Document for LIVING TRUST DATED JANUARY 18, 2018 THE LAST WILL OF LINDA PRIDE

Case Number: 23GDCV02489 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 07/11/2024 8:30am Case No. 23GDCV02489 Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: VARTOUHIE ACHAKIAN, an individual; v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, and CALSTAR MOTORS INC., a California Corporation d/b/a CALSTAR MOTORS, and DOES 1-10, inclusive TENTATIVE RULING COMPEL RESPONSES BACKGROUND Plaintiff, Vartouhie Achakian, filed a Complaint on 11/22/2023 alleging three causes of action. The first two causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty and (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Implied Warranty are alleged against Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. The third cause of action for negligent repair is alleged against Defendant, Calstar Motors Inc., a California Corporation dba Calstar Motors. RELIEF REQUESTED ¿ Plaintiff Vartouhie Achakian (Plaintiff) will, and hereby does, move for an order deeming the truth of matters admitted in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One. This Motion pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2033.280, subdivision (a), and 2033.280, subdivision (b), on the grounds that Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, (MBUSA or Defendant) has failed to provide any responses to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions (RFA), which seek information directly relevant and material to their claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA). Thus, Plaintiff seeks an order deeming the truth of matters admitted. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,904.00, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2031.310, 2023,030, et seq for Defendants misuse and abuse of the discovery act and its failure to file any responses or production to Plaintiffs initial set of RFAs. The Motion is based upon this Notice, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Luis A. Serrano, the papers on file, and upon any other matters that may be presented to the Court at the hearing. No separate statement is being submitted in support of the instant Motion, as it is not required pursuant to rule 3.1345(b), of the California Rules of Court. (LAS Decl., ¶ 18.) (Mot. p. 2.) Procedural Moving Party: Plaintiff, Vartouhie Achakian Responding Party: Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC Moving Papers: Notice/Motion; Serrano Declaration; Proposed Order Opposition Papers: Opposition Reply: Reply; Serrano Declaration 16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Ok LEGAL STANDARD REQUEST TO DEEM ADMISSIONS ADMITTED Within 30 days after service of requests for admission, the party to whom the requests are directed shall serve the original of the response to them on the requesting party, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared, unless on motion of the requesting party the court has shortened the time for response, or unless on motion of the responding party the court has extended the time for response. (CCP § 2033.250(a).) If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). (CCP § 2033.280(b).) Further, If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, the following rules apply: (a) The party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010). The court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with Sections 2033.210, 2033.220, and 2033.230. (2) The partys failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (CCP § 2033.280(a).) The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (CCP § 2033.280(c).) ANALYSIS Plaintiffs Moving Arguments Plaintiff moves this Court for an order deeming all requests admitted without objections, to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions, due to Defendant, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLCs (MBUSA) failure and outright refusal to provide any responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions. Plaintiffs counsel, Serrano, states that the instant discovery was propounded on January 3, 2024. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 1.) Serrano states that responses were due no later than February 2, 2024. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 10.) As of May 29, 2024, Serrano states that Defendants counsel has not responded to Plaintiffs discovery. (See Serrano Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendants Opposition Arguments Defendants Opposition appears to argue that either: (1) this hearing be continued for 60-75 days to investigate the issues raised in the motion, or (2) this motion be denied because Plaintiff failed to properly serve the RFAs to Defendants email authorized for service of pleadings and written discovery; therefore, Defendant had no obligation to provide the responses Plaintiff now seeks via its motion. Continuance Defendant first argues that the hearing on this motion be continued for 60-75 days. Defendant argues that the attorney handling the discovery and motions in this case has recently taken a leave of absence and has not been in communication with the Defendants firm. Defendant thus argues that its counsel has been unable to discuss the facts of the preparation and service of discovery with the handling attorney. Defendant argues that a 60-75 day continuance will provide the time necessary to investigate the status of the discovery in this case and present all relevant facts to the Court. Defendant also argues: It is MBUS contention that such circumstances provide the substantial justification or are the kind of circumstances [which] make the imposition of the sanction unjust that the California Legislature had in mind pursuant to Civil Code Section 2030.290(c). Therefore, the Court should deny Plaintiffs requested relief at least for the moment and in turn continue the Motion hearing for 60-75 days. (Oppo. p. 2.) Courts Discussion on Continuance The Court does not find Defendants request for a 60-75 day continuance availing. First, Defendant argued that the attorney handling the discovery and motions in this case recently took a leave of absence and has not been in communication with Defendants law firm. Because of this, Defendant explains that counsel has been unable to discuss the facts of the preparation and service of discovery with the handling attorney. The Court does not find Defendants excuse persuasive or compelling. It is up to Defendants counsel to effectively operate its own law firm so that it can diligently represent its client. Second, Defendant provides no legal authority for its request for a continuance. Defendant cited to 2030.290(c) which pertains to interrogatories, and the instant motion pertains to RFAs. Further, even if this motion pertained to interrogatories, 2030.290(c) addresses the issue of sanctions when compelling responses to interrogatories. CCP § 2030.290(c) does not address what the legal standard is for granting or denying a continuance on a motion to compel responses to RFAs. Failing to Properly Serve the RFAs Defendant argues that the subject discovery requests were not properly served, thus it did not owe a response. Defendant argues as follows: California Rules of Court, Rule 2.251 states: When a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or fax transmission, the document may be served electronically under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. Electronic service under Civ. Proc. Code section 1010.6 means service of a document, on a person, by either electronic transmission or electronic notification. Electronic transmission, in turn, means the transmission of a document by electronic means to the electronic service address at or through which a person receives electronic service. Section 1010.6(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Similarly, Electronic notification means the notification of the person that a document is served by sending an electronic message to the electronic address at or through which the person receives electronic service , specifying the exact name of the document served, and providing a hyperlink at which the served document may be viewed and downloaded. Section 1010.6(a)(1)(C). Electronic