Kick Ass Pictures, Inc. Vs New Beginnings, Inc.

Case Number: 22BBCV01254 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B martha burrola , Plaintiff, v. the vons companies, inc, et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 22BBCV01254 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion for summary judgment; and motions to compel responses BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Martha Burrola (Plaintiff) alleges that on December 23, 2020, as she was existing a Pavilions grocery store, she walked across a clear liquid substance at the entrance and exit door and on the adjacent parking area and painted crosswalk. She alleges that this caused the area to be slippery when walked over. She alleges that there was no warning that the area was wet or slippery. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on the painted crosswalk as she was walking towards her car. Plaintiff alleges that the store premises was owned, operated, leased, rented, maintained, and/or managed by Defendant The Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons) and that the premises/common areas were owned, operated, leased, rented, maintained, and/or managed by Defendant The Decurion Corporation (Decurion Corp.). The first amended complaint (FAC), filed June 28, 2023, alleges a cause of action for negligence, premises liability. On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff named Rancho Marketplace Gateway, LLC as Doe 6 (Rancho); Robertson Properties Group as Doe 7 (Robertson); and Decurion Management Company as Doe 8 (Decurion Management). B. Cross-Complaints On April 11, 2023, Vons filed a cross-complaint against Rancho for: (1) breach of contract; (2) implied indemnity; (3) express indemnity; (4) contribution and apportionment; and (5) declaratory relief. On July 13, 2023, Rancho filed a cross-complaint against Moes 1-25 for: (1) equitable/implied indemnity; (2) contribution and apportionment; (3) declaratory relief; (4) breach of contract; and (5) express indemnity. On May 10, 2024, Rancho named The Vons Companies Inc. as Moe 1. On July 18, 2023, Decurion Corp. filed a cross-complaint against Foes 1-25 for: (1) equitable/implied indemnity; (2) contribution and apportionment; (3) declaratory relief; (4) breach of contract; and (5) express indemnity. C. Motions on Calendar On May 10, 2024, Decurion Corp. filed a motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff on the sole cause of action for premises liability in the FAC. The Court is not in receipt of an opposition brief. On June 25 and 28, 2024, Rancho filed 3 motions to compel Plaintiffs initial responses to: (1) Form Interrogatories (FROG); (2) Special Interrogatories (SROG); and Document Demands (DD). The Court is not in receipt of an opposition brief. DISCUSSION RE MSJ Decurion Corp. moves for summary judgment in its favor and against Plaintiff on the sole cause of action for premises liability in the complaint. The elements of a premises liability claim and negligence claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. ( Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) Because a landowner is not the insurer of a visitors safety, the owners actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability. ( Hall v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139.) Ordinarily, where there is a dangerous condition on the business proprietors property, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition for a sufficient time to remedy or warn of the danger. ( Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205-07.) In support of the motion, Decurion provides the following undisputed material facts. Plaintiff filed the complaint on December 19, 2022, alleging that she slipped and fell on December 23, 2020 (Incident) on a crosswalk in the parking lot in front of Vons Pavilions located at 1110 West Alameda Avenue, Burbank, California (the Subject Property). (Fact 1.) On June 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed the FAC with a single claim for premises liability, which alleged that she was injured after she slipped and fell in a clear liquid substance existed at the entrance and exit door to the Pavilions grocery store and on the adjacent parking area and painted crosswalk causing the area to be slippery when walked over. (Fact 2.) On July 18, 2023, Decurion filed its answer to the FAC, asserting various affirmative defenses including the 9 th and 27 th affirmative defenses of No Causation and Lack of Duty Foreseeability. (Fact 3.) The Subject Property at the time of the Incident was being leased to lessee Vons by lessor Rancho pursuant to the original lease dated July 17, 1989, as amended by the Lease Modification Agreement dated November 15, 2005. (Fact 4.) Rancho owned the Subject Property following a grant deed conveyance from California Drive-In Theatres Inc. dated July 7, 2004. (Fact 9.) Rancho is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with active status with the California Secretary of State. (Fact 10.) Decurion is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California with active status with the California Secretary of State and it did not own or hold title to the Subject Property at the time of the Incident on December 23, 2020. (Fact 10.) Decurion is a holding company for various subsidiaries that manage and control various commercial real estate assets, including Rancho, the owner and lessor of the Subject Property. (Fact 11.) Decurion was not a party to any leasing agreement governing the Subject Property at the time of the Incident on December 23, 2020. (Fact 12.) Decurion was not in any way involved in the daily management, control and maintenance of the parking lot at the Subject Property at the time of the Incident on December 23, 2020. (Fact 13.) Plaintiff produced photographs which she claims depict the parking lot area at the Subject Property where she slipped and fell, as well as the crosswalk painted stripes which allegedly became slippery when wet. (Fact 5-6.) Decurion served SROG, set one, Nos. 11-13 on Plaintiff requesting the identification of all evidence supporting her contention that Decurion owned, managed, and controlled the parking lot area where the incident occurred, to which Plaintiff responded on September 25, 2023, stating that she could not identify any witness or document to support her contention. (Fact 7-8.) Based on the undisputed material facts and evidence provided by Decurion, Decurion has shown that it did not own, lease, occupy, or control the Subject Premises but that Rancho was the owner of the Subject Premises who leased the property to Vons. Decurion has shown that Plaintiff did not produce discovery responses showing that that Decurion owned, managed, or controlled the parking lot where the Incident occurred. Decurion argues that since it did not own, possess, or control the Subject Premises and was merely a holding corporation of Rancho, it owed no duty to Plaintiff. (See Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 CalApp.4 th 523, 538-539 [discussing the alter ego doctrine and recognizing that the parent company is not necessarily exposed to liability for its subsidiarys obligations].) The Court finds that Decurion has upheld its initial burden in summary judgment. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact. No opposition has been filed and, thus, Plaintiff has not raised any arguments or triable issues of material fact regarding whether Decurion owned, leased, occupied, or controlled the Subject Premises or whether the alter ego doctrine should apply. As such, Decurions motion for summary judgment is granted. DISCUSSION RE MOTIONS TO COMPEL Rancho moves to compel Plaintiffs initial responses to the FROG, SROG, and RPD. On February 3, 2024, Rancho served on Plaintiff the FROG requests. On April 11, 2024, Rancho served on Plaintiff the SROG and RPD requests. Rancho states that Plaintiff did not serve objections or request an extension. Ranchos counsel attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiffs counsel, but did not receive a response from Plaintiffs counsel. As of the filing of the motions, Rancho states that it has not received responses from Plaintiff. Ranchos unopposed motions to compel responses to the FROG, SROG, and RPD are granted pursuant to CCP §§ 2030.290 and 2031.300. Plaintiff is ordered to provide verified responses to Ranchos discovery requests, without objections, within 20 days of notice of this order. Rancho requests sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorney in the amount of $1,920 for each motion (= [1 hour to prepare the motion + 2 hours to attend the hearing + 1 hour to review the opposition + 1 hour to prepare the reply, at $450/hour] + $60 in filing fees + $20 for parking). The requests are granted in the reasonable amount of $1,000 in attorneys fees and $180 in filing fees, for a total of $1,180. The motions are relatively simple motions to compel initial responses and are unopposed. The Court also notes that Burbank Courthouse does not charge for parking. