Order: DITECH FINANCIAL LLC vs. O'RELL, DEBORAH

AGUINA VS CRAWFORD MCC1901351 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REAL ESTATE SERVICES AGUINA VS CRAWFORD JOINDER TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY MCC1901351 REAL ESTATE SERVICES JUDGMENT Tentative Ruling: Grant Defendant’s requests for judicial notice. Deny Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice. Grant the motion as to all five causes of action. Deny Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Corporation’s motion for joinder as it is untimely. I. Late Opposition Plaintiff’s opposition was not filed until July 2 and 3 – only four and five days before the hearing, respectively. No memorandum of points and authorities was filed at all. Under CCP §437c(b)(2), all opposition papers must be served on the moving party and filed with the court at least 14 days before the date set for hearing on the motion, unless the court shortens the time for good cause shown. Here, no good cause has been shown and the court did not shorten the time required to file an opposition. Thus, Plaintiff’s opposition is untimely. A court has discretion to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765.) If the court decides to consider late-filed papers, circumstances may require a continuance of the hearing to allow the moving party an opportunity to reply to matters contained therein. (See Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 CA4th 614, 623 (dictum) (disapproved on other grounds by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 C4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6).) The court does consider the late-filed papers as even with these documents, the motion is still properly granted. Thus, there is no prejudice to Defendants if the court considers the documents filed in Opposition. The documents filed in Opposition do not provide any admissible evidence. The issues with the requests for judicial notice are discussed in the next section. The response to the separate statement indicates where Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ assertions, but there is no evidence provided in support. Plaintiff references documents (which are not properly judicially noticed) and makes various statements that are unsupported by a declaration or any other evidence. As a result, no evidence is provided in support of the Opposition meaning Plaintiff has not shown any triable issues of material fact. II. Joinder Defendants Crawford Real Estate and Shoshone Service Corporation filed a joinder to the MSJ on June 20, 2024. This joinder includes a memorandum of points and authorities, a separate statement 1, a list of exhibits, request for judicial notice, and declaration of Leonel Tapia. However, 75 days’ notice is required on a motion for summary judgment. (CCP §437c(a).) The motion and accompanying documents were not mailed until June 5, 2024. This does not comply with the 75- day notice requirement. Accordingly, the court does not grant the joinder. Where the moving party notices the hearing in less than the required time, notice must begin anew. The court cannot cure this defect by continuing the hearing for the missing number of days. (Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 CA4th 1258, 1268.) Deny. III. Request for Judicial Notice Generally, a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, the date it was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction and the legally operative language as long as there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. (Scott v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 743, 755.) The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 1-8. The court can properly take judicial notice of Defendants’ requests 9-11 under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). GRANTED. Plaintiff makes sixteen (16) requests for judicial notice. Requests 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are properly judicially noticed under Evidence Code §452(d) (court records). However, a party requesting judicial notice of any materials under Evid. Code §§ 452 or 453 must provide the court and each opposing party with copies of the material to be so noticed. (CRC 3.1306(c); see Evid. Code § 453; Creed-21 v. City of San Diego (2015) 234 CA4th 488, 519-520—although ordinance qualified for judicial notice under Evid. Code § 452, request properly denied due to insufficient information given under Evid. Code § 453.) Plaintiff did not provide copies of any of the documents they request the court to take judicial notice of. The remaining requests (not court records) are not properly subject to judicial notice. The court therefore denies all of Plaintiff’s requests. IV. First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract “A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff’s performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant’s breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom.” (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1031.) A contact will be enforced if it is sufficiently definite for the court to ascertain the parties’ obligations and to determine whether there has been a breach. (Bustamante v. Intuit Inc. (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 199, 209.) To plead a cause of action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may attach a copy of the written contract and incorporate it by reference or plead the terms verbatim or the legal effect of the contract. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) In the Fifth Amended Complaint (FAC), plaintiff alleges he entered into a written contract with Defendants on November 7, 2013, whereby Defendants agreed to and loaned Plaintiff $500,000 to develop the property. (¶13.) Then, in “mid 2016,” Plaintiff requested and received an extension on the loan, as well as an additional loan to be securitized by the property in the amount of $275,000. (¶15.) Plaintiff asserts Defendants agreed to the loan if Plaintiff met three conditions: (1) an appraisal of the property; (2) Plaintiff obtain a dismissal of a recorded abstract of judgment from a Family Law matter; and (3) Plaintiff acquire title insurance for the new loan. (¶16.) The FAC alleges all of these conditions were met. (¶16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “breached their promise and commitment to give Plaintiff the additional funding and denied the loan.” (¶16.) Defendants argue this claim fails for five distinct reasons. First, Defendants assert it is undisputed that no lender ever spoke a word to Plaintiff, either before or after the $500,000 loan was funded, during the foreclosure process, or after the 1 “Each moving party shall support [the] motion for summary judgment with a separate statement.” Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 636. Here, Crawford and Shoshone filed their own separate statement and evidence so this was complied with. foreclosure process. Thus, there was no agreement between Plaintiff and lenders for an additional $275,000 loan. (SUMF No. 11.) The evidence Defendants provide in support of this material fact is sufficient to meet Defendants’ initial burden. As noted above, Plaintiff has not provided any admissible evidence in support of the Opposition. As a result, the motion is properly granted. Second, Defendants assert Plaintiff did not meet the second requirement to obtain the additional loan because he failed to obtain a dismissal or release of the abstract of judgment in the family law case. Defendants provide evidence in support of this material fact which, again, is not rebutted by Plaintiff. Third, Defendants argue the alleged oral agreement to loan money is not enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Civil Code §1624(a)(7) states: “The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent… A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money or to grant or extend credit, in an amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person engaged in the business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or extending credit. For purposes of this section, a contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money secured solely by residential property consisting of one to four dwelling units shall be deemed to be for personal, family, or household purposes.” The FAC notes the property was undeveloped and not residential in nature. (¶8.) Thus, the statute of frauds applies and any alleged oral agreement to the purported loan is unenforceable. Fourth, Defendants argue the alleged loan for $275,000 is not specific enough to be an enforceable agreement. Defendants note there is no allegation as to the terms of repayment, making it too uncertain to enforce under Peterson Development Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank (1991) 233 CalApp.3d 103, 115. 2 There is no evidence before the court of any terms of repayment of the alleged $275,000 loan, making it unenforceable. Fifth, Defendants argue the claim is outside the applicable two-year statute of limitations for a breach of oral contract under CCP §339(1). The FAC alleges Defendants breached their promise to loan Plaintiff the additional $275,000 on May 3, 2017. The initial Complaint was not filed under October 29, 2019. This is outside the statute of limitations and makes the claim improper. For all of these reasons, the motion is granted as to the breach of contract claim. V. Second Cause of Action – Promissory Estoppel Promissory estoppel is a doctrine that employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise sought to be enforced. (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310.) A promissory estoppel claim requires proof of the same elements as a cause of action for breach of contract, except for consideration. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 903.) The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1672.) 2 “’[a] loan commitment is not binding on the lender unless it contains all of the material terms of the loan, and either the lender's obligation is unconditional or the stated conditions have been satisfied. When the commitment does not contain all of the essential terms ... the prospective borrower cannot rely reasonably on the commitment, and the lender is not liable for either a breach of the contract or promissory estoppel.’ (9 Miller & Starr, op. cit. supra, § 28.4, at p. 8, fn. omitted.) The material terms of a loan include the identity of the lender and borrower, the amount of the loan, and the terms for repayment.” This claim also fails for many of the same reasons stated above. The terms of the alleged loan agreement are uncertain as there are no specified repayment terms. There is evidence no lender ever communicated with Plaintiff in making this alleged loan agreement. This claim also falls outside the two-year statute of limitations. Since the claim for breach of contract fails, the claim for promissory estoppel also fails. VI. Third Cause of Action – Tortious Interference with Contract The elements of a cause of action for the intentional interference contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.) “To establish the claim, the plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the primary purpose of disrupting the contract, but must show the defendant's knowledge that the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his or her action.” