Adverse Possession Claims in California

“If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020(b); Code Civ. Proc., §§ 321-325 [adverse possession statutes].)“[T]he requirements of adverse possession are rigid, precise and must be construed in favor of the person sought to be dispossessed.” (Finely v. Yuba County Water Dist. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 691, 697.)

“If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020(b); Code Civ. Proc., §§ 321-325 [adverse possession statutes].)“[T]he requirements of adverse possession are rigid, precise and must be construed in favor of the person sought to be dispossessed.” (Finely v. Yuba County Water Dist. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 691, 697.)

Defendant contends that CCP § 326 applies because there was a landlord/tenant relationship and that the five year adverse possession element did not begin to run until five years after Plaintiffs’ last rent payment. Plaintiffs stopped paying rent in August 2014. Therefore, the timing for adverse possession did not begin to run until five years after that, which was August 2019. Five years after August 2019 would complete the timing element for adverse possession, or August 2024.

Unlike a “claim of right” adverse possession claim, which can be based on a deliberately wrongful claim of right, one based upon “color of title” must be based upon some sort of written conveyance attempt, which is defective for some reason. Safwenberg v. Marquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 301, 309. A “color of title” adverse possession claim also requires good faith reliance upon it by the party claiming adverse possession. Estate of Williams (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 141, 147.

Defendants GG&C 1, LLC, and David Adams submit a demurrer to the eighth and eleventh causes of action in the second amended complaint for quiet title and adverse possession. Defendants challenge the lack of a specified basis for the quiet title claim---legal or equity. To the extent Plaintiff relies on the adverse possession claim, Defendants challenge the later alleged cause of action in that the quiet title claim in no way incorporates said adverse possession claim.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Adverse Possession Claims Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, is GRANTED.

s Adverse Possession defense Plaintiffs' UMFs (1-5) are established as stated. Defendant Dansk's additional UMFs (6-8) are unopposed but immaterial. Grant Plaintiffs Harch and RPJ's Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Defendant Dansk Investment Group, Inc.'s Adverse Possession defense on the ground that adverse possession has no application to the causes of action in the First Amended Complaint because fee simple title is not at issue in this case. (Swartzbaugh v. Sampson (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 451, 462.)

Based upon the documents judicially noticed, adverse possession in not an appropriate cause of action for this situation. The demurrers are sustained without leave to amend.

Mere occupation, payment of taxes or mortgage, and other acts that might establish adverse possession by a person who is not a tenant in common are, absent an ouster, not sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether title has passed by adverse possession.

While Plaintiff alleges the elements of adverse possession, Plaintiff does not allege any material factual allegations to support her claim. Plaintiff alleges that she has been in possession and has paid all taxes “during the 5-year period.” However, Plaintiff alleges that she has been in possession of the Property since 1992.

The FAC, however, does not state sufficient specific facts constituting the alleged adverse possession and only sets forth the elements for adverse possession in a conclusory manner.

Plaintiffs claim is based on adverse possession. Defendant has a deed. Defendant demurs. There are a lot of bases for the demurrer, but only one need be addressed. The Civil Code allows a claim of adverse possession to be made only under certain conditions. One condition is that the party claiming adverse possession have timely paid the property taxes for five years. And that will destroy plaintiffs claim here.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

The court notes that the Petition states “the court case for adverse possession does not meet all the qualifications according to the law, as set forth.” That statement is vague and requires further clarification. It appears that Petitioner is asking the court to rule on whether a claim for adverse possession is valid.

Here it is clear to the court that plaintiffs seek to quiet title and for a declaration of their rights based on their claim of adverse possession. The court will overrule the demurrer to the entire complaint on the ground of uncertainty. Quiet Title: Vanyo claims that an action for quiet title does not raise a claim for adverse possession. But the Supreme Court has rejected this contention.

