Clearscape Funding Corp. Vs. James Diggins

Case Number: 22STCV14153 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: B HEARING DATE : Thurs., July 11, 2024 JUDGE /DEPT : Moskowitz/Dept. B CASE NAME : Diana Bernabe v. Walgreen Co.

Case Number: 21PSCV00172 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: K Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Manking ELS LLCs and Cross-Defendants Chung Chin Tsai aka Johnny Tsais and Kenny Tsais Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED. The court awards attorneys fees and costs in the reduced amount of $329.04, payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling. Background Plaintiff Manking ELS, LLC (Manking) alleges as follows: On May 19, 2017, Manking entered into a Commercial Lease Agreement (CLA) with Enhancer Elsinore, LLC (Enhancer), Esther Lin (Lin) and Walter Lynn (Lynn) (collectively, Defendants) pertaining to the Elsinore Hot Springs Motel (Property). The CLA, which was to be effective on June 16, 2017, called for a three-year lease term. At Defendants request, the parties on June 16, 2017 signed an Addendum, extending the lease from July 16, 2017 to such date at which inspections pass to qualify the Property for an occupancy permit. At the same time the parties executed the CLA, Defendants drafted a Hotel Management Agreement (HMA), which the parties entered into on June 16, 2017. Defendants failed to pay rent and failed to manage and maintain the Property. On November 12, 2021, Manking filed a Second Amended Complaint, asserting causes of action against Defendants and Does 1-10 for: 1. Breach of Written Contract 2. Fraud/Misrepresentation 3. Negligent Misrepresentation 4. Breach of Fiduciary Duties 5. Common Counts 6. Accounting On March 1, 2022, the court sustained Defendants demurrer to the second and third causes of action, without leave to amend. On March 25, 2024, Defendants filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FACC), asserting causes of action against Manking, Chung Chin Tsai aka Johnny Tsai (J. Tsai), Kenny Tsai (K. Tsai) and Roes 1-50 for: 1. Rescission 2. Breach of Contract (In the Alternative) 3. Intentional Misrepresentation 4. Negligent Misrepresentation 5. Negligence 6. Disgorgement On May 8, 2024, Mankings, J. Tsais and K. Tsais defaults were entered on the FACC. A Trial Setting Conference is set for July 11, 2024. Legal Standard The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Discussion Manking, J. Tsai and K. Tsai (together, Cross-Defendants) move the court for an order, per Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (b), setting aside the default entered against them on the FACC, on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Cross-Defendants counsel Maxwell Lin (Lin) attests that the date for response to the FACC was mis-calendared due to a clerical error by a member of his staff (Lin Decl., ¶ 4); that he did not notice the mistake for several days due to an unusually heavy calendar ( Id. ); that on May 6, 2024 opposing counsel Jason Feazell (Feazell) emailed him and indicated that if a response was not filed that day, he would file a request for default ( Id. , ¶ 5); that he did not notice Feazells above statement because it was part of a thread wherein other matters were being discussed until May 8, 2024 ( Id. ); that he prepared the answer which was filed May 9, 2024 ( Id. , ¶ 5, Exh. A) and that he later learned that Cross-Defendants default had been filed and entered on May 8, 2024 ( Id. , ¶ 6). The motion is granted on the mandatory basis of attorney affidavit of fault. Enhancer, Lin and Lynn urge the court to award them attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $1,379.04 for pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivisions (b). (Opp., 5:23-6:2). Subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part, that [t]he court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorneys affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties . . . Under the circumstances, the court is inclined to award attorneys fees and costs in the reduced amount of $329.04 (i.e., 1 hour at $300.00/hour, plus $29.04 filing fee), which are payable within 30 days from the date of the notice of ruling.

