Bmf V Fl Seven Lakes Carrollwood Llc Vs Barbour, Daniel

Case Number: 24STCV00592 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 37 HEARING DATE: Wednesday, July 17, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 24STCV00592 CASE NAME: Daniel Rogosin, et al. v. 9 Silver LLC, et al. MOVING PARTY: Defendants 9 Silver LLC and Nathan Young OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Daniel Rogosin and Elizabeth Rogosin TRIAL DATE: Not Set PROOF OF SERVICE: OK PROCEEDING: Motion to Strike FAC OPPOSITION: 7 July 2024 REPLY: Not filed as of 07/12/24 at 11:28 am. TENTATIVE: D efendants motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 10 days leave to amend. The Court sets an OSC Re: Filing of Amended Complaint for July 29, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Defendants to give notice. Background On January 9, 2024, Daniel and Elizabeth Rogosin (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against 9 Sliver LLC; Nathan Young (collectively Defendants); and Does 1 to 100. The operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges five causes of action: 1) Breach of Contract 2) Account Stated; 3) Open Book Account; 4) Negligence; and 5) Private Nuisance. Defendants now move to strike punitive damages from the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. The matter is now before the court. Discussion I. Legal Standard A. Motion to Strike ¿ Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (CCP § 435(b)(1); CRC, rule 3.1322(b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded].) ¿¿¿¿ B. Leave to Amend Where the defect raised by a motion to strike or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave to amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. ( CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. ( Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) ¿¿¿ II. Motion to Strike [1] A. Summary of Allegations The FAC alleges that on or about January 6, 2022, Plaintiffs entered a residential least (the Lease) with Defendants for a premises located in Los Angeles, CA (the Premises). (FAC, ¶ 1, Ex. 1.) Under the Lease, Defendants would rent the Premises until January 31, 2024, with rent of $18,000 to be paid on the first day of each month. (FAC, ¶ 2.) Defendant Nathan Young (Young) personally guaranteed the Lease. (SAC, ¶ 3.) Defendants have breached the term of the Lease by failing to pay the monthly rent owed for October 2023. (FAC, ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs filed an unlawful detainer action (the UD Action) (LASC Case No. 23STCV26741). FAC, ¶ 5.) Defendants vacated the Premises on November 2023 without paying the rent due for November 2023. (FAC, ¶ 6.) For the months of October and November 2023, Plaintiffs are owed a total of $36,000 for past rent due. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Due to the Lease expiring in January 2024 and costs associated with repairs and legal fees incurred in the UD Action, the FAC alleges Defendants owe a total of $117,260, including credit for a $36,000 security deposit paid by Defendant. (FAC, ¶¶ 7-10, Ex. 2, 3.) B. Defendants Request to Strike Punitive Damages Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages because the FAC fails to allege facts to show malice, oppression, or fraud. (FAC, ¶¶ 33 at p.8:17-19.) To state a claim for punitive damages under Civ. Code § 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. ( Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042.)¿ The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. ( Ibid .)¿¿Malice is defined in Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(1) as conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Oppression is defined as despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) The term despicable has been defined in the case law as actions that are base, vile, or contemptible. ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc . (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 891.) Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) Paragraph 44 states: As a further direct and legal result of the wrongful acts and/or omissions of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek the recovery of punitive and exemplary damages against Defendants as set forth above. The court finds that apart from Defendants not paying rent and breaching the lease, the FAC is devoid of facts showing how Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression in not paying rent. Moreover, the FAC fails to explain why Defendants are liable for the repair costs of the Premises and how such conduct was intentional and done with malice, oppression, or fraud. As to the private nuisance claim, Plaintiffs fail to explain how Defendants interfered with Plaintiffs right to use and enjoy the Premises by not paying rent and how such conduct was done with malice, oppression, or fraud. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. ( Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895896.) The motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Conclusion D efendants motion to strike is granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 10 days leave to amend. The Court sets an OSC Re: Filing of Amended Complaint for July 29, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. Defendants to give notice. [1] Pursuant to CCP § 435.5(a), the meet and confer requirement has been met. (Fisher Decl., ¶¶4-6.)

