Summons: Summerlyn Place Owner LLC dba Summerlyn Place VS Rakeish Pickett

Case Number: 22STCV28938 Hearing Date: August 2, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING MI YOUNG KIM vs. HANNAM CHAIN, USA, INC. Case No.: 22STCV28938 Hearing Date: August 2, 2024 Defendants motion for terminating sanctions is GRANTED. On 9/6/2021, Plaintiff Mi Young Kim (Plaintiff) filed suit against Hannam Chain USA, Inc., alleging: (1) breach of written contract; (2) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) constructive eviction. Now, Defendant moves for terminating sanctions. The motion is unopposed. Discussion Defendant argues that terminating sanctions are appropriate because Plaintiff has failed to litigate this action. Plaintiff failed to respond to any of Defendants discovery or correspondence regarding the same, Plaintiff did not oppose Defendants motions to compel discovery, and Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court order to provide discovery by 4/14/2024. Plaintiff did not oppose this motion and thus is considered to have conceded to the merits of the motion. In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is either unwilling or unable to litigate this action. Terminating sanctions are therefore appropriate. Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion for terminating sanctions is granted. It is so ordered. Dated: August , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 30, 2024 line 2. DEFENDANT ACRYLIC TECHNOLOGIES, INC.'s MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD. GRANTED. No opposition filed. Counsel to prepare an order. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

22CV020109: SANCHEZ-CORDERO, et al. vs JOE'S PHO SAN LEANDRO INC., et al. 07/31/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend complaint; filed by Moises Sanchez- Cordero (Plaintiff) in Department 20 Tentative Ruling - 07/25/2024 Karin Schwartz The Motion for Leave to Amend filed by Moises Sanchez-Cordero on 07/05/2024 is Granted. Plaintiffs Moises F. Sanchez-Cordero, Jose Lopez-Munoz, and Jorge Luis C. Arellano’s unopposed motion for leave to amend is GRANTED. “The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading[.]” (CCP § 473(a)(1).) A court’s discretion is usually exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings, and it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. (See, e.g., Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Plaintiffs move for leave to amend the complaint to add a factual allegation regarding Plaintiff Arellano’s period of employment and to add a cause of action for waiting time penalties. Plaintiffs state that the new allegations arise out of the same nexus of operating facts originally pleaded, and the facts were recently discovered in preparing Plaintiffs’ mediation brief. There is no opposition on file. This order shall not be construed as a determination that the First Amended Complaint adequately alleges its causes of action. PLEASE NOTE that the proposed First Amended Complaint submitted with the moving papers is NOT deemed filed or served. Plaintiffs shall file and serve the First Amended Complaint by or before August 9, 2024. If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV020109: SANCHEZ-CORDERO, et al. vs JOE'S PHO SAN LEANDRO INC., et al. 07/31/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend complaint; filed by Moises Sanchez- Cordero (Plaintiff) in Department 20 BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.

C23-01810 CASE NAME: KEVIN HUMPHREY VS. JASVIR SINGH SHAHI HEARING ON DEMURRER TO: TO: 2ND AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT FROM: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY FILED BY: CONTRA COSTA COUNTY *TENTATIVE RULING:* Before the Court is Defendant Contra Costa County’s Demurrer to the Second Amended Cross- Complaint of Dillard Trucking, Inc. dba Dillard Environmental Services. The County’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted as explained below. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. Factual and Procedural Background This matter concerns damages claims related to a flooding event that took place in January 2023 at or near the intersection of Byron Highway and Camino Diablo in Contra Costa County. FAC Allegations According to the FAC, Plaintiffs own a single-family residence located at 3238 Camino Diablo. Defendant Shahi owns and operates a gas station, convenience store, and restaurant located at 15031 Byron Highway. Cross-Complainant Dillard Trucking Services, Inc. (“Dillard”) operates a trucking, environmental services, and toxic storage and disposal service located at 3120 Camino Diablo. For ease of reference only, below is an illustration of the location of the Properties. (The red π indicates Plaintiff’s Property; blue Δ is Defendant’s Property; and Dillard’s Property is underlined in purple.) It is alleged that a ‘seasonal drainage channel’ is located on the southwestern and southern boundary of the Defendant’s Property. (¶ 6.) This “Drainage Channel” receives and conveys water that discharges from a public drainage system, which collects surface water at and around the intersection SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/24/2024 of Byron Highway and Camino Diablo. (Ibid.) This Drainage Channel then conveys the water across the Defendant’s Property – which is immediately adjacent to