Clerk Notice: UMPQUA BANK V CYGNET ONLINE, LLC

22CV013333: MARTIN vs TENNYSON ELECTRIC, INC. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Order re: Settlement Award and Dismissal in Department 1B Tentative Ruling - 07/24/2024 Sandra Bean The Motion for Order PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT AWARD AND DISMISSAL [CODE CIV. PROC., 998] filed by Tyler Martin on 04/19/2024 is Denied. Plaintiff Tyler Martin’s Motion for Order Regarding Settlement and Dismissal is as follows: the Court finds the current 998 offer is invalid, and thus dismissal is DENIED. On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff Tyler Martin accepted the following Offer under CCP § 998 as made by Defendant Tennyson Electric, Inc.: Pursuant to Section 998 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Defendant TENNYSON ELECTRIC, INC. (“Defendant”) hereby offers Plaintiff TYLER MARTIN (“Plaintiff Martin”) $50,000, inclusive of attorney fees and costs, in exchange for a dismissal with prejudice of this lawsuit as full and final settlement of all of his claims in the above captioned action (the “Action”), expressly inclusive of any and all claims for costs and attorneys’ fees, in exchange for the following upon the receipt of such funds: (1) the execution of a release by Plaintiff Martin of all of his claims against Defendant in the Action; and (2) the entry of a Request for Dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiff Martin’s claims asserted in the operative Complaint as against Defendant in the Action in their entirety. This offer does not contemplate entry of a judgment of any kind against Defendant TENNYSON ELECTRIC, INC. (Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 458, 470 [“Although section 998 refers to entry of a judgment or award, an offer that provides for the plaintiff’s dismissal of the action with prejudice is a valid form of offer within section 998.”]. If this offer is not accepted within thirty (30) days of the date of its service, as extended by operation of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 by virtue of its manner of service, it shall be deemed withdrawn, and may not be given in evidence upon the trial of this matter. Plaintiff Martin shall indicate an acceptance of the offer through his attorney’s signature below, or through his attorney’s signature on a separate document indicating that the offer is accepted. (Escobedo Decl. ex. 4) Further, on April 4, 2024, Counsel for Defendant sent a check for $50,000 to the Plaintiff. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV013333: MARTIN vs TENNYSON ELECTRIC, INC. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Order re: Settlement Award and Dismissal in Department 1B Plaintiff argues that the offer is clear, and the release must be limited to the terms of the offer that which encompasses only “all of his claims against Defendant in the Action” but Defendant seeks to add additional terms specifically Defendant seeks to include all claims that could have been asserted and a waiver of Civil Code § 1542. The Court finds that the terms of the 998 offer are ambiguous. Does the release of all Plaintiff’s claims in this action include those asserted and those that could have been asserted but were not? There was no proposed release attached to the offer and the parties do not mutually assent to the meaning of the terms of the 998 offer. (See Valentino v. Elliott Sav-On Gas, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 692, 700-701 reh'g denied and opinion modified (June 23, 1988) [$15,000 offer was conditioned on release of claims other than those being litigated: value of those claims was uncertain, rendering $15,000 offer uncertain].) The Court finds the terms of the 998 offer are too ambiguous to be enforced since there is no mutual assent to a release and the signing of a release is a condition of this compromise. Thus, the offer is uncertain and invalidated. ------ If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court. How Do I Contest a Tentative Ruling? Find your case in eCourt at https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov/ using “Case Search” or “Calendar Search” (after you log in) Select the Tentative Rulings Tab Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" Enter your name and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue. Select "Proceed" You must also notify the department via email (Dept1b@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and opposing parties by no later than 4:00 PM, one court day before the scheduled hearing. Please provide this information to any opposing parties. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE HEARING/CONFERENCE WILL BE IN- PERSON WITH THE OPTION TO APPEAR REMOTELY. COUNSEL AND PARTIES MAY APPEAR EITHER IN-PERSON IN DEPARTMENT 1B AT RENE C. DAVIDSON COURTHOUSE OR BY REMOTELY THROUGH THE ZOOM PLATFORM. COUNSEL AND PARTIES WHO CHOOSE TO APPEAR REMOTELY MUST HAVE AN APPROPRIATE INTERNET CONNECTION, A WORKING MICROPHONE, AND FUNCTIONING CAMERA, OTHERWISE THE PARTY OR ATTORNEY MUST APPEAR IN PERSON. Department 1B Meeting ID 16057295607 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV013333: MARTIN vs TENNYSON ELECTRIC, INC. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Order re: Settlement Award and Dismissal in Department 1B Personal Meeting URL https://zoomgov.com/j/16057295607 One tap mobile +16692545252,,16057295607# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16057295607# US (US Spanish Line) Join by SIP 16057295607@sip.zoomgov.com Join by H.323 161.199.138.10 (US West) 161.199.136.10 (US East