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1148.) It is well established that corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of a corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24.) “The tort duty not to interfere with the contract falls only on strangers – interlopers who have no legitimate interest in the scope or course of the contract’s performance.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 513.) Plaintiff alleges he entered into a valid purchase agreement with Robert S. Dickens for the purchase of the lots on September 4, 2019, for a purchase price of $675,000. (FAC ¶46.) Plaintiff alleges he gave actual notice of the opened escrow and purchase agreement to Defendants on September 10, 2019. (¶47.) Plaintiff then alleges that Defendants intentionally submitted excessive payment demands to escrow to thwart the closing of escrow and effectuate a non- judicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s property. (¶48.) Defendants present evidence that escrow’s closing date was set for December 4, 2019, which was after the scheduled Trustee’s sale on November 1, 2019. Defendants present evidence that the lenders did not agree to accept the purchase price of $675,000 as payment of the balance due under the loan which was in excess of $713,000. (Hermansen Decl. ¶22.) The evidence before the court shows the lenders carried out the Trustee’s sale as planned, which was lawful. This is evidence that Defendants’ actions were not designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship between Plaintiff and the alleged buyer. Defendants have met their initial burden and Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show a triable issue of material fact. VII. Fourth Cause of Action – Quiet Title A quiet title action seeks to establish an interest in real property as between adverse claimants. (Deutsche Bank National Trust v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 201) The elements are: (1) the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land; and (2) defendant claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff. (South Shore Land Co. v. Peterson (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 740- 741.) A quiet title complaint must be verified and must include: (a) a description of the property; (b) the title of the plaintiff as which a determination is sought and the basis of the title; (c) the adverse claims to the title of plaintiff against which a determination is sought; (d) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (e) a prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against adverse claims. (Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §761.020.) Tender is generally a necessary element for a mortgagor to maintain a cause of action to quiet title against the mortgagee. (See Fonteno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1372; Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86-87.) The FAC seeks a declaration that Plaintiff is the title owner of record for the property as to the effective date of November 4, 2019. (¶53.) The FAC asserts Plaintiff is willing and able to tender the amount owed to Defendants. (¶54.) “The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title. [Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations. [Citations.] An inquiry into the underlying theory requires the court to identify the nature (i.e., the ‘gravamen’) of the cause of action. [Citation.]” (Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2 Cal. App. 5th 421, 428.) As discussed above, the underlying theory of Plaintiff’s case (breach of contract/promissory estoppel) violates the two-year statute of limitations for an oral agreement. Thus, this claim also is barred by the statute of limitations. VIII. Fifth Cause of Action – Wrongful Foreclosure The elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim are: (1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering. (Lona v.Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104.) A party challenging a foreclosure must make full tender to establish his or her ability to purchase the property. (United States Cold Storage v. Greater Western Savings & Loan (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1225.) While it is not always necessary to establish tender to prevent a foreclosure, the borrower must show that he or she tendered the full amount of indebtedness in order to set aside a foreclosure sale that has already occurred. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1053-1054.) Plaintiff’s claim that the foreclosure was improper is rooted in the purported $275,000 loan commitment. As discussed, any alleged agreement of this loan is not enforceable. Accordingly, the unfounded allegation of breach of contract cannot be the basis for the wrongful foreclosure claim. The evidence before the court shows the foreclosure was properly executed. (SUMF 54- 59.) There is no admissible evidence included with the Opposition, so Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption.

Case Number: 24NWCV00960 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Hernandez v. Lopez, et al., Case No. 24NWCV00960 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendants Daniel Lopez and Nidelvia Yah move ex parte to vacate and set aside the default and default judgment entered against them on June 17, 2024, quash any writ, and stay the execution in the instant case. On April 11, 2024, Defendants demurred to the complaint. On May 31, 2024, Defendants answered. On June 4, 2024, the Court overruled Defendants demurrer. Because Defendants both demurred and answered, the motion for default is vacated and the ex parte motion is MOOT.

