Village Oaks Realty Ii Inc Vs Alain Arencibia Diaz Et Al

HULL, ET AL. VS. THE CADLE COMPANY, ET AL. Case Number: 22CV-0200159 Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions (“OSC”) issued on May 17, 2024, to Plaintiffs James Hull and Shirley Hull for failure to abide by California Rule of Court 3.110. Defendant Tri Counties Bank was amended into the Complaint on January 24, 2024. There has been no summons issued for Tri Counties Bank, and they have not been served. The matter is not at issue. No response to the OSC has been filed. Plaintiff remains in violation of CRC 3.110. Sanctions will be imposed in the amount of $250. The clerk is instructed to prepare a separate Order of Sanctions. The Court confirms today’s review hearing set for 9:00 a.m.

S-CV-0050523 Patel, Ragini vs. Kaur, Manjit et al ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged Appearance required.

Case Number: 23STCV25326 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT PATRICK MOLLOY, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. CAREY HELLMAN, etc., et al., Defendants. CASE NO.: 231STCV25326 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT Date: July 30, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Defendant Carey Hellman dba Hellman Associates (Hellman) RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. BACKGROUND This action was filed on October 17, 2023 and arises out of construction work performed by Defendant Hellman on Plaintiffs duplex (the Project). The proposal for the Project was presented by Hellman to Plaintiffs on December 10, 2022. (Complaint, para. 6.) Hellman performed work on the Project from January 6 to April, 2023. (Complaint, para. 12.) Plaintiffs allege that After some of [the allegedly deficient work] came to light, [Plaintiffs] learned that Hellmans contractors license with the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) was inactive or had lapsed. They further discovered that some of the subcontractors Hellman hired for the work were also not licensed. (Complaint, para. 16.) The Complaint alleges causes of action for Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract; 2) Negligence; 3) Breach of Implied Warranty; 4) Disgorgement Per Bus. & Prof. Code (B&PC) §7031; 5) Unfair Business Practices Per B&PC § 17200, et seq. ; and 6) Fraud. All of these causes of action rely, among other things, on Plaintiffs allegation that Hellman was an unlicensed contractor at the time he performed work on the Project. On December 22, 2023, Defendant Hellman filed his demurrer to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action of the Complaint. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendants Request for Judicial Notice of a copy of a Contractors License naming Hellman and dated January 1982 is DENIED. This is not an official record of the status of Hellmans license at the time of his work on the Project. The Court does, however, accept the Declaration of Christopher L. Mass, Esq. in Support of Opposition to Demurrer (Mass Decl.), which provides the foundation for the record of the status of Hellmans contractors license since November 1, 2009. This document evidences that Defendants license was not active during the period of time that Defendant was working on the Project. DISCUSSION Legal Standard Legal Standard for Demurrer [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis for Demurrer Fourth Cause of Action Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for Disgorgement is not a valid cause of action because it is based on the allegation that Defendant was not licensed while working on the Project, whereas Defendant possessed a contractors license during the entire construction project. Defendants purported evidence of his initial licensure in 1983 does not, however, support his contention that he was actively licensed when he worked on the Project. [1] The evidence supplied by the Mass Declaration shows that Defendant was not actively licensed during his work on the Project. Defendants Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action of the Complaint is therefore OVERRULED. Fifth Cause of Action Defendants Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the B&PC Section 17200 for Unfair Business Practices depends upon his position that he was not in violation of the CSLB rules for contractor licensing at the time he performed work on the Project. As indicated above, the Court does not accept Defendants position that he was licensed throughout his work on the Project. Even if he were so licensed, which apparently he was not, the allegation that his subcontractors were also not licensed would provide all necessary support for an Unfair Business Practices claim. (Complaint, para. 16.) Defendants Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action of the Complaint is therefore OVERRULED. Sixth Cause of Action Defendants Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud is also based upon the premise that Defendant was properly licensed throughout the time he worked on the Project. Defendant has not established that this is the case and, for that reason, the Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 30th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court [1] Although the Demurrer makes a reference to the one year statute of limitations for claims under B&PC Section 7031, Defendant worked on the Project from January through April of 2023 and this action was filed on October 17, 2023 well within any one year statute of limitations.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 23, 2024 line 3. DEFENDANT EASTWOOD DEVELOPMENT INC., LUCAS EASTWOOD, 4028 25TH STREET, LLC DEMURRER TO 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT is continued to August 23, 2024 on Court's own motion. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

