Preview
4-LV01ISOSW- 400
File No.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
In The General Court Of Justice
Gui (Ford County District Court Division Small Claims -
Spoken Language Court Inte eter Needed For Any Party, Victim, Or Witness? (If Yes, identify person(s) and language(s). Interpreters provided for all court
proceedings at no cost.) No OYes:: (explain)
1.. The defendant is a resident of the county named above
COMPLAINT 2.. The defendant entered into possession of premises described below as a lessee of plaintiff.
Description Of Premises (include location and address)
IN SUMMARY EJECTMENT
a 503 Fair Fat Row A Conventional
Gr ace nc O Public Housing
CL Section 8
Rate Of Ren
$
nants Share)
per
# Month
e 2.O2 y
Type Of Lease
Week LC] Oral Written
G.S. 7A-216, 7A-232; Ch. 42, Arts. 3 and 7
Name And Add Of Plaintiff 3 The defendant failed to pay the rent due on the above date and the plaintiff made demand for the rent and waited the
10-day grace period before filing the complaint
(] The iease period ended on the above date and the defendant is holding over after the end of the lease period
FAIRFax 20.
HACKS, AUC} ] The defendant breached the condition of the lease described below for which re-entry f is specified
[] Criminal activity or other activity has occurred in violation of G.S.
:
"GuWFoRd Teo2 Soo Description Of Breach/Criminal Activity (g ive names, dates, places and illegal activity)
42-63 as specified below. 53
>
Failbre +0
f
VERSUS vere
La
o
|
Name And Address Of Defendant 1
individual Corporation oO
B TIAKA
e
AN on D> ww
VC 4.. The plaintiff has demanded possession of the premises from the defendant
a
a
Ofas Tefused toParren and the
=<
GreevSwoore, NC 21467 plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession
The defendant owes the plaintiff the following:
2
5.
County elephone No Pout
Zo Description Of Any Property Damage
Name And Address Of Defendant 2
O Individual Corporation
Amo tOf Amount Of Rent Past Due « ue
Due
$ OAR S245' S 2 © "Ib
County Telephone No
6. demand to be put in possession of the premises and to recover the total amount listed above and daily rental until entry
of judgment plus interest and reimbursement for court costs
Name And Address Of Plaintiffs Attorney Or Agent
Ls Date Name Of Plaintiff/Attomey/Agent (type or print) Signature Of Piaintiff/Attorney/Agent
QSOS FrirF Road
NG ABN) |
CERTIFICATION WHEN COMPLAINT SIGNED BY AGENT OF PLAINTIFF
certify that am an agent of the plaintiff and have actual knowledge of the facts alleged in this Complaint
Attorney Bar No Date Name Of Agent (type or print) Signature Of Agent
AOQCCVM-20, Rev. 7/24 (Over)
© 2024 Administrative Office of the Courts
INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT
THE CLERK OR MAGISTRATE CANNOT ADVISE YOU ABOUT YOUR CASE OR ASSIST YOU IN COMPLETING THIS FORM.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, YOU SHOULD CONSULT AN ATTORNEY.
1 . The PLAINTIFF must file a small claim action in the county where at least one of the 9 . The DEFENDANT may file a written answer making defense to the claim, in the
defendants resides. office of the Clerk of Superior Court. This answer should be accompanied by a copy
for the plaintiff and be filed no later than the time set for trial. The filing of the answer
2 . The PLAINTIFF cannot sue in small claims court for more than $10,000.00
excluding DOES NOT relieve the defendant of the need to appear before the magistrate to
interest and costs unless further restricted by court order.
assert the defendant's defense.
3 . The PLAINTIFF must show the complete name and address of the defendant to
10. Requests for continuances of cases before the magistrate may be granted for good
ensure service on the defendant: If there are two defendants and they reside at
. cause shown and for no more than five (5) days per continuance unless the parties
different addresses, the plaintiff must include both addresses. The plaintiff must :
determine if the defendant is a corporation and sue iri the complete corporate name. agree otherwise.
If the business is not a corporation, the plaintiff must determine the owner's name 11. The magistrate will render judgment on the date of hearing unless the parties agree
and sue the owner. otherwise, or the case is complex as defined in G.Ss. TA-222, in which case. the
decisionn i is required within five (5) Gays.