Case Number: 22NWCV00350 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C BETANCOURT, JR., ET AL. v. ANGEL BETANCOURT CASE NO.: 22 NWCV00350 HEARING: 7/10/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #2 TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Angel Betancourts motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED. The order is STAYED until a hearing scheduled for September 11, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. If Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Special Interrogatories (Set Two) by the hearing date, or show good cause why responses have not been produced, the stay will be lifted and terminating sanctions will be ordered. Moving Party to give NOTICE. This is a dispute between family members over ownership of real property located at 9800 San Carlos Avenue, Units A, B, and C, in South Gate, California 90280. The parties are siblings. Plaintiffs Enrique Betancourt, Jr. and Maria Betancourt sue for the following: (1) resulting trust; (2) constructive trust; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) quiet title; and (5) accounting. On July 11, 2023, the parties participated in a mandatory settlement conference. They did not settle the case. Defendant Angel Betancourt moves for monetary and non-monetary sanctions against plaintiffs Maria Betancourt and Enrique Betancourt, Jr. based on disobeying the Courts October 12, 2023 discovery order. Legal Standard The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery. ( Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.) The following factors may also be relevant: (1) the time which has elapsed since written discovery was served; (2) whether the party served was previously given a voluntary extension of time; (3) the number of discovery requests propounded; (4) whether the unanswered questions sought information which was difficult to obtain; (5) whether the answers supplied were evasive and incomplete; (6) the number of questions which remained unanswered; (7) whether the questions which remain unanswered are material to a particular claim or defense; (8) whether the answering party has acted in good faith, and with reasonable diligence; (9) the existence of prior orders compelling discovery and the answering party's response thereto; (10) whether the party was unable to comply with the previous order of the court; (11) whether an order allowing more time to answer would enable the answering party to supply the necessary information, and; (12) whether a sanction short of dismissal or default would be appropriate to the dereliction. ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 79697.) Generally, [a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. ( Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) The court may impose a terminating sanction by an order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(1).) Discussion Defendant argues that the Court may grant terminating sanctions because Plaintiffs failed to obey the Courts October 12, 2023 order compelling discovery responses. On October 12, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motions to compel Plaintiffs responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set Two. The Court also issued monetary sanctions of $1,475.00. According to Defendants counsel, Plaintiff has not responded to discovery to date or paid sanctions. (Decl. Lanphere, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff Maria Betancourt filed a declaration in opposition. She stated that given the financial condition she and her brother were in, she could no longer afford legal representation. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 8.) She said she tried to get her case file from her former counsel from December 8, 2023 to May 2024. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 11.) She also said that Attorney Santana told her that Attorney Mojarro stated that he had no notice of the October 12, 2023, sanctions. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 15.) She further states that Attorney Santana will request the file from Attorney Mojarro and upon receipt, she will be able to address the issues raised by the October 12, 2023 order. (Decl. Betancourt, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff Enrique Betancourt, Jr. has not opposed the instant motion. Defendants responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests were originally due in September 2022 and November 2022. (Decl. Lanphere, ¶¶ 13, 14.) Defendants have now delayed responding to Plaintiffs discovery requests for 22 months. Defendants did not respond to Plaintiffs request and did not oppose the May 2023 discovery motions. Further, Defendants counsel granted multiple extensions at Plaintiffs request. (Decl. Lanphere, ¶¶ 18, 21.) Further, Attorney Santana has not substituted in as counsel for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs became pro per litigants in December 2023, and it is unclear if they will obtain their case file from their former counsel and continue litigating. The Court is inclined to issue terminating sanctions. Defendant should not have to defend a lawsuit which has remained dormant for as long as this one has, without just cause. Defendant Angel Betancourts motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED. The order is STAYED until a hearing scheduled for September 11, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. If Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendants Form Interrogatories (Set One) and Special Interrogatories (Set Two) by the hearing date, or show good cause why responses have not been produced, the stay will be lifted and terminating sanctions will be ordered.