23CV47102 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is on calendar for July 26, 2024. Defendant has requested a continuance of thirty days to obtain and analyze the relevant Parcel Map to determine if Plaintiff’s claims in the Reply are correct. The court finds there is good cause for Defendant’s request and grants the same. Accordingly, the matter is continued to August 30, 2024, at 9:00 am in Department 2. PG&E v DKM, LLC

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 26, 2024 line 5. PLAINTIFF ONE STEUART LANE 603 LLC MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES DENIED. Opposition filed. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23STCV24766 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: David Oday, et al. v. 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV24766 MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOVING PARTY : Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiffs David Oday and Lakota Patrick Ford CASE HISTORY : · 10/11/23: Complaint filed. · 01/10/24: First Amended Complaint filed. · 03/01/24: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a breach of contract and habitability defect action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to replace the roof of Plaintiffs condominium, causing extensive water damage and mold throughout the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly issued special assessments in violation of the operative covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the property, and retaliated against Plaintiffs for raising these issues. Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as Plaintiff David Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). DISCUSSION: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states: In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 533.) Modification of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case. ( Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.) The party seeking modification has the burden of proving that the request is justified. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) Analysis Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to post the undertaking of $70,416.09 ordered by the Court. (See February 22, 2024 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs, in opposition, state that payment in the amount specified by the Courts order was deposited with the Court on June 26, 2024, with notice given to Defendant the next day. (Declaration of Scott J. Kalter ISO Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs deposit of the funds to the Court is effective as a posting of a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710, but only if the deposit is accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.710(c).) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not executed such an agreement, and, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved. The Court concurs with Defendant that an authorization to dispose of the funds to satisfy liability is required for Plaintiffs deposit to be considered posting of the bond under section 995.710. In response to the Courts prior tentative ruling, Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has submitted an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED given that Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Moving party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 23STCV08125 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 82 Wilmington Trust, N.A., Case No. 23STCV08125 v. Hearing: July 26, 2024 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse Maguire Properties Department: 82 350 S. Figueroa, LLC Judge: Stephen I. Goorvitch [Tentative] Order Denying Motion for Leave to Intervene INTRODUCTION Proposed Intervening Defendant Nonghyup Bank, as Trustee of Meritz Private Real Estate Fund 27, c/o Meritz Alternative Investment Management (Meritz or the Proposed Intervenor) seeks leave to intervene in this action as a defendant. Meritz moves for mandatory intervention pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387(d)(1)(B), or, in the alternative, permissive intervention pursuant to section 387(d)(2). Plaintiff Wilmington Trust National Association, as Trustee on behalf of the Holders of GCT Commercial Mortgage Trust 2021-GCT, Commercial Mortgage Passthrough Certificates, Series 2021-GCT (Plaintiff) opposes the motion. This action arises from the $465 million debt financing of properties known as the Gas Company Tower and World Trade Center Parking Garage located at 555 W. Fifth Street and 350 S. Figueroa Street in Los Angeles, CA (the property). The $465 million loan facility for the property was split into three tranches: (1) the $350 million senior mortgage loan; (2) a $65 million Mezzanine A loan; and (3) a $50 million Mezzanine B loan. Only the senior loan is secured by a deed of trust on the property. Plaintiff, as assignee of the senior lender, seeks specific performance of the rents, issues, and profits clause of the deed of trust securing the $350 million senior loan for the Property. A receiver has been appointed to manage the property, collect rents, and market the property for sale. Meritz, an assignee of a mezzanine lender and potential bidder, now contends that it has a direct interest in the property and the outcome of this action. The court concludes that Meritzs asserted interest