Document for LLOYD MANAGEMENT INC. vs Cassie Hardy, Zion Olivera

CV-23-003803 – TELO, SAJMIR vs CABRAL, LEVI – Defendants’ Motion to Compel Appearance and Testimony at Deposition and Production of Documents – DENIED, in part; HEARING REQUIRED. Defendants have failed to establish the Court’s authority to order disclosure of the requested records and testimony pursuant to Plaintiff’s property (the Bluff Creek property), as the provisions of Rev. & Tax Code § 408(e)(3) only authorize the Court to issue such an order in the context of a proceeding by a taxpayer challenging the assessment.  Therefore, the motion is DENIED as to the request concerning the Bluff Creek property. With regard to Defendant’s property (the Gomes Road property), it appears that the County Assessor is amenable to disclosure of the requested information, but it is unclear whether all responsive materials have been produced or whether the Assessor’s office has any remaining objections to be resolved in that regard. In addition, it is unclear whether the Assessor opposes the request for testimony relative to the Gomes Road property.  Therefore, counsel shall appear at the hearing to discuss these issues. THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM IS DOWN. If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to the court before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing. Upon receipt, the court will schedule a Zoom hearing.

CV-22-003529 – AHLUWALIA, NIRMAL KUMAR vs KHACHO, ESAM – Defendant and Cross-Complainant Esam Khacho’s Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication – MOOT. In view of the Court’s granting of Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved from Deemed Admissions, on which deemed admissions Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is founded, this motion is moot.

Case Number: 23PSCV02165 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: K Defendant Ronald B. Bibonias Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendant Bibonia is ordered to file an Answer within 10 days. Wilfred T. Cos Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED in part (i.e., as to the first through fourth, sixth and seventh, and ninth causes of action). The court will inquire of the parties whether leave to amend should be granted. Background Plaintiff Flossie C. Parungao (Plaintiff) alleges as follows: Plaintiff and Wilfred T. Co aka Winnifredo T. Co (Co) are siblings. In June 2004, Plaintiff located and negotiated the purchase of the property located at 302 S. Loraine Ave., Glendora, California 91741 (Property) to serve as her residence. Co offered to assist Plaintiff with the purchase of the subject property. Plaintiff and Co agreed that (1) Co would co-sign the purchase financing documents and take record title to the subject property, (2) Plaintiff would provide all of the funds needed for the down payment and closing costs, (3) Plaintiff would thereafter directly pay or provide funds for payment of the loan, property taxes, insurance and other subject property related-expenses, and that (4) upon request from Plaintiff, Co would execute such documents and take such other actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the subject property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Contract). Plaintiff did all things required of her under the Contract. In 2023, Plaintiff asked Co to sign over record title to her; Co refused. Plaintiffs ensuing investigation revealed that Co transferred the subject property into the Ronald B. Bibonia and Wilfred T. Co Revocable Trust dated November 24, 2020 (Trust). On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Co, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust, Ronald Bibonia (Bibonia), individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust (collectively Defendants), and Does 1-50 for: 1. Specific Performance of Oral Contract 2. Breach of Oral Contract 3. Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform] 4. Intentional Misrepresentation 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 6. Conversion 7. Violation of Penal Code § 496 8. Quiet Title 9. Accounting 10. Imposition of Constructive Trust On April 26, 2024, the court sustained with leave to amend the demurrer as to the first through fourth, and sixth and seventh causes of action. It also overruled the demurrer as to fifth and eighth causes of action. On May 16, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against Co, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust, Bibonia, individually and as Co-Trustee of the Trust (collectively Defendants), and Does 1-50 for: 1. Specific Performance of Oral Contract 2. Breach of Oral Contract 3. Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform] 4. Intentional Misrepresentation 5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 6. Conversion 7. Violation of Penal Code § 496 8. Quiet Title 9. Accounting 10. Imposition of Constructive Trust A Case Management Conference is set for July 30, 2024. Legal Standard A demurrer may be made on the grounds that the pleading, inter alia , does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. ( Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. ( SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [citations omitted].) At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the factual basis for the claim against him. ( Semole v. Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721.) [A] demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the pleading, or the construction placed on an instrument pleaded therein, or facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge. ( S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732 [citations omitted].) Discussion Defendants demur, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to the first through ninth causes of action in Plaintiffs complaint, on the basis that they each fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and are uncertain. [1] Request for Judicial Notice The court rules on Defendants Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) as follows: Granted as to Exhibit A (i.e., deed of trust recorded April 11, 2007). Merits As to Bibonia Bibonia contends that the demurrer should be summarily sustained as it pertains to him, on the basis that the FAC is again completely devoid of factual allegations against him. (Dem., 18:9). A review of the FAC demonstrates that Bibonia was not contractually bound based on the alleged oral contract but merely listed on the Propertys title. Plaintiffs contention that Bibonia is a beneficiary to the property is insufficient to allege his involvement in the alleged oral agreement. Nevertheless, Bibonias name on the Propertys title is sufficient to include him on the eighth cause of action for quiet title. As a result, Bibonias demurrer is sustained on this basis as to causes of action one through seven, and nine without leave to amend. As to Co First and Second Causes of Action (i.e., Specific Performance of Oral Contract and Breach of Oral Contract, Respectively) [T]he elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. ( Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) Plaintiff has alleged that in June 2004, she located and negotiated the purchase of the Property to serve as her residence and that [a]t the time, . . . [her brother] Co offered to assist [her] with the purchase of the Property (FAC, ¶¶ 7 and 8); that she and Co agreed that (1) Co would assist [her] by co-signing the purchase financing documents and taking record title to the Property, (2) [she] would provide all of the funds needed for the down payment and closing costs, (3) [she] would thereafter directly pay or provide funds for the payment of the loan, property taxes, insurance and other Property related expenses, and (4) upon request from [her, Co would execute such documents and take such other actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the Property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Contract) ( Id. ). Co first argues that the alleged oral contract is barred by the Statute of Frauds. (See Civil Code § 1624, subd. (a)(3) [The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the parts agent: . . . (3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein . . .] On April 26, 2024, the court overruled the demurrer on statute of frauds grounds. As a result, the court will not consider the Statute of Frauds argument. Co next argues that the alleged oral contract fails for lack of consideration. (See Civ. Code § 1550 [It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: 1. Parties capable of contracting; 2. Their consent; 3. A lawful object; and, 4. A sufficient cause or consideration].) Plaintiffs only response is that making substantial payments over an extended period of time constitutes consideration. (See Opposition at 14.) Plaintiff relies on Flojo International, Inc. v. Lassleben (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 713, 719, in support of her contention. However, Flojo does not support her contention. In Flojo , a former distributor of products for a company obtained ownership of the company, extinguished the debts the company owned to the distributor, and provided the former owner royalty rights for future sale of goods. ( Id . at 719-20.) The court reversed an order granting summary judgment and held that consideration to the companys prior owner in extinguishing debt was sufficient reason or consideration to bind the company. ( Id . at 720.) Here, Plaintiff again fails to articulate the consideration that Co received. Her contention that other family members benefited by making the Property available as a residence for a sibling demonstrates a sibling promissory estoppel cause of action more so than an oral agreement. Moreover, it appears this alleged consideration was not alleged as part of the original oral agreement. The demurrer is sustained. Third and Fourth Causes of Action (i.e., Fraud [Promise Without Intent to Perform and Intentional Misrepresentation, Respectively) The essential allegations of an action for fraud are a misrepresentation, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage. ( Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109.) Promissory fraud is a subspecies of the action for fraud and deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may be actionable fraud. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Co asserts that there is no actionable misrepresentation because, [Plaintiff] herself failed to perform her own obligations under the alleged agreement, including (1) failure to co-sign for the loan and (2) failure to pay off the mortgage as agreed. (Dem., 13:15-17). Plaintiff alleges that Co promised beginning in 2004 that he would execute documents and take such [] actions as might be needed to evidence he had no interest in the Property other than the bare record title he would be relinquishing (Promise). (FAC ¶ 23.) However, there is no specificity as to the specific false statements made by Co. ( Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) In fact, it is unclear what actionable statements are alleged in the FAC except for that found in paragraph 30 in the FAC (I will do that.). ( People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 549.) Because the consideration (i.e. as to Co) under the alleged oral agreement is ambiguous, the statement in paragraph 30 does not provide the necessary sufficiency to support a claim because the extent of the agreement has not been fully described. Cos demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action is sustained. Sixth Cause of Action (i.e., Conversion) The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiffs ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendants conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. ( Los Angeles Federal Credit Union v. Madatyan (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1387 [quotations and citation omitted].) Further, [t]he tort of conversion applies to personal property, not real property. ( Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1295.) Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Co has repudiated his agreement to replace himself with Plaintiff as record title holder of the Property, denied Plaintiffs interest as owner of the Property. In doing so, Defendants have effectively converted and taken for their own use and benefit all of the monies expended by Plaintiff in connection acquisition [sic] and ownership of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 43). [2] Co asserts that Plaintiffs cause of action fails because the Property cannot be the subject of a claim for conversion. Plaintiff, in turn, argues that [w]hat was taken was not real property, but instead a specific corpus of personal propertymoney. . . (Opp., 12:14-15). Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that the monies expended by Plaintiff to live in the property ever went to Co, as opposed to the lender. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. Seventh Cause of Action (i.e., Violation of Penal Code § 496) Penal Code § 496, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that [e]very person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. While Co does not provide any authority for his position that Penal Code § 496 does not apply to real property, Plaintiffs allegation portend to allow a lower threshold or burden to obtain more than compensatory damages. As stated before, without greater foundation and briefing, the court will not allow this cause of action to proceed at this time. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. Ninth Cause of Action (i.e., Accounting) A cause of action for an accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting. ( Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179.) Plaintiff has alleged that she is entitled to an accounting of all loans and other transactions secured by or relating in any way to the Property from 2004 to the present, an accounting of any charges or liens against the Property resulting from the conduct and activities of Defendant, as well as an accounting of all property and other assets obtained or derived by Defendants with funds borrowed against or otherwise obtained with respect to the Property. (FAC, ¶ 55). As the court held before, Plaintiff has not alleged that Co ever received any monies for the Property from Plaintiff or anyone else in connection with the Property at any time. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged that Co encumbered the Property at any time. Cos demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. [1] The court previously overruled the demurrer as to the fifth and eighth causes of action. (See Order, April 26, 2024.) As a result, the court will consider only the demurrer as to the first through fourth, sixth and seventh, and ninth causes of action. [2] It appears Plaintiff failed to edit the FAC as the same grammatical mistakes are repeated in both versions.

CV-22-002183 – CUSHING, ROBERT vs SIERRA NORTHERN RAILWAY – Defendant Sierra Northern Railway’s Motion for Order Sealing Documents re: Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED, and unopposed. The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Defendant. THE COURT’S PHONE SYSTEM IS DOWN. If you desire a hearing, you must email your request to the court before 4:00 p.m. today. In addition, your email must list the email addresses of all counsel who will appear at the hearing. Upon receipt, the court will schedule a Zoom hearing.

Case Number: 23SMCV06028 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: I The court is inclined to GRANT the ex parte application assuming that there is no indicated opposition to it. The court continued the prior hearing and instructed counsel to inform opposing counsel of the continuance and to inform the court as to whether there is any opposition to the application, which is based on a settlement. No written opposition has been filed. If there is no indication of an oral opposition, the court will sign a judgment. However, the proposed judgment suggests that it is being rendered after trial. The court is not sure such is the case.

