Case Number: 24SMCV00625 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC to give notice. REASONING Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC (Plaintiff) requests judicial notice of the Deed of Trust recorded November 6, 2019, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20191198681; the Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded February 12, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210247143; and the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded March 3, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210348502. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). Analysis Plaintiff moves the Court for an order granting summary judgment or adjudication in its favor on the grounds that Defendants Eliyahu Marciano and Anthony Marciano (Defendants) have not paid any rent to Plaintiff since the time Plaintiff acquired and perfected its title to the property; the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 does not apply to this action or the tenancy because the more restrictive local ordinance applies instead, and Plaintiff has complied with all provisions of the local ordinance; and any contention that service of the complaint was defective is inapposite where Defendants appeared in the action and filed an answer. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) [T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it owns the premises at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard in Venice, and Defendants entered into a written fixed-term lease with Palms Blvd. Venice Beach, LLC for the period of November 30, 2020 to May 31, 2022 with monthly rent at $4,500, payable on the seventh day of each calendar month. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-8.) Plaintiff acquired title and ownership of the property following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and title was perfected on March 3, 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants failed to pay any rent after Plaintiff acquired title to the property, and Defendants comply with the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, which expired on January 26, 2024, a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, a second 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, or a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit. Plaintiff seeks past-due rent of $162,000 under four notices, holdover damages, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-19.) The basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed. (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16.) Plaintiff provides evidence that it acquired title to the subject real property at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard, Venice, California 90291 following a foreclosure sale that went forward on February 4, 2021, and Plaintiff perfected its title to the property by recording a Trustees Deed Upon Sale on March 21, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The property consists of a five-bedroom main residence with an additional guesthouse containing two additional bedrooms. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 3.) Shortly after acquiring the property, on April 7, 2021, Defendants presented Plaintiff with a copy of a residential lease purportedly entered into by Defendants and the prior owner, Palms Blvd Venice Beach, LLC (Palms, LLC). (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff states it was unaware, prior to April 7, 2021, that any lease existed for any tenants or occupants of the property. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 7.) The lease reflects that, on November 30, 2020, Defendants entered into a residential lease for the property with Palms, LLC, providing that Defendants were to pay $4,500.00 per month, beginning on November 30, 2020, payable on the seventh day of each month, for a term expiring on May 31, 2022. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has not received any rent from Defendants since acquiring title to the property on or about February 4, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 9.) On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff proceeded with a civil lawsuit against Defendants, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 21STCV16332 (HOF REO 1 LLC v. Marciano) to ascertain the validity of the lease, but Plaintiff ultimately dismissed the civil suit and concedes here that the lease is a bona fide lease between Defendants and the prior owner, Palms, LLC. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 10.) However, Plaintiff contends there was never any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants directly to occupy the property, whether in writing, oral, or otherwise. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff served a total of four separate notices to pay rent to quit as follows: (1) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, totaling $31,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) (2) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, totaling $76,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) (3) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning February 7, 2023, through November 7, 2023, totaling $45,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) (4) On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning January 7, 2024, through February 7, 2024, totaling $9,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) The time for Defendants to cure under each of the notices expired, and no payment was received, nor was there any attempt to make payment. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 12; Labarre Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also provides evidence that it has complied with Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09, which applies in place of Civil Code section 1946.2 because the local ordinance is more protective (see Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B; Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶¶ 3-8, Exs. A-E), and Defendants answered the complaint on March 8, 2024, thereby waiving any argument that service of the complaint was incomplete (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1014 [A defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers].) The lease agreement provided with the motion shows that Defendants entered into the lease with the prior owner, Palms, LLC, which Plaintiff does not dipsute. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 5.) The lease agreement includes information on how to pay rent; specifically, lease payments must be made at the landlords address stated in the notices provision of the lease in paragraph 46. (Ibid.) Notably, Plaintiff provided no evidence with its initial motion that it informed Defendants of the name, telephone number, and address of the person or entity to whom rent payment must be made after Plaintiff became owner of the property, which is required under Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c). The statute states that an owner shall not serve a notice to pay rent or quit or otherwise evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent that accrued during a period of noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 (ibid.), and merely making contact with Defendants is insufficient to show compliance with the statute. The Court continued the hearing on the motion, despite Defendants nonappearance at the hearing, and required Plaintiff to show compliance with the statute. In its supplemental filing, Plaintiff provides evidence that on November 22, 2023, it served a Notice Regarding Residential Lease, which provided Defendants with Plaintiffs name, a copy of the Trustees Deed Upon Sale through which Plaintiff acquired title, provided contact information for Plaintiffs agents, included information for service of process, provided the name and address for payments to be made, and included a copy of the lease agreement. (Labarre Supplemental Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. F.) While compliance with Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c), makes it such that Defendants may be liable for unpaid rent during the earlier noncompliance period, it is axiomatic that there is a one-year ceiling on a rent demand, i.e., a three-day notice can only demand rent accrued within one year prior to its service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2).) Plaintiff states that the first notice was served on December 22, 2023, seeking rent owing from March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, which clearly exceeds the one-year limit, and the second notice, served on the same day, sought rent owing from October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, also exceeding the one-year limit. While Code of Civil Procedure section 1179.05 tolled the one-year limitations period if the landlord was prohibited by COVID-19 related authority from demanding payment of rent, Plaintiff has not alleged any such tolling under this statute or any other statute. Thus, Plaintiff has not clearly established its claim for unlawful detainer as to the first two notices, and Plaintiff has moved only for summary judgment, not adjudication. Thus, the burden does not shift to Defendants to create a triable issue of material fact. For these reasons, Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Evidentiary Objections Defendants object to certain statements within the declarations of Kevin Holliday and Olivier J. Labarre. Defendants objections are OVERRULED.