23CV02548 SHAW v. SHAW (UNOPPOSED) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT PARTITION REFEREE The unopposed motion is granted. Mr. Singer will be appointed as the partition referee. Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Case No. 19CV02702 RHOADS v. BECKLEY APPLICATION FOR ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING/OSC FOR SALE OF DWELLING This application is continued as discussed below. The original application, brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 704.740 through 704.850, was filed on January 26, 2023. For a variety of reasons, the application was continued and not ruled upon. When the application was filed, Mr. Beckley was without counsel and the court noted procedural as well as notice issues with the application, resulting in continuances. Mr. Beckley then retained counsel, Thornton Davidson, on June 29, 2023. Mr. Davidson sought to be relieved as counsel on May 8, 2024. The declaration in support of Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved noted the next court date as June 11, 2024. The court issued a tentative ruling the day before the June 11 hearing, tentatively granting the motion to be relieved and specifically continuing the application for sale of dwelling to allow defendant to either retain new counsel or participate in a pro per capacity. The parties were ordered to appear. At the June 11 hearing, attended by Mr. Davidson and plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Eschen, Page 1 of 2 the court granted Mr. Davidson’s motion to be relieved and set July 11, 2024 as the next hearing date. Mr. Beckley did not attend the June 11, 2024 hearing, nor is there evidence before the court that he was notified of the July 11, 2024 date. The order prepared by Mr. Davidson after the hearing and served on Mr. Beckley stated that the tentative ruling became the order of the court. While the order attached the tentative ruling, there is no mention in either the order or the tentative ruling of the July 11, 2024 hearing date for the application. The tentative ruling specified that the application hearing would be set at the next court date. The court will issue an order to show cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 704.770, subdivision (a). “After the judgment creditor has filed an application for an order for sale, the court sets a time and place for hearing and must order the judgment debtor to show cause why an order for sale should not be made in accordance with the application. The hearing must be set no later than 45 days after the application is filed, or such later time as the court orders on a showing of good cause.” (2 MB Practice Guide: CA Debt Collection 17.36 (2024).) After the OSC is set, Mr. Rhoads must serve on the judgment debtor, Mr. Beckley, a copy of the OSC, a copy of the application, and a copy of the notice of hearing in the form required by the Judicial Council. (See Code of Civ. Proc. § 704.770, subd. (b).) Page 2 of 2

23CV035374: VENTAS REALTY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs MOHAMMED, et al. 07/19/2024 Hearing on Motion to be Admitted Pro Hac Vice in Department 25 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Jenna Whitman The application of Jennifer Metzger Stinnett for admission pro hac vice is GRANTED. The court sets a compliance date for payment of annual renewal fee. (Gov. Code 70617(e)(2).) Compliance Hearing renewal PHV Stinnett is scheduled for 07/16/2025 at 03:00 PM in Department 25 at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse.

Case Number: 23STCV17316 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING LESBIA LUCRECIA MONTOYA, Plaintiff, v. HORACIO F. MONTOYA; et al., Defendants. Case No: 23STCV17316 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Calendar Number: 3 Defendant Horacio F. Montoya moves for relief from the Courts November 16, 2023 order for the partition of the property located at 854-645 1/2 East 50th Street, Los Angeles, California 90011 (the Property), which Defendant and Plaintiff Lesbia Lucrecia Montoya (Plaintiff) own as joint tenants. The Court DENIES Defendants motion. Background Plaintiff and Defendant each own a 50 percent share of the Property as joint tenants. On July 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, stating claims for (1) partition; (2) accounting; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) unjust enrichment. The complaint was verified. On November 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for partition of the Property pursuant to the stipulation of the parties (the November 16 Order). On January 24, 2024, the Court entered an interlocutory judgment of partition of the Property and appointed Blake C. Alsbrook (the Referee) as referee to complete the partition sale of the Property. On June 28, 2024, the Court granted the Referees ex parte application for an order directing the Clerk of the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Referee and against Defendant and all occupants residing at the Property (the June 28 Order). On June 25, 2024, Defendant filed this motion, which is styled as an appeal and seeks relief from the November 26 Order. Discussion Defendants motion is called in different parts of the motion an appeal and as a motion to strike the sale of the Property. The motion states that it seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure, section 904.1 the statute governing grounds for appeal on the basis that the Courts November 16 Order was wrong. To the Courts knowledge, Defendant has not followed the procedures for filing an appeal and in any event, the Court is not able to consider appeals of its own judgments. Defendants motion could be characterized as a motion for reconsideration, and the Court will consider it as such. Within ten days of service of an order, a party may move for reconsideration based on new facts, circumstances, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); see also Mink v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.) The moving party shall state by affidavit what application was made before, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd .(a).) [T]he party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time. ( Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.) The legislative intent was to restrict motions for reconsideration to circumstances where a party offers the court some fact or circumstance not previously considered and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. ( Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) If those requirements have been met to the satisfaction of the court but the court is not persuaded the earlier ruling was erroneous, the proper course is to grant reconsideration and to reaffirm the earlier ruling. ( Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (c).) Defendant argues that the November 16 was wrong because (1) the property has many repairs to be made which would increase its market value if completed; (2) the property has a mortgage of $497,840.00, for which Defendant is solely responsible; and (3) the property has been on the market for more than three months and has not sold. None of these arguments provide a basis for reconsideration. Knowledge of the mortgage was available to Defendant at the time of the order in fact, Defendant first informed the referee of the mortgage shortly after the order and refused to provide the Referee with financial information about it. (Alsbrook Declaration in Support of Ex Parte Application for Writ of Possession (Alsbrook Decl.) ¶ 9.) The Referee also learned shortly after his appointment that Defendant was occupying the Property which would give him access to knowledge of any defects in need of repair. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 4.) Finally, the Referee has received an offer to buy the Property. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 12.) The Referee represented in his ex parte brief that the offer was for a purchase price of $660,000.00. (Ex Parte Application for Writ of Possession at p. 2:19-25.) The Referee declared that it was Defendants continued residence at the Property that was delaying the sale. (Alsbrook Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants first two arguments could have been presented at the original hearing for the motion, and are therefore not new facts. The delay in the sale of the Property appears to be a result of Defendants own conduct, and not a result of an inability to find a buyer. The Court therefore denies Defendants motion.

FCS057009 Motion by Plaintiff DMP MANAGEMENT, LLC to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records and for Sanctions TENTATIVE RULING Evidence Code §1563(b)(1) authorizes a nonparty witness to charge the subpoenaing party “reasonable costs” with respect to the production of business records pursuant to a records subpoena, with those costs generally limited to $24/hour per person for the reasonable clerical costs to locate and produce the records responsive to the subpoena. All reasonable costs incurred in a civil proceeding by a witness who is not a party with respect to the production of all or any part of business records requested pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum shall be charged against the party serving the subpoena duces tecum. (1) “Reasonable costs,” as used in this section, includes, but is not limited to, the following specific costs: ten cents ($0.10) per page for standard reproduction of documents of a size 8½ by 14 inches or less; twenty cents ($0.20) per page for copying of documents from microfilm; actual costs for the reproduction of oversize documents or the reproduction of documents requiring special processing which are made in response to a subpoena; reasonable clerical costs incurred in locating and making the records available to be billed at the maximum rate of twenty-four dollars ($24) per hour per person, computed on the basis of six dollars ($6) per quarter hour or fraction thereof; actual postage charges; and the actual cost, if any, charged to the witness by a third person for the retrieval and return of records held offsite by that third person. After the original enactment of this statute, the Legislature amended it, to add the “including but not limited to” language. Nevertheless, a nonparty receiving a records subpoena should produce responsive documents subject to the clerical hourly rate limitation, absent the providing of sufficient evidence to establish that the document search cannot reasonably be performed by a clerical, non-professional person. The only evidence AMS has presented is the declaration of its founder/chief engineer. All he claims in his declaration is that nearly all work and communications are in electronic form, stored on computers, and not stored yet in separate folders per project. While his declaration reported directing “an associate in my office, Marie Thompson”, to contact AMS’s attorney, he also claimed that “AMS does not employ any clerical persons or secretaries or persons who are compensated at the rate of $24/hour”. That latter statement does not rule out that AMS employs or could employ any clerks or secretaries (only that if AMS does so employ, none are paid at the hourly rate of $24). And it does not seem likely that an engineering firm of even small size lacks any support staff (secretary, clerk, receptionist or even bookkeeper) who at relatively low hourly rates could not be tasked with the job of sorting through computer records. The court therefore grants DMP’s motion, and orders AMS to produce documents (electronic or otherwise) responsive to the business records deposition subpoena. The court also imposes sanctions against AMS, in the amount of $1,460.00, payable to DMP by 5:00 p.m. within 30 days from issuance of this Order. Compliance with all terms of this order is due within 20 days of service of the signed order. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://www.zoomgov.com/j/1602210102?pwd=emlhR29SczExam56NFFqWHFvSitmZz09 Meeting ID: 160 221 0102 Passcode: 650928 One tap mobile +16692545252,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)