Case Number: 22STCV22161 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT ENGINEER.AI CORPORATION, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. TALKDESK, INC., Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22STCV22161 [TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART DEMURRER TO FAC; OVERRULING DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT; GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO COMPEL PRIVILEGE LOG DOCUMENTS Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 9, 2024 On July 8, 2022, Plaintiffs Engineer.ai Corporation, Engineer.ai Global Limited, and Engineer.ai India Private Limited (collectively, Engineer) filed this action against Defendant Talkdesk, Inc. (Talkdesk). On October 5, 2023, Engineer filed a first amended complaint (FAC). On November 7, 2023, Talkdesk filed a demurrer to the FAC. On February 23, 2024, Talkdesk filed a cross-complaint. On April 2, 2024, Engineer filed a demurrer to the cross-complaint. On June 12, 2024, Talkdesk filed a motion to compel production of privilege log documents. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DEMURRER A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. ( Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true. ( Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) TALKDESKS DEMURRER TO ENGINEERS FAC The FAC alleges (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) declaratory relief. Talkdesk demurs to the second and third causes of action. A. The Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant is Duplicative of Breach of Contract (Second Cause of Action). Talkdesk argues that the claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is uncertain and duplicative. (Demurrer at pp. 6-10.) The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other partys right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. The covenant thus cannot be endowed with an existence independent of its contractual underpinnings. [Citation.] It cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc . (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-350.) [T]ort recovery for breach of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is available only in limited circumstances, generally involving a special relationship between the contracting parties, such as the relationship between an insured and its insurer. ( Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1370.) Because the covenant of good faith and fair dealing essentially is a contract term that aims to effectuate the contractual intentions of the parties, compensation for its breach has almost always been limited to contract rather than tort remedies. ( Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 43.) If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in a companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated. ( Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395.) That is the case here. The FAC alleges that the MSA contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party to the contract will do anything to interfere with the rights of the other party to receive the benefits of the contract. (FAC ¶ 33.) Therefore, Talkdesks conduct as described herein prevented Plaintiffs from receiving the benefits under the MSA. (FAC ¶ 35.) This is merely duplicative of the claim for breach of contract and seeks the same damages. (FAC ¶¶ 30, 36.) The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. B. Engineer Sufficiently Alleges a Controversy for Judicial Determination (Third Cause of Action). Talkdesk argues that the claim for declaratory relief is an improper attempt to obtain by declaratory relief what Engineer cannot obtain under the terms of the contract. (Demurrer at p. 11.) A person who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an action for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The remedy of declaratory relief is cumulative and does not restrict other remedies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1062.) . . . The mere fact that another remedy is available will not suffice as sufficient grounds for a court to decline a declaration, because declaratory relief is not intended to be exclusive or extraordinary. ( Kirkwood v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.) Engineer seeks a judicial determination as to whether Talkdesk waived its right under the MSA to raise any dispute regarding its unpaid invoices and a declaration that Talkdesk waived its right to dispute the invoice amounts of all of the foregoing invoices. (FAC ¶¶ 39, 62.) Talkdesk argues that this is a request to read out the entire rest of the MSA in favor of its isolated interpretation of a single clause. (Demurrer at p. 11.) That is not the case. Any determination of liability or waiver will still require full contractual interpretation. The demurrer to the third cause of action is overruled. ENGINEERS DEMURRER TO TALKDESKS CROSS-COMPLAINT The cross-complaint alleges (1) breach of contract; (2) intentional interference with contractual relations; (3) attempted extortion; (4) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; (5) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (6) declaratory relief. Engineer demurs to all causes of action. A. Talkdesk Sufficiently Alleges Harm Caused by the Side-Switching (Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action). Engineer argues that the causes of action related to Phams side-switching are no more than a re-litigation of the Disqualification Order and did not pray for any relief beyond what the Disqualification Order already provided. (Demurrer