Clerk Notice: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. VS MIGHTY MIKE PLUMBING, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

Case Number: 20STCV35324 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 16220 LINDA TERRACE LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. HA TIKVA MANAGEMENT LLC, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV35324 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER FOR RELIEF FROM WAIVER OF EXPERT WITNESSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 On September 15, 2020, Plaintiffs 16220 Linda Terrace LLC and Scott A. Moore filed this action against Defendants Ha Tikva Management LLC and Eugene Rapaport. On January 17, 2023, the parties exchanged expert witness information. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 2.) When Defendants current handling attorney took over this case, he discovered that a withdrawal of expert witnesses was inadvertently served on Plaintiffs. (Kalter Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) On August 11, 2023 and September 7, 2023, Defendants counsel informed Plaintiffs counsel about the inadvertent disclosure. (Kalter Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Defendants counsel has never received any request to depose Defendants expert witnesses. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendants counsel attempted to get a stipulation for relief from waiver, but Plaintiffs did not agree. (Kalter Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) On June 12, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for relief from waiver of expert witnesses. Plaintiffs did not file any oppositions. On motion of any party who has failed to submit expert witness information on the date specified in a demand for that exchange, the court may grant leave to submit that information on a later date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.710.) Defendants provided their expert witness information on January 17, 2023, for experts Sergey Shvartsman and Tatyana Skevin. Defendants discovered the erroneous withdrawal by August 11, 2023 and notified Plaintiffs. Trial is not until October 28, 2024, and there is sufficient time for Plaintiffs to depose Defendants experts. No prejudice is shown. Accordingly, the unopposed Motion for Order for Relief from Waiver of Expert Witnesses is GRANTED. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23STCV09558 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Case Name: Gary R. Belz, et al. v. Cyber 1 LLC, et al. Case No.: 23STCV09558 Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication Moving Party: Plaintiff Gary R. Belz, et al. Responding Party: Defendants Cyber 1, LLC, Norman Kravetz and Douglas Jacobsen Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Based on the undisputed facts, (1) Defendants defaulted on their obligations under the Note and personal guarantees; and (2)there is currently an outstanding balance of $4,883,666.77. Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff is also the owner of the collateral pledged as security for the personal guarantees executed by Defendants Kravetz and Jacobsen. No triable issues of fact remain as to any of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. I. Background Plaintiff Gary R. Belz, as representative for the benefit of himself and Gary Belz Family LP (collectively, Lender) provided a single credit facility of $4,550,000 evidenced by a Promissory Note (the Note) executed by Defendant Cyber 1 LLC (Cyber 1). The Note was personally guaranteed by Defendants Norman Kravetz and Douglas Jacobsen. It is undisputed that Cyber 1 failed to make a principal payment amount on February 1, 2023 in the amount of $450,000. Cyber 1 has also failed to pay three months of interest on the Note. Under the Note, Lender is entitled to the entirety of the remaining principal balance, plus interest and attorneys fees. On April 26, 2023, Lender filed a complaint against Defendants Cyber 1, Kravetz and Jacobsen alleging (1) breach of contract Note; (2) breach of contract Personal Guarantees; and (3) declaratory relief. II. Evidentiary Objections Defendants Objection to paragraph 4 of the Gurvitz Declaration is overruled. (Evid. Code, §§1221 and 1222.) III. Defendants Request for Judicial Notice Defendants RJN of the White House announcement passing HR Bill 2617 on December 29, 2022 and HR Bill 2882 on March 23, 2024 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c)(official acts of the&executive&departments of the United States&). IV. Discussion A. Legal Standard A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (p)(1).) A party is entitled to summary judgment only if it meets its initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This is true even if the opposing party fails to file any opposition. The court's assessment of whether the moving party has carried its burdenand therefore caused a shiftoccurs before the court's evaluation of the opposing party's papers. Therefore, the burden on the motion does not initially shift as a result of what is, or is not, contained in the opposing papers. ( Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 417, 434435 (landlords failure to address issue of whether they were aware of their tenants marijuana growing operation was not grounds to grant summary judgment where moving party failed to satisfy its initial burden as to the issue); Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1086-1087 (court cannot grant summary judgment based merely on lack of opposition; court must first determine if the moving party has satisfied its burden). In addition, the evidence and affidavits of the moving party are construed strictly, while those of the opponent are liberally read. ( Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.) All doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion (whether there is any issue of material fact [Code of Civil Procedure] § 437c) are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion (i.e., a denial of summary judgment). ( Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 502.) B. No triable issues of fact remain as to the 1 st cause of action for breach of contract and 2 nd cause of action for breach of personal guarantees Lender moves for summary judgment