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant The Decurion Corporations motion for summary judgment is granted as to the sole cause of action in Plaintiffs complaint. Defendant The Decurion Corporation is dismissed with prejudice. Defendant Rancho Marketplace Gateway, LLCs motions to compel responses to the FROG, SROG, and RPD are granted. Plaintiff is ordered to provide verified responses to Ranchos discovery requests, without objections, within 20 days of notice of this order. Plaintiff and her counsel of record, jointly and severally, are ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,080 to Defendant, by and through counsel, within 20 days of notice of this order. Each moving party shall provide notice of their respective order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23BBCV02845 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A TENTATIVE RULING JULY 26, 2024 DEMURRER & MOTION TO STRIKE Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23BBCV02845 MP: Hami Golbar, Fred Golbar, and Gol 5 Properties, LLC (Defendants) RP: Brandon Brooks (Plaintiff) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ALLEGATIONS: Brandon Brooks (Plaintiff) brings this action against Hami Golbar, Fred Golbar, and Gol 5 Properties, LLC (collectively Defendants) associated with an apartment Plaintiff rented from Defendants (the Subject Property). Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to remedy a number of deficient conditions at the Subject Property. The Court previously sustained Defendants demurrer to various causes of action and Plaintiff has subsequently filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). Plaintiffs FAC contains 12 causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Statutory Breach of the Warranty of Habitability (Civil Code §§1941, 1941.1, And 1942.4), (3) Violation of Civil Code §1942.4, (4) Violation of Civil Code §1942.5, (5) Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability, (6) Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq., (7) Private Nuisance, (8) Negligence, (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), (10) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing, (11) Violation of LAMC 45.33, and (12) Violation of Civil Code § 789.3(a) As before, Defendants now generally demur to the causes of action for Private Nuisance and IIED on grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages. Plaintiff opposes and Defendants reply. ANALYSIS: I. LEGAL STANDARD The grounds for a demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (C.C.P. § 430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Id. ) A demurrer assumes the truth of all factual, material allegations properly pled in the challenged pleading. ( Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at p. 318.) No matter how unlikely or improbable, the plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. ( Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 604.) But this does not include contentions; deductions; conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. ( Blank , supra , 39 Cal. 3d at 318.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) §§ 430.10(e) and (f), the party against whom a complaint has been filed may demur to the pleading on the grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or that the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and/or unintelligible. It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. ( Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1074, 1082.) Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See C.C.P. §§ 435, 436, and 437.) The proper procedure to attack false allegations in a pleading is a motion to strike. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) In granting a motion to strike made under C.C.P. § 435, [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 [notice of motion to strike whole or part of complaint], or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) Irrelevant matters include immaterial allegations that are not essential to the claim or those not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim. (C.C.P. § 431.10.) The court may also [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (C.C.P. § 436 (b).) II. MERITS Meet and Confer C.C.P. §§ 430.41(a) and 435.5(a) requires that the moving party meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the demurrer and/or motion to strike. Upon review the Court finds the meet and confer requirements were met. (Mantovani Decl. ¶ 4.) Facts Plaintiffs FAC contains an overarching facts section, which is incorporated by reference into each of his 12 causes of action. Plaintiff alleges that shortly after commencing tenancy, someone stole his parking spot (FAC. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff also alleges that his vehicle was vandalized after his parking spot was reassigned. (FAC ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Property had its gas service interrupted for a prolonged period of time for repairs. (FAC ¶ 34.) Plaintiff states that this interruption caused him to experience severe health symptoms because he could not use his fireplace and other gas appliances. (FAC ¶ 36.) Plaintiff alleges that the gas remains turned off for the building. (FAC ¶ 37.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants did not provide the necessary accommodations after he was furloughed during the Covid-19 pandemic. (FAC ¶ 40.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges he was served with a 3-day notice to quit which was followed by two unlawful detainer suits. (FAC ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs FAC also contains a list of alleged defective conditions of the Subject Property which include infestations, extensive water damage, and unsafe/unsanitary common areas. (FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff does not provide any further allegations as to the nature of these defects or when they occurred. ( Id .) Plaintiff alleges that he has contacted Defendants with respect to these defects several times, but the problems persist. (FAC ¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges he was forced to hire his own pest and mold inspection companies. (FAC ¶ 52.) Seventh COA Private Nuisance Sustained without Leave to Amend To establish an action for private nuisance, (1) the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; (2) the invasion of the plaintiffs interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land. ( Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-263, [citations, italics, brackets, and quotation marks omitted].) The Court previously sustained the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend. The Court relied on the reasoning in El Escorial Owners Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. which held Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim. ( El Escorial Owners Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) The Court also cited Melton v. Boustred , which found that a demurrer is properly sustained where a nuisance claim is merely a clone of the negligence claim. ( Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 542.) The Court found Plaintiffs arguments that his cause of action was not duplicative to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff argued that his nuisance cause of action differed from his negligence cause of action because it alleged both intentional and negligent behavior of Defendants. This argument is virtually unchanged in Plaintiffs current opposition. Likewise, the Court remains unpersuaded. The Courts previous ruling made clear that Plaintiff must allege facts specific to his nuisance claim if he wished it to survive demurrer. A review of the FAC shows that no such allegations are present. Plaintiff has added allegations that he had a possessory interest in the Subject Property. (FAC ¶ 125.) While this is an element of a private nuisance action, it does not speak to any specific behavior of Defendants in creating a nuisance. Plaintiff also has added a list of alleged actions by the Defendant to this cause of action. (FAC ¶ 128.) They are as follows: a. Failing to address hazardous gas leaks and exposure risks; b. Allowing infestations of vermin and pests to persist; c. Neglecting to remedy mold, mildew, and extensive water damage; d. Failing to replace essential safety features, such as the fireplace pilot exchanger; e. Providing inadequate heating and improper ventilation; f. Ignoring ongoing plumbing issues and unsafe or unsanitary common areas; g. Failing to maintain the safety and security of the Plaintiff's designated parking space, resulting in vandalism of Plaintiff's vehicle. (FAC ¶ 128.) The Court does not find these allegations are specific to Plaintiffs nuisance claim, particularly in light of the allegations in the cause of action for Negligence. In that cause of action Plaintiff alleges the Defendant negligently allow the following conditions: (1) mold and/or mildew; (2) water damage; (3) lack of effective