Upon a review of the FAC (which the court notes has made but minor, superficial changes), the court finds Plaintiff has again failed to specifically plead adverse possession. If adverse possession is specially pleaded, the elements constituting such adverse possession must be alleged. (See CCP section 7 61.020 subd. (b) [If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.] (emphasis and underline added).

Failure to pay taxes when assessed in any one year of the five years of adverse possession defeats the claim for adverse possession. (Southern Land Co. v. McKenna (1929) 100 Cal.App.152, 157-158.) It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that taxes were paid on time. (See Gilardi v. Hallan (1981) 30 Cal.3d 317, 326.) Mr. Madyun’s statements at trial and the tax records attached to his motion confirm that he cannot carry this burden.

Otay's claim to quiet title through adverse possession does not arise from the 1998 purchase agreement or some other contract. Otay's adverse possession claim does not relate to any 'breach' of the 1998 purchase agreement. Accordingly, the prayer for attorney's fees should be stricken." [Reply, Motion to Strike, 6:21-7:1] THEREFORE, the motion for an award of attorney fees is DENIED.

CAUSES OF ACTION: from Plaintiff’s Complaint, 1) Quiet Title and Adverse Possession 2) Declaratory Relief 3) Injunctive Relief SUMMARY OF FACTS: Initially, on January 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint against defendants Alan Luong Lam and Yanshan Chen Lam (collectively, "Defendants") alleging Quiet Title and Adverse Possession, Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint").

These allegations are sufficient to assert title by adverse possession. Cody’s allegations of abandonment are inconsequential. In considering the doctrine of adverse possession in this factual context, the Court considered whether a co-tenant could ever take hostile possession of a property as against another co-tenant in order to satisfy all the elements necessary for adverse possession. The answer is yes; adverse possession is possible between co-tenants. See, Hunter v. Schultz (1966) 240 C.A.2d 24.

The failure to pay the taxes assessed in any one year defeats a claim premised on adverse possession. Southern Land Co. v. McKenna (1929) 100 Cal. App. 152, 158. The judicially noticed and certified County records demonstrate Plaintiff cannot satisfy the adverse possession element requiring the payment of property taxes. This ruling is made without leave to amend the pleading unless Plaintiff appears at the hearing and is able to articulate the ability to state a cognizable claim.

Based on this evidence and precedent, counsel now believes his client has a claim for adverse possession. Trial is a month away. If the motion is granted, it would require continuing the trial to allow C-H to challenge the new allegations (via demurrer, motion for summary adjudication, etc.) and conduct discovery. In the four and a half years since this case was filed, counsel had opportunity to investigate the issue of property tax payment/adverse possession.

However, this is insufficient to allege a claim for adverse possession against a co-tenant in title. Where a claim of ownership is by adverse possession against a cotenant, mere possession alone cannot establish adverse possession because each tenant has a right to occupy the whole of the property, and hence a tenant in exclusive possession is not doing so adversely to the other. (Preciado v. Wilde, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at 325.)

However, this is insufficient to allege a claim for adverse possession against a co-tenant in title. Where a claim of ownership is by adverse possession against a cotenant, mere possession alone cannot establish adverse possession because each tenant has a right to occupy the whole of the property, and hence a tenant in exclusive possession is not doing so adversely to the other. (Preciado v.

Adverse Possession “In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provision of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have timely paid all state, county, or municipal taxes

There are no clear allegations that the Chase claims are subject to adverse possession. Defendants argue this is insufficient to support a claim of adverse possession, as it is settled that a mortgagor does not hold an adverse claim to title for purposes of adverse possession. Both sides rely on Harvey v.

They allege they are owners of the Property by virtue of adverse possession. They claim they have exclusively possessed and used the Property (which are located below their unit) for more than 20 years. Their cross complaint alleges claims for adverse possession, prescriptive easement and declaratory relief. Defendant Casa Gateway has cross-claimed against Moe Defendants.

Plaintiff also fails to submit adequate evidence to support his allegation that he acquired title via adverse possession. (Complaint, ¶16.)