Case Number: 23BBCV00340 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B Michele A. Santopietro , Plaintiff, v. sandra d. Santopietro, et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23BBCV00340 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: ex parte motion for conitnuance of summary judgment hearing BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiff Michele Santopietro (Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant) alleges that on June 27, 2007, she and her mother purchased property located at 554 E. San Jose Ave., #204 in Burbank for $510,000 and the grant deed asserted the property was granted to Sandra D. Santopietro, a widow and Michele A. Santopietro, a single woman as Joint Tenants (First Deed). On October 8, 2008, a second grant deed (Second Deed) was executed, whereby Plaintiffs interest in the property was transferred to her mother as a bona fide gift, but she alleges that she had no knowledge of the fraudulent transfer of title and did not agree to relinquish her interest. Plaintiff alleges she lived at the property for 14-15 years without knowledge of the transfer and made mortgage payments. Plaintiff alleges that in May 2022, her mother changed the locks to the property to prevent her from entering and thereafter learned of the fraudulent transfer. On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff alleges she discovered that the property was listed for sale. On June 15, 2022, she alleges she went to the property to collect her mail and she encountered Defendant Michael McDonald of Compass (real estate agent), who threatened her. She also encountered Defendant Mary Anne Been (another real estate agent) who informed her mother to block her phone number. On September 16, 2022, a third grant deed (Third Deed) was entered, whereby Plaintiffs mother sold the property to Defendants Juvelyn Palomique and Stephen Harrison for $780,000. She alleges that McDonald and Been, by and through Compass, and Defendant Robert Reffkin facilitated the sale of the property. Plaintiff alleges that she has attempted to approach the property to obtain her mail, but has been denied access. She alleges that the sale was wrongful, because her signature on the second grant deed was forged. The complaint, filed February 10, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) quiet title; and (2) fraud. The Court notes that Plaintiff attempted to file a first amended complaint (FAC) on April 2, 2024, alleging causes of action for: (1) fraud; and (2) fraud. She attempted to file the FAC after Plaintiff had filed on February 13, 2024, a motion to dismiss the 1 st cause of action in the initial complaint for Defendants failure to timely file an FAC following the Courts ruling sustaining a demurrer to the 1 st cause of action in the initial complaint with 20 days leave to amend on November 3, 2023. The hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on April 5, 2024 and the Court entered an order dismissing the 1 st cause of action for quiet title in the initial complaint. Plaintiffs improper and belatedly filed FAC was stricken by the Court on June 24, 2024. The operative pleading shall be the initially filed complaint. B. Relevant Background and Motion on Calendar On April 10, 2024, Defendant Sandra D. Santopietro (Defendant) filed a motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff on the remaining causes of action in the complaint and for costs of suit. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication that plaintiff cannot establish all of the necessary elements of the 2 nd cause of action for fraud and for the prayer for punitive damages in connection with the 2 nd cause of action, such that Plaintiff is entitled to final judgment. On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff (in pro per) filed an opposition brief. On June 21, 2024, Defendant filed reply papers. The motion for summary judgment came for hearing on June 28, 2024. The Court heard oral arguments and took the matter under submission. The Court gave Plaintiff 5 court days to file a document stating where the notary book was located. On July 3, 2024, Defendant filed a supplemental brief with information stating that the notary book was being held at the Los Angeles County Recorders office, as evidenced by Exhibit 6 of the moving papers. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for continuance of the summary judgment hearing. The Court held a hearing on the ex parte application on July 3, 2024; Plaintiff appeared and no appearances were made by Defendants. The Court took the ex parte application under submission. On July 8, 2024, the Court issued its ruling on the ex parte application, setting it for hearing on July 26, 2024. The Court ordered Defendant to file and serve an opposition brief by the end of the business day on July 19, 2024. The Court ordered the motion for summary judgment to remain under submission, but expressed its consideration of continuing the hearing on the motion for summary judgment for approximately 90 days to allow Plaintiff a final opportunity to gather evidence. The Court did not permit any further briefing. DISCUSSION Defendant moves for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication on the remaining cause of action for fraud and the issue of punitive damages in the complaint. On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for continuance under CCP § 437c(h). On July 3, 2024, the Court noted in its minute order that Defendants did not appear at the hearing on the application. The Court originally ordered Defendant to file an opposition brief to Plaintiffs ex parte application by the end of the business day on July 19, 2024. However, the court experienced a court-wide technology issue such that filings were not permitted. As