Preview
Filing # 125107580 E-Filed 04/16/2021 06:22:36 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15™
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PALM
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL JURISDICTION DIVISION
CASE NO.: 2021-CA-002979XXXX-MB
JUSTIN FORER, an individual, and
MORGAN FORER, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
M&S JASMINE PROPERTIES, LLC,
a New York limited liability company, and
SAMY KHALIL, an individual,
Defendants.
/
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, Justin Forer and Morgan Forer (the “Forers” or “Plaintiffs”), by and through
undersigned counsel, hereby sues Defendants, M&S Jasmine Properties, LLC (“M&S” or
“Defendant”) and Samy Khalil (“Khalil or “Defendant”), as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. Plaintiffs asserts claims against Defendant M&S for Specific Performance (Count
I), Breach of Contract (Count II) regarding Defendant’s breach of the parties’ “AS IS”
Residential Coniract tor Sale and Purchase (ihe “Agreement’) relating to ine real property
located at 920 Jasmine Dr., Delray Beach, Florida 33483 (the “Property”), and for Breach of
Contract (Count III) against Khalil and M&S for breaching the Lease Agreement between the
parties for the Property, and to pierce the corporate veil (Count IV).
KLuGer, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 So. BISCAYNE BLVD.,27™ FLOOR, MIAMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000
CHEN. DAIAARCACUAAIINTY Cl INGEDU ARDIIV7ZN FLED AAMaINND, Ne99.28 DM
Pn. PAL DLA VUUINE TT, FL, vUOL IE mDnuecy, ULUIAN, Ut ure.) uu.2e.00 ivPARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
2. This is an action for equitable relief and damages in an amount greater than Thirty
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees.
3. Plaintiffs are Florida residents who currently reside in Palm Beach County, Florida,
and are otherwise sui juris.
4. Defendant, M&S is, upon information and belief, a New York limited liability
company which conducts substantial and not isolated activities in the State of Florida, including
owning and renting the subject Property in Palm Beach County, Florida. M&S is otherwise sui
juris.
5. Defendant Khalil is, upon information and belief, a Florida resident who currently
resides in Palm Beach County, Florida. Further, Khalil conducted and conducts substantial and
in Palm Beach County, Florida. Khalil is otherwise swi juris.
6. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court (i) as the acts and/or omissions
complained of took place within Palm Beach County, Florida, (ii) the real property which is the
subject of this action is located in Palm Beach County, Florida, and (iti) Section 18(U) of the
Agreement states that jurisdiction and venue lie in the county where the real property is located
(Palm Beach County).
GENEKAL ALLEGAT IUINS
A. The Parties’ Lease Agreement
7. On or about June 20, 2020, Plaintiffs and Khalil entered into the Residential
Lease agreement (the “Lease”) attached hereto as Exhibit “A.”
8. The Lease provided for Plaintiffs to lease the Property for an initial lease term
2
KLUuGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000commencing on August 1, 2020 and running through April 30, 2021.
9. On or about June 21, 2020, Plaintiffs and Khalil entered into an Addendum to the
Lease (the “Addendum’”), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “B.”
10. Significantly, the Addendum provided Plaintiffs with three significant rights: a)
Dininsi fen A thn A tha Ianan fr aanntha naman Lanna tavena: bY Ts tha
Piainuiis ietaiiea wie Option 1G exteiid ihe lease Tor Six MGMUNS Gi the Saifie lease terns; by ail ui
event Khalil received an offer to purchase the Property during the lease term, Plaintiffs had a
right of first refusal to match the offer price and purchase the Property; and c) in the event
Plaintiffs decided to purchase the Property, fifty-percent (50%) of the rental amounts paid by the
Plaintiffs would be applied to the purchase price of the Property. See Addendum, Ex “B.”
lL. At the time Plaintiffs and Khalil entered into the Lease and the Addendum,
Plaintiffs were led to believe and understood that Khalil was the sole owner of the Property. The
piopeit ly Técoias Tor te Pali Deacn Coiiity Pioperty ly Appiaiser appear (6 Conf this Tact.
12. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Khalil appears to have sold or otherwise transferred
the Property to M&S on or about November 20, 2020.
13. Plaintiffs timely exercised their right to extend the Lease beyond April 30, 2021
and provided notice to Khalil’s and M&S’ counsel.
B. The Purchase and Sale Agreement
14. On January 29, 2021,! Plaintiffs and M&S entered into the Agreement, through
which Plaintiffs contracted to purchase from M&S the improved real property located at real
property located at 920 Jasmine Dr., Delray Beach, in Palm Beach County, Florida 33483 (the
: The Agreemeni identifies january 25, 2021 as the Effective Date of the Agreemeni. See section
paragraph 3(b)and 4 of the Agreement and the handwritten Effective Date therein.
3
KLuGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000“Property”. A copy of the Agreement is attached as Exhibit “C.””
15. Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the Property (as more particularly described in the
Agreement) for a purchase price of $1.5 million. See Ex. “C” at Section 2.
16. Plaintiffs were required to deposit into escrow the total sum of $150,000.00 against
additional amount due under the Agreement payable in cash at closing. Jd.
17. The closing was scheduled to occur forty-five (45) days from the Effective Date —
thus, the closing date was supposed to be on March 15, 2021 (the “Closing Date”). Id. at Section
4.
18. | The Agreement made clear that the remainder of the purchase price, exclusive of
the deposit, was to be made through financing available to the Forers. Jd. at Section 8. The Forers
timely obtained proper financing to close on the purchase of the Property, and timely advised M&S
and its attorney of this fact in writing by letter dated March 1, 2021. Thus, the Forers satisfied
their obligations pursuant to Section 8 of the Agreement.
19. In the event of default by M&S, Forers are permitted to seek damages or specific
performance of the Agreement. /d. at Section 15(b).
20. The Agreement provides that in the event of any litigation between the parties under
this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs. Id. at ]17.
Cc. M&S Defaults Under the Agreement
21. Despite that the Forers had timely satisfied all conditions necessary to move toward
fimaly Olacing ac tha Clacina Data annrnachad M280 haaan signaling ite intant ta dafonlt undar
Ulery UiGSing, a> We Widollg, Va appivacuea, me OCgal siguaiiig, 1s ten vO Gciaui uUeL
? The Agreement is in the standard FAR/BAR form regularly utilized for residential real estate closings.
4
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000the Agreement and back out of the deal.
22. In this regard, on March 2, 2021, M&S wrote to the Forers, falsely claiming that
the Forers had not met the March 1, 2021 financing loan approval notification deadline, despite
the fact that the Forers had indeed done so on March 1, 2021.
a” Ths wast dow nA a KOnnaMatinn af On.
4. ALE HEAL Gay, ca a Valiccuaudn G1 UO
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “D,” in which M&S purports to cancel the Agreement.
24. Since receiving notification of M&S’ intentions to cancel the Agreement, the
Forers, through counsel, have advised of their intention to close as intended and have otherwise
disputed M&S’ baseless position.
25. The Forers have performed, and were otherwise ready, willing and able to
perform, their obligations under the Agreement and to close on March 15, 2021, and have been
ready, willing and able to close since then as well.
26. M&S has breached the Agreement, and failed to close on March 15, 2021, as
required. As a result, M&S is in default of the Agreement and has breached its obligations
thereunder.
27. Further, since M&S’ breach on or about March 15, 2021, Plaintiffs and M&S have
engaged in negotiations with the hope that M&S would remedy its breach and satisfy its
obligations to close by providing sufficient documentation to allow for M&S to property sign and
notarize closing documents, as required. However, M&S has been unable to satisfy its
obligations in this regard and has instead delayed the closing. Plaintiffs have incurred, and
continue to incur, substantial additional fees for the delayed closing.
28, Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Agreement, the Forers have requested that M&S
voluntarily participate in the process of engaging in dispute resolution and mediation; however, as
5
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000of the date of filing the instant Amended Complaint, no agreement has been reached between the
Forers and M&S to mediate, no date has been scheduled for mediation, nor is it clear at
this point whether M&S is waiving mediation based upon its actions.
29. In sum, M&S failed and refuses to timely consummate the transaction in
accordance with the Asreement and refuses to honor its obligations under the Agreement,
D. The Landlord Breached the Lease Agreement and Addendum
30. As alleged above, Khalil appears to have sold or transferred the Property to M&S
on or about November 20, 2020 without first offering the Plaintiffs the option to purchase the
Property for the same amount Khalil sold to M&S ($10). Khalil’s actions in this regard
constitute a breach of the Lease and Addendum.
31. Further, while it is unclear whether Khalil or M&S remained as the landlord after
Noveiiver 20, 2020, Kiialit aiid Mocs Have taKeii Mie PositiGA tat Me’S iGOK OVE aS tie
landlord for the Property at a certain point, and Plaintiffs have timely made their rent payments
to M&S after Khalil requested they do so.