is, at most, indirect and consequential. Accordingly, the motion is denied. BACKGROUND On or about February 5, 2021, Citi Real Estate Funding Inc. and Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A. (the Original Senior Lenders) originated a $350 million mortgage loan (Senior Loan), which was securitized into a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) facility that is currently administered by Plaintiff. The Senior Loan is secured by a deed of trust that encumbers the Property. (Allegrette Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, Exh. 1.) Simultaneously with origination of the Senior Loan, Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. and Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC (Original Mezz A Lenders) originated a $65 million Mezzanine A loan, as evidenced by, among other documents, a Mezzanine A Loan Agreement (Mezz A Loan). Meritz submits evidence that it acquired ownership of the Mezz A Loan on or about March 4, 2021, having purchased the loan from the Original Mezz A Lenders. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 9, Exh. 5-1 and 5-2.) According to Meritzs principal and co-founder, Russ Allegrette, the Mezz A Loan is secured by a pledge of 100% membership interests in the owners of the Property, Defendants Maguire Properties 350 S. Figueroa, LLC, and Maguire Properties 555 W. Fifth, LLC. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 9; see also Suppl. Allegrette Decl. ¶ 2.) As stated succinctly by Plaintiff, Meritz holds only a pledge of membership interests in the Defendant property owners. (Amended and Replacement Memorandum in Opposition to Application to Intervene [Oppo.] 10:28.) [1] On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed its verified complaint seeking specific performance of the terms and provisions of the deed of trust and appointment of a receiver. On April 19, 2023, the court (Beckloff, J.) appointed Gregg Williams as receiver (the receiver) to manage and market the property, collect rents, and review and evaluate offers from third parties with respect to the sale of the property. On May 24, 2023, the court entered an order confirming the appointment. Meritz has expressed interest in bidding on the property and contacted the receiver directly in March 2024 seeking a tour of the Property. (Receiver Decl. ¶¶ 3-6.) In March 2024, Meritz, as a non-party, filed an opposition to the receivers ex parte application for authorization to enter a lease with the City of Los Angeles for certain premises in the property. The receiver later withdrew that motion. On May 3, 2024, the receiver filed an ex parte application for approval of an exclusive listing agreement in order to sell the property. Meritz filed an opposition. The court granted the ex parte application. (See courts minute order, dated May 13, 2024.) LEGAL STANDARD A. Mandatory Intervention Under Code of Civil Procedure section 387(d)(1)(B), a non-party may intervene as a matter of right if that non-party claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. The moving party must make a timely application and submit a proposed pleading. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 387(c) and (d)(1).) Section 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention. ( Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1200.) B. Permissive Intervention Under Code of Civil Procedure section 387, the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where the following factors are met: (1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. ( Siena Court Homeowners Ass'n, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 1428.) DISCUSSION A. Mandatory Intervention 1. Meritz does not demonstrate a sufficient interest in the transaction For mandatory intervention, Meritz must show that the interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action & is a significantly protectable interest. ( Siena Court Homeowners Assn v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423-1424.) To demonstrate a significant protectable interest, an applicant must establish that the interest is protectable under some law and that there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue. ( Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Assn (9th Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 893, 897.) Meritz argues that it should be granted mandatory intervention given [its] position as the mezzanine lender, its interests in the Property, the subject matter of this action, and the outcome of this action. (Application to Intervene (Appl.) 13:7-9.) The court disagrees. Meritz does not claim an interest in the property that is the subject of this action. The complaint includes a single cause of action for specific performance of the deed of trust that secures the Property. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-24.) Only the Senior Loan is secured by the deed of trust on the Property. The Mezz A Loan, which was assigned to Meritz, does not hold a security interest in the Property. (See Allegrette Decl. ¶¶ 2-11, Exh. 1-5.) This is clear from the Intercreditor Agreement (ICA), in which Meritzs predecessor acknowledged that the Mezz A Loan does not constitute or impose & a lien or encumbrance upon, or security interest in any portion of the Premises or any other collateral securing the Senior Loan or any assets of Borrower&. ( Id . Exh. 6 at p. 27, ¶ 2(a).) Nor does Meritz claim an interest in the transaction that is the subject of this action. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the borrower has defaulted on the Senior Loan by failing to make payments due and that Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of terms and conditions of the deed of trust, which encumbers the Property. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-24.) The claim does not involve any default on the Mezz A Loan or any contractual dispute related to the Mezz A Loan, the ICA, or the interrelationship between the senior and mezzanine lenders. (See generally California Physicians Service v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 91, 96 [health insurers contract claim was not the transaction at issue in the subscribers tort action].) Meritz suggests that it has an interest in the property or transaction at issue in the complaint because Mezz A Borrower pledged one hundred percent (100%) of its membership interests in the Defendants to Original Mezz A Lenders to secure the Mezz A Loan. (Appl. 5:19-20.) As phrased in the reply, Meritz contends that if it were to exercise remedies as contemplated under the Pledge Agreement, Meritz would own and control the Receivership Defendants . (Reply 3:19-21.) This argument is not persuasive. If Meritz exercised its purported remedies, it would own and control the receivership defendants and therefore would not need to intervene. Rather, Meritz seeks to intervene on its own behalf as a mezzanine lender. Further, Meritz concedes that there is an event of default under the Senior Loan and that Defendants would not have access to such sums to make payments to Mezz A Lender. (Appl. 4:21-23.) Meritz does not present any evidence suggesting that, if it exercised rights to assume membership interests in the Defendants, it would have any greater interest in the Property than it does now as a mezzanine lender. Under such circumstances, Meritz does not show that a lien on membership interests of the Defendants confers a protectable interest in the Property or in the transaction at issue in the complaint. (See Corp. Code § 17701.04(a) [A limited liability company is an entity distinct from its members.]; § 17703.04(a) [debts, obligations, and liabilities of an LLC do not become the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or manager].) Citing various provisions of the loan documents, Meritz contends that the action could indirectly impact its interests as a mezzanine lender. (See Appl. 4-10.) As an example, Meritz states that the Senior Loan Agreement also makes extensive reference to the existence of the Mezzanine A Loan and Mezzanine B Loan, including: (i) stating in Section 1.1 that the lien and security interests created by each Mezzanine Loan Agreement, the Other Mezzanine Loan Documents and any loan documents entered into with respect to a Replacement Mezzanine Loan are Permitted Encumbrances on the Property. (Appl. 4:3-7.) Meritz cites section 8.5 of the Senior Loan Agreement, which pertains to the remittance of debt service payments under the Mezz A Loan from Property cash flow. (Appl. 4:12-16.) As Meritz concedes, these provisions are conditioned so long as no Event of Default had occurred. (Appl. 4:10.) Later, Meritz cites to provisions of the ICA that, according to Meritz, authorize payments to mezzanine lenders following repayment of the Senior Loan. (Appl. 7:23.) Since it is undisputed that an event of default has occurred and the Senior Loan has not been repaid, Meritzs interest in excess proceeds is indirect and consequential. (See Continental Vinyl Products Corp. v. Mead Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 543, 550 [a n unsecured creditor of a defendant who will be rendered unable to pay the debt if he loses a lawsuit is held to have only a consequential interest not justifying intervention in the litigation]; see also Id. at 553 [a shareholder has a consequential but not direct interest in the outcome of litigation involving the corporation].) Meritz also asserts that the ICA reflects additional agreements between the Original Senior Lender and the Mezzanine Lenders in respect of matters such as removal and replacement of the property manager for the Properties, budget approval and requests for disbursement of sums held in reserve. (Appl. 7:25-28, citing Allegrette Decl. ¶ 14.) Relatedly, Meritz asserts that section 15(a) of the ICA requires written consent of the mezzanine lenders in certain circumstances. (Appl. 8.) Meritzs briefs and the Allegrette declarations do not analyze the specific contract terms upon which Meritz relies or explain how they are relevant to this action, including the courts appointment of a receiver. Accordingly, the arguments are forfeited for purposes of this application. ( Nelson v. Avondale HOA (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862-863 [When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived].) Moreover, in its proposed answer, Meritz does not allege any defense based on breach of the ICA or other loan document. This action concerns Defendants default and the specific performance of the deed of trust, and Meritz does not show that any contract dispute related to the ICA is directly at issue in this action. The court has considered Meritzs remaining contentions, including about the complexity of the capital stack utilized in this transaction by the Original Senior Lenders. (See Appl. 2:7-8.) None convinces the court that Meritz claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 387(d)(1)(B).) Accordingly, Meritz is not entitled to mandatory intervention. 