Tentative ruling in department 49 on Jul. 11, 2024 in Los Angeles County, CA - Case no: xxxxx011

Case Number: 23STCV27912 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 805 WOOSTER, LLC , Plaintiff, vs. BRETT HYMAN , et al ., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV27912 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. of The Law Office of Carlos A. LLoreda, Jr. (Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendant Brett Hyman. While Counsel has provided sufficient reason for withdrawal, Items 5, 6, and 7 of the proposed order (Form MC-053) are blank. If Counsel provides the Court with a revised order prior to the hearing, the Court will grant the motion.¿ Counsel is ordered to give notice of this order.¿ DATED: July 26, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV01212 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B MARTIN HUTTO, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV01212 vs. [TENTATIVE] RULING CITY OF TORRANCE, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant City of Torrance Responding Party: Plaintiff Martin Hutto (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One (2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff Martin Hutto is ordered to serve further responses to defendants Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 and to defendants Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60 within twenty days. BACKGROUND On April 19, 2023, plaintiff Martin Hutto filed a complaint against City of Torrance and Torrance Police Department for (1) violation of POBRA, (2) declaratory relief, and (3) Labor Code §1102.5. On April 25, 2023, the court (Judge Frank) issued a TRO on April 25, 2023. On September 15, 2023, the court issued a preliminary injunction. LEGAL AUTHORITY 45-Day Rule : This motion must be served within 45 days after service of the response in question (extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, or fax; see CCP §1013); otherwise, the demanding party waives the right to compel any further response to the CCP §2031.010 demand. CCP §§2031.310(c), 2016.050; see Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745. The 45-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1410. The parties, however, can also agree in writing on a specific later date by which to file the motion to compel. CCP §2031.310(c). Meet-and-Confer Requirement : The motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a declaration showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve the issues outside of court (so-called meet and confer). CCP §§2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2). Separate Statement : Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request shall be accompanied by a separate statement. This includes a motion to compel further responses to demand for inspection of documents or tangible things. CRC Rule 3.1020(a)(3). Interrogatories CCP §2030.300 states: (a) On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. . . . (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories. . . . CCP §2030.220 states: (a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party. CCP §2030.230 states: If the answer to an interrogatory would necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from the documents of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed, and if the burden or expense of preparing or making it would be substantially the same for the party propounding the interrogatory as for the responding party, it is a sufficient answer to that interrogatory to refer to this section and to specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained. . . . CCP §2030.010(b) provides: An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. Request for Production of Documents On receipt of a response to an inspection demand, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. CCP § 2031.310(a). A statement of compliance shall state that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. CCP § 2031.220. A representation of inability to comply with [a] particular demand for inspection . . . shall affirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. This statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item. CCP § 2031.230. A motion to compel further response to requests for production shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. CCP § 2031.310(b)(1). To establish good cause, the burden is on the moving party to show both: [1] Relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and [2] Specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). The fact that there is no alternative source for the information sought is an important factor in establishing good cause for inspection. But it is not essential in every case. Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial , 8:1495.6 (citations omitted). Declarations are generally used to show the requisite good cause for an order to compel inspection. The declarations must contain specific facts rather than mere conclusions. Id. at 8:1495.7 (citation omitted). The declarations may be on information and belief, if necessary. However, in such cases, the specific facts supporting such information and belief (the sources of the information) must also be alleged. Id. at 8:1495.8 (citation omitted). Most declarations are made by the attorney for the moving party, who is usually more familiar with the relevancy and specific facts constituting good cause for inspection. Id. at 8:1495.9. If good cause is shown by the moving party, the burden is then on the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure (the same as on motions to compel answers to interrogatories or deposition questions. . . ). Id. at 8:1496 (citation omitted). DISCUSSION Defendant City of Torrance requests that the Court compel plaintiff to respond further to Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 and Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60. The Court notes only the requests that remain at issue based on the reply. In the reply, the City withdrew its motion as to Special Interrogatories, Nos. 1-46, 48, 50-53, 55, 57, 59-59, 61, 63, 65-66, 68-72, 74, 83, 85, 87-89, and 91-102 and Requests for Production of