of its entire complaint. Lender alleges three causes of action for breach of contract based on three separate agreements: (1) the Note with Cyber 1; (2) the personal guaranty of the Note executed by Kravetz; and (3) the personal guaranty of the Note executed by Belz. To prevail on Lenders claims for breach of the Note against Cyber 1 Lender must establish: (1) existence of the contract; (2) Lender's performance; (3) Cyber 1s breach; and (4) damages. ( First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Recce (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 731, 745.) To prevail on Lenders claims for breach of Kravetzs and Jacobsens personal guarantees, Lender need only establish that (1) Kravetz and Jacobsen executed an agreement assuming liability for Cyber 1s debt under the Note; (2) Cyber 1, the principal debtor, defaulted on its underlying obligations; and (3) Kravetz and Jacobsen breached their obligation to pay upon default of the Cyber 1. (Civ. Code, §2807; R.P. Richards, Inc. v. Chartered Const. Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 146, 154.) Lender establishes that Cyber 1 executed a Promissory Note on February 15, 2022 whereby Cyber 1 borrowed $4,550,000 from Lender subject to certain explicit repayment obligations. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No.1; Belz Dec., ¶2, Ex. 1.) Lender provided the credit facility as reflected in the Note. (Belz Dec., ¶2.) Lender establishes that under the Note, Cyber 1 was required to pay the principal balance of $4,550,000 in four annual installments: (1) $450,000 on February 1, 2023; (2) $600,000 on February 1, 2024; (3) $1,000,000 on February 1, 2025; and (4) the remaining principal balance on February 1, 2026. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 2; Belz Dec., Ex. 1, ¶1.) On February 15, 2022, Kravetz and Jacobsen also executed separate personal guarantees guaranteeing the Note. (Plaintiffs SSUMF Nos. 9 and 10; Belz Dec., Exs. 2 and 3.) Under their guarantees, Kravetz and Jacobsen promised to pay all principal and interest whenever it became due, including any accelerated balance, upon Cyber 1s failure to pay. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 12; Bezl Dec., Exs. 2-3, Section 1.) In addition, Kravetz and Jacobsen pledged 7.5% each of their outstanding membership interests in Equity Orchestration LLC as collateral for the guarantees. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 14, Ex. 4, Section 1.) Cyber 1 failed to make the first payment due under the Note in the amount of $450,000 on or before February 1, 2023. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 16; Belz Dec., ¶4.) Cyber 1 failed to tender any interest payments from February 2023 to the present. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 18.; Belz Dec., ¶¶6, 9.) On March 21, 2023, Lender sent notice to Defendants of Cyber 1s breach of its obligation to pay the first installment by February 1, 2023 in the amount of $450,000. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 21, Gurvitz Dec., Ex. 5 (Lenders March 21, 2023 Written Notice).) On April 3, 2023, Defendants informed Lender that they could not make the required payments and cure their breach. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 22; Gurvitz Dec., ¶4.) Kravetz and Jacobsen have also refused to tender the collateral as required by the Pledge Agreement in support of their personal guarantees. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 23; Belz Dec., ¶10.) Plaintiff submits evidence that the full amount of the Note ($4,550,000) is due. Plaintiff also submits evidence that there is currently $333,666.77 due in interest. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 19; Belz Dec., ¶¶6-9.) Lender therefore establishes (1) the existence of the Note with Cyber 1 and the personal guarantees with Kravetz and Jacobsen; (2) Lender performance of its obligations by providing Cyber 1 with the $4,550,000 credit facility; (3) Defendants breach of the Note and the personal guarantees based on their failure to make the first payment due on February 1, 2023 and the failure to pay interest within 10 days of receiving notice of their default; and (4) the damages suffered as a result of the breach ($4,550,000 + $333,666.77 = $4,883,66.77). The burden therefore shifts to Defendants to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the first and second causes of action for breach of contract. (CCP §437c(p)(1).) Defendants fail to do so. Defendants fail to raise a triable issue of fact or establish an affirmative defense to the causes of action. i. Defendants defenses based on course of conduct and commercial impracticability fail to raise a triable issue of fact as to the breach element of Plaintiffs first and second causes of action for breach of the Note and breach of the personal guarantees Defendants concede that they failed to make the first principal payment due under the Note and the personal guarantees or interest payments from February 1, 2023 onward. (Defendants Responses to SSUMF Nos. 16-23.) However, they claim they are not in breach due to the parties course of dealing and commercial impracticability. Course of dealing . According to Defendants, in prior dealings involving short term obligations, Plaintiff adjusted these obligations to avoid default. (Defendants Additional Material Fact (AMF) No. 28, Kravetz Dec., ¶11, Ex. C.) Defendants contend they made monthly interest payments until January 2023 on the Note and the personal guarantees, which was consistent with the parties prior course of conduct. (Defendants AMF No. 32; Kravetz Dec., ¶¶38-43; Jacobsen Dec., ¶¶10-15.) Defendants testify that Lenders current actions of putting them in default and filing this lawsuit contradicts Lenders prior course of conduct. (Defendants AMF No. 34; Belz Depo., Ex. M, pp. 44, 49-50; Kravetz Dec., ¶¶2-43; Jacobsen Dec., ¶¶2-15.) Defendants fail to establish that the Note or the personal guarantees were uncertain or indefinite, such that the Court must resort to the parties course of dealing to interpret the contract and determine the obligations thereunder. Defendants rely on California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474 as authority for the proposition that they are not in breach of the Note or