Document for BANK OF NEW YORK vs MAYERS, RUTH

Case Number: 23STCV25326 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 56 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT PATRICK MOLLOY, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, vs. CAREY HELLMAN, etc., et al., Defendants. CASE NO.: 231STCV25326 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT Date: July 30, 2024 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept. 56 MOVING PARTY: Defendant Carey Hellman dba Hellman Associates (Hellman) RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers. BACKGROUND This action was filed on October 17, 2023 and arises out of construction work performed by Defendant Hellman on Plaintiffs duplex (the Project). The proposal for the Project was presented by Hellman to Plaintiffs on December 10, 2022. (Complaint, para. 6.) Hellman performed work on the Project from January 6 to April, 2023. (Complaint, para. 12.) Plaintiffs allege that After some of [the allegedly deficient work] came to light, [Plaintiffs] learned that Hellmans contractors license with the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) was inactive or had lapsed. They further discovered that some of the subcontractors Hellman hired for the work were also not licensed. (Complaint, para. 16.) The Complaint alleges causes of action for Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract; 2) Negligence; 3) Breach of Implied Warranty; 4) Disgorgement Per Bus. & Prof. Code (B&PC) §7031; 5) Unfair Business Practices Per B&PC § 17200, et seq. ; and 6) Fraud. All of these causes of action rely, among other things, on Plaintiffs allegation that Hellman was an unlicensed contractor at the time he performed work on the Project. On December 22, 2023, Defendant Hellman filed his demurrer to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action of the Complaint. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendants Request for Judicial Notice of a copy of a Contractors License naming Hellman and dated January 1982 is DENIED. This is not an official record of the status of Hellmans license at the time of his work on the Project. The Court does, however, accept the Declaration of Christopher L. Mass, Esq. in Support of Opposition to Demurrer (Mass Decl.), which provides the foundation for the record of the status of Hellmans contractors license since November 1, 2009. This document evidences that Defendants license was not active during the period of time that Defendant was working on the Project. DISCUSSION Legal Standard Legal Standard for Demurrer [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis for Demurrer Fourth Cause of Action Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for Disgorgement is not a valid cause of action because it is based on the allegation that Defendant was not licensed while working on the Project, whereas Defendant possessed a contractors license during the entire construction project. Defendants purported evidence of his initial licensure in 1983 does not, however, support his contention that he was actively licensed when he worked on the Project. [1] The evidence supplied by the Mass Declaration shows that Defendant was not actively licensed during his work on the Project. Defendants Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action of the Complaint is therefore OVERRULED. Fifth Cause of Action Defendants Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the B&PC Section 17200 for Unfair Business Practices depends upon his position that he was not in violation of the CSLB rules for contractor licensing at the time he performed work on the Project. As indicated above, the Court does not accept Defendants position that he was licensed throughout his work on the Project. Even if he were so licensed, which apparently he was not, the allegation that his subcontractors were also not licensed would provide all necessary support for an Unfair Business Practices claim. (Complaint, para. 16.) Defendants Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action of the Complaint is therefore OVERRULED. Sixth Cause of Action Defendants Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud is also based upon the premise that Defendant was properly licensed throughout the time he worked on the Project. Defendant has not established that this is the case and, for that reason, the Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is OVERRULED. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar. Dated this 30th day of July 2024 Hon. Holly J. Fujie Judge of the Superior Court [1] Although the Demurrer makes a reference to the one year statute of limitations for claims under B&PC Section 7031, Defendant worked on the Project from January through April of 2023 and this action was filed on October 17, 2023 well within any one year statute of limitations.