Case Number: 22TRCV00276 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Tuesday, July 16, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 13 PROCEEDINGS Wendy Newton v. Clay Claudino, et al. 22TRCV00276 1. Clay Claudino, et al.s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint 2. Clay Claudino, et al.s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint TENTATIVE RULING Clay Claudino, et al.s Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint is overruled, in part, and sustained with 20 days leave to amend, in part. Clay Claudino, et al.s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint is denied, in part, and deemed moot, in part. Background Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on April 11, 2022, and the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) was filed on April 4, 2024. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Plaintiff was a tenant of a property located at 509 Longfellow Avenue, Hermosa Beach, California 90254. The property suffered from numerous habitability problems. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: 1. Negligence 2. Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 3. Statutory Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 4. Breach of Contract 5. Nuisance 6. Fraud 7. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 8. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Use and Enjoyment 9. Trespass 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress 11. Violation of Civil Code Section 827 12. Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.2 13. Retaliatory Eviction 14. Constructive Eviction 15. Conversion. Meet and Confer Defendants set forth meet and confer declarations in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41 and CCP § 435.5. (Decls. Rudolf Petrosyan.) Request for Judicial Notice Defendants request for judicial notice is granted pursuant to Evidence Code Section 452(d). Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. ( Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.) Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. ( Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." ( Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609610.) Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is uncertain. Uncertainty exists where a complaints factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Defendants demur to the entire TAC and each cause of action pursuant to CCP § 430.10(a)(e) and (f) on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter, that the causes of action fail to state sufficient facts, and that the TAC is uncertain. First, Defendants again demur to the entire TAC on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction because a prior unlawful detainer judgment acts as collateral estoppel to bar the causes of action of the TAC. The Court has again taken judicial notice of the Complaint, Answer, and Judgment in Case No. 20IWUD00738. In ruling to the demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, the Court already determined that the demurrer based on lack of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. It is not clear why Defendants again demurred on these same grounds. Defendants are instructed in the future to read the Courts minutes and rulings prior to filing documents or making appearances in this Court. For Defendants benefit the Court will repeat what was written in the Courts prior ruling: An unlawful detainer action is a special limited summary proceeding limited to the issue of the right to possession. As such, the parties cannot raise extrinsic issues and are generally limited in the issues that they can litigate. Thus, usually, the judgment in the unlawful detainer action does not have a res judicata effect on any issue other than one that was necessarily litigated to determine the right of possession. [T]he critical question is whether or not the unlawful detainer defendant has had adequate opportunity to present his case. Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036. In some circumstances, the unlawful detainer judgment does bar a subsequent action by the parties. Any issue that was necessarily litigated in the unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of the right to possession cannot be raised in any subsequent action between the parties. The party asserting issue preclusion bears the burden of establishing these requirements. Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 757. The unlawful detainer judgment may be barred by res judicata on issues that were not necessary to the issue of possession when the issue is raised in the proceedings without objection and fully litigated by the parties. Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal. 3d 251, 25657. Here, a review of the UD Complaint, Answer, and Judgment does not reveal, at least for purposes of the instant demurrer, a complete bar to the causes of action based on principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. First, the Court notes that the UD Judgment was entered only in favor of Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007. Defendants have failed to establish, at this time, that the other two Defendants named in the Complaint can utilize the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata in their favor. Second, a review of the UD Judgment only reflects a discussion of issues involving Newtons alleged maintenance of a nuisance by placing undue restrictions on the asbestos abatement efforts. As the parties are probably aware, there are a multitude of issues that are alleged in the instant Complaint which are not addressed at all in the UD Judgment. The Court declines to dismiss