER 12, 2024, PETITIONER IS TO FILE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE PETITION AND NOTICE OF HEARING IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 22SMCV00902 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Starbucks Corporations Demurrer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Starbucks Corporations Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant Starbucks Corporation shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment per statute. Defendant Starbucks Corporation to give notice. REASONING Defendant Starbucks Corporation (Defendant) demurs to Plaintiff Augustine Rotibi (Plaintiff)s single cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (SAC) and moves to strike Plaintiffs claim and prayer for punitive damages. [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967), but the Court does not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125). Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 [A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) First Cause of Action: Unruh Civil Rights Violation The elements of a claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act are (1) defendant is a business establishment, (2) defendant intentionally denied plaintiff accommodations, advantages, privileges, facilities, or services, (3) defendant was motivated to do so based on its perception that plaintiff belonged to a statutorily defined group, (4) plaintiff was harmed, and (5) defendants conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs harm. (See Civ. Code, § 51; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216.) The objective of the Act is to prohibit businesses from engaging in unreasonable, arbitrary or invidious discrimination. Therefore, the Act applies not merely in situations where businesses exclude individuals altogether, but also where treatment is unequal. (Pizarro v. Lambs Players Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174, citations omitted.) In its prior rulings on Defendants demurrer to the initial pleading and Defendants demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, the Court ruled that Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to support his claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and Plaintiff has again made no amendments to his claim here. Plaintiff again alleges that he ordered a tea with a spike of lemonade, and when he asked for a refill, he was charged the full amount of the drink based on the color of his skin. (SAC ¶¶ 12, 14, 19-21, 26.) Plaintiff alleges that his client, a Caucasian female, was only charged 50 cents for a refill of the same drink, and he observed other patrons, all Caucasian, requesting and getting a refill for their drinks without any questions or refusal, and discounted rates were only offered to patrons that were Caucasian. (SAC ¶¶ 15, 19, 20.) The Court previously ruled that Plaintiff had not alleged that any discrimination against him was intentional, and Plaintiff had also failed to allege how the corporation may be liable for the cashiers actions. Plaintiff has added no substantive allegations here, continuing to rely on the same facts. Thus, there remain insufficient facts to support a claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as Plaintiff has provided only conclusions to support his claim without alleging intentional discrimination or facts which may support liability against Defendant for the cashiers actions. Given that the Court has allowed Plaintiff two opportunities to amend his pleading to state sufficient facts, and he instead relies only on the same facts in each new iteration of the pleading, the Court lacks a basis to conclude that amendment will cure the deficiencies in the pleading, and Plaintiffs opposition does not compel a different conclusion, as he provides no information about possible amendments, instead focusing solely on the veracity of the current facts. Accordingly, Defendant Starbucks Corporations Demurrer to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Starbucks Corporations Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. Defendant Starbucks Corporation shall prepare, serve, and submit a proposed judgment per statute.