.: BC607078 Hearing Date: April 5, 2017 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BACKGROUND This is an adverse possession action arising out of real property located in Los Angeles (“Property”). Plaintiff Rosemary Thompson (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she obtained the Property by will, and has been in possession of the Property since January 1, 1992.

The Court of Appeal in Viera , recognized a difference between establishing an easement by adverse possession and by acquiring ownership by adverse possession of an easement by the owner of the servient property. To establish hostility for adverse possession there need not be open aggression or combat, neither need a notice to the owner be given other than the claimants occupancy.

The facts alleged are the same facts alleged as the basis of the adverse possession claim. The quiet title claim is not an alternative ground for recovery because it is based on the success of the adverse possession claim. Defendant’s argument that the claim is barred based on the Creditor’s Claim under Probate Code section 9353(a)(1) is inapplicable. Defendant states that Plaintiff is barred from seeking recovery of alleged expenses paid on Decedent’s house.

He alleges adverse possession as the basis of his claim to title (Complaint ¶ 2), but he does not allege the specific facts that make him a proper adverse possessor.

The complaint attempts to allege causes of action for quiet title and declaratory relief based on a claim of adverse possession. However, the complaint does not state facts indicating that plaintiffs are entitled to the property based on adverse possession, as required under CCP Section 761.020(b). The elements of adverse possession include that the possession be “actual” and that it also be “hostile” or “adverse.” (12 Witkin, Summary of California Law, 11th ed., Real Property, §§226-227, pp. 285-288).

The relevant five-year period for purposes of Plaintiff’s adverse possession claim is the five-year period preceding the filing of his Complaint. As Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 15, 2021, the operative five-year period for purposes of taking title by adverse possession is March 15, 2016 through March 15, 2021. Thus, all property taxes must have been timely made during that time to meet the property tax element for an adverse possession claim.

Plaintiff concedes in this motion that he made tax payments only in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2016, which would be insufficient to support adverse possession. (Motion, p. 12.) Consequently, Plaintiff has not met his initial burden to prove each element of his adverse possession claim. Plaintiffs failure to timely pay taxes on the Property for a five-year period is confirmed by records from the County of Los Angeles Treasurer and Tax Collector presented by Defendant. ( Candelas Decl. ¶ 2, Ex.

Finally, Plaintiff shall clarify whether the claim is based upon adverse possession under color of title pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 322 or adverse possession without color of title. If Plaintiff contends the claim is based upon color of title, Plaintiff shall identify the written instrument upon which that claim rests and explain when, if ever, Plaintiff asserted or recorded an adverse claim of title.

Mackey states that they have paid property taxes, HOA dues, and made property improvements until May 5, 2023, and otherwise declares they have met all requirements for an adverse possession claim. However, Mackey does not submit any evidence beyond this declaration which establishes any of the above-listed elements for an adverse possession claim.

Adverse Possession One of the requirements of a viable adverse possession claim is that the possession must be hostile to the interest of the actual title owner. (Andreotti v. Andreotti (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 533, 541.) Permissive use is not adverse. (Id.) Plaintiff admits in the Complaint that the property at issue “remained in the family with the understanding that Jesus Cisneros and his wife Gloria J. Cisneros would be residing there.” (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (b) .) As set forth above, the Court sustains Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs twenty-fifth cause of action for adverse possession.

If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession. (c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought. (d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.

Third Cause of Action for Adverse Possession As to the third cause of action for Adverse Possession, Cross-Complainant fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and the cause of action is uncertain.

Adverse possession by one joint owner against another joint owner may be established if the holding party can show that the other owner had notice of the adverse possession. (Id. at p. 422.) On the other hand, if the other co-tenant did not have actual or constructive notice of the hostile possession, then the holding tenant is not entitled to adverse possession, since the exclusive occupancy by one co-tenant is deemed to be permissive and not hostile to the other tenants. (Ibid, quoting West v.