waterproofing and weather protection; (4) lack of or decrease in unit services; (5) failure to timely replace the fireplace pilot exchanger; (6) inadequate heating devices; (7) gas exposure; (8) improper ventilation; (9) outgrown vegetation and unkept landscaping; and (10) inoperable central air condition, rendering the Subject Property substandard and untenantable as alleged herein. (FAC ¶ 143.) The Court notes that the vast majority of the conditions resulting from Defendants alleged negligence overlap with those resulting from Defendants alleged intentional behavior. All of the allegations in FAC paragraph 128 are attributable to either intentional acts or negligence and none of the allegations are accompanied by specific facts indicating intentional behavior. Further, to the extent that Plaintiffs negligence action does not explicitly mention the parking situation, the Court notes the FAC contains no allegations that this situation arose from Defendants intentional actions. Plaintiff merely alleges that he complained of the parking situation and Defendants response was markedly deficient. (FAC ¶ 31.) The Court finds the additional allegations upon amendment are insufficient to set Plaintiffs claim of Private Nuisance apart from his claim of Negligence. As Plaintiff has had previous opportunity to allege additional facts speaking specifically to nuisance and has failed to do so, the Court finds it improbable that further amendment would cure this deficiency. Accordingly, the demurrer to the cause of action for Private Nuisance is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Ninth COA IIED Sustained with Leave to Amend The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendants outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. ( Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, [citation and ellipses omitted].) The Court previously sustained the demurrer to this cause of action, finding Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled intentional conduct. Specifically, the Court focused on the Defendants alleged refusal to remediate, given that courts have preciously found IIED claims proper in situations where a landlord has outright refused to remediate habitability issues. ( Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057.) The Court found that the facts alleged in the Complaint did not indicate a complete refusal to remediate. Plaintiff alleged he emailed about various conditions on October 20, 2021, July 14, 2022, August 26, 2022, April 12, 2023, and April 13, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 41.) At the same time, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants responses have been inconsistent and inadequate, allowing the infestation and unsanitary conditions to persist. (Compl. ¶ 52.) The Court found this latter allegation indicated that some remediation had taken place but that it was insufficient to remedy Plaintiffs concerns. The Court notes that such insufficient response was not akin to an intentional refusal to remediate. Upon amendment Plaintiff has removed the above referenced allegation that Defendants response was inconsistent and inadequate. Instead, Plaintiff now pleads that, &[d]espite Plaintiffs continual appeals regarding the aforementioned infestations and substandard conditions within the subject property, Defendants have completely ignored each of these requests& (FAC ¶ 54.) First the Court notes that there are no specific allegations as to which requests have been responded to and which have been ignored. From Plaintiffs FAC it is clear that he has complained on multiple occasions to Defendants about various conditions at the Subject Property. (See FAC ¶ 24, 45, 188.) Regardless, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendants were not responsive to an email in early April (FAC ¶ 45) and an email on April 27, 2023 (FAC ¶ 47.) This leaves the prior year and half of complaints, including emails specifically identified in paragraph 24, unaccounted for. Further, there is a complete lack of particularity in identifying the subject of these complaints. It appears from Plaintiffs FAC that his complaints regarding the parking situation received some sort of response, as he alleges that Defendants response was markedly deficient. (FAC ¶ 29.) This indicates that Defendants were responding at least in some capacity to some of Plaintiffs complaints. Further, Plaintiffs allegations that Defendants were unresponsive to the April emails is equally indicative of negligence as it is intentional behavior. If Plaintiff wishes to state a claim for IIED based on Defendants intentional refusal to remediate, it is incumbent upon him to allege facts showing such refusal occurred. Lastly, Plaintiffs substituting of inconsistent and inadequate for the allegation that he was completely ignored does little to assuage concerns regarding the sham pleading doctrine. The sham pleading doctrine generally prohibits a plaintiff from amending a complaint to omit harmful allegations from prior pleadings, without explanation. ( Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.) Under the sham pleading doctrine, [a] plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict facts pleaded in the original complaint, or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false. ( Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877-878.) Here, Plaintiff has added no allegations which explain his previous contention that Defendants response was inadequate rather than an outright refusal to remediate. Plaintiffs amendment is not so much an addition of facts as a substituting of language. Despite the above, the Court finds the FAC contains sufficient information such that the Court believes sufficient facts can be pled to support the claim if they exist. Although Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently articulate these as of yet, it remains possible he could do so. Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike Defendants seek to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages and all references to Defendants conduct as malicious oppressive despicable or outrageous. (See FAC ¶¶ 93, 99, 100, 101, 115, 167, 1280 182.) The Court notes that Plaintiffs punitive damages claims are, at least in part, derived from the IIED cause of action. Given the Court has sustained the demurrer to that cause of action with leave to amend, Defendants motion strike punitive damages is MOOT. --- RULING : In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER Hami Golbar, Fred Golbar, and Gol 5 Properties, LLC s Demurrer and Motion to Strike came on regularly for hearing on July 26, 2024 with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE DEMURRER TO THE SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. THE DEMURRER TO THE NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS MOOT. CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE SET FOR AUGUST 27, 2024 IS ADVANCED AND CONTINUED ON THE COURTS MOTION TO NOVEMBER 12, 2024 AT 9:00 AM UNLESS ALL PARTIES WAIVE NOTICE, DEFENDANT GOL 5 TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

Case Number: 22STCV36344 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-29-24 Case # 22STCV36344 Trial Date: 11-12-24 c/f 10-21-24 c/f 8and rour-19-24 c/f 7-22-24 c/f 6-3-24 FURTHER DOCUMENTS/ADMISSIONS/SPECIAL INTERROGATIRES MOVING PARTY: Defendant, 1016 Industries RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Giavanna Papasavvas RELIEF REQUESTED Motions to Compel Further Responses SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff VAV Plastics, Inc. manufactures plastic bottles. Plaintiff also offers custom design services. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Arminak Solutions dba KBL Cosmetics was a customer. Between August 3, 2020 and October 22, 2020, Defendant ordered $2,540,000 in manufactured products. The order also required the development of special molds, plus pallets for delivery, which Plaintiff alleges was separately invoiced for $11,000 and $1,036 ($12,306 total). Plaintiff alleges most of the product ordered has been delivered, but Defendant refuse to take the remaining portion of the order and ordered the cessation of future production. Plaintiff alleges a remaining balance due of $4342,540.21. Finally, Plaintiff also alleges an entitlement to reimbursement for special equipment acquisitions totaling $54,337.91. The total sum for the bottles, molds and pallets, and equipment amounts to $408,914.12. On February 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed its complaint for Breach of Oral Contract, and Common Counts. On June 4, 2020, Defendant answered and filed a cross-complaint for Breach of Contract, Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Declaratory Relief, Breach of Express Warranty, Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. On August 2, 2021, Cross-Complainants filed a first amended cross-complaint for Breach of Contract, Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Declaratory Relief, Breach of Express