4 The PLAINTIFF may serve the defendant(s) by mailing a copy of the summons and
complaint by registered or certified mail, retum receipt requested, addressed to the 12. The PLAINTIFF or the DEFENDANT may appeal the magistrates decision in this
party to be served or by paying the costs to have the sheriff serve the summons and case. To appeal, notice must be given in open court when the judgment is entered, or
complaint. If certified or registered mail is used, the plaintiff must prepare and file a notice may be given in writing to the Clerk of Superior Court within ten (10) days after
swom statement with the Clerk of Superior Court proving service by certified mail and the judgment is entered. If notice is given in writing, the appealing party must also
must attach to that statement the postal receipt showing that the letter was accepted. serve written notice of appeal on all other parties. The. appealing party must PAY to
the Clerk of Superior Court the costs of court for appeal within ten (10) days after the
5.In filling out number 2 of the complaint in subsidized housing (e.g., Section 8,
judgment is entered. If the appealing party applies to appeal as an indigent, and that
voucher, housing authonty), the landlord should include in the "Rate Of Rent" box
only that portion of the rent that the tenant pays directly to the landlord.
request is denied, that party has an additional five (5) days to pay the court costs for
the appeal.
6 In filling out number 3 in the complaint, if the landlord is seeking to remove the
13. If the defendant appeals and wishes to remain on the premises the defendant must
tenant for failure to pay rent when there is no written lease, the first block should be
also post a stay of execution bond within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered. In
checked. (Defendant failed to pay the rent due on the above date and the plaintiff
the event of an appeal by the tenant to district court, the landlord may file a motion to
made demand for the rent and waited the ten (10) day grace period before filing
dismiss that appeal under G.S. 7A-228(d). The court may decide the motion without a
the complaint.) If the landlord is seeking to remove the tenant for failure to pay rent
when there is a written lease with an automatic forfeiture clause, the third block hearing if the tenant fails to file a response within ten (10) days of receipt of the mation.
should be checked. (The defendant breached the condition of the lease described 14. Upon request of the tenant within seven (7) days of the landlord being placed iin lawful
below for which re-entry is specified.) And "failure to pay rent" should be placed in possession, the landlord shall release any personal property of the tenant. ff, after
the spacee for description of the breach. If the landlord is seeking to evict tenant for. being placed in lawful possession by execution of a writ, the laridlord has offered to
violating some other condition in the lease, the third block should also be checked. release the tenant's property and the tenant fails to retrieve such property during the
If the landlord is claiming that the term of the lease has ended and the tenant landlord's regular business hours within seven (7) days after execution of the writ,
refuses to leave, the second block should be checked. If the landlord is claiming that the landlord may throw away, dispose of, or sell the property in accordance with the
criminal activity occurred, the fourth block should be checked and thé conduct must provisions of G.S. 42-25.9(g). If sold, the landlord must disburse any surplus proceeds
be described in space provided. to the tenant upon request within seven (7) days of the sale. If the total value of the
7 . The PLAINTIFF must pay advance court costs at the time of filing this Complaint. property is less than $500.00, it is deemed abandoned five (5) days after execution
unless the tenant requests, prior to expiration of the five-day period, release of the
in the event that judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, court costs may be
property to the tenant, in which case the landlord shall release possession of the
charged against the defendant.
property to the tenant during regular business hours or at a time agreed upon.
8. The PLAINTIFF must appear before the magistrate to prove his/her claim.
15. This form is supplied in order to expedite the handling of small daims. It is designed
to cover the most common claims.
AOC-CVM-201, Side Two, Rev. 7/24
© 2024 Administrative Office of the Courts
Related Content
in Guilford County
Ruling
Gary Kidgell vs County of Merced
Jul 24, 2024 |
23CV-04276
23CV-04276 Gary Kidgell v. County of Merced
Demurrer by Defendant County of Merced to first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action in
Second Amended complaint
The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s First Cause of Action for Cancellation
of a Written Instrument for failure to state a claim not barred by the statute of limitations
is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to plead around the statute of limitations.
The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Third cause of Action for failure to
allege a fiduciary duty that was breached by the County of Merced is SUSTAINED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND to state facts establishing a fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff by the
City of Merced.
The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Fourth cause of Action for failure to
allege a statutory basis for liability against the County of Merced is SUSTAINED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND to state a statutory basis for Plaintiff’s claim.
The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Fifth cause of Action for failure
conduct a fraud investigation of recorded documents is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND to state fact establishing a duty to conduct an investigation of recorded
documents.
The Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint’s Sixth cause of Action for breach of
duty is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to state fact establishing a duty to breached
by the recording of the subject deed.
Motion to Strike Proofs of Service and Punitive Damages Claims in Second Amended
Complaint by Defendant City of Merced
The Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Claims is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to
state a cause of action and grounds for an award of punitive damages.
The Motion to Strike Proof of Service filed with the Court is DENIED AS MOOT given that
Defendant has made a general appearance in this action by filing a demurrer addressing
the merits of various causes of action therein. (See e.g. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Company v.
Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1145.)