(Opp., p. 6.) 5th Cause of Action: Adverse Possession Meehan does not allege sufficient facts for this cause of action.

On April 1, 2016, by separate §850 petition, administrator claimed title to the real property at 728 West Hemlock St., Port Hueneme, California, by adverse possession. The attorney-in-fact for the record title owner filed a verified objections/response on May 16, 2016, rejecting decedent's claim to title by adverse possession.

As far as this Court is aware, no California case holds that the doctrine of adverse possession extends to personal property. "The court in San Francisco Credit C. House v. Wells [(1925)] 196 Cal. 701, 707, suggested that the doctrine of adverse possession would not apply to personal property, and no California case has been cited in support of such an application." (Society of Cal. Pioneers v. Baker (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 774, 785, fn. 13; see also Bufano v.

Thus, a guardian may not acquire title by adverse possession against his ward, nor an agent against his principal, nor an executor against the heirs."] [Part 1 of 2]

Quiet Title to Real Property Via Adverse Possession (APN 328-140-010); 5. Quiet Title to Real Property – Reformation of Deed (APN 328-140-011); 6. Quiet Title to Real Property Via Adverse Possession (APN 328-140-011). In the Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the subject parcels by their correct legal descriptions and also by erroneous Assessor Parcel Numbers (APNs), by adding an extra zero to each APN.

Defendant OCIS demurs to the SAC on the grounds that the first cause of action for adverse possession is precluded by collateral estoppel, and the second cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails to plead sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. OCIS’ demurrer is well taken.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint and all causes of action asserted therein are based on a flawed theory of adverse possession. His Complaint admits that he entered the property on October 13, 2017 (Complaint ¶ 11). This action was filed less than two weeks later, on October 26, 2017. A party claiming adverse possession must establish his continuous claim to and occupancy of the property and pay all state, county, or municipal taxes owed on the property for a five year period. Civil Code § 1007, Code Civ.

Plaintiff argues that there is no "significant, unanticipated change in the case" because Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's claim, Defendant is not entitled to a continuance to file a dispositive motion on the adverse possession claim, and Defendant has had opportunity to conduct discovery on Plaintiff's adverse possession claim despite the claim not being pled in Plaintiff's complaint.

Cross-Defendant Kersh brings this motion for summary adjudication to the adverse possession claim in the FACC. Kersh focuses on the element of hostility to possession and ouster by one cotenant of the other, in seeking summary adjudication. Kersh asserts that he was not ousted from the property for purposes of adverse possession because he was only removed from the property after Troglia obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and later, a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (DVRO).

The first two causes of action in the FAC of Plaintiffs allege Quiet Title by Adverse Possession Founded Upon Written Instrument against Cynthia Cotter and other unknown persons and Quiet Title by Adverse Possession Founded Upon Occupation against Cynthia Cotter and other unknown persons. The Third cause of action for Quiet Title and the Fourth cause of action for Declaratory Relief are alleged against all Defendants including Defendant Northstar.

Carpenter argues that he has established title to the Property by adverse possession. Carpenter asserted nearly identical arguments in his prior Motion for Summary Judgment, made as to his claim to quiet title. (See Carpenters Motion for Summary Judgment (filed 12/30/2022), pp. 5-10.) The Court denied that motion on April 6, 2023, finding that Carpenter failed to meet his initial burden to establish his adverse possession of the Property.

The Howards alleged they acquired title to certain property by adverse possession by 1959, which property the Silvas conveyed to the Schaniel in 1973. The Howards brought an action for quiet title seeking to resolve their claim for adverse possession and sought damages for slander of title against the real estate broker Arbaugh who brokered the 1973 transaction. The court held that slander of title could not be applied to a title acquired by adverse possession but as yet not established by decree.

Because the Court ordered consolidation, the Ebrahims failure to address the claim for adverse possession prevents the Court from adjudicating the primary right of ownership as to the Property. Without placing the adverse possession COA into issue in the MSA, a risk of conflicting rulings is present. The remedy for adverse possession is to quiet title in the adverse possessor.