Warranty, Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage RULING : OSC re: Discovery Referee. Defendant, 1016 Industries scheduled four concurrent motions to compel further responses. While the court specially set the subject motions, it appears the parties continue to file more and more motions to compel further responses even well after the trial date, and ask the court to adjust the parties latest developments, including the latest rejected stipulation. A review of the history of the parties discovery disagreements shows multiple previously filed motions, ongoing disputes, and at least four prior trial continuances, at least in part, presumably due to said discovery disputes. The court favors robust discovery thereby allowing the best prosecution and defense during the adjudication of all actions presented. The court however also declines to schedule Independent Discovery Conferences due to an already impacted calendar. Any and all law disputes must be addressed by law and motion with applicable new motion limits instituted. Given the reviewed history of the disputes, and voluminous and complexity level of the disputes, the Court hereby sets this matter for an OSC re referral to a discovery referee. When the court in any pending action determines that it is necessary for the court to appoint a referee to hear and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to discovery in the action and to report findings and make a recommendation thereon. (Code Civ. Proc., § 639, subd. (a)(5).) Appointment requires a court finding of exceptional circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 639, subd. (d)(2).) Absent agreement of all parties, courts may not make blanket referrals, except in the unusual case where a majority of factors favor reference, including: (1) there are multiple issues to be resolved; (2) there are multiple motions to be heard simultaneously; (3) the present motion is only one in a continuum of many; (4) the number of documents to be reviewed (especially in issues based on assertions of privilege) make the inquiry inordinately time-consuming. ( Taggares v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 94, 105.) Where one or more of the above factors unduly impact the courts time and/or limited resources, the court is clearly within its discretion to make an appropriate reference. (Id. at 106.) Again, the court understands the prior use and perhaps reliance on the IDC system. The court also faces impacts from the recent ransomware attack and ongoing impacted calendars preceding the operations shut down now further exacerbating the situation. The court is also mindful of the November 12, 2024, trial date. The court therefore sets an OSC re: Discovery Referee for August 16, 2024 at 8:30 a.m., with the purpose of allowing the parties to consider their options while still allowing for potential appointment well before the trial date. If the parties wish to stipulate in advance of the hearing, the court invites such an agreement. The parties may consider criteria such as costs of the respective referee, allocation of costs for any discovery involving third parties, authority to award sanctions and/or attorneys by the referee, availability, etc. The court can and has set expedited referee referrals in the past, and therefore strongly encourages the parties to check availability. The court will also accelerate the referee report review in order to facilitate resolution of the claims. If the parties refuse to stipulate, the parties may submit any opposition to the appointment no later than nine (9) court days before the August 16, 2024 hearing datedue date of August 5, 2024. Any briefs shall be no more than five (5) pages of points and authorities, plus any declarations. The court will issue a tentative ruling following a review of the briefs, if applicable. The four motions are placed off-calendar pending the OSC and subject to either presentation before the referee or reset on the court calendar. Defendant to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV24766 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: David Oday, et al. v. 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV24766 MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOVING PARTY : Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiffs David Oday and Lakota Patrick Ford CASE HISTORY : · 10/11/23: Complaint filed. · 01/10/24: First Amended Complaint filed. · 03/01/24: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a breach of contract and habitability defect action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to replace the roof of Plaintiffs condominium, causing extensive water damage and mold throughout the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly issued special assessments in violation of the operative covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the property, and retaliated against Plaintiffs for raising these issues. Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as Plaintiff David Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). DISCUSSION: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states: In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 533.) Modification of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case. ( Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.) The party seeking modification has the burden of proving that the request is justified. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) Analysis Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to post the undertaking of $70,416.09 ordered by the Court. (See February 22, 2024 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs, in opposition, state that payment in the amount specified by the Courts order was deposited with the Court on June 26, 2024, with notice given to Defendant the next day. (Declaration of Scott J. Kalter ISO Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs deposit of the funds to the Court is effective as a posting of a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710, but only if the deposit is accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.710(c).) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not executed such an agreement, and, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved. The Court concurs with Defendant that an authorization to dispose of the funds to satisfy liability is required for Plaintiffs deposit to be considered posting of the bond under section 995.710. In response to the Courts prior tentative ruling, Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has submitted an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED given that Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Moving party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 22STCV04747 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Jane Doe filed this action against Defendants, LBUSD and Thomas Maggio for damages arising out of childhood sexual abuse. 2. Motion to Stay Proceedings a. Legal Standard Any party may file a motion for an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.5 staying the proceedings in any action being considered for, or affecting an action being considered for, coordination, or the court may stay the proceedings on its own motion. The motion for a stay may be included with a petition for coordination or may be served and submitted to the Chair of the Judicial Council and the coordination motion judge by any party at any time prior to the determination of the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.515.) b. Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 451, 452, subds. (d) and (h), 453, Defendants request for judicial notice is granted as to Exhibits B-G. Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 is also granted. c. Analysis Defendant moves to stay the trial because (1) there are two pending writs before two different appellate courts to decide the constitutionality of California Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218) and (2) Defendant wants to be able to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations without fear that its relevant Board will violate the law to authorize payments for any settlement agreement. To elaborate, AB 218 authorized a three-year window beginning in January 1, 2020 that allowed claims of childhood sexual assault to be brought regardless of how long the abuse allegedly occurred. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340.1, subd. (q).) AB 218 amended Government Code § 905 to retroactively strip statutory governmental immunities for public entities which violates Article XVI section 6 of the Constitution and its prohibition of gifts of public funds. Defendant states the first pending writ, West Contra Costa U.S.D. v. Superior Court (First Appellate District Case No. A16934), wherein the parties are awaiting the requested oral arguments and have submitted their respective briefs. In the second pending writ, Roe # 2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707), the court requested an informal response to the filed writ, granting the school district until May 17, 2024 to file an informal reply to the response. In exercising its discretion [regarding stay] . . . the court should consider the importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed solely to harass an adverse party, and of avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions . . . [and] whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advanced. (Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215.) First, Defendant argues that like Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800, 807-808 wherein a stay of a state court action involving the obligation to pay attorneys fees was justified because a broad action involving RICO was pending in federal court that would govern that case and other cases involving such fee obligations, here this case should be set aside because one or both of the two pending appellate writ proceedings could resolve the issue as to AB 218s unconstitutionality. Defendant further explains that staying this case is the only way to ensure the case will not conflict with the decisions reached in the two pending Appellate Court cases. Next, Defendant also asserts staying the action will not prejudice Plaintiffs rights because Plaintiff waited 25 years to file the lawsuit and any stay would toll the time within which Plaintiff is required to bring the case to trial. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) In opposition, Plaintiff responds that (1) no legal support exists to mandate a stay in similar contexts and (2) staying the action would prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff notes that the First District has issued a tentative ruling agreeing that these actions are not barred by the Constitutional limitation argued by Defendant, and contends the appellate court will likely adopt that ruling as final after arguments on 7/18/24. Plaintiff notes that the Second District has summarily denied similar writ petitions. Plaintiff notes that, in the event the different courts of appeal split, this case will be in the same procedural posture it is in now. Plaintiff also notes that the issue will likely go to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the courts of appeal split, and this could take years. Pursuant to Nken v. Holder (2009) 556 U.S. 418, 426, when considering whether to impose a stay, the Court must consider several factors. Those factors are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. (Id., at p. 434.) Once an applicant satisfies the first two factors, the traditional stay inquiry calls for assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest. The Court wishes to hear from the parties at the hearing concerning the outcome of the 7/18/24 oral arguments. Specifically, the Court wishes to know whether the First District issued a ruling. Regardless, the Court is not inclined to grant the motion. Granting the instant motion would prejudice Plaintiff. Defendant has not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits. There is no guarantee that the decisions made by the Court of Appeals in the pending writs would create a definitive ruling on the issue as it could always be further appealed to the Supreme Court, potentially taking years to resolve. The Court notes that the vast majority of trial courts have held against the District on this argument, and this trial court has consistently held against the District on this issue. The motion is therefore denied. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 24STCV01536 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Case Name: Blaine Gregory Roque, et al. v. Knight Claremont, Inc., et al. Case No.: 24STCV01536 Motion: Motion to Compel Arbitration Moving Party: Defendant Knight Claremont Inc. Responding Party: Plaintiffs Blaine Gregory Roque, Michael Alexander Luna, Sean Michael Henderson Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. This is a wrongful termination action. Plaintiffs Blaine Gregory Roque (Roque), Michael Alexander Luna (Luna), and Sean Michael Henderson (Henderson) (collectively, Plaintiffs) initiated this action against Defendants Knight Claremont, Inc. and Knight Automotive Group, LLC, alleging the following causes of action: (1) whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5; (2) negligent supervision and retention; (3) breach of express oral contract not to terminate without good cause; (4) breach of implied-in-fact contract not to terminate employment without good cause; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. On March 26, 2024, Defendant Knight Claremont Inc. filed its answer to the Complaint. On June 12, 2024, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Defendant Knight Automotive Group, LLC without prejudice. On June 14, 2024, Defendant Knight Claremont Inc. (hereinafter, Defendant) filed a motion to compel arbitration. Thereafter, on June 17, 2024, Defendant filed an amended motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 2, and Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1281.2 and 1281.4 on the ground that Plaintiffs entered into valid and enforceable arbitration agreements in connection with their employment with Defendant. Defendants further request the current action to be stayed during the pendency of arbitration. Legal Standard California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, the party opposing the petition then bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to demonstrate that there should be no enforcement of the agreement, and the trial court sits as a trier of fact to reach a final determination on the issue. ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The Court is empowered by Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 to compel parties to arbitrate disputes pursuant to an agreement to do so. The party petitioning to compel arbitration under written arbitration agreement bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing the petition must meet the same evidentiary burden to prove any facts necessary to its defense. The trial court acts as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Provencio v. WMA Securities, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1031.) Discussion A. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement Under the California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. ( Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.) With respect to the moving party's burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court. ( Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.) Here, the Court finds that Defendant has satisfied its initial burden by submitting evidence that Plaintiffs each signed separate arbitration agreements in connection with their employment with Defendant. As to Plaintiff Roque, Defendant has shown that he signed two separate arbitration agreements. Plaintiff Roque first signed an arbitration agreement on September 16, 2022, along with other employment documents. (David. Decl. ¶¶ 23-26, Exh. 1-2.) Notably, even though this agreement contained an opt-out provision, Plaintiff Roque made no attempt to exercise this option. ( Id. at ¶¶ 27-30.) Thereafter, Plaintiff Roque electronically signed a second arbitration agreement on February 3, 2023 via HRHotlink.com. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 18-21, 33-34; Exh. 4.) This agreement also included an opt-out provision that specified the methods in which an employee can exercise this option. Again, however, Plaintiff Roque did not elect to opt out of arbitration. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 35-37; Benbow Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. 16.) With regard to Plaintiff Luna, Defendant has shown that he electronically signed two separate arbitration agreements. Plaintiff Luna first signed an arbitration agreement on November 17, 2022 as part of the application process. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 8-12, 40,48; Exhs. 7, 9.) Plaintiff Luna also signed a separate arbitration agreement on November 23, 2022. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 39, 41-42; Exh. 5-6.) On October 4, 2022, Plaintiff Henderson, as part of the application process, electronically signed an arbitration agreement. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 6-13, 53-54, 56; Exhs. 10-12.) Defendant submitted the declaration of Brandy Davis, who explained the safety precautions associated with using HRHotlink.com in order to ensure the authenticity of the signatures collected. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 8, 20.) Namely, employees are required to use their own unique email address and password to access the website before being directed to the documents that need to be signed. The employees email address must be verified first before proceeding with the process. Thus, Defendant has authenticated the electronic signatures of the each Plaintiff. (See Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062 [discussing how an electronic signature is properly authenticated].) Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden to show that there are arbitration agreements that exist between Defendant and each Plaintiff. Furthermore, as indicated in the aforementioned agreements, the FAA is the governing law. ( Ibid. ) In opposition, Plaintiffs contest the validity of certain agreements. Plaintiff Roque argues that he signed the September 16, 2022 arbitration agreement under duress because the human resource manager, Stephen Miarecki, stated that Plaintiff Roque could not be paid until he signed all of the onboarding documents. (Roque Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff Roque further attests that Mr. Miarecki stated that he could not take the documents to look them over. Economic duress occurs when a party is induced by an act so coercive as to cause a reasonably prudent person faced with such act to have no reasonable alternative and agree to an unfavorable contract regardless of its terms. ( Tarpy v. County of San Diego (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 267, 277.) Economic duress applies only when one party does a wrongful act that is sufficiently coercive that a reasonably prudent person would feel there is no alternative and agree to the contract. ( CrossTalk Productions, Inc. v. Jacobsen (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 631, 644; Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1158.) Based on Plaintiff Roques declaration, the Court concludes that the signature procured on September 16, 2022 was not the result of economic duress. Mr. Miareckis statements do not suggest that Plaintiff Roque could not have reviewed the documents when they were presented to him. Thus, a reasonably prudent person would not have felt they had no alternative but to agree to the arbitration agreement. After all, Plaintiffs failure to take measures to learn the contents of the document [he] signed is attributable to [his] own negligence. ( Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 431.) In any case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff signed a subsequent arbitration agreement on February 3, 2023. As to this agreement, Plaintiff Roque contends that he opted out of the arbitration agreement signed on February 3, 2023 because he had submitted a letter opting out with Diane Agapay, a human resource employee. (Roque Decl. ¶ 12, Exh. 3.) However, this method did not comply with the opt out procedure set out within the arbitration agreement. In it, it states that an employee must provide notice of opting out of the arbitration agreement by either (1) personally delivering a letter to the Human Resource manager, or (2) sending an email to smiarecki@sunriseford.com. (Davis Decl., Exh. 4 at pg. 2.) The evidence submitted by Plaintiffs does not suggest that Ms. Agapay is a Human Resource manager, and there is no evidence to show that Plaintiff Roque provided notice to Mr. Miarecki via email. Therefore, an agreement to arbitrate exists between Plaintiff Roque and Defendant. Plaintiffs Henderson and Luna deny signing their respective arbitration agreement on October 19, 2022 and November 23, 2022. (Henderson Decl. ¶ 8; Luna Decl. ¶ 8.) Athough these plaintiffs do not recall electronically signing an arbitration agreement that was presented to them during the application process (Henderson Decl. ¶ 6, Luna Decl. ¶ 6), Defendant has authenticated these signatures. Therefore, an agreement to arbitrate exists between these plaintiffs and Defendant. Accordingly, the Court shall next address whether these arbitration agreements are unconscionable. B. Unconscionability Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is substantively and procedurally unconscionable. (Opposition at pp. pp. 6-11.) An agreement is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. ( OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910.) But procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present in the same degree. ( OTO , supra , 8 Cal.5th at 125.) Courts use a sliding scale approachthe more substantively unconscionable the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. ( Armendariz v. Found Health Psychcare Servs., Inc . (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) Under general contract principles, unconscionability has both a procedural and substantive element, with the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, and the latter focusing on overly harsh or one-sided rules ( Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract on the basis of unconscionability. ( Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc . (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.) i. Procedural Unconscionability Procedural unconscionability pertains to the making of the agreement; it focuses on the oppression that arises from unequal bargaining power and the surprise to the weaker party that results from hidden terms or the lack of informed choice. ( Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 795.) Arbitration clauses are often found in adhesion contracts (standardized contracts drafted by a party of superior bargaining power and presented to the weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis). (See, e.g., Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at 113-114.) Here, Plaintiffs first argue that the arbitration agreements is procedurally unconscionable because it is an adhesion contract. (Opposition at pp. 7-8.) The mere fact an adhesion contract is involved does not per se render the arbitration provision unenforceable because such contracts are an inevitable fact of life for all citizensbusinessman and consumer alike. ( Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. ¿(1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817.) Second, Plaintiffs argue that oppression was present because the parties are unsophisticated to understand the implications of the arbitration agreement as they were unfamiliar with the legal jargon used within those agreements. (Opposition at pg. 8; Roque Decl., ¶ 6, Henderson Decl. ¶ 6, Luna Decl. ¶ 6.) This argument is unpersuasive because Plaintiffs declarations do not set forth their respective educations and experience to suggest that they were truly unsophisticated parties. In any case, Plaintiffs failed to read the agreements before signing them. Third, Plaintiffs argue that they were never advised of the significance the arbitration agreements, and they were never provided a copy of the agreements once they were signed. (Opposition at pp. 8-9.) Defendant asserts that the arbitration agreements prominently explained that by agreeing the Plaintiffs gave up a right to a jury trial. Each Plaintiff was presented with an arbitration agreement along with several onboarding documents. Fourth, Plaintiffs contend there is evidence of surprise because the arbitration agreements were buried within other documents unrelated to arbitration and the agreements themselves are not conspicuously written. (Reply at pp. 9-10.) These arguments are only slightly persuasive. Surprise occurs where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form. ( Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 247.) As stated above, the arbitration agreements were included with several other documents. The text of the arbitration agreements is conspicuously written and easy to read. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that they were never provided with a copy of the arbitration rules, and the arbitration agreements that Plaintiffs Luna and Henderson signed were vague as to which rules are followed. (Reply at pg. 10; Roque Decl. ¶ 8, Henderson Decl. ¶ 9, Luna Decl. ¶ 11.) But the arbitration agreement that Roque signed states that the arbitration rules from JAMS would apply, and the agreement includes a link to find where these rules can be found. (Davis Decl. Exh. 4.) Thus, while the applicable rules were not provided, they were not artfully hidden from Plaintiff Roque. ( Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246.) Also, the failure to attach a copy of the arbitration rules is not in of itself an indication of procedural unconscionability. ( Lane v. Francis Cap. Mgmt, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 692.) With regard to Plaintiffs Luna and Henderson, the absence of arbitration rules does raise an issue. Other than stating that arbitration would be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act, these arbitration agreements fail to articulate the specific rules that would apply during arbitration or where to find them. Although the procedure for selecting the arbitrator is disclosed, the governing arbitration rules are not. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a slight degree of procedural unconscionability because the arbitration agreements are adhesion contracts and, as to Plaintiffs Luna and Henderson, a moderate degree of procedural unconscionability because the arbitration rules were not referenced or included. ii. Substantive Unconscionability Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether the terms create overly harsh or one-sided results as to shock the conscience. ( Suh v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1515; Sanchez, supra , 61 Cal.4th at 910-911 [an old-fashioned bad bargain or a contract term which merely gives one side a greater benefit insufficient].) Here, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreements have a high degree of substantive unconscionability for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreements are indefinite in scope and duration. (Opposition at pp. 9-13, relying on Cook v. University of Southern California, et al., (2024)102 Cal.App.5th 312.) As to the arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiffs Henderson and Luna, Plaintiff references the following language to show that the agreements are indefinite in duration and scope: Our agreement to arbitrate includes any and all claims which arise out of the employment context or any other interaction/relationship we had, have or may have in the future. (David. Decl. ¶¶ 50-51, 54, Exh. 9, 12 at ¶ 4.) Also, these arbitration agreements are intended to cover the Companys owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, partners, attorneys, sister companies&affiliated persons/entities, independent contractors& ( Ibid .) But Plaintiffs ignore language that defines what claims are covered by these arbitrations, all of which arise from the Plaintiffs employment with Defendant. Thus, in actuality, the arbitration agreements are limited in scope to claims that arise during or related to Plaintiffs employment. As to Plaintiff Roque, Plaintiffs contend that the following language is impermissibly overbroad: Employee and Dealership agree to resolve by final and binding arbitration any dispute, claim, or controversy, including but not limited to those related to Employees employment with or termination of employment by Dealership, its affiliated entities, or their respective officers, directors, employees, or agents. (David Decl. ¶ 34, Exh. 4 at ¶ 1.) This exact language has been found to be reasonable. ( Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1069-1070.) Therefore, there is no basis to substantiate the Plaintiff Roques argument that his arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionably on this ground. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable because it prevents them from engaging in collective action but allows Defendants to join other plaintiffs to the instant action. (Reply at pg. 13.) This argument is unpersuasive. There is no indication that Plaintiffs claims give rise to a class action or that other individuals could be joined in this action. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing that there is any degree of substantive unconscionability in the arbitration agreements that they executed. Accordingly, the Court declines to find that these agreements are unconscionable. Plaintiffs alternatively request the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306 in order to present extrinsic evidence and oral testimony before the Court. The Court finds no basis for this request; it is denied. Conclusion The motion to compel arbitration is granted.

Case Number: 24TRCV00170 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling ¿¿ ¿¿¿ HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 ¿¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00170 ¿¿¿ CASE NAME: Karin Friedman v. Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, et al. ¿ MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. ¿ RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Karin Friedman TRIAL DATE: Not Set. ¿¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, 3 rd cause of action for negligent hiring ¿¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ A. Factual ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff, Karin Friedman (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, Carellon Behavioral Health of CA, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Hiring. On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. The SAC is based on Plaintiffs allegation that on August 18, 2023, Plaintiff called Defendant, Carelon and spoke to a therapist regarding issues of depression and anxiety for forty-five minutes. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends that Carelon then emailed her on August 21, 2023 the information of two therapists, both of whom said they were a good match for her, and both of whom were men. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that she called back and asked for female therapists, and they said that none were available in her area. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Thus, Plaintiff indicates that she contacted Defendant Cavuoti to set up an initial meeting because he was the closest therapist to her location. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that a few days after, she spoke with Defendant Cavuoti to explain to him that she requires consistent therapy due to her psychological disorder of depression and anxiety (among other issues). (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further notes that she told him she was adopted and suffered abuse from her mother. (SAC, ¶ 10.) After informing him of this, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti stated he was also adopted, was the same age as her, and stated that they had a lot in common, and that he could not wait to meet her. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that on August 30, 2023, she had her first appointment with Defendant Cavuoti. During this initial appointment Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti spoke with her about his previous weekend in Vegas and brought the conversation back to himself when he informed Plaintiff about his own history of abuse. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends that she was upset by this information as she was also abused as a child. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff notes that the conversation continuously came back to Defendant Cavuoti, and she did not get a lot of time to speak with him about her own issues. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Cavuoti abruptly and stated, our time is over. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff notes that he then opened the door and said, I know I am not supposed to do this, and proceeded to hug her while pressing her close to him while making audible, strange noises which sounded like oh, oh. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that after she left, she had her partner pull over on the side of the road and she vomited. (SAC, ¶ 15.) As soon as she got home, Plaintiff notes she took a shower and called her psychiatrists office and told him what had happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also notes that she called Defendant Carelon and told them what happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Carelon apologized profusely and said they would send her more referrals, to which they subsequently sent five (5) women. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff notes that she proceeded to speak with her psychiatrist weekly due to the incident, who prescribed her mediation to address her nerves in the wake of the incident. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Subsequently, Plaintiff notes that she unintentionally left her files at Defendant Cavuotis office, and he forced her into further communications to retrieve her paperwork, which caused her additional stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. (Carelon) now files a demurrer to the SAC. B. Procedural¿ ¿¿ ¿¿ On June 14, 2024, Carelon filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 23, 2024, Carelon filed a reply brief. ¿ II. ANALYSIS ¿¿ A. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) B. Discussion Defendant Carelon demurs to Plaintiffs SAC on the grounds that it argues Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of An Independent Contractor fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. i. Meet and Confer Requirement The declaration of Kelsey A. Hill is offered in support of Carelons counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Hill declares that on April 2, 2024, she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying the defects in the FAC and asking to meet and confer. (Declaration of Kelsey A. Hill (Hill Decl.), ¶ 2.) On April 10, 2024, Hill indicates that she and her colleague, Junga Kim, met and conferred with Plaintiffs counsel and that subsequently, the FAC was amended. On June 6, 2024, Hill indicates that she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying and outlining the legal arguments and bases of Carelons anticipated demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC and asking Hill to meet and confer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 7.) Hill asserts that after receiving no response to her initial email, she sent a follow-up email to Plaintiffs counsel on June 10, 2024, after which Hill and Plaintiffs counsel exchanged emails regarding the anticipated demurrer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 9.) Hill further notes that in her June 13, 2024 email, she explained that Carelons demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC is based on the same grounds as previously articulated with respect to the FAC. (Hill Decl., ¶ 10.) However, despite efforts, Hill notes that the parties were unable to reach an agreement resolving the objections. (Hill Decl., ¶ 11.) Thus, this Court finds that the parties have met and conferred in good faith prior to filing the demurrer, and the meet and confer requirements have been met. ii. Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor Carelon argues that Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor fails as a matter of law. Carelon argues that Plaintiffs cause of action is defective for three reasons: (1) first, Plaintiff fails to plead that at the time of hiring or prior to , Carelon knew or should have known Defendant Cavuoti presented an undue risk of the particular harm to which Plaintiff was allegedly exposed; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that Carelon owed her any duty of care in selecting (and recommending and referring) Cavuoti as a potential therapist; and (3) even if Carelon owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, she has not alleged that Carelon breached that duty by selecting Defendant Cavuoti as a participating provide, or that any such breach was a substantial factor in causing her injury. Generally, a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or its employees. ( American States Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 18, 28.) However, [o]ver time, the courts have, for policy reasons, created so many exceptions to this general rule of nonliability that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions. ( Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 693.) One of these exceptions is referred to as the peculiar risk doctrine. ( Ibid .) California recognizes a cause of action that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. ( Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054, citing Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836.) The basis for such a claim is that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. ( Capital Cities , supra , at p. 1054; Evan F ., supra, at pp. 836-837.) In Capital Cities , the Second District determined that the demurrer to the plaintiffs pleading was properly sustained because of a lack of specific factual allegations that the casting director, who allegedly drugged, beat, and then facilitated the gang rape of the aspiring actor, was previously known by the employer to act in such a fashion. Plaintiff there had only alleged that the employer knew that the casting director used his position to gain sexual favors, that the director personally used drugs, and that the use of a casting couch is common in the entertainment industry. From Capital Cities the Court finds that when a claim such as negligent hiring or negligent selection of an independent contractor is asserted, greater specificity in pleading the prior knowledge of the employer or hirer is required. In the Second Districts analysis of the demurrer there, the panel stated: knowledge that [casting director] Marshall used his position of authority to extract or to coerce sexual favors is not knowledge that he would first drug and then attack a potential employee. ( Capital Cities, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10541055.) Applying that reasoning here, plaintiff would need to allege that Carelon knew or should have known from some prior incident, screening process, a prior claim, or otherwise that Cavuoti would discuss his own personal history of childhood abuse with a new patient, that he would make veiled romantic overtures to female therapy patients, and that he would hug, embrace, or make inappropriate physical contact with therapy patients. No allegatison of those sort are contained in the SAC. Carelon cites to CACI No. 426 (Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention of Employee), noting that in order to sufficiently state a claim for negligent selection of an independent contractor, a plaintiff must show among other things that the hiring defendant knew or should have known that the contractor was unfit or incompetent and that the contractors unfitness or incompetence created a particular risk of harm to other people. ( See CACI No. 426 element 2.) While Plaintiff has alleged each element of CACI 426 in conclusory fashion, more factual detail is required. For example, was Carelon aware of inappropriate behavior of Defendant Cavuoti prior to hiring him? Did other patients of Defendant Cavuoti make similar complaints to Defendant Carelon prior to him being recommended as a therapist to Plaintiff? Without more detailed facts and allegations, Plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. As such, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer with leave to amend. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Carelons demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Carelon is ordered to give notice.

Case Number: 23STCV11783 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT FLORIDALMA AGUSTIN, et al. , Plaintiffs, vs. GARY GILLMAN, et al. , Defendants. CASE NO.: 23STCV11783 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PETITIONS FOR APPROVAL OF COMPROMISE OF CLAIM OR ACTION OF DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS OF JUDGMENT FOR MINOR Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Floridalma Agustin (Petitioner) The Court has considered the moving papers. No opposition papers were filed. Any opposition papers were required to have been filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 1005, subdivision (b). BACKGROUND Petitioner, individually and as guardian ad litem for minor claimants Kayro Jehiel Carranza-Agustin (10); Loida Jocabed Carranza (8); and Elimelec Aliel Carranza-Agustin (4) (collectively, Minor Claimants), and Plaintiff Hugo Adolfo Carranza (collectively Plaintiffs), initiated this action against Defendants Gary Gillman; Debbie Gillman; and Encino Management Services (collectively, Defendants). This action arises out of a landlord/tenant relationship. The complaint alleges: (1) breach of warranty of habitability; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) negligence; and (4) breach of contract. Petitioner filed the instant petitions to approve the compromise of disputed claim on behalf of Minor Claimants (collectively, the Petitions). DISCUSSION If an action is pending and settlement is effected prior to trial, the minors compromise must be approved by the court. (CCP § 372.) A petition to approve a minors compromise is governed by California Rules of Court (CRC) , rules 7.950, et seq . and Probate Code sections 3500 and 3600 et seq . The trial court is authorized to approve and allow payment of reasonable expenses, costs, and attorney fees in an action concerning the compromise of a minors claim. (Prob. Code, § 3601, subd. (a); Curtis v. Estate of Fagan (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 270, 277-79; see also CCP § 373.5.) Attorneys Fees Unless the court has approved the fee agreement in advance, the court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor or a person with a disability. (CRC, r. 7.955(a).) The court must give consideration to the terms of the agreement between the attorney and minors representative and must evaluate the agreement based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was made. (CRC, r. 7.955(a)(2).) CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) sets out nonexclusive factors the court may consider in determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees in connection with a petition for minors compromise. Under CRC Rule 7.955(c), the petition must include a declaration by the attorney addressing the factors set forth in CRC Rule 7.955(b)(2) that are applicable to the matter that is before the Court. Here, the Minor Claimants, by and through Petitioner, their guardian ad litem, have agreed to settle their claims against Defendants in exchange for $5,000 each. Upon approval, $1,250 of each settlement payment will be allocated towards attorneys fees, and $725.61 will be used to reimburse the fees and costs advanced by Plaintiffs' counsel, leaving a balance of $3,024.39 to be disbursed to Petitioner for each minor claimant. The Court finds that the settlement is fair and reasonable. Further, the Court considers the requested amount in attorneys fees, which amounts to 25% of each settlement payment, to be fair and reasonable. For these reasons and because they are unopposed, the Court provisionally GRANTS the Petitions, conditioned on Petitioner appearing (either remotely or in person) at the hearing. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 29th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court