32. At all times material, Khalil held himself out as the sole agent and authorized
representative of M&S. Khalil never advised Plaintiffs of any other members of M&S, nor did
he advise that he lacked authority to bind M&S. Indeed, Khalil always acted as M&S’
representative in all capacities, including collecting rent from Plaintiffs and signing the
Agiceingit.
33. Moreover, while Plaintiffs and M&S were discussing a potential resolution of
M&S’ breach in order to close the sale of the Property, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs’ rent
payment for April 2021 would be deducted at closing from the sale proceeds. However, while
M&S delayed the closing and failed to satisfy its obligations to close, and while the parties
6
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000continued to negotiate a potential resolution, M&S had the audacity to demand that Plaintiffs
immediately pay April rent plus certain unsubstantiated and incorrect “late fees” to M&S.
34. | When Plaintiffs reminded M&S, through counsel, of the above arrangement
concerning April rent being deducted at closing, M&S nonetheless demanded immediate
navment.
peg
35. Because the payment of April rent is disputed, Plaintiffs offered to pay April rent
to M&S’ counsel to hold in escrow pending the resolution of the pending sale issues and dispute.
M&S’ counsel refused.
36. Therefore, Plaintiffs have no other alternative but to pay April rent into the Court
registry to hold until the outcome of this case. Based upon the facts of this case, it would be
inequitable for M&S to keep April rent without providing the appropriate credit toward the
wal
p Of ue Pi
to Plaintiffs as of March 15, 2021.
37. All conditions precedent to this action have occurred, been performed, or otherwise
satisfied by Plaintiffs, or have been waived or excused by the actions or inactions of Defendant.
38. Plaintiffs have retained the undersigned counsel to represent them in this action and
are obligated to pay undersigned counsel reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for its services.
COUNTI
PECIFIC PERFORMANCE/INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
39. Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-38 above as if
fully set forth herein, and further allege as follows:
40. This is an action against M&S for specific performance and injunctive relief.
41. — The Agreement is a valid, enforceable contract, which is binding on Defendant.
7
KLuGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.900042. The Agreement is clear, definite, and certain in all of its essential elements.
43. Plaintiffs have satisfied all conditions to close and Plaintiffs are ready, willing and
able to perform all remaining obligations under the Agreement, including closing on the sale of
the Property for the agreed-upon purchase price.
AA Tinfredant MOO beanahad tha wn
44. VEICHUGHL MOO ViCACica Wie Tal
fial teims of tie Agie
refusing to close the transaction regarding the Property on or before March 15, 2021, as required.
45. Defendant M&S otherwise refuses to honor its obligations under the Agreement.
46. — Section 15(b) of the Agreement allows Plaintiffs to proceed in equity in this Court
to enforce their rights under the Agreement, including specific performance and damages.
47. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law because, among other things, the Property
is unique and specific performance must be compelled, requiring M&S to complete the sale of the
Property to Plaintiffs.
48. Moreover, Plaintiffs request that this Court enjoin M&S from selling, transferring,
mortgaging, compromising, wasting, or otherwise burdening the subject Property, or taking any
action which might otherwise prevent Plaintiffs from acquiring clear marketable title to the
Property, with the Property to be preserved in its present condition.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand that judgment be entered against Defendant, M&S, in
which the Court (a) orders Defendant M&S to specifically perform under the Agreement, (b)
awards Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action in accordance with the
Agreement, (c) in the absence of M&S’ compliance with the Court’s order that it specifically
perform under the Agreement, enjoin M&S from selling, transferring, mortgaging,
compromising, wasting, or otherwise burdening the subiect Property, or taking any action
which might otherwise prevent Plaintiffs from acquiring clear marketable title to the Property,
8
KLuGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000with the Property to be preserved in its present condition, (d) damages incidental to the delay
in closing on the Property, and (e) entering such other and further relief in favor of Plaintiffs as
this Court deems just and proper.
COUNT II
BREACH OF CONTRACT (Agreement,
49. Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-38 above as if
fully set forth herein, and further allege as follows:
50. This is an action against M&S for Breach of Contract.
un
This Claim iS asserted if the altemative to Count 1
52. | The Agreement is a valid, enforceable contract, which is binding on Defendant.
53. Defendant M&S breached the material terms of the Agreement by canceling and
indicating its intention to refuse to close the transaction to purchase the Property on March 15,
2021, as required. As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to the remedies set forth in Section 15(b) of
the Agreement.
54. Plaintiffs have suffered, and continue to suffer, damages as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant’s breach of contract.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand that judgment be entered against Defendant,
M&S, for damages, attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in accordance with the Agreement,
interest, and such other and further relief in favor of Plaintiffs as this Court deems just and
proper.
COUNT II
BREACH OF CONTRACT (Lease and Addendum)
55. Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-38 above as if
fully set forth herein, and further allege as follows:
9
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.900056. — This is an action against Khalil and M&S for breach of the Lease and Addendum.
57. The Lease and Addendum are valid, enforceable contracts, which are binding on
Defendant Khalil and M&S to the extent Khalil assigned such contracts to M&S, as appears to
have been the case.
58. _Detenaaits breached ie iiaterial terns Gf tiie Lease aid Addendum by: a)
failing to provide Plaintiffs the right to exercise their right of first refusal to purchase the Property
for the same price as it appears to have been purchased by M&S ($10); b) failing to property
acknowledge and reflect Plaintiffs’ right to have fifty-percent (50%) of their rental payments to date
count toward the final purchase price for Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Property; and c) transferring the
Lease and Addendum to M&S without authority.
59. Plaintiffs have suffered, and continue to suffer, damages as a direct and proximate
result of Defendants’ breaches of contract.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand that judgment be entered against Defendants, Khalil
and M&S, for damages, attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in accordance with the Lease,
interest, and such other and further relief in favor of Plaintiffs as this Court deems just and
proper.
COUNT IV
ACTION TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL
60. Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-38 above as if
fully set forth herein, and further allege as follows:
61. This is an action to pierce the corporate veil against Khalil.
62. At all times material, and upon information and belief, Khalil acted as the sole
mambar and anth
meiner ana au
agant nf ARO Zhalil al
agent Ur iio. Ntiaiit aL
10
KLUuGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, M1AMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000sole and complete authority to bind M&S.
63. | M&S appears to have been used for the purpose of insulating Khalil’s assets from
creditors and for the fraudulent or improper purpose of attempting to avoid liability for Khalil’s
unlawful conduct.
64. — Khalil dominated and controlled M&S to such an extent that M&S was in fact
non-existent and was a mere instrumentality of Khalil. Accordingly, M&S is an alter ego of
Khalil.
65. | M&S’ breaches of the Agreement and the Lease and Addendum are therefore
imputed to Khalil.
66. Khalil used M&S for the fraudulent improper purpose of transferring the Property
to shield this asset from creditors and for other improper purposes.
67. The fraudulent and improper purpose of M&S caused injury to Plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered in their
favor piercing the corporate veil of M&S and holding Khalil personally liable for M&S’
breaches of the Agreement, and, as applicable, the Lease and Addendum, and all injunctions,
monetary damages, attorneys’ fees and costs awarded against M&S in this action, and any
other such relief that this Court deems just and proper.
Dated: April 16, 2021
11
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L., 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27" FLOOR, MiAMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000Respectfully submitted,
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN,
KATZEN & LEVINE, P.L.
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Miami Center, 27"" Floor
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131
Telephone: (305) 379-9000
Facsimile: (305) 379-3428
By:_s/ Michael S. Perse
Michael S. Perse
Fla. Bar No. 603619
mperse@klugerkaplan.com
Michael T. Landen
Fla. Bar No. 161144
mlanden@klugerkaplan.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing will be served on
Defendant at the same time as service of the Summons and Amended Complaint in this action.
12
KLUGER, KAPLAN, SILVERMAN, KATZEN & LEVINE, PLL. 201 SO. BISCAYNE BLYD., 27™ FLOOR, MIAMI, FL 33131 305.379.9000‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151
Nonlawyer Disclosure tie FloridaRealtors*
the landlord or tenant for whom you are filling in the blanks. (If you are 2 filling i in the blanks for bath landlord and
tenant, complete two nonlawyer disclosures and give one to each.)
1. Insert your name in the first 5 blank “Name” spaces and sign below.
2. Have the landlord or tenant whom you are assisting complete the provision regarding her/his ability to read
English, and have her/him sign below.
3. Give this completed disclosure to ihe landtord or tenant, as appropriate. Keep a copy of this completed
Ainalansien anal oll £
UISTIGSUTE GG aii OimS YOU Give tO He yOur GS 107 at Gast 6 years.