service is only effective under the Code if the service is to the electronic service address which the receiving party has agreed to be served. That was not done. In this case, the electronic service address is MBUSA@clarkhill.com. Plaintiff cannot produce evidence that he served the MBUSA@clarkhill.com email address, the correct email account. In the Proof of Service dated January 3, 2024, Noel Castellon of Plaintiffs law firm declares under penalty of perjury that Castellon served the subject discovery BY ELECTORNIC MAIL to several addresses, none of which was MBUSA@clarkhill.com. (Hom Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) While it is correct that Plaintiff and MBUSA had an agreement to accept service by e-mail, by and through counsel, that agreement required Plaintiff to serve any such documents to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com. Any documents not served to MBUSA@clarkhill.com falls outside of the e-service agreement and is not proper service. This is not a valid service address for MBUSA in this case. (Hom Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs counsel knew that all service by e-mail must be sent to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com. The current motion to compel, for instance, was served on May 29, 2024, on MBUSA@clarkhill.com. The agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail did not change between January 3, 2024, when Plaintiff served the discovery requests, and May 29, 2024, when Plaintiff served the present motion. Plaintiffs counsel knew and understood what email addresses needed to be served and failed to serve the correct email box MBUSA@clarkhill.com when they served the subject discovery. That failing is fatal to the instant Motion because it demonstrates that the subject discovery was not properly served, and no responses were required. (Hom Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions were not properly served pursuant to C.C.P. section 2031.080(a), and MBUSA was not obligated to respond. (Oppo. p. 2-4.) Courts Discussion on Failing to Properly Serve the RFAs Defendant cites to CRC, Rule 2.251 without specifying which subsection of 2.251 it is citing. It appears as if Defendant is citing to a portion of 2.251(a) which states in relevant part, When a document may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or fax transmission, the document may be served electronically under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6[.] (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.251(a).) The Court notes that Defendants citation to 2.251(a) is not particularly helpful. Defendant argued that Plaintiff served the wrong e-mail address, but Defendants citation provides no help on how the Court is determine what the proper service address is for any given party. Defendant also cited to CCP § 1010.6(a)(1)(B) and 1010.6(a)(1)(C). These citations are also unhelpful to the Court. As stated in CCP § 1010.6(a): (a) A document may be served electronically in an action filed with the court as provided in this section, in accordance with rules adopted pursuant to subdivision (h). (1) For purposes of this section: (A) Electronic service means service of a document, on a person, by either electronic transmission or electronic notification. Electronic service may be performed directly by a person, including a party, by a persons agent, including the persons attorney, or through an electronic filing service provider, and by a court. (B) Electronic transmission means the transmission of a document by electronic means to the electronic service address at or through which a person receives electronic service. (C) Electronic notification means the notification of the person that a document is served by sending an electronic message to the electronic address at or through which the person receives electronic service, specifying the exact name of the document served, and providing a hyperlink at which the served document may be viewed and downloaded. (D) Electronic filing means the electronic transmission to a court of a document presented for filing in electronic form. For purposes of this section, this definition of electronic filing concerns the activity of filing and does not include the processing and review of the document and its entry into the courts records, which are necessary for a document to be officially filed. (CCP § 1010.6(a)(1)(A)-(D).) Defendant argues that Electronic service is only effective under the Code if the service is to the electronic service address which the receiving party has agreed to be served. (Oppo. p. 3.) As a preliminary matter, the Court points out that Defendant provided no legal authority for this argument. Defendant then concedes that Plaintiff and MBUSA had an agreement to accept service by e-mail and that that agreement required Plaintiff to serve documents to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com. Defendant argues that since Plaintiffs counsel knew that all service by e-mail must be sent to MBUSA@clarkhill.com, and since the discovery was not served to MBUSA@clarkhill.com, the subject discovery was not properly served and no responses were required. While Defendant bolded specific portions of § 1010.6(a)(1)(B) that stated, to the electronic service address at or through which a person receives electronic service, this citation does not address how the Court is to determine what is the proper electronic service address. Further, even if the Court were to accept Defendants argument that electronic service is only effective under the Code if the service is to the electronic service address which the receiving party has agreed to be served, Defendant does not come forward with proof of any type of agreement that shows where the parties agreed to be electronically served. Defendants counsels declaration simply stated in relevant part, While it is correct that Plaintiff and MBUSA had an agreement to accept service by email, by and through counsel, that agreement required Plaintiff to serve any such documents to the email address MBUSA@clarkhill.com." (Hom Decl. ¶ 4.) The Opposition also argues that Plaintiff served the instant motion to the correct email address, as opposed to the discovery at issue, because Plaintiffs counsel knew and understood what email address needed to be served. Opposition argues that even though the instant motion was served at the proper email address on 5/29/2024, when Plaintiff previously served the discovery on January 3, 2024, nothing between January 3, 2024 and 5/29/2024 changed with the parties agreement, thus, Opposition appears to be implying that Plaintiff knew the proper service email address all along. However, this argument doesnt help the Court assess how it is to determine what the proper email service address of the parties is. The Court will hear argument on what Defendant is attempting to assert with respect to CCP § 1010.6(a)(1). Plaintiffs Reply Arguments Courts Discussion on Untimely Opposition Plaintiff points out that Defendant untimely served the Opposition on 6/27/2024. The Court does not find this argument availing. First, Plaintiff neither explains nor makes it clear to how the Opposition is untimely. Further, even if the Opposition is untimely, the Court will utilize its discretion and consider the Opposition. Courts Discussion on CCP § 1010.6 and CRC, rule 2.251 Plaintiffs Reply argues that when Defendant, a represented party, filed its Answer on December 21, 2023, Defendant affirmatively consented to e-service under § 1010.6 et seq. and Rule 2.251(b)(1)(B). For the reasons explained below, the Court will explain the problems it had analyzing Plaintiffs arguments that the instant discovery was properly served. Plaintiff states in the Reply: Rule 2.251(c)(1) of the California Rules of the Court, expressly provides that [a] court may require parties to serve documents electronically in specified civil actions by local rule or court order, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter. (Reply, p. 4.) The Court fails to understand Plaintiffs argument. CRC, rule 2.251(c)(1) states, A court may require parties to serve documents electronically in specified civil actions by local rule or court order, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter. (CRC, Rule 2.251(c)(1).) The Court fails to understand Plaintiffs argument because 2.251(c)(1) does not address how the Court is to determine what the proper email address is for the parties to be served at. Plaintiff also stated in Reply: Section 1010.