KING, ET AL. VS. TYNER, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202922 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration or dismissal. The Court is in receipt of a status report in which Plaintiff reports that the arbitration scheduled for July has been rescheduled to August 6 th and 8th. The case will be continued to Tuesday, September 3, 2024, at 9:00 am for review regarding status of arbitration or dismissal. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Motion to Compel Defendant Fritts Ford MORA vs FORD MOTOR to Respond to Plaintiff's Special CVRI2305266 COMPANY Interrogatories, Set One by OCTAVIO MORA, BARBARA MORA Tentative Ruling: This matter was stayed as to Fritt’s Ford on 4/22/2024. As such, this motion is off calendar.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 202100555658CUOE: Christiane Lange Applegate vs. Seed Beauty LLC 07/22/2024 in Department 43 Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement Pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act The morning calendar in courtroom 43 will normally begin at 8:45. Please arrive for your hearing no later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called. The Court allows appearances by CourtCall and Zoom, but parties must both use the same platform if appearing remotely. The court’s equipment is not capable of handling mixed remote appearances. Counsel are expected to cooperate in this regard. Refer to the Courtroom 43 webpage for more information about remote appearances. If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:30 a.m. If you wish to appear by CourtCall, you must make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the court day before your scheduled hearing. Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not be granted. No exceptions will be made. For Zoom appearances, you must email the court at Courtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with a simultaneous copy to all other counsel/self-represented parties no later than 3:00 p.m. the court day before the appearance. INCLUDE THE PHRASE "ZOOM APPEARANCE ON (DATE OF HEARING)" IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF YOUR EMAIL. You will receive the login information for your appearance in reply to your email. If appearing by Zoom, log into the hearing no later than 8:30 a.m. The Court will transfer you to the meeting room when your matter is called. Do not attempt to appear by Zoom without following these instructions. With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish to submit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Coats's secretary, Ms. McIntyre at 805- 477-5894, stating that you submit on the tentative. Or, you may email Courtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu of sending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing party appears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do not communicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, the Court may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative. Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is required but not signed at the hearing, the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with the court. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized. Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion For Approval of Settlement Under Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) 202100555658CUOE: Christiane Lange Applegate vs. Seed Beauty LLC Tentative Ruling: At 9:43 a.m. on Thursday July 18, 20024, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Joint Status Report regarding the Monday July 22, 2024, hearing, stating: “The Parties intend to proceed with the settlement approval hearing as scheduled. The Parties are working on finalizing and obtaining signatures to the settlement agreement and intend on filing the settlement agreement shortly.” At 4:13pm on the same day, the Court received the declaration of Kawnporn “Mai” Tulyathan, attaching, among other things, an unsigned “Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release of PAGA Claims.” Neither submission (the Joint Status Report or the Tulyathan declaration) was timely filed or served on the required parties. The Court intends to continue the hearing to August 12, 2024, so that all parties, including the LWDA, are provided proper notice and all moving papers. It does not appear that the LWDA was provided with any of the declarations accompanying the Motion. Moreover, the Court cannot move forward with this Motion absent a fully-executed settlement agreement. Absent a fully-executed agreement there is no enforceable agreement for the Court to consider. Notably, as of June 6, 2024, the parties stated that they were “still continuing to negotiate one remaining provision in the PAGA settlement agreement that remains unsettled,” and on July 18, 2024, the parties indicated that they were in the process of both finalizing and obtaining signatures. The nature of the one provision is not articulated and there is no explanation for the failure to obtain all signatures to the agreement. In short, there is no agreed upon settlement before the Court and reaching the merits now would be premature. Moving party is ordered to serve notice of the continuance.

23CV040651: MARQUISES vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel .; filed by ELEANOR A MARQUISES (Plaintiff) in Department 520 Tentative Ruling - 07/23/2024 Julia Spain The Motion to Compel PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANTS COMPLIANCE WITH DEFENDANTS OWN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE AND DEMAND FOR MANDATORY MONE filed by ELEANOR A MARQUISES on 06/12/2024 is Withdrawn.

