Amber Barefoot V. Christine Catoni Et Al.

Case Number: 23AVCV00526 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: A14 Background This is a quiet action. Plaintiff Charles D. Shea (Plaintiff) presents that the real property at issue is commonly known as 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster, CA 93536 (the Subject Property). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lito Vales (Lito) [1] and Vicki Vales (Vicki and collectively the Vales) took title to the Subject Property from Lancaster Palms, LLC by as joint tenants by way of a Grant Deed recorded on August 18, 2006, as Document No. 06-1842986, that the Vales refinanced the Subject Property numerous times, and the Vales deeded their interest in the Subject Property to Plaintiff as his sole and separate property, by way of a Grant Deed which recorded in on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363739. Plaintiff presents that his spouse, Kim Marie Rosas-Shea, deeded her interest in the Property to Plaintiff by way of an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed (IGD) which recorded in on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363738. Plaintiff further alleges that he obtained a loan in the amount of $244,000.00 from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. with MERS as nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns, secured by 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster CA 93536 by way of a deed of trust recorded on April 16, 2018 as Document No. 20180363740. Plaintiff contends that the Vales did not disclose that there was any other prior deed of trust encumbering the Subject Property, but Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (SLS) and its predecessors-in-interest contend that here is a prior deed of trust securing a loan to the Vales in the amount of $58,000.00 from lender Countrywide Bank, N.A. with MERS as nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns, which was recorded on October 23, 2006, as Document No. 06-2340701 with the correct common description of the Subject Property, but incorrect Assessor Parcel Number (APN). Hereinafter, this deed of trust will be addressed as the 2006 DOT. Plaintiff believes that the deed of trust at issue is related to the Vales other property, commonly known as 3523 W Avenue K4, Lancaster, CA 93536. From this deed of trust, Plaintiff alleges that (1) an Assignment of Deed of Trust (as to the 2006 DOT) was recorded on July 18, 2019 as Document No. 20190699535 containing the common property address with the incorrect APN; (2) a second Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded on August 11, 2022 as Document No. 20220810290 containing the common property address with the incorrect APN; (3) on or about January 25, 2023, a Notice of Default pertaining to the Prior DOT was recorded as Document No. 20230050193, containing the correct common address and APN; and (4) on April 28, 2023, a Notice of Trustee Sale pertaining to the Prior DOT was recorded as Document No. 20230276620, containing the correct common address and APN, subsequently occurred, affecting the Subject Property. Plaintiff contends that he is a bone fide purchaser. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title, cancel the 2006 DOT, and declaratory relief. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging three causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Cancellation of Instrument; and (3) Declaratory Relief. On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, amending the fictitious name of Doe 1 to MEB Loan Trust VI (MEB). On July 24, 2023, SLS filed its Answer. On October 20, 2023, MEB filed its Answer. On October 17, 2023, Vicki was placed into default. On November 14, 2023, Lito was placed into default. On February 02, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. On February 07, 2024, the parties entered a stipulation to continue the trial date and all discovery deadlines, granted by the Court. On February 08, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial and Related Dates, set for hearing on February 13, 2024. On February 13, 2024, the Court informed the parties that the stipulation was previously granted on February 07, 2024. The Court did not rule on the Ex Parte Application which appeared to be based on the previously filed stipulation. On June 25, 2025, SLS filed its Opposition. On July 02, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Reply. ----- Legal Standard Standard for Summary Judgment The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.¿ (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Cal. Code Civ. Proc.¿§437c(c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to¿any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿ ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.¿ ( Juge¿v. County of Sacramento¿ (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 ( Juge ), citing¿ FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima ¿(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Cal.¿Code Civ.¿Proc.¿§437c(p)(2);¿ Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿ (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. ¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ ¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿¿ Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v.