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that documents filed by represented parties in all limited, unlimited, and complex civil actions must be filed electronically and allow for service electronically , unless the Court excuses parties from doing so. Although not required, self-represented parties are encouraged to participate in electronic filing and service. If a party with a fee waiver files documents electronically, that party is exempt from the fees and costs associated with electronic filing. Thus, contrary to MBUSAs position, Rule 2.251 et seq. confirms that service of Plaintiffs initial set of discovery was properly on effected on December 21, 2023. (Serrano Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) (Reply, p. 4-5.) The Court again fails to understand Plaintiffs argument. First, Plaintiff does not specify which subsection of § 1010.6 that Plaintiff is quoting from, and the Court is unclear as to which subsection of § 1010.6 Plaintiff is quoting from. Further, whatever legal authority Plaintiff is attempting to cite, Plaintiffs argument does not address the issue of how the Court is to determine the proper electronic service address for the parties. Plaintiff also stated in Reply: Section 1010.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, made effective January 1, 2023, works in conjunction with Rule 2.251 of the California Rules of the Court, which, together, unequivocally authorizes electronic service as an appropriate medium of service for parties that have appeared in action and are represented by counsel for which the Court requires mandatory e-filing under 1010.6(h), without requiring any prior consent. In fact, 1010.6(b)(2), expressly confirms that [a] person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. Notably, the statutory schemes only reference to prior consent to e-service is embodied in subdivision (c)(1-2). However, this is limited to unrepresented part[ies], which MBUSAs Answer confirms it is not. In any event 1010.6(c)(3)(ii), provides that affirmative consent to e-service of even non-represented parties can be established through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. (Reply, p. 5, ln. 7-19.) The Court has several problems with Plaintiffs arguments. First, Plaintiff cites § 1010.6(b)(2) which states, A person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. ( Ibid .) An issue with Plaintiffs argument is that the citation does not address how the Court is to determine the proper service address of the parties. Second, Plaintiff cites to § 1010.6(c)(1)-(2). The Court does not find Plaintiffs citation availing. Although Plaintiff argues that the statutory schemes only reference to prior consent to e-service is embodied in § 1010.6(c)(1)-(2), that does not appear to be the case. CCP § 1010.6(c) applies to electronic service by consent of an unrepresented person in a civil action. Here, the Defendant that Opposed this motion is not an unrepresented person. Further, while Plaintiff argues the only reference to prior consent to e-service is embodied in § 1010.6(c)(1)-(2), § 1010.6(b)(3) seems to be more on point as it pertains to represented parties and what must be done before first serving electronically. With respect to the Replys arguments on page 5, lines 7-19, the Court does not find the arguments availing because it does not provide legal authority that addresses the issue that is before this Court, i.e. , how the Court is to determine what the proper service address is. Further, while the Reply on page 5, lines 7-19 cites 1010.6(b)(2), the Reply fails to cite § 1010.6(b)(3), which appears as if it would have been helpful to the Court. As stated in § 1010.6(b): (b) (1) This subdivision applies to mandatory electronic service. The court may order electronic service on a person represented by counsel who has appeared in an action or proceeding. (2) A person represented by counsel, who has appeared in an action or proceeding, shall accept electronic service of a notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. (3) Before first serving a represented person electronically, the person effecting service shall confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served. (4) A person represented by counsel shall, upon the request of any person who has appeared in an action or proceeding and who provides an electronic service address, electronically serve the requesting person with any notice or document that may be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or facsimile transmission. (CCP § 1010.6(b)(1)-(4).) Therefore, § 1010.6(b)(2) appears relevant because the Defendant opposing this motion seems to have appeared on 12/21/2023 when its counsel filed an Answer. Further, what the Reply failed to cite to was § 1010.6(b)(3) which stated, Before first serving a represented person electronically, the person effecting service shall confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served. ( Ibid .) Here, the Reply does not address 1010.6(b)(3). Under 1010.6(b)(3), it appears as if Plaintiff was to confirm the appropriate electronic service address for the counsel being served; however, the Reply does not address this. The Court will hear argument. Reply also states: Rule 2.251(b)(1)(B) sets forth the means by which a party may manifest express consent to eservice, specifically providing that [m]anifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the partys electronic service address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. A party or other person may manifest affirmative consent by serving notice of consent to all parties and other persons and either: (i) Agreeing to the terms of service with an electronic filing service provider, which clearly states that agreement constitutes consent to receive electronic service; or (ii) Filing Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address (form EFS-005-CV). (See also, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.253, subds. (b)(1)-(6) [conditions for mandatory e-filing set forth by local rule.) Here, because MBUSA, a represented party, electronically filed its Answer, on December 21, 2023, it has affirmatively consented to e-service under Section 1010.6 et seq. and Rule 2.251(b)(1)(B). (Serrano Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) Moreover, Plaintiff properly effectuated service on Defendants counsel of record after Defendants Answer was electronically filed with Court. (Serrano Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Moreover, Plaintiffs electronic service of the RFAs was made on the attorneys listed on the first page of Defendants Answer. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 9.) Whats more, Defendant failed to list their electronic service address of MBUSA@clarkhill.com on their email when they electronically served their Answer on Plaintiffs counsel. Consequently, Plaintiffs service of RFAs was unequivocally occurred electronically on January 3, 2024; thereby rendering MBUSAs boilerplate objections as improper and an abuse of discovery under Rule 2.251(b)(1)(A). MBUSAs tactics are clearly a bad faith stratagem designed to obstruct Plaintiffs efforts to conduct meaningful discovery, which Plaintiff is rightfully entitled. (Reply, p. 5, ln. 20-28 p.6 ln. 1-12.) The Court has several issues with the arguments asserted in the Reply from page 5, lines 20-28 to page 6, lines 1-12. Plaintiff cites to CRC, rule 2.251(b)(1(B) to argue that by Defendant electronically filing an Answer, and by Defendant listing several email addresses on said Answer, the email addresses listed on the Answer demonstrate that Defendant affirmatively consented to be electronically served documents at the email addresses listed on said Answer. The Court does not find this argument availing because rule 2.251(b)(1)(B) does not say anything about how the email addresses listed on an Answer determine where a party can receive