Ruling
DAVID ODAY, ET AL. VS 118 WADSWORTH AVENUE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
Jul 29, 2024 |
23STCV24766
Case Number:
23STCV24766
Hearing Date:
July 29, 2024
Dept:
47
Tentative Ruling
Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47
HEARING DATE:
July 29, 2024
TRIAL DATE:
NOT SET
CASE:
David Oday, et al. v. 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association, et al.
CASE NO.:
23STCV24766
MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
MOVING PARTY
: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association
RESPONDING PARTY(S)
: Plaintiffs David Oday and Lakota Patrick Ford
CASE HISTORY
:
·
10/11/23: Complaint filed.
·
01/10/24: First Amended Complaint filed.
·
03/01/24: Cross-Complaint filed.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:
This is a breach of contract and habitability defect action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to replace the roof of Plaintiffs condominium, causing extensive water damage and mold throughout the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly issued special assessments in violation of the operative covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the property, and retaliated against Plaintiffs for raising these issues.
Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required.
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as Plaintiff David Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c).
DISCUSSION:
Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states:
In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 533.) Modification of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case. (
Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage
(1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.) The party seeking modification has the burden of proving that the request is justified. (See
Loeffler v. Medina
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.)
Analysis
Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to post the undertaking of $70,416.09 ordered by the Court. (See February 22, 2024 Minute Order.)
Plaintiffs, in opposition, state that payment in the amount specified by the Courts order was deposited with the Court on June 26, 2024, with notice given to Defendant the next day. (Declaration of Scott J. Kalter ISO Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs deposit of the funds to the Court is effective as a posting of a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710, but only if the deposit is accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.710(c).) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not executed such an agreement, and, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved.
The Court concurs with Defendant that an authorization to dispose of the funds to satisfy liability is required for Plaintiffs deposit to be considered posting of the bond under section 995.710. In response to the Courts prior tentative ruling, Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has submitted an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
:
Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED given that Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c).
Moving party to give notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________
Theresa M. Traber
Judge of the Superior Court
Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at
Smcdept47@lacourt.org
by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.
Ruling
MIA CORDES, ET AL. VS ROYAL GARDEN APARTMENTS, INC.
Jul 26, 2024 |
23BBCV00663
Case Number:
23BBCV00663
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
NCB
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
North Central
District
Department B
michael green
,
et al.
,
Plaintiffs,
v.
royal garden apartments inc.,
Defendant.
Case No.:
23BBCV00663
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
[
TENTATIVE] order RE:
motion to compel attendance; and motion seeking a protective order
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiffs Michael Green, Mia Cordes, Delia Reed, Zarinah Reed, and Jimmie Henry (Plaintiffs) allege that they reside at 6705 Riverton Avenue, North Hollywood, CA 91606 in various units.
Michael Green and Mia Cordes reside in Apartment 13, Jimmie Henry resides in Apartment C1, and Delia Reed and Zarinah Reed reside in Apartment 21.
Defendant Royal Garden Apartments Inc. (Defendant) is alleged to be the owner, agent, and manager of the 6705 Riverton Avenue property.
Plaintiffs allege that the premises have an infestation of roaches and rodents, lack adequate gas facilities, and lack smoke detectors.
They allege that the premises are uninhabitable.
The complaint, filed March 23, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of warranty of habitability; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) nuisance; (4) negligence (Civ. Code, §§ 1714(a), 3333); (5) premises liability (negligence per se); (6) unfair business practice and unfair competition; and (7) IIED.
On August 16, 2023, Plaintiffs named J.K. Residential Services, Inc. as Doe 1.
B.
Motions on Calendar
On June 12, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel the attendance, uninterrupted and without coaching testimony and the production of documents, of Plaintiff Michael Green.
On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.
On July 2, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief.
On June 12, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for protective order preventing Plaintiffs counsel from coaching the deponent and speaking on the cell phone during the deposition or, alternatively, appointing a discovery referee at the expense of Plaintiff.
On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief.
On June 27, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief.
DISCUSSION RE MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION
Defendant moves to compel the deposition of Mr. Green, uninterrupted and without coaching testimony, and for the production of documents.
Defendant argues that it has attempted to take Mr. Greens deposition on multiple occasions, only to be notified about last-minute changes to time, location, and participation of Mr. Green and Plaintiffs counsel.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not object to Defendants deposition notices and that Plaintiffs have not produced documents.
The parties met and conferred regarding the deposition of Mr. Green set for May 14, 2024.
On May 9, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel confirmed the deposition and stated that the time should be at 12:00 p.m. as Mr. Green no longer lived in California but would be in town that day.
(Mot., Ex. C.)
On May 13, 2024, Defendant accommodated the request by contacting the court reporter and moving the start time.