¿Paetkau ¿(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)¿¿¿ ----- Discussion Application At the crux of Plaintiffs arguments related to the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument) is Plaintiffs assertion that he is a bona fide purchaser. A buyer is a bona fide purchaser if it bought property in good faith, for value, and had no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another. ( 612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1278; Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) The first element does not require that the buyer's consideration be the fair market value of the property (or anything approaching it). (Citation.) Instead, the buyer need only part with something of value in exchange for the property. (Citation.) ( Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. , supra , 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251.) The determination whether a party is a good faith purchaser or encumbrancer for value ordinarily is a question of fact; on appeal, that determination will not be reversed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence. ( Triple A Management Co., Inc. v. Frisone (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 520, 536.) The general rule places the burden of proof upon a person claiming bona fide purchaser status to present evidence that he or she acquired interest in the property without notice of the prior interest. [Citations.] ( First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1442.) Here, there is no presentation of what Plaintiff parted with for the Subject Property. Rather, Plaintiff has not only alleged that he was deeded the Subject Property in the Complaint (see Complaint ¶ 11) [2] , but also evidenced that it was deeded to him through his attached declaration (see Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 3[Defendants Lito Vales and Vicki Vales (collectively, the Vales) transferred the real property commonly known as 43827 Chaparral Drive, Lancaster CA 93536 (the Chaparral Property) to me by way of a Grant Deed which recorded on April 16, 2018 bearing Document No. 20180363739. I am the current owner of the Chaparral Property. A true and correct copy of the Grant Deed is incorporated herein by reference and attached to Compendium of Evidence as Tab 2].) While Plaintiff presents that he paid value for the Subject Property, Plaintiff relies only on: (1) the Grant Deed, and (2) a subsequent loan in the amount of $244,000.00 from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. secured by a Deed of Trust. (See Motion for Summary Judgment 6:22-26; Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 5.) While Plaintiff states that he pai value for the Subject Property in his declaration (see Compendium of Evidence, Tab 11, Decl. of Plaintiff ¶ 5), what has been presented to the Court is that (1) the Subject Property was deeded to Plaintiff by the Vales ( id . at ¶ 3, and Tab 2); (2) Plaintiffs spouse deeded any interest in the Subject Property to him through an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed ( id . at ¶ 4, and Tab 3); and (3) a subsequent loan in the amount of $244,000.00 was obtained from CrossCountry Mortgage, Inc. and secured by the Subject Property (id. at ¶ 5, and Tab 4). There has been neither a presentation of evidence that value was exchanged for the Subject Property between the Plaintiff and the previous owners, the Vales nor a foundation laid for a grant deed to qualify as a purchase or exchange of value. Thus, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that he is a bona fide purchaser and so his arguments for the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument) fail. Plaintiffs argument for the Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) is that it is undisputed that the 2006 DOT was not recorded in the Subject Propertys chain of title giving Plaintiff constructive notice; and (2) Plaintiff purchased the Subject Property without any notice of the existence of the Prior DOT or Defendants claimed interest in the Prior DOT. As discussed, ante , there is an issue as to whether Plaintiff purchased the Subject Property. The Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relieve) is derivative of Plaintiffs other claims. As Plaintiff has not met his burden for both the First Cause of Action (Quiet Title) and Second Cause of Action (Cancellation of Instrument), the derivative Third Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief) fails. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. ----- Conclusion Plaintiff Charles D. Sheas Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff Charles D. Sheas Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED. [1] Defendants Lito Vales and Vicki Vales share the same surname. The Court address each individually by their first name for the purpose of clarity. No disrespect is intended. [2] The Complaint itself alleges both that Plaintiff was deeded the Subject Property and that Plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser. (Compare Complaint ¶ 11 with Complaint ¶¶ 22, 28, 39, 41 and Prayer ¶ 2.)

SCV-265714, County of Sonoma v. Castagnola Appearances required.