electronic service. For the sake of clarity, the Court will cite CRC, rule 2.251(b) in full below: (b) Electronic service by express consent (1) A party or other person indicates that the party or other person agrees to accept electronic service by: (A) Serving a notice on all parties and other persons that the party or other person accepts electronic service and filing the notice with the court. The notice must include the electronic service address at which the party or other person agrees to accept service; or (B) Manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic service address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. A party or other person may manifest affirmative consent by serving notice of consent to all parties and other persons and either: (i) Agreeing to the terms of service with an electronic filing service provider, which clearly states that agreement constitutes consent to receive electronic service; or (ii) Filing Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address (form EFS-005-CV). (2) A party or other person that has consented to electronic service under (1) and has used an electronic filing service provider to serve and file documents in a case consents to service on that electronic filing service provider as the designated agent for service for the party or other person in the case, until such time as the party or other person designates a different agent for service. (CRC, Rule 2.251(b)(1)-(2).) Although Plaintiffs Reply argues that 2.251(b) shows that Defendant can be served at the email addresses listed on the Answer because the Answer was electronically filed, the Court fails to see how Plaintiff arrives at such a conclusion based on 2.251(b). Therefore, both parties should be prepared to address all aspects of CRC, rule 2.251(b) at the hearing. For example, both parties should be prepared to address if 2.251(b)(1) or 2.251(b)(2) is applicable here. Further, if the parties think 2.251(b)(1) is applicable, they need to explain if 2.251(b)(1) has been met by either 2.251(b)(1)(A) or 2.251(b)(1)(B). Further, the Court notes that eCourt lists counsel for MBUSA as Brian Hom. On eCourt, Brian Homs email address is listed as bhom@clarkhill.com. The discovery at issue here was in fact served at bhom@clarkhill.com. CRC, rule 2.251(b)(1)(B) states, Manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the court's electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the party's electronic service address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. Here, it would be helpful for the Court if Defendant came forward with any documents it filed/signed with the electronic service provider when initially filing its Answer. The instant discovery was served at the email address that Defendants counsel provided on eCourt; however, it is unclear as to what email address Defendants counsel provided to the electronic filing service provider as the email address that it consents to for the purpose of receiving electronic service. Further, the parties should be prepared to address 2.251(b)(2) because (b)(2) addresses how a party can consent to service on the electronic filing service provider. Likewise, Defendant alleged it had an agreement to be electronically served at MBUSA@clarkhill.com; therefore, Defendant should be prepared to come forward with this alleged agreement. Courts Discussion on Additional Arguments in Reply On page 2 of the Reply, Plaintiff points out that nowhere in the Opposition or the accompanying Brian Hom Declaration does MBUSA claim it was not in possession or had not received Plaintiffs discovery. Reply points out that the declaration merely points out that service was improper. Reply argues that it is thus safe to assume that MBUSA received the discovery. The Court notes that while it is true that the Opposition and the Hom Declaration fail to state that it never received the discovery, the problem with the Replys argument is it fails to explain how this argument is legally relevant. This argument seems to be rooted in the common-sense argument that Defendant must have received the discovery because Defendants declaration did not state that it did not receive the discovery. However, this does not help the Court because Plaintiff does not explain how this argument is legally relevant for determining the ruling on this motion. On page 2 of the Reply, Plaintiff also argues that MBUSA cited no applicable statutory authority to support its position that it did not have to respond to the discovery because the service address was improper. Here, the Court will hear argument. TENTATIVE RULING OVERALL The Court will hear argument. Both parties should be prepared to address all issues the Court noted in its Analysis section. Both parties should be prepared to address CCP § 1010.6(b)(3) and CRC, Rule 2.251(b)(1)-(2). Further, both parties should be prepared to come forward with any alleged agreements on service, or any documents filed/signed with the Courts electronic filing service provider that either party would need to prove its argument. If the Court were to find that the instant discovery was properly served, the Court notes that Opposition did not address the merits of Plaintiffs motion. Therefore, it would appear as if the Court could deem the truth of the matters admitted in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One, since Defendant has not provided any responses, much less timely responses. Further, Defendants argument on a request for a continuance is unavailing. But to take a step back for a moment from the minutiae of e-service procedures, the Court is aware that the parties before the Court handle matters together frequently. The parties appear in this Department almost daily on various matters. It is well accepted in the case law and elsewhere that discovery is primarily meant to be dealt with by counsel, corresponding and discussing the issues that arise with each other in good faith and with a spirit of professionalism. To require the parsing of various statutes and Rules of Court regarding electronic service on discovery matters such as this oneif disputes like this one became commonplacewould literally bring the calendar in this Department to a grinding halt. For perspective, imagine a member of the public reading this tentative decision. Besides having their eyes glaze over, that imagined member of the public would perhaps justifiably ask themselves what was going on in the courts the taxpayers were funding? Thirteen pages of small type about email addresses? In any event, in the interests of efficiency, the parties are encouraged to attempt, as best they can, to talk to each other and work out issues like service and confirming receipt of discovery requests and other items with professional courtesies such as a follow up telephone call or email. Simple follow-up steps like these could potentially save the parties and the Court unnecessary expenditure of resources on contretemps such as the one presented in this motion. Sanctions Requests for Admission It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (CCP § 2033.280(c).) The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,904.00. Plaintiff bases its sanctions request on the following: " Draft Plaintiffs meet and confer letter regarding Defendants lack of responses to Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions. .5 of an hour; " Draft Plaintiffs Notice of Motion and Motion to Deem the RFAs Admitted Without Objections. 2 hours; " Draft Declaration in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Deem the RFAs Admitted Without Objections Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One. - .7 hours; " Anticipated time to review Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Deem Admitted to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One, and Draft Plaintiffs Reply Brief. 2.5 hours; " Anticipated time to prepare for, and attend, the hearing regarding Motion to Deem the RFAs Admitted to Plaintiffs Request for Admissions, Set One. 1 hour " Filing fee - $60.00 16. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs counsels also states his billable rate is $395.00 per hour. (See Serrano Decl. ¶ 16.) The Court will hear argument.