(Mot., Ex. C.)
That same day, Plaintiffs counsel emailed stating that Mr. Green would not be available in person, but could appear remotely as he lived in Las Vegas, Nevada.
(Mot., Exs. E-G.)
Defense counsel responded that the last-minute changes were unacceptable and that the deposition would be going forward at the noticed time and location.
(Mot., Ex. G.)
On May 14, 2024 at 10:00 a.m., the deposition went forward, but Plaintiffs counsel and Mr. Green did not appear, such that a notice of nonappearance was taken.
(Mot., Ex. I.)
Plaintiffs argue that they informed defense counsel that Mr. Green lived in Nevada and would be available to appear for his deposition remotely or in Las Vegas.
They argue that despite attempts to set another deposition date or set a remote deposition, Defendant has refused to meet and confer regarding Mr. Greens deposition.
Prior to the deposition going forward on May 14, 2024, there appears to have been miscommunication between the parties regarding Mr. Greens whereabouts or his residence.
On May 9, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel sought to push back the deposition time, stating that Mr. Green would be in town and available to attend his deposition.
On May 13, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel that Mr. Green did not live in California and would now be made available for a remote deposition.
It is not clear when Plaintiffs counsel became aware of Mr. Greens residency and whether this information could have been disclosed earlier.
However, based on the papers provided by the parties, it appears that Plaintiffs counsel disclosed Mr. Greens Nevada address on May 13, 2024one day before the noticed deposition.
The parties do not dispute that Defendant may take the deposition of Mr. Green.
Rather, Plaintiffs counsel has offered to make Mr. Green available remotely or in person in Las Vegas, although notice of Mr. Greens new residency was not provided until only a day prior to the noticed deposition date.
Further, Defendant knew that Mr. Green and Plaintiffs counsel were not able to make the deposition on May 14, 2024 at 10:00 a.m., but proceeded to conduct the deposition for that time.
(In the opposition brief, Plaintiffs argue that although they gave notice of Mr. Greens non-residency, defense counsel failed to grant the accommodation for a slight change of time to allow Mr. Green to travel to California. [Opp. at p.5.].
However, this argument appears to contradict the emails wherein Plaintiffs counsel stated that Mr. Green would be available remotely for his deposition or that Defendant could conduct the deposition in Las Vegas.)
At this time, the Court will grant the motion to compel Mr. Greens deposition as neither party disputes that Mr. Greens deposition should go forward.
However, the parties should meet and confer regarding how the deposition will be conductedin person or remotely.
Defendant should re-notice Mr. Greens deposition, taking into consideration his non-residency in California.
(CCP § 2025.250(a) [
Unless the court orders otherwise under Section 2025.260, the deposition of a natural person, whether or not a party to the action, shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the deponent's residence, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of the deponent's residence.].)
Further, as no documents were produced and the request for documents was not objected to nor addressed in the opposition brief, Mr. Green is ordered to produce the documents requested prior to the deposition.
Defendant seeks $2,589.46 in sanctions against Mr. Green and his counsel, which accounts for $1,572.50 in attorneys fees and $1,016.85 for the cost of the non-appearance.
(Flesch Decl., ¶¶19-23.)
Plaintiffs seek $3,200 in sanctions against Defendant for the time spent by counsel to oppose the motion.
(Ekpenisi Decl., ¶21.)
At this time, the Court declines to award sanctions on this motion.
The parties should have engaged in further meet and confer efforts once they realized that the May 14, 2024 deposition would not be going forward as discussed in their emails and based on Mr. Greens updated residency.
While the process of scheduling the deposition may have been frustrating for both counsel, both counsel are tasked with acting with civility towards one another in scheduling a deposition.
(See LASC Local Rule, Appendix 3.A. Guidelines for Civility in Litigation at (e)(2) [In scheduling depositions, reasonable consideration should be given to accommodating schedules or opposing counsel and of the deponent, where it is possible to do so without prejudicing the clients rights.].)
If further issues arise regarding the inability to conduct Mr. Greens deposition or Mr. Greens deposition was unnecessarily delayed, the Court will consider imposing sanctions at that time.
DISCUSSION RE MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Defendant moves for a protective order so that it can depose Plaintiffs, uninterrupted and without coaching by Mr. Ekpenisi.
CCP § 2025.420 states in relevant part:
(a)
Before, during, or after a
deposition
, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organization may promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied
by a meet and confer declaration
under Section 2016.040.
(b)
The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. This pr
otective order
may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following directions:
&
(5)
That the deposition be taken only on certain specified terms and conditions.
(CCP § 2025.420.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs counsel Macauley Ekpenisi has a history of disruptive conduct during depositions and last-minute requests prior to depositions going forward.