Documents, Nos. 3-4, 8-13, 26, 38, 41, 44, 50, and 54-57 based on plaintiff providing supplemental responses. On December 19, 2023, defendant served its discovery requests. On February 12, 2024, plaintiff served responses and objections. On July 1, 2024, pursuant to joint stipulation and order, the hearing on the motions was continued to allow the parties to reach a stipulation regarding the discovery and use in the litigation of plaintiffs confidential police officer personnel records and information, and protective order, without the need for a noticed Pitchess motion. The complaint alleges that that plaintiff was investigated and given educational reminders in connection with two arrests he made. Plaintiff apprehended suspects in a catalytic converter theft on May 17, 2021 and commented to one of the arrestees, Welcome to Torrance. Plaintiff was investigated for the comment and invoked his rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) and/or the Meyers-Milias Brown Act, including use of a representative of his choice. Defendants ultimately concluded the investigation and gave plaintiff an educational reminder for misconduct based on the Welcome to Torrance comment. Plaintiff arrested a suspect who was disturbing the peace on March 4, 2022. During the arrest, plaintiff used force against the suspect, who ultimately stabbed plaintiffs partner in the clavicle area with a pen and struck plaintiff in the head. Plaintiff was administratively investigated for his use of force during the arrest. Defendant ultimately concluded that plaintiff should be given an educational reminder to be more thorough in his reports of use of force. Plaintiff filed a personnel complaint against Chief Hart for inappropriate comments and social media posts on November 2, 2022. Plaintiff alleges Torrance Police Department revived the Internal Affairs investigation against him after his complaint. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated his rights under POBRA, including by failing to provide proper notice of the nature of the investigations, subjecting plaintiff to punitive action and/or threatening him with punitive action for exercising his rights under POBRA and placing comments adverse to his interest in his personnel file. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants committed whistleblower retaliation in response to his complaints about Chief Harts inappropriate comments and social media posts. Special interrogatories Defendant contends that Special Interrogatories, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 remain at issue because they do not implicate confidential peace officer personnel information and that plaintiffs Pitchess objections are without merit. Defendant also argues that plaintiffs response to Nos. 60, 62, 64, 73, 84, 86, and 90 directing defendant to other documents is improper under CCP §2030.230 because the interrogatories do not necessitate the preparation or the making of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary of or from. In the opposition, plaintiff contends that the discovery requests were improperly served because they were sent via email although the parties had not stipulated to email service. Plaintiff also argues that the motion was filed untimely on April 2, 2024. In reply, defendant contends that its discovery requests were properly electronically served pursuant to CRC Rule 2.251(c). Moreover, defendant argues, the motion was timely filed on April 2, 2024 because April 1 was a court holiday. The Court finds that the request was properly served and that the motion was timely filed. The Court also finds that plaintiffs objections lack merit, including based on Pitchess. The remaining special interrogatories at issue do not implicate Pitchess for the reasons argued by defendant. Further, plaintiffs responses under CCP §2030.230 are improper. The motion is thus GRANTED. Requests for production of documents Defendant asserts that Request for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60 remain at issue. Defendant argues that as to the remaining requests, plaintiff has failed to state whether plaintiff possesses additional documents that do not constitute protected police officer personnel records and information and has failed to produce any such non-Pitchess record documents, in compliance with CCP §2031.240. Under CCP §2031.240, (a) If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category. Defendant argues that even if Pitchess applies to any responsive peace officer personnel records, plaintiff still has the ability to either identify and produce any non-personnel records and information, or state he cannot comply because he has no records. Further, defendant asserts, the City is entitled to obtain documents within plaintiffs possession, custody, or control, irrespective of whether the City may already possess or have access to them, citing to CCP §2031.010. Defendant further argues that plaintiffs objections that certain defined terms (communication, relate, and refer) are overly broad and ambiguous are without merit because none of the Citys requests utilize the defined term communication and only Request Nos. 54-60 include refer or relate, and such requests are limited in scope. In opposition, plaintiff argues that a Pitchess motion was and is required as the requests seek personnel files. Plaintiff also argues that the requests were improperly served via email and that the motion was untimely filed. The Court finds that the requests were properly served, and the motion was timely filed. The Court also finds that plaintiffs responses do not comply with CCP §2031.240 and that plaintiffs objections lack merit as to non-Pitchess documents. The motion is GRANTED. Sanctions Under CCP § 2023.030(a), [t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Under CCP § 2023.010, an example of the misuse of the discovery process is (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel further responses against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. CCP § §2030.300(d), 2031.310(h). Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348(a) states: The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. The Court denies each partys request for sanctions. ORDER The motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff Martin Hutto is ordered to serve further responses to defendants Special Interrogatories, Set One, Nos. 47, 49, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 86, and 90 and to defendants Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 1-2, 5-7, 14-25, 27-37, 39-40, 42-43, 45-49, 51-53, 58, and 60 within twenty days. Defendant is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 21STCV05696 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 29 Motions to Compel the Deposition of Plaintiffs filed by Defendant Frank Rodriguez Garcia. Tentative The motions are denied without prejudice. Background On February 16, 2021, Davis Tivas and Santos Tivas (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Frank Rodriguez Garcia (Defendant) for negligence arising out of an automobile accident occurring on February 15, 2019. On March 29, 2023, Defendant filed his answer. On June 26, 2024, Defendant filed these motions to compel the deposition of Plaintiffs. Defendant also seeks sanctions. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard Any party may obtain discovery & by taking in California the oral deposition of any person, including any party to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.010.) Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210 through 2025.280 provide the requirements for (among other things) what must be included in a deposition notice, when and where depositions may be taken, and how and when the notice must be served. The service of a deposition notice & is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party to attend and to testify, as well as to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing for inspection and copying. ( Id. , § 2025.280, subd. (a).) Section 2025.410, subdivision (a), requires any party to serve a written objection at least three days before the deposition if the party contends that a deposition notice does not comply with the provisions of sections 2025.210 through 2025.280. Section 2025.450, subdivision (a), provides: If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for¿inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice. Any such motion to compel must show good cause for the production of documents and, when a deponent has failed to appear, the motion must be accompanied by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. ( Id. , subd. (b).) When a motion to compel is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. ( Id. , § 2025.450, subd. (g)(1).) Discussion Defendant served Plaintiffs with notices of their depositions, with both scheduled for June 18, 2024. (Holly Decls., ¶ 3 & Exhs. A.) Defendant reached out prior to the deposition to confirm, but Plaintiff did not serve any objection and did not appear. (Id., ¶¶ 4-6.) Defendant now moves for an order compelling Plaintiffs to attend their depositions. Defendant is certainly entitled to take Plaintiffs deposition under the Civil Discovery act, but to obtain a court order compelling the depositions, Defendant must comply with all statutory requirements. Here, Defendant has not done so. Specifically, Defendant presents no evidence that, following the nonappearances, he reached out to Plaintiff to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b).) Accordingly, the motion is denied without prejudice. Conclusion The Court DENIES Defendants motion to compel the deposition of Plaintiffs without prejudice. Moving party to give notice.

Case Number: 19BBCV00384 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B william farmer , et al. , Plaintiffs, v. lisa thelma long, Defendant. Case No.: 19BBCV00384 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion for an order assigning defendants interest in earnings BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiffs William Farmer and Jennifer Farmer (Plaintiffs) allege that on April 4, 2018, they entered into a written Promissory Note agreement with Defendant Lisa Thelma Long (Defendant). Plaintiffs allege that on April 20, 2018, Defendant failed to repay the loan. Plaintiffs allege that they suffered $50,000 plus interest at the legal rate of $10% since April 4, 2018. The complaint, filed May 9, 2019, alleges causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) common counts; and (3) fraud. B. Relevant Background On September 10, 2019, the default of Defendant was entered. On August 11, 2020, default judgment was entered against Defendant in the amount of $109,073.00. On August 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a writ of execution (money judgment) for the amount of $109,157.76, which was returned and filed on August 14, 2020. On January 7, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a writ of execution (money judgment) for the amount of $113,008.64. On March 30, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an Abstract of Judgment. On June 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a writ of execution (money judgment) for the amount of $150,267.46. C. Motion on Calendar On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order assigning Defendants interest in earnings. The Court is not in receipt of an opposition brief. LEGAL STANDARD CCP § 695.010(a) states: Except as otherwise provided by law, all property of the judgment debtor is subject to enforcement of a money judgment. CCP § 708.510 provides in relevant part: (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor or to a receiver appointed pursuant to Article 7 (commencing with Section 708.610) all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments, including but not limited to the following types of payments: (1) Wages due from the federal government that are not subject to withholding under an earnings withholding order. (2) Rents. (3) Commissions. (4) Royalties. (5) Payments due from a patent or copyright. (6) Insurance policy loan value. (b) The notice of the motion shall be served on the judgment debtor. Service shall be made personally or by mail. (c) Subject to subdivisions (d), (e), and (f), in determining whether to order an assignment or the amount of an assignment pursuant to subdivision (a), the court may take