CV-21-002417 – CLEMENTS, BOBBY vs ODAY, JEFF – Defendants’ Motion for Terminating and Monetary Sanctions and in the Alternative Evidentiary Sanctions – GRANTED, in part, Denied in part, unopposed. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s order of February 16, 2023, compelling Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s properly propounded discovery within fourteen (14) days, as well as Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s verbal admonishment in that regard at the Case Management Conference of October 30, 2023, constitutes a willful failure to comply with the Court’s orders that warrant the imposition of terminating sanctions against Plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure §§2023.010 and 2023.030; Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell (2017) 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 727, rehearing denied, review denied; Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007), 149 Cal.App.4th 285; Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004), 117 Cal.App.4th 913; Fred Howland Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 6050. Monetary Sanctions of attorney’s fees and costs in the sum of $1560.00 are hereby awarded against Plaintiff payable to Defendant’s Counsel, Aleshia M. White within thirty (30) days of service of this order on Plaintiff.

22CV021036: GUERRA vs REYNA, et al. 07/23/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 22 Tentative Ruling - 07/17/2024 Brad Seligman The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Nancy Cole, Yolanda Reyna on 06/17/2024 is Granted. Defendants Yolanda Reyna (“Reyna”) and Nancy Cole’s (“Cole”) (collectively “Defendants”) Unopposed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED in its entirety with leave to amend because Plaintiff Gloria Guerra’s form complaint that checks boxes corresponding to general negligence and fraud fails to allege material facts sufficient to support its conclusory allegations that negligence and fraud took place. (Code Civ. Proc. §, 438, subd. (d).) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS – LEGAL STANDARD A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Like a demurrer, in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, any defect upon which a motion for judgment on the pleadings is based must appear on the face of the pleadings or from a matter which may be judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc. §, 438, subd. (d).) Where the complaint is defective, it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970–971.) ANALYSIS Defendants’ unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with leave to amend because Plaintiff’s form complaint fails to provide a coherent narrative of facts to indicate what each defendant did to support Plaintiff’s claims against them. The form complaint attaches seven separate pages of attachments (all titled “Cause of Action - General Negligence”) which each make various conclusory allegations regarding the distribution of an inheritance and a property located at 1737 Ustick Road, Modesto, California. While it remain unclear what actually happened due to the dearth of material facts alleged, it appears that Reyna was the executor of the trust and Cole persuaded Reyna not to distribute some portion of the inheritance to Plaintiff. Several conclusory statements regarding embezzlement, grand theft, criminal fraud, greed, persuasion of the Rena (the executor) to sell her own home to hand over her life savings and breach of fiduciary duties are alleged without much context. It therefore remains unclear what actions were taken by each defendant that supports Plaintiff’s claims against them and what those claims actually are. As Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence or fraud, Defendants’ unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings with granted with leave to amend. (Code Civ. Proc. §, 438, subd. (d).) In amending her Complaint, Plaintiff should identify the trust at issue (by date, name or SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV021036: GUERRA vs REYNA, et al. 07/23/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 22 otherwise). In addition, although Plaintiff appears to have filed various declarations over the course of this litigation, those declarations are not part of her Complaint. The Complaint itself must state all material facts that Plaintiff claims are relevant to this case. NEGLIGENCE To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege material facts to show that: 1) Defendant owed plaintiff a legal duty, 2) Defendant breached that duty, and 3) Defendant’s breach proximately caused Plaintiff’s damages or injuries. (Thomas v. Stenberg (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 654, 662.) FRAUD To state a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege material facts to show that: 1) Defendant made a misrepresentation 2) Defendant knew that their representation was false 3) Defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff 4) Defendant induced the plaintiff’s reliance 5) Plaintiff’s reliance was justified, and 6) As a result of Plaintiff’s reliance, Plaintiff was damaged. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) Additionally, the cause of action for fraud must state facts that “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.) With these guidelines in mind, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file her amended pleading within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING? THROUGH eCOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select “Search” SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 22CV021036: GUERRA vs REYNA, et al. 07/23/2024 Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Department 22 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select “Click to Contest this Ruling” 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select “Proceed” BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK (dept22@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely. Notice via BOTH eCourt AND email is required. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no party contests the tentative ruling.