Case Number: 23CHCV00264 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F47 Date: 7/11/24 Case #23CHCV00264 MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED Motion filed on 4/4/24. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Rock Creek Capital, LLC RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant Norma S. Carcamo NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED : An order deeming the truth of matters specified in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions served on Defendant Norma S. Carcamo. RULING : The motion is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION & PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 1/30/23, Plaintiff Rock Creek Capital, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Norma S. Carcamo (Defendant) for breach of contract. On 4/4/23, Defendant, representing herself, filed an answer to the complaint. On 2/2/24, Plaintiff served Defendant, by U.S. Mail, with Requests for Admissions, Set 1. (Aguirre Decl., Ex.1). Defendant failed to serve responses. (Aguirre Decl.). Therefore, on 4/4/24, Plaintiff filed and served the instant motion seeking an order deeming the truth of matters specified in Plaintiffs Request for Admissions served on Defendant. Defendant has not opposed or otherwise responded to the motion. ANALYSIS Due to Defendants failure to respond to the Requests for Admissions, Plaintiff is entitled to an order deeming the matters admitted. CCP 2033.280(b), (c). CONCLUSION The motion is granted.

Case Number: 23CHCV03036 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 7-10-24 Case #23CHCV03036, Allison M. Harada vs. Carlos Martinez, Jr. Trial Date: N/A MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Allison M. Harada RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Defendant Carlos Martinez, Jr.s responses to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories, as well as sanctions. RULING : Motion is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION On November 30, 2023, Plaintiff Allison M. Harada (Plaintiff) served form interrogatories on Defendant Carlos Martinez, Jr. (Defendant). Responses to the form interrogatories were due on January 4, 2024. No responses were served by that date. Plaintiff never received any responses to her discovery requests. Plaintiff filed this motion to compel discovery responses to the form interrogatories on April 18, 2024. No opposition has been filed. Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $810.00 against Defendant. Form Interrogatories The propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and monetary sanctions if a party to whom the interrogatories are directed fails to respond. (CCP §§ 2030.290, 2030.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404.) Responses to interrogatories are due within thirty days from the date of service of the interrogatories. (CCP §§ 2030.260(a), 2016.050.) The responding party waives any objections to the interrogatories by failing to serve responses in a timely manner. (CCP § 2030.290(a).) Defendant has failed to respond to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories. Plaintiff has moved for an order compelling Defendants response to these Interrogatories. The Court grants Plaintiffs motion to compel responses to the Form Interrogatories. Sanctions CCP § 2023.030 authorizes the Court to issue sanctions against a party engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. Failure to respond to discovery, evasive responses, and objections lacking substantial justification are misuses of the discovery process. (CCP § 2023.010, subd. (d)-(f).) Plaintiff has requested sanctions in the amount of $810.00 against Defendant. The amount was based on Plaintiffs counsel spending 0.5 hours preparing this motion at $750 an hour; an anticipated 0.5 hours reviewing the opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing, plus the $60 filing fee. (Young Decl., ¶ 9.) While no opposition was filed, Plaintiff did file a notice of no opposition and will attend the hearing on this motion; therefore, the Court grants the sanctions in the full requested amount. Plaintiffs request for sanctions against Defendant is granted in the total amount of $810.00. ORDER 1. Plaintiffs motion to compel responses to the form interrogatories is granted. 2. Defendant is ordered to serve responses within twenty (20) days. 3. Defendant is ordered to pay sanctions in the total amount of $810.00. Defendant is ordered to pay these sanctions to Plaintiffs counsel within twenty (20) days.