With respect to Plaintiff Mia Cordes deposition scheduled for May 22, 2024 at 10:00 a.m., Mr. Ekpenisi requested on May 20, 2024 that the deposition start at 11:30 a.m. and be conducted remotely.
On May 21, 2024, Mr. Ekpenisi asked that Ms. Cordes deposition be conducted at 2:00 p.m., as he had 3 different unlawful detainer actions in Pasadena courthouse on May 22, 2024.
Defendant denied these requests and Plaintiffs counsel confirmed that the deposition would go forward.
Defendant states that Ms. Cordes deposition began on May 22, 2024 at around 10:00 a.m., but during the deposition, Mr. Ekpenisi got on his cell phone, began talking about an unrelated matter with a federal court judge, and left the deposition.
(Mot., Ex. J.)
Upon his return, Defendant argues that Mr. Ekpenisi began coaching Ms. Cordes before she had an opportunity to answer a question (or began answering deposition questions himself), and when instructed not to coach Ms. Cordes, Mr. Ekpenisi began pointing to documents to inform Ms. Cordes how to respond.
(Mot., Ex. K, Ex. L.)
Defendant argues that similar conduct occurred in Plaintiffs Zarinah and Delia Reeds depositions as Plaintiffs counsel showed up 45 minutes late to the depositions, made phone calls during the depositions, and coached the witnesses.
(Mot., Ex. M [Zarinah Reed Depo. re start time of deposition]; Exs. N and O [Mr. Ekpenisi answering questions on Zarinah Reeds behalf]; Ex. P [Mr. Ekpenisi answering questions on Delia Reeds behalf during her deposition].)
Defendant also refers to the motion to compel Mr. Greens deposition to argue that Mr. Ekpenisi has a history of making last-minute requests for depositions.
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they requested accommodations for their counsels scheduling conflicts, but Defendant refused to make such accommodations before the depositions or during the depositions (when Mr. Ekpenisi asked for a short break).
However, Plaintiffs have not shown why they did not object to deposition notices based on scheduling conflicts or seek accommodations earlier.
Based on the ordinary business of the courts, advance notice of hearings is given to litigants and their counsel regarding hearing dates and times.
Further, the deposition transcript shows that Mr. Ekpenisi disrupted his own clients answer by seeking a short break for himself to handle a federal matter.
(See Mot., Ex. J at pp.12-13.)
Plaintiffs argue that the motion is not accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, such that this motion is improper.
However, based on counsels interactions over email and at the deposition, it appears that further meet and confer efforts on this particular topic would have been ineffective.
For example, during Ms. Cordes deposition, when defense counsel asked Mr. Ekpenisi whether he understood that when defense counsel was asking Ms. Cordes a question, he was expecting an answer from her, Mr. Ekpenisi stated: No, its not.
(Mot., Ex. K at p.20.)
Based on the deposition record, Mr. Ekpenisi responded to questions on behalf of his clients/the deponents despite being asked repeatedly not to answer or coach the witness.
There appears to be a course of conduct regarding Mr. Ekpenisi making last-minute requests for accommodations of depositions (to move the times or to make them remote), appearing to the depositions late, interrupting defense counsel or the witness, and answer on behalf of his clients or coaching them on how to respond to deposition questions.
For these reasons, the motion for a protective order is granted such that the Court will order Mr. Ekpenisi to attend depositions in a timely matter and allow the depositions of his clients to go forward without phone call interruptions (i.e., other court hearings and unrelated matters) and without coaching by Mr. Ekpenisi.
Mr. Ekpenisi may still make objections on the record during a deposition, but may not instruct his clients on how to answer or
answer deposition questions on their behalf except on grounds of privilege.
In the notice of motion, Defendant seeks $3,211 against Plaintiffs counsel, while the conclusion in the memorandum of points and authorities seeks $3,630 against Plaintiffs.
Defense counsel Daniel G. Fleschs declaration seeks $3,211 in sanctions (= 10.5 hours x $185/hour, plus $1,268.60 in costs for the deposition of Ms. Cordes). (Flesch Decl., ¶¶27-31.)
In opposition, Plaintiffs seek $3,600 in sanctions.
The Court will award sanctions to Defendant in the reasonable sum of $2,500 for counsels time spent on this matter, plus $1,268.60 for Ms. Cordes suspended deposition.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Defendant Royal Garden Apartments, Inc.s motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiff Michael Green is granted.
The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding a mutually agreeable date and time to conduct the deposition and whether the deposition will be proceeding remotely or in person.
Following meet and confer efforts, Defendant is ordered to re-notice Plaintiff Michael Greens deposition on the mutually agreeable date and time or, if the parties were unable to agree upon a date, within 60 days of this order.
