Wilmington Savings Fund Society Vs. Smith, Fernando Dewittet Al.

Case Number: 22STCV08879 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 31, 2024 Case Name: Young, et al. v. Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association, et al. Case No.: 22STCV08879 Matter: Motions to Compel Further Responses (4x) Moving Party: Plaintiffs Irene Young and Jesse Chang Responding Party: Defendant Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion as to Requests for Production is granted in part. The Motions as to Form Interrogatories and Request for Admission are granted. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs Irene Young and Jesse Chang seek to compel further responses from Defendant Pacific Plaza Elite-Alhambra Homeowners Association as to their requests for production, set two, form interrogatories, set two, request for admission no. 15. Request for Admission Request for Admission no. 15 states, Admit that YOU have not repaired the defects that were the subject of the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTE. Previously, Defendant responded: After a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter contained in this request, admit in part and deny in part. The Court compelled a further response because there was no specificity as to what was admitted and denied. Defendant then served the following amended response that is the subject of the current Motion: After a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter contained in this request, to the best of Responding Partys knowledge, the Developer has completed the repairs to Plaintiffs property and therefore responds: Deny. Plaintiffs argue that this is evasive because the request did not relate to the Developer, who is never identified in the response anyway. They also contend that it is unclear whether the phrase Plaintiffs property relates to Plaintiffs unit or the entire condominium building that was the subject of the CONSTRUCTION DEFECT DISPUTE. The Motion to Compel is granted. A further response should be provided in 10 days that (a) admits that Defendant itself did not do the repairs at issue, but (b) denies that the repairs were never done, because the developer, Pacific Plaza Investments, LLC, addressed them. This would seem to better embody a response that complies with CCP § 2033.220. The Court declines to award sanctions. Form Interrogatories (2x) The next Motions pertain to form interrogatory no. 17.1 as it relates to requests for admission nos. 7 and 15. Given that the Court has required a further response for RFA no. 15, a further accompanying response should also be provided for FI no. 17.1. With respect to request no. 7, the response for form interrogatory no. 17.1 is deficient. No facts or documents are specifically identified and no contact information is provided for Partners Community Management. Thus, the Motions to Compel are grantedfurther responses are required within 30 days. The Court awards reduced sanctions to Plaintiffs in the amount of $750. Requests for Production With respect to the requests for production, Defendant contends that supplemental documents were served such that the Motion is moot. Defendant, however, never addresses its actual responses. The Motion is granted as to request nos. 1-7, 9-12, 15-22 because the non-privilege objections lack merit and Defendant should provide updated responses in which documents are identified with Bates numbers. For its privilege log, Defendant should indicate recipients and authors. With respect to request nos. 8, 13, 14, 24, and 25, Defendant should provide a response that complies with Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.230. The Motion is denied without prejudice as to request no. 23, which seems to target predominantly privileged matters. Further responses are to be provided within 30 days. The Court awards Plaintiffs reduced sanctions in the amount of $750. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

C23-01403 CASE NAME: GUPTA VS. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY: OWEN, GREGORY S. *TENTATIVE RULING:* By stipulation this demurrer is continued to August 22, 2024.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 24, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT PAUL FRENKIEL, TIFFANY PINTOR DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend as Plaintiff's complaint is uncertain. Plaintiff shall allege the scope of encroachment and the starting date of the encroachment (specifically before or after Plaintiff's house was torn down). Demurrer is otherwise overruled. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