personal guarantees based on the parties course of dealing in connection with prior transactions that are entirely unrelated to the Note. California Lettuce Growers is inapposite. In California Lettuce Growers , the defendant argued it was not obligated under the parties agreement to purchase beets delivered to it by plaintiff, because the parties agreement did not specify a price, time and place of delivery and was therefore unenforceable as illusory and void. ( California Lettuce Growers , supra , 45 Cal.2d at 481. Here, Defendants do not argue that the Note or the personal guarantees are illusory and void. The court in California Lettuce Growers resorted to the parties and the industrys course of dealing to fill in the unstated terms of price, time and place of delivery. ( Id. at 483.) Defendants provide no authority for their attempt to use course of dealing to amend clear and definite obligations in an agreement. Commercial impracticability . [W]here performance remains possible, the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability excuses performance of a contractual obligation when performance is impossible or extremely impracticable. A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost. Circumstances that may make performance more difficult or costly than contemplated when the agreement was executed do not constitute impossibility. A party cannot avoid performance simply because it is more costly than anticipated or results in a loss. ( KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Intern., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5 th 1032, 1058-1059 (affirming summary judgment of landlords unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent; defendant failed to present any evidence that cost of paying rent as obligated under the lease could only have been done at an excessive and unreasonable cost due to COVID shutdown).) Defendants submit evidence that they suffered a number of financial setbacks due to the COVID shutdown. (Kravetz Dec., ¶35.) Such arguments have been rejected. ( KB Salt Lake III, LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5 th at 1058-1059; SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5 th 882, 895-896 (impracticability did not apply to excuse lessee from lease payments on health club even though COVID shutdown prevented it from operating the health club, which it maintained was the purpose of the lease).) Defendants fail to establish based on the evidence presented that repaying the Note in accordance with the schedule could only have been done at excessive and unreasonable cost. Defendants do not present evidence as to what they would have had to do to satisfy the payments under the Note. They only state that they suffered severe financial setbacks due to COVID policy. Defendants fail to establish that they were discharged from their obligations under the Note and the personal guarantees due to impracticability. ii. Defendants fail to raise a triable issue as to damages based on offset Defendants argue there are triable issues of fact as to damages, because they are entitled to an offset for the collateral pledged as security for the Pledge Agreement. However, Defendants present no evidence as to the value of the collaterala 15% membership interest in Equity Orchestration LLCnor may the Court assume that the value of such an interest is greater than zero. Defendants therefore fail to raise a triable issue of fact as to the first and second causes of action for breach of contract based on offset. C. No triable issues of fact remain as to Plaintiffs declaratory relief claim and summary adjudication is properly granted as to the third cause of action for declaratory relief In Lenders third cause of action for declaratory relief, Lender seeks an order declaring that Defendants Kravetz and Jacobsen have no right to the Equity Orchestration membership interests and that these interests are the sole and exclusive property of the Lender. (Complaint, ¶40.) Lender contends that, upon Defendants default, right to ownership of the Equity Orchestration LLC membership interests transferred to Lender based on Section 5 of the Pledge Agreement. (Complaint, ¶38.) Lender does not seek a declaratory order regarding the value of the 15% interest in Equity Ownership pledged as collateral for the personal guarantees. Lender establishes that Kravetz and Jacobsen pledged their respective 7.5% membership interests in Equity Orchestration LLC in the Pledge Agreement executed in connection with the personal guarantees on February 15, 2022. (Plaintiffs Separate Statement, Issue No. 3, SSUMF No. 14,. Belz Dec., Ex. 4, Section 1.) As discussed above, Defendants failed to make the first principal payment due under the Note, nor did they pay any interest due from February 1, 2023 onward. (Plaintiffs SSUMF Nos. 17-18; Belz Dec., ¶¶6-9, Ex. 2-3, Section 1.) Lender provided notice of the default to Defendants on March 21, 2023 and Defendants confirmed on April 3, 2023 that they were unable to make the payments. (Plaintiffs SSUMF Nos. 21-22, Gurvitz Dec., ¶4; Ex. 5 (Lenders March 21, 2023 Written Notice).) Kravetz and Jacobsen have also refused to tender their interests as required under the Pledge Agreements. (Plaintiffs SSUMF NO. 23.) However, section 5 of the Pledge Agreement does not automatically grant Lender rights in the membership interests upon Default, nor does it create any obligation on Defendants to voluntarily transfer the membership interests to Lender. (Belz Dec., Ex. 4, Section 5.) Instead, section 5 states as follows: If a Pledgor shall default in payment of any Obligations or be in violation of any provision hereunder or under any promissory note or other document, instrument or agreement evidencing or relating to the Obligations, in each case, after giving effect to any applicable cure period (any such default, a Default), the Pledgee will have all rights and remedies of a secured party after default under the UCC and other applicable law . ( Id. ) Based on the Pledge Agreement, Defendants were not obligated to voluntarily sign over their interests. As Defendants point out in their response to SSUMF No. 24, Lender was entitled to all rights and remedies of a secured party after default under the UCC and other applicable law. Lender