GEORGE ZAKI told me that he/she is a nonlawyer and may not give legal
(Name)
advice, cannot tell me what my rights or remedies are, cannot tell me how to testify in court, and cannot represent
me in court.
Rule 10-2.1(b) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar defines a paralegal as a person who works under
the supervision of a member of The Florida Bar and who performs specifically delegated substantive legal work for
which a member of The Florida Bar is responsible. Only persons who meet the definition may call themselves
paralegals. == GEORGE ZAKI informed me that he/she is not a paralegal as defined by the
(ivamne)
rule and cannot call himself/herself a paralegal.
GEORGE ZAKI told me that he/she may only type the factual information
(Name)
provided by me in writing into the blanks on the form. Except for typing, GEORGE ZAKI
(Name)
may | not tell me what to put i in the form and may y not, eos the form for me. However, if f using a form approved
ay ine Supreme Coiiit oF Fiofaa, Ss may ask me Taciual questions io Tin
(Name)
the blanks on the form and may also tell me how to file the form.
Landlord or Tenant:
¥ can read English.
I cannot read English but this notice was read to me by
(Name)
in which I understand.
(Language)
same khalil
Landlord or Tenant signature
george gake Justin Forer
Licensee signature Landlord or Tenant signature
ND-2_Rev 7/13, ©2013 Florida Realtors®
ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}
Residential Lease for Single Family Home or Duplex : 7
(FOR A TERM NOT TO EXCEED ONE YEAR) ‘ FloridaRealtors
ABOX ([___]) OR A BLANK SPACE INDICATES A PROVISION WHERE A CHOICE OR DECISION MUST BE MADE BY THE
PARTIES.
THE LEASE IMPOSES IMPORTANT LEGAL OBLIGATIONS. MANY RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES ARE
GOVERNED BY CHAPTER 83, PART II, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, FLORIDA STATUTES. A COPY OF THE
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT IS ATTACHED TO THIS LEASE.
1. PARTIES. This is a lease (the “Lease") between SAMY KHALIL
(name and address of owner of the property)
("Landlord") and
JUSTIN AND MORGAN FORER
(rame(s) of person(s) to whom the property Is leased)
("Tenant").
Landlord's E-mail Address: samy5553@yahoo.com
Landlord's Telephone Number: 917-749-5557
‘anmntin © antl Aeltennns
Tenaits E-iman AGGIES:
Tenant's Telephone Number:
2. PROPERTY RENTED. Landlord leases to Tenant the land and buildings located at 920 JASMINE DRIVE
(street address)
DELRAY BEACH Florida 33483
(zip code)
together with the following furniture and appliances [List all furniture and appliances. If none, write "none."] (In the Lease, the property
leased, including furniture and appliances, if any, is called the “Premises"):
The Premises shall be occupied only by the Tenant and the following persons:
3. TERM. This is a lease for a term, not to exceed twelve months, beginning on August 1, 2020 and
: (month, day, year)
ending April 30, 2021 (the "Lease Term").
(month, day, year)
4, RENT PAYMENTS, TAXES AND CHARGES. Tenant shall pay total rent in the amount of $82,800.00 (excluding taxes) for the
Lease Term. The rent shall be payable by Tenant in advance in installments or in full as provided in the options below:
CO in installments. If in installments, rent shall be payable
, on the 1 day of each month (if left blank, on the first day of each month) in the amount of
2 FOE per installment.
OR
DO weekly, on the day of each week (If left blank, on Monday of each week.) in the amount of $.
pei misiaument.
O in full on in the amount of $.
(date)
Tenant JF_) ME) and Landlord ( 7 d¢ ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 1 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}
Tenant shall also be obligated to pay taxes on the rent when applicable in the amount of $. with each rent installment
C with the rent for the full term of the Lease. Landlord will notify Tenant if the amount of the tax changes.
Payment Summary
[X] If rent is paid in installments, the total payment per installment including taxes shall be in the amount of $8,200.00 .
O If rent is paid in full, the total payment including taxes shall be in the amount of $. .
All rent payments shall be payable to SAMY KHALIL at
(rame)
13 DUKE DR NEW HYDE PARK NY 11040 1207 . (If left blank, to Landlord at Landlord's address.)
(address)
(If the tenancy starts on a day other than the first day of the month or week as designated above, the rent shall be prorated from
through in the amount of $. and shall be due
(date) (date)
on . (If rent paid monthly, prorate on a 30-day month.)
(date)
Tenant shall make rent payments required under the Lease. Ry 1 SRRRRE all applicable) [] cash, 1) personal check, Llmoney order,
1 cashier's check, or [] other A\ (specify). If payment is accepted by any
means other than cash, payment is not considered made until the other instrument is collected.
If Tenant makes a rent payment with a worthless check, Landlord can require Tenant [Xl to pay all future payments by [] money
order, cashier's check, or official bank check or _O cash or other (specify)
and (1 to pay bad check fees in the amount of $20. 0 (not to exceed the amount prescribed by Section 68.065, Florida
Statutes).
5. MONEY DUE PRIOR TO OCCUPANCY. Tenant shall pay the sum of $27,600.00 _in accordance with this paragraph prior to
occupying the Premises. Tenant shall not be entitled to move in or to keys to the Premises until all money due prior to occupancy has
been paid. If no date is specified below, then funds shall be due prior to Tenant occupancy. Any funds designated in this paragraph due
aftar areunaney hall ha naid acrarr Any funde due under all ha navabla ta Landlord at | andlard’e addrace or
Ener COCUPENCy, Site 2S pare SCCCr oy ramus Gue Una an Oe payaure to Lonuora at Lonaoras auarose oF
to
(name)
at
(address)
First [x] month's [] week's rent plus applicable taxes $ 9,200.00 due 06/23/2020
o
2
e
G
Proraiea rent plus aj
Advance rent for [x] month [] week of
LAST MONTH plus applicable taxes $ 9,200.00 que 08/01/2020
Last [J month's [] week's rent plus applicable taxes $ due
Security deposit $ 9,200.00 que 08/01/2020
Additional security deposit $ due
Security deposit for homeowners’ association $ due
Pet Deposit $ due
Other, $ due
Other, $ due
tenant UF _)MMF_) and Landlord eF_) ¢ ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 2 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}
6. LATE FEES. (Complete if applicable) In addition to rent, Tengnt shall pay a late charge in the amount of $150.00 (If left
blank, 4% of the rent payment) for each rent payment made days after the day it is due (if left blank, 5 days if rent is paid
monthly, 1 day if rent is paid weekly).
7. PETS AND SMOKING. Unless this box [] is checked or a pet deposit is paid, Tenant may not keep pets or animals on the
Premises. If Tenant may keep pets, the pets described in this paragraph are permitted on the Premises.
(Specify number of pets, type(s), breed, maximum adult weight of pets.)
Unless this box [1] is checked, no smoking is permitted in the Premises.
8. NOTICES.
is Landlord's Agent. All notices must be sent to
J Landlord at _ 13 DUKE DR NEW HYDE PARK NY 11040 1207
© Landiord’s Agent at
unless Landlord gives Tenant written notice of a change. All notices of such names and addresses or changes thereto shall be delivered
to the Tenant's residence or, if specified in writing by the Tenant, to any other address. All notices to the Landlord or the Landlord's Agent
(whichever is specified above) shall be given by U.S. mail or by hand delivery.
Any notice to Tenant shall be given by U.S. mail or delivered to Tenant at the Premises. If Tenant is absent from the Premises, a notice
to Tenant may be given by leaving a copy of the notice at Premises.
9. UTILITIES. Tenant shall pay for all utilities services during the Lease Term and connection charges and deposits for activating
existing utility connections to the Premises except for , that Landlord agrees to
provide at Landlord’s expense (If blank, then “NONE”).
10. MAINTENANCE. Landlord shall be responsible for compliance with Section 83.51, Florida Statutes, and shall be responsible for
maintenance and repair of the Premises, unless otherwise stated below: (Fill in each blank space with "Landlord" for Landlord or
"Tenant" for Tenant, if left blank, Landlord will be responsible for the item):
Landlord/Tenant Landlord/Tenant Landlord/Tenant Landlord/Tenant
O toofs & O windows & O © screens O- steps
& O doors & O floors & Os porches & Os exterior walls
& O foundations & 1 plumbing & O _ structural components
& O__sheating &) O __hotwater & 1 stunning water & 1 locks and keys
& Cs electrical system & 1 cooling & (1 smoke detection
devices
QO garbage removal/ outside receptacles
oO extermination of rats, mice, roaches, ants and bedbugs
& 2 exte of wood-destraving or
& 0 __slawn/shrubbery & 0 __pool/spa/hot tub
oO x] water treatment Oo x] filters (specify) AIR CONDITIONR FILTERS
O sceilings & (1 _ interior walls
oO 1 Other (specify)
Tenant shall notify SAMY KHALIL at 13 DUKE DR NEW HYDE PARK NY 11040 1207
(name) (address)
(if left blank, Landlord at Landlord’s address) and of maintenance and repair requests.