Case Number: 23STCV17398 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Case Name: 7561 Melrose, LLC v. Wesley Scott Reardan , et al . Case No.: 23STCV17398 Motion: OSC re: Entry of Default Judgment Moving Party: Plaintiff 7561 Melrose, LLC Responding Party: Unopposed Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Default Judgment Application is denied without prejudice. Background This is an unlawful detainer action which arises from the alleged non-payment of rent. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff 7561 Melrose, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a ComplaintUnlawful Detainer against Defendants Wesley Scott Reardan (Reardan), Tyler Steven Gonzalez (Gonzalez), and Does 1 to 10. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is seeking forfeiture of the lease, reasonable attorneys fees, and damages at the rate of $666.66 per day from July 13, 2023. (UD-100 at pp. 3-4.) On October 2, 2023, default was entered against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. (10/03/23 Minute Order.) On October 30, 2023, judgment by default was entered against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez for possession only. (10/30/23 Judgment.) On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Court Judgment form (CIV-100) seeking default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez in the sum of $196,301.50. Also, on such date, Plaintiff filed a Proposed Judgment and Declaration of Parviz Sarshar (Sarshar) in Support of Default Judgment. Legal Standard California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 sets forth the requirements for default judgments. In pertinent part, the rule dictates that a party must use form CIV-100 and file the following documents with the clerk: (1) except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3)¿interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5)¿a declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8)¿exhibits as necessary; and (9)¿a request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1800(a)(1)-(9).) Discussion Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1800 in order to obtain entry of default judgment against Defendants Reardan and Gonzalez. Plaintiff has failed to: (1) provide interest computations as necessary; and (2) dismiss parties against whom judgment is not sought as the Doe defendants have not been dismissed. Plaintiffs have also failed to substantiate the requested damages as no ledger or documentation is attached to the declaration of Ms. Sarshar showing the amount of past due rent, late fees, or holdover damages. Additionally, although requesting attorneys fees, Plaintiff has not indicated whether the requested attorneys fees are allowed by statute or agreement of the parties. The declaration of Ms. Sarshar fails to set forth the basis for the requested attorneys fees. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs default judgment application is denied without prejudice.

Case Number: 23LBCV01651 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Daniel Kwan Haeng Lee filed this action against Defendant, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Successor-in-Interest for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2008-AR12 and Does 1-25 for quiet title, slander of title, cancellation and expungement of void instrument, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff filed the complaint on 9/06/23. On 10/09/23, JP Morgan filed a demurrer and motion to strike directed at the complaint. On 3/06/24, prior to the hearing on the pleading challenge, Plaintiff filed his operative First Amended Complaint. The FAC includes causes of action for cancellation and expungement of void instruments and declaratory relief. 2. Demurrer a. Legal Standard on Demurrer A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing partys pleading. It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purpose of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true, however improbable they may be. A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan 39 Cal.3d 311 (1985). No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no speaking demurrers). A demurrer is brought under CCP § 430.10 [grounds], § 430.30 [as to any matter on its face or from which judicial notice may be taken], and § 430.50(a) [can be taken to the entire complaint or any cause of action within]. Specifically, a demurrer may be brought per CCP § 430.10(e) if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. Per CCP §430.10(a) a demurrer may be brought where the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Furthermore, demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. CCP § 430.10(f). However, in construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn, 189 Cal.App.3rd 764, 769 (1987). And, if the facts pled in the complaint are inconsistent with facts which are incorporated by reference from exhibits attached to the complaint, the facts in the incorporated exhibits control. Further, irrespective of the name or label given to a cause of action by the plaintiff, a general demurrer must be overruled if the facts as pled in the body of the complaint state some valid claim for relief. Special demurrers are not allowed in limited jurisdiction courts. (CCP § 92(c).) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 348 (1976). The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.) Finally, CCP section 430.41 requires that [b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (CCP §430.41(a).) The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (CCP §430.41(a)(2).) Thereafter, the demurring party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (CCP §430.41(a)(3).) b. Meet and Confer Defense Counsel, Steven M. Dailey filed a declaration establishing he and Plaintiff met and conferred prior to the filing of the demurrer, but were unable to agree on a resolution of the merits of the pleading challenge. The demurrer is therefore ripe for resolution. c. Grounds for Demurrer Defendants demur to the FAC, contending: Plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party to the lawsuit; Plaintiff is not the real party in interest to allege causes of action relating to the foreclosure because he is not the borrower; Plaintiffs FAC is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiffs claims are time-barred; The subject sale is presumed valid; Claims attacking the sale fail absent tender of all amounts due under the loan; WaMu was a bona fide encumbrancer on the property via its loan agreement with Plaintiffs spouse; Plaintiff does not allege facts to show any assignment was void; Each of Plaintiffs causes of action fails to state a cause of action. d. Summary of Opposition Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. He argues: Plaintiff needs to file a Second Amended Complaint to cure defects concerning the identification of the defendants to the action; Plaintiff is the only damaged party by way of Defendants actions, and there is no indispensable party who needs to be joined in the suit; Plaintiff wishes to add claims for fraud and wrongful foreclosure to cure any defects in his claims; Plaintiff is the real party in interest because he is the trustee of the trust that owns the subject property; Res judicata does not apply in this case because Plaintiff has never sued before, and the issues decided in the prior litigation were different from the issues posed by way of this action; There is no statute of limitations defense because the subject deed of trust is void, and there is no time bar to asserting a claim based on a void instrument; Similarly, claims based on the trustees sale are not barred by the statute of limitations because the sale is void; The presumption of valid sale does not operate to save Defendants from Plaintiffs claims; Tender is excused because the subject deed of trust is void on its face; It cannot be determined, at the pleading stage, whether WaMu was a bona fide encumbrancer for value; Plaintiff adequately alleged facts to support each of his causes of action pled, and if the Court finds he did not do so, he should be given leave to do so. e. Summary of Reply The reply restates the moving arguments and contends nothing in the opposition defeats the demurrer. Defendants ask the Court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. f. Request for Judicial Notice Defendants seek judicial notice of various documents relating to the subject property, all of which have been recorded in the County Recorders office. They also seek judicial notice of documents filed in two lawsuits, NC055738 and NC061515, as well as various documents filed in bankruptcy court and the court of appeals. The RJN is unopposed and granted. g. Allegations of the FAC and Facts Subject to Judicial Notice The crux of Plaintiffs FAC is that a deed of trust and assignment of deed of trust, Exhibits 3 and 4 to his FAC, are void and should be cancelled and expunged. Exhibit 3 to the complaint is a Deed of Trust in favor of Washington Mutual and indicating a security interest in the subject property due to a loan taken out by Yuri I. Lee, a married woman, as her sole and separate property. The document was recorded on 8/28/06. The document is signed by Yuri I. Lee, dated 8/18/06, and notarized by Michele D. Reynoso. Exhibit 4 to the FAC is an assignment of the deed of trust from Washington Mutual to Bank of America, and it is dated 11/04/10. The crux of Plaintiffs complaint is that the deed of trust is void because he, by virtue of his community property interest in the property, was a co-owner of the property at the time his wife encumbered the property. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased the property using a community property fund he shares with his wife in January of 2004, and the residence was officially designated as community property by way of a grant deed executed on 7/28/06 and conveyed into a family trust via grant deed the same day. FAC, ¶2. Defendants, in their demurrer, show that the 7/28/06 grant deeds upon which Plaintiff relies were not actually recorded until 9/05/06, approximately one week AFTER Defendants predecessor-in-interest recorded the purportedly void deed of trust. Specifically, Defendants judicially noticeable documents show that, on 2/25/04, a grant deed was recorded showing the property owned by Daniel and Yuri as husband and wife. Then on 8/28/06, Daniel and Yuri conveyed the property to Yuri only as a married woman as her sole and separate property. The same day, Daniel and Yuri recorded an interspousal grant deed, which also conveyed all interest in the property from Daniel to Yuri. Exhibit 5 to the RJN shows that it was not until 9/05/24 that Daniel and Yuri recorded documents purporting to transfer interest in the property back to both of them as spouses. h. Analysis The Court finds the FAC fails to state a cause of action for numerous reasons set forth in the demurrer. First and foremost, the FAC does not plead the existence of a void deed of trust because the judicially noticeable documents show