Plaintiff’s Property. (Ibid.) The Drainage Channel is alleged to be part of the Kellogg & Brushy Creek Watershed, as identified in the Contra Costa Watershed Atlas. (¶ 7.) The Drainage Channel receives accumulated surface water from the public drainage system at the northwestern corner of Defendant’s Property, then conveys it roughly Southeast along property lines until discharging it into the Clifton Court Forebay. (¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege that at some unknown time, Defendants modified the portion of the Drainage Channel where it traverses Defendant’s Property by installing two adjacent pipelines within the bed of the Drainage Channel, then burying those pipes and redirecting the water the previously flowed within the Drainage Channel into and through the two underground pipes. (¶ 8.) This modification reduced the capacity of the Drainage Channel, compromising its ability to receive and convey the drainage water it receives from the surrounding area. (Ibid.) This ‘undergrounding’ of the pipes was done without obtaining the necessary permits and approvals from Contra Costa County (or other public entity.) (¶ 10.) At some point in time, Defendant Dillard began improperly storing toxic chemicals and waste on its Property. (¶ 11-12.) On or about January 15, 2023 a significant rain event occurred. (¶ 13.) The “Rainstorm” caused a substantial volume of water to accumulate upon the Dillard Property. (¶ 14.) The water became contaminated due to the improper storage of toxic waste. (Ibid.) The contaminated water the flowed from the Dillard Property into the public storm drainage system. (Ibid.) This contaminated water was then discharged into the Drainage Channel on Defendant’s Property. (¶ 16.) Due to the unauthorized ‘undergrounding’ performed by Defendant on his Property, the Drainage Channel did not have sufficient capacity to handle the flow of water. (¶ 17.) As a result, the contaminated water overflowed the Drainage Channel and entered Plaintiffs’ Property. (Ibid.) This toxic water causes damage to structures and contamination of soil on Plaintiffs’ Property. (Ibid.) Based on the above events, Plaintiffs FAC sets forth four causes of action against Defendants Shahi and Dillard: (1) nuisance; (2) trespass; (3) negligence; and (4) injunctive relief. Plaintiffs do not allege any claims against the County. Cross-Complaint Defendant/Cross-Complainant Dillard Trucking, Inc. (“Dillard”) filed its Cross-Complaint on November 29, 2023, and a First Amended Cross-Complaint on January 30, 2024. The FACC asserted two causes of action against the County: (1) equitable indemnity, and (2) contribution. The FACC indicated that the facts supporting these causes of action were set forth in the allegations of the Plaintiffs’ FAC. Contra Costa County demurred to the FACC on February 27, 2024. In essence, the County argued that Dillard failed to allege any facts indicating that the County owned or controlled the property at issue – SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/24/2024 i.e. the Drainage Channel, Watershed, public drainage system, or Forebay. On April 23, 2024, the Court issued a tentative ruling sustaining the County’s demurrer, but granted Dillard leave to amend. As no party contested that tentative ruling, it became the order of the Court. Dillard filed its Second Amended Cross-Complaint on May 8, 2024. The County again demurred to Dillard’s pleading, again arguing that the pleading fails to allege that the County owns or controls the property at issue in this matter. The SACC is exactly the same as the FACC but for the addition of paragraphs 7-13 in SACC. These additional paragraphs appear to be Dillard’s attempt to remedy the lack of allegations connecting the County to the property at issue in this matter. Legal Standard for Demurrer “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but disregards contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. (1984) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) A demurrer lies only for defects appearing on the face of the complaint or from matters of which the court must or may take judicial notice. (CCP 430.40; see Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550 (“Doe”)), but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099 quoting Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) Analysis As noted above, Dillard added seven new paragraphs of allegations to the SACC to address the deficiencies identified by the Court’s ruling on the County’s first demurrer. The new allegations attempt to explain how the water moves across the various parts of the intersection at issue. In essence, it is alleged that the public drainage system collects surface water from the intersection of Byron Highway and Camino Diablo and conveys it into the Drainage Channel, which is ‘immediately adjacent to Plaintiffs’ property.’ (¶ 7.) The Drainage Channel is part of the Watershed, and conveys this water “roughly Southwest along property lines until discharging it into the Clifton Court Forebay.” (Ibid.) On information and belief, it is alleged that “the Drainage Channel, the Kellogg & Brushy Creek Watershed, the public drainage system, and the Clifton Court Forebay are all owned and controlled by SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/24/2024 Cross-Defendant County.” (¶ 8.) The Drainage Channel and public drainage system are alleged to be defective, and County had notice of the dangerous condition caused by these defects. (¶ 9-10.) Dillard also alleges that the County had a duty to maintain the Drainage Channel and public drainage system under Contra Costa County Code 1010-2.006 and 1010-2.102. (¶ 11-13.) By failing to abide by this duty, the County contributed to the Plaintiffs’ injuries. Dillard puts forth two theories of liability against the County. These are based on alleged violation of Government Code sections 815.6 and 835. Each will be discussed below. Government Code Section 815.6 Government Code section 815.6 “generally provides for direct liability of a government entity for failure to discharge a mandatory duty.” (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1458.) Claims brought under section 815.6 must meet a three-pronged test for “determining whether liability may be imposed on a public entity: (1) an enactment must impose a mandatory, not discretionary, duty …’ (2) the enactment must intend to protect against the kind of risk of injury suffered by the party asserting section 815.6 as a basis for liability…’ and (3) breach of the mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered.’” (Ibid. quoting State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848, 854.) “One of the essential elements that must be plead is the existence of a specific statutory duty.” (Ibid.) Such a duty cannot be alleged generally, but the “facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged.” (Ibid.) “Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or ‘enactment,’ the statute or ‘enactment’ claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified.” (Ibid.) The SACC alleges that the County “had a duty to maintain the Drainage Channel and public drainage system in good working order under Contra Costa County Code 1010-2.006 and 1010-2.102.” (¶ 11.) Section 1010-2.006 states, in pertinent part: No person, firm, corporation, municipality or public district shall allow on its property or commit or cause to be committed any of the [following] acts …: (1) Impair or impede the natural flow of storm waters, or other water running in a defined channel, natural or man-made, or allow on its property or cause or permit the obstruction of such channel; Section 1010-2.012 provides, in pertinent part, that “the public works department is charged with the responsibility for the administration of the provisions of this division.” By its own terms, Section 1010-2.006 applies to any “person, firm, corporation, municipality or pubic district…” As noted by the County, the Contra Costa County Code defines the term “County” to mean the county of Contra Costa, California. (Contra Costa County Code 16-4.010.) That section also makes clear that “[n]otwitstanding any other provision of this code, its sections, chapters or articles shall be SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/24/2024 applicable to the county only where they expressly specify such county application.” (Ibid.) Section 1010-2.006 does not specifically express that it applies to the County. As such, it does not. Government Code Section 835 “Section 835 is the sole statutory basis for a claim imposing liability on a public entity based on the condition of public property.” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.) “Under section 835, a public entity may be liable if it creates an injury-producing dangerous condition on its property or if it fails to remedy a dangerous condition despite having notice and sufficient time to protect against it.” (Ibid. emphasis added.) “To state a cause of action against a public entity under section 835, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a dangerous condition existed on the public property at the time of the injury; (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the property in sufficient time to have taken measures to protect against it.” (Ibid.) “For purposes of this section, property of a public entity means real or personal property ‘owned or controlled by the public entity.’” (Goddard v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 350, 359.) “A public entity may not be held liable under section 835 for a dangerous condition of property that it does not own or control.” (Ibid. citations omitted.) As noted above, the SACC alleges, on information and belief, that “the Drainage Channel, the Kellogg & Brushy Creek Watershed, the public drainage system, and the Clifton Court Foreby are all owned and controlled by Cross-Defendant County.” (¶ 8.) Dillard contends these allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage. To begin with, the above allegations are merely contentions or conclusions of law made by Dillard – not facts. When reviewing a demurrer, the court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but “it does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the challenged pleading. (City of Atascadero, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at 459.) Even if those assertions are considered to be ‘facts,’ when ruling on a demurrer, the Court can consider matters which are subject to judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) “Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264 quoting Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117.) “When ruling on a demurrer, ‘[a] court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.’” (Ibid.) Pursuant