at p. 7.) The cross-complaint seeks, in part, A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Engineer from using Talkdesk confidential, privileged, or protected information that it improperly obtained, and enjoining Engineer from receiving assistance related to matters adverse to Talkdesk from anyone who has received Talkdesk protected information . . . . (Cross-Complaint at p. 26.) Engineer contends that Talkdesk had already received this relief through the Disqualification Order. Plaintiffs had already been enjoined from accessing or using Talkdesks confidential information, or speaking with any person who may have been exposed to Talkdesks confidential information. There is no further relief that would add to the prohibition to which Plaintiffs are already subject. (Demurrer at pp. 7-8.) That is not correct. The Courts February 28, 2023 Disqualification Order was more limited: (1) Engineer, its counsel, its CEO, and its COO were ordered to have no communications with Engineers new counsel except to the extent necessary to transfer case files that do not contain confidential Talkdesk information; (2) Engineer was ordered to designate, with Talkdesks agreement, an individual who will serve as Engineers client representative; (3) all communications by Engineer and by counsel during the transition was to be in writing and first be provided to Talkdesks counsel; and (4) Engineer was ordered to create an ethical wall. Engineer implicitly acknowledges that it is presenting an inaccurate interpretation of the Order: Plaintiffs offered Talkdesk to enter into a stipulated order providing for the injunction against Plaintiffs use of Talkdesk confidential information, except to the extent necessary to defend against the Cross-Complaint. Talkdesk rejected that offer. (Demurrer at p. 8, fn. 1, citations omitted.) Such a stipulated order would be unnecessary if the Disqualification Order did, in fact, already provide that full injunctive relief. Engineer also argues that there is no allegation of recoverable monetary damage, citing the American rule that each party ordinarily pays its own attorney fees. (Demurrer at p. 8.) The cross-complaint alleges that Talkdesk suffered monetary damages in the form of Talkdesks attorneys fees in seeking to have its confidential and privileged information placed under seal or stricken from the public record and in moving to disqualify Mr. Pham and Mr. Lobbin from continuing to work on the Engineer v. Talkdesk litigation. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 67; see Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 71, 86.) Talkdesk attaches a copy of the parties contract, in which the parties agreed, In any action or proceeding to enforce rights under this Capacity Partner Agreement, the prevailing party will be entitled to recover costs and attorneys fees. (Cross-Complaint, Ex. A at p. 3 [PH000370].) Talkdesk therefore sufficiently alleges a basis for recovery of attorney fees. Whether this clause applies to the dispute cannot be determined at this time. (See Demurrer at p. 8, fn. 2.) The demurrer to the second, third, and fourth causes of action is overruled. B. Talkdesk Sufficiently Alleges Engineers Knowledge for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations (Second Cause of Action). Engineer argues that Talkdesk fails to allege that Engineer knew of the contract at issue and knew that it was interfering with the contracts performance. (Demurrer at pp. 8-9.) The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendants knowledge of this contract; (3) defendants intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. ( Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra , 50 Cal. 3d at p. 1126, fn. 2.) The cross-complaint alleges that Andrew T. Pham was bound by his Employment Agreement and Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement (PIIA). (Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 32-33.) Engineers senior executives, including at least Sachin Duggal and Joe Norena knew of Mr. Phams ongoing contractual obligations to Talkdesk, including those arising from his Employee Agreement and PIIA. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 64.) This knowledge came, in part, from Phams discussions on behalf of Talkdesk with Engineers CEO, Sachin Duggal, about Engineers claims. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 34.) Mr. Duggal knew or should have known that Mr. Pham was barred from assisting Engineer in that matter [regarding the MSA], having known that he worked on that very issue for Talkdesk, but Mr. Duggal pressed Mr. Pham to betray his obligations to Talkdesk anyway. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 37.) This sufficiently alleges facts about Engineers knowledge of Talkdesks contracts with Pham. Engineer intentionally induced Pham to use Talkdesk confidential, protected, and privileged information for the benefit of Engineer in suing Talkdesk on the MSA and in assisting Engineer in its attempted extortion of Talkdesk., and Engineer caused Mr. Pham to breach his obligation to maintain Talkdesks confidential information as confidential from Engineer and persuaded Mr. Pham instead to actively use Talkdesk protected and confidential information he learned of as Talkdesks fiduciary and lawyer in Engineers complaint filed against Talkdesk in this matter and in the prior April 13, 2022 federal complaint and April 15, 2022 draft complaint. (Cross-Complaint ¶¶ 65-66.) This sufficiently alleges facts about Engineers intentional interference. The demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled. C. Talkdesk Sufficiently Alleges Facts About the Invoices (First and Fifth Causes of Action). Engineer argues that Talkdesk does not allege damages for the first and fifth causes of action for breach of contract and unfair competition. (Demurrer at p. 10.) Specifically, Talkdesks sole alleged damage is the amounts that Talkdesk improperly paid Engineer in reliance of the invoices that Plaintiffs allegedly falsified, and Talkdesk did not allege that it suffered any damage from invoices that it did not pay, because it cannot. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, the First and Fifth Causes of Action are insufficient to the extent that they rely on allegations regarding invoices that Talkdesk never paid. ( Ibid. ) The parties agree that Between February and September of 2020, both Engineer.ai and Talkdesk fully performed under the MSA. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 57, FAC ¶ 17.) Engineer later breached the contract by backdating invoices and tendering false invoices for money not actually owed by Talkdesk. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 60.) Talkdesk was harmed in at least the amounts that it improperly paid Engineer in reliance on the falsified invoices. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 61.) This sufficiently alleges Talkdesks damages. There is no mention of Talkdesk rely[ing] on allegations regarding invoices that Talkdesk never paid. (See Demurrer at p. 10.) Engineer also argues that Talkdesks allegations about backdated invoices borders on frivolous, as it [is] a basic failure of English language comprehension, and the term raising an invoice is an unambiguous British expression under which Engineer was fully compliant. (Demurrer at p. 11.) This argument about contractual interpretation cannot be resolved on demurrer. The demurrer to the first and fifth causes of action is overruled. D. Talkdesk Sufficiently Alleges a Controversy for Judicial Determination (Sixth Cause of Action). Engineer argues that the sixth cause of action for declaratory relief does not concern any present rights and duties and is neither necessary nor proper. (Demurrer at pp. 12-13.) A person who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an action for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) The remedy of declaratory relief is cumulative and does not restrict other remedies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1062.) . . . The mere fact that another remedy is available will not suffice as sufficient grounds for a court to decline a declaration, because declaratory relief is not intended to be exclusive or extraordinary. ( Kirkwood v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.) Talkdesk seeks a declaratory judgment that Talkdesk provided proper notice of its intent to terminate the contract on September 18, 2020, that the contract was validly terminated on November 2, 2020, and that it is not obligated to pay any invoice for any services provided by Engineer after that date. (Cross-Complaint ¶ 103.) This is a request for a judicial declaration about Talkdesks legal duty to Engineer in the parties actual controversy about the MSA and Talkdesks duty to pay in the future. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is overruled. MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGE LOG DOCUMENTS Engineer produced an April 2024 Privilege Log that identified five documents. (Motion at p. 4.) It later produced the document withheld at Entry No. 1, which Talkdesk contends had nothing in the document that suggested any basis for ever withholding the document as privileged. ( Id. at p. 5.) Talkdesk now seeks to compel Engineers production of the other four remaining entries. Talkdesk provides a copy of Engineers April 2024 Privilege Log. (Van Zant Decl., Ex. 1.) A privilege log must identify with particularity each document the responding party claims is protected from disclosure by a privilege and provide sufficient factual information for the propounding party and court to evaluate whether the claim has merit. ( Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1130 ( Catalina ).) Generally, a privilege log typically should provide the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the documents date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted. ( Ibid. ) Once the proponent makes a prima facie showing of a confidential attorney-client communication, it is presumed the communication is privileged and the burden shifts to the opponent to establish waiver, an exception, or that the privilege does not for some other reason apply. The opponent may not rely on the communications content to make that showing. ( DP Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 659-660.) Item No. 2 is a February 10, 2020 email from James Barsdorf to Marc Thurlow, which was also copied to Ankur Chawla, John Keefer, and Karandeep Singh Grover. It is described as Email(s) containing a confidential communication between client and attorney made in the course of their attorney-client relationship regarding contract with Talkdesk, Inc. Item No. 3 is February 11, 2020 email from James Barsdorf to Sachin Dev Duggal, which was also copied to Ankur Chawla, Karandeep Singh Grover, John Keefer, Varghese Cherian, and Marc Thurlow. It is described as Email(s) containing a confidential communication between client and attorney made in the course of their attorney-client relationship regarding contract with Talkdesk, Inc. Item No. 4 is a July 31, 2020 reply to comment by Deepak Tehlan, replying to [saurabh@engineer.ai]; @sachmans @spd @marc_thurlow. It is described as