Case Number: 24AVCV00237 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This is a quiet title action. Plaintiff Clearview Real Estate Holdings, LLC (Plaintiff) alleges presents that the real property at issue is commonly known as 1741 Viridian Ave., Lancaster, CA 93534 and provides the legal description in Exhibit A of the Complaint (the Subject Property). Plaintiff further presents that it is the current and true legal and equitable titleholder to the Subject Property by way of a perfected and duly recorded trustees deed upon sale; Defendant Amir Aki Shaheed-Edwards (Shaheed-Edwards) is the former borrower under that certain deed of trust dated September 16, 2019, and recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County as Document Number 20190977291 and has no valid right, title, lien, or interest in the Subject Property; and that Defendant Society Ventures LLC (Society Ventures) claims to have a lien interest in the Subject Property through the fraudulent use of a UCC Financing Statement recorded against the Subject Property which was recorded as Document Number 20230558836 on or about August 22, 2023, but has no valid right to title, lien or interest in the Subject Property as UCC Financing Statement cannot create a security interest in real property. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title and cancel clouds on title on the Subject Property. On February 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Complaint alleging three causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Cancellation of Instrument, and (3) Slander of Title. On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 1 to Diane Merritt and a Notice of Lis Pendens. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 2 to Amir Aki Shaheed-Edwards dba Bait Califa Trust. On April 02, 2024, Society Ventures filed a Request to Waive Court Fees, subsequently denied. On April 05, 2024, Society Ventures filed a Motion to Quash Service. The Motion to Quash Service was voided on May 07, 2024 as Society Ventures, a corporation, was trying to proceed in pro per with an individual non-attorney representing it. (See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146 [A corporation has the capacity to bring a lawsuit because it has all the powers of a natural person in carrying out its business. However, under a long-standing common law rule of procedure, a corporation, unlike a natural person, cannot represent itself before courts of record in propria persona, nor can it represent itself through a corporate officer, director or other employee who is not an attorney. It must be represented by licensed counsel in proceedings before courts of record.].) On April 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order Prohibiting Defendants from Encumbering/Transferring Real Property, subsequently granted on April 19, 2024. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff requested default as to Society Ventures, LLC. The Court set an Order to Show Cause (OSC) regarding entry of default on Society Ventures for April 30, 2024. On April 26, 2024, the Court held a hearing on an OSC titled, OSC RE: Why A Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue Cancelling the March 4, 2024 Trustee's Deed Upon Sale In Favor of Defendant Society Ventures, LLC, Recorded Against the Subject Property, Recorded In the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office. There were no appearances. At this hearing, the Court advanced and vacated the OSC regarding entry of default on Society Ventures and continued it to June 24, 2024 at 08:30 AM in Department A14 at Michael Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse. The Court gave notice of the change. On May 06, 2024, Shaheed-Edwards filed his Answer. On June 24, 2024, the OSC regarding entry of default on Society Ventures was held. On June 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Opposition. On July 02, 2024, Society Ventures filed its Reply. . . .[A]ll reply papers [shall be filed with the court and a copy served on each party] a t least five court days before the hearing. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).) Section 1013, which extends the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, does not apply to a notice of motion, papers opposing a motion, or reply papers governed by this section. ( Ibid .) The hearing is set for July 09, 2024. July 04, 2024 is a national holiday resulting in court closure. As such, five court days before the hearing is July 01, 2024. A Reply should have been filed by July 01, 2024 to be timely. The Reply is untimely. No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).) The Court, in its discretion, does not consider the late filed Reply. ----- Legal Standard Standard to Quash Service Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10 provides: A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. (2) To stay or dismiss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum. (3) To dismiss the action pursuant to the applicable provisions of Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 583.110) of Title 8. When a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service. ( Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403,413; see also Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [. . .where a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.].) Chapter 1.5 provides the Court with the discretionary ability to dismiss for delay in prosecution pursuant to this article on its own motion or on motion of the defendant if to do so appears to the court appropriate under the circumstances of the case. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.410.) ----- Discussion Application The Court notes that there is a Proof of Service that is signed by a registered process server. (See Proof of Substituted Service). This creates a presumption of service. (See Cal. Evid. Code § 647.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20, which discusses substituted service provides: (a) In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the person to be served as specified in Section 416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, at his or her usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. (b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the persons dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing. (c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), if the only address reasonably known for the person to be served is a private mailbox obtained through a commercial mail receiving agency, service of process may be effected on the first delivery attempt by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the commercial mail receiving agency in the manner described in subdivision (d) of Section 17538.5 of the Business and Professions Code. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40, discussing out of state service provides: A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form of mail is deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing. The Court emphasizes that Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40 allows service on a person outside of this state (1) in any manner provided by this article or (2) by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Accordingly, the Court must take into consideration all allowed methods under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.10-416.3, which discuss manner of service of summons. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 allows service by mail in a similar fashion to the second alternative allowed in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40: A summons may be served by mail as provided in this section. A copy of the summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of the notice and acknowledgment provided for in subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30(a).) Though there are differences between the two Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 415.30 and 415.40, the Court finds case law on Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.30 helpful for the issue of whether PO box service is allowed by code: The Judicial Council comment following Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50 states service by mail is not required "where a defendant's whereabouts and his dwelling house or usual place of abode, etc. cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence." (Judicial Council of Cal. com., Deering's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1991 ed.) § 415.50, p. 676.) However, we do not read this comment to exclude service by mail in the instant case. Although respondent could not ascertain appellant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode," we believe the post office box falls into the "etc." category. (See Donel Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 327 [150 Cal. Rptr. 855] [where mailing of summons is reasonably feasible, any method of service less likely to provide actual notice is insufficient]; Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 315-318 [94 L. Ed. 865, 873-876, 70 S. Ct. 652] [for the same proposition]; see also U.S. v. $84,740.00 U.S. Currency (9th Cir. 1990) 900 F.2d 1402 [in addition to service by publication, the government served defendants with a forfeiture complaint by sending two certified letters to defendants' post office box].) Our finding a post office box is a sufficient address for compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30 also is supported by case law interpreting the statutory predecessor to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50. Former Code of Civil Procedure section 413 required "a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited in the post office, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence. . . ." (Italics added.) At least two courts defined the term "residence" not as the defendant's abode, but rather as "the address at which letters would be most likely to reach the defendant." ( Sousa v. Freitas (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 663 [89 Cal. Rptr. 485]; cf. San Diego Sav. Bank v. Goodsell (1902) 137 Cal. 420, 427 [70 P. 299].) This interpretation of "residence" is relevant to our holding a post office box is a sufficient address for service under Code of Civil Procedure 415.30 because it demonstrates how statutory language and judicial comments should be read to achieve the statute's fundamental objective of serving notice on the defendant. Whenever possible, a statute should be interpreted as broadly as necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose. (See generally, S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 [interpreting language in Securities and Exchange Commision rule 10b-5 as broadly and as flexibly as necessary to accomplish the statute's purpose]; cf. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist . (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 408, 425 [261 Cal. Rptr. 384, 777 P.2d 157] [where a statute has two possible interpretations, courts should apply the more reasonable of the two].) ( Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Hendrix (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 740, 745-46.) Thus, it appears when taking case law, statute, and the context of the mailed service into consideration, that Plaintiff has not effected service in a way that is authorized by California law. That is, Plaintiff has sent a copy of the summons and of the complaint to Diane Merrit at an address that is not associated with Society Ventures. The address associated with Society Ventures is 3500 Lennox Rd., Atlanta, GA 30326. (See Stewart Decl. 3, Exh. B.) The Court notes that the declaration provided by Jessie Stewart (Stewart), the manager of Society Ventures, states that Diane Merritts only authority was to conduct the trustee sales related to the Subject Property and Diane Merrit has no connection with the 8549 Wilshire Blvd. address other than its association with the one time public/private lien sale pursuant to UCC. (See Stewart Decl. ¿¿ 5-7.) Service on a corporation must be to (1) the person designated as agent for service of process as provided by any provision in Section 202, 1502, 2105, or 2107 of the Corporations Code (or Sections 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code, as in effect on December 31, 1976, with respect to corporations to which they remain applicable); (2) the president, chief executive officer, or other head of the corporation, a vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or chief financial officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive service of process.; (3) if the corporation is a bank, to a cashier or assistant cashier or to a person specified in subdivision (a) or (b); and (4) if authorized by any provision in Section 1701, 1702, 2110, or 2111 of the Corporations Code (or Sections 3301 to 3303, inclusive, or Sections 6500 to 6504, inclusive, of the Corporations Code, as in effect on December 31, 1976, with respect to corporations to which they remain applicable), as provided by that provision. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10.) The registered agent for Society Ventures is Stewart. (See Stewart Decl. 3, Exh. B.) Plaintiffs Opposition, including the requests for judicial notice, does not address Society Ventures Georgia address or its agent for service of process on file with Georgias Secretary of State. As such, Plaintiffs Opposition does not affect the Courts analysis. As presented, the Summons and Complaint have been (1) served on an individual that is not authorized to accept service on behalf of Society Ventures in violation of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10; (2) served at an in-state address by mail only in violation of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40. Service; and served at an address that is not associated with Society Ventures. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED. ----- Conclusion Specially appearing defendant Society Ventures, LLCs Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint is GRANTED.