Case Number: 24SMCV00625 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC to give notice. REASONING Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLC (Plaintiff) requests judicial notice of the Deed of Trust recorded November 6, 2019, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20191198681; the Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded February 12, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210247143; and the Trustees Deed Upon Sale recorded March 3, 2021, in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office as Document No. 20210348502. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). Analysis Plaintiff moves the Court for an order granting summary judgment or adjudication in its favor on the grounds that Defendants Eliyahu Marciano and Anthony Marciano (Defendants) have not paid any rent to Plaintiff since the time Plaintiff acquired and perfected its title to the property; the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 does not apply to this action or the tenancy because the more restrictive local ordinance applies instead, and Plaintiff has complied with all provisions of the local ordinance; and any contention that service of the complaint was defective is inapposite where Defendants appeared in the action and filed an answer. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) [T]he court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection) . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that it owns the premises at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard in Venice, and Defendants entered into a written fixed-term lease with Palms Blvd. Venice Beach, LLC for the period of November 30, 2020 to May 31, 2022 with monthly rent at $4,500, payable on the seventh day of each calendar month. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-8.) Plaintiff acquired title and ownership of the property following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and title was perfected on March 3, 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Defendants failed to pay any rent after Plaintiff acquired title to the property, and Defendants comply with the 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, which expired on January 26, 2024, a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, a second 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, or a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit. Plaintiff seeks past-due rent of $162,000 under four notices, holdover damages, and forfeiture of the agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-19.) The basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed. (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16.) Plaintiff provides evidence that it acquired title to the subject real property at 1352 and 1354 Palms Boulevard, Venice, California 90291 following a foreclosure sale that went forward on February 4, 2021, and Plaintiff perfected its title to the property by recording a Trustees Deed Upon Sale on March 21, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The property consists of a five-bedroom main residence with an additional guesthouse containing two additional bedrooms. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 3.) Shortly after acquiring the property, on April 7, 2021, Defendants presented Plaintiff with a copy of a residential lease purportedly entered into by Defendants and the prior owner, Palms Blvd Venice Beach, LLC (Palms, LLC). (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff states it was unaware, prior to April 7, 2021, that any lease existed for any tenants or occupants of the property. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 7.) The lease reflects that, on November 30, 2020, Defendants entered into a residential lease for the property with Palms, LLC, providing that Defendants were to pay $4,500.00 per month, beginning on November 30, 2020, payable on the seventh day of each month, for a term expiring on May 31, 2022. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has not received any rent from Defendants since acquiring title to the property on or about February 4, 2021. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 9.) On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff proceeded with a civil lawsuit against Defendants, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 21STCV16332 (HOF REO 1 LLC v. Marciano) to ascertain the validity of the lease, but Plaintiff ultimately dismissed the civil suit and concedes here that the lease is a bona fide lease between Defendants and the prior owner, Palms, LLC. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 10.) However, Plaintiff contends there was never any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants directly to occupy the property, whether in writing, oral, or otherwise. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff served a total of four separate notices to pay rent to quit as follows: (1) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, totaling $31,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.) (2) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 30-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, totaling $76,500.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) (3) On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff served a 5-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning February 7, 2023, through November 7, 2023, totaling $45,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.) (4) On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit for rent owing beginning January 7, 2024, through February 7, 2024, totaling $9,000.00. (Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) The time for Defendants to cure under each of the notices expired, and no payment was received, nor was there any attempt to make payment. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 12; Labarre Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also provides evidence that it has complied with Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09, which applies in place of Civil Code section 1946.2 because the local ordinance is more protective (see Civ. Code, § 1946.2, subd. (g)(1)(B; Mot., Labarre Decl. ¶¶ 3-8, Exs. A-E), and Defendants answered the complaint on March 8, 2024, thereby waiving any argument that service of the complaint was incomplete (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1014 [A defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers].) The lease agreement provided with the motion shows that Defendants entered into the lease with the prior owner, Palms, LLC, which Plaintiff does not dipsute. (Mot., Holliday Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 5.) The lease agreement includes information on how to pay rent; specifically, lease payments must be made at the landlords address stated in the notices provision of the lease in paragraph 46. (Ibid.) Notably, Plaintiff provided no evidence with its initial motion that it informed Defendants of the name, telephone number, and address of the person or entity to whom rent payment must be made after Plaintiff became owner of the property, which is required under Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c). The statute states that an owner shall not serve a notice to pay rent or quit or otherwise evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent that accrued during a period of noncompliance with Civil Code section 1962 (ibid.), and merely making contact with Defendants is insufficient to show compliance with the statute. The Court continued the hearing on the motion, despite Defendants nonappearance at the hearing, and required Plaintiff to show compliance with the statute. In its supplemental filing, Plaintiff provides evidence that on November 22, 2023, it served a Notice Regarding Residential Lease, which provided Defendants with Plaintiffs name, a copy of the Trustees Deed Upon Sale through which Plaintiff acquired title, provided contact information for Plaintiffs agents, included information for service of process, provided the name and address for payments to be made, and included a copy of the lease agreement. (Labarre Supplemental Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. F.) While compliance with Civil Code section 1962, subdivision (c), makes it such that Defendants may be liable for unpaid rent during the earlier noncompliance period, it is axiomatic that there is a one-year ceiling on a rent demand, i.e., a three-day notice can only demand rent accrued within one year prior to its service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161, subd. (2).) Plaintiff states that the first notice was served on December 22, 2023, seeking rent owing from March 7, 2021, through September 7, 2021, which clearly exceeds the one-year limit, and the second notice, served on the same day, sought rent owing from October 7, 2021, through January 7, 2023, also exceeding the one-year limit. While Code of Civil Procedure section 1179.05 tolled the one-year limitations period if the landlord was prohibited by COVID-19 related authority from demanding payment of rent, Plaintiff has not alleged any such tolling under this statute or any other statute. Thus, Plaintiff has not clearly established its claim for unlawful detainer as to the first two notices, and Plaintiff has moved only for summary judgment, not adjudication. Thus, the burden does not shift to Defendants to create a triable issue of material fact. For these reasons, Plaintiff HOF REO 1 LLCs Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication is DENIED. Evidentiary Objections Defendants object to certain statements within the declarations of Kevin Holliday and Olivier J. Labarre. Defendants objections are OVERRULED.

Case Number: 20STCV03304 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 74 MOVING PARTY: Defendants RRM Properties, Ltd. and Robertsons Ready Mix, Ltd. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority Motion for Leave to Supplement List of Expert Witnesses The court considered the moving papers, opposition, and reply in connection with this motion. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority filed its complaint in eminent domain against defendants RRM Properties, Ltd.; H.D. Nogle & Sons, Inc.; Helena A. Hartfield; Frank K. Lyon; Ben Shiffman; William G. Isaac; Consolidated Rock Products Co.; Calmat Co.; Roberts Ready Mix, Ltd.; and all persons known or unknown, on January 27, 2020. Plaintiff seeks to acquire various property interests belonging to Defendants according to its power of eminent domain under the Public Utilities Code, section 130050 et seq., for the Rosencrans/Marquardt Grade Separation Project and for public transportation purposes and all uses necessary, incidental or convenient thereto. (Compl., ¶ 3 and Exh. 1 [description of property interests].) Three defendants did not answer, and five have been dismissed. The remaining two, RRM Properties, Ltd. and Robertsons Ready Mix, Ltd. (together Defendants) answered on March 11, 2020. Jury trial is set for August 19, 2024. On May 23, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for an order granting leave to supplement its list of expert witnesses. They seek to designate Michael Orozco, P.E., a civil engineer employed by RRM, as an expert witness for examination at trial. On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff opposed. On July 1, 2024, Defendants replied. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 1258.290 governs the amendment of an expert witness list post-exchange in an eminent domain proceeding. The section permits the court to grant leave for such an amendment if the court finds that such party has made a good faith effort to comply with Sections 1258.210 to 1258.260, inclusive, that he has complied with Section 1258.270, and that by the date of exchange he: (1) Would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call such witness or discovered or listed such opinion or data; or (2) Failed to determine to call such witness or to discover or list such opinion or data through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1258.290(a).) In making a determination under [section 1258.290], the court shall take into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied on the list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data and will be prejudiced if the witness is called or the testimony concerning such opinion or data is given. ( Id. , subd. (b).) DISCUSSION 1. Compliance with Sections 1258.210 through 1258.260 Defendants argue they made good-faith efforts to comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1258.210 through 1258.260 and have complied with section 1258.270. Plaintiff does not directly contest their actual compliance prior to the date of the hearing, and it is not necessary for the Court to examine their compliance to dispose of this motion. Plaintiff prevails on other grounds in particular, Defendants failure to exercise diligence, discussed below. 2. Reasonable Diligence or Mistake The Code requires the Court to find that Defendants could not have uncovered the need for their proposed expert with due diligence, or that they failed to initially designate their expert due to mistake, inadvertence, etc. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1258.290(a)(1)-(2).) Defendants have not shown either. Defendants repeatedly argue they would have produced Orozco as their person most knowledgeable for deposition, but Plaintiff did not proceed with that deposition, which Defendants contend shows Defendants complied in good faith with the expert exchange statutes. (Mot., 2:25; Madueno Decl., ¶ 24.) But Defendants willingness to produce Orozco as a PMK (a fact witness) is not the same as designating him as an expert. Defendants do not explain why Plaintiff had to take Orozcos deposition in order for Defendants to identify him as an expert. Defendants counsels declaration establishes that numerous depositions took place and, in particular, depositions of other expert witnesses from at least January 4, 2023. (Madueno Decl., ¶ 10 [I took the deposition of Metros designated fixtures and equipment appraisal expert].) Defendants do not explain why, if as they anticipate Orozco will be testifying as a fact witness, and they had considered which experts will testify, they did not further designate Orozco as an expert witness, or did not move to supplement earlier. In short, Defendants could have uncovered the need for Orozcos designation earlier by exercising due diligence. Defendants have also not shown mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Counsel testifies [n]either [she] nor [her] office intentionally or knowingly failed to designate Orozco as an expert. (Madueno Decl., ¶ 23.) This is not the standard. Lack of intent is not the same as excusable neglect. The Court must make one of the findings described in section 1258.290, subdivisions (a)(1) and (2), in order to grant Defendants motion. The Court cannot do so. Defendants motion must be denied. 3. Reliance and Prejudice a. Reliance The statutory date for expert exchange was November 16, 2022, more than eighteen months ago. Plaintiff has spent a year and a half preparing for trial while relying on Defendants designation list. This reliance is substantial, particularly given that the case is set for trial only forty-one (41) days from the date of this ruling. b. Prejudice Defendants apparently intend to call Orozco at trial based on his percipient knowledge of relevant facts. But Defendants have already designated an expert James Roberts to testify to the opinions he formed based on Orozcos personal knowledge. If Orozco is also permitted to testify to the same, Defendants will be permitted to duplicate their expert testimony and bolster the credibility of a fact witness, to Plaintiffs detriment and on short notice. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants motion. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 19SMCV00221 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: N Duncan J. McCreary and Reeder McCreary, LLPs Motions to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiffs NBA Automotive Inc., R&H Automotive Inc., RHC Automotive Inc., and RHH Automotive Inc. is GRANTED. Counsel has asserted a valid reason for withdrawal, i.e., there is a likely conflict of interest which may result in a violation of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(b)(0).) Counsel has provided the required forms under rule 3.1362 of the California Rules of Court and served the opposing parties and client with the same. There being good cause to grant counsels request to withdraw, Duncan J. McCreary and Reeder McCreary, LLPs Motions to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiffs NBA Automotive Inc., R&H Automotive Inc., RHC Automotive Inc., and RHH Automotive Inc. is GRANTED. This ruling granting counsels motion to withdraw shall become effective upon filing of proof service of this ruling upon Plaintiffs NBA Automotive Inc., R&H Automotive Inc., RHC Automotive Inc., and RHH Automotive Inc. Plaintiffs NBA Automotive Inc., R&H Automotive Inc., RHC Automotive Inc., and RHH Automotive Inc. are reminded that a corporation cannot represent itself in litigation and must be represented by licensed counsel. (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145.)