.: BC607078 Hearing Date: January 6, 2017 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BACKGROUND This is an adverse possession action arising out of real property located in Los Angeles (“Property”). Plaintiff Rosemary Thompson (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she obtained the Property by will, and has been in possession of the Property since January 1, 1992.

Adverse Possession in General Adverse possession is a means of acquiring title to property, after lapse of time, by continued possession. See Civil Code § 1007 and see Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45 C.A.4th 558, 562. Title acquired by adverse possession is absolute. Id. It is a new title, founded on the disseizin, and not the old estate of the former owner, although it is of the same nature and extent. See Williams v. Sutton (1872) 43 C. 65, 73 and Tobin v. Stevens (1988) 204 C.A.3d 945, 952.

Adverse Possession Defense Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff has alleged a valid easement claim then Defendants can defeat that claim by adverse possession. Perhaps Defendants will end up proving their adverse possession theory, but at the demurrer stage the Court will not find that Defendants have taken the portion of Echo Springs by adverse possession.

He claims he acquired it by adverse possession. A title acquired by adverse possession is available as the basis of an action or a defense. Baker v. Clark (1900) 128 Cal. 181.

Quite Title by Adverse Possession The elements of an adverse possession cause of action are (1) open and notorious use, (2) hostile to the true owner, (3) for a period of five years, (4) continuous and uninterrupted, (5) under claim of right, and (6) plaintiff paid taxes on the land. ( Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305; Silacci v.

Those persons who used the land for many years claimed title through adverse possession. As to the issue of paying taxes, the Newman court stated: "'As no taxes were assessed against said strip ... this of itself would not prevent them from acquiring title by adverse possession.' (Brown v. Bachelder, 214 Cal. 753 [7 P.2d 1027]; 2 Cal.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession, § 65, p. 570.)." Id., at 291. See also Hagman v.

DISCUSSION The First Amended Complaint FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) quiet title; (2) estoppel; and (3) adverse possession. (ROA 42.) Defendants demur to the third cause of action for adverse possession on the ground that the FAC does not state sufficient facts pursuant to CCP § 430.10(e).

If an adverse possession affirmative defense is added, discovery may be required. The claim will hinge on Busiashvilis allegation that she paid taxes on the disputed area. Proving or refuting that allegation may require obtaining property tax or other documents and/or expert testimony from appraisers or others. Nonetheless, the interest of justice favors allowing the proposed amendment.

Demurrer Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks declaratory relief and to quiet title based on a theory of adverse possession. “The elements necessary to establish title by adverse possession are tax payment and open and notorious use or possession that is continuous and uninterrupted, hostile to the true owner and under a claim of title, for five years.” (McLear-Gary v. Scott (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 145, 152.)

Thus, Penal Code section 602 protects a property owners right, whether acting directly or through an agent, to seek assistance from law enforcement to request an occupant to leave the Property for criminal trespass even where the person claims adverse possession, provided that the property owner acts before the adverse possession elements are satisfied.

In addition, while a cause of action for adverse possession may be based on a claim of right (as opposed to adverse possession based on color of title), Civil Code section 325 states that land is only deemed to be adversely possessed by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment, or decree, if the land has been protected by a substantial enclosure and usually cultivated or improved. These circumstances have not been pleaded as part of Plaintiffs adverse possession claim.

Respondent's Demurrer to Petition Pursuant to Probate Code Section 850 for Claim of Adverse Possession is SUSTAINED with leave to amend, pursuant to CCP section 430.10(e). For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the Court considers all material facts properly pleaded in the Petition as true.

Quiet Title Arising from Adverse Possession No dispute exists that SUZANNE holds and continues to possess record title to the property. However, a material dispute of fact does exist as to whether GERALD has destroyed SUZANNE’s seisin by adverse possession. No dispute exists that on July 2, 2009, at SUZANNE’s request GERALD paid $39,000 to prevent loss of the property from foreclosure.