Case Number: 23PSCV01807 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 26 Yang v. Interinsurance Exchange, et al. MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS (CCP §§ 2031.300, 2023.010) TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Clubs Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, and Request for Sanctions, is GRANTED. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS TO SERVE VERIFIED RESPONSES TO THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS, WITHOUT OBJECTIONS, WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS ALSO ORDERED TO PAY SANCTIONS OF $285.00 TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. ANALYSIS: On January 9, 2024, Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Defendant) served Request for Production of Documents, Set One, on Plaintiff Bin Yang (Plaintiff). ( Motion, Vallone Decl., Exh. 1.) Despite a meet and confer effort extending the deadline to serve verified responses without objections, Plaintiff has not served responses to the discovery. ( Id . at ¶¶5-7 and Exh. 2.) Defendant filed the instant Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, and Request for Sanctions, on June 7, 2024. No opposition has been filed to date. Discussion Based on Plaintiffs failure to serve initial responses to the discovery, the Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production of Documents and Request for Monetary Sanctions, is granted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300.) There is no requirement for a prior meet and confer effort before a motion to compel initial responses can be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300.) Furthermore, the motion can be brought at any time after the responding party fails to provide the responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300.) Therefore, Defendant is entitled to an order compelling Plaintiff to serve verified responses to the Request for Production of Documents, Set One, without objections. Plaintiffs failure to timely respond constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) Sanctions are appropriate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 and have been properly noticed. However, the amount sought is excessive for simple and unopposed motions. Pursuant to a lodestar calculation, sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff in the amount of $285.00 based on one hour of attorney time billed at $225.00 per hour and costs of $60.00. (Motion, Vallone Decl., ¶10.) Conclusion Defendant Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Clubs Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, and Request for Sanctions, is GRANTED. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS TO SERVE VERIFIED RESPONSES TO THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS, WITHOUT OBJECTIONS, WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. PLAINTIFF BIN YANG IS ALSO ORDERED TO PAY SANCTIONS OF $285.00 TO DEFENSE COUNSEL WITHIN 20 DAYS SERVICE OF THIS ORDER. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 23STUD11620 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 25 Hearing Date: Wednesday, July 10, 2024 Case Name: CROFT PLAZA APARTMENT HOMES LLC vs WILLIAM MOCHON. Case No.: 23STUD11620 Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment Moving Party: Plaintiff Croft Plaza Apartments Homes LLC Responding Party: None Notice: NO Served by mail on 6/17/24 (see below) Recommended Ruling: Deny without prejudice. SERVICE : [ X ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK [ X ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK [ X ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) NO see below OPPOSITION : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None REPLY : None filed as of July 5, 2024 [ ] Late [ X ] None BACKGROUND On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff Croft Plaza Apartments Homes LLC (Plaintiff) filed this unlawful detainer action against Defendant William Mochon (Defendant). Defendant filed his answer on October 6, 2023 stating that the action should be dismissed as Defendant will vacate the property by November 1, 2023. On December 27, 2023, the Court found that possession was no longer at issue and the case was reassigned to an Independent Calendar Court. On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment. No opposition has been filed. MOVING PARTY POSITION Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the basis that Defendant owes monthly rent to Plaintiff, vacated the subject property, and did not assert any affirmative defenses. OPPOSITION No opposition has been filed. REPLY No reply has been filed. ANALYSIS I. Legal Standard & Discussion In unlawful detainer actions, Code of Civil Procedure § 1170.7 provides that A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the answer is filed upon giving five days notice. Summary judgment shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under Section 437c. Here, the issue of possession has become moot, and the case has become an ordinary civil action in which the landlord may seek damages. (Motion, 5:18-22; Fish Construction Co. v. Moselle Coach Works, Inc. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 645 , 658.) As this is no longer an unlawful detainer case, but an ordinary civil action, there is insufficient notice. CCP section 437c(a)(2) provides that [n]otice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a)(2); see Cuff v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 582, 596.) If the notice is served by mail to an address within the State of California, the 75-day period is increased by 5 days. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a)(2).) The Court lacks power to change the notice and filing periods of section 437c. (See McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 115-18; see also Urshan v. Musicians Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 765-66 (discussing McMahon and reversing judgment for failure to provide notice by the statutorily required minimum time period); Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 299.) Parties may stipulate to waive the statutorily mandated minimum notice period. (See Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital v. Danning, Gill, Diamond & Kollitz (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1301; Lyons v. Security Pacific National Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1014.) The case qualifies for § 1179a trial precedence only when possession is in issue (CCP § 1179a). Thus, if the tenant has permanently vacated (returned possession to the landlord) after commencement of the unlawful detainer, the action is not triable on the summary calendar and not entitled to precedence under CCP § 1179a; it becomes an ordinary civil action. (Civ.C. § 1952.) This is supported by the rationales in Fish Construction Co., supra, and Lynch, supra, which Plaintiff cites to in its moving papers, as the summary procedures in an unlawful detainer action has been removed and the action is proceeding as an ordinary civil action for rent. Accordingly, the time period for a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the rent owed and not possession would follow the ordinary civil time period rather than that of an unlawful detainer action. III. Conclusion Plaintiff Croft Plaza Apartments Homes LLC Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED without prejudice. Moving Party is ordered to give notice.