the action or sustain the demurrer, at this time, based on principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The Court notes that the prior demurrer was sustained based solely on uncertainty grounds based on the failure to differentiate the parties that committed certain acts. The Court will review the TAC to determine if the TAC has now rectified those uncertainty issues. As to the demurrer of Clay Claudino, individually, the demurrer is overruled. Plaintiff states sufficient facts to state the causes of action and the Third Amended Complaint is not uncertain. Numerous factual allegations have been alleged against this Defendant to support the elements of the cause of action and Clay Claudino is specifically named as the landlord/lessor in the lease agreement attached to the TAC. However, as to the demurrer of Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007, the demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. As to these Defendants, the Court again sustains the demurrer based on uncertainty. The Court again notes that the attached lease reflects the parties to the lease as Plaintiff and Defendant Clay Claudino only. Most of the causes of action alleged against Defendants would only be applicable to the landlord - Clay Claudino. Despite Plaintiffs constant reference to the other Defendants as also being landlords, the only lessor named in the lease agreement is Clay Claudino. There are several causes of action that may be applicable to a Defendant solely based on ownership of the property. However, the allegation of ownership is completely uncertain. Plaintiff appears to allege that the owners are all of the following: Clay Claudino, individually, Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007. This allegation is uncertain because generally when a trust is the title owner of the property it would not hold joint ownership with individuals. Typically, ownership of property would be held by individuals or a Trust, but usually not co-owned by individuals and a Trust. Curiously, Defendants made specific arguments in this regard only related to the Fraud and IIED causes of action. However, the uncertainty in the allegation of ownership of the property permeates every cause of action. As to the Fraud and IIED causes of action, the Court notes that there does not appear to be any factual allegations within these causes of action directed against Defendants Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007 and Lee Marie Claudino. The factual allegations are directed solely to Clay Claudino, individually. Thus, the demurrer of Clay Claudino, individually, is overruled. The demurrer of Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007 is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. CCP § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP § 437. Defendants move to strike the following: 1. Page 2. line 4, which states, "Ms. Newton is a single, approximately 59-year old woman." 2. Page 4, lines 3-5, which states, "Plaintiff, believing that her sister and her very young niece would be moving into the residence with her as a result of her brother-in-law dying from asbestos exposure&" 3. Page 29, lines 14-15, which state "Defendants engaged in conduct, which was malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages." 4. Page 29, lines 23-26, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the implied warranty of habitability has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 5. Page 31, lines 10-11, which state "Civil Code § 3294 allows for punitive damages where a defendant's actions were done with malice, oppression, or fraud." 6. Page 35, lines 19-21, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 7. Page 37, lines 19-21, which state "Defendants' conduct in breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 8. Page 38, lines 23-24, which state "Plaintiffs are thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 9. Page 44, lines 18-19, which state "Plaintiff is thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 10. Page 49, lines 1-4, which state "Any lessor or agent of lessor who violates §1942.5, shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action for all of the following 1) The actual damages sustained by the lessee; (2) Punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) no more than two thousand ($2000) for each retaliatory act where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice with respect to that act." 11. Page 49, lines 17-20, which state "Defendants have individually, and in concert, acted with reckless and conscious disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff Defendants' conduct has been grossly negligent, malicious, and oppressive, thereby entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial." 12. Page 51, lines 8-10, which state "Plaintiffs are thus entitled to exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial." 13. Page 52, lines 23-28, which state "Defendants unauthorized acts of conversion were done with the intent o [sic] depriving Plaintiff of their property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and were despicable, malicious, oppressive, and/or fraudulent conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages to Plaintiff in an amount not yet ascertained but which amount is within the jurisdictional requirements of this Court and will be proven at time of trial." 14. Prayer for relief items 6, which state "For treble damages according to proof at time of trial" 15. Prayer for relief items 7, which state "For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof at time of trial" (Notice of Motion, pages 2-3). As to Defendant Clay Claudino, the motion to strike is denied. Civ. Code, § 3294 states, in relevant part: (a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. [I]t is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 921. Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. Id. [I]f the tenant wrongfully evicted elects to sue in tort, damages may be awarded for mental anguish and pain or physical injury; exemplary damages may also be recovered when the landlord's conduct justifies the award[.] Id. at 926. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient specific facts that Defendant Clay Claudino acted with malice, oppression, and/or fraud to support the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. In addition, Plaintiff has alleged facts to support the request for statutory penalties. Finally, the allegations are not false, irrelevant, or improper on their face. As to Defendants Lee Marie Claudino, individually, and Clay Claudino and Lee Marie Claudino, as Trustees of the Clay and Lee Claudino Living Trust Dated November 2, 2007, the motion to strike is deemed moot pursuant to the Courts ruling sustaining the demurrer to the entire TAC. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 15, 2024 line 6. PLAINTIFF 655 POWELL I5, LP Motion To Enforce Settlement: Memorandum Of Points And Authorities is GRANTED. Judgment shall enter for $54,000 for the "balance owing" under the stipulation and for reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $2,250. Request for prejudgment interest and NSF fees is not supported by the terms of the settlement agreement or authority. No opposition filed. =(501/HEK) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23STCV28792 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 16, 2024 TRIAL DATE: 03/04/2025 CASE: Worthen v. Hinds CASE NO.: 23STCV28792 MOTION FOR ORDER ESTABLISHING ADMISSIONS AND FOR SANCTIONS MOVING PARTY : Defendant/ Cross-Complainant Collin Hinds RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Lawrence George Worthen CASE HISTORY: · 11/27/23: Complaint filed. · 12/26/23: First Amended Complaint filed. · 02/13/24: Cross-complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: The dispute arises from the lease of the real property located at 5622 Keniston Ave. Los Angeles CA, 90043. Plaintiff files the instant action against Defendant to recover rent paid based on alleged defects with the property not disclosed at the time of the creation of the parties landowner/tenant relationship. On May 14, 2024, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed the instant motion for an order deeming his Requests for Admission, Set One, as admitted based on Plaintiffs failure to respond under Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.280. Plaintiff filed his opposition on June 28, 2024. No reply has been filed. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Collin Hindss Motion for an Order Establishing Admissions is DENIED as MOOT. Request for Sanctions is DENIED. DISCUSSION: Request for Admissions Legal Standard A party must respond to requests for admissions within 30 days after service of such requests. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subd. (a).) If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response&(a) [that party] waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product& (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (a).) The requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7. ( Id . at subd. (b).) A motion dealing with the failure to respond, rather than with inadequate responses, does not require the requesting party to meet and confer with the responding party. ( Deymer v. Costa Mesa Mobile Home Estates (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 395, fn. 4 [disapproved on other grounds in Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973]). There is no time limit within which a motion to have matters deemed admitted must be made. ( Brigante v. Huang (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1585.) Analysis Defendant provides the declaration of his counsel, Alain V. Bonavida, who states that he served Plaintiff with Defendants Request for Admissions, Set One (RFAs) via overnight delivery on April 2, 2024. (Bonavida Decl. ¶ 3; Exh. A.) The request was delivered to Plaintiff on April 3, 2024. ( Id. ; Exh. B.) Counsel swears that as of the filing of the instant motion, no responses have been received. ( Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs opposition declaration states that he did not receive Defendants discovery request but did receive two USPS packages, one of which contained the instant motion. (Worthen Decl. ¶ 1.) By the time he filed his opposition, however, Plaintiff had responded to the RFAs. ( Id. ¶ 3; Exh. A.) Based on Plaintiffs declaration, the motion appears to be moot under CCP § 2033.280(c) as Plaintiff has provided his responses to the request for admissions compliant with CCP §2033.220. Defendant has not filed a reply challenging the responses. Therefore, the Court finds the motion to be moot. Sanctions Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, that the court may impose a monetary sanction on a party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone because of that conduct. A misuse of the discovery process includes failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) Furthermore, it is mandatory that the Court impose a monetary sanction&on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Defendant requests $3,150.02 be issued as a monetary sanction against Plaintiff. (Bonavida Decl. ¶ 5.) While the filing of late response does not negate the Courts discretion to issue monetary sanctions, sanction in this case would be unwarranted as Plaintiff swears under penalty of perjury that his failure to respond timely was through no fault of his own. (Worthen Decl. ¶ 5.) Therefore, the Court declines to issue sanctions in this case. Accordingly, Defendant/Cross-Complainant Collin Hindss Motion for an Order Establishing Admissions is DENIED as MOOT. Request for Sanctions is DENIED Moving party to give notice, unless waived. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 16, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.