Plaintiff is ordered to produce documents responsive to the request for documents prior to the deposition date.
No sanctions will be awarded on this motion.
Defendant Royal Garden Apartments, Inc.s motion for a protective order is granted such that the Court will order Macauley Ekpenisi to attend depositions in a timely matter and allow the depositions of his clients to go forward without phone call interruptions (i.e., other court hearings and unrelated matters) and without coaching by Mr. Ekpenisi.
Mr. Ekpenisi may still make objections on the record during a deposition, but may not instruct his clients on how to answer or
answer deposition questions on their behalf except on grounds of privilege.
Plaintiffs counsel is ordered to pay
monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,768.60 to Defendant, by and through counsel, within 20 days of notice of this order.
Defendant shall provide notice of this order.
DATED: July 26, 2024
___________________________
John Kralik
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
HAUT vs BUSH
Jul 24, 2024 |
CVRI2401221
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
CVRI2401221 HAUT VS BUSH
BY KEVIN BUSH, SEABOARD INC.
Tentative Ruling: Grant motion to compel arbitration and stay action as to these Defendants
pending completion of arbitration.
Ruling
MICHELE SANTOPIERTO VS SANDRA D. SANTOPIERTO, ET AL.
Jul 26, 2024 |
23BBCV00340
Case Number:
23BBCV00340
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
Dept:
NCB
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
North Central
District
Department B
Michele A. Santopietro
,
Plaintiff,
v.
sandra d. Santopietro,
et al.
,
Defendants.
Case No.:
23BBCV00340
Hearing Date:
July 26, 2024
[
TENTATIVE] order RE:
ex parte motion for conitnuance of summary judgment hearing
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations
Plaintiff Michele Santopietro (Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant) alleges that on June
27, 2007, she and her mother purchased property located at 554 E. San Jose Ave., #204 in Burbank for $510,000 and the grant deed asserted the property was granted to Sandra D. Santopietro, a widow and Michele A. Santopietro, a single woman as Joint Tenants (First Deed).
On October 8, 2008, a second grant deed (Second Deed) was executed, whereby Plaintiffs interest in the property was transferred to her mother as a bona fide gift, but she alleges that she had no knowledge of the fraudulent transfer of title and did not agree to relinquish her interest.
Plaintiff alleges she lived at the property for 14-15 years without knowledge of the transfer and made mortgage payments.
Plaintiff alleges that in May 2022, her mother changed the locks to the property to prevent her from entering and thereafter learned of the fraudulent transfer.
On June 3, 2022, Plaintiff alleges she discovered that the property was listed for sale.
On June 15, 2022, she alleges she went to the property to collect her mail and she encountered Defendant Michael McDonald of Compass (real estate agent), who threatened her.
She also encountered Defendant Mary Anne Been (another real estate agent) who informed her mother to block her phone number.
On September 16, 2022, a third grant deed (Third Deed) was entered, whereby Plaintiffs mother sold the property to Defendants Juvelyn Palomique and Stephen Harrison for $780,000.
She alleges that McDonald and Been, by and through Compass, and Defendant Robert Reffkin facilitated the sale of the property.
Plaintiff alleges that she has attempted to approach the property to obtain her mail, but has been denied access.
She alleges that the sale was wrongful, because her signature on the second grant deed was forged.
The complaint, filed February 10, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) quiet title; and (2) fraud.
The Court notes that Plaintiff attempted to file a first amended complaint (FAC) on April 2, 2024, alleging causes of action for: (1) fraud; and (2) fraud.
She attempted to file the FAC after Plaintiff had filed on February 13, 2024, a motion to dismiss the 1
st
cause of action in the initial complaint for Defendants failure to timely file an FAC following the Courts ruling sustaining a demurrer to the 1
st
cause of action in the initial complaint with 20 days leave to amend on November 3, 2023.
The hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on April 5, 2024 and the Court entered an order dismissing the 1
st
cause of action for quiet title in the initial complaint.
Plaintiffs improper and belatedly filed FAC was stricken by the Court on June 24, 2024.
The operative pleading shall be the initially filed complaint.
B.
Relevant Background and Motion on Calendar
On April 10, 2024, Defendant Sandra D. Santopietro (Defendant) filed a motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff on the remaining causes of action in the complaint and for costs of suit.
In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication that plaintiff cannot establish all of the necessary elements of the 2
nd
cause of action for fraud and for the prayer for punitive damages in connection with the 2
nd
cause of action, such that Plaintiff is entitled to final judgment.
On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff (in pro per) filed an opposition brief. On June 21, 2024, Defendant filed reply papers.
The motion for summary judgment came for hearing on June 28, 2024.