MSC22-00125 CASE NAME: AGAPITO VS. NACELLI *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Before the Court is Defendant Tina Paclebar’s Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens. Factual Background Plaintiffs allege that they met with Defendant Joseph Nacelli in July 2009 to discuss their desire to purchase real property located at 761 Mariposa Ave. in Rodeo, California (“Property”). As Plaintiffs did not qualify for a mortgage, they wanted to have Defendant Nacelli hold title to the Property in trust for them. At that time, Mr. Nacelli was living rent-free with Plaintiffs. In return, Plaintiffs agreed they would make the down payment for the Property and pay all costs related to the Property, including property taxes, insurance, and maintenance and repair costs. Defendant Nacelli agreed to these terms. On July 1, 2009, title to the Property was transferred to Mr. Nacelli, per the terms of the above agreement. Plaintiffs used Josephine Agapito’s sister, Elizabeth Monsanto, as their real estate agent. Plaintiffs, not Mr. Nacelli, paid into escrow the down payment for the Property. Since that time, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 Plaintiffs have paid the mortgage, paid for all upkeep of the Property, and have rented the Property to family members of Plaintiff Arnel Agapito. Mr. Nacelli never moved into the Property, but instead continued to live rent-free with Plaintiffs until 2017 when he voluntarily moved out. Mr. Nacelli admits he never paid any expenses related to the Property, nor had anything to do with maintaining the Property. However, in December 2021, Mr. Nacelli sold the Property to Defendant Tina Paclebar – without consulting with or informing Plaintiffs. Defendant Paclebar is the long-term domestic partner of Defendant Jane Nacelli – who is Plaintiff Josephine Agapito’s (and Defendant Joseph Nacelli’s) sister. Ms. Paclebar has been considered ‘part of the family’ to the Agapito’s for over 15 years. She has been invited to family holidays and events. The Property was never put up for sale to the general public. Instead, the Property was sold to Ms. Paclebar for $365,000. The closing statement for the sale, however, indicates that Mr. Nacelli ‘gifted’ $154,163.43 of that amount to Ms. Paclebar. Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on January 24, 2022. They allege a number of causes of action against Mr. Nacelli, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. They also allege causes of action aimed at nullifying the sale of the Property, including quiet title, constructive trust, and fraudulent conveyance. Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Paclebar knew, or should have known, that Mr. Nacelli was not the rightful owner of the Property, and was not authorized to sell it. Ms. Paclebar contends she is a bona fide purchaser of value for the Property, and had no knowledge of the alleged agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli. Legal Standard “[A] lis pendens is recorded by someone asserting a real property claim, to give notice that a lawsuit has been filed which may, if that person prevails, affect title to or possession of the real property described in the notice.” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1069, citing CCP §§ 405.2, 405.4, 405.20.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 405.30, at any time after a notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party with an interest in the real property may apply to the Court to expunge the notice. “The expungement statutes provide that a lis pendens may be expunged on three grounds: (1) ‘the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.31); (2) ‘the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32); or (3) ‘adequate relief can be secured to the claimant by the giving of an undertaking’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.33).” (Carr v. Rosien (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 845, 857.) Probable validity is met when the Plaintiff establishes her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.) The party prevailing on an expungement motion must be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in making or opposing the motion unless the court finds the other party acted with “substantial justification” or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs “unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.38.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 Overview of Issues and Arguments Real Property Claim Initially, it is uncontested that Plaintiff’s complaint involves a real property claim. Those claims include the claims for quiet title, constructive trust, and fraudulent conveyance. Probable Validity of Plaintiff’s Claims Next, the Court considers the merits of the claim. “‘ “If the claimant does plead a real property claim, but the claim pleaded has no evidentiary merit, the lis pendens must be expunged upon motion under [Code of Civil Procedure §] 405.32.” ’ [Citation.]” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 475; see also Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1011-1012.) Under section 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” “Probable validity” means “it is more likely than not that the [plaintiff] will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim.” (Code of Civil Procedure §405.3.) Plaintiff again has the burden on this issue and must present evidence showing it is likely to prevail on the real property claim. Defendant’s Position Defendant argues that she is a bona fide purchaser for value of the Property. “A bona fide purchaser for value “is one who pays value for the property without notice of any adverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings.” (Melendrez v. D & I Investments, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250 quoting Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 442.) “The elements of bona fide purchase are payment of value, in good faith, and without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights.” (Id. at 1251 citations omitted.) “Thus, the two elements of being a BFP are that the buyer (1) purchase the property in good faith for value, and (2) have no knowledge or notice of asserted rights of another.” (Ibid.) “The first element does not require that the buyer’s consideration be the fair market value of the property (or anything approaching it.) [citation] Instead, the buyer need only part with something of value in exchange for the property.” (Ibid.) “The second element required to establish BFP status is that the buyer have neither knowledge nor notice of the competing claim.” (Ibid.) Defendant presents evidence that the recorded grant deeds for the Property showing title transferred to Joseph Nacelli on July 1, 2009, and then from Mr. Nacelli to Defendant Tina Paclebar on December 17, 2021. (Brink Decl. Exs. A-B.) There are no other recorded documents showing any other ownership interest in the Property by any other person, including Plaintiffs. In addition, when Defendant Paclebar purchased the Property Mr. Nacelli executed the purchase agreement as well as a Homeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance Affidavit. (Paclebar Decl. Exs. A-B.) By executing these documents, Mr. Nacelli warranted that he was the owner of the Property and was unaware of any SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 liens or encumbrances on the Property. Defendant Paclebar also submits a declaration which states that, prior to the close of escrow, she “was never informed either verbally or in writing, that Joseph Nacelli did not have authority to sell me the Property, or that there was a verbal agreement between Joseph Nacelli and Plaintiffs concerning ownership of the Property.” (Paclebar Decl. ¶ 10.) Thus, Defendant argues, that as the recorded documents only showed the Mr. Nacelli owned the Property, Mr. Nacelli indicated in multiple documents that he was the owner, and Mrs. Paclebar claims that she was never informed of any claims of ownership of the Property by Plaintiffs, she is a bona fide purchaser for value. Plaintiffs’ Position Plaintiffs dispute the claim that Ms. Paclebar had no knowledge of the arrangement they had with Mr. Nacelli regarding their true ownership of the Property and the fact that Mr. Nacelli was merely holding title on their behalf. They present evidence that Mr. Nacelli confirms that he was merely holding title in their name, and that he never paid any money for the Property and had no real connection to the Property. Mr. Nacelli testified as much: Q. So you never paid a cent for the Mariposa property; is that accurate? A. Yes. Q. And you never lived there; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. And you never received any income from the property; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. You merely put your name on the title for the plaintiffs; is that correct? A. Yes, that’s correct. … (Nacelli Depo. at 42:13-23.) Thus, Mr. Nacelli was aware that when he put the Property into his name, he was not doing so as the ‘real’ or equitable owner, but was only the named or ‘paper’ title owner holding the Property on behalf of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Mr. Nacelli asserts that Plaintiffs breached the above agreement – apparently by allowing the Property to go into foreclosure on two occasions. (Nacelli Depo. 42:21-48:4.) There were discussions between the parties during this time, and Plaintiffs eventually fixed the foreclosure issues. (Ibid.) Since Plaintiffs addressed the issues, and ultimately started making all necessary payments on the Property again, Mr. Nacelli confirmed he was continuing to hold title to the Property on behalf of Plaintiffs: Q. And then because they fixed [the foreclosure issues], you continued to hold title in your name but for [Plaintiffs] Josephine and Arnel; is that correct? A. Yes. (Nacelli Depo at 48:5-8.) Plaintiffs also dispute the claim that Ms. Paclebar had no knowledge of the above agreement, or the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 fact that Plaintiffs were the owners-in-fact of the Property. While not technically a part of the family, Plaintiffs explain that Ms. Paclebar has been treated as such for over 15 years. She has been the long- term partner of Jane Nacelli – the sister of Joseph Nacelli and Plaintiff Josephine Agapito. (Arnel Agapito Decl. ¶ 2.) She has visited Plaintiffs’ house on numerous holidays over the years. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs make clear that during these get togethers, both Plaintiffs specifically told Ms. Paclebar that they owned the Property. (Ibid.) Specifically, Arnel Agapito’s declaration states: “During these family get-togethers, on more than one occasion, my wife and I told Defendant Tina Nacelli that we owned the Mariposa Property.” (Agapito Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant’s Reply On Reply, Defendant refutes a number of the key statements in Mr. Agapito’s declaration – by citing to Mr. Agapito’s own deposition testimony. First, Defendant disputes the claim that Mr. Agapito had an agreement (or personally knew about and agreement) with Mr. Nacelli wherein he would be named the owner of the Property but would hold title for the benefit of Plaintiffs. Second, Defendant challenges the claim that Mr. Agapito told Defendant Paclebar about this alleged agreement. Specifically, with regard to supposed agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli, Mr. Agapito testified at his deposition as follows: Q. We touched on this earlier, but you personally never had a verbal agreement with Joseph [Nacelli] regarding him being on title to the Mariposa property to be held in trust for you or your wife; true? A. True. Q. If there was such a conversation, it was between your wife and Joseph; right? A. If -- if there was, it would be between Joseph and my wife. Yeah. (Agapito Depo. at 36:25-37:8.) Defendant contends the above testimony undermines the statements in the Agapito Declaration which state that Mr. and Mrs. Agapito had conversations with Mr. Nacelli regarding the arrangement and that Mr. Agapito has direct knowledge of the agreement. (See Agapito Decl. ¶¶ 4-7.) Defendant also takes issue with the declaration’s statement that “my wife and I told Defendant Tina Nacelli (sic) that we owned the Mariposa Property.” (Agapito Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant points out that Mr. Agapito’s deposition testimony is just the opposite: Q. Did you ever personally ever tell Tina that your wife and Joseph had reached a verbal agreement concerning the Mariposa property? A. No. … Q. Right. My question is a little more to the point. How do you know what Tina knows regarding any agreement between Joseph and your wife regarding any agreement between Joseph and your wife regarding the Mariposa property? How do you know SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 that? A. I don’t know. Q. You don’t know; right? A. I don’t know. I’m just speculating. (Agapito Depo. at 39:24-40:2; 68:1-7.) More specifically, Mr. Agapito testified at deposition that he “never had any conversation to -- to Tina regarding the property.” (Id. at 79:13-21.) Thus, Mr. Agapito testified at deposition that (1) he never had an agreement with Mr. Nacelli, (2) he can only speculate that Mrs. Agapito had an agreement with Mr. Nacelli, and (3) he never spoke to Mrs. Paclebar regarding that alleged agreement. Defendant also submits deposition testimony from Mr. Nacelli confirming that he never told Defendant Paclebar that he was not the true owner of the Property. (Nacelli Depo. at 31:22-32:15.) Essentially, on reply Defendant refutes any argument that she had any actual notice of the allege agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli regarding title to the Property. Analysis As noted above, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges real property claims. Thus, the focus of the Court’s inquiry relates to whether Plaintiffs has established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32.) It is undisputed that the recorded chain of title for the Property indicates that Mr. Nacelli was the owner of the Property from July 1, 2009 until December 17, 2021, when title was transferred to Defendant Paclebar. Plaintiffs’ general theory of their case is that Mr. Nacelli was holding the Property in trust for them, and that Defendant Paclebar knew this to be the case. They allege a number of different causes of action which all rely upon this general theory. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Mr. Nacelli did not actually own the Property, but was merely holding title in his name for the benefit of Plaintiffs. In fact, Mr. Nacelli admitted as much during his deposition. While Mr. Nacelli testified that he ‘believed’ that Plaintiffs’ breached their agreement – he also testified that they fixed any breach by remedying the foreclosure proceedings and continuing to make payments on the mortgage. (Nacelli Depo at 48:5-8, quoted above.) Even if there were some time limit discussed as to when Plaintiffs would transfer title into their name, there is no explanation as to why any breach of that term would result in actual title of the Property being conveyed to Mr. Nacelli. While Defendant cites to the representations made by Mr. Nacelli in, for example, the Homeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance Affidavit that he was the true ‘owner’ of the Property, Plaintiffs allege fraud and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action against Mr. Nacelli that address these representations. Mr. Nacelli’s own testimony appears to undermine his representations made in these documents. While this evidence supports their claims against Mr. Nacelli, the main focus of the instant motion SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 relates to what Defendant Paclebar was aware of – or should have been aware of. Plaintiffs