to the Evidence Code, “courts have taken judicial notice of the existence and recordation of real property records, including deeds of trust, when the authenticity of the documents is not SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/24/2024 challenged.” (Fontenot, 198 Cal.App.4th at 264 multiple citations omitted.) “The official act of recordation and the common use of a notary public in the execution of such documents assure their reliability, and the maintenance of the documents in the recorder’s office makes their existence and text capable of ready confirmation, thereby placing such documents beyond reasonable dispute.” (Ibid.) “[A] court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity.” (Id. at 265.) “From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when the effect is clear from its face.” (Ibid.) As noted by the County, the SACC makes clear that the Drainage Channel is solely located on Defendant Shahi’s property. The County submits the deeds of trust for both Plaintiffs’ property as well as Defendant Shahi’s property. Neither of those deeds show any interest in the properties by the County – either by easement, right or way, or other encumbrance. (RJN Exs. F, G.) In addition, the SACC is uncertain regarding what, specifically, Dillard is alleging to support its claim that the County has some ownership interest in the property at issue in this matter. There are references to the Drainage Channel, the Kellogg & Brushy Creek Watershed, a ‘public drainage system’ and the “Clifton Court Forebay,” but no explanation as what these things are, how they interact, how the County owned or controlled them, and how that allege ownership/control lead or contributed to the damages alleged by Plaintiffs. There are just unsupported assertions that the County “owned and controlled” those undefined things and therefore it contributed to the flooding that occurred on Plaintiffs’ property. Such vague allegations do not provide the County with sufficient information to properly respond to Dillard’s complaint. Based on the above, the SACC fails to allege sufficient facts to impose liability upon the County under section 835, as it fails to indicate that any property at issue is owned or controlled by the County. Leave to Amend “[T]he burden is on the plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.” (Medina v. Safe-Guard Products, Internat., Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 105, 112 fn. 8.) (citation omitted.) A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend when the moving party “merely stated in its opposition to [the] demurrer [or motion to strike] that ‘if the Court finds the operative complaint deficient, Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend….” (Major Clients Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1133.) Here, Dillard’s only reference to a request for leave to amend is in its conclusion when it states: “[S]hould the Court sustain any portion of Cross-Defendant’s Demurrer, Cross-Complainant respectfully request that this Court allow it leave to amend those portions of the SACC.” (Opp. at SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 07/24/2024 5:28-6:2.) Dillard was already given leave to amend once. It has failed to make any showing at this time as to how it could amend its pleading to properly assert a claim against the County. As such, leave to amend is denied at this time. Conclusion Based on the above, the County’s demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 26, 2024 line 4. DEFENDANT KEJERA ROBERTS, SANDERA LEWIS DEMURRER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Plaintiff's late-filed (July 16, 2024) opposition is stricken, but considered. (In which Plaintiff admits there is a scrivener's error and requests leave to amend.) =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 21BBCV00739 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT NOHO PROPCO, LLCS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A THIRD AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION This is an action arising from the alleged breach of a contract concerning construction of two apartment buildings, retail space, and subterranean parking. On August 19, 2021, Plaintiff Snyder Langston Residential, LLC (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants Noho Propco LLC (NPL) and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Labor and Materials Furnished; (3) Foreclose Mechanics Lien; and (4) Statutory Violation of Civil Code sections 8810 et seq . On September 30, 2021, NPL filed an Answer to the Complaint. Also, on such date, NPL filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff for, among other causes of action, breach of contract, misrepresentation, and negligence. On October 26, 2021, this action was deemed related to One Silver Serve, Inc. v. Synder Langston Residential, LLC , LASC Case No. 20BBCV00846, which was filed on November 19, 2020. (10/26/21 Minute Order.) Case No. 20BBCV00846 was deemed the lead case. (10/26/21 Minute Order.) On January 18, 2022, NPL filed a First Amended Cross-Complaint (FAXC) against Plaintiff alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Negligence. On March 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against NPL alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Labor and Materials Furnished; (3) Foreclose Mechanics Lien; and (4) Statutory Violation of Civil Code sections 8810 et seq . On May 26, 2022, NPL filed the operative Second Amended Cross Complaint (SAXC) against Plaintiff; J.S. Egan Design, Inc.; Don E. Empakeris Architects; Jayco-Cal Engineering, Inc.; Kaplan Gehring McCarroll Architectural Lighting, Inc.; PE&C Civil Engineering, LLC; SQLA, Inc.; Sacharias Vorgias Consulting Electrical Engineering, Inc.; Burnett & Young Shoring Engineers, Inc.; John Labib & Associates, Structural Engineers; Vivian C. Tanamachi; Salamoff Design Studio, LLC; 6th Generation, Inc.; and Roes 1 through 100, inclusive (collectively, Cross-Defendants) alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Negligence; (4) Breach of Contract; (5) Negligence/Professional Negligence; (6) Express Indemnity; and (7) Equitable Indemnity/Apportionment. On November 9, 2022, Cross-Defendant Don E. Empakeris Architects filed a Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff and Moes 1 through 50 alleging causes of action for: (1) Equitable/Implied Indemnity; (2) Contribution; (3) Apportionment of Fault; and (4) Declaratory Relief. On December 28, 2023, pursuant to requests for dismissal filed by NPL, the following Cross-Defendants were dismissed from the SAXC: John Labib & Associates, Structural Engineers; Salamoff Design Studio, LLC; Kaplan Gehring McCarroll Architectural Lighting, Inc.; Burnett & Young Shoring Engineers, Inc.; 6th Generation, Inc.; SQLA, Inc.; PE&C Civil Engineering, LLC; and J.S. Egan Design, Inc. On March 27, 2024, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Jared D. Moses sitting in Department P at Pasadena Courthouse effective April 2, 2024. On June 3, 2024, NPL filed and served the instant Motion to File a Third Amended Cross-Complaint. The motion is made on the grounds that NPL has claims for damages against the remaining Cross-Defendants that said Cross-Defendants dispute remain [sic] and have sought to file this Third Amended Cross-Complaint to be clear on the remaining damages sought in this action. (Not. of Mot. at p. 2:3-6.) As of July 25, 2024, the motion for leave to amend is unopposed. Any opposition was required to have been filed and served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) II. LEGAL STANDARD Civ. Proc. Code §473, subd. (a), allows courts to permit amendment of pleadings in furtherance of justice and on any terms as may be proper. Motions for leave to amend are directed to the sound discretion of the judge: The court may, in furtherance of justice and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.... (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1).) However, the courts discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. (Citations.) The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. (Citation.) Leave to amend should be denied only where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but under substantive law, no liability exists and no amendment would change the result. (Citation.) ( Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.) Courts will ordinarily not consider the validity of a proposed pleading; the preferred practice is to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings. ( Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.) But a court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where the proposed pleading fails to state a cause of action and further amendment would be futile. ( Foxborough v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231.) Courts have discretion to deny leave to amend where delay in seeking amendment has prejudiced the other party. ( Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.) Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, subd. (b), requires that a motion for leave to amend be accompanied by a declaration stating why the amendment is necessary and proper, the effect of the amendment, when the facts giving rise to the amended declaration were discovered, and the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier. III. ANALYSIS In support of the motion, E. Scott Holbrook, Jr. (Holbrook) declares the following: this action was resolved with most parties in December 2023. (Holbrook Decl., ¶ 2.) Subsequently mediation has been held with one of the remaining cross-defendants with further mediation scheduled. (Holbrook Decl., ¶ 2.) NPL seeks to amend the [cross-complaint] to be clear that the claims [NPL] abandoned of $21,000,000 against Plaintiff . . . were abandoned because of, arose of, resulted from, occurred in connection with, and/or were related to the services provided by the Third Party Design Cross Defendants remaining in this action. (Holbrook Decl., ¶ 2.) Counsel states that it is now necessary to file a Third Amended Cross-Complaint to assure the remaining cross-defendants do not object to the damages claims as not being plead in an effort to exclude some of NPLs claims for damages claiming they were not alleged against the remaining cross-defendants. Mr. Holbrook then generally describes the proposed modifications from the SAXC to the Third Amended Cross-Complaint. (Holbrook Decl., ¶ 3(a)-(i).) The Court finds that the motion is procedurally improper and not compliant with California Rules of Court , Rule 3.1324. NPL has failed to state by page, paragraph, and line number, where the deleted or additional allegations are located. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324(a).) Additionally, the declaration of Mr. Holbrook in support of the motion does not state the effect of the amendment, why the amendment is proper, when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered, and why the request for amendment was not made sooner. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324(b).) Nevertheless, notwithstanding these procedural infirmities, the Court will permit the filing of the third amended cross-complaint. The motion is unopposed and there are rare occasions when principles of efficiency lead one to conclude that it is best not to exalt form over substance. IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Based on the foregoing, Defendant and Cross-Complainant Noho Propco LLC s Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Cross-Complaint is GRANTED. Defendant and Cross-Complainant Noho Propco LLC to give notice of this order. Dated: July 30, 2024 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

23CV47109 PLAINTIFF/CROSS-DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION This action is one of a number of matters arising from disputes concerning ownership and management of Beach Lake Village mobile home park in Mokelumne Hill. Plaintiff/cross-defendant has demurred to the cross-complaint and filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s May 14, 2024, order striking the Request to Enter Default against Defendant Bonnie K. Hurley. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted. First, neither the motion nor demurrer comply with Local Rule 3.3.7. All matters noticed for the Law & Motion calendar shall Include the following language in the notice: 3 3 7 Tentative Rulings (Repealed Eff 7/1/06, As amended 1/1/18) All parties appearing on the Law and Motion calendar shall utilize the tentative ruling system. Tentative Rulings are available by 2:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the scheduled hearing and can be accessed either through the court's website or by telephoning 209-754-6285. The tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the court, unless a party desiring to be heard so advises the Court no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing including advising that all other sides have been notified of the intention to appear by calling 209-754-6285. Where appearance has been requested or invited by the Court, all argument and evidence Is limited pursuant to Local Rule 3 3. All matters noticed for the Law & Motion calendar shall Include the following language in the notice: Pursuant to Local Rule 3 3 7, the Court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by 2:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing. The complete text of the tentative ruling may be accessed on the Court's website or by calling 209-754-6285 and listening to the recorded tentative ruling. If you do not call all other parties and the Court by 4:00 p.m. the court day preceding the hearing, no hearing wiII be held and the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the court [emphasis in original.] Failure to include this language In the notice may be a basis for the Court to deny the motion. Plaintiff/cross-defendant previously filed a demurrer to the cross-complaint that was denied for failure to comply with Local Rule 3 3 7. Plaintiff has once again filed a notice and demurrer that fails to include this mandatory language and the demurrer is therefore, again, overruled. Local Rule 1.7 authorizes the Court to impose sanctions on an attorney that fails to comply with any requirements in the Local Rules. Plaintiff as a pro se litigant is held is on notice that any further failures to comply with the local rules will result in sanctions. Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is OVERRULED. Cross-defendant must answer the cross-complaint within twenty (20) calendar days. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Edward J. Mulry Jr. (“Plaintiff”) moves for reconsideration of the Court’s May 14, 2024 Order striking the Request to Enter Default against Defendant Bonnie K. Hurley. Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a) provides, in relevant part: (a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. Section 1008(e) provides further that “no application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.” A motion for reconsideration must be made within 10 days after service upon the moving party of written notice of entry of the order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) Here, the Court Clerk served notice of the Court’s May 14, 2024 minute order striking the default on May 14, 2024. Plaintiff’s motion was filed on June 24, 2024, thus the motion is untimely. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. The Clerk shall provide notice of the Ruling forthwith. No further formal Order is required.

Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for CVPS2204703 COPP vs BARANEK BARANEK INVESTMENTS, LLC Tentative Ruling: Grant. No opposition was filed. Counsel is ordered to file with the Court within 5 days a revised proposed order including all contact information for Defendant in Box 6 of the proposed revised order, which should include the current or last known address, telephone number, and email for the client. Counsel is reminded that he will not be relieved until a proof of service of the final signed order is filed with the Court.