Email(s) containing a confidential communication between client and attorney made in the course of their attorney-client relationship regarding contract with Talkdesk, Inc. Item No. 5 is undated Typed word document notes containing a confidential communication between client and attorney made in the course of their attorney-client relationship regarding prospective litigation, and material(s) prepared by attorney in anticipation of the [litigation] reflecting attorneys impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories. Engineers Privilege Log suggests that a privilege applies for these documents. Although these items do not identify all parties roles, Item Nos. 2-4 include Marc Thurlow, who Talkdesk knows is Engineers former in-house counsel. (See, e.g., Motion at pp. 4, 7.) Item No. 5 describes attorney work product and communications that are privileged. However, the Privilege Log does not provide sufficient factual information for the propounding party and court to evaluate whether the claim [of privilege] has merit. ( Catalina, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1130.) Talkdesk asks the Court to order Engineer to produce the documents withheld at Entry Nos. 2-4 within five (5) days of entry of such order. (Motion at p. 16.) The Court cannot do so. Engineer timely objected on the grounds of privilege and preserved these objections through production of a privilege log, regardless of whether the objections were sufficiently detailed in their response or privilege log and the court, as a matter of law, could not find that they had waived these privileges. ( People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1074-1075.) When confronted with a deficient privilege log that fails to provide the necessary information to rule on attorney-client and work product objections, a trial court may order the responding party to provide a further privilege log that includes the necessary information to rule on those objections, but may not order the privileges waived because serving a deficient privilege log, or even failing to serve a privilege log, is not one of the three statutorily authorized methods for waiving the attorney-client privilege. ( Catalina, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1120 1121.) In reply, Talkdesk asks that the Court alternatively order a supplemental privilege log. The motion is granted in part. Engineer is ordered to produce a supplemental privilege log that provides sufficient factual information for Talkdesk and the Court to evaluate whether the claims of privilege have merit, including the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the documents date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted. ( Catalina, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1130.) The request for sanctions is denied. CONCLUSION The demurrer to the FACs second cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. The demurrer to the FACs third cause of action is OVERRULED. Talkdesk is ordered to file an answer within 10 days. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).) The demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is OVERRULED. Engineer is ordered to file an answer within 10 days. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).) The motion to compel privilege log documents is GRANTED IN PART. Engineer is ordered to produce to Talkdesk a supplemental privilege log pursuant to the above instructions within 30 days. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 9th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 22STCV17484 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 22STCV17484 MOTIONS : Petition for Minors Compromise MOVING PARTY: Petitioner Andres Sijifredo Barajas OPPOSING PARTY: Unopposed The Court has reviewed the petition filed on June 11, 2024 by Petitioner Andres Sijifredo Barajas (Petitioner) on behalf of Claimant Andres Julian Barajas, age 10. The Court denies the petition without prejudice for the following reasons: In attachment 8, Petitioner provided medical records from two days after the subject motor vehicle accident. However, the Court requires further records, or a parent declaration attesting that Claimant is fully recovered from the chest and back pain. Due to the selection in item 11b(3), Petitioner must provide attachment 11b(3). Petitioner requests $333.33 in attorney fees which represents 33.33% of the gross settlement. Petitioner must include an attorney declaration in attachment 13a discussing the factors in California Rules of Court, rule 7.955(b). The declaration by counsel filed on June 11, 2024 is insufficient; additionally, the attorney declaration must be attached to the petition. As stated in the previous petition, attachment 17e must be provided. Accordingly, the Court denies the petition without prejudice. Petitioner shall give notice and file a proof of service of such.

Case Number: 23NWCV02843 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C Saucedo, et al. vs. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Case No. 23NWCV02843 This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiffs move ex parte to set the motion to compel further discovery responses and motion to compel compliance, scheduled for October 29, 2024, and March 18, 2025, respectively, to Tuesday, December 10, 2024. Plaintiffs argue judicial economy because the Court will decide two motions that address deficiencies in the same discovery responses. Based on the above, the Court GRANTS the motion. The motions are ADVANCED to today and CONTINUED to Thursday, December 12, 2024, at 10:30 A.M. in Dept. SE-C.