Case Number: 24NNCV01081 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B 330 north brand, inc. , Plaintiff, v. johnhart corp ., Defendant. Case No.: 24NNCV01081 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (cont. from July 5, 2024) [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff 330 North Brand, Inc. (Plaintiff) filed an unlawful detainer complaint against Defendant JohnHart Corp. (Defendant). The property at issue is located at 330 North Brand Blvd., Suite 130, Glendale, CA 91203. Plaintiff is the owner of the premises. On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff as landlord and Defendant as tenant entered into a written Office Lease (as amended by a First Amendment to Office Lease dated January 3, 2017, a Second Amendment to Office Lease dated May 31, 2017, a Third Amendment to Office Lease dated February 15, 2018, and a Fourth Amendment to Office Lease dated August 18, 2020; hereinafter, Lease) whereby Defendant leased the premises. Plaintiff alleges that additional space within the building containing the premises was also leased by Defendant under the Lease, but possession of such space has been resolved and is not at issue in this matter. Plaintiff alleges that the Lease expired on December 31, 2020 and that all times thereafter, Defendant remained in possession pursuant to Article 15 of the Lease (the holdover provision), except that the parties agreed that Defendant would not pay 200% of the rent as (a) the time period was in the midst of Covid and (b) the parties were attempting to negotiate an extension of the Lease. Plaintiff alleges that the Lease expired on December 31, 2020 and the Lease became a month-to-month holdover tenancy. Plaintiff alleges that on October 8, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice To Terminate Tenancy (the Notice) on Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Lease by forwarding same according to the notice provisions of the Lease to Defendant at the Premises via FedEx. FedEx confirmed delivery as of October 11, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that the Notice required Defendant to quit the premises within 30 days after service of the Notice and also set forth Plaintiff's election to declare a forfeiture of the Lease. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is still in possession of the premises despite more than 30 days passing since service of the Notice (the expiration of the 30-day period was November 10, 2023). On May 23, 2024, the default of all unnamed occupants in possession was entered. B. Motion on Calendar On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant in this case for possession of the premises and for damages in the amount of $61,090.70 (190 days at $321.53 per day for each day that Defendant remains at the premises from January 12, 2024 until judgment). Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication on the following issue: · Issue 1: The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to an order summarily adjudicating the cause of action for unlawful detainer and granting possession of the premises because Defendants occupancy of the premises has been month-to-month for years. Plaintiff has served a 30-day notice to terminate the lease and Defendant failed to vacate the property. On July 3, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition brief. The Court held a hearing on the matter on July 5, 2024. The Court was informed that an opposition was filed and continued the hearing to July 10, 2024 in order to give Plaintiff an opportunity to file a reply brief by July 8, 2024. On July 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION CCP § 1161 defines unlawful detainer in relevant part as follows: 1. When the tenant continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property, or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to the tenant; provided the expiration is of a nondefault nature however brought about without the permission of the landlord, or the successor in estate of the landlord, if applicable; including the case where the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant, employee, agent, or licensee and the relation of master and servant, or employer and employee, or principal and agent, or licensor and licensee, has been lawfully terminated or the time fixed for occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired; but nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as preventing the removal of the occupant in any other lawful manner; but in case of a tenancy at will, it shall first be terminated by notice, as prescribed in the Civil Code. (CCP § 1161(1).) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in its favor against Defendant. In support of its motion, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Spencer Wilson, the Vice President of Transwestern, the agent and property manager for Plaintiff. (Wilson Decl., ¶1.) Mr. Wilson states that on December 19, 2011, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written Office Lease for the premises, which was subsequently amended 4 times (Lease). ( Id. , ¶3, Ex. A [Lease].) He states that all relevant times, Plaintiff has owned the premises. ( Id. , ¶4.) He states that Defendant has been month-to-month since the Lease term expired on December 31, 2020 as shown in paragraph 4 of the last amendment to the Lease. ( Id. , ¶5.) He states that because the parties were unable to agree upon the terms of a new lease or for an extension of the Lease, Plaintiff sought to take back the space after entering into a new lease for the premises with a new tenant and that new lease provides for a rental amount of $9,796.00 per month. ( Id. , ¶6.) Mr. Wilson states that after letters were sent back and forth with Defendant concerning the need for the return of the premises, it became clear that Defendant was not going to vacate as requested. ( Id. , ¶7.) He states that on December 8, 2023, he served a 30-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy (Notice) on Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Lease by forwarding the same according to the notice provision of the Lease to Defendant at the premises via FedEx (delivery confirmed as of December 11, 2023). ( Id .) He states that the Notice required Defendant to quit the premises within 30 days after service of the Notice. ( Id. , Ex. B [Notice with FedEx confirmation].) Mr. Wilson