that Plaintiffs wife was the sole owner of the property on the date the deed of trust was recorded, and therefore Defendants predecessors were under no obligation to include Plaintiff on the loan or resultant deed of trust. The Court finds, as Defendants correctly note in their demurrer, that Plaintiffs spouse is a necessary party to this litigation. She is the one who signed the loan agreement that resulted in recording of the deed of trust. Pursuant to CCP §389(a), therefore, she qualifies as an indispensable party and must be named in the suit. Additionally, the Cout finds Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the deed of trust, assignment of deed of trust, or any resulting sale. Plaintiff was not the owner of the property, per recorded documents, on the date of the encumbrance. Only his wife was. Plaintiff sets forth no facts showing why the deed of trust was somehow void due his lack of signature on the loan if he was not an owner of the property on the date of the loan. Additionally, the Court finds this case is barred by res judicata. Plaintiffs spouse has filed two prior actions against Defendants or their predecessors. Pursuant to Hawkins v. SunTrust Bank (2016) 246 Cal.App.4 th 1387, 1394, Plaintiff is in privity with his spouse. Pursuant to Barnes v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2013) 2013 WL 5217393, Defendants are in privity with their predecessors. The Court has reviewed judicially noticeable documents from NC055738 and NC061515. In NC055738, Plaintiffs spouse sued JP Morgan Chase and California Reconveyance Company to enjoin a foreclosure sale. On 6/02/11, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer without leave to amend. In NC061515, Plaintiffs spouse sued US Bank and various others seeking injunctive relief precluding a foreclosure sale. The case was removed to the Bankruptcy Court, which ultimately dismissed the case; notably, Plaintiffs spouse appealed the dismissal, and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. The Court finds the two prior cases were sufficiently similar to this case, in that both of them sought to preclude foreclosure and this case seeks an order that the deed of trust upon which the foreclosure was conducted is void. Finally, the Court finds the claims are time-barred. Plaintiffs only contention in support of his position that the claims are not time-barred is essentially that void documents can always be challenged without a time limitation. However, as noted above, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to plead facts establishing the subject documents are void, and therefore he also failed to plead facts circumventing the statute of limitations. i. Leave to Amend Plaintiff, in the event the demurrer is sustained, seeks an order granting him leave to amend. Notably, he also seeks an order granting him leave to add additional defendants to the action and/or additional causes of action to the action. The Court finds this case presents purely legal issues for determination, and leave to amend would be entirely futile. Leave to amend is therefore denied. 3. Motion to Strike Defendants motion to strike is moot in light of the ruling on the demurrer. 4. Conclusion The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Defendants must prepare a judgment of dismissal for processing. Defendants are ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Matter on the Disocvery Calendar for Tuesday, July 9, 2024, line 5, PLAINTIFF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO BY AND THROUGH THE SAN FRANCISCO PORT COMMISSION'S Motion To Have Requests For Admission Deemed Admitted; To Compel Responses To Discovery; And Request For Monetary Sanctions Against Defendants Kathrine Higdon, Lolman Enterprises, Inc. And Cynthia Foxworth Off calendar. Motion to be set in department 501 per SF Local Rule 8.10. = (302/JPT)

Case Number: 23STCV18797 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Monica Gonzalez Sanchez, Plaintiff, vs. Lidia Pacheco, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV18797 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 08/08/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: None Set Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lidia Pacheco Responding Party: Plaintiff Maria Sanchez Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition. Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. Background This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58 th Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. ( Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. ( Id . at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. ( Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. ( Id. at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. ( Id. ) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. ( Id. at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. ( Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. ( Id. ) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action: 1. Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 2. Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Nuisance 5. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 6. Negligence 7. Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation 8. Fraud Concealment 9. Landlord Harassment 10. Constructive Eviction 11. Retaliatory Eviction 12. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 13. Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer. Discussion Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend. A. The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer. B. The Complaint is Vague As to Defendants second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled Facts. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.) Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below). C. Statute of Limitations Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. ( Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP (2018) 22 Cal.App.5 th 508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained in its entirety. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV07444 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Nicole Management, LLC v. B-Side Group, LLC CASE NO.: 23STCV07444 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT MOVING PARTY : Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Nicole Management, LLC CASE HISTORY : · 04/03/23: Complaint filed. · 10/17/23: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an action for breach of a rental contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay rent on a commercial lease agreement. Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. DISCUSSION: Defendants Gerald Aschoff and Todd Hughes move for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint. // Legal Standard Parties generally must file a cross-complaint against the party who filed the complaint before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.50(a).) However, parties seeking to file untimely compulsory cross-complaints may file with the Court for leave to do so, even though the failure to timely file resulted from oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.50.) In such a case, after notice to the adverse party, the Court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint if the party acted in good faith. This section is liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. ( Id .) The purpose of the compulsory cross-complaint statute is to prevent piecemeal litigation. ( Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) Compulsory cross-complaints consist of those causes of action existing at the time of service of the answer that the defendant must bring against the plaintiff, or else forfeit the right to bring them in any other action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30(a).) Specifically, compulsory cross-complaints consist of the causes of action that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 426.10(c).) To avoid piecemeal litigation, courts liberally construe the term transactionit is not confined to a single, isolated act or occurrence . . . but may embrace a series of acts or occurrences logically interrelated. ( Align Technology , supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 960.) Thus, a motion to file a compulsory cross-complaint at any time during the action must be granted where forfeiture would otherwise result, unless the moving party engaged in bad faith conduct. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99.) The determination that the moving party acted in bad faith must be supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid.; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902 [We conclude that this principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section].) Factors such as oversight, inadvertence, neglect, mistake or other cause, are insufficient grounds to deny the motion unless accompanied by bad faith. ( Silver Organizations Ltd, supra , 217 Cal.App.3d at 99 ) Rather, bad faith is defined as [t]he opposite of good faith, generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake . . . , but by some interested or sinister motive[,] . . . not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather . . . the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. ( Id. at 100.) Whether Claims are Compulsory Defendants seek leave to file a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and new parties Masoud and Ramin Omrany alleging fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and related claims arising from the same rental agreement that is the basis of the original Complaint in this action. (Declaration of Rachel A. Baker ISO Mot. Exh. A.) Defendants counsel states that the proposed cross-complaint is substantively identical to the October 17, 2023 Cross-Complaint stricken by the Court. (Baker Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that B-Side is not entitled to pursue a cross-complaint in this action and that Defendants have not explained what discovery gave rise to their crossclaims. Neither argument is persuasive. First, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, B-Side Group is not named as a party on the proposed Cross-Complaint. (Baker Decl. Exh.1.) Second, no explanation of the facts giving rise to the crossclaim is required in the context of a compulsory cross-complaint. Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith with substantial evidence, the Court is obliged to grant a motion for leave to file an untimely cross-complaint. ( Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 99; Foots Transfer & Storage Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 897, 902.) Plaintiff has made no such affirmative showing. Defendants motion must therefore be granted, as the proposed crossclaims are compulsory on their face. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants are to file a clean, standalone copy of the proposed cross-complaint within 10 days of this order. Moving Parties to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.