filed this action and sought a declaratory order declaring its ownership of the collateral, which it was entitled to do under Section 5. Defendants acknowledge that Lenders action for declaratory relief is a proper exercise of its rights to file an action for judicial foreclosure. (Defendants SSUMF No. 24.) As discussed above, there are no triable issues of fact remaining as to the issue of breach. The undisputed facts establish that (1) Defendants are in default under the Note and the personal guarantees and (2) Lender has exercised its rights under the law to ownership of the collateral based on Defendants default per section 5 of the Pledge Agreement. As such, based on the undisputed facts, Lender is entitled to an order declaring it the owner of the collateral pledge under the Pledge Agreement, a total 15% interest in Equity Ownership LLC. Conclusion Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Based on the undisputed facts, (1) Defendants defaulted on their obligations under the Note and the personal guarantees; and (2) there is currently an outstanding balance of $4,883,666.77. Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff is also the owner of the collateral pledged as security for the personal guarantees executed by Defendants Kravetz and Jacobsena 15% membership interest in Equity Orchestration LLC. No triable issues of fact remain as to any of the causes of action alleged in the complaint.

Case Number: 24TRCV00451 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling HEARING DATE: July 10, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00451 CASE NAME: Raul Rubio; Noemi Rubio v. American Honda Motors Co., Inc., et al. MOVING PARTY: Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Raul and Noemi Rubio TRIAL DATE: Not Set. MOTION: (1) Demurrer Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAIN with leave to amend. More than mere conclusions are required for a successful assertion of the discovery rule to overcome a demurrer based on the statute of limitations where the suit alleges an event more than four years before the suit was filed but lacks any detail on what happened thereafter and when. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On February 2, 2024, Plaintiffs, Raul Rubio and Noemi Rubio (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against Defendants, American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and DOES 1 through 10. On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); and (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5). Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (AHM) now files a demurrer to the FAC. B. Procedural On May 20, 2024, AHM filed its Demurrer. On June 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief. On July 2, 2024, AHM filed a reply brief. II. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiffs proof need not be alleged. ( C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. ( Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, [a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. ( Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿ B. Discussion Preliminarily, this Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition brief does not argue against AHMs contention that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts for each cause of action, but only addresses the statute of limitations issue. i. Meet and Confer Requirement The declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault, Esq., is offered in support of counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Vault declares that she met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiffs counsel regarding the demurrer. However, Vault contends that the parties respective counsels were unable to come to an agreement regarding the grounds for which AHM brings this demurrer. (Declaration of Leanna L. H. Vault (Vault Decl.), ¶ ¶ 2-3.) Thus, this Court finds that the meet and confer requirements have been met. ii. Statute of Limitations AHM first argues that each of Plaintiffs Song-Beverly claims are time barred. T he statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty of merchantability is four years. (CCP § 337, Comm. Code § 2725, Montoya v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495; Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 .) A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (Comm. Code § 2725(b).) While the Song-Beverly Act supplements rather than supersedes the provisions of the UCC, the same four-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under either statute. ( Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3rd 205, 213-24.) The discovery rule of Section 2725(2) also applies to claims under the SBA, such that a cause of action accrues not on the date of sale, but rather when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that the warrantor or its authorized repair facility was unable to fix the warranty-covered defects after a reasonable number of attempts. ( Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.) Plaintiffs allege they purchased the 2017 Acura ILX on October 31, 2016. Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until February 7, 2024, and did not file this FAC until April 19, 2024. As such, AHM argues that on its face, all four causes of action are time-barred. The FAC attaches the Honda warranty, which includes a 5-year, 60,000-mile warranty on the powertrain, which per page 10 of the warranty booklet includes the engine and internal parts of the transmission. The FAC alleges two specific repair history events in paragraphs 22 and 23, both of which mention powertrain concerns at 16,585 and 53,701 miles respectively. Both of these events were alleged to have occurred within the first 3 years after sale, but are more than four years before this lawsuit was filed In their opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does not begin to run from the date of the sale of the subject vehicle, but instead, is tolled. Californias discovery rule delays the start of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers, or is on inquiry notice (i.e., has reason to discover) facts supporting a cause of action. ( Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc . (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry or if they have the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation. ( Id . at 808; fn. 2 provides: At common law, the term injury, as used in determining the date of accrual of a cause of action, means both a person's physical condition and its negligent cause. (emphasis in original).) The discovery rule applies to Lemon Law claims. ( Krieger, supra, 234 Cal.App.3rd at p. 218.) In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, [a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. ( Fox, supra , 35 Cal.4th at 808, citing ( McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 (superseded on limited grounds by Code Civ. Proc. § 340.8(c))(emphasis in original).) When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts for purposes of the accrual of a case of action or application of the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in this case, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable conclusion. ( Broberg v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 912, 921.) In this Courts view, Plaintiffs have failed to allege (as Fox and McKelvey require) the specific facts to show the time and manner of discovery and the inability to have earlier discovered the elements of their cause of action. Here, Defendant argues that the alleged Song-Beverly causes of action occurred at the time of the sale of the Subject Vehicle, on or about October 31, 2016, and that Plaintiffs did not file this action until February 7, 2024. Defendants argument ignores the discovery rule, the allegations of two powertrain complaints within the first 5 years and 60,000 miles after sale, and the conclusionary allegation that Plaintiffs did not discover Defendants wrongful conduct until shortly before filing this Complaint . . . . Plaintiffs included vague and conclusionary statements in their FAC that the discovery rule, Class Action Tolling, and the Repair Doctrine delayed the accrual of their Song-Beverly causes of action. The Class Action tolling allegations in FAC ¶27 contend that the filing of Conti v. American Honda, Case No. 2:19-cv-2160 on March 22, 2019 tolled the statute of limitations here. However, the FAC contains absolutely no details whatsoever as to whether a class was or was not certified, what type of class action was alleged there, as to what claimed defect or defect, and how that other lawsuits pendency bears on the allegations in this case. The Court thus does not base its tentative ruling on the threadbare assertion of the words class action tolling without any specific factual allegations to support that assertion such as when the purported class certification was denied which would of course ended the claimed tolling period. However, Plaintiff has provided at least some factual allegations as to the discovery rule and repair doctrine, as discussed below. The FAC alleges that AHMs Song-Beverly violations occurred, not only at the time of the sale, but also AHMs violations continued as Plaintiffs continued to experience symptoms of the defects despite Defendants representations that the various defects were repaired. (FAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiffs further allege that they discovered Defendants wrongful conduct alleged in the FAC shortly before filing the Complaint in February of 2024, as the subject vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following AHMs unsuccessful attempts to repair them. (FAC, ¶ 26.) But the FAC lacks details as to what happened between October 18, 2019 when Plaintiffs presented the subject vehicle for a powertrain complaint and the filing of suit more than four years later. For example, the FAC lacks any allegation as to what it was that occurred shortly before suit was filed that caused them to discovery AHMs alleged wrongful conduct. The FAC fails to allege the date and circumstances of the claimed belated discovery. The FAC fails to address whether the same alleged defect or symptom reappeared on a particular date or whether that was or was not brought to AHMs or its dealers attention. Instead, the FAC in ¶24 vaguely alleges that Plaintiffs continued to experience symptoms of the defects. If Plaintiffs experienced those symptoms on or before February 8, 2020, more than four years before suit was filed, Plaintiffs will need considerably more and different allegations to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. If plaintiffs allege they had no such symptoms for four years, until shortly before suit was filed, they will need to make more specific allegations as to how a claimed ongoing defect did not manifest symptoms for such a long period of time such that AHM should be responsible for failing to repurchase an apparently long-repaired vehicle. iii. Sufficiency of Allegations AHM also argues that Plaintiffs causes of action are not alleged sufficiently. Plaintiff alleges basic facts bearing on the core Lemon Law duty that if a manufacturer or representative does not service or repair the vehicle to conform with the express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer or representative must replace the vehicle or reimburse the buyer. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2 , subd. (d).) Here, the FAC alleges that the subject vehicle suffered transmission defects and engine defects that were unable to be conformed by AHM or its representatives, but that despite this, AHM failed to replace the vehicle or reimburse Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ ¶ 22-26.) AHM argues that the allegations are pled in a conclusory way. The Court agrees as discussed above. The FAC is barely one step removed from a lawsuit that merely recites the elements of a cause of action by quoting CACI. Because the Court will be requiring Plaintiffs to amend its suit to plead the tolling allegations with greater specificity, the Court encourages Plaintiffs to include a greater factual development of what occurred in the subject vehicles repair history after October of 2019 to support the four causes of action that are pleaded in a vague and conclusionary way. . I II. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, AHMs demurrer is SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend. AHM is ordered to give notice of the ruling unless notice is waived.