Case Number: 23STCV18797 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 45 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Monica Gonzalez Sanchez, Plaintiff, vs. Lidia Pacheco, Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV18797 DEPARTMENT 45 [TENTATIVE] RULING Action Filed: 08/08/2023 [1st Amended Complaint Filed: N/A] Trial Date: None Set Hearing date: 07/09/2024 Moving Party: Defendant Lidia Pacheco Responding Party: Plaintiff Maria Sanchez Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint The Court considered the moving papers and the opposition. Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. Background This case stems from a landlord-tenant dispute. Maria Sanchez (Plaintiff) alleges that Lidia Pacheco (Defendant) committed several unlawful acts while operating as landlord of 1422 E 58 th Dr., Los Angeles, CA 90001 (the Premises). (Complaint, ¶6.) Plaintiff alleges that she began renting the Premises in 2004 under a previous owner Angelina Davalos (Davalos). Davalos passed away in 2017. Thereafter, Defendant became the new owner. ( Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that she has been paying a rental fee of $900.00 each month to the Defendant. Upon entering the agreement for the rental lease of the Premises, Plaintiff alleges that she asked the owner if there was anything to be aware of prior to the start of the lease, to which the owner at that time replied in the negative. Plaintiff alleges she did not discover the alleged illegality of the unit until 2023. ( Id . at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff additionally alleges that the Premises was infested with insects, vermin, and mold at the time she entered into the lease agreement. ( Id. at ¶8.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant, but nothing was done, the issue only grew worse between 2019 and 2022. ( Id. at ¶10.) Issues with the plumbing also arose, and Plaintiff alleges that after giving notice, Defendant did not respond, and Plaintiff therefore conducted repairs at her own expense. ( Id. ) In November of 2019, Plaintiff alleges that there was no gas nor hot water for a week. ( Id. at ¶10.) In June of 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she was asked to vacate the premises, with no written eviction notice. ( Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that no rental contract was ever provided. ( Id. ) Prior to this in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant verbally harassed her to leave. Plaintiff then filed suit. The Complaint contains the following causes of action: 1. Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4 2. Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability 3. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 4. Nuisance 5. Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq. 6. Negligence 7. Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation 8. Fraud Concealment 9. Landlord Harassment 10. Constructive Eviction 11. Retaliatory Eviction 12. Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 13. Violation of AB 1482 Tenant Protection Act The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer; no reply was filed. Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Defendant provides the Declaration of Thomas Shinton Regarding Meeting and Conferring. The Declaration states that Defendant reached out on September 7, 2023, but was unable to reach the Plaintiff. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied, however, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court turns to the demurrer. Discussion Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. ( Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Defendant demurs to the Complaint as a whole and each and every cause of action on three main grounds: (1) the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, (2) the pleading is uncertain and unintelligible, and (3) that several of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The Court agrees, sustains the demurrer in its entirety and grants Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend. A. The Complaint Fails to Properly Allege a Contract Each of the causes of action are based on an alleged rental contract with Defendant, however, the contract is neither provided verbatim, nor attached. ( Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Moreover, the legal effect of the contract is not plead. ( Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Although Plaintiff does not allege a breach of contract, without a verbal or written rental lease agreement, none of the causes of action can survive demurrer. B. The Complaint is Vague As to Defendants second contention that the Complaint is vague, the Court agrees. First, several of the causes of action plead, do not state specific facts, but rather refer back to the section labeled Facts. Second, the Complaint makes clear that from 2004 to 2017, the owner of the Premises was Davalos. (Complaint, ¶6.) The