The Court heard oral arguments and took the matter under submission.
The Court gave Plaintiff 5 court days to file a document stating where the notary book was located.
On July 3, 2024, Defendant filed a supplemental brief with information stating that the notary book was being held at the Los Angeles County Recorders office, as evidenced by Exhibit 6 of the moving papers.
On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for continuance of the summary judgment hearing.
The Court held a hearing on the ex parte application on July 3, 2024; Plaintiff appeared and no appearances were made by Defendants. The Court took the ex parte application under submission.
On July 8, 2024, the Court issued its ruling on the ex parte application, setting it for hearing on July 26, 2024.
The Court ordered Defendant to file and serve an opposition brief by the end of the business day on July 19, 2024.
The Court ordered the motion for summary judgment to remain under submission, but expressed its consideration of continuing the hearing on the motion for summary judgment for approximately 90 days to allow Plaintiff a final opportunity to gather evidence. The Court did not permit any further briefing.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication on the remaining cause of action for fraud and the issue of punitive damages in the complaint.
On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for continuance under CCP § 437c(h).
On July 3, 2024, the Court noted in its minute order that Defendants did not appear at the hearing on the application.
The Court originally ordered Defendant to file an opposition brief to Plaintiffs ex parte application by the end of the business day on July 19, 2024.
However, the court experienced a court-wide technology issue such that filings were not permitted.
As such, the Court will order Defendant to file and serve an opposition by the end of the business day on July 30, 2024.
The Court will continue the hearing on the ex parte application and set it for hearing on August 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.
As stated in the Courts prior July 8, 2024 order:
When the Court took this matter under submission, the Courts tentative ruling had been to grant the motion. Based on the review of the evidence submitted, and the flood of evidence that Plaintiff Michele Santopietro submitted ex parte, the Court is considering continuing the motion for summary judgment by about 90 days to allow Plaintiff to gather more evidence. The concerns of the Court in this regard are as follows:
a. There is a basic conflict in the evidence: Michele Santopietro testifies that her signature is forged; Sandra Santopietro testifies that it was not. Michele Santopietro has not done much to enhance the credibility of her allegation. Moreover, her somewhat wild style of allegation has tended to damage her credibility. And the fact that she seems to sign her name differently every time she signs it hardly makes a determination easy and is suspicious in and of itself.
Nevertheless, the rules of summary judgment permit the Court to make credibility determinations only in very limited circumstances.
b. The copies of the notary book seem in good order, and Ms. Michele Santopietro has done nothing to substantiate her allegations of irregularity. Somewhere, perhaps in a previous notary entry, there must be an exemplar of her fingerprint such that the genuineness of the fingerprint can be established. Even if such an exemplar does not exist, Michele Santopietro could submit her current fingerprint. The Court is inclined to continue the matter for a sufficient interlude to allow Michele Santopietro to present fingerprint evidence. Of course, Defendants could also submit such evidence.
c. Michele Santopietro alleges that her mother Sandra Santopietro is incompetent to execute the declaration that forms the basis of the summary judgment motion. Sandra Santopietros declaration is somewhat conclusory and she does admit that Michele Santopietro maintained keys to the property before it was sold. Sandra Santopietros declaration is submitted from an out of state location that corresponds to where Michele Santopietro alleges that Sandra Santopietro has been placed in a care home. After reviewing the timetable of the litigation, the Court is inclined to let Michele Santopietro undertake to support her allegations with evidence. A 90-day continuance should be sufficient for this purpose.
All of these tentative thoughts are subject to the Courts review of an opposition to Michele Santopietros ex parte.
The Court is concerned enough by Michele Santopietros previous litigation conduct to caution that if there is a continuance to allow further support for an opposition, there will only be one continuance. Michele Santopietro now appears to have a pattern of late responses that require continuances and further examinations of evidence that should have previously been submitted. Nevertheless, the Court is inclined to give her one last chance to come up with additional admissible evidence in support of her claims.
(July 8, 2024 Order at pp.4-5.)
The Court will allow one final continuance on the ex parte application matter.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court sets a hearing on Plaintiffs ex parte application for a continuance of the motion for summary judgment for August 2, 2024 at 8:30 a.m.
Defendant is ordered to file and serve an opposition brief by July 30, 2024 by the end of the business day.
The matter of Defendant Sandra D. Santopietros motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication remains under submission, but the Court is considering continuing the hearing on that matter for approximately 90 days to allow Plaintiff Michele Santopietro a final opportunity to gather evidence. No further briefing shall be permitted.
Defendant shall give notice of this order.