Case Number: 23SMCV03493 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Southern California Injured Workers LLC, v. Amigo Management CASE NO.: 23SMCV03493 MOTION: OSC Re: Preliminary Injunction HEARING DATE: 7/26/2024 Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 526(a), a preliminary injunction may be issued in the following cases: 1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action. 3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. 5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief. 6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings. 7) Where the obligation arises from a trust. In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the trial court considers two factors: 1) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial (CCP §526(a)(1)); and 2) a balancing of the irreparable harm that the moving party is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied compared to the harm that the non-moving party is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (CCP §526(a)(2); 14859 Moorpark Homeowners Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402.) A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits. ( MaJor v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 623.) [A] cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted. ( Id . (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168).) The courts ruling on a preliminary injunction is not an adjudication of the merits, is not a trial, and does not require a statement of decision. ( Cohen v. Board of Supervisors , (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.) The judge is not required to state her reasons for granting or denying a preliminary injunction; a cursory statement is sufficient. ( City of Los Altos v. Barnes , (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198.) A proposed order must be presented to the judge for signature, with any required undertaking, within one day after the preliminary injunction is granted, or other time ordered by the judge. (CRC 3.1150(f).) EVIDENTIARY ISSUES Cross-Defendants objections to the Marchant declaration are GRANTED as to nos. 17-24 (foundation, personal knowledge and legal conclusion). The remainder of objections are OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants objections to the Tantuwaya declaration are ruled on as follows: Sustained as to objections nos. 1 and 43. Sustained in part as to no. 3, as to the portion starting with who I later . . .. Sustained in part as to no. 12, as to the portion starting with In February of 2022 and in without my knowledge and/or authority. Sustained in part as to no. 44, as to the portion starting with Also, a total of . . . and ending in December 31, 2022. All other objections are OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants objections to the supplemental Winthrop declaration are OVERRULED. The Court agrees that the attached documents should have been part of a supplemental request for judicial notice. The Court also agrees that while the Court may take judicial notice of the documents existence, it cannot take judicial notice of any factual assertions therein. Cross-Complainants objections to the supplemental Marchant declaration are OVERRULED. Cross-Complainants request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) Cross-Defendants request for judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) Analysis Cross-Complainant Funding4Doctors LLC ("Funding") moves for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Cross-Defendants Injured Worker Medical Group, LLC ("IWMG") and Dr. Vrijesh S. Tantuwaya from disbursing and/or otherwise dissipating funds collected and being collected on behalf of Funding pursuant to 30 Masters Receivables Advance Agreements ("Agreements 1-30"). Specifically, they request the following order: (1) Cross-Defendants are ENJOINED from taking any action whatsoever that will dissipate the funds collected on account of the thirty (30) Masters Receivables Advance Agreements (Agreements 1-30) as set for in the Verified Cross-Complaint filed by Funding, as well as the Cross-Complaint filed by IWMG, including, but not limited to, paying, disbursing, distributing, or otherwise dissipating funds collected and being collected by IWMG; (2) Cross-Defendants are ORDERED to provide Funding with an accounting of all funds collected on account of Agreements 1-30 within fourteen (14) days of this Order, and to identify all banks and/or financial institutions at which such funds are being held; and (3) Cross-Defendants are ORDERED to provide a copy of this Order by Certified Mail to any and all banks and financial institutions at which such funds are being held. Funding reasons that it will succeed on the merits of their contract claims because the Agreements are admitted by IWMG and personally guaranteed by Dr. Tantuwaya. Further, Funding will suffer great and irreparable injury because Cross-Defendants may use and/or distribute the amounts that are due under the Agreements, and by the time the case is over, there may be no money left. (See Dodge, Warren & Peters Ins. Svcs., Inc. v. Riley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1414 [an injunction may be granted when a party to the action is doing or threatens an act in violation of another party's rights and tending to render the judgment ineffectual].) Funding does not meet its burden to show its irreparable harm, such that the balance of equities favors an injunction. Funding cites no substantive evidence that IWMG or Dr. Tantuwaya are dissipating the disputed funds rendering ineffectual any resulting judgment. Funding merely asserts in conclusory terms that the funds are at risk of dissipation by Cross-Defendants IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya as they are attempting to use the funds due to Funding for their own benefit to pay restitution to IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya's victims in the open and ongoing criminal investigation against Dr. Tantuwaya. (Marchant Decl., ¶ 18.) Cross-Defendants deny this assertion. (Krieger Decl., ¶¶ 4-6.) Indeed, restitution could not be owed in an open and ongoing criminal investigation. IWMG and Dr. Tantuwaya also present evidence that they continue to generate funds and receivables through their ongoing medical practices. (Tantuwaya Decl., ¶ 122.) Any judgment against them would therefore not be ineffectual. Funding therefore fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.