such, the Court will order Defendant to file and serve an opposition by the end of the business day on July 30, 2024. The Court will continue the hearing on the ex parte application and set it for hearing on August 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. As stated in the Courts prior July 8, 2024 order: When the Court took this matter under submission, the Courts tentative ruling had been to grant the motion. Based on the review of the evidence submitted, and the flood of evidence that Plaintiff Michele Santopietro submitted ex parte, the Court is considering continuing the motion for summary judgment by about 90 days to allow Plaintiff to gather more evidence. The concerns of the Court in this regard are as follows: a. There is a basic conflict in the evidence: Michele Santopietro testifies that her signature is forged; Sandra Santopietro testifies that it was not. Michele Santopietro has not done much to enhance the credibility of her allegation. Moreover, her somewhat wild style of allegation has tended to damage her credibility. And the fact that she seems to sign her name differently every time she signs it hardly makes a determination easy and is suspicious in and of itself. Nevertheless, the rules of summary judgment permit the Court to make credibility determinations only in very limited circumstances. b. The copies of the notary book seem in good order, and Ms. Michele Santopietro has done nothing to substantiate her allegations of irregularity. Somewhere, perhaps in a previous notary entry, there must be an exemplar of her fingerprint such that the genuineness of the fingerprint can be established. Even if such an exemplar does not exist, Michele Santopietro could submit her current fingerprint. The Court is inclined to continue the matter for a sufficient interlude to allow Michele Santopietro to present fingerprint evidence. Of course, Defendants could also submit such evidence. c. Michele Santopietro alleges that her mother Sandra Santopietro is incompetent to execute the declaration that forms the basis of the summary judgment motion. Sandra Santopietros declaration is somewhat conclusory and she does admit that Michele Santopietro maintained keys to the property before it was sold. Sandra Santopietros declaration is submitted from an out of state location that corresponds to where Michele Santopietro alleges that Sandra Santopietro has been placed in a care home. After reviewing the timetable of the litigation, the Court is inclined to let Michele Santopietro undertake to support her allegations with evidence. A 90-day continuance should be sufficient for this purpose. All of these tentative thoughts are subject to the Courts review of an opposition to Michele Santopietros ex parte. The Court is concerned enough by Michele Santopietros previous litigation conduct to caution that if there is a continuance to allow further support for an opposition, there will only be one continuance. Michele Santopietro now appears to have a pattern of late responses that require continuances and further examinations of evidence that should have previously been submitted. Nevertheless, the Court is inclined to give her one last chance to come up with additional admissible evidence in support of her claims. (July 8, 2024 Order at pp.4-5.) The Court will allow one final continuance on the ex parte application matter. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court sets a hearing on Plaintiffs ex parte application for a continuance of the motion for summary judgment for August 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. Defendant is ordered to file and serve an opposition brief by July 30, 2024 by the end of the business day. The matter of Defendant Sandra D. Santopietros motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication remains under submission, but the Court is considering continuing the hearing on that matter for approximately 90 days to allow Plaintiff Michele Santopietro a final opportunity to gather evidence. No further briefing shall be permitted. Defendant shall give notice of this order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

C23-01403 CASE NAME: GUPTA VS. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY: OWEN, GREGORY S. *TENTATIVE RULING:* By stipulation this demurrer is continued to August 22, 2024.

20CV44713 DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT This case involves a landlord-tenant dispute over the condition of the residence after being surrendered back to the homeowner. At the core of the dispute is Defendants’ removal of floating boat dock and other items on the property owned by Plaintiff Guaranty Holdings of California, Inc (“GHOC”). The First Amended Complaint (FAC) was filed on May 27, 2023. As against all Defendants, including Bernadette Cattaneo (“Cattaneo”) and David Robinson (“Robinson”) (collectively “Moving Defendants”) the FAC alleges causes of action for conversion and receipt of stolen property. As against Defendant Christopher Dufresne (“Dufresne”) and the Estate of Sylvia Brown (“Estate”) the FAC also alleges a cause of action for fraud. As against Cattaneo, the FAC also alleges a cause of action for private nuisance. Now before the Court are the Moving Defendants’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint. The Court denies the Request for Judicial Notice as to: (A) the obituary as irrelevant, and grants as to (B) and (C) as these are government agency documents, though the Court did not find them relevant to its analysis and decision. I. Factual Background In or about December 2018, GHOC purchased the residence known as 108 Sanguinetti Court, Copperopolis, California (the “Residence”) at a Trustee’s Sale. At the time GHOC purchased the Residence, Dufresne occupied the Residence and owed approximately $400,000. Following GHOC’s purchase of the Residence, counsel for GHOC and counsel for Dufresne and the Estate, entered into negotiations regarding when Dufresne would vacate the Residence. In January 2019, GHOC’s former attorney received a letter dated January 9, 2019, signed by Dufresne (hereinafter “the Letter”) that read, in pertinent part: This letter is meant to serve as my written assurance to you that I Christopher Michael Dufresne have no intentions of stripping or removing the dock, lift, fixtures or anything else from property address: 108 Sanguinetti Ct. Copperopolis, CA 95228.” GHOC alleges that in reliance on the Letter, it did not take any additional precautions prior to May 8, 2019, to secure the fixtures affixed to the Residence as real and not personal property. Calaveras County Superior Court ordered Dufresne and the Estate to vacate the residence on or before May 9, 2019. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dufresne, Robinson, Cattaneo, Holman, and others “acted in concert” to remove the following fixtures that were affixed to the real property of the Residence: 1) A marine dock attached to the Residence; 2) Three (3) ceiling fans; 3) Lights; 4) Several Viking refrigerators; 5) Wine cooler; and 6) Kitchen Aid refrigerator (collectively, “the Property”). At the core of the dispute is Defendants’ removal of the floating boat dock (“Dock”). Plaintiff alleges that the Property is worth approximately $205,000.00. According to GHOC, it later learned that Dock was taken by Moving Defendants and the other defendants to the Resort, where it remained for several years. GHOC believes that the Dock has since been damaged beyond repair and is no longer at the Resort. Thereafter, GHOC incurred costs in excess of $165,000 to replace Dock at the Residence. However, following installation of the new dock, Cattaneo and others with control of the Residence began intentionally blocking GHOC’s access to the new dock. II. Standard for Demurrer “A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint and admits all facts properly pleaded.” (Setliff v. E.I.Du Pont de Nemours & Co.(1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 1525, 1533.) The court assumes the truth of the allegations asserted but does not assume the truth of “contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal. App. 4th 242, 247.) The court can further look at those facts that “reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007), 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 111.) If a complaint does not sufficiently state a cause of action, “but there is a reasonable probability that a defect can be cured by amendment, leave to amend must be granted.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 26, 38.) Moving Defendants asserts that the FAC is subject to demurrer pursuant to Civ. Code 430.10 (e) (failure to state a claim) and 430.10(f) (uncertainty). “‘[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.’” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 842, 848 fn.3 [citing Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135].) III. Analysis A. Conversion “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages....” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240, internal citation and quotations omitted.) In order to prove a cause of action for conversion, “the plaintiff must show the defendant acted intentionally to wrongfully dispose of the property of another.” (Duke v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 490, 508, citation omitted.) The FAC alleges that GHOC purchased the Residence and that there was an understanding between GHOC and Dufresne that all fixtures would remain on the Residence, including the Dock. (FAC ¶ ¶ 12, 15.) GHOC next alleges that Cattaneo and Robinson acted in concert with other defendants to wrongfully remove the Property. (FAC ¶ 18.) Finally, GHOC alleges that as a result of the wrongful removal of the Property, it was damaged in excess of $200,000.00.1 GHOC has stated a cause of action for conversion. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to the first cause of action. B. Receipt of Stolen Property (Penal Code §§ 496(A) and (C) Penal Code section 496(a) provides: Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170. 1 Defendants male a lengthy argument about whether the floating dock is readily moveable and whether under the factual circumstances the dock is personal or real property. In support, Defendants cite to a 1983 letter from the California Board of Equalization regarding floating docks in a completely different lake in a different part of California. While the Court takes judicial notice of the letter as requested, the letter is irrelevant to the issues on demurrer. Undermining Defendants argument is the fact that within that letter it specifically states that whether something is a fixture or not is “one of fact to be determined from the evidence in a particular case.” Defendants reliance on statements made in depositions are also improper at the demurrer stage. Penal Code section 496(c) provides: Any person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision (a) or (b) may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees. Moving Defendants argue that the FAC fails to state a claim for this cause of action because Penal Code section 496(a) also states: “no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property.” They argue that because the FAC alleges that they committed the wrongfully taking of the Property, they cannot also be liable for receiving those stolen goods. Moving Defendants argument is misplaced. First, the language in Section 496(a) states that person cannot be convicted of both the crime of theft and of receiving stolen property. (See, People v. Jaramillo (1976), 