evidence regarding Defendant Paclebar’s knowledge of the agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli appeared convincing on first blush. Plaintiffs show that Defendant Paclebar is not a distant third-party to parties to this litigation. While she is not legally a member of the family, she has been the long-term partner of the sister of the two main parties to the agreement – i.e. Plaintiff Mrs. Agapito and Defendant Nacelli. She has attended numerous family holidays over the years. Mr. Agapito, in his declaration in support of the opposition, affirmatively states that “my wife and I told Defendant Tina Nacelli (sic) that we owned the Mariposa Property,” during these family events. That statement, however, turns out to be false. As outlined above, Mr. Agapito testified in his deposition that (1) he personally did not have an agreement with Mr. Nacelli regarding taking title to the Property for the benefit of Plaintiffs, (2) he had no personal knowledge about any such agreement between his wife and Mr. Nacelli, and (3) he never personally told Defendant Paclebar that such an agreement existed. The statements in Mr. Agapito’s declaration were the sole basis for evidencing that Ms. Paclebar had knowledge of the alleged agreement between Plaintiffs and Mr. Nacelli. “But a declaration may not contradict factual admissions made in a deposition.” (Arnold v. Dignity Health (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 419 fn. 4 citations omitted.) As courts have made clear, in the context of summary judgment motions, a “party cannot evade summary judgment by submitted a declaration contradicting his own prior deposition testimony.” (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1120 citations omitted; see also Best Rest Motel, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 969, 708-09, citing Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12 [“A party cannot create a triable issue of fact by providing a declaration that contradicts its prior deposition testimony.”]) The rationale behind this rule applies in the current situation. It is notable that Plaintiffs failed to submit a declaration by Mrs. Agapito – who Mr. Agapito indicates was the party that allegedly had conversations with Mr. Nacelli and Mrs. Paclebar regarding the Property. Instead, they attempt to have Mr. Agapito’s declaration evidence Mrs. Agapito’s knowledge. It is clear from Mr. Agapito’s deposition testimony, however, that he does not have personal knowledge of any agreement with Mr. Nacelli, nor of any discussions with Ms. Paclebar regarding this alleged agreement. “A bona fide purchaser for value “is one who pays value for the property without notice of any adverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings.” (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 1250.) Plaintiffs have failed to provide any admissible and credible evidence showing that Mrs. Paclebar had any knowledge of the alleged agreement between Mr. Nacelli and Mrs. Agapito regarding the Property. As for paying value, Plaintiffs concede that the Property was sold for $365,000, and that Ms. Paclebar paid approximately $211,000 after the gift from Mr. Nacelli of roughly $154,000. They contend, without evidence, that this is ‘below market.’ Even if that is the case, a bone fide purchaser “need SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 only part with something of value in exchange for the property,” and that amount need not “be the fair market value of the property (or anything approaching it.)” (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 1251.) Under section 405.32, “the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” “Probable validity” means “it is more likely than not that the [plaintiff] will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim.” (Code of Civil Procedure §405.3.) Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden. As such, Defendant Paclebar’s motion to expunge the lis pendens is granted. Attorney Fees California Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38 provides: The court shall direct that the party prevailing on [a motion to expunge a lis pendens] be awarded the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust. Plaintiff contends that their recording of the lis pendens was not frivolous and as such attorney’s fees and costs should be denied, citing a couple of unpublished federal district opinions. (Opp. at 12:25- 13:4.) Such decisions are “neither binding nor controlling on matters of state law.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 175.) Plaintiffs have made no showing that they ‘acted with substantial justification.’ Instead, it appears to be quite the opposite. Plaintiffs’ opposition relies upon statements in Mr. Agapito’s supporting declaration, made under penalty of perjury, which are directly contradicted by his earlier deposition testimony. They fail to provide any admissible evidence showing that Ms. Paclebar had knowledge of the alleged agreement between Mrs. Agapito and Mr. Nacelli. Based on the above, the Court finds that attorney fees are properly awarded to Defendant in the amount of $4,675.