(lelephone number)
11. ASSIGNMENT. Unless this box [] is checked, Tenant may not assign the Lease or sublease all or any part of the Premises
without first obtaining the Landlord's written approval and consent to the assignment or sublease.
12. KEYS AND LOCKS. Landlord shall furnish Tenant
2 # of sets of keys to the dwelling
ane
w Or ian DOX KEYS
________ # of garage door openers
Tenant WF) we) and Landlord cf) ¢ ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 3 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}
If there is a homeowners’ association, Tenant will be provided with the following to access the association's common areas/facilities:
# of keys to
# of remote controls to
#of electronic cards to
other (specify) to
At end of Lease Term, all items specified in this paragraph shall be returned to
(name)
at (If left blank, Landlord at Landlord's address).
(address)
13. LEAD-BASED PAINT. L] Check and complete if the dwelling was built before January 1, 1978. Lead Warning Statement (when
used in this article, the term Lessor refers to Landlord and the term Lessee refers to Tenant).
Housing built before 1978 may contain lead-based paint. Lead from paint, paint chips, and dust can pose health hazards if not managed
properly. Lead exposure is especially harmful to young children and pregnant women. Before renting pre-1978 housing, Lessors must
disclose the presence of known lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in the dwelling. Lessees must also receive a
federally approved pamphlet on lead poisoning prevention.
Lessor's Disclosure (initial)
sk (a) Presence of lead-based paint or lead-based paint hazards (check (i) or (ii) below):
i) Known lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards are present in the housing (explain).
(i)____ Lessor has no knowledge of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in the housing.
sk (b) Records and reports available to the Lessor (check (i) or (ii) below):
(i) Lessor has provided the Lessee with all available records and reports pertaining to lead-based paint and/or
lead-based paint hazards in the housing (list documents below).
(ii)_(__Lessor has no reports or records pertaining to lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in
the housing.
Lessee's Acknowledgment (initial)
(c) Lessee has received copies of all information listed above.
(d) Lessee has received the pamphlet Protect Your Family From Lead in Your Home.
Agent's Acknowledgment (initial)
(e) Agent has informed the Lessor of the Lessor's obligations under 42 U.S.C. 4852d and is aware of his/her responsibility
to ensure compliance.
Certification of Accuracy
The following parties have reviewed the information above and certify, to the best of their knowledge, that the information provided by
the signatory is true and accurate.
men EP aoe odin Lanen 612119090 10-14 PM EDT
samy Ragu VEST ORI manaeee teeemeet
Less¢'s signature Date Lessor's signature Date
Morgan Forer 6/21/2020 10:42 PM EDT
Lessee's signature Date Lessee's signature Date
george zaki 06/20/2020
Agent's signature Date Agent's signature Date
14, SERVICEMEMBER, If Tenant is 2 member of the United States Armed Forces on active duty or state active duty or a member of
the Florida National Guard or United States Reserve Forces, the Tenant has rights to terminate the Lease as provided in Section
83.682, Florida Statutes, the provisions of which can be found in the attachment to this Lease.
Tenant F (MF, and Landlord cf_) ( ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 4 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-267115115. LANDLORD'S ACCESS TO THE PREMISES. Landlord's Agent may enter the Premises in the following circumstances:
A. At any time for the protection or preservation of the Premises.
B. After reasonable notice to Tenant at reasonable times for the purpose of repairing the Premises.
C. To inspect the Premises; make necessary or agreed-upon repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements; supply
agreed services; or exhibit the Premises to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workers, or contractors
under any of the following circumstances:
(1) with Tenant's consent;
(2) in case of emergency;
(3) when Tenant unreasonably withholds consent; or
(4) if Tenant is absent from the Premises for a period of at least one-half a rental installment period. (If the rent is
current and Tenant notifies Landlord of an intended absence, then Landlord may enter only with Tenant's consent or
for the protection or preservation of the Premises.)
16. HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION. IF TENANT MUST BE APPROVED BY A HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION
(“ASSOCIATION”), LANDLORD AND TENANT AGREE THAT THE LEASE IS CONTINGENT UPON RECEIVING APPROVAL FROM
THE ASSOCIATION, ANY APP! CATION FEE RE REN RY AN assoc TION SHAL RE pain RV aq L ANDI orn
oO TENANT. IF SUCH APPROVAL IS NOT OBTAINED PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT ( OF LEASE TERM, EITHER PARTY MAY
TERMINATE THE LEASE BY WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE OTHER GIVEN AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO APPROVAL BY THE
ASSOCIATION, AND IF THE LEASE IS TERMINATED, TENANT SHALL RECEIVE RETURN OF DEPOSITS SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE
5, IF MADE. If the Lease is not terminated, rent shall abate until the approval is obtained from the association. Tenant agrees to use due
diligence in applying for association approval and to comply with the requirements for obtaining approval. 0 Landlord 1 Tenant
shall pay the security deposit required by the association, if applicable.
17. USE OF THE PREMISES. Tenant shall use the Premises for residential purposes. Tenant shall have exclusive use and right of
possession to the dwelling. The Premises shall be used so as to comply with all state, county, municipal laws and ordinances, and all
covenants and restrictions affecting the Premises and ail ruies and reguiations of homeowners’ associations affecting the Premises.
Tenant may not paint or make any alterations or improvements to the Premises without first obtaining the Landlord's written consent to the
alteration or improvement. However, unless this box [1 is checked, Tenant may hang pictures and install window treatments in the
Premises without Landlord’s consent, provided Tenant removes all such items before the end of the Lease Term and repairs all
damage resulting from the removal. Any improvements or alterations to the Premises made by the Tenant shall become Landlord’s
property. Tenant agrees not to use, keep, or store on the Premises any dangerous, explosive, toxic material which would increase the
probability of fire or which would increase the cost of insuring the Premises.
18. RISK OF LOSS/INSURANCE.
A. Landlord and Tenant shall each be responsible for loss, damage, or injury caused by its own negligence or willful conduct.
B. Tenant should carry insurance covering Tenant's personal property and Tenant's liability insurance.
19. PROHIBITED ACTS BY LANDLORD. Landlord is prohibited from taking certain actions as described in Section 83.67, Florida
Statutes, the provisions of which can be found in the attachment to this Lease.
20. CASUALTY DAMAGE. If the Premises are damaged or destroyed other than by wrongful or negligent acts of Tenant or persons
‘on the Premises with Tenant's consent, so that the use of the Premises is substantially impaired, Tenant may terminate the Lease
within 30 days after the damage or destruction and Tenant will immediately vacate the Premises. If Tenant vacates, Tenant is not liable for
rent that would have been due after the date of termination. Tenant may vacate the part of the Premises rendered unusable by the
damage or desiruction, in whicn case Tenant's y for rent snail be reduced by ine fair rental vaiue of tne part of the Premises inat
was damaged or destroyed.
21. DEFAULTS/REMEDIES. Should a party to the Lease fail to fulfill their responsibilities under the Lease or need to determine
whether there has been a default of the Lease, refer to Part Il, Chapter 83, entitled Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which
contains information on defaults and remedies. A copy of the current version of this Act is attached to the Lease.
22. SUBORDINATION. The Lease is automatically subordinate to the lien of any mortgage encumbering the fee title to the Premises
from time to time.
1 10 Li
THE TENANT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 713.10, FLORIDA STATUTES. Tenant shall notify all parties performing work on the
Premises at Tenant's request that the Lease does not allow any liens to attach to Landlord's interest.
24. RENEWAL/EXTENSION. The Lease can be renewed or extended only by a written agreement signed by both Landlord and
Tenant, but the term of a renewal or extension together with the original Lease Term may not exceed one year. A new lease is required
for each year.
25. TENANT'S TELEPHONE NUMBER. Tenant shall, within 5 business days of obtaining telephone services at the Premises, send
written notice to Landlord of Tenant's telephone numbers at the Premises.
26. ATTORNEYS' FEES. In any lawsuit brought to enforce the Lease or under applicable law, the party in whose favor a judgment or
decree has been rendered may recover reasonable court costs, including attorneys’ fees, from the non-prevailing party.
tenant _) MF) and Landlord cf) ¢ ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 5 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151
ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}
27. MISCELLANEOUS.
A. Time is of the essence of the performance of each party's obligations under the Lease.
B. The Lease shall be binding upon and for the benefit of the heirs, personal representatives, successors, and permitted
assigns of Landlord and Tenant, subject to the requirements specifically mentioned in the Lease. Whenever used, the singular
number shall include the plural or singular and the use of any gender shall include all appropriate genders.