Because there is no triable issue of material fact as to this element of Plaintiffs claims for adverse possession, summary judgment is granted for Defendant.

Adverse Possession Plaintiff also contends that triable issues exist with respect to the adverse possession affirmative defense.

COMPLAINT Defendant demurs to the single cause of action alleged for quiet title based on adverse possession and "allodial title." Adverse Possession requires possession of the property for a minimum of five years continuously and Plaintiff must have paid all state, county, or municipal taxes during that time. (Code of Civil Procedure § 325(b).)

Explanation: This action seeks to quiet title of a five-acre property located at APN 045-270-06 (“the Property”), either through adverse possession or easement by prescription. The action further seeks declaratory relief regarding the rights and duties of the parties as to the Property.

· The Complaint is too conclusory and fails to include specific facts constituting adverse possession. · There is no proof that a notice of pendency of the action was filed in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the real property is located. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 761.010.) · The Does added on June 4, 2025, have not been formally included in the Complaint.

Adverse Possession Adverse possession requires (1) actual occupation; (2) hostile to the owners title; (3) claimed under color of title or claim of right; (4) continually and uninterrupted for five years; and (5) the holder must pay all taxes during the time period. ( Dimmick v. Dimmick (1962) 58 Cal.2d 417, 421.)

Soofer next challenges plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action “To Quiet Title to Portion of Twenty Foot Easement by Adverse Possession.”

Plaintiff has occupied the Subject Property since September 2, 2010 and claims right to the property based on adverse possession. (TAC ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff has occupied the Subject Property since September 2, 2010 and claims right to the property based on adverse possession. (TAC ¶ 12.)

Adverse Possession The third cause of action is for adverse possession. The Jameses demur on the ground that White's possession of the disputed property was, as alleged, not hostile. "[T]he doctrine of agreed boundary [is] incompatible with the rule applicable to title by adverse possession.

Defendant claims that, at the December 14, 2017 hearing, “Judge Umhofer found that the allegations of adverse possession brought by Defendant Righetti at that time in the form of a Probate Petition took priority over the resolution of” this lawsuit. (Mtn., p. 2, ll. 5-8.) The Court has reviewed the transcript of the December 14 proceedings.

The quiet title cause of action stands or falls with adverse possession. Plaintiff contends that he meets the property tax requirement (which is generally the downfall of adverse possession claims). He asserts that the prior owner did not pay the property taxes, causing a default. Plaintiff learned of the default and potential foreclosure of the property, and plaintiff therefore paid the taxes himself. Essentially, the default began in 2020.

Quiet Title and Adverse Possession “The elements of an adverse possession claim consist of the following: (1) actual possession by the plaintiff of the property under claim of right or color of title; (2) the possession consists of open and notorious occupation of the property in such a manner as to constitute reasonable notice to the true owner; (3) the possession is adverse and hostile to the true owner; (4) the possession is uninterrupted and continuous for at least five years; and (5) the plaintiff

Further, Plaintiff is entitled to allege alternative theories of recovery such as an easement on the one hand, or alternatively, an interest in the land by adverse possession. Finally, a demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Plaintiff has not, in the first instance, demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his adverse possession claim because the facts alleged in the Complaint and repeated in the moving papers do not demonstrate possession hostile to Defendant’s title.

HEARING ON MOTION TO/FOR STRIKE PORTIONS OF 1ST AMND CRS-CMPLNT FILED BY GREG HART, STEVEN HART, KRISTIN HART, JANINE SENIOR * TENTATIVE RULING: * Cross-Defendants Greg Hart, Steven Hart, Kristen Hart and Janine Senior’s motion to strike portions of the first amended cross complaint is denied as to the request to strike “changed conditions”, “abandonment” and “adverse possession”, and the motion is otherwise granted with leave to amend.