Case Number: 23STCV30245 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 17 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 17 TENTATIVE RULING TAE SUNG SHIN vs. GENWORTH LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. Case No.: 23STCV30245 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend to file a FAC is GRANTED. On 12/12/2023, Plaintiff (Tae Sung Shin) filed suit against Genworth Life Insurance Company, Hanmi Bank, Susan Cho, Michelle Kim, and John Kim, alleging: (1) breach of life insurance contract; (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) breach of bank account contract; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) resulting trust; (6) constructive trust; (7) tortious interference with contractual relations; (8) unjust enrichment; (9) common counts; (10) declaratory relief; and (11) injunctive relief. On 4/9/2024, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a first amended complaint (FAC). Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition. Discussion Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to file a FAC. The proposed amendment would clarify existing allegations, would add causes of action against the individual defendants for Elder Abuse, Conversion, and Cancellation of Instrument, and would remove causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Hanmi Bank, and for tortious interference with contractual relations against the individual defendants. The policy favoring leave to amend is so strong that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an amendment unless the adverse party can show meaningful prejudice. ( Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761. ) Here, trial is not until 11/10/2025. Plaintiffs motion is adequately supported by a proposed amended pleading and a substantive explanation as to why the new allegations are necessary. Accordingly, the Court finds no meaningful prejudice would result from granting leave to amend. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend to file a FAC is granted. It is so ordered. Dated: July , 2024 Hon. Jon R. Takasugi Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.

Case Number: 23AHCV00560 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT EBF HOLDINGS, LLC dba EVEREST BUSINESS FUNDING , Plaintiff(s), vs. CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC., et al. , Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23AHCV00560 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR AN ORDER THAT THE GENUINENESS OF DOCUMENTS AND THE TRUTH OF MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION BE DEEMED ADMITTED, AND FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT CORINTHIAN HOSPICE, INC. Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. July 8, 2024 Plaintiff EBF Holdings, LLC dba Everest Business Funding (Plaintiff) moves for an order deeming admitted the genuineness of documents and truth of matters specified in its First Set of Requests for Admission served on defendant Corinthian Hospice, Inc. (Defendant) on October 16, 2023. The motion is unopposed. Where a party fails to timely respond to a request for admission, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) The court shall grant a motion to deem admitted requests for admissions, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Where a party fails to provide a timely response to requests for admission, [i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) The motion is unopposed and there is no dispute that Defendant failed to serve responses to Plaintiffs discovery requests. It also does not appear that Defendant has served substantially compliant proposed responses. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Defendant in the reduced amount of $385, consisting of .5 hours at Plaintiffs counsels hourly rate and a $60 filing fee, payable within 20 days of the date of this Order. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 9th day of July 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Case Number: 24STCV02743 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Case Name: The Access Fund I, LP, et al. v. Dash Radio, Inc., et al. Case No.: 24STCV02743 Matter: (1) Demurrer (2) Motions to Quash Service of Summons (2x) Moving Party: (1) Defendants Dash Radio, Inc. and Kevin Tsujihara (2) Defendants Matt Michelsen, Ron R. Goldie, Scott P. Keeney, and Michael Zeisser Responding Party: Unopposed Notice: OK Ruling: The Demurrer is overruled as moot. The Motions to Quash are granted. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Demurrer The Demurrer of Defendants Dash Radio, Inc. and Kevin Tsujihara to the Complaint is overruled as moot in light of the filing of the First Amended Complaint on July 1, 2024. Motions to Quash Service of Summons Defendants Matt Michelsen, Ron R. Goldie, Scott P. Keeney, and Michael Zeisser seek to quash service of summons due to improper service. A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10(a)(1).) Although the defendant is the moving party, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of demonstrating facts by a preponderance of evidence justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in California. ( In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I and II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110.) Because Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition, they have not carried their burden to show that jurisdiction exists. Thus, the Motions to Quash are granted. Moving parties to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 22STCV24782 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 78 Superior Court of California ¿ County of Los Angeles ¿ Department 78 ¿ ¿ DANIEL CHU , Plaintiff (s) , vs. GRCA2 DEVELOPMENT, LLC , et al., Defendant ( s ) . Case No.:¿ 22STCV24782 Hearing Date:¿ July 1 5 , 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Daniel Chu (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants GRCA2 Development, LLC (GRCA2), Gerry Wiener (Wiener), and CAA General Contractor, Inc. (CAA) , and Cesar Andrino (Doe 1) for breach of contract action arising from renovation defects . Plaintiff alleges that on October 15, 2015, he entered into a Residential Purchase Agreement (RPA) with GRCA2 to purchase real property and improvements located at 2260 Maravilla Drive, Los Angeles, California . ( Compl . ¶ 9.) In sum , Plaintiff discovered material defects in the renovations in 2016 , and the parties settled the dispute pursuant to a Settlement Agreement in which GRCA2 represented t o Plaintiff that GRCA2 had repaired or addressed all matters and defects set forth in the Addenda. ( Id. at ¶ ¶ 18-20.) In August 2021, Plaintiff attempted to settle the property to a third party when Plaintiff discovered that no certificate of occupancy was ever obtained, and discovered evidence that GRCA2 and CAA intentionally concealed the defective renovations. ( Id. at ¶ ¶ 21-23.) CAA now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs claim is barred by a full release of all claims contained in the Settlement Agreement signed in 2016. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and CAA filed a repl y. I I . REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE & EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Plaintiff requests the Court to take judicial notice of the CAA General Contractor Inc. s Articles of Incorporation from the California Secretary of States website. The unopposed request is granted. ( Cal. Evid. Code § 452 (h).) Plaintiff objects to the declaration of CAAs counsel Mark R. Stapke ( Stapke ) on the grounds of lack of foundation and lack of personal knowledge. Objections 1-2 are sustained, objection 3 is overruled as to the statement that Stapke took the deposition of Plaintiff but sustained as to Mr. Chu testified to the following , and objections 4-7 are sustained. II I . LEGAL STANDARD A party may move for summary judgment if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) [I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).) The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if the party does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. ( Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr . (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. ( Avivi , supra , 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) IV . DISCUSSION ¿ CAA argues that it is a licensed general contractor hired by Wiener, who was acting on behalf of GRCA2, to add a pool and do minor interior remodeling of the subject property. It is undisputed that Plaintiff and GRCA2 entered into a settlement agreement , of which CAA was not present throughout its course . Nonetheless , CAA argues that the release contemplated CAA, because it broadly included Wieners present and former agents, subcontractors, and vendors . In support thereof, CAA proffers a shortform handwritten agreement between Plaintiff and GRCA2 dated November 22, 2016 ( Stapke Decl. ¶ 6; Exh . A) , and a longform Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release entered on December 20, 2016 by and between Plaintiff and GRCA2 ( Stapke Decl. ¶ 7; Exh . B ). The Court finds that CAA has not met its prima facie burden that Plaintiff had waived all claims arising from the subject property against it. ( City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 780 n. 58 (citations omitted) [ [T]he defendant bears the burden of raising the defense and establishing the validity of a release as applied to the case at hand. ].) Aside from sustaining Plaintiffs objections to Stapkes declaration, CAA was notably not a named party to any of the releases , nor does CAA properly support its argument that the agreement between Plaintiff and GRCA2 , without a doubt, contemplated CAA as a third-party beneficiary. CAA s reliance on Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn . (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146 and Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159 are not applicable to the issue at hand . As noted by Plaintiff, the parties in Salehi and Winet involved the same signatories to the release. However , the issue here is whether CAA, as a non-signatory to the release s and a non- participant to the negotiations leading to the releases , was intended to be a third-party beneficiary. Even if CAA did meet its prima facie burden, Plaintiffs opposition raises multiple well-founded arguments precluding summary judgment in CAAs favor . First , CAA failed to plead waiver as an affirmative defense in its Answer to Plaintiffs c omplaint. Further, Plaintiff asserts that CAA also did not reference any defense of waiver or release in its written responses to Plaintiffs written discovery. It appears that this defense is being raised for the first time on a motion for summary judgment. As cited by Plaintiff, A party who fails to plead affirmative defenses waives them. ( California Acad. of Scis . v. Cnty . of Fresno (1987) 92 Cal. App. 3d 1436, 1442 .) Second, n otwithstanding the procedural issue , Plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact. The Court agrees that C AA was not specifically named as a third- p arty in the release, and that there is a factual dispute as to whether CAA was implicitly covered by the terms of the releases. CAA describes itself as a general contractor. The release includes GRCA2s and Plaintiffs subcontractors, vendors, assigns, agents, employees, directors, officers, attorneys, predecessors, successors, parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, shareholders, members, and assigns , but there is no language including the category of general contractor. Plaintiff argues a triable issue of material fact exists as to the intent of the release, which did not specify general contractor when it was able to expressly name subcontractors. CAAs motion also does not address Plaintiffs allegations of fraud in inducement to rescind the settlement agreement , which would naturally foreclose any potential applicability to CAA . V . CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, CAAs motion for summary judgment is DENIED . Moving Party is ordered to give notice . DATED: July 12 , 2024 __________________________ Hon. Michelle C. Kim Judge of the Superior Court PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: " Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. " If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line SUBMIT followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsels contact information, and the identity of the party submitting . " Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. " If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