C. The agreements contained in the Lease set forth the complete understanding of the parties and may not be changed or
terminated orally.
D. No agreement to accept surrender of the Premises from Tenant will be valid unless in writing and signed by Landlord.
E. All questions concerning the meaning, execution, construction, effect, validity, and enforcement of the Lease
shall be determined pursuant to the laws of Florida.
F. A facsimile copy of the Lease and any signatures hereon shall be considered for all purposes originals.
G. As required by law, Landlord makes the following disclosure: "RADON GAS." Radon is a naturally occurring radioactive gas
that, when it has accumulated in a building in sufficient quantities, may present health risks to persons who are exposed to it
over time. Levels of radon that exceed federal and state guidelines have been found in buildings in Florida. Additional
information regarding radon and radon testing may be obtained from your county health department.
28. BROKERS' COMMISSION. [I Check and complete if applicable. The brokerage companies named below will be paid the
commission set forth in this paragraph by I Landlord 1 Tenant for procuring a tenant for this transaction.
GEORGE ZAKI CYNTHIA G WOHL.
Real Estate Licensee Real Estate Licensee
RELIABLE REALTY BEX REALTY LLC
Real Estate Brokerage Company Real Estate Brokerage Company
5% 5%
Commission Commission
29, TENANT'S PERSONAL PROPERTY. TENANT MUST INITIAL IN THIS BOX [___] FOR THE FOLLOWING PROVISION TO
APPLY. BY SIGNING THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT, THE TENANT AGREES THAT UPON SURRENDER, ABANDONMENT, OR
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF THE DWELLING UNIT DUE TO THE DEATH OF THE LAST REMAINING TENANT, AS PROVIDED
BY CHAPTER 83, FLORIDA STATUTES, THE LANDLORD SHALL NOT BE LIABLE OR RESPONSIBLE FOR STORAGE OR
DISPOSITION OF THE TENANT'S PERSONAL PROPERTY.
The Lease has been executed by the parties on the dates indicated below.
samy khalil 06/20/2020
Landlord's Signature Date
Landlord's Signature Date
Date
Uostin Forer 6/21/2020 10:15 PM EDT
Tenant's Signature Date
Morgan Forer 6/21/2020 10:42 PM EDT
Tenant's Signature Date
This form was completed with the assistance of:
Name of Individual: GEORGE ZAKI
Name of Business: RELIABLE REALTY INC.
Address:
Telephone Number: 561-239-0326
Copy of Current Version of Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Part Il, Chapter 83, Florida Statutes to Be Attached
Tenant Vial ) uF) and Landlord ¢ . d¢ ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 6 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151Early Termination Fee/Liquidated Damages Addendum
C lagree, as provided in the rental agreement, to pay $ (an amount that does not exceed two months’ rent) as
liquidated damages or an early termination fee if | elect to terminate the rental agreement and the landlord waives the right to seek
additional rent beyond the month in which the landlord retakes possession.
[K] Ido not agree to liquidated damages or an early termination fee, and | acknowledge that the landlord may seek damages as
provided by law.
samy khalil 06/20/2020
Landtord’s Signature Date
Landlord's Signature Date
Landlord's Signature Date
Uostin Forer 6/21/2020 10:17 PM EDT
Tenant's Signature Date
o. - Tel tatatdalat tala ab
Morgan Forer Bi21i2026 142 PM EDT
Tenant's Signature Date
Tenant JF ) UF) and Landlord ( sk d¢ ) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 7 of 18.
RLHD-3x__Rev 7/16 Approved on April 15, 2010, by the Supreme Court of Florida, for use under rule 10-2.1(a) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151
ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
PART II
RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES
83.40 Short title.
83.41 Application.
83.42 Exclusions from application of part.
83.43 Definitions.
83.44 Obligation of good faith.
83.45 Unconscionable rental agreement or provision.
83.46 Rent; duration of tenancies.
83.47 Prohibited provisions in rental agreements.
83.48 Attorney fees.
83.49 Deposit money or advance rent; duty of landlord and tenant.
83.50 Disclosure of landlord's address.
83.51 Landlord's obligation to maintain premises.
83.52 Tenant's obligation to maintain dwelling unit.
83.53 Landlord's access to dwelling unit.
83.535 Flotation bedding system; restrictions on use.
83.54 Enforcement of rights and duties; civil action; criminal offenses.
83.55 Right of action for damages.
83.56 Termination of rental agreement.
83.561 Termination of rental agreement upon foreclosure.
83.57 Termination of tenancy without specific term.
83.575 Termination of tenancy with specific duration.
83.58 Remedies; tenant holding over.
83.59 Right of action for possession.
83.595 Choice of remedies upon breach or early termination by tenant.
83.60 Defenses to action for rent or possession; procedure.
83.61 Disbursement of funds in registry of court; prompt final hearing.
83.62 Restoration of possession to landlord.
83.625 Power to award possession and enter money judgment.
83.63 Casualty damage.
83.64 Retaliatory conduct.
83.67 Prohibited practices.
83.681 Orders to enjoin violations of this part.
83.682 Termination of rental agreement by a servicemember.
83.683 Rental application by a servicemember
83.40 Short title. -This part shall be known as the "Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act."
History. --s. 2, ch. 73-330.
83.41 Application. —This part applies to the rental of a dwelling unit.
History. --s. 2, ch. 73-330; ss. 2, 20, ch. 82-66.
83.42 Exclusions from application of part. --This part does not apply to:
(1) Residency or detention in a facility, whether public or private, when residence or detention is incidental to the provision of medical,
geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or similar services. For residents of a facility licensed under part II of chapter 400, the
provisions of s. 400.0255 are the exclusive procedures for all transfers and discharges.
(2) Occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of which it is a part in which the buyer has paid at least 12 months’
rent or in which the buyer has paid at least 1 month's rent and a deposit of at least 5 percent of the purchase price of the property.
(3) Transient occupancy in a hotel, condominium, motel, roominghouse, or similar public lodging, or transient occupancy in a mobile home
park,
(4) Occupancy by a holder of a proprietary lease in a cooperative apartment.
(5) Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit.
History. --s. 2, ch. 73-330; s. 40, ch. 2012-160; s. 1, ch. 2013-136.
83.43 Definitions. --As used in this part, the following words and terms shall have the following meanings unless some other meaning is
plainly indicated:
(1) "Building, housing, and health codes" means any law, ordinance, or governmental regulation concerning health, safety, sanitation or
fitness for habitation, or the construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use, or appearance, of any dwelling unit.
(2) "Dwelling unit" means:
(a) A structure or part of a structure that is rented for use as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person or by two or more persons
who maintain a common household.
(bd) A mobiie home renied by a tenant.
(c) A structure or part of a structure that is furnished, with or without rent, as an incident of employment for use as a home, residence, or
sleeping place by one or more persons.
(3) "Landlord" means the owner or lessor of a dwelling unit.
(4) mE Ee iF person entitled to occupy a dwelling unit under a rental agreement.
Tenant ) and Landlord ( * ) (____) acknowledge receipt of a copy of this page, which is Page 8 of 18.
‘Serial: 046759-600159-2671151
ecronicaty signed using eSIgnUmINe™ | SESSION IU: 11 /1C/Z-2220-4005-¥0ERIECADDCS 3/8 I}(5) "Premises" means a dwelling unit and the structure of which it is a part and a mobile home lot and the appurtenant facilities and
grounds, areas, facilities, and property held out for the use of tenants generally.
(6) "Rent" means the periodic payments due the landlord from the tenant for occupancy under a rental agreement and any other payments
due the landlord from the tenant as may be designated as rent in a written rental agreement.
(7) "Rental agreement" means any written agreement, including amendments or addenda, or oral agreement for a duration of less than 1
year, providing for use and occupancy of premises.
(8) ‘Good
Related Content
in Palm Beach County
Ruling
YANG RIM CO., LTD, A KOREAN CORPORATION VS A & Y INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 |
23STCV04534
Case Number:
23STCV04534
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
54
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Yang Rim Co., Ltd.,
Plaintiff,
Case
No.:
23STCV04534
v.
Tentative Ruling
A & Y International Global Inc., MIQBA, Inc., Adrian Nasimi, David Kim, Fred Kim, et al.,
Defendants.
Hearing Date: July 9, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint
Moving Party
: Defendants A & Y International Global Inc., Adrian Nasimi
Responding Party
: Plaintiff Yang Rim Co., Ltd.
T/R
:
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A CROSS-COMPLAINT IS GRANTED.
DEFENDANTS to notice.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at
SMCdept54@lacourt.org
with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought the present action for (1) breach of contract(s), (2) account stated, (3) open book account, (4) common count for services performed, (5) fraud/false promise, and (6) negligent misrepresentation, based on an alleged series of purchase order contracts entered into by Plaintiff and Defendants.