into consideratio n all relevant factors , including the following: (1) The reasonable requirements of a judgment debtor who is a natural person and of persons supported in whole or in part by the judgment debtor. (2) Payments the judgment debtor is required to make or that are deducted in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments , including earnings assignment orders for support . (3) The amount remaining due on the money judgment. (4) The amount being or to be received in satisfaction of the right to payment that may be assigned. (d) A right to payment may be assigned pursuant to this article only to the extent necessary to satisfy the money judgment. (CCP § 708.510(a)-(d).) When an application is made pursuant to Section 708.510 or thereafter, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an order restraining the judgment debtor from assigning or otherwise disposing of the right to payment that is sought to be assigned. The application shall be made on noticed motion if the court so directs or a court rule so requires. Otherwise, it may be made ex parte. (CCP § 708.520(a).) The court may issue an order pursuant to this section upon a showing of need for the order. The court, in its discretion, may require the judgment creditor to provide an undertaking. (CCP § 708.520(b).) The court may modify or vacate the order at any time with or without a hearing on such terms as are just. (CCP § 708.520(c).) DISCUSSION Plaintiffs/Judgment Creditors move for an assignment order against Defendant, assigning Defendants interest in any earnings for acting and/or directing in any performance, whether television, movies, commercials, plays, or other forms of media and all payment thereunder, to Plaintiffs to the extent necessary to pay the judgment in full, including interest thereon. Plaintiffs also seek an order restraining Defendant, any agent, employee, or attorney of Defendant, whether alone or in concert, from encumbering, assigning, disposing or spending her interest in the right to be assigned listed above. In support of the motion, Plaintiffs provide the declaration of counsel Derek L. Tabone. Mr. Tabone states that nothing has been collected on the default judgment entered on August 14, 2020. (Tabone Decl., ¶¶4-5.) He states that the most recent writ of execution issued on June 4, 2024 is for the amount of $150,267.46. ( Id. , ¶6.) Counsel states that Defendant is, among other things, an actress who does work in commercials, movies, and television shows and her IMDB website shows that she has worked in multiple movies or television shows every year, as well as doing voice overs in over 170 commercials. ( Id. , ¶¶7-8, Ex. C.) The website states that Defendant has 3 theatrical agents: Stewart Talent, Elev8, and Taylor Talent Services. ( Id. , ¶9.) Plaintiffs seek an order assigning all of Defendants right to payment for her movie, television, and commercial work until Defendants judgment has been paid. ( Id. , ¶10.) The Court considers the factors under CCP § 708.510(c). First, Defendant is a natural person. There is no information on whether she is supporting any other persons. As the motion is unopposed, Defendant has not provided any statements that she is supporting any other persons. Second, it does not appear that Defendant has made any effort to make payments towards the judgment. According to Mr. Tabone (Plaintiffs counsel), the judgment is still unpaid. Plaintiffs have not indicated whether there are any other assignment orders or wage assignments, etc. and Defendant has not filed an opposition to provide such information. Third, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant owes $150,267.46, based on the June 4, 2024 writ of execution. Fourth, Plaintiffs seek an assignment of Defendants right to payment for her movie, television, and commercial work until Defendants judgment has been paid. The approximate amount of how much Defendant is paid for her acting work is not provided. Since the judgment has not been satisfied and the motion is not opposed, there are grounds to issue an assignment order pursuant to CCP § 708.510. The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs request for assignment orders. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiffs William Farmer and Jennifer Farmers motion for an order assigning Defendant Lisa Thelma Longs interest in her earnings from her movie, television, and commercial work is granted. Defendant, as well as any agent, employee, or attorney of Defendant, whether alone or in concert, shall be restrained from encumbering, assigning, disposing or spending her interest in the aforementioned earnings. Plaintiffs shall give notice of this order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV24766 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 29, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: David Oday, et al. v. 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV24766 MOTION TO DISSOLVE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOVING PARTY : Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiffs David Oday and Lakota Patrick Ford CASE HISTORY : · 10/11/23: Complaint filed. · 01/10/24: First Amended Complaint filed. · 03/01/24: Cross-Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a breach of contract and habitability defect action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants refused to replace the roof of Plaintiffs condominium, causing extensive water damage and mold throughout the unit. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants improperly issued special assessments in violation of the operative covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the property, and retaliated against Plaintiffs for raising these issues. Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED, as Plaintiff David Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). DISCUSSION: Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 because of Plaintiffs failure to post the bond required. Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure section 533 states: In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc. § 533.) Modification of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case. ( Union Interchange, Inc. v. Savage (1959) 52 Cal.2d 601, 606.) The party seeking modification has the burden of proving that the request is justified. (See Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1504.) Analysis Defendant 118 Wadsworth Avenue Homeowners Association moves to dissolve the preliminary injunction entered on February 22, 2024 on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to post the undertaking of $70,416.09 ordered by the Court. (See February 22, 2024 Minute Order.) Plaintiffs, in opposition, state that payment in the amount specified by the Courts order was deposited with the Court on June 26, 2024, with notice given to Defendant the next day. (Declaration of Scott J. Kalter ISO Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs deposit of the funds to the Court is effective as a posting of a bond under Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710, but only if the deposit is accompanied by an agreement executed by the principal authorizing the officer to collect, sell, or otherwise apply the deposit to enforce the liability of the principal on the deposit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 995.710(c).) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not executed such an agreement, and, therefore, that the injunction should be dissolved. The Court concurs with Defendant that an authorization to dispose of the funds to satisfy liability is required for Plaintiffs deposit to be considered posting of the bond under section 995.710. In response to the Courts prior tentative ruling, Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has submitted an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction is DENIED given that Plaintiff David Patrick Oday has served and filed an agreement authorizing the deposit to be applied to enforce the liability of the principal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 995.710(c). Moving party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 23BBCV01986 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: NCB Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles North Central District Department B siranush aklyan , et al. , Plaintiffs, v. state of california, et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23BBCV01986 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 [ TENTATIVE] order RE: motion to strike BACKGROUND A. Allegations Plaintiffs Siranush Aklyan, Aper G. Agakhanian, Grigor Choginyan, and Lena Ananyan (Plaintiffs) allege that on February 25, 2023 at approximately 1:30 a.m., Siranush Aklyan was operating her vehicle in the number 1 of 5 lanes on the I-5 northbound freeway. Aper G. Agakhanian, Grigor Choginyan, and Lena Ananyan were passengers int the vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that they became trapped underwater following a heavy rainfall on the Golden State I-5 freeway. Plaintiffs allege that a vehicle maneuvering the number two (2) lane initiated the passage adjacent to their vehicle, precipitating the generation of a wave, thereby inducing a hydrodynamic disturbance. This perturbation induced an unintended rotational motion of the Plaintiffs' vehicle in a counter-directional manner, leading to its eventual submersion. In a bid to evacuate the vehicle, the Plaintiffs made several unsuccessful attempts to unlatch the doors due to the exerted hydrostatic pressure, rendering them inoperable. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs successfully extricated themselves from the vehicle by manipulating one of the windows and effecting their exit through said window. (Compl., ¶7.) Plaintiffs allege that the roadway was dangerous for drivers as the surface had insufficient traction and friction, had improper grooving and treatment of the pavement, used improper materials in the design/construction/maintenance/repair of the roadway, etc. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants State of California and Caltrans District 7 owned, occupied, leased, used, regulated, controlled, managed, maintained, operated, supervised, repaired, and possessed the portion of the freeway at issue. The complaint, filed August 25, 2023, alleges causes of action for: (1) statutory liability/dangerous condition of public property; and (2) negligence. B. Motion on Calendar On June 14, 2024, Defendant the People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportation (Defendant) (erroneously named as State of California and Caltrans District 7) filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On July 24, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief. DISCUSSION Defendant moves to strike portions of the complaint at paragraph 24 (page 9, line 5). The specific language includes references to Government Code, §§ 815.2(a), 820(a), and 840.2. They argue that they do not dispute that Plaintiffs properly plead a cause of action for dangerous condition of public property, but that the allegations for vicarious liability and negligence by referencing the aforementioned sections is improper. (Reply at p.5.) First, Defendant argues that sections 815.2(a) and 820(a) regarding vicarious liability are improper. Government Code, § 815.2(a) states: A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. Government Code, § 820(a) states: Except as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not specifically identified any employee of Defendant for which Defendant could be vicariously liable and that, even if Plaintiffs were able to identify employees, its employees are immune such that Defendant cannot be vicariously liable. Defendant cites to Yee v. Superior Court (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 26, 40: A public entity cannot be held vicariously liable for actions of its employees that are actually acts of the entity itself, albeit performed by necessity by employees or agents. Vicarious liability depends on the employee being independently liable for the act, the entity becoming liable because the employee's act was taken within the scope of his or her employment. ( Yee , supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at 40.) Defendant argues that a claim for dangerous condition of public property can only lie pursuant to Government