Case Number: 23STCV24766 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: David Oday, et al. v. 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV24766 MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOVING PARTY : Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiffs David Oday and Lakota Patrick Ford CASE HISTORY : · 10/11/23: Complaint filed. · 01/10/24: First Amended Complaint filed. · 03/01/24: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a breach of contract and habitability defect action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to replace the roof of Plaintiffs condominium, causing extensive water damage and mold throughout the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly issued special assessments in violation of the operative covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the property, and retaliated against Plaintiffs for raising these issues. Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as Plaintiff David Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). DISCUSSION: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states: In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 533.) Modification of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case. ( Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.) The party seeking modification has the burden of proving that the request is justified. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) Analysis Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to post the undertaking of $70,416.09 ordered by the Court. (See February 22, 2024 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs, in opposition, state that payment in the amount specified by the Courts order was deposited with the Court on June 26, 2024, with notice given to Defendant the next day. (Declaration of Scott J. Kalter ISO Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs deposit of the funds to the Court is effective as a posting of a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710, but only if the deposit is accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.710(c).) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not executed such an agreement, and, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved. The Court concurs with Defendant that an authorization to dispose of the funds to satisfy liability is required for Plaintiffs deposit to be considered posting of the bond under section 995.710. In response to the Courts prior tentative ruling, Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has submitted an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED given that Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Moving party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

S-CV-0050801 State Farm General Ins. Company vs. Gofort Power Inc. ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required. First amended complaint [filed 12/06/23] is not at issue - Need responsive pleading, default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Gofort Power Inc.

Case Number: 23STCV14641 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Case Name: H Wood Apartments, LLC, et al. v. Luxurban Hotels, Inc., et al. Case No.: 23STCV14641 Matter: Motion for Assignment Order Moving Party: Plaintiffs H Wood Apartments, LLC and SevenWest Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted. Judgment Creditors to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 10, 2024, the Court entered a stipulated judgment that required Defendant LuxUrban Hotels, Inc. to ultimately pay $318,000 to Plaintiffs H Wood Apartments, LLC and SevenWest. Plaintiffs H Wood Apartments, LLC and SevenWest now seek an order instructing Judgment Debtor LuxUrban Hotels, Inc. . . . to assign its interest in any money and/or assets held by Roth Capital Partners, LLC, and all rights to payment thereunder, to Judgment Creditors to the extent necessary to pay Judgment Creditors judgment in full, including accrued interest through the date of payment. An assignment order is a court order assigning to the judgment creditor or a receiver appointed pursuant to CCP § 708.610 et seq. [ ] the debtor's right to payments due from a third person. It is authorized by CCP § 708.510 et seq. [CCP § 708.510(a); see Landstar Global Logistics, Inc. v. Robinson & Robinson, Inc. (2013) 216 CA4th 378, 390, 156 CR3d 687, 697statutory provisions re assignment orders are subject to strict construction]. (Ahart, Cal. Prac. Guide Enf. J. & Debt (2021) Ch. 6G-5.) All or part of a right to payment due, or to become due, may be ordered assigned whether or not such right is conditioned upon future developments. [CCP § 708.510(a)]. ( Ibid .) The court has broad discretion in determining whether to order an assignment, and in fixing the amount to be assigned. ( Ibid .) The court may consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to: the reasonable economic needs of a natural person judgment debtor and those supported partly or wholly by the debtor; payments the judgment debtor is required to make or that are deducted in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments; the amount remaining due on the money judgment; and the amount remaining to be received on the right to payment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 708.510(c).) Because there is no opposition, the Motion is granted. (See Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4 th 1403, 1410.) Judgment Creditors to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Monday, July 22, 2024, Line 5. 2 - DEFENDANT NUNUNG SUGIYANTI's DEMURRER to 1ST Amended COMPLAINT. Transferred to be heard in department 501 on July 30, 2024. That department handles all wrongful eviction cases per SF Local Rule 8.10A1. =(302/CK)