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [stating it is a “fundamental principal that one may not be convicted of stealing and of receiving the same property”].) It does not state that a person cannot be civilly liable under subsection (c) for both taking and receiving stolen property. Further, there is legal authority to the contrary. (See Siry Investment L.P. v. Fakhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal. 5th 333 [limited partner could bring a civil cause of action under section 496(c) against general partner and others even where the defendants had both undertaken the theft and received the stolen property].) Moving Defendants also argue that this cause of action is barred by the three year statute of limitations set forth in Penal Code section 801. They assert that the FAC alleges the theft occurred on May 8, 2019 but the FAC was not filed until May 17, 2023. This argument is also without merit. Under the relation-back doctrine, an amended complaint will relate back to the date the original complaint was filed if the amended complaint: “(1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers to the same instrumentality as the original complaint.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999), 21 Cal.4th 383, 409.) An amended complaint “relates back to the original complaint even if the plaintiff alleges a new legal theory or cause of action, so long as the amended complaint is based on the same general set of facts.” (Hutcheson v. The Superior Court (2002), 74 Cal.App.5th 932, 940.) Here the original complaint which was timely filed and the FAC allege a nearly identical set of facts, causation, and injury. Accordingly, Defendant’s statute of limitations argument is meritless. Accordingly, the demurrer as to the second cause of action for receipt of stolen property is overruled. C. Fraud The FAC alleges a cause of action for fraud against Dufresne and the Estate but not against the Moving Defendants. Accordingly, the demurrer to this cause of action is moot as to the Moving Defendants. D. Private Nuisance A private nuisance includes “[a]nything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.)” GHOC alleges it owns the Dock and that Cattaneo purposefully installed, maintained, and positioned structures on Tulloch Reservoir to intentionally block GHOC’s access to the new dock. The allegation that Cattaneo obstructed GHOC’s access to the new dock and therefore the use and enjoyment of the dock is the type of physical interference with land use that “constitutes the most obvious and common type of nuisance.” (Rancho Viejo v. Tres Amigos Viejos (2002), 100 Cal.App.4th 550, 561 [citing 11 Witkin, Summar of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) Equity, § 126, p. 807.) Moving Defendants argue that the FAC fails to state a claim for private nuisance because there is no allegation that Cattaneo owns the neighboring property where the obstructions apparently were placed. However, Moving Defendants fail to cite any legal authority that would require GHOC to allege Cattaneo owns the neighboring land in order to make claim for private nuisance. Moving Defendants also refer to photographs that show the obstructions are small and therefore could not be a nuisance. Reference to matters outside the pleadings, unless subject to judicial notice, is not proper at the demurrer stage. (Kanter v. Reed (2023), 92 Cal.App.5th 191, 203.) GHOC has stated a cause of action for private nuisance and accordingly the demurrer to this cause of action is overruled. E. Motion To Strike Punitive Damages Punitive damages are recoverable where a plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.) Relevant to this case, “malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of rights or safety of others. (Ibid.) “Oppression” means conduct that subjects a person to “cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons’ rights.” (Civ. Code. §3294(c)(2).) The proper standard for a motion to strike punitive damages is whether plaintiff has alleged “ultimate facts” showing an entitlement to exemplary damages. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Here, the FAC states that Cattaneo and Robinson willfully and with malice stole the Property and refused to return it to GHOC. The FAC further alleges that Cattaneo willfully and with malice intentionally blocked GHOC’s access to its new dock. The FAC’s allegations have simply pleaded a claim for punitive damages in the language of the statute authorizing punitive damages. While this is not objectionable when sufficient facts are alleged to support the allegation, here the FAC lacks ultimate facts showing a punitive damages claim. (See Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [citation omitted].) Moving Defendants’ motion to strike reference to punitive damages is granted, with 20 (twenty) days leave to amend. F. Motion to Strike Reference to “Time and Money Spent” Moving Defendants move to strike reference to “time and money spent” as part of the receipt of stolen property claim. (FAC ¶ 43.) Cal. Civil Code section 3336 allows for compensation for time and money spent in pursuit of converted property. In the prayer for relief, the FAC is clear that compensation for “time and money spent” is related to the conversion claim alone. The motion to strike reference to “time and money spent” in Paragraph 43 is denied. IV. Summary of rulings The demurrer is overruled as to causes of action 1, 2, and 4. It is moot as to cause of action 3. The motion to strike punitive damages is granted, with leave to amend. The motion to strike Paragraph 43 is denied. The Clerk shall provide notice of the Ruling forthwith. Plaintiff to prepare a formal Order in conformity with these rulings pursuant to CRC 3.1312.. FORD v GREENHORN GOLF, LLC.