Defendants David Kim, Fred Kim, and MIQBA, Inc. are in default.
ANALYSIS
A party who fails to plead a cause of action.¿.¿. whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action.
The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith.
This subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.
(CCP § 426.50.)
Causes of action involving the same transaction or occurrence as the claims in the plaintiffs complaint are compulsory and are forfeited if not pleaded in the same action.
(CCP § 426.30(a); 426.10(c).)
The Court has no discretion to deny a motion for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint absent substantial evidence of bad faith.
(
Silver Organizations Ltd. v. Frank
(1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.)
Permission to file a permissive cross-complaint may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.
(CCP § 428.50(c).
Defendants A & Y International Global Inc. and Adrian Nasimi move for leave to file a cross-complaint against Plaintiff Yang Rim Co., Ltd. and Co-Defendants MIQBA, Inc., Fred Kim, David Kim, and new party Alex Kim for (1) intentional fraud, (2) conspiracy to commit intentional fraud, (3) conversion, and (4) conspiracy to commit conversion.
The proposed cross-complaint, attached as Exhibit A, arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying complaint.
Defendants argue that their first attorney, Andrew Ritholz, withdrew as attorney of record prior to the beginning of discovery and failed to file a timely cross-complaint due to neglect, inadvertence, or oversight.
Defendants newly retained counsel has learned new facts from documents produced during discovery on March 28, 2024, which support the filing of this cross-complaint.
Defendants also ask for the matter to be abated on the basis that Plaintiff is not qualified to do business in California and, thus, cannot maintain the instant lawsuit.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the motion is supported only by conclusions based on hearsay regarding recently discovered documents.
Plaintiff contends that the declaration of Defendants attorney is insufficient.
As noted, the Court must allow leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint absent substantial evidence of bad faith.
The Court does not find evidence of bad faith.
Defendants may move to abate the action through a separately filed motion.
Defendants Motion is GRANTED.
Ruling
JOHNSON, ET AL VS. PARENT, ETAL
Jul 10, 2024 |
CVCV21-0197618
JOHNSON, ET AL VS. PARENT, ETAL
Case Number: CVCV21-0197618
This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. The Court ordered this matter to arbitration
on February 5, 2024. Neither side appeared for the prior hearing on May 3, 2024. The Court notes that
Substitutions of Attorney have been filed on behalf of Plaintiffs. An appearance is necessary on today’s
calendar to discuss the status of arbitration.
Ruling
Mariam Diarra vs Carson Kelly, et al
Jul 10, 2024 |
23CV02998
23CV02998
DIARRA v. KELLY et al
MOTION FOR AN ORDER DECLARING CARSON KELLEY’S JUDGMENT
DEBT TO MARIAM DIARRA TO BE A COMMUNITY PROPERTY DEBT
The motion is denied without prejudice.
Diarra obtained a default judgment against Carson Kelly and Humanize Global, US, Inc.
in the amount of $40,718.24. The underlying complaint alleged Labor Code violations, breach of
contract, promise without intent to perform, and violations of Business and Professions Code
section 17200. Carson Kelly is alleged to be the managing agent of Humanize Global. Diarra
worked for or was contracted by Carson Kelly and Humanize Global.
Diarra, now as judgment creditor, moves the court to declare that the debt of Carson
Kelly is a debt of the marital community of Carson Kelly and his wife Shannon Kelly, to declare
the wages of Shannon Kelly be subject to garnishment to satisfy Diarra’s judgment against
Carson Kelly, and to authorize that a writ of execution issue in her name.
Family Code section 902 defines debt as “an obligation incurred by a married person
before or during marriage, whether based on contract, tort, or otherwise.” Family Code section
910, subdivision (a) states that “[e]xcept as expressly provided by statute, the community estate
is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which
spouse has the management and control of the property and regardless of whether one or both
spouses are parties to the debt or the judgment for debt.”
Page 3 of 4
Diarra has not made a sufficient showing in this motion as follows:
1. Evidence of a marriage between Shannon and Carson Kelly, including the date
Carson and Shannon married. The only evidence are the vague statements from
counsel and Diarra in their declarations.
2. Evidence that Humanize Global US, Inc. was community property, rather than the
separate property of Carson Kelly.
In light of the above deficiencies, the court need not reach the merits of the motion.
Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order
incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the
tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in
accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the
prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is
simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of
sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.
Page 4 of 4
Ruling
FISCUS vs. PATTERSON, et al.
Jul 10, 2024 |
CVCV22-0199210
FISCUS VS. PATTERSON, ET AL.
Case Number: CVCV22-0199210
Tentative Ruling on Motion to Continue Trial Date: This matter involves multiple parties and Cross-
Complaints. Plaintiff is Paula Fiscus. Defendant/Cross-Defendants/Cross-Complainants Gregory G. Gonzales
and Marcia J. Gonzales, Trustees of the Greg and Marcia Gonzales Family 2014 Revocable Trust will be referred
to as the Gonzales Defendants. James Patterson and Patterson Landscape/Yard Manicurist Agency will be
referred to as the Patterson Defendants. The Gonzales Defendants have filed a Motion to Continue the presently
set August 20, 2024, trial date. The Patterson Defendants have joined the motion. Plaintiff has opposed the
motion. Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company has not filed anything related to the motion and
did not attend the ex parte hearing on June 27, 2024, at which time was shortened to hear the motion today instead
of July 22, 2024, as originally noticed. There is no evidence that the Gonzales Defendants provided notice of
today’s hearing to Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company. Cross-Defendant Mark Behnke
Construction has also not filed anything related to the motion but did attend the ex parte hearing and is therefore
aware of today’s hearing.
Merits. “To ensure the prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial are firm. All parties and
their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain.” CRC 3.1332(a). “Although continuances of trials are
disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a
continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.” CRC 3.1332(c).
Circumstances that may indicate good cause are:
(1) The unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness because of death, illness, or other
excusable circumstances;
(2) The unavailability of a party because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(3) The unavailability of trial counsel because of death, illness, or other excusable circumstances;
(4) The substitution of trial counsel, but only where there is an affirmative showing that the
substitution is required in the interests of justice;
(5) The addition of a new party if:
(A) The new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial;
or
(B) The other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for
trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the case;
(6) A party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence
despite diligent efforts; or
(7) A significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not
ready for trial.
CRC 3.1332(c).
When considering whether to grant a motion to continue, there are several factors that the Court must consider
including:
(1) The proximity of the trial date;
(2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any
party;
(3) The length of the continuance requested;
(4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or
application for a continuance;
(5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance;
(6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the
need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay;
(7) The court's calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials;
(8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial;
(9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance;
(10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or
by imposing conditions on the continuance; and
(11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.
CRC 3.1332(d).
The reasons presented by the Gonzales Defendants to continue the trial are that trial counsel has a conflicting trial
schedule and because Marcia Gonzales’s son is getting married the week of trial. In the moving papers, the
Gonzales Defendants note that the wedding date was set prior to the Court setting the Augst 20, 2024 trial date.
The reasons for the Patterson Defendants joining the motion are because counsel has a conflicting trial schedule,
counsel is moving homes in late August, and because the Pattersons have a prepaid vacation from August 26-
September 6, 2024. It is not clear whether the Pattersons’ vacation was set and prepaid when the Court set the
trial date of if the Pattersons planned it after the trial date was set. Plaintiff opposes the continuance on the grounds
that Defendants have failed to show good cause for the continuance, and because Plaintiff will be prejudiced by
a continuance. The prejudice alleged is that a later trial would not allow time for necessary remediation of the
landscaping issues before the next rainy reason. These issues have resulted in significant erosion and flooding.
Plaintiff also argues that the parties stipulated to the August 20, 2024, trial date and all agreed that no further
continuances would be granted absent stipulation. While this agreement did not make it into the Court’s Order
dated April 10, 2024 (which was submitted by the Patterson Defendants), it is clear from the Stipulation that the
parties did reach such a stipulation.
Conflicting trial schedules do not automatically create good cause to continue a trial. Trial counsel regularly have
multiple trials set for the same week. Any attorney who practices in civil law is well aware that not every trial set
actually goes forward as scheduled. No good cause has been presented in that regard. As to the wedding, it
appears the counsel for the Gonzales Defendants did not check with their client prior to agreeing to a trial date.
Had they checked, surely Ms. Gonzales would have pointed out that her son was getting married that week. The
unavailability of Ms. Gonzales due to her son’s wedding may constitute an excusable circumstance under CRC
3.1332(c)(2). Similarly, the Patterson’s vacation could also be such a circumstance, depending on when it was
scheduled.