states that the action was not filed sooner than April 2024 because Plaintiff was trying to find a different space for the new tenant so that Defendant could possibly remain in the premises if the parties could reach an agreement on the terms; however, that did not happen. ( Id. , ¶8.) He states that while the parties have been negotiating an extension, they never reached an agreement on terms, there is no writing signed by the parties extending the Lease and no new lease between the parties for the premises. ( Id. , ¶10.) He states that Defendant has simply claimed to have some sort of agreement without any approval from Plaintiff. ( Id. ) Mr. Wilson states that Defendant is still in possession of the premises despite more than 30 days passing since service of the Notice and Plaintiff has not accepted any rent for the premises since the Notice was served. ( Id. , ¶9.) Mr. Wilson states that the rent called for in the new lease ($9,796.00 per month) is the reasonable rental value of the premises, as that is the most recent arms-length transaction for this exact space and based upon that monthly rent, the daily value of the premises is $322.06 (calculated by taking the monthly rent of $9,796.00 and multiplying it by 12 months and then dividing that by 365 days). ( Id. ) Mr. Wilson states, however, because Plaintiff asked for $321.53 in the complaint, Plaintiff will use that lower amount. ( Id. ) Here, Plaintiff has established its burden establishing that Defendant has continued in possession of the premises after the Lease expired. Paragraph 4 of the Fourth Amendment of the Lease states that the term respecting Suite 130 shall expire on December 31, 2020. After the tenancy became a holdover month-to-month tenancy, Plaintiff served the Notice on December 8, 2023 (confirmed delivery by FedEx on December 11, 2023). However, as stated by Mr. Wilson in his declaration, Defendant did not vacate the premises within 30 days and the parties were unable to agree upon a Lease extension or a new lease. Thus, Plaintiff has established the elements of an unlawful detainer claim for the real property at issue. As such, the burden shifts to Defendant to raise a triable issue of material fact. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment solely because the Lease expired. Defendant argues that it has partially performed the terms of a fully negotiated and agreed-to Fifth Amendment. ( Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291, 295 [While the defendant was not entitled to a judgment in the present proceedings decreeing specific performance of the agreement to execute the lease, nevertheless the part performance of such an agreement can be interposed as an equitable defense to the plaintiff's attempt to wrest from him the possession of the premises by the summary proceedings in unlawful detainer.]; Pearsall v. Henry (1908) 153 Cal. 314, 318 [The question whether there has been a part performance of the oral agreement is necessarily one of fact to be determined by the trial court.].) [1] In support of the opposition, Defendant provides the declaration of Harout Keuroghlian, the owner of Defendant, and a copy of the unexecuted Fifth Amendment. Mr. Keuroghlian states that as of September 2021, Defendant was responsible for leasing: (a) Suite 130 (lease expired December 31, 2020), which was approximately 2,930 square feet; (b) Suite 660 (lease expired January 31, 2022), which was approximately 1,662 square feet; and (c) Suite 701 (lease to expire on August 31, 2023), which was approximately 2,241 square feet. (Keuroghlian Decl., ¶5.) He states that in September 2021, Anneke Greco, the Executive Vice President of Jones Lang LaSalle, the authorized agent of Plaintiff, proposed that Defendant surrender Suites 660 and 701 early as a part of negotiations for an extension of Suite 130. ( Id. , ¶6.) He states that in reliance on the terms being negotiated, Defendant voluntarily and prematurely surrendered possession of the Giveback Premises (Suites 660 and 701, set to expire 4 months and 2 years later, respectively) and Defendant ceased paying rent for those spaces. ( Id., ¶7.) Mr. Keuroghlian states that on March 22, 2022, Ms. Greco sent Defendant a proposed Fifth Amendment to the Lease back dated to January 2022, honoring most of the mutually agreeable terms during the previous Suite 130 negotiations. ( Id. , ¶8.) On October 24, 2022, Ms. Greco sent a revised Fifth Amendment, which contained all of the terms needed for the Lease but had one mistake; Mr. Keuroghlian stated that he informed Ms. Greco that he was willing to execute the extension. ( Id. , ¶9, Ex. 1 [Fifth Amendment].) He states that in November and December 2022, Defendant continuously attempted to contact Plaintiff to finalize execution of the new Lease for Suite 130 and that Ms. Greco responded on December 21, 2022, stating that she needed an accounting reconciliation. ( Id. , ¶¶10-11.) He states that he attempted to contact Plaintiff until July 2023 and continued to pay monthly base rent which Plaintiff routinely accepted, believing that he was performing under the Fifth Amendment. ( Id. , ¶11.) Mr. Keuroghlian states that on July 21, 2023 (nearly a year later), Ms. Grecos associate responded to Defendants July 28, 2022 correspondence regarding reconciliations. ( Id. , ¶12.) On July 25, 2023, Defendant sent correspondent to Ms. Greco requesting an update on the Lease execution. ( Id. , ¶13.) He states that Ms. Greco responded on July 26, 2023, stating that Plaintiff leased Suite 130 to another tenant who agreed to a longer-term period. ( Id. , ¶14.) On September 12, 2023, Defendant received a Notice of Termination; on November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed the complaint; and on December 14, 2023, Plaintiff issued the December 8, 2023 Notice. ( Id. , ¶¶15-17.) While Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because Defendant partially performed under the Fifth Amendment by surrendering the Give Back Space and paying rent, Defendant has failed to present evidence in support of its burden in opposition. At most, Defendant provides Mr. Keuroghlians declaration and the unsigned Fifth Amendment, but Defendant fails to provide any documentary evidence of the parties communications (emails, letters, etc.) and fails to state what amount of rent was paidwhether it was the rent under the last lease amendment or the Fifth Amendmentor