Case Number: 22STCV09946 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 52 Plaintiff Lauren Taxters Motions to Compel: (1) Deposition of Defendants Person Most Qualified, (2) Responses to Form Interrogatories, (3) Responses to Special Interrogatories Motion to Compel Deposition Plaintiff Lauren Taxter moves to compel the deposition of defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLCs person most qualified on several matters of examination. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a) provides, If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action & without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, & the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony. Plaintiff does not show defendant failed to appear for a deposition. Plaintiff served a notice of deposition of defendants person most qualified on several topics for March 2, 2024, which was a Saturday. (Gabrielyan Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiff served an amended notice of deposition to take place on March 11. ( Id. , ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Before that date, plaintiff agreed to reschedule the deposition. (Motion, p. 5.) Defendants counsel did not respond to plaintiffs counsels requests for alternate dates to depose defendants person most qualified. (Gabrielyan Decl., ¶¶ 7-9, Ex. C.) Plaintiff did not, however, serve a second amended notice of deposition for which defendant failed to appear. Plaintiff agreed to reschedule the deposition. Failing to provide alternate dates for a deposition is not the same as failing to appear at a properly noticed deposition. I t may be a professional courtesy to mutually schedule a deposition, but the Civil Discovery Act does not require that. An oral deposition shall be scheduled for a date at least 10 days after service of the deposition notice. (CCP § 2025.270(a).) The service of a deposition notice under Section 2025.240 is effective to require any deponent who is a party to the action& to attend and to testify. (CCP § 2025.280(a).) Plaintiff had to serve a new notice of deposition. If defendant did not appear on the date as noticed, then plaintiff could move to compel the deposition. Motions to Compel Responses to Form and Special Interrogatories Plaintiff Lauren Taxter moves to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to form interrogatories, set seven and special interrogatories, set one. When the responding party fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses. (CCP § 2030.290(b).) Failing to serve a timely response waives any objection to the interrogatories. (Id., subd. (a).) Plaintiff served form interrogatories - general, set seven and special interrogatories, set one, on defendant on January 26, 2024. (Gabrielyan Decls., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs counsel agreed to extend defendants deadline to respond to March 7. ( Id. , ¶ 7.) Defendant had not served any responses as of May 14, when plaintiff filed these motions. ( Id. , ¶ 11.) Defendant did not serve a timely response to plaintiffs form interrogatories, set seven and special interrogatories, set one. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an order compelling defendant to serve verified responses without objections to the interrogatories. On each motion, plaintiff moves for $1,460 in sanctions against defendant. Failing to respond to an authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process subject to monetary sanctions. (CCP § 2023.010(d).) Defendant failed to respond to plaintiffs interrogatories. It did not act with substantial justification. Sanctions are just under the circumstances. Plaintiff, however, did not reasonably incur $1,460 in expenses for each motion. These expenses include 2 hours of attorney fees at $350 hourly anticipated for reviewing defendants oppositions and preparing replies. (Gabrielyan Decls., ¶ 12.) Defendant did not file an opposition. Plaintiff did not file a reply. The court therefore reduces the sanctions by $700 on each motion. Disposition Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendants deposition is denied . Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to form interrogatories, set seven, is granted . Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to serve verified responses without objections to form interrogatories general, set seven, within 20 days. Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to pay plaintiff Lauren Taxter $760 in sanctions within 20 days. Plaintiff Lauren Taxters motion to compel defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC to respond to special interrogatories, set one, is granted . Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to serve verified responses without objections to plaintiffs special interrogatories, set one, within 20 days. Defendant 900 South Figueroa Street Apartments Investors LLC is ordered to pay plaintiff Lauren Taxter $760 in sanctions within 20 days.

Case Number: 22STCV26196 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 22STCV26196 MOTIONS : Motion to be Relieved from Waiver of Objections to Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: Cross-Defendant A.J. Molino & Associates, Inc. BACKGROUND Defendant/Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (Cross-Complainant), moves for relief from waiver of objections to Cross-Defendant A.J. Molino & Associates, Inc.s (Cross-Defendant) Request for Production, Set One and Request for Admission, Set One. Cross-Defendant opposes and Cross-Complainant replies. LEGAL STANDARD A party who fails to serve a timely response to a demand for inspection (or request for admission) waives any objection to the demand, including based on privilege or work product, unless the court finds that the party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance and the partys failure was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.300 (a), 2033.280(a).) The Civil Discovery Act does not include a definition of substantial compliance, and few cases have addressed the circumstances under which a response will be deemed not in substantial compliance. (See St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 778 ( St. Mary ).) Substantial compliance means actual compliance with respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. ( Id . at 779.) However, substantial compliance should not be understood as requiring actual compliance with every specific statutory requirement. ( Ibid .)¿¿ ¿ A court may not find that only some portions of a document containing responses are code- compliant, but must instead determine whether the document as whole substantially complies. ( St. Mary , supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at 77980 [this position is supported by the fact that there is an effective statutory vehicle to compel a responding party to cure unsatisfactory responses].)¿ The statutory language mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect in the discovery statute should be interpreted using the same general principles developed in application of the identical language in section 473, subdivision (b). ( Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 275.) Although the party moving for relief under section 473 has the burden to show that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was excusable, any doubts as to that showing must be resolved in favor of the moving party. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420.)¿¿ DISCUSSION Cross-Defendant served Request for Production, Set One and Request for Admission, Set One on Cross-Complainant on March 5, 2024. The responses were originally due April 5, 2024. (Sohrabian Decl. ¶ 2-3.) These responses were served on prior counsel. During this time, Cross-Complainant changed representation and the case file was being transferred to current counsel (who moved to a different firm). Current counsel substituted into this case on April 22, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 5.) However, the file still had not been transferred. As a result, Cross-Complainant requested an extension to May 31, 2024, which Cross-Defendant granted. However, [o]n Friday, May 31, 2024, our office experienced technical issues with the file, so our office emailed Cross-Defendants counsel in the evening that we would have responses by Monday morning, June 3, 2024. On June 3, 2024, Cross-Defendants counsel indicated that he had not granted the extension and therefore objections were waived. ( Id. ¶ 10-11.) Cross-Complainants counsel, Tiffany E. Sohrabian, declares that because of the technical issue, she could not access the Request for Production, Set One and Request for Admission, Set One. ( Id. ¶ 14.) Cross-Defendant then re-served the discovery on June 6, 2024, and Cross-Complainant provided responses on June 10, 2024. ( Id. ¶ 15-16.) In opposition, Cross-Defendant confirms that extensions were granted until May 31, 2024. However, when Cross-Complainant asked to serve responses by June 3, 2024, it does not appear that Cross-Defendant agreed. (Opp., 3; Kim Decl. ¶ 24.) Instead, Cross-Defendant demanded responses without objections. Cross-Defendant argues that counsel acted negligently by attempting to complete the responses at the end of the day when they were due. (Opp., 5.) It also argues that the responses are not substantially compliant. Cross-Complainant describes the technical issues with the file with limited detail and asserts in reply, without a supporting declaration, that when Defendant Foot Lockers counsel attempted to open the discovery documents on May 31, 2024, in order to complete the responses, she discovered that the files were corrupted and she was unable to open them. Further, she was unable to obtain another copy of the discovery documents on May 31, 2024, because she did not realize this until after the end of the business day. (Reply, 2.) However, it appears that when Cross-Complainant did receive the re-served electronic versions of discovery on June 6, Cross-Complainant did not complete the responses on the same day, and did not provide them until June 10. Cross-Complainant does not explain the further untimeliness or otherwise provide a basis for the Court to find excusable neglect. This delay undermines Cross-Complainants argument that a technical issue resulted in delay. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Cross-Complainant Foot Locker Retail, Inc.s Motion to be Relieved from Waiver of Objections to Requests for Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents is DENIED. Moving party to provide notice and file a proof of service of such .