Regarding the CRC 3.1332(d) factors, the trial date is one month and twelve days away. Trial has been continued
twice before. The first was by stipulation on October 13, 2022. The second was by stipulation on April 9, 2024,
as discussed above. The Gonzales Defendants have requested a continuance to November of 2024 while the
Patterson Defendants have requested 45-60 days. The only alternative means to address the problem that gave
rise to the motion or application for a continuance would be potentially taking witnesses out of order at trial.
Plaintiff may be prejudiced by the continuance. The matter is not entitled to preferential trial setting. Regarding
the Court’s calendar, one of the two civil trial courts will be dark on the currently set date of August 20, 2024,
which reduces the chance that this matter will be assigned to a courtroom for trial. Counsel is not currently
engaged in another trial that causes a conflict and only provides evidence that there are other trials that might
affect counsel’s availability. There is no stipulation for a continuance. The parties previously agreed that no
further continuances would occur absent a stipulation.
Regarding the interests of justice, the Court is in a position of having to weigh how much counsel’s failure to
consult with their clients regarding their schedules should be permitted to affect their client on a personal level.
It is clear that counsel should have done a better job to make sure that the agreed upon trial date worked for all
parties, and not just counsel. This is particularly so when the parties explicitly stipulated that no further
continuances would take place. However, the Court does not feel that it is in the interest of justice to punish Ms.
Gonzales by potentially preventing her from participating in her son’s wedding based on counsel’s failure to
communicate properly. As to the Patterson vacation, it is unclear whether this vacation was set at the time the
trial was set or if the Pattersons scheduled their vacation later. However, the Court does understand the need for
the Pattersons to be present for the trial to present their testimony.
On balance, the Court finds that granting of a short continuance would be in the interest of justice. The Pattersons’
vacation lasts until September 6, 2024. Therefore, the Court intends to continue the trial to Tuesday, September
10, 2024. If this trial date does not work for Plaintiff, the Court will entertain the first available date for Plaintiff.
Should the trial be continued, all discovery deadlines will flow from the new trial date.
However, the Court notes that Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company was not provided with
notice of today’s hearing. Absent an appearance by Defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company, the
Court will continue today’s hearing to July 22, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 63 as that is the date that was
originally noticed.
Ruling
Barton vs General Motors LLC
Jul 10, 2024 |
SCV-270482
SCV-270482, Barton v. General Motors LLC
Plaintiff Barton moves for attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $147,967.50 for attorney fees
per Civil Code section 1794(d). The motion is GRANTED for the reduced amount of
$82,000.00.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this action against GM asserting three causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act
regarding a vehicle Plaintiff bought from GM. Ultimately, the parties settled their claims.
Plaintiff filed two memorandum of costs to support their motion for fees after the settlement. GM
requested the Court to strike or tax a majority of the costs requested by Wirtz Law. The Court
entered an order striking a portion of the fees and costs requested in counsel Wirtz Law’s
memorandum of costs so that the total award of costs was $8,816.22. Plaintiff now brings this
motion for attorney’s fees for representation by Plaintiff’s two counsels, Wirtz Law (“WL”) and
Quill and Arrow LLP (“QA”). GM opposes the motion.
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The Court rules as follows to Plaintiff’s objection to the Declaration of Kyle Roybal:
1. Objection to Paragraph 4 as inadmissible hearsay, argumentative, inadmissible opinion,
lacking foundation, and irrelevant is OVERRULED.
2. Objection to Paragraph 5 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED.
3. Objection to Paragraph 6 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED.
4. Objection to Paragraph 8 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED.
5. Objection to Paragraph 9 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED.
6. Objection to Paragraph 15 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED.
7. Objection to Paragraph 21 as in inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is SUSTAINED.
8. Objection to Paragraph 22 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is OVERRULED.
9. Objection to Paragraph 23 as inadmissible hearsay, inadmissible opinion, lacking
foundation, and irrelevant is OVERRULED.
ANALYSIS
Legal Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, attorney's fees are an allowable cost when
authorized by contract, statute, or law. (C.C.P. § 1033.5(a)(10)(B).) In general, the “prevailing
party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs of suit in any action or proceeding.
(Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.)
The Song-Beverly Act allows for additional recovery by a buyer who prevails in an action per
Civil Code section 1794(d), for reasonably incurred costs including attorney’s fees based on
actual time expended expenses and other costs in connection with the commencement and
prosecution of such action.
Moving Papers
Plaintiff broke down the fees incurred for each counsel in the motion.
Plaintiff incurred $21,600.00 for QA’s legal representation. QA requests approval of rates of
$500.00 for managing attorney and $350 to $425 for associate attorneys.
Plaintiff incurred $77,045.00 for WL’s legal representation. WL’s fees are broken down based
on various attorney, paralegal, and “non-attorney” rates on page 16 of Exhibit 1 to the
Declaration of Richard Wirtz. WL requests approval of an increased rate of $750.00 for the
managing attorney, $550.00 for senior attorneys, $450.00 for associate attorneys, and $250.00 to
$300.00 for paralegal rates.
Counsels also request a multiplier of 1.5 to the lodestar fees requested so that the total attorney’s
fees amount requested is $147,967.50.
GM argues that Counsel’s work in the matter warrants a fee award of only one quarter of the
$147,967.50 requested. GM argues that the billing was excessive and requests that the multiplier
be denied because this is a routine Song-Beverly matter of many that counsels work on regularly.
Application
Based on the moving papers, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees per Civil Code
section 1794(d). The Court finds the hours worked by counsels to be reasonable, with multiple
attorneys assisting at the two separate firms. The Court will reduce WL’s rates to the amounts
reasonable in the local area. As WL did not sufficiently show that Plaintiff attempted to find
local counsel, but were unsuccessful, the Court will not award rates acceptable in the Los
Angeles area. The Court will award QA’s requested rates as reasonable per local standards. The
Court also does not find that a multiplier of 1.5 is warranted in this matter as counsel has not
shown sufficient justification for the enhancement.
Accordingly, the Court will award fees as follows:
Name Position & Experience Hours Hourly Rate Fees
Wirtz Law
Alana Mellgren Associate Attorney 12.9 350.00 $4,515.00
Amy Rotman Senior Attorney 18.1 450.00 $8,145.00
Jessica Underwood Senior Attorney 50.6 450.00 $22,770.00
Richard Wirtz Managing Attorney 37.1 550.00 $20,405.00
Rebecca Evans Managing Paralegal 3.8 250.00 $950.00
Florence Goldson Senior Paralegal 2.3 250.00 $575.00
Andrea Lizarraga Paralegal 4.0 200.00 $800.00
Amanda Vitanatchi Paralegal 11.2 200.00 $2,240.00
TOTAL WL: $60,400.00
TOTAL QA: $21,600.00
TOTAL FEES: $82,000.00
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of
$82,000.00. Plaintiff shall submit a written order to the Court consistent with this tentative ruling
and in compliance with Rule of Court 3.1312(a) and (b).
Ruling
AMY A. MAXWELL VS BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
Jul 09, 2024 |
24LBCV00120
Case Number:
24LBCV00120
Hearing Date:
July 9, 2024
Dept:
S27 Plaintiff has discovery motions scheduled for 7/09/24, 7/18/24, and 7/23/24.
There is also a status conference re: appointment of a discovery referee scheduled for 7/09/24.
In the interest of efficiency, the Court continues the 7/09/24 and 7/18/24 motions to 7/23/24, to be heard concurrently with the currently scheduled motion to deem RFAs admitted.
The Court takes off calendar the status conference re: appointment of discovery referee.
Upon further review, all pending motions are related motions to compel responses to initial discovery (and deem RFAs admitted), based on the contention that Defendant has not served any timely responses to outstanding discovery.
The Court finds this is not the type of discovery dispute that warrants appointment of a referee.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at
gdcdepts27@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at
www.lacourt.org
.
If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar
.
If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.
Ruling
FIDEL HERNANDEZ MEDINA, ET AL. VS TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.
Jul 10, 2024 |
22STCV11303
Case Number:
22STCV11303
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
40
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 40
FIDEL HERNANDEZ MEDINA, an individual and PATRICIA HERNANDEZ, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., a California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants
.
Case No.:
22STCV11303
Hearing Date:
7/10/24
Trial Date:
N/A
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs
Background
Pleadings
Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandez (Plaintiffs) sue Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota USA) pursuant to an October 14, 2022 Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleging claims of (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b).
The claims arise from allegations that Toyota USA has breached express and implied warranties in favor of Plaintiffs by failing to repair, replace, or repurchase a used Toyota vehicle purchased by the Hernandez Plaintiffs subject to express warranties through which Toyota USA undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiffs vehicle or to provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance.
Relevant Procedural History
On February 20, 2024, trial commenced in this action before concluding on February 26, 2024.
On February 24, 2024, the jury issued its verdict in favor of Toyota USA.
On March 8, 2024, judgment was entered in Toyota USAs favor.