DATED: July 26, 2024
___________________________
John Kralik
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
PATRICK MALLOY, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL. VS CAREY HELLMAN
Jul 30, 2024 |
23STCV25326
Case Number:
23STCV25326
Hearing Date:
July 30, 2024
Dept:
56
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
PATRICK MOLLOY, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CAREY HELLMAN, etc., et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO.: 231STCV25326
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
Date: July 30, 2024
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept. 56
MOVING PARTY: Defendant Carey Hellman dba Hellman Associates (Hellman)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs
The Court has considered the moving, opposition and reply papers.
BACKGROUND
This action was filed on October 17, 2023 and arises out of construction work performed by Defendant Hellman on Plaintiffs duplex (the Project).
The proposal for the Project was presented by Hellman to Plaintiffs on December 10, 2022. (Complaint, para. 6.)
Hellman performed work on the Project from January 6 to April, 2023.
(Complaint, para. 12.)
Plaintiffs allege that After some of [the allegedly deficient work] came to light, [Plaintiffs] learned that Hellmans contractors license with the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) was inactive or had lapsed.
They further discovered that some of the subcontractors Hellman hired for the work were also not licensed.
(Complaint, para. 16.)
The Complaint alleges causes of action for Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract; 2) Negligence; 3) Breach of Implied Warranty; 4) Disgorgement Per Bus. & Prof. Code (B&PC) §7031; 5) Unfair Business Practices Per B&PC § 17200,
et seq.
; and 6) Fraud.
All of these causes of action rely, among other things, on Plaintiffs allegation that Hellman was an unlicensed contractor at the time he performed work on the Project.
On December 22, 2023, Defendant Hellman filed his demurrer to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action of the Complaint.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants Request for Judicial Notice of a copy of a Contractors License naming Hellman and dated January 1982 is DENIED.
This is not an official record of the status of Hellmans license at the time of his work on the Project.
The Court does, however, accept the Declaration of Christopher L. Mass, Esq. in Support of Opposition to Demurrer (Mass Decl.), which provides the foundation for the record of the status of Hellmans contractors license since November 1, 2009.
This document evidences that Defendants license was not active during the period of time that Defendant was working on the Project.
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Legal Standard for Demurrer
[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (
Lewis v. Safeway, Inc.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See
Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co.
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (
Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Analysis for Demurrer
Fourth Cause of Action
Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for Disgorgement is not a valid cause of action because it is based on the allegation that Defendant was not licensed while working on the Project, whereas Defendant possessed a contractors license during the entire construction project.
Defendants purported evidence of his initial licensure in 1983 does not, however, support his contention that he was actively licensed when he worked on the Project.
[1]
The evidence supplied by the Mass Declaration shows that Defendant was not actively licensed during his work on the Project.
Defendants Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action of the Complaint is therefore OVERRULED.
Fifth Cause of Action
Defendants Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action for violation of the B&PC Section 17200 for Unfair Business Practices depends upon his position that he was not in violation of the CSLB rules for contractor licensing at the time he performed work on the Project.
As indicated above, the Court does not accept Defendants position that he was licensed throughout his work on the Project.
Even if he were so licensed, which apparently he was not, the allegation that his subcontractors were also not licensed would provide all necessary support for an Unfair Business Practices claim. (Complaint, para. 16.)
Defendants Demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action of the Complaint is therefore OVERRULED.
Sixth Cause of Action
Defendants Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud is also based upon the premise that Defendant was properly licensed throughout the time he worked on the Project.
Defendant has not established that this is the case and, for that reason, the Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is OVERRULED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMC_DEPT56@lacourt.org as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
If the department does not receive an email and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion will be placed off calendar.
Dated this 30th day of July 2024
Hon. Holly J. Fujie
Judge of the Superior Court
[1]
Although the Demurrer makes a reference to the one year statute of limitations for claims under B&PC Section 7031, Defendant worked on the Project from January through April of 2023 and this action was filed on October 17, 2023 well within any one year statute of limitations.
Ruling
SARAH LEWIS VS. KENNETH RUNYON ET AL
Jul 22, 2024 |
CGC23610891
Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Monday, July 22, 2024, Line 5. 2 - DEFENDANT NUNUNG SUGIYANTI's DEMURRER to 1ST Amended COMPLAINT. Transferred to be heard in department 501 on July 30, 2024. That department handles all wrongful eviction cases per SF Local Rule 8.10A1. =(302/CK)
Ruling
ASIAN, INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT PUBLIC VS. IMAGE INTERIORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED ET AL
Jul 24, 2024 |
CGC23609093
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 24, 2024 line 4. LAINTIFF ASIAN, INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION MOTION FOR JUDGMNT ON THE PLEADINGS is OFF CALENDAR, moot. See July 10, 2023 Lee Declaration. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.