Code, §§ 830 to 835.4. Second, Defendant argues that section 840.2 for direct employee liability does not govern dangerous conditions of public property actions. Government Code, § 840.2 states: An employee of a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property if the plaintiff establishes that the property of the public entity was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) The dangerous condition was directly attributable wholly or in substantial part to a negligent or wrongful act of the employee and the employee had the authority and the funds and other means immediately available to take alternative action which would not have created the dangerous condition; or (b) The employee had the authority and it was his responsibility to take adequate measures to protect against the dangerous condition at the expense of the public entity and the funds and other means for doing so were immediately available to him, and he had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 840.4 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (Govt Code, § 840.2.) Again, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not identified any specific individual against whom a section 840.2 claim could be brought. Plaintiffs argue that they are not required to plead the name of the specific individuals prior to undergoing discovery. Plaintiffs rely on C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872, wherein the California Supreme Court stated: The complaint, it is true, does not identify by name or position the District's employees, administrators and/or agents who allegedly failed to properly hire, train and supervise Hubbell. But the District cites no statute or decision requiring a plaintiff to specify at the pleading stage which of the defendant's employees committed the negligent acts or omissions for which a public entity is allegedly liable under section 815.2. To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged. [Citation.] ( C.A. , supra, 53 Cal.4th at 872; see Perez v. City of Huntington Park (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 817, 820821 [ The plaintiff may be unable to identify which employee committed the wrongful act, but this is not fatal to the employer's liability, if the evidence establishes that some employee in the scope of employment committed the wrongful act.].) Although the complaint does not name specific individuals who were employed by Defendant, the complaint alleges that Defendant and Does 1-100 knew of the dangerous and defective conditions of the roadway, knew that the plan or design of the roadway had become dangerous due to the change in the conditions of the roadway, failed to warn drivers or take other actions, etc. (Compl., ¶¶14-19.) Plaintiffs allege that the dangerous conditions and acts/omissions of Defendant and Does 1-100 and their management, administrators, designers, planners, engineers, maintenance personnel, inspectors, and/or other employees, staff, agents, or contractors were done within the course and scope of their duties. ( Id. , ¶21.) At this time, the Court will not preemptively strike references to section 815.2(a) and 820 for vicarious liability as there may be a basis for independent liability against Defendants employee(s) and their actions that were undertaken during the scope of their employment. The Court finds that the allegations are sufficiently particular for the cause of action to go forward. Similarly, section 840.2 is for direct liability against an employee of a public entity for a dangerous condition of public property. Whether Plaintiff is able to discover the names of such employees later, amend the Doe designations, and prove this will have to be determined beyond the pleading stage. As currently alleged, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts against Defendant and specifically alleged the code sections that are at issue in this action; the identity of the particular individuals employed by Defendant is better left to be determined during the discovery process. Finally, Defendant argues that public employees are immune from discretionary acts under Government Code, § 820.2, such that it cannot be vicariously liable for the actions or inactions of its employees. Section 820.2 states: Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused. While such an exception may exist, at this time, the Court will not prematurely determine if the exception applies to the facts of this case based on the pleadings alone. Again, this is better addressed upon the consideration of evidence at the motion for summary judgment or trial stage. The motion to strike is overruled. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Defendant the People of the State of California, acting by and through the Department of Transportations motion to strike is overruled. Defendant is ordered to answer. Defendant shall give notice of this order. DATED: July 26, 2024 ___________________________ John Kralik Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 24SMCP00171 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 207 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 207 HEARING DATE June 13, 2024, continued to July 25, 2024 CASE NUMBER 24SMCP00171 MOTION Motion to Compel Arbitration MOVING PARTY Petitioner Wasser, Cooper & Mandles P.C. OPPOSING PARTY (none) BACKGROUND Petitioner Wasser, Cooperman & Mandles P.C. (Petitioner) moves to compel Respondent Shazeen Shah (Respondent) to arbitration regarding a dispute over legal fees incurred in connection with Petitioners provision of legal services to Respondent in the matter, Marriage of Shah/Aschinger. (Verified Petition at ¶ 1; Ex. A.) The petition is unopposed. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION LEGAL STANDARDS [T]he advantages of arbitration include a presumptively less costly, more expeditious manner of resolving disputes. It follows a party to a valid arbitration agreement has a contractual right to have its dispute with another party to the contract resolved quickly and inexpensively. ( Henry v. Alcove Investment, Inc . (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 94, 99100 [cleaned up].) Thus, on petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; see also EFund Capital Partners v. Pless (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320 [the language in section 1281.2 compelling arbitration is mandatory].) The right to compel arbitration exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a partys conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subds. (a)-(c).) On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court must first determine whether an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature. ( Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 [cleaned up].) The party seeking to compel arbitration must also plead and prove a prior demand for arbitration and a refusal to arbitrate under the agreement. ( Mansouri v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 633, 640-641.) And while the moving party on a motion to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence, [a] party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final determination. ( Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 [cleaned up]; see also Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability].) ANALYSIS As a threshold matter, [a] petition to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. ( Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 515, 532.) As such, a courts personal jurisdiction over the respondent requires compliance with the same service rules that apply for service of a summons and complaint in any other lawsuit. ( Frey & Hogan Corp. v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San Francisco (1936) 5 Cal.2d. 401, 403-404.) Moreover, due process requires that a respondent be given written notice of the moving and supporting papers at least sixteen court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Here, there is no proof of service indicating that the original Petition to Compel arbitration was ever served on Respondent in a manner that would give the Court personal jurisdiction to hear the matter. Further, there is no proof of service indicating that the notice of the hearing was ever served on Respondent. The Court continued the hearing to allow Petitioner to file a proof of service, but no proof of service has yet been filed. The Court acknowledges that a Notice of Continuance was filed on June 14, 2024, but no proof of service attached to that notice. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Because the Court finds no proof of service demonstrating that Respondent was notified about this lawsuit or was given proper notice of the hearing, the Court denies without prejudice the Petition to Compel Arbitration. Further, the Court continues that Case Management Conference to January 23, 2025 at 8:30 A.M. in Department 207. Petitioner shall provide notice of the Courts order and file the notice with a proof of service forthwith. DATED: July 25, 2024 ___________________________ Michael E. Whitaker Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV31285 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Case Name: Jamgotchian, et al. v. Coastal Laundromat, Inc., et al. Case No.: 23STCV31285 Matter: Anti-SLAPP Motion Moving Party: Defendants Coastal, Bruce Nye, and Sonja Nye Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted. Coastal to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In case no. BC674357, on February 7, 2023, a jury entered verdicts in favor of Plaintiffs DONE! Ventures, LLC (Done!) and Coastal Laundromat, Inc. (Coastal), and against Defendants Jerry Jamgotchian, El Segundo Plaza Associates L.P. (ESPA), and Theta Holding IV, Inc. (Theta) for Plaintiffs claims for interference with contract, negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of contract. On May 8, 2023, the Court entered a judgment on the verdict. On July 12, 2023, the Court ruled on a motion for new trial/JNOV, stating that the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury was improper and that Coastal was either to stipulate to $525,000 or else the Court would grant a new trial only as to the amount of punitive damages. Coastal stipulated to taking less punitive damages. On September 5, 2023, the Court ruled on Coastals motion for attorneys fees and prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest was rejected, but the Court awarded $357,673 in fees. On February 6, 2024, the Court entered a final ruling denying Defendants motion to tax costs with respect to Done!. That ruling also rejected prejudgment interest for Done!. On February 27, 2024, the Court entered an amended judgment, which reduced the amount of punitive damages to be obtained by Done! and indicated the amount of fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to be awarded as discussed above. On March 27, 2024, the Court denied Defendants request to amend the February 27, 2024, judgment as follows: (1) amend title of the Courts February 27, 2024, judgment to read Final Judgment and not its current incorrect and misleading title, Amended Judgment, (2) Amend the date of the Courts award of post-judgment interest from May 8, 2023 (date of the Courts interim, non-final jury verdict judgment) to the date of final judgment, or February 27, 2024 (the date the Court signed final judgment in this case, erroneously entitled Amended Judgment, as above), as the May 8, 2023 interim judgment is void and no longer has any force and effect by operation of law. The Court also denied Defendants request to quash all outstanding levies issued under the Courts interim - and now void and unenforceable - May 8, 2023 jury verdict judgment. On December 12, 2023, Jamgotchian, ESPA, and Theta filed the instant case, case no. 23STCV31285, against Coastal, Bruce Nye, and Sonja Nye for (1) slander of title, (2) quiet title, (3) defamation, (4) libel per se, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (6) negligent interference with contractual relations. Essentially, Jamgotchian and his entities have now elevated their contentions about a premature judgment to separate lawsuits. The basis for all of their claims is that the judgment lien from BC674357 was invalid and premature, which has been rejected by the Court multiple times. On February 27, 2024, Jamgotchian, ESPA, and Theta filed case no. 24STCV05004 against Done! for (1) slander of title, (2) quiet title, (3) defamation, (4) libel per se, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (6) negligent interference with contractual relations. On June 14, 2024, the Court related case nos. BC674357, 23STCV31285, and 24STCV05004. Coastal and the Nyes now assert an Anti-SLAPP Motion or Special Motion to Strike the entirety of the Complaint pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. Jamgotchian and his entities did not file an opposition. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets forth the procedure governing anti-SLAPP motions. In pertinent part, the statute states, A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the persons right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1).) The purpose of the statute is to identify and dispose of lawsuits brought to chill the valid exercise of a litigants constitutional right of petition or free speech. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a); Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055-1056.) Courts employ a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions. ( Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) To invoke the protections of the statute, the defendant must first show that the challenged lawsuit arises from protected activity, such as an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. ( Ibid .) From this fact, courts presume the purpose of the action was to chill the defendants exercise of First Amendment rights. It is then up to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by showing a reasonable probability of success on the merits. ( Ibid .) In determining whether the plaintiff has carried this burden, the trial court considers the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(2); see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 ( Soukup ).) Protected Activity To meet their burden for the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Defendants must demonstrate that the Complaints causes of action arise from protected activity. That is, it must be that defendants conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . the act underlying the plaintiffs cause or the at which forms the basis for the plaintiffs cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. ( Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 (internal citations omitted).) An act in furtherance of a persons right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e).) Here, all causes of action are premised on the enforcement proceedings in BC674357. Indeed, the Complaint states: Defendants actions in failing and refusing to withdraw, vacate and/or remove their premature and void Judgment Lien and Abstract(s) of Judgment are, were and continue to be made in bad faith and with specific malicious intention to harm and injure Plaintiffs, as they are knowingly made and maintained without any basis in law and in knowing violation of the Courts September 8, 2023 Minute Order. To date, Defendants have failed and refused to remove their premature and void Judgment Lien and/or Abstract(s) of Judgment and therefore is/are baseless, wrongful and financially damaging to Plaintiffs, and each of them. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.) The actions taken to enforce the judgment in BC674357, particularly the filing of abstracts of judgment, are protected activity within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(1)-(2). (See, e.g., O'Neil-Rosales v. Citibank (S. Dakota) N.A. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6. [ privileged or not, defendants acts of obtaining an abstract of judgment and recording it as a real property lien fell within the categories of section 425.16, subdivision (e). Rusheen v. Cohen , supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713 [ Any act includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action].)].) Furthermore, the equitable claims at issue essentially challenge the force and effect of the judgment in BC674357, and this undoubtedly relates to protected petitioning activity. (See, e.g., Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 28687 [paragraphs 33, 38, and 45 set forth what Hoffman is alleged to have done that gives rise to the quiet title, cancellation of instrument, and slander of title causes of action; each of those paragraphs complains about Hoffman's recording of the 2018 Abstract of Judgment . . . . Hoffman has demonstrated that the conduct about which the Weedens complain . . . is Hoffman's conduct in obtaining and recording the 2018 Abstract of Judgment, which the Weedens concede is protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).].) The Court concludes that Defendants have carried their burden to show that the Complaint arises from protected activity under CCP § 425.16(e)(1)-(2). Minimal Merit On the second component of the analysis, courts employ a summary-judgment-like procedure, accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendants evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the plaintiffs evidence as a matter of law. ( Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.) In other words, the Court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. The Court accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that his or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP. ( Soukup , supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) Here, the subject causes of action are premised on the assertion that the judgment lien arising from BC674357 was invalid because it was based on a premature judgment. This has been rejected at least a half-dozen times in BC674357. Jamgotchian and his entities are well aware of this Courts reasoning and can refer to the rulings in BC674357, all of which are incorporated herein by reference. Based on these rulings, the Court concludes that there is no possibility of Jamgotchian and his entities prevailing herein and that there are no triable issues of fact. Thus, the Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted. The entirety of the Complaint is stricken. The Request for Judicial Notice is granted. Coastal to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.