provide documentary evidence through canceled checks or bank statements of the rental amounts paid. It is Defendants shifted burden to provide opposing evidence of a triable issue of material fact and Defendant has failed to do so here. In addition, as pointed out by Plaintiff in the reply brief, Defendant cannot rely on an oral modification, as the Lease at section 30.8 states that the terms cannot be modified orally. ( Conley v. Matthes (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1465 [ Oral modifications of written agreements are precluded only if the written agreement provides for written modification.]; Mot., Ex. A [December 19, 2011 Office Lease at § 30.8].) [2] Plaintiff preemptively raised this in the motion papers on page 5 and again raised this in the reply brief, but Defendant did not address the integrated nature of the Lease (and its subsequent amendments) in the opposition brief. The cases cited by Defendant also fail to include a factually similar situation as this case. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has not raised a triable issue of material fact in its shifted burden on this motion for summary judgment. As such, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiff 330 North Brand, Inc.s motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to lodge with the Court and serve on Defendant a proposed judgment within ten (10) days and to provide notice of this order. Plaintiff shall provide notice of this order. DATED: July 10, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court [1] Defendant cites to various cases regarding partial performance of unexecuted agreements or oral agreements to argue that it has sufficiently raised a triable issue of material fact. However, the cases cited are factually distinguishable. For example, Schubert v. Lowe (1924) 193 Cal. 291 involved an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to execute a written lease. Unlike this case, Schubert did not involve an underlying written and executed agreement that required all subsequent amendments and modifications to be in writing. [2] Section 30.8, entitled Entire Agreement; Merger; Severability states that no provision of the Lease may be modified, waived or discharged except by an instrument in writing signed by the party against which enforcement of such modification, waiver or discharge is sought.

SCV-265714, County of Sonoma v. Castagnola Appearances required.

Case Number: 21PSCV00172 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: K Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Manking ELS LLCs and Cross-Defendants Chung Chin Tsai aka Johnny Tsais and Kenny Tsais Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED. The court awards attorneys fees and costs in the reduced amount of $329.04, payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Background Plaintiff Manking ELS, LLC (Manking) alleges as follows: On May 19, 2017, Manking entered into a Commercial Lease Agreement (CLA) with Enhancer Elsinore, LLC (Enhancer), Esther Lin (Lin) and Walter Lynn (Lynn) (collectively, Defendants) pertaining to the Elsinore Hot Springs Motel (Property). The CLA, which was to be effective on June 16, 2017, called for a three-year lease term. At Defendants request, the parties on June 16, 2017 signed an Addendum, extending the lease from July 16, 2017 to such date at which inspections pass to qualify the Property for an occupancy permit. At the same time the parties executed the CLA, Defendants drafted a Hotel Management Agreement (HMA), which the parties entered into on June 16, 2017. Defendants failed to pay rent and failed to manage and maintain the Property. On November 12, 2021, Manking filed a Second Amended Complaint, asserting causes of action against Defendants and Does 1-10 for: 1. Breach of Written Contract 2. Fraud/Misrepresentation 3. Negligent Misrepresentation 4. Breach of Fiduciary Duties 5. Common Counts 6. Accounting On March 1, 2022, the court sustained Defendants demurrer to the second and third causes of action, without leave to amend. On March 25, 2024, Defendants filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC), asserting causes of action against Manking, Chung Chin Tsai aka Johnny Tsai (J. Tsai), Kenny Tsai (K. Tsai) and Roes 1-50 for: 1. Rescission 2. Breach of Contract (In the Alternative) 3. Intentional Misrepresentation 4. Negligent Misrepresentation 5. Negligence 6. Disgorgement On May 8, 2024, Mankings, J. Tsais and K. Tsais defaults were entered on the FACC. A Trial Setting Conference is set for July 11, 2024. Legal Standard The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Discussion Manking, J. Tsai and K. Tsai (together, Cross-Defendants) move the court for an order, per Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (b), setting aside the default entered against them on the FACC, on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Cross-Defendants counsel Maxwell Lin (Lin) attests that the date for response to the FACC was mis-calendared due to a clerical error by a member of his staff (Lin Decl., ¶ 4); that he did not notice the mistake for several days due to an unusually heavy calendar ( Id. ); that on May 6, 2024 opposing counsel Jason Feazell (Feazell) emailed him and indicated that if a response was not filed that day, he would file a request for default ( Id. , ¶ 5); that he did not notice Feazells above statement because it was part of a thread wherein other matters were being discussed until May 8, 2024 ( Id. ); that he prepared the answer which was filed May 9, 2024 ( Id. , ¶ 5, Exh. A) and that he later learned that Cross-Defendants default had been filed and entered on May 8, 2024 ( Id. , ¶ 6). The motion is granted on the mandatory basis of attorney affidavit of fault. Enhancer, Lin and Lynn urge the court to award them attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $1,379.04 for pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivisions (b). (Opp., 5:23-6:2). Subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, that [t]he court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorneys affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties . . . Under the circumstances, the court is inclined to award attorneys fees and costs in the reduced amount of $329.04 (i.e., 1 hour at $300.00/hour, plus $29.04 filing fee), which are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling.