Case Number: 21STCV35189 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE : Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court . TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 32 HEARING DATE : July 9, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 21STCV35189 MOTIONS : Motion for Order Authorizing and Requiring Release of Cell Phone Records MOVING PARTY: Defendants Mickey Vasquez, Red Bull North America, Inc., and Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Mickey Vasquez, Red Bull North America, Inc., and Red Bull Distribution Company, Inc. (Defendants) move to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena for Defendant Mickey Vasquezs cell phone records served on non-party T-Mobile USA, Inc. Plaintiff Elia Rosa Mercado Leiva (Plaintiff) has filed a notice of non-opposition. No other opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking discovery from a person who is not a party to the action may obtain discovery by oral deposition, written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010.)¿ A deposition subpoena may command either: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020.)¿ A service of a deposition subpoena shall be affected a sufficient time in advance of the deposition to provide the deponent a reasonable opportunity to locate and produce any designated documents and, where personal attendance is commanded, a reasonable time to travel to the place of deposition.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (a).)¿ Personal service of any deposition subpoena is effective to require a deponent who is a resident of California to: personally appear and testify, if the subpoena so specifies; to produce any specified documents; and to appear at a court session if the subpoena so specifies.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.220, subd. (c).)¿ A deponent who disobeys a deposition subpoena may be punished for contempt without the necessity of a prior order of the court directing compliance by the witness.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.240.)¿A motion to compel compliance with a deposition subpoena must be made within 60 days after completion of the deposition record, the date objections are served, or the date specified for production, and be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., §2025.480, subd., (b); Board of Registered Nursing v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 59 CA5th 1011, 1032-1033.) California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a) states, [i]f a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the courts own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, . . . in making an order pursuant to motion made . . . under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorneys fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . . MEET AND CONFER The Declaration of Anneke J. Shepard , Defendants counsel, does not describe a meet and confer effort. DISCUSSION On June 5, 2024, Defendants personally served a subpoena on T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) requesting cell phone records for Mickey Vasquez (Vasquez). Plaintiff alleges Vasquez was using his cell phone when the subject motor vehicle accident took place. Defendants dispute this theory. Therefore, both parties appear to seek the cell phone records to support their various positions. However, Defendants filed this motion before T-Mobile objected to the subpoena or failed to comply. Defendants appear to bring this motion because Plaintiff previously subpoenaed the records in August 2023. (Shepard Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.) However, at the time, T-Mobile objected that it would not produce the records absent a Court order. It does not appear that Plaintiff attempted to move to compel the subpoena at that time. The instant motion was filed on June 5, 2024. However, the production date specified on their subpoena is June 25, 2024. (Shepard Decl. Exh. F.) Defendants bring this motion anticipating that T-Mobile will also request a Court order before producing the documents. No opposition and no reply has been filed for this motion. Therefore, Defendants produce no evidence that T-Mobile objected or failed to comply with the subpoena. Defendants however attach declarations from Mickey Vasquez and Tania Vasquez, owners of the subject cell phone number, giving authorization for releasing their cell phone records. ( Id. ¶¶ 56, Exh. D, E.) A nonparty must comply (or not) with the subpoena on the date specified for production. If a party is not satisfied with the nonparty's compliance, the party has 60 days in which to meet and confer with the nonparty. These meet and confer efforts do not affect the mandatory 60-day deadline. The meet and confer process is part of the 60-day period in which to file a motion; it does not extend it. If the party is still unsatisfied with the nonparty's compliance with any portion of the subpoena at the end of this period (because, for example, the nonparty still has not produced the requested documents), the party may file a motion to compel. ( Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court of Orange County (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 103435.) Therefore, since there is no evidence that T-Mobile objected to the subpoena or failed to comply, the motion to compel compliance is conditionally denied, subject to Defendant providing updated information at the hearing. The Court further notes that counsels failure to meet and confer further provides the Court with no information regarding T-Mobiles position as to this current motion.

Case Number: 20SMCV01023 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: M CASE NAME: Klenk v. Behringer Harvard Redwood LLC, et al. CASE NO.: 20SMCV01023 MOTION: Motion for Attorneys Fees Motion to Tax Costs HEARING DATE: 7/10/2024 Legal Standard Attorneys Fees With respect to attorney fees and costs, unless they are specifically provided for by statute (e.g., CCP §§ 1032, et seq.), the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.¿(CCP § 1021.) The prevailing party on a contract, which specifically provides for attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the agreement, is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a); CCP §§ 1032, 1033.5(a)(10)(A).)¿The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine the prevailing party and shall fix, as an element of the costs of suit, the reasonable attorney fees.¿(Civ. Code § 1717(a), (b).)¿Any notice of motion to claim attorney fees as an element of costs under shall be served and filed before or at the same time the memorandum of costs is served and filed; if only attorney fees are claimed as costs, the notice of motion shall be served and filed within the time specified in CRC 3.1700 for filing a memorandum of costs.¿(CRC 3.1702; Gunlock Corp. v. Walk on Water, Inc. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303, fn. 1.) It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ( Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 624.) The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the lodestar [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. ( Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) [A] computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys fee award. ( Margolin v. Regl Planning Commn (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 [discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys fees award].) Such an approach anchors the trial courts analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorneys services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. ( Id . at 48, fn. 23.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. ( Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.) In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.¿( Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)¿General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. ( Ibid .) Costs The prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. (CCP § 1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108.) Prevailing party includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. (CCP § 1032 (a)(4).) Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. (CCP § 1033.5(c)(2).) If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. ( Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774.) On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Ibid.) Analysis Defendants GS Redwood Property LLC and Greystar California Inc. (Defendants) move for an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.4 and Rule of Court, rule 3.1702. Defendants seek attorneys fees in the amount of at least $169,139.20, and an award of costs in the amount of $63,749.55. Defendants also move to tax Plaintiff Wendy Klenks verified memorandum of costs, filed January 31, 2024. Defendants Costs Defendants claim $63,749.55 in costs. However, Defendants failed to file a memorandum of costs as required by California Rules of Court (CRC), rule 3.1700. A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment[.] (CRC Rule 3.1700(a).) Judgment was entered on December 20, 2023. Notice was filed on January 11, 2024. Plaintiff timely filed a memorandum of costs as the prevailing party at trial on January 31, 2024. Defendants did not file or serve any memorandum of costs. The instant motion for fees and costs was not filed until February 20, 2024. Thus, the request for costs is untimely. Defendants contend that a memorandum of costs is not required for attorneys fees pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1702. Indeed, no memorandum of costs is required for attorneys fees unless such fees are fixed without the necessity of a court determination. (CRC Rule. 3.1702(e).) However, the instant request concerns costs outside of attorneys fees. Notably, Rule 3.1702 does not refer to such costs at all. Thus, Defendants were not excused from CRC Rule 3.1700s requirement that a memorandum of costs be filed within 15 days of service of notice of judgment to recover costs as a prevailing party. Since Defendants failed to comply with this mandatory provision, costs cannot be awarded. Furthermore, the Court would disallow the costs claimed for inspection and testing. (Ward Decl., Ex. E.) Such costs are not expressly allowed by statute. (CCP § 1033.5(b)(1)-(2), (c)(2).) If considered on the merits, the Court would strike the request for $23,916.40 and for $8,635.00 related to testing/inspection of the property. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to the cost request. Attorneys Fees Section 194 2.4(b)(2) provides for recovery of reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party in a suit between landlord and tenant regarding untenable conditions. The trial court has discretion to determine which party, if any, is the prevailing party on a practical level. ( Galan v. Wolfriver Holding Corp. , (2000) 80 Cal. App. 4th 1124, 1128.) A prevailing defendant may recover only reasonable attorney fees incurred in [its] defense of the action by [the plaintiff]. ( Hill v. Affirmed Housing Group (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1197.) To the extent [a prevailing defendants] shared counsel engaged in litigation activity on behalf of [a codefendant] for which fees are not recoverable, the [trial] court has broad discretion to apportion fees. ( Id .) A court may apportion fees even where the issues are connected, related or intertwined. ( Id .) And although time-keeping and billing procedures may make a requested segregation difficult, they do not, without more, make it impossible. ( Id .) Attorneys fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed. ( Dane-Elec Corp., USA v. Bodokh (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 761, 771.) Thus, [a]pportionment is not required when the claims for relief are so intertwined that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the attorneys time into compensable and noncompensable units. ( Id . at 771-72.) Defendants prevailed on the section 194 2.4 claim and other related habitability issues. On November 28, 2023, the Court granted Defendants motion for judgment of nonsuit on the section 1942.4 claim. The Court found that Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence on the elements related to an inspection, notice of abatement, and delay without good cause. (See Civ. Code §1942.4(a)(2), (3).) Later, on November 30, 2023, the jury returned its verdict in favor of Defendants on the habitability claim, the quiet enjoyment claim, and the nuisance claim, and in favor of Plaintiff on the negligence claim. While the statutory claim was not presented to the jury, the jury considered and rejected the related common law habitability claims. Plaintiff decidedly lost on the habitability issues, including the statutory claim which would have entitled her to attorneys fees. Despite losing on the majority of her claims, and recovering only a small percentage of damages actually requested, Plaintiff did prevail at trial with a recovery of $58,000.00 on her negligence claim. However, on a practical level, Defendants are the prevailing party as to the habitability claims, and Defendants may recover their attorneys fees. In their opposition, Plaintiff argued that all the claims are intertwined and that all of counsels work related to all of the claims. As such, Plaintiff argues that apportionment of fees between the claims is appropriate. Plaintiff requests that the Court reduce the fee award by 50%. Here, Defendants submitted detailed time records for the legal work performed. Defendants attorneys billed 810.4 hours at $237 per hour for a total of $169,139.20. (Ward Decl., Ex. D, G.) The Court finds the reduced hourly rate reasonable in light of counsels experience, education and expertise. The Court will apportion the fees to reflect the mixed success of the Defendants and the interrelated nature of the causes of action. In light of the entirety of the record, and using the lodestar method, the Court finds that a reasonable fee in this instance would be $111,631.87, which represents 534.86 hours of attorney time at the approved rate. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED in the amount of $111,631.87. Motion to Tax Plaintiffs Costs Defendants move to tax Plaintiff Wendy Klenks verified memorandum of costs, filed on January 31, 2024. While Defendants prevailed on the habitability claim, Plaintiff should still be considered the prevailing party at trial. On December 20, 2023, the Court entered judgment against Defendants Greystar California, Inc. and GS Redwood Properties, LLC, jointly and severally, in the sum of $58,000, in favor of Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to allowable costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. Defendants request the Court tax from Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs the following items: Item 1 - Filing and motions fees of $696.54 Item 4 - Deposition costs $3,567.45 Item 5 - Service of process $142 Item 11 - Court reporter fees $3,387.50 As to each item, Defendants argue that the verified costs are unreasonable because Plaintiff does not provide any detail for the Court to determine if Plaintiff is seeking proper costs. However, the cited costs are expressly allowed by statute. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(1), (3), (4), (11).) Plaintiff provided a verified memorandum of costs, confirming that the sought costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case. Therefore, th e burden is on Defendants to demonstrate that such costs were not reasonable or necessary. Defendants do not meet this burden by merely suggesting that Plaintiff must present further details beyond the verified memorandum. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

Case Number: 20STCV49018 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C GAMEZ, ET AL. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL. CASE NO.: 20STCV49018 HEARING: 7/10/24 #5 TENTATIVE RULING Defendants County of Los Angeles, Leticia Garcia, Francine Jimenez, and Gabriela Alcalas Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication is CONTINUED to July 24, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. Moving party to give notice.