Case Number: 23STCV14015 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPT : 39 HEARING DATE : July 11, 2024 CASE NUMBER : 23STCV14015 MOTION : Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs Isamar Cervantes and Yolanda Rodriguez OPPOSING PARTY: Defendant Kia America, Inc. MOTION Plaintiffs Isamar Cervantes and Yolanda Rodriguez (Plaintiffs) move to compel Defendant Kia America, Inc. (Defendant) to further respond to Requests for Production of Documents, set one (RPD), Nos. 1-3, 7, 18, 20, 22, 24, 30, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 54-56, 65, 73, 75-77, and 85-86. ANALYSIS If the propounding party deems responses to requests for production of documents unsatisfactory, the propounding party may move to compel further responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310.) Plaintiffs allege their 2020 Kia Sorrento vehicle had defects Defendant was unable to repair within a reasonable number of attempts. Plaintiffs, therefore, contend Defendant is liable under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act). Plaintiffs demanded Defendant produce documents about Plaintiffs vehicle and concerning the same make and model of the vehicle. To date, Defendant has produced its sales file, repair orders, and CARFAX history report for Plaintiffs vehicle, copies of a recall and a technical service bulletin that applied to Plaintiffs vehicle, the warranty claim records for Plaintiffs vehicle, communications between Plaintiffs and Defendant, and relevant portions of Defendants service policies and procedures. (See Declaration of Sharon L. Stewart, Exhibits B, D.) Defendant refuses to produce documents about other 2020 Kia Sorrento vehicles. (See Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses, p. 1.) Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery regarding the alleged defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiffs vehicle. Likewise, Plaintiffs are entitled to evidence of Defendants conduct towards other purchasers of defective vehicles, which is pertinent to a finding the manufacturer willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act by failing to adequately repair a vehicle. ( Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1191, 1204.) The court grants the motion to compel further responses. Defendant essentially contends the information Plaintiffs seek about defects in vehicles of the same make and model as Plaintiffs vehicle is irrelevant. In the context of discovery, evidence is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. Admissibility is not the test, and it is sufficient if the information sought might reasonably lead to other, admissible evidence. ( Glenfed Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) As set forth above, information about the same make and model as Plaintiffs vehicle is pertinent to this case. Defendant claims Plaintiffs definition of electrical defect(s) in the RPD is improper. Plaintiffs defined electrical defect(s) as one or more defect(s) within the electrical architecture of the Kia Sorento vehicles equipped with the same electrical architecture as the SUBJECT VEHICLE that can result in (1) loss of power, (2) battery draining, (3) lights dimming or flickering, (4) power windows, doors or locks not working, (5) failure to start, (6) malfunctioning of the instrument cluster, (7) malfunction or failure of the auto start-stop feature (8) malfunction or failure of the engine stop-start (ESS) feature (9) malfunctioning or failure of the fuses, modules, and/or relays; as well as, any other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. (See Plaintiffs Separate Statement, p. 7.) This definition is reasonably particularized, as required: it specifies information about issues with the electrical architecture in Kia Sorrento vehicles. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.030, subd. (c)(1).) Further, even if Defendant objects to this definition, Defendant must, at minimum, identify documents responsive to the RPD that incorporate the definition as Defendant understands it. ( Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901, fn. 3.) The court declines to impose sanctions. The court notes, on February 7, 2024, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs letter regarding Defendants responses to the RPD. (Declaration of Sharon L. Stewart, Exhibit C.) Instead of further engaging with Defendant, Plaintiffs declared the parties at an impasse and filed this motion. Further efforts to informally resolve this dispute may have avoided the need for judicial intervention or, at the very least, may have narrowed the issues before the court, particularly as Defendant did produce some of the documents Plaintiffs seek in this motion, including the documents regarding Defendants policies and procedures. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) Accordingly, a sanctions award would be unjust under the circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).) CONCLUSION AND ORDER Plaintiffs motion to compel further responses to the RPD is granted. Defendant is to produce responsive documents that pertain to vehicles of the same year, make, and model of Plaintiffs vehicle. Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this order and to file proof of service of same.