Case Number: 23LBCV01545 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Arkas, LLC filed this action against Defendants, Elizabeth Richter and all unknown occupants, tenants, and subtenants for unlawful detainer on 8/15/23. Defendant filed a response to the complaint on 9/01/23. 2. Trial The Court called this matter for a non-jury trial on 12/06/08 and concluded trial on 12/08/23. Plaintiff appeared through an attorney, Defendant appeared and represented herself. The Court found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. On 12/20/23, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The judgment is for possession only, and does not include an award of monetary damages. 3. Post-Trial Proceedings Defendant has filed numerous post-trial motions and applications. On 12/20/23, she filed an ex parte application for order staying execution of judgment, which was denied. On 1/12/24, at Plaintiffs request, the Court issued a writ of possession. On 2/09/24, Defendant filed a 170.6 challenge to judicial officer, which was denied. On 2/16/24, Defendant filed a motion to set aside and vacate judgment. It appears this is the motion on calendar today, though Defendant failed to indicate the date for hearing on her moving papers; the motion will be discussed further below. On 5/17/24, Defendant filed an ex parte application to vacate judgment, which was denied. On 5/28/24, Defendant filed an ex parte application for arrest of Sam Ostayon and parties involved in fraud upon the court, which was denied; she also filed an ex parte application to set aside the judgment and quash any writ of possession, which was also denied. 4. Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment CCP §663a a. Grounds for Motion As noted above, on 2/16/24, Defendant filed a motion to set aside/vacate judgment CCP §663a. There is no notice of motion, and no hearing date. There is, however, a reservation ID number, and it appears Defendant reserved the motion for hearing on 7/11/24. The caption of the motion indicates it is brought per U.S.C.S. Ct. App. 9 th Cir., Appx R 8001(d)-1. This is a California state court, and state courts are not governed by federal law. Defendants motion indicates she seeks relief because Sami Mikhael Ostayan falsely stated, under oath, that Arkas is a non-profit company, when it is in reality a for-profit company. Additionally, she contends properties subject to foreclosure are reported to the attorney general for verification of eligible bidders, but Defendants property has not been registered with the AG. Finally, she contends Ostayan was sworn into court under oath as MR. STEIN. b. Summary of Opposition Defendant contends the motion was not timely filed, and because the time limit for ruling on a motion to vacate judgment has expired, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Defendant contends the motion is moot because the sheriffs department completed the lock-out process in May. Defendant contends Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence to support any of her contentions. c. Analysis Per CCP §663a(b), the time for the Court to rule on the motion has expired. The Code makes clear that the power of the court to rule on a motion to set aside and vacate a judgment shall expire 75 days&after service upon the moving party by any party of written notice of entry of judgment. Plaintiff served written notice of entry of judgment on 12/21/23. The time limit is jurisdictional. See Advanced Building Maintenance v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1393-94. The motion to vacate judgment is therefore denied. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 23STCV26467 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING CIRCA 1200, LLC, vs. FRANCISCO MEZA. Case No.: 23STCV26467 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Circa 1200, LLCs Request for Default Judgment Having considered all documents submitted in support of a default judgment, the Court rules as follows: Background On October 30, 2023, Circa 1200, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Francisco Meza (Defendant) for common count and breach of contract. On December 15, 2023, the clerk entered defaults against Defendant. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Court Judgment to be heard on July 9, 2024. Partys Request Plaintiff requests the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award Plaintiff damages in the amount of $113,760.75, prejudgment interest at a rate of 10% in the amount of $8,913.86, attorneys fees in the amount of $702.00, and costs in the amount of $498.00, for a total judgment of $123,874.61. Discussion Plaintiff submitted a completed default judgment packet, with all applicable attachments. The Court finds sufficient evidence to justify the requested award and grants Plaintiffs request in full. Conclusion The application for default judgment filed on June 18, 2024, is granted. Judgment in the amount of $123,874.61 is entered against Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV33738 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 61 ADMIRE 3377 FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs KI JONG OH, et al. TENTATIVE Plaintiff Admire 3377 Family Limited Partnerships Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Ki Jong Oh is GRANTED. Plaintiff to give notice. DISCUSSION A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment may meet their initial burden by prov[ing] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) The defendant may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Plaintiff Admire 3377 Family Limited Partnership (Plaintiff) moves for summary judgment on their sole cause of action for breach of lease against Defendant Ki Jong Oh (Defendant). [T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) Plaintiff presents Defendants responses to requests for admission, admitting the existence of the lease agreement in this action, admitting that Defendant