2. Meritzs interests are adequately represented The court also concludes that Meritzs interests as a mezzanine lender, including its interests in any excess proceeds from the Property, are adequately represented by the courts appointment of a receiver and the courts review and approval of any offer to purchase the property. A receiver is an agent and officer of the court, and is under the control and supervision of the court&. The receiver is also a fiduciary who must act for the benefit of all parties interested in the property. ( City of Chula Vista v. Gutierrez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.) Meritz does not argue or present evidence that the Receiver has acted in bad faith or has taken any actions inconsistent with an intention to maximize the value of the Property. Nor does Meritz develop any argument that Plaintiff, acting for the Senior Lender, has acted in bad faith or taken actions inconsistent with maximizing the value of the Property. (See Continental Vinyl Products Corp. v. Mead Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 543, 553 [denying major shareholders request to intervene because there was no allegation of bad faith on the part of the trustee or implication that he intends to abandon prosecution of the litigation to the fullest extent possible].) Finally, the receiver has given Meritz notice of the ex parte applications he has filed in this action; Meritz does not claim a lack of notice of any proceeding; and the court has considered Meritzs oppositions to applications filed by the Receiver. (See Receivers Statement 2; see also Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1184(c) [notice for receivers final report].) Therefore, Meritzs motion for mandatory intervention is denied. B. Permissive Intervention The court denies permissive intervention for several reasons. As discussed, Meritz does not have a direct and immediate interest in this action. Moreover, intervention will greatly enlarge the issues in the litigation. Finally, the purported reasons for intervention do not outweigh the opposing parties concerns. Indeed, the court has genuine concerns that Meritz is pursuing intervention merely to obtain a strategic advantage in purchasing the building. Previously, Meritz opposed the receivers efforts to retain a broker to market and sell the property. Some of Meritzs arguments were factually incorrect. For example: Counsel for the Bank argued that the listing agreement favors a sale to the City of Los Angeles. To the contrary, the listing agreement caps the commission for a sale to the City of Los Angeles and provides the same or higher commissions for a sale to purchasers other than the City or County of Los Angeles. Regardless, the court will review and approve any sale, which will include a review of all credible offers, so the listing agent cannot sell the property to the City of Los Angeles if there is a better offer. (Courts Minute Order, dated May 13, 2024, at 2.) More important, Meritz had no valid reason to oppose retention of a real estate broker to list the property for sale. (See ibid .) Meritzs opposition appears to have been nothing more than an attempt to delay the real estate listing to a time when there would be fewer prospective buyers and more comparable buildings, which would benefit Meritzs efforts to purchase the building: At the hearing, counsel for Nonghyup expressed concern that the Receiver is seeking appointment of a receiver on an ex parte basis and seeks to list the property in mid-June. The court finds no basis to delay appointment of a listing agent, as counsel for Nonghyup raises no valid objections to the listing agreement. Nor did counsel raise any concerns that suggest the court would benefit from further briefing. To the contrary, the court finds good cause to handle this matter on an expedited basis: (1) There are identified potential buyers for the Property that may not be available three months from now, including both the City and County of Los Angeles; (2) Any delay works against the markets perceived value of the Property; (3) Spring is the ideal time to list a commercial real estate investment property in Southern California; and (4) It is prudent to sell the property before the uncertainty of the election. (See Declaration of Jeffrey Bramson, ¶¶ 16-21.) The court also relies on the representation of Gregg Williams that he is aware of four comparable properties in receivership that will be marketed later this year, which may make it difficult to sell the property, i.e ., based upon the competition, especially given the declining market for office real estate. ( Ibid .) The receiverwho is a neutral party in this disputeraises a legitimate concern that Meritz will use intervention to obstruct any actions by the receiver that are inconsistent with Meritzs interests as a bidder on the property. Meritz previously did so in attempting to delay the receivers efforts to list the building for sale. Simply, Meritz has a conflict of interest. Meritz cannot seek intervention to protect its alleged security interest while seeking to purchase the building. Such an outcome would permit Meritz to attempt to sabotage any effort to sell the property to a purchaser other than Meritz. Therefore, the motion for permissive intervention is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Based upon the foregoing, the Proposed Intervenors motion is denied. Counsel for the receiver shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 26, 2024 ______________________ Stephen I. Goorvitch Superior Court Judge [1] A $50 million Mezzanine B loan (Mezz B Loan) was also originated as part of the debt facility related to the Property. In its motion, Meritz has not claimed an interest in the Mezz B Loan. (See Allegrette Decl. and Suppl. Allegrette Decl. generally.)