Real Estate, supra, Adverse Possession, § 16:5, p. 15.) . . . that the owner nonetheless fails to look in the direction of the flag, or is not in the area to observe it, will not undermine its effect." (6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, Adverse Possession, § 16:5, p. 14.) (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 318, 327.) Defendant has presented no evidence that negates Plaintiffs’ claim as to the Second Cause of Action, Adverse Possession, Claim of Right.

Simply put, this statute provides no increased pleading requirements on a claim of adverse possession, and there is no element to adverse possession that the adverse possessor be on the official tax roll. However, quiet title requires a verified complaint, which includes adverse possession claims. (CCP §§ 760.020, 761.020.) Cross-Complainants failed to verify their allegations, including those related to payment of taxes. (FACC ¶ 14.)

Finally, Plaintiff fails to submit evidence to support his allegation that he acquired title via adverse possession. (Id. at ¶16.) To establish title by adverse possession, Plaintiff must establish possession that is uninterrupted for at least five years and payment of all taxes assessed against the property during the five-year period, among other things. (Marriage v. Keener (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 186, 192.) And here, there is no evidence of either.

GARSIDE, ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — FOR QUIET TITLE AND ADVERSE POSSESSION [RESP] CAMERON COLSON [RESP] RALPH GARSIDE RULING The “Motion for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession” filed on September 16, 2022, by respondents Ralph Garside and Cameron Colson (collectively “Respondents”), is DENIED. Although captioned as a “motion,” the document appears to be another attempt to file a cross- complaint for which Respondents have neither sought leave of court nor have been granted the same.

GARSIDE, ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — FOR QUIET TITLE AND ADVERSE POSSESSION [RESP] CAMERON COLSON [RESP] RALPH GARSIDE RULING The “Motion for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession” filed on September 16, 2022, by respondents Ralph Garside and Cameron Colson (collectively “Respondents”), is DENIED. Although captioned as a “motion,” the document appears to be another attempt to file a cross- complaint for which Respondents have neither sought leave of court nor have been granted the same.

GARSIDE, ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — FOR QUIET TITLE AND ADVERSE POSSESSION [RESP] CAMERON COLSON [RESP] RALPH GARSIDE RULING The “Motion for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession” filed on September 16, 2022, by respondents Ralph Garside and Cameron Colson (collectively “Respondents”), is DENIED. Although captioned as a “motion,” the document appears to be another attempt to file a cross- complaint for which Respondents have neither sought leave of court nor have been granted the same.

GARSIDE, ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — FOR QUIET TITLE AND ADVERSE POSSESSION [RESP] CAMERON COLSON [RESP] RALPH GARSIDE RULING The “Motion for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession” filed on September 16, 2022, by respondents Ralph Garside and Cameron Colson (collectively “Respondents”), is DENIED. Although captioned as a “motion,” the document appears to be another attempt to file a cross- complaint for which Respondents have neither sought leave of court nor have been granted the same.

GARSIDE, ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — FOR QUIET TITLE AND ADVERSE POSSESSION [RESP] CAMERON COLSON [RESP] RALPH GARSIDE RULING The “Motion for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession” filed on September 16, 2022, by respondents Ralph Garside and Cameron Colson (collectively “Respondents”), is DENIED. Although captioned as a “motion,” the document appears to be another attempt to file a cross- complaint for which Respondents have neither sought leave of court nor have been granted the same.

GARSIDE, ET AL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION — FOR QUIET TITLE AND ADVERSE POSSESSION [RESP] CAMERON COLSON [RESP] RALPH GARSIDE RULING The “Motion for Quiet Title and Adverse Possession” filed on September 16, 2022, by respondents Ralph Garside and Cameron Colson (collectively “Respondents”), is DENIED. Although captioned as a “motion,” the document appears to be another attempt to file a cross- complaint for which Respondents have neither sought leave of court nor have been granted the same.