Case Number: 23STCV15942 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 maria padilla , et al.; Plaintiffs , vs. joseph heffesse, as trustee of the Coldwater Canyon Trust , et al.; Defendants . Case No.: 23STCV15942 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: petition for approval of compromise of claim for minor claimant anthony jayden diaz MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Jeanette Oliveros RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim for Minor Claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this petition. No opposition papers were filed. DISCUSSION Plaintiff and petitioner Jeanette Oliveros (Petitioner) seeks court approval of the settlement made on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz (Minor Claimant) in this action. The compromise of a minors disputed claim for damages is valid only after it has been approved, upon the filing of a petition, by the court.¿ (Prob. Code, § 3500.)¿ The petition must be verified by the petitioner, must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise, and must be prepared on Judicial Council form MC-350.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.)¿ Defendants Joseph Heffesse, as trustee of the Coldwater Canyon Trust, Sandra B. Sternberg Heffesse, and LA Properties Heffesse LLC have agreed to pay a total of $175,000 to settle this action, of which $5,000 will be separately allocated to Minor Claimant. (MC-350, ¶¶ 10-11.) Of the $5,000 allocated to Minor Claimant, $1,250 will be paid to counsel for attorneys fees and $134.35 will be paid to counsel for legal costs. (MC-350, ¶¶ 13, 16.) The remaining $3,615.65 will be paid or delivered to the parent of Minor Claimant, i.e., Petitioner, without bond, on the terms and under the conditions specified in Probate Code sections 3401-3402. (MC-350, ¶ 18, subd. (b)(5); MC-350, Attachment 18b(5), Oliveros Decl., ¶¶ 1-2, 6; Prob. Code, §§ 3401, 3402.) The court has reviewed the petition and finds the settlement to be fair and reasonable, and in the best interest of Minor Claimant. The court further finds that the declaration of Rachel Fishenfeld is sufficient to support the request for attorneys fees in the amount of $1,250 (representing 25 percent of the $5,000 settlement). (Fishenfeld Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, 6-11; Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 7.955.) The court therefore grants Petitioners petition. ORDER The court grants petitioner Jeanette Oliveross petition for approval of compromise of claim on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz. The court orders that the $3,615.65 settlement on behalf of minor claimant Anthony Jayden Diaz may be paid to plaintiff and petitioner Jeanette Oliveros pursuant to Probate Code sections 3401 and 3402. The court orders petitioner Jeanette Oliveros to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 29, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

CV-22-003529 – AHLUWALIA, NIRMAL KUMAR vs KHACHO, ESAM – Defendant and Cross-Complainant Esam Khacho’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication – MOOT. In view of the Court’s granting of Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved from Deemed Admissions, on which deemed admissions Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is founded, this motion is moot.

Re: Arturo Rodriguez v. Ravdeep Singh Superior Court Case No. 23CECG04769 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 (Dept. 502) Motion: Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint and Motion to Strike Tentative Ruling: To order the hearing off calendar, as no motion was filed for this hearing date, and it does not appear any notice was given to plaintiff of this hearing. Explanation: Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings against defendants’ answer, which was originally scheduled for March 28, 2024, but was continued to May 14, 2024, to allow plaintiff to correct defects in his proof of service of the motion. His motion was granted on May 14, 2024. On May 10, 2024, defendants filed a memorandum of points and authorities and four declarations in support of a demurrer, and these papers reflected a hearing date of May 14, 2024. However, defendants had not calendared a hearing for a demurrer, and instead were apparently attempting to use the date for plaintiff’s motion as a hearing date for their own motion. When defendants appeared for oral argument at this hearing, the court informed them that they did not have a motion on calendar, and they needed to obtain a hearing date from the court’s Law and Motion desk before filing moving papers. After this, defendants obtained a hearing date, but they did not file any moving papers for this hearing date. Perhaps defendants believed that the papers they filed on May 10, 2024, served as the moving papers for the July 25th hearing. This is incorrect. Those papers did not give plaintiff any notice of a hearing on July 25, 2024. Furthermore, there is no Notice of Motion included with the papers filed on May 10, 2024. Nor is there a proof of service of any moving papers on plaintiff for a hearing on July 25, 2024. The statement in the Declaration of June Waara that she verbally informed plaintiff of the hearing on July 25, 2024, does not make for service of the motion on plaintiff. If defendants desire a hearing on a demurrer to the complaint, they must obtain a hearing date from the Law and Motion clerk, and thereafter file moving papers properly indicating the date they obtained, which show timely and proper service of the motion on plaintiff. Even though defendants are self-represented, they are held to the same standards as attorneys and they must follow the rules of civil procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Also, the declaration of non-party June Waara filed on defendants’ behalf on July 12, 2024 indicates that she met and conferred with plaintiff regarding the demurrer, which defendants are supposed to do. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41.) Ms. Waara’s status as a licensed and bonded Unlawful Detainer Assistant and Process Server does not give her any authority to meet and confer with plaintiff on defendants’ behalf. Ms. Waara should take care not to practice law without a license. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: KCK on 07/23/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 22, 2024 line 4. DEFENDANT TRILION CAPITAL FUND, LLC, TCF PROPERTIES, LLC, DAVID WEINER DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT is continued to August 15, 2024 for the moving party to provide a courtesy copy of the moving papers and reply no later than July 23, 2024 with a cover letter reflecting new hearing date. (Opposition received). =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Marshal v. Skyline PSC1901112 Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs Development Co LLC Tentative Ruling: This is a derivative action brought by certain homeowners in a planned community located in Palm Springs, California. On February 13, 2019, Plaintiffs Gemma Marshall, Lynn Leskera, Mark Matthews, Lori Matthews, Sandy Kaufman 4, and Dave Davidson, derivatively on behalf of Pinnacle Owners Association, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed their original “Member Derivative Complaint” against Defendant Skyline Development Co. LLC (“Skyline”) for: (1) breach of governing documents and (2) breach of fiduciary duty. After multiple demurrers and motions, on January 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against Defendants Skyline Development Co., LLC, Jennifer Roberts, and David Gilbert (together 3 That motion was originally scheduled to be heard on July 10, 2024, but pursuant to an ex parte request by Plaintiff the matter was continued and is set to be heard on September 18, 2024. 4 At some point, Lawrence Lichter was substituted in as trustee of the Sanford Kaufman Living Trust. “Defendants”). The TAC asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of governing documents and violation of the Davis-Stirling Act (I); (2) breach of governing documents and violation of the Davis- Stirling Act (II); (3) breach of fiduciary duty of board director; (4) breach of fiduciary duty of controlling shareholder; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty (supplemental). Thereafter, a demurrer to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was sustained. On April 10, 2024, the parties attended a Mandatory Settlement Conference (“MSC”) with Judge Tam Nomoto Schumann (Ret.). At the MSC, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that was conditioned on the signing of a formal written agreement, pursuant to which, among other things, the parties would be responsible for their own costs. Following the MSC, the parties exchanged drafts of a written agreement, but due to the introduction of additional terms, the settlement fell apart. On April 15, 2024, Lichter filed a request for dismissal of his claims against Defendants, and the dismissal was entered the same day. On April 24, 2024, Defendants filed a memorandum of costs seeking the recovery of $14,536.20. *** Lichter moves to strike the costs sought by Defendants. He argues that the parties reached a settlement agreement at the MSC, under which the parties would bear their own fees and costs. He relied on this agreement in dismissing his claims, and Defendants are acting in bad faith by seeking to recover costs. He also argues that Plaintiffs are the ones who realized their litigation goals in the settlement, so they should be deemed the prevailing party. Finally, he argues that costs should not be awarded against him because it is a derivative action and his claims are the same as those brought by the other Plaintiffs. In opposition, Defendants argue that at the MSC (which Lichter did not attend in violation of a court order 5), the parties reached a conditional settlement that would become final once formalized in writing. They argue that the written agreement never happened, so there is no settlement. Despite this, Lichter voluntarily dismissed his complaint as to all Defendants, making them the prevailing party. Finally, they argue that Lichter does not dispute the appropriateness of any of the costs sought, so the motion should be denied entirely. In reply, Lichter argues that Defendants are not the prevailing parties and it would be inequitable to award costs against him. Analysis Under C.C.P. §1032(b), unless otherwise provided, “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” C.C.P. §1032(a)(4) defines prevailing party as: (1) party