Case Number: 20STCV46934 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 73 7/11/2024 Dept. 73 Hon. Rolf Treu, Judge presiding BARRIOS v. TELACU NW FIVE, INC., et al. ( 20STCV46934 ) Counsel for Plaintiff/opposing party: Daniel Balaban (Balaban & Speilberger, LLP) Counsel for Defendant/moving party: Benjamin Sampson (Bordin Semmer LLP) MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL DEPOSITION OF RUDY ELIAS ( filed by Defendant Waste Management of California, Inc. on 04/04/24) TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Waste Management of Californias Motion to Compel Deposition of Rudy Elias is GRANTED. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. Moving party to give notice. BACKGROUND On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff Jerson Barrios (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Telacu NW Five, Inc.; Telacu 1270, Inc.; Telacu Development Corporation, Inc.; The East Los Angeles Community Union; Waste Management of California, Inc. (Waste Management); and Waste Management Collection and Recycling, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). The Complaint alleges that while in the course of Plaintiffs employment with Garibay Landscaping, Inc., Plaintiff sustained significant injuries during an incident on May 2, 2020. Plaintiff alleges he was standing on the outer ledges on the top of a dumpster, as he and others usually did, to empty the contents of the reusable trash bags full of leaves, shrubbery, branches, which was being handed to him by another member of the Garibay Landscaping crew. Plaintiff alleges he suddenly lost his balance and fell down to the ground hitting the back of his head, neck, back and the rest of his body onto the asphalt/concrete floor, suffering a skull fracture, respiratory failure, spinal injuries and shoulder abrasion, among other injuries. On April 4, 2024, Defendant Waste Management filed the instant Motion to Compel Witness Rudy Elias to Comply with the Deposition Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents. No opposition was filed. ANALYSIS Defendant Waste Management moves to compel the deposition of third-party witness Rudy Elias. A party may move to compel a non-partys compliance with a subpoena that requires the attendance of a witness. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.(a) Unlike a motion to compel a partys deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, the movant is not required to show good cause or include an accompanying meet and confer declaration. On February 12, 2024, Rudy Elias was served with a subpoena for his personal appearance at deposition which was set for March 21, 2024. Defendant Waste Management asserts that Mr. Elias testimony is highly relevant to this case. Plaintiff identified Mr. Elias as a post-incident employer, thus Defendant Waste Management argues Mr. Elias testimony is important for liability and damage-related issues. Defendant Waste Management contends that Mr. Elias never indicated he would not be able to appear. The Court notes that the motion is unopposed. Due to the lack of opposition, an inference is created that the motion is meritorious. ( Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) The Court GRANTS Defendant Waste Managements motion. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. CONCLUSION Defendant Waste Management of Californias Motion to Compel Deposition of Rudy Elias is GRANTED. Rudy Elias is ordered to appear for deposition within 30 days. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 24SMCV01057 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M City of Santa Monica v. Colonial Manor et al., 24SMCV01057 Background On April 25, 2024, the parties stipulated in this matter and the related matter, 24SMUD00651, Colonial Manor v. Reyes, to have the Court resolve the legal issue of whether Santa Monica Rent Control Charter Amendment (SMRCC) Section 1806(c) and other ordinances permit Colonial Manor to raise the rent to the market rate under the agreed upon factual circumstances of the case. (4/25/24 Order.) On July 6, 2024, the parties submitted their Stipulated Facts for the July 10, 2024, Non-Jury Trial on Rent Increase Validity. The specific issue to be addressed is whether Colonial Manor had the right to impose an unlimited rent increase for a unit that was occupied by the spouse of the original occupant who is now deceased. Colonial Manor contends that when the original occupant(s) vacate a unit, the landlord can raise the rent on everyone else. Colonials interpretation of the statute relies upon the language in Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) permitting an owner to increase rent to a lawful sublessee or assignee when the original occupant(s) are no longer permanently residing there. If Mrs. Reyes falls within that category, then the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act preempts the local Santa Monica rent control ordinance preventing Colonial from raising the rent. Therefore, the Court must interpret the terms sublessee and assignee as used in section 1954.53, as well as the term original occupant. Does Section 1954.53(d)(2) Apply to the Facts of this Case The effect