vacated the premises in September 2022, admitting that Defendant at the time of vacating had failed to pay contract rent through the lease term, and that the record of payments attached to the requests for admission are an accurate reflection of the payments. (Robison Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs property manager testifies that Defendant vacated the premises with $976,085.96 due in unpaid rent, which after application of the security deposition, yields $940,805.96 due in unpaid rent. (Kim Decl. ¶¶ 57.) Plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden to show the absence of triable issues as to each element of its breach of lease claim. The burden now shifts to Defendant show triable issues exist as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. Defendant in opposition argues that Plaintiff has failed to address any of the affirmative defenses raised in his answer. (Opposition at pp. 6, 1011.) But a plaintiff moving for summary judgment on their claims has no burden to disprove the listed defenses in the defendants answer to satisfy their initial burden. (Los Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 508.) These defenses furnish no basis to deny the motion except insofar as Defendant presents admissible evidence to show triable issues of fact exist as to his defenses. Defendant relies upon the defenses of contractual impossibility and Civil Code § 1511 as defenses to the present motion. (Opposition at p. 12.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the government-ordered closure of the premises during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an irresistible superhuman cause excusing performance of the lease. (Opposition at pp. 1217.) Defendant also argues that performance was excused by the defense of frustration of purpose. (Ibid.) The doctrine of frustration excuses contractual obligations where performance remains entirely possible, but the whole value of the performance to one of the parties at least, and the basic reason recognized as such by both parties, for entering into the contract has been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event. A party seeking to escape the obligations of its lease under the doctrine of frustration must show: (1) the purpose of the contract that has been frustrated was contemplated by both parties in entering the contract; (2) the risk of the event was not reasonably foreseeable and the party claiming frustration did not assume the risk under the contract; and (3) the value of counter-performance is totally or nearly totally destroyed. Governmental acts that merely make performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive do not suffice to excuse a contractual obligation. (SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882, 895, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted.) [W]here commercial frustration does apply, the legal effect ... is the immediate termination of the contract. . . . [T]he application of the doctrine of frustration under California law compels the termination of the contract, the law does not recognize the temporary frustration defense. (Id. at p. 896.) Simultaneously, Civil Code § 1511 states that performance of an obligation is excused [w]hen such performance or offer is prevented or delayed by the act of the creditor, or by the operation of law, and [w]hen it is prevented or delayed by an irresistible, superhuman cause, or by the act of public enemies of this state or of the United States, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary. (Civ. Code § 1511, sudb. (1), (2).) As an initial matter, it should be noted that Defendant submits no evidence in support of its affirmative defenses. Defendant provides links to a March 2020 Los Angeles County order in its separate statement directing the pandemic closure of [g]yms and fitness centers. (Defendants Separate Statement No. 2.) Another entry on the separate statement states that Defendants business was negatively affected not as a result of its own actions, but because of the supervening causes of the Pandemic and applicable regulations, citing for this purpose on Defendants unverified answer. (Defendants Separate Statement No. 4.) Defendant thus presents no actual evidence of negative effects resulting from the pandemic or closure orders. But assuming the truth of these assertions, Defendants affirmative defenses remain unsupported. The defense of impossibility under Civil Code § 1511 does not apply, because the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability applies to the partys obligations under the contract in this case to pay rent. (See SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) As such, impossibility does not apply, because [t]he government closure orders did not make it illegal for [Defendant] to pay rent. (Ibid.) Nor is there any basis for application of the doctrine of frustration of purpose, although this doctrine might excuse the performance of a rental contract based on the government-ordered closure of a business. This is because the effect of frustration of purpose is the immediate termination of the contract. (Id. at p. 896.) There is no such thing as temporary frustration of purpose in California. (Ibid.) Here, it is undisputed that Defendant remained in possession of the premises for the full duration of the lease term, even as the closure orders went into effect. (Robinson Decl. Exh. 2.) The frustration of purpose doctrine therefore did not excuse [Defendant] from its obligation to pay rent (even if the lease was an installment contract) because [Defendant] did not attempt to rescind the lease and instead remained in possession of the premises. (KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Intern., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1057.) There are therefore no triable issues as to the elements of Plaintiffs claims, or Defendants affirmative defenses. The motion is therefore GRANTED.