with a net monetary recovery; (2) a defendant who is dismissed; (3) a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and (4) a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (Ibid.) “If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Ibid.) The court has no discretion in awarding fees if the moving party falls into one of the four categories set forth in C.C.P. § 1032(a)(4). (Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198; see also, Vons Cos., Inc. v. Lyle Parks Jr., Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 823, 832 [“absent statutory authority, ‘the court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party’”][citation omitted].) Additionally, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a complaint, the defendant is the prevailing party. (Santisas 5 Lichter was, however, represented by counsel at the MSC. v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.) “This is true … regardless of whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.” (Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 331.) In the present case, Lichter dismissed the action against Defendants. While he claims the parties agreed that each party would bear their own costs, any such agreement was never formalized. 6 Accordingly, Defendants are the prevailing parties as to Lichter and are entitled to their costs. Defendants seek to recover costs totaling $14,536.20. C.C.P. § 1033.5(a) contains a list of items specifically allowed as recoverable costs, and § 1033.5(b) contains a list of items that “are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law.” An item neither specifically allowable under subdivision (a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may be allowed or denied in the discretion of the court if certain requirements are satisfied. (C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(4).) In particular, the item “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and “shall be reasonable in amount.” (C.C.P. § 1033.5(c)(2) and (3).) Objection to any item or items on the cost memorandum may be made by filing and serving a noticed motion to tax cost. (C.C.P. § 1034; CRC 3.1700 (b)(1).) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) “A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety,” and the opposing party has the burden to demonstrate that they are not proper. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.) A verified memorandum does not require copies of bills, invoices or other documentation to be attached. (Id. at 1267.) If the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at 774.) Here, Defendants filed a verified memorandum of costs. The costs sought (for filing and motion fees, deposition costs, service of process, court reporter fees, and a discovery referee) appear to be proper charges, and Lichter has not challenged any specific cost. Accordingly, Defendants are awarded costs totaling $14,536.20. Ruling: Deny the motion. Award costs to Defendants in the amount of $14,536.20 to be paid by Lichter. 6 If Lichter contends the dismissal was erroneously filed, he can seek to vacate the dismissal.

MSC19-02639 CASE NAME: VEGA VS GAGNI HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: BAY AREA ESCROW DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S S.A.C FILED BY BAY AREA ESCROW SERVICES FILED BY: *TENTATIVE RULING:* Introduction Before the Court is Defendant Bay Area Escrow Services (“Bay Area Escrow”)’ Demurrer. The Demurrer relates to Plaintiff Roman Vega (“Vega”)’s Complaint for five contract and fraud related causes of action. For the following reasons, the Demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff Roman Vega shall have until August 8, 2024 to amend. Meet and Confer Requirement On February 7, 2024, Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiff’s counsel met and conferred over the telephone regarding Defendant’s intent to file a demurrer and Defendant’s counsel sent an email to SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 Plaintiff’s counsel with a summary of their conversation. (Rood Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4.) Mr. Rood requested more time to consider the issues and on February 20, 2024, Mr. Rood sent an email to Defendant’s counsel stating that he expects Defendant to file a demurrer. (Rood Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Thus, Defendant’s meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. The Second Amended Complaint Defendant Joly Gagni is a real estate investor who purchased 1341 Rosemary Lane in Concord (the Property) with the intent to remodel and sell it. (SAC ¶ 2.) Title to the Property was taken in the name of Sierra Capital Investments, LLC, which was owned and operated by Gagni. (¶ 2.) Gagni added plaintiff Roman Vega as an LLC member for the purchase of the Property and solicited funds from Vega for the down payment. (¶¶ 2-3.) Vega provided $80,000 as initial funds for the purchase of the Property. (¶ 4.) The parties agreed that Vega would be reimbursed this amount from the net proceeds of the sale of the Property, and the rest of the proceeds would be split evenly between them. (¶ 4.) Under the agreement, Gagni was required to supervise and fund the remodeling of the Property, which she failed to do. (¶ 5.) Vega was required to invest additional funds for the remodeling. (¶ 5.) As the property was being offered for sale, Gagni attempted to take all the net proceeds for herself. (¶ 6.) In response, Vega filed this action and recorded a lis pendens. (¶ 6.) The parties agreed the lis pendens would be withdrawn, allowing for the Property to be sold, while the sale proceeds remained in an escrow opened with Bay Area Escrow. (¶ 6.) Net proceeds in the amount of $76,579.04 were to be retained by Bay Area Escrow, pending a written agreement of the parties or a judgment. (¶ 6.) Vega alleges that Bay Area Escrow was required to retain the sale proceeds in escrow and could not act on any request to disburse the funds unless all parties agreed in writing. Vega alleges Bay Area Escrow breached its contract with the parties and committed negligence when it allowed Gagni to unilaterally withdraw the funds from escrow. (¶ 7.) Vega filed the original complaint naming Gagni and Sierra Capital Investments on December 18, 2019. Vega executed the subject escrow instructions on December 20, 2019. Vega amended his complaint to name Bay Area Escrow on August 15, 2023. The parties stipulated to the filing of the second amended complaint (SAC). Bay Area Escrow then filed this demurrer to SAC claiming that Vega’s causes of action for negligence and breach of contract are barred by a one-year limitations period in the escrow instructions. Vega filed a notice of non-opposition to the demurrer and requesting leave to amend. Bay Area Escrow filed a reply in which it objected to Vega’s request to amend, claiming Vega had not met his burden to show the defect in the statute of limitations could be cured by amendment. Legal Standard “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550), but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1099.) Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe at 551, fn. 5.) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 242, 247.) Analysis The escrow instructions attached to the SAC provide for a one-year contractual limitations period from the close of escrow. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: the instructions contained in these general provisions and any supplemental instructions shall be construed and interpreted according to California law. NO ACTION SHALL LIE AGAINST ESCROW HOLDER FOR ANY CLAIMS, LOSSES, LIABILITY OR ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION OF ANY KIND OR NATURE WHATSOEVER, HOWEVER CAUSED OR OCCURRED IN THIS ESCROW TRANSACTION OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE HANDLING OR PROCESSING OF THIS ESCROW TRANSACTION, UNLESS BROUGHT WITHIN TWELVE 12 MONTHS AFTER THE CLOSE OF ESCROW OR ANY CANCELLATION OR TERMINATION OF ESCROW FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER. (SAC Ex. D, ¶ 13.) Bay Area Escrow argues the escrow closed no later than June 8, 2021 because this is the date the new owners of the Property recorded their deed. As Vega did not file this lawsuit until August 15, 2023, Bay Area Escrow claims that all causes of action in the complaint are time-barred. "A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be [] raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred." (Guardian N. Bay, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (2001) 94 Cal. App. 4th 963.) Here, no defect in the statute of limitations appears on the face of the SAC or any judicially noticeable matter. Bay Area Escrow provides a Lexis Nexis printout purporting to show that escrow closed by June 8, 2021, which is the date the new owners of the Property recorded their deed. (See Def.’s RJN, Exh. 1.) This document is extrinsic to the SAC and not the proper subject of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452(d). As a result, the Court might have found that Bay Area Escrow was limited to making its objection by answer under CCP section 430.30(b). However, Vega has specifically requested leave to amend the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 2 SITTING IN 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 07/19/2024 SAC to address the issues raised in the demurrer. While Vega did not meet their burden by failing to show how the defects in the SAC can be cured (Reply at p. 2: 19-25), “[L]iberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given." (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1227.) When the Complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or there is a reasonable possibility that amendment could cure the defect, it is an abuse of discretion for a judge to deny leave to amend. (JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Ward (2019) 33 Cal. App. 5th 678, 684.) If Vega has not had an opportunity to amend the Complaint in response Demurrer, leave to amend should be liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the Complaint shows on its face that it cannot be amended. (City of Stockton v Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. App. 4th 730, 747; Align Technol. Inc. v Tran (2009) 27 Cal. App. 4th 197, 216.) Accordingly, Vega’s request to amend is granted.

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION CVRI2401221 HAUT VS BUSH BY KEVIN BUSH, SEABOARD INC. Tentative Ruling: Grant motion to compel arbitration and stay action as to these Defendants pending completion of arbitration.