On March 21, 2024, Toyota USA filed its Memorandum of Costs, seeking to recover $22,309.48 in costs.
On April 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Tax Costs.
On June 26, 2024, Toyota USA filed its opposition to the instant motion.
On July 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply papers.
Motion to Tax Costs
Legal Standard
:
In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b);
Santisas v. Goodin
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606;
Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Assuming the prevailing party requirements are met, the trial court has no discretion to order each party to bear his or her own costs of suit. (
Michell v. Olick
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198;
Nelson v. Anderson
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 129.) The term prevailing party for costs purposes is defined by statute to include: ¿
(1) The party with a net monetary recovery; ¿
(2) A defendant who is dismissed from the action; ¿
(3) A defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and ¿
(4) A defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)
If the party does not fall within one of these four express categories, the court may exercise its discretion to award or deny costs. (See
Lincoln v. Schurgin
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 100, 105.)
If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the prevailing party shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) For example, even if a plaintiff maintains a net monetary recovery, in determining the prevailing party in the litigation, the trial court should also consider, if applicable, the defendants success on its declaratory relief claims and exercise its discretion to allow costs or not and, if allowed, to apportion them as appropriate. (
Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1142; see, e.g.,
Lincoln v. Schurgin
,
supra
, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 104-105 [when plaintiff wins net monetary recovery but defendant prevails in its cross-action for declaratory relief, case presents circumstance not otherwise specified; in that case, determination of prevailing party is matter within courts discretion].)
¿Allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (
Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc.
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)
A verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services therein listed were necessarily incurred. (
Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc
. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266.) A party seeking to tax costs must provide evidence to rebut this prima facie showing. (
Jones v. Dumrichob
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266, superseded by statute on other grounds in Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1) [whether costs permissible from filing of complaint or from date of 998 offer].) Mere statements unsupported by facts are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing that costs were necessarily incurred. (
Jones v. Dumrichob
,
supra
, at p. 1266.)¿On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (
Ibid
.) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (
Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc.
,
supra
, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) However, because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute, a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized. (
Ibid
.) Discretion is abused only when, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. (
Lincoln v. Schurgin
,
supra
, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.)¿
Order Striking or Taxing Costs
: GRANTED IN PART
As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that Toyota USA is not seeking to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) because that statute is limited to buyers of consumer goods. Rather, as the prevailing party in this action, Toyota USA is entitled to recover costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1032(a)(4) and 1033.5. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs appear to argue the opposite. (See Reply at pp. 3-4, relying on
Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar, Inc.
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1264.) However, this argument is not persuasive. Code of Civil Procedure § 1794(d) does not explicitly preclude a seller of consumer goods from recovering their costs under Code of Civil Procedure § 1032. Indeed, in
Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, the Court rejected this argument. (
Id.
at p. 988 [In this case, plaintiff filed suit under the Song-Beverly Act, but defendants prevailed. Defendants sought to recover their costs and expert witness fees under sections 1032, subdivision (b) and 998, subdivision (c), whereas plaintiff argued the more specific provisions of the Act prohibited prevailing defendants from any such recovery.
We conclude defendants are entitled to their costs and expert witness
fees].) Thus, in determining whether an award of costs should be issued, the Court will rely on the guideline set forth under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c).
Here, Toyota USA seeks $22,309.48 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1032 and 1033.5. By way of its motion, Plaintiffs seek to tax these costs in the following categories: (1) motion and filing fees in its entirety or alternatively $181.08; (2) deposition costs in the amount of $4,351.70; (3) court reporter fees in their entirety; and (4) other costs and fees in the amount of $2,338.49.
First, Plaintiffs argue that Toyota USAs requested costs of $1,447.72 for motion and filing fees should be stricken because they include attorney service fees, and Toyota USA has failed to correctly identify the actual court motion and filing fees incurred. (Motion at pg. 5.) However, this ignores the numerous invoices enclosed and referenced by Toyota USAs Memorandum of Costs at Attachment 1g that identify the court motion and filing fees incurred.
Furthermore, [i]f the items in a cost memorandum appear proper, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence the expenses were necessarily incurred by the prevailing party. (Citation.) To controvert this evidence, the burden is on the objecting party to present evidence showing the contrary. (Citation) (
Whatley-Miller v. Cooper
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1115.) Filing fees and electronic filing fees are recoverable costs (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(1), (14).) Thus, it is Plaintiffs burden to present evidence to show why these costs should not be awarded. In this regard, Plaintiffs identify $181.08 worth of filing fee costs that should be taxed. (Motion at pp. 6-7.) Of these costs, the Court finds that the filing fees associated with Toyota USAs Motions in Limine were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation because they had been untimely filed. Therefore, these costs are taxed in the amount of $65.34. As to the costs associated with unsuccessful motions, the Court finds that these costs were not prepared merely out of convenience and are recoverable as a result. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(c).)
Second, Plaintiffs argues the claimed deposition costs should be taxed in the amount of $4,351.70 because the amounts are excessive and unnecessary. Recovery of deposition costs is allowed.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(3).) Defendants point out that multiple deposition dates for the plaintiffs had to be scheduled and rescheduled. In this instance, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to undermine the prima facie evidence that the expenses were necessarily incurred by Toyota USA. (
Whatley-Miller, supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at 1115.)
Third, Plaintiffs contend that Toyota USAs claimed court reporter fees should be taxed because they are not recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033 subd. (b)(5). (Motion at pg. 8.) This argument is not persuasive. The Court has discretion to allow additional costs that are reasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5 subd. (c)(4). Based on the invoices submitted with its Memorandum of Costs, Toyota USA has shown that these claimed costs were for court reporting fees during the trial. Such expenses are reasonable in light of the understandable prudence of preserving a record for appeal. Notably, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to suggest that the amount of these fees is unreasonable. Therefore, the Court declines to tax this category of costs.
Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that the claim for other costs and expenses that include meals, copying charges, travel, and lodging. (Motion at pp. 8-12.) The Court largely agrees that many of these costs are either not allowed or not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. For instance, Toyota USA seeks to recover $50.37 in FedEx charges of trial documents and the final status conference. Courier and messenger fees are recoverable, at the discretion of the trial court, if they are reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. (
Dept. of Children & Family Services
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 696, as modified (July 18, 2019), rehg denied (Aug. 9, 2019), review denied (Oct. 23, 2019).) Because these costs are not expressly allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5, it is Toyota USAs burden to establish why these costs were necessary. (
Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn.
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) However, the opposition fails to articulate such a necessity. Thus, the Court taxes these courier costs as not reasonable.
Also, Toyota USA seeks to recover $19.98 associated with a CARFAX report for trial, but Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(b)(2) excludes investigation costs. Moreover, Toyota USA seeks to recover a combined amount of $2,095.49 for meals, lodging, and travel. While it is in the Courts discretion to award these costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(c)(4), they have been properly objected to, and Toyota USA has failed to meet its burden in establishing why these costs were not merely convenient and reasonable in amount.
In terms of the $196.90 in costs spent for additional copies of trial exhibits, these costs are allowed under Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(13) and appear to be reasonable in amount. Thus, the Court declines to tax these amounts.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion to tax costs is granted in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs Fidel Hernandez Medina and Patricia Hernandezs Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED in part in the amount of $2,231.18. Consequently, Toyota USA shall be entitled to recover $20,078.30 in costs.
Ruling
ENCORE AUTOMOTIVE, INC. VS ROBERT Y. LEE, ET AL.
Jul 10, 2024 |
22AHCV00604
Case Number:
22AHCV00604
Hearing Date:
July 10, 2024
Dept:
3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT
ENCORE AUTOMOTIVE, INC.
,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
ROBERT Y. LEE, et al.
,
Defendant(s).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO.:
22AHCV00604
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE:
PLAINTIFF ENCORE AUTOMOTIVE, INC.S MOTION TO COMPEL ROBERT Y. LEES RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORIES
Dept. 3
8:30 a.m.
July 10
, 2024
On
August 24, 2022
, plaintiff
Encore Automotive, Inc.
(Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant
Robert Y. Lee
(Defendant). On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for an order compelling Defendants responses to First Set of Form Interrogatories. On June 26, 2024, Defendant filed a response to this motion stating that responses without objections had been served. On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief stating that Defendant failed to serve responses to Form Interrogatory Nos. 50.2, 50.3, 50.4, 50.5, and 50.6. In light of Defendants apparent failure to serve responses to these interrogatories, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion in part and orders Defendant to serve verified responses, without objections, to Form Interrogatory Nos. 50.2, 50.3, 50.4, 50.5, and 50.6 from Plaintiffs First Set of Form Interrogatories, within 15 days of the date of this order.
Moving party to give notice.
Dated this
10th
day of July 2024
William A. Crowfoot
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.
Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.
If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.