Complaint also makes clear that there were issues that began in 2004. For example, both the causes of action for fraud are based on representations made to Plaintiff upon entering into the alleged lease agreement in 2004, several years before Defendant took over. (Complaint, ¶7. Also see Opposition Papers, 31:7-16.) Another example is the issue with vermin which began in 2004, and apparently was never corrected by Davalos. It is unclear as to what time periods Defendant, the current landlord, is being sought to be liable for because Defendant took over in 2017. By this time Plaintiff was well aware of several of the issues that triggered the pleaded causes of action, which leads to concerns with the applicability of the delayed discovery doctrine (explained further below). C. Statute of Limitations Finally, Defendant asserts the defense that many of the causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff became aware of most if not all of the issues plead within the Complaint long before Defendant took over as landlord. Even the delayed discovery doctrine would provide no assistance here, as to delay the statute of limitations the accrual of a cause of action occurs when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury had a wrongful cause. ( Lederer v. Gursey Schneider LLP (2018) 22 Cal.App.5 th 508, 521.) It is clear that Plaintiff discovered the necessary elements for many of these causes of action as early as 2004 (see generally, the Complaint), but only filed a Complaint with the Court in 2023. Consequently, the demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is sustained in its entirety. Leave to Amend Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment]. As there is reasonable possibility of successful amendment, the Court grants Plaintiffs 20 days leave to amend. Conclusion Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is SUSTAINED in its entirety. Plaintiff is granted 20 days leave to amend. It is so ordered. Dated: July 9, 2024 _______________________ MEL RED RECANA Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24NWCV00981 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: C Cerritos Retail Centercal, LLC vs. Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, Case No. 24NWCV00981 This is an unlawful detainer action. Defendant moves ex parte to advance the hearing on the motion to set aside, which is currently set for August 7, 2024. Default judgment was entered on June 14, 2024. Defendant was served a five-day notice to vacate on July 2, 2024. Defendant filed the instant motion on Monday, July 8, 2024. Defendant argues that it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware that it had to answer within five days. On May 29, 2024, the Court issued the following order: [T]he Court conferred with Plaintiffs Counsel, Nahal Zarnighian. There was no appearance by Defendant. The Court stated that it had reviewed Defendants motion to set aside default and was inclined to grant the motion under CCP § 473, subd. (b). Defendant appears to argue that it relied upon a tentative ruling posted by the Court which granted Defendant an opportunity to file a Supplemental Reply by May 14, 2024. Defendant denies having received notice of the Courts final order requiring Defendant to Answer within 5 days. Given the Courts inclination with respect to Defendants motion to set aside default, and in an effort to expedite these proceedings, Plaintiffs Counsel had no opposition to the Court advancing Defendants motion to be heard today. Accordingly, Plaintiffs ex parte application to shorten time for hearing on Defendants motion to set aside default is GRANTED. Defendants motion to set aside default is ADVANCED to todays date and GRANTED. The demurrer filed on May 20, 2024 is STRICKEN because it was filed when Defendant was still in default. The hearing on Defendants demurrer is ADVANCED to todays date and taken OFF-CALENDAR. Defendant is ORDERED to file and serve an answer or other responsive pleading within 5 days. Clerk to give notice. The Court orders the default entered on 05/16/2024 as to Wokcano Cerritos, LLC, a California limited liability company vacated. Certificate of Mailing is attached. (5/29/24 Minute Order.) In the instant ex parte application, Defendant claims it did not receive actual notice of the May 29, 2024 ex parte hearing and was unaware it had to answer within 5 days. However, the minute order reflects that the Clerk provided notice of the Courts ruling to the parties. Moreover, the argument Defendant makes here is the same one it made in its previous motion to set aside default. The Court granted the previous ex parte application. With respect to the instant motion, the Court determines that Defendants claim of ignorance is not supported by the record and is made solely for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, the ex parte application is DENIED. Clerk to give notice.

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