of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act provision allowing residential landlords to establish the initial rental rate for a dwelling or unit is to permit landlords to impose whatever rent they choose at the commencement of a tenancy. ( Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232.) The term occupant is not limited to a party to the rental agreement, but rather applies to any individual who has resided in the dwelling from the start of a tenancy, with the landlord's permission. ( Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arb. Bd. , (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 505, 512 [city rent control protections applied to tenants' sons occupancy because he was an original occupant that continuously resided at the Unit pursuant to the original lease even after the sons parents had moved out]; Cobb v. San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Bd. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 345 [landlord did not have authority to increase tenant's rent where tenant occupied apartment before effective day of rent increase, tenant was not assignee or sublessee of previous tenant, and landlord negotiated prior rent increase with tenant, and demanded prompt payment of rent].) Civil Code section 1954.53(d)(2) authorizes unlimited rent increases only when the occupants that remain are sublessee[s] or assignee[s] of the previous tenant. The Court concludes that the terms sublessee or assignee was not an attempt to refer to all persons still occupying a unit after the original occupants. The use of the term occupant in the same subsection suggests that the legislature was intending to use the more specific meanings behind sublessee and assignee, as opposed to non-original occupants. ( See In re M.A. , (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5 th 143, 150 (when different terms are used in part of same statutory scheme, they are presumed to have different meanings.) The statute can be fairly read to narrowly permit rent increases only to a sublessee or assignee who occupied a unit after January 1, 1996, and where the original occupants have vacated. Thus, if the individual is not a sublessee or assignee, the provisions would not apply even if the original occupants have vacated. This conclusion is supported by the remaining sections of Civil Code section 1954.53. Section 1954.53 subsection (d)(1)-(4) all refer to subletting. For example, subsection (d)(1) states that the Act does not preclude express agreements in leases establishing rent for sublessees. ((d)(1) Nothing in this section or any other provision of law shall be construed to preclude express establishment in a lease or rental agreement of the rental rates to be applicable in the event the rental unit subject thereto is sublet&) (d)(3) provides the subdivision does not apply to partial changes in occupancy of a dwelling or unit where one or more of the occupants of the premises& remains an occupant in lawful possession of the dwelling or unit (emphasis added). As discussed below, this case could be considered a partial change in occupancy referred to in (d)(3), which demonstrates a recognition of the type of situation presented here . Furthermore, subsection (d)(4) also recognizes that nothing in the section prohibits a covenant against sublease or assignment, unless the owner received written notice from the tenant and accepted rent. Thus, the context of subsection (d)(2) supports the position that it is referring specifically to sublets or assignments, as opposed to any other kind of occupant whether original or not. As the caselaw explains, the purpose of this subsection was to preclude friends and family from creating subtenancies and assignments that could avoid the Costa Hawkins Act. It would not preclude an owner establishing a new, oral lease with occupants during partial changes in occupancy. Giving a strict interpretation of the terms, section 1954.53(d)(2) would not preempt Santa Monicas ordinance and allow for the 400% increase in rent. The stipulated facts admit that Vilma Reyes is not an assignee or subtenant. Milton Reyes lived at the Unit as a tenant until his death on September 8, 2023. (Stipulated Fact (SF) 2.) Defendant, Mrs. Reyes, moved into the Unit in about February 2021. (SF 4, 5.) The couple got married in February 2022. (SF 3.) Mrs. Reyes never paid Milton Reyes rent. (SF 6.) Mrs. Reyes also never entered into any written, verbal, or implied agreement for Mr. Reyes to assign or transfer his tenancy rights to the Rental Unit. (SF 7.) Thus, it is undisputed that she never paid rent to, or entered into an assignment with, her husband. Furthermore, Mrs. Reyes persuasively argues that a marital relationship cannot create a common law subtenancy between husband and wife. As such, the Court concludes that Vilma Reyes is neither a subtenant or assignee of Milton Reyes and Costa Hawkins does not authorize a rental increase that would violate SMRCC law. Alternatively, Mrs. Reyes would still be protected from the rent increase as a tenant. A landlord and new occupant may informally create a tenancy. It is well established that a tenancy need not be created by a lease, but may be created by occupancy by consent. ( Miller v. Elite Ins. Co. , (1980) 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 750; see also Parkmerced Co. v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. , (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 490, 494-95.) Family members and friends who subsequently move into the apartment are not protected unless the landlord consents to the occupancy and accepts rent from the new occupant, thus creating a new tenancy. Here, the evidence before the Court set forth in the stipulated facts is that Colonial Manor explicitly, implicitly, or by operation of law, created a new tenancy with Mrs. Reyes. Once married in 2022, Mrs. Reyes can be considered to have owed and paid rent to Colonial Manor based upon her husbands rental payments. Mrs. Reyes did not owe a duty to pay rent to her husband but did owe an obligation to Landlord to pay the rent owed to it by her husband. (Family Code § 914(a)(1).) Since Plaintiff accepted this rent from Mr. Reyes and his spouse (the new occupant), a new tenancy would have been created so long as the landlord was aware that Mrs. Reyes was occupying the unit. There is no evidence that Colonial Manor was not aware of Mrs. Reyes occupying the Unit. In fact, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion since Colonial Manor sent her the notice of the rent increase immediately after her husband died. Therefore, as an alternative to concluding that section 1954.53(d)(2) is inapplicable, the Court would conclude that Colonial Manor and Mrs. Reyes created a new tenancy in 2021 or February 2022, which pursuant to the terms of the December 2022 notice, was at a rental rate of $666.00, including all surcharges. (SF 9.) As stated, there is no evidence that Colonial Manor did not know the Reyes were married, and that Vilma Reyes was residing with Milton Reyes at the Unit. By accepting rent from Milton Reyes, Colonial Manor was accepting rent from husband and wife. Furthermore, the Courts ruling would fulfill the purpose behind the Costa Hawkins Act. As the legislative history makes clear, t he Costa-Hawkins Act establishes vacancy decontrol for residential dwelling units where the former tenant has voluntarily vacated, abandoned or been legally evicted. (Legis. Analyst, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1164 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) p. 2.) It was not intended to be used to evict or raise rental rates on a surviving spouse, who was not part of the initial lease agreement.

Case Number: 23CHCV02264 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/9/24 Case #23CHCV02264 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CROSS-COMPLAINT Motion filed on 2/26/24. MOVING PARTY: Defendant Hanna Margaret Eva Perlstein RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Zafar Neymatov NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order granting Defendant Hanna Margaret Eva Perlstein leave to file a cross-complaint against Cadillac of Beverly Hills for: (1) Indemnification, (2) Apportionment of Fault and (3) Declaratory Relief. RULING : SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out of a rear-end collision that occurred on 10/13/21 on the northbound Interstate 5 involving vehicles driven by Plaintiff Zafar Neymatov (Plaintiff) and Defendant Hanna Margaret Eva Perlstein (Defendant). On 7/31/23, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for: (1) Motor Vehicle and (2) General Negligence. On 12/29/23, Defendant filed her answer to the complaint. At the time Defendant filed the answer, Defendant was unaware of facts on which to base a cross-complaint. After the answer to the complaint was filed, Defendant became aware that at the time off the accident, Plaintiff was driving a courtesy vehicle loaned to her by Cadillac of Beverly Hills (Cadillac) which had come to a complete and sudden stop in the middle of the interstate moments before the accident. Based on the foregoing, Defendant seeks an order granting her leave to file a cross-complaint against Cadillac (currently not a party to the action) for: (1) Indemnification, (2) Apportionment of Fault and (3) Declaratory Relief. Plaintiff has not opposed or otherwise responded to the motion. ANALYSIS CCP 428.50 provides: (a) A party shall file a cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him or her before or at the same time as the answer to the complaint or cross-complaint. (b) Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a date for trial. (c) A party shall obtain leave of court to file any cross-complaint except one filed within the time specified in subdivision (a) or (b) . L eave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action. Since the proposed cross-complaint is not alleged against Plaintiff and a trial date has not been set, Defendant was not required to obtain leave of court to file the cross-complaint. See CCP 428.50(b). Defendants citation to CCP 426.50 is misplaced. The subject cross-complaint is not compulsory because the related cause of action is not being alleged against Plaintiff. See CCP 426.30(a